Lozada, Dennise Endri D.

Torts and Damages

Atty. Caronan W; 7:30-9:30

1. Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. The Court of Appeals (March 14, 1997, G.R. No. 97626)

Facts: Private respondent, Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its General
Manager, Romeo Lipana, filed a complaint for the recovery of the sum of P304,979.74 which
represented the various deposits respondent made in its account with the petitioner, Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by Philippine commercial International Bank, but was
not credited and was instead credited to one Bienvenido Cotas. For a period of one year, Lipana
entrusted several RMC funds, amounting to the sum involved in this case, to Irene Yabut, his
secretary. Unbeknownst to him, Yabut had been transferring the funds to Cotas, his husband,
who also had an account with the petitioners. Yabut would prepare two cash deposit slips, one as
the original that the banks usually keep for their record, and another as a duplicate which would
usually be the copy for the depositor. She would then put her husbands’ name as the account
holder in the original copy but would leave the one in the duplicate empty. The petitioners’ teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate deposit slips,
despite the lack of information in the duplicate slip. Upon realizing the loss of its funds, Lipana
demanded recovery from the bank, which went unheeded, and later on filed a case with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, insisting that the banks negligent acts through one of their
employees was the proximate cause of the loss of the funds. Both the RTC and the CA decided
in favor of the private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of funds.

Held: Yes, the Court held that Mabayad and the bank itself was guilty of negligence. Negligence,
as defined in the case, was the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. In this case, Mabayad was
negligent on validating the deposit slips without checking whether or not all the slips were
properly accomplished. The bank was also guilty of negligence as the manager, even after the
investigation, was not aware of the validation of the blank deposit slips. Furthermore, under the
doctrine of “last clear chance” the bank, through Mabayad, had the last opportunity to avoid any
harm had it observed their procedure properly. The doctrine of last clear chance meant that
where both parties were negligent, but the negligent act of one was appreciably later in time than
that of the other, or when it was impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The Court, however, put a 40%
share of liability on the part of the private respondent under Article 2179 of the Civil Code. The
fact that Lipana failed to realize the loss for a year showed that the lack of vigilance over his
affairs which contributed to the injury he suffered.
2. Jonas Aonuevo vs. Court of Appeals (October 20, 2004, G.R. No. 130003)

Facts: Jerome Villagracia, herein private respondent, was traveling on his bicycle along Boni
Avenue when he collided with petitioner Aonuevo who was then driving a Lancer car owned by
the company Procter and Gamble Phils. Corroborated with the witnesses’ statements that
petitioner was speeding as he made the left turn and collided with Villagracia, both the RTC and
the CA ruled in favor of Villagracia and ordered petitioner to pay for actual damages. Petitioner,
on the other hand, argued that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should also apply in analogy
for non-motorized vehicles. At the time of the incident, Villagracia violated the municipal
ordinance for bike safety equipment and did not register his bike, therefore, violating traffic
regulations. Petitioner insisted that following the said article, Villagracia should then be
considered negligent and at fault and petitioner should then be absolved of any liability for
damages.

Issue: Whether or not the Villagracia acted with negligence per se as directed under Article 2185.

Held: No, the Court found the petition without merit. It was held that violation of a statutory duty
constituted negligence either as a matter of law or as negligence per se. However, such violation
of statute would not render the attachment of negligence per se unless the violation itself was
deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. There should be a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation that was being avoided by the enactment of the regulation. In
this case, the violation of the ordinance by Villagracia was not enough to absolve petitioner for
the tort. The failure of installing the said safety equipment were not the proximate cause of the
injury sustained as shown by the evidences and the petitioners’ admission that he had seen
Villagracia from a good distance of 10 m. He would have avoided any collusion had he been
more vigilant with his driving and not have been speeding.
3. Spouses Bernabe Africa and Soledad Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc (March 31 1996, G.R. No.
L-12986

Facts: Petitioner spouses were one of the families affected by the fire that broke out at the Caltex
service station located at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue. There were conflicting
claims with regard to how the fire started, but it happened while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck to the underground storage of the said service station, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses affecting a lot of people including petitioners who filed for damages and
alleged negligence on the part of the respondents. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
decided that petitioners failed to prove negligence on the part of the respondents and that the
latter exercised due care in the premises with respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied in this case.

Held: Yes, the doctrine was applied to the case. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur pertained to the
principle that “where the thing which caused the injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s want of care.” The burden of
evidence then would shift on the person who had control over the thing and prove that he had
exercised due care and diligence. In this case, the gasoline station was under the control of the
respondents. Considering that gasoline was a highly combustible material, they should be more
cautious on how they handle the material than that which would satisfy the standard due
diligence. The driver of the tank was transferring the gasoline alone, and without assistance.
Moreover, had respondents put a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from spreading
toward its neighbors, they would not have had such an incident which caused more harm to more
people. Indeed, negligence was attributable on the part of respondents.
4. Juan Bernardo vs. M. B. Legaspi (December 23, 1914, G.R. No. 9308)

Facts: Both plaintiff and defendant filed complaints against each other for the hopes of
recovering damages for injuries sustained during an automobile collision. Both plaintiff and
defendant insisted that the other was the negligent in handling his automobile.

