CASE DIGESTS – RULE 3

Case: Manese v. Sps. Velasco, Jan. 29, 2009

FACTS:

 Subject matter of the controversy is the alleged foreshore land in Guisguis, Sariaya, Quezon.
 Respondent Velasco was issued OCT No. P-16783 for the said property by the RD-Quezon Province, based on
Homestead Patent No. 133300. He then sold it to Sylvia Flores and was later on sold to Mildred Christine Flores-
Tantoco.
 Adjacent to the alleged foreshore land is the agricultural land owned by petitioners in this case.
 On Aug. 31, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents,
alleging that the issuance of the homestead patent and the series of transfers involving the same property were
null and void.
 Petitioners also claimed that they were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and use of the
said foreshore land since 1961.
 Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ff. ground: petitioners do not have the legal personality to
file the complaint since the property forms part of the public domain and only the Sol-Gen could bring an action
for reversion or any action which may have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent.
 On June 15, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that petitioners do not have legal
personality to file the complaint. It held that the government, not petitioners, is the real party in interest and,
therefore, only the Sol-Gen may bring an action in court. The CA affirmed the decision, hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are real parties in interest with authority to file a complaint for annulment of title of the
foreshore land.

RULING:

No, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest in this case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure, “a real party interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter
of controversy is foreshore land. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by
lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man.
Actions, such as in this case, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. The action shall be instituted by
the Sol-Gen or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Tanjuatco v. Judge Gako, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2016, March 23, 2009

FACTS:

 The administrative case stemmed from a complaint of petitioner against respondent judge, charging him with
Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment, Gross Partiality and/or Gross Ignorance in connection with a contract
recission case filed with respondent’s court.
 Group of heirs filed the case. Defendants said that the all the parties should be impleaded.

ISSUE: W/N all the co-owners should file the case as indispensable parties.

RULING:

No, the co-owners are not considered as indispensable parties in this case. One plaintiff can file in behalf of the
other co-owners.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Soquillo v. Tortola, G.R. No. 192450, July 23, 2012

FACTS:

 On Mar. 28, 1996, Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. sold to Ramon Jamis a 1,192 sq.m parcel of land (disputed property)
situated in Alubijid, Misamis Oriental. Jamis then sold it to Jorge P. Tortola, respondent.
 Tortola took possession of the property and paid its corresponding taxes. However, the receipts for the
payments still stated Coloso, Jr.’s name.
 Tortola and his family moved to Bukidnon. He left Villaflores as his agent and caretaker of the disputed property.
 Tortola then knew that Coloso and the other heirs of Coloso, Jr. had sought Atty. Pacana’s legal services to
recover the disputed property.
 On Sep. 21, 1993, Coloso and the other heirs of Coloso, Jr. filed an application for free patent with the CENRO of
Cagayan de Oro City to obtain a title over the disputed property. An OCT was covering the disputed property
was issued in favor of the heirs of Coloso, Jr.
 On Oct. 11, 2000, Coloso and the other heirs of Coloso, Jr. executed a notarized deed of absolute sale conveying
the disputed property to Soquillo (petitioner).
 In 2001, Soquillo filed before the MTC a complaint for illegal detainer against Villaflores and his wife. Tortola
then discovered Villaflores’ ejectment from the disputed property. Tortola filed an action for annulment of
title/sale/judgment with prayers for the issuance of injunctive reliefs and award of damages before the RTC.
 The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Tortola, declaring him as the owner and legal possessor of the disputed
property.
 Soquillo appealed the decision to the CA, stating that Tortola was not the real party-in-interest as he sought the
cancellation of a free patent and that the State should have been the real party-in-interest, which the CA denied.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N Tortola is the real party-in-interest

RULING:

Yes, Tortola is the real party-in-interest in this case. The Court stated that in Tortola’s complaint, he alleged prior
ownership of the disputed property and fraud exercised upon him by the heirs of Coloso, Jr. to obtain a free patent and
certificate of title covering the same. The complaint was not for reversion but for the declaration of nullity of the free
patent and title. Hence, Tortola was the real party-in-interest and the complaint was properly filed in his name.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

FACTS:

