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Real Life Accident - Inaction of OOW Leads To Collision of Two Vessel in Good Weather and Visibility PDF
Real Life Accident - Inaction of OOW Leads To Collision of Two Vessel in Good Weather and Visibility PDF
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At about 0515, vessel A’s lookout alerted the OOW to a vessel on his starboard side.
The OOW determined that the vessel was overtaking his ship on a course of
around 090 degrees and would pass 3 or 4 cables clear down his vessel’s starboard
side. He attempted to plot vessel B’s radar target, but was unsuccessful: he did not
take a visual bearing of the vessel.
Some 17 minutes later, the two vessels were less than 3 NM from each other and
on a collision course. At about this time, or soon after, the lookout on Vessel A
warned the OOW for a second time about the other ship on their starboard side.
As the distance between the two ships further reduced, the lookout alerted the
OOW for a third time to the presence of the other ship.
The OOW started to alter his vessel’s heading slowly to port; he predicted that this
adjustment would increase the passing distance of the two ships. Shortly
afterwards the lookout shouted for the OOW to ‘do something’. The OOW now
realized that a collision was imminent. He put the steering controls into manual
mode and turned the helm hard to port. Meanwhile, vessel B’s watchkeeper first
saw vessel A very close on his port bow but was unable to take avoiding action in
the short time now available to him.
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Some of the findings of the official report were:
* Vessel A’s OOW did not establish that vessel B was on a steady bearing, and that
his was the give-way vessel. The inaction of vessel A’s OOW showed a total
disregard for the safety of his vessel and his shipmates. Despite his experience
and knowledge of the Colregs, he made an unfounded assumption that vessel B
would pass clear of his vessel.
* Vessel A’s OOW did not assess the situation correctly initially, or reconsider his
assessment when the situation did not develop as he expected. Even in the
scenario that he had imagined, he was willing to accept a CPA that was much less
than specified in the Master’s night orders.
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* The complacent attitude of vessel A’s OOW, his misplaced belief in his ability to
assess the risk of collision by eye, and his underestimation of the chance of
encountering another vessel at close quarters combined to prevent him from
taking the necessary actions to prevent the collision.
* Vessel B’s watchkeeper did not post a lookout or set the watch alarm, and
instead relied on his ability to maintain an effective lookout on his own.
* In choosing to take the watch alone and not setting the watch alarm, the
watchkeeper on vessel B demonstrated extremely poor judgment, systematically
overcoming each of the safeguards that should have been in place for keeping an
effective navigational watch.
* The lack of regard of vessel B’s watchkeeper for his primary roles as lookout and
officer in charge of a navigational watch can only be assessed as complacent.
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Why would you alter course to Port as the giveway vessel? Is it not one of the first and first
things you are taught in the COLREGs?
Should have taken early action to avoid a close quarters situation developing. Altering
course slightly starboard when the vessel was spotted could have completely avoided the
collision
A prudent mariner should always consider the safety of the crew, the ship, the cargo, and
the marine environment.
The article is very informative and useful particularly in classes wherein COLREG is being
taught. This will also increase the students safety awareness in keeping a proper look-out.
Look-out is look-out and NO other duty should be assigned to him except keeping a proper
look-out.
esperidion catabay says: April 16, 2014 at 1:08 pm
Vessel B's oow was also neglect of duty. Rule 17 Stand on vessel may take action if it becomes
clear that the give way vessel is not taking appropriate action. Vessel B should give the signal
that she's in doubt and alter course to starboard.
The incident clearly shows that, unmanned designs actually requires some level of human
attention. The problem was experienced because both of the OOWs on watch keeping
believed so much on the auto pilot.
It is dificult to understand that with such advance technology such as ARPA that ships can
still collide in any weather condition or has the standard of training deteriorated that much.
Maybe the IMO should take a look at the standards and adjust accordingly.
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