Issue: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either parties.

Held: No, both parties were found to be negligent therefore neither could recover. Where it
appeared in a collision that both the parties were equally negligent in the handling of their
automobiles and they equally contributed to the principal occurrence as determining causes
thereof, neither could recover of the other for the damages suffered.
5. Vicente Josefa vs. Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) (July 18, 2014, G.R. No. 182705)

Facts: This case involved a collision that happened between a dump truck, a jeepney and a car.
As a result of the collision, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, among others, was damaged. Upon
investigation by respondent, it was discovered that the truck, driven by Pablo Manojo Bautista
and owned by the petitioner. Respondent then demanded reimbursement for the replacement fees
from petitioner. Josefa refused to pay back respondent which prompted the latter file a case for
damages against the former on account of the negligence in driving the truck that resulted with
the damaging of the post. Petitioner countered the claim and insisted that the complaint was
baseless. The trial court found for the petitioner, holding that respondent failed to prove that the
truck was the one which hit the post as the evidences gathered were mere hearsays. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the mere fact that the truck hit the pole was enough
to make petitioner vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent.

Issues: a. Whether or not truck was the negligent in hitting the post.
b. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply.
c. Whether or not petitioner was vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the civil Code.

Held: a. No, the truck was not negligent. Under the Civil Code, one who damaged another, there
being fault or negligence, was obliged to pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if
there was no pre-existing relation between the parties was called quasi-delict. For quasi-delist to
prosper, the most important thing to consider was whether or not there was connection between
the negligence and the damages done. In this case, although it was admitted, even by the
petitioner, that it was the truck that hit the pole, there was no evidence as to why or how the
accident occurred. Therefore, it could not be properly imputed to the petitioner simply because it
was his truck that hit the pole.

b. Yes, the truck was found to be at fault and negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Under this doctrine, as a matter of common knowledge and experience and in the
absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence, the very nature of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury. In other words, res ipsa loquitur is grounded on the superior
logic of ordinary human experience that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of
the accident itself. The defendants’ negligence then should be presumed and he had the burden to
prove that he did not commit any negligence. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must
show that: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. In this case, the truck was under the full
control of the driver. Hitting the post was not a usual and ordinary accident to happen unless the
truck acted with fault and was negligent.
 c. Yes, Josefa, under the Article 2180, paragraph 5 was vicariously liable under the
registered owner rule. In quasi-delict, the registered owner of the vehicle is the employer of its
driver in contemplation of the law.
6. Salud Villanueva VDA De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina (October 22, 1957, G.R. No. L-
10126)

Facts: It was September 13, 1952, and bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation head out from
Madeo, Cavite and to Pasay, City with 18 passengers on board. At about 2:00 in the morning,
while the bus was traversing the road, one of its front tires burst and the bus began zig-zagging
along the road until it fell into a ditch and overturned. Most of the passengers were able to come
out without help but three passengers, including one Juan Bataclan who was later found to be
petitioners’ husband. The passengers called for help and after half an hour, about ten men came
and one of them was holding a torch fueled by petroleum. When they approached the bus, a fire
started and consumed the bus including the passengers trapped inside. Widowed, the petitioner
filed for recovery of moral, compensatory, and exemplary damages against the respondent. The
trial court awarded the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals endorsed the appeal to the
higher Court.

Issue: Whether or not the fire was the proximate cause of the death of petitioners’ late husband.

Held: No, the Court held that the overturning of the bus was the proximate cause of the death of
the trapped passengers. Proximate cause, as defined by the Court, was that cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, the car was completely
overturned on its back, resulting to the leaking of its gasoline from the bus to the ground. When
the men approached the bus, of which apparently one of them was holding a torch, the fire must
have touched the gasoline-soaked part that lead to the burning of the bus. The leaking was not
unnatural or unexpected, nor was the torch as they were in a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available. The burning of the bus was also attributed to the negligence of the
driver and the conductor. Not only were they speeding, as testified by one of the passengers, but
they did not warn any of the rescuers of the fact that the bus had overturned and a leak may be
present. Rather than staying close to where the accident happened, where they could have smelt
the leak of the gasoline, and therefore directed the people not to bring any lighted torch, they
were only seen walking back and forth on the road. Therefore, the proximate cause for the death
of the passengers was the overturning of the bus.
7. Norman A. Gaid vs People (April 7, 2009, G.R. No. 171636)