 On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners).
 On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note 5 in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to
pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand.
However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
 On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of America
(USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney 6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty.
Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents.
 On Sep 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money with
the RTC-Quezon City against the respondents. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, stated that the
filing of the complaint against them was improper as they reside in Bacolod City and petitioners in Los Angeles,
California, USA. The RTC denied the motion of the respondents.
 Respondents filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, claiming that the petitioners’ grant of SPA in favor of Atty.
Aceron notwithstanding, the said complaint may not be filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron
resides, i.e. RTC of QC, explaining that as a representative, Atty. Aceron was not a real party-in-interest in the
case. CA granted the petition and directed the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Aceron is a real party-in-interest in this case.

RULING:

No, Atty. Aceron is not a real party-in-interest in this case. Despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners,
he is not covered under the definition of the real party-in-interest, as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court stated
that “interest” within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree of judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in
interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.

Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file the complaint against the respondents. He
may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real
party in interest.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Guizano v. Veneracion, G.R. No. 191128, September 12, 2012

FACTS:

 This case involves two parcels of land in Barangay Kapihan, San Rafael, Bulacan that Lucia Santos (married to
David Santos) and her brother, Nicasio Bernardino, inherited from their mother.
 Nicasio sold his share of the property, Lot No. 431 consisting of 6,445 square meters, to Dr. Eugenio and his
wife Carmencita. The property was registered on February 22, 1985 under Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT)
No. RT-18578,4 in the name of Emmanuel Guizano, the son of the Guizano spouses.
 Lucia and her husband, for their part, sold a 656 sqm. portion of their land (subject property) in September
1995 to Reynaldo.
 Since the Santoses did not have any documentary proof of ownership over the subject property, Reynaldo
had to rely on the Santoses’ representation that Lucia inherited the land from her parents.
 Thereafter, Carmencita discovered that the property sold to Reynaldo was actually part of the property that
had already been registered in Emmanuel’s name under TCT No. RT-18578 on February 22, 1985. She thus
placed the word “HOLD” on the subdivision plan signed by the geodetic engineer.
 RTC dismissed Reynaldo’s complaint for lack of merit. CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered Carmencita
to convey the subject property to Reynaldo.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the complaint was filed against the real party-in-interest.

RULING:

No, the real party-in-interest is Emmanuel and not Carmencita. The complaint was filed against Carmencita,
despite his knowledge that the subject property is registeresd in Emmanuel’s name.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Ind. Corp., G.R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014

FACTS:

 Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nanette B. Crisologo (Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2)
collection cases before RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-98 and
26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Kok, et. al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was
the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao
City (RTC-Br. 8),  docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same defendants.
 JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologo’s failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or
annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then available to them, rendered
recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since
they were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were not
indispensable parties since their rights over the properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and
executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and absolutely the subject
properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
 JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 applies, no notice to Spouses
Crisologo was required because they were not real parties-in-interest in the case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if
they were, their non-participation in the proceedings was because of their failure to properly intervene pursuant
to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the case before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because Spouses Crisologo
did not perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering the issues in the CA petition moot and academic.

ISSUE: W/N Sps. Crisologo should be recognized as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.

RULING:
Yes, Sps. Crisologo should be recognized as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien. In its ruling,
the Court stated that in an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the
persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Sec. 108 of P.D. No.
1529. In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order
relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. Under Sec. 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The reason behind this compulsory joined of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues,
not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. In the
present case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Sps. Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to
implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013

FACTS:
 Petitioners Rebecca Pacana-Contreras and Rosalie Pacana, children of Lourdes Teves Pacana and Luciano
Pacana, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages.
 Petitioners alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in the family business who hid the business records
and burned and ransacked the family files.
 She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation named “Rovila Water Supply, Inc.”
Upon inquiry with the SEC, the petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with the
respondents as the majority stockholders.
 It was also alleged that the respondents used the name of Lourdes as one of the incorporators and made it
appear in the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a place other than the Pacana residence.
 The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized by Lourdes through a
sworn declaration and special power of attorney.
 During the pendency of the case, Lourdes died.
 Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the petitioners are not the real parties in
interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.
 RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that petitioners are not the real parties in interest
as they are not suing as heirs of their deceased parents.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion to dismiss.

