This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been
fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIA.2017.2774767, IEEE
TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION FROM LOW VOLTAGE SIDE WITH
LIMITED GENERATION – POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND
PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS – A CASE STUDY
Copyright Material IEEE
Paper No. PCIC-(do not insert number)
Gautami Bhatt, P.E.
Member, IEEE
Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals
3000 Post Oak Blvd.
Houston, TX 77056
USA
gnbhatt@bechtel.com
Abstract – A large existing delta-wye step-down
transformer was proposed to be temporarily used as a
step-up transformer and energized from the low voltage
wye winding by multiple small diesel generators to
accelerate commissioning activities by utilizing existing
temporary generation. This paper is a case study that
discusses the associated power system constraints
created by this proposed modified power system
configuration. The modified power system configuration
resulted in an ungrounded HV system created by the
transformer’s delta winding which required HV system
modifications to create a grounded system. Additionally,
the existing power system had generation and load flow
constraints, and had protection and coordination
constraints that needed to be maintained to supply the
existing loads. Also, the inrush current resulting from the
transformer energization needed to be evaluated and
compared to the generator’s short time current rating.
Finally, modifications to the protection and coordination
settings resulting from the modified power system
configuration, and confirmation that the arc flash incident
energy levels were acceptable after implementation of
modified settings were required.
Index Terms — interconnect transformer, diesel
generator, ungrounded system, reverse power flow,
transformer inrush current, transformer energization,
generator short time current rating, inrush restraint
I. INTRODUCTION
Diesel generators were provided to supply power to the
temporary power system and supply the associated
construction power and man camp loads during the early
phases of the construction of a multi-train liquefied natural
gas (LNG) facility. This international facility was designed
in accordance with IEC standards and is a 50 Hz system.
A 33 kV-11.55 kV, 13 MVA, delta-wye, step-down
transformer was designed and installed to allow the
permanent plant gas turbine generators (GTG) to provide
power to the temporary power system after the GTGs
were commissioned. This would allow the diesel
generators to be shutdown which would avoid diesel fuel
consumption and the associated premium costs due to a
remote project site location.
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Transactions on Industry Applications
Terry Tadlock, P.E. Dragan Ristanovic, P.E.
Senior Member, IEEE Senior Member, IEEE
Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals
3000 Post Oak Blvd. 3000 Post Oak Blvd.
Houston, TX 77056 Houston, TX 77056
USA USA
trtadloc@bechtel.com dristano@bechtel.com
Due to project schedule changes and desire to
accelerate commissioning activities, an opportunity was
identified to utilize the 13 MVA step-down transformer in
reverse operation to backfeed, or step-up, from the
temporary power system to the permanent power system.
Implementing this scheme presented several technical
challenges.
Firstly, utilizing the delta-wye resistance grounded step-
down transformer in a step-up configuration creates an
ungrounded high voltage system. Section II of the paper
discusses the concerns with the ungrounded high voltage
(HV) system and modifications to the HV system to create
system grounding.
Additionally, the system short circuit current in this
modified configuration was much lower than the minimum
short circuit currents on which the system protection
settings were originally based. They were comparable to
the expected transformer inrush current that the system
may see during transformer energization. Section III of the
paper discusses the power system generation and load
flow constraints, and protection and coordination limits.
Also, energizing the 13 MVA transformer with much
smaller 2.08 MW diesel generators (DG) presented the
challenge of large transformer energization while avoiding
nuisance tripping of the DGs which were already in
service and supplying power to the construction power
system. Section IV of the paper discusses transformer
energization and inrush currents. This section also shows
the results of the software simulation of the transformer
energization and the effect of this energization on the
diesel generators.
Section V demonstrates the relay logic and interlocks
implemented to avoid nuisance trip on inrush. This section
also shows the new protection settings implemented for
the modified system configuration. Section VI discusses
re-evaluation of system arc-flash incident energy levels to
ensure personnel safety. Section VII shows actual results
of transformer energization in the site conditions.
II. SYSTEM GROUNDING
A. Planned power system configuration
During the initial phases on the project, diesel
generators were being used to supply power to the 11 kV
temporary power system and supply the associated
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construction power and man camp loads. During normal
operation, three (3) diesel generators were running with
two (2) additional diesel generators available for peak
loading and redundancy. Each 