Facts: Petitioner Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide for the death
of fourteen-year-old student Michael Dayata. On October 25, 2001, Gain was driving his jeepney
in front of the school and was filled to the seating capacity. According to witnesses, Dayata who
was on the left side of the road raised his hand to flag down the jeepney which was traversing on
the right side of the road. Next thing witnesses saw was Dayata’s feet was pinned down to the
rear wheel of the jeepney, after which he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. When
Mellalos, the conductor for the jeepney, heard that a boy was run over, he jumped out of the
jeepney and carried the body of the victim in a motorcycle. They proceeded to three different
hospitals but Dayata was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy results showed that he died of
cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. The trial court found Gain guilty of reckless
imprudence while the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the homicide was not
resulted by reckless imprudence as he was not driving recklessly during that time. However, he
was still found guilty of simple negligence for not having stopped upon hearing that a boy was
run over.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was guilty of negligence.

Held: No, he was acquitted by the Court on both crimes of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide and simple negligence resulting in homicide. Reckless imprudence consists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The Court found that during the time
before the accident up until the moment of the impact with Dayata, Gain had not acted recklessly
nor with negligence. He was driving slowly and was not able to see Dayata go to the jeepney on
the left side. It was Dayata’s own negligence in trying to catch up with the jeepney to get a ride.
On the other hand, from the moment of the impact to the time that found that a person got hit,
Gain did not immediately stop the jeepney because he did not see anybody go neat his vehicle.
Even assuming arguendo that he was negligent, it must still be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. In this case, it was the head injuries sustained by Dayata at the
point of impact that was the cause of death. Therefore, even at the instance that the jeepney
stopped, Dayata’s life could not have been saved. Therefore, petitioner was acquitted on both
reckless imprudence and simple negligence resulting to homicide.
8. Juan Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-47851 and L-47896, October 3,
1996)

Facts: The Philippine Bar Association (Bar) decided to construct an office building located
Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken by the United Construction Inc, in an
administration basis. However, a strong earthquake hit Manila and the building sustained serious
damages. Petitioners, the ones who also prepared the plans and specifications for the building,
filed for damages against United Construction as the latter was accused of not following the
plans and caused the defects that lead to its partly destructed state. The Commissioner, found
later on, that aside from the earthquake itself, the damages were also caused by the defects in the
plans and specifications prepared by petitioners, deviations and failure from the United
Construction to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building. Moreover,
it was found that the contractors and the architects failed to exercise the required degree of
supervision in the construction of the building. The trial court and the Court of the Appeals both
agreed with the findings of the Commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not an act of God which caused the failure of the building, should exempt
those who are liable from their respective liabilities.

Held: No. It had been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in
producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause
of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God,
he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may
have been occasioned. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of
the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be
either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. The negligence on petitioners, as
well as with United Construction had been established already by the courts.
9. Phoenix Construction Inc. vs The Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L65296, March
10, 1987)

Facts: Private respondent Leonardo Dionisio had a cocktail-and-dinner meeting and was on his
way home in Makati. He had a shot or two and was traversing the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos streets in Bangkal. Makati when his headlights suddenly failed. When he
switched his headlights on bright, he saw a dump truck, registered under the name of the
petitioners, that was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. There were no
lights not any indication of early warning reflector devices and it was partly blocking the way.
Dionisio tried to avoid the collusion by swerving but it was too late and smashed into the dump
truck which resulted to his physical injuries which included the loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Issue: Whether or not Dionisio contributed negligence to the injuries he suffered.

Held: Yes, the court held that Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory and it was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the injury. The court found that the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury was the wrongful or the negligent way the dump truck was positioned. There
was reasonable relationship between the petitioners’ negligence and the respondent’s injuries.
Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
10. Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta (G.R. No. 120027, April 21, 1999)

Facts: Petitioner was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera who got involved in an accident that lead
him to his death. He was riding a motorcycle on the southbound lane of East Service Road in
Muntinlupa when he crashed into the left portion of the truck trailer, which back then, had no tail
lights and only had two pair of red lights on both metal plates. As stated, he died and petitioners
claimed damages arising from his death. Respondents on the other hand refused to do so. The
trial court found for the petitioners, stating that it was respondent’s negligence that was the
proximate cause of Reynaldo’s death. The Court of Appeals, reversed, stating that it was
Reynaldo’s bumping that was the proximate cause of his death.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was guilty of negligence.

Held: Yes, the court denied the petition. Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
In this case, the petitioners insisted that the lack of the trucks tail lights and the insufficient light
on the place of the accident were the reasons for Reynaldo’s death. However, the Court found
that the truck had installed light bulbs at its metal plates which could be seen on the highway. It
was also travelling at a normal speed. On the other hand, the victim was travelling behind the
truck. He was in control of the situation and his motorcycle was equipped with headlights to let
him see what was in front of him. It had been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle were presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidences. In this case, petitioners failed to prove otherwise.