RULING:

Yes. As ruled by the Court in previous cases, mere failure to implead indispensable parties should not amount to
dismissal of the case and the Court shall order the amendment of the pleading. In the present case, the Court
acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed indispensable parties
who should have been impleaded by the trial court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010

FACTS:
 Present controversy arose from a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 378, dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Arroyo.
 Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-
employees at the National Printing Office (NPO), perceiving the said E.O. as a threat to their security of tenure.

ISSUE: W/N the petition qualifies as a class suit.

RULING:
No, the petition does not qualify as a class suit. Under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the requisites of a
class suit are the ff.: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class can fully protect the interests of all concerned. These
requirements must be satisfied in order for a petition to qualify as a class suit.
The Court ruled that the current petition is not a class suit as it was not able to fulfill the requirements laid down
by the law. First, the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, pointed out that there were about 549 employees in
the NPO and only 67 of it were petitioners in this case. Such number comprised only a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed represent. In addition, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
In a past jurisprudence, the Court observed that an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation and in
determining such, the court must consider that: a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the
interest of the other members of the class; b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
class. In another jurisprudence, this Court held that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the
class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper. In the present case, there is an
apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Therefore, the
instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008

FACTS:
 Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog, filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages
against defendants, Sps. Saligumba before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. They alleged that they have been in actual,
open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land in Aklan. The Sps.
Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing in the said land.
 Sps. Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the disputed land.
 Sps. Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence after continuous rescheduling
of their presentation of evidence.
 After a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision. The RTC
declared Sps. Palanogs as the lawful owners of the subject land and ordered Sps. Saligumbas to vacate the
premise and restore possession to Sps. Palanogs.
 A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court, in its Order
dated May 8, 1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision
could no longer be executed by mere motion.
 Thereafter, Monica Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision date August 7, 1987 in
the civil case which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners
Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants.
 Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, in his Answer, stated that the Sps. Saligumbas died while the civil case was
pending and no order of substitution was issued. Hence, the trial was null and void.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the revival of judgment in the civil case and
ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the present case is binding on the deceased parties and on the present petitioners.

RULING:
Yes. Under the express terms of Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, in case of death of a party, and upon
proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere
notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. At the
same time, Atty. Miralles (counsel for deceased spouses) and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to
them to appear, never confirmed the death of the Sps. Saligumba. The Court further stated that it is the duty of the
counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. Failure to comply with his duty under Sec. 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and
the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Regalado v. Regalado, G.R. No. 196919, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
 Petitioner sought reconsideration and asked for leniency in the application of the Rules of Court and asserted
that he was authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of Hugo
Regalado by virtue of SPA attached to the complaint filed together with the motion for reconsideration.
 Respondents opposed the motion and manifested that Hugo Regalado died on April 23, 2008, even before the
challenged decision of the RTC was rendered on May 15, 2008.
 On December 15, 2009, Atty. Miguel B. Albar, counsel of Hugo Regalado furnished the CA with a notice of Hugo
Regalado’s death on April 23, 2008, together with a list of the latter’s legal representatives.
 On October 15, 2010, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, ruling that the authority of petitioner had
ceased effective from the date of death of Hugo Regalado.
 Petitioner argues that he did not lose his right or interest over the case despite Hugo’s death since he is one of
the compulsory heirs. As such, he signed the petition before the CA, not as an agent of Hugo Regalado, but as a
compulsory heir.

ISSUE/S: W/N petitioner’s action survives or is not extinguished upon the death of a party.

RULING:
Yes, petitioner’s action was one for cancellation of title which is a real action affecting as it does title to or
possession of real property. It is an action that survives or is not extinguished upon the death of a party, pursuant to Sec.
1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Under the same Rules, Sec. 16, Rule 3 lays down the procedure that must be observed
when a party dies in an action that survives.
Hugo Regalado passed away on April 23, 2008, but the notice of his death was served to the CA by his counsel
only on December 15, 2009. Although Hugo died as early as the pendency of the proceedings before the RTC, the non-
fulfillment of the requirement before said court is excusable since the RTC rendered a decision on May 15, 2008, or
before the expiration of the 30-day period set by the rule.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
CASE DIGESTS – RULE 4

Case: Sps. Saraza v. Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013

FACTS:
 The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William Francisco (respondent) against Fernando Saraza
(Fernando) and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza) (petitioners).
 Petitioners argue that the filing of the complaint in RTC-Imus, Cavite was not proper. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the filing of the complaint in the RTC-Imus, Cavite was proper.

RULING:
Yes. Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that the
personal actions “may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.” Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite,
the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Phil. Bank of Communications v. Lim, G.R. No. 158138, April 12, 2005

Facts:
 PBCOM filed a complaint against respondents with the RTC of Manila for the collection of a deficiency
amounting to PHP 4,014,297.23.
 Petitioner alleged therein that respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety agreement
dated November 16, 1995 in favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc., that were extended or may be
extended in the future to respondents.
 It was also expressly stipulated therein that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said promissory
note shall be Makati City, ‘to exclusion of all other court’.
 Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, invoking the stipulation
contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to the restrictive/exclusive venue. Trial
court denied it.
 On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged debt was based on the Promissory Note, which had provided
an exclusionary stipulation on venue “to the exclusion of all other courts.”
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the filing of the action on the Surety Agreement in Manila was proper.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the cause of action to recover on the basis of the Surety Agreement is inseparable from
that which is based on the Promissory Note. Under the Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that personal actions
must be commenced and tried (1) in the place where the plaintiff resides, or (2) where the defendant resides, or (3) in
case of non-resident defendants, where they may be found, at the choice of the plaintiff. This rule, however, does not
apply when the law specifically provides otherwise, or when – before the filing of the action – the contracting parties
agree in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties.
A stipulation on the venue does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying or
restrictive words are used in the agreement.
In the present case, the stipulation on the exclusivity of the venue as stated in the promissory note is not an
issue.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Paglaum Mgt. Corp v. Union Bank, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012

FACTS:
 Petitioner Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three
parcels of land located in the Province of Cebu and covered by TCT Nos. 112488, 112489, ND t-68516. Said lots
are co-owned by Benjamin B. Dy, president of petitioner Health Marketing Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech).
 On Feb. 3, 1994, respondent Bank extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of PHP 10,000,000 wherein it
executed three Real Estate Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of respondent.
 The provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out or in connection therewith, originally
stipulates that the venue of all suits and actions arising out or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in
Makati City.
 However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages dated Feb 11. 1994, the stipulation regarding the venue stated
that “all suits and actions arising from these mortgages shall be in Cebu City, Metro Manila, or in the place
where any of the mortgaged properties are located at the absolute option of the Mortgagee”.
 HealthTech defaulted from its obligations to the Bank which then led the two parties to enter into a
Restructuring Agreement, which stated that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith
shall be commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. HealthTech still defaulted from
its obligations, notwithstanding the Restructuring Agreement it entered into with the Bank.
 Due to HealthTech’s default, the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. As the sole bidder,
the Bank was issued a Certificate of Sale. It also filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title.
 Consequently, HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction.
 On Nov. 23, 2001, the Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on different grounds, one of which is improper venue. RTC
granted the motion.
 Petitioner and HealthTech then elevated it with the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage.

RULING:
Yes, Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage. According to
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area
where the property is situated. In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the province of Cebu. Thus,
following the general rule, PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu and not in Makati. However,
an exception to the general is provided under the 2 nd paragraph of Rule 4. According to the Rules, real actions can be
commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is situated in instances where the parties have
previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an
agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that should be followed is that contained in the Real Estate
Mortgages, as contended by the Bank, or that in the Restructuring Agreement , as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech.
The Court ruled that the venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling as it modified the entire
loan obligation. The Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue
stipulation, which applies not only in principal obligation, but also to mortgages. The phrase “waiving any other venue”
plainly shows that the choice of Makati City as the venue of actions arising out of or in connection with the Restructuring
Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Ochoa v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011

FACTS:
 Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding
only on petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed with the RTC of Parañaque
City but not on respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage which was filed in the same
court.
 Case involves petitioners’ mortgaged real property in Parañaque City over which respondent bank was granted a
special power to foreclose extrajudicially.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the sale shall be made exclusively in Parañaque City.

RULING:
Yes, the sale shall be made exclusively in Parañaque City. The Court ruled that extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a
real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135 and as provided in its Section 2, sale cannot be made legally outside of
the province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be
made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in
which the property or part thereof is situated. Therefore, the exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties
and sanctioned by Sec. 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court shall not apply to Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by
respondent bank because the provisions provided under Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial
foreclosure is not.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
CASE DIGESTS – RULE 6

Case: GSIS v. Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010

FACTS:
 Respondent Fernando Caballero was the registered owner of a residential lot in Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato
wherein he built a 2-storey residential/commercial building.
 On March 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia, secured a loan from petitioner GSIS in the amount of PHP 20,000,
as evidenced by a promissory note. They also executed a real estate mortgage over their property as security for
the loan.
 Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with GSIS. Hence, the property was foreclosed and was sold in a
public auction where petitioner is the sole bidder. Petitioner failed to redeem the property within the
designated period which resulted to the cancellation of his TCT and another one was issued in favor of
petitioner.
 Petitioner informed him of the of the consolidation of title in its favor and requested him to pay a monthly rental
in view of petitioner’s continued possession of the property.
 Petitioner then scheduled the property for public bidding where CMTC was considered as the highest bidder.
Respondent’s daughter also participated in the bidding, however, her bid is lower than CMTC’s.
 Petitioner’s TCT was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of CMTC. This led into the filing of Complaint
against CMTC by respondent’s daughter. Petitioner filed their answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim.
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. It also granted petitioner’s counterclaim and
directed Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC. CA affirmed the decision but modified the portion
of the judgment ordering Fernando to pay the rentals.
 The CA ruled that petitioner’s counterclaim is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim which requires the
payment of docket fees in order for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner’s counterclaim is compulsory or restrictive; and W/N the RTC can acquire jurisdiction over
it.

RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA’s view that petitioner’s counterclaim is permissive. In its ruling, the Court laid
down the tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or restrictive: a) are the issues of fact and law raised
by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? B) would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? C) will substantially the same evidence support or refute the plaintiff’s
claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim? and d) is there any logical relation between the claim and counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
In the present case, the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is
entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC’s rent
payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the
consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do, because
it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since the petitioner failed
to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Calibre Trading Inc. v. Bayer Phils., G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010

FACTS:
 Petitioner was one of Bayerphil’s distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within Pangasinan and Tarlac.
 On July 31, 1989, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to petitioner after the latter failed to settle its unpaid
accounts.
 Petitioner then accused Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating
Calibre’s accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply
goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business through a suit for damages.
 Bayerphil, through its Answer with Counterclaim, denied its alleged wanton appointment of other distributors,
reasoning that it could not be faulted for a difference in treatment between a paying dealer and a non-paying
one. It also prayed for the collection of petitioner’s unpaid accounts.
 Petitioner moved to strike out the counterclaim, stressing that the issues of between the damages suit it filed
and Bayerphil’s counterclaim for collection of sum of money are totally unrelated.
 The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed Bayerphil’s counterclaim as it is considered as a permissive
counterclaim and that respondent failed to pay the docket fees.
 CA reversed the decision, stating that petitioner does not have a valid cause of action against Bayerphil. It also
stated that Bayerphil’s counterclaim is compulsory as it arose from the same dealership agreement as
petitioner’s basis for its claims.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether Bayerphil’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.

RULING:
Bayerphil’s counterclaim is permissive. Its suit may independently proceed in a separate action. Although the
rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each
other are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. There was also no logical relationship between the two
actions in a way that the recovery or dismissal of plaintiff’s suit will establish a foundation for the other’s claim. The
counterclaim for collection of money is not intertwined with or contingent on Calibre’s own claim for damages, which
was based on the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence.
However, even if Bayerphil’s counterclaim is considered as permissive, the Court ruled that the trial court erred
in dismissing Bayerphil’s counterclaim for non-payment of docket fees. The Court further stated that Bayerphil has never
evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It has always argued that
Calibre’s contention that its counterclaim was permissive ever since the latter opposed Bayerphil’s motion before the
RTC to implead the Sebastian spouses. It is a settled doctrine that “although payment of the prescribed docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the
docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period.” In the present case, the trial court had jurisdiction over
the counterclaim although it erroneously ordered its automatic dismissal. The trial court should have instead directed
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable time.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Sps. Mendiola v. CA, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012

FACTS:
 Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products by Pacific Management &
Development which belongs to petitioner Ramon Mendiola.
 To secure Pacific’s performance executed on Aug. 1, 1985 a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their
real estate and its improvements located in Municipality of Parañaque, Rizal.
 Pacific defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in Apr.
1987. They received information regarding the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the auction to be
conducted.
 Petitioners learned that Tabangao’s winning bidder bid of P670,000 had topped Shell’s bid of P600,000. After
application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of P170,228.00 remained and was
not paid by petitioner Ramon. Shell sued in the RTC Manila to recover deficiency.
 In petitioner’s answer with counterclaim, he asserted that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage had
been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action were made in bad
faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
 Petitioners commenced in the RTC Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure wherein defendants
Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal, citing several grounds. RTC Makati denied the motions of
both petitioners and defendants. It also averred that petitioners’ failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in
Manila case already barred the action.
 Petitioner appealed with the CA, which affirmed the RTC Manila’s decision and finding that he was guilty of
forum shopping for instituting the Makati case.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Makati case could prosper independently of the Manila case.

RULING:
No. In its ruling, the Court stated that the Makati case is barred and should be dismissed on ground of res
judicata and waiver. In the Manila case, petitioner Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the
filing of the action had been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
His pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the Makati case was identical to the
compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila case.
Case law had laid down the four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, and these are
the following: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and counterclaim? Accordingly, the Court stated that the four test were met as far as the
Makati case is concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioners’ credit purchases
under the distributorship agreement with Shell. Hence, the Makati case was already barred by res judicata as it met the
following elements: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be,
between the first and second action, identity of the parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

Petition dismissed.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Philtranco Service Enterprises v. Paras, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012

FACTS:
 In this case, petitioner appeals the decision of the CA which affirmed RTC’s ruling and awarded moral, actual,
and temperate damages, and attorney’s fees and costs of suit, to respondent Paras.
 Respondent Paras was figured in a vehicular accident on Feb. 9, 1987 while on board a bus operated by
petitioner Inland. The bus which bumped it is owned by petitioner Philtranco.
 Due to the accident, Paras needed to undergo 2 operations. In relation with this, he filed a complaint for
damages based on breach of contract of carriage against Inland in which Inland denied responsibility.
 Inland then filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and its driver. It sought for exoneration of its
liabilities to Paras, asserting that the latter’s cause of action should be directed against Philtranco considering
that the accident was caused by the driver’s lack of care, negligence and reckless imprudence.
 The RTC granted the third-party complaint and ordered for Philtranco and its driver, as third-party defendants to
pay actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees to Paras.
 Upon appeal, the CA modified RTC’s ruling and added payment of temperate damages, and attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the payment of
damages by Philtranco to Paras.

RULING:
No. In its ruling, the Court stated that impleading Philtranco and its driver through the third-party complaint
was correct, in accordance to Sec. 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. The requisites for a third-party action are: (1) that the
party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action; (2) that the claim against the third-party defendant must
belong to the original defendant; (3) the claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant must be based
upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and, (4) the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-
party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
Paras’ cause of action against Inland did not need to be the same as the cause of action of Inland against
Philtranco and its driver in the impleader/third-party complaint. It is a settled that a defendant in a contract action may
join as third-party defendants those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiff’s claim against him, or even directly
to the plaintiff. Nor was it a pre-requisite for attachment of the liability to Philtranco and its driver that Inland be first
declared and found liable to Paras for the breach of its contract of carriage with him.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Soriente v. Estate of Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009

FACTS:


CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MIDTERMS)

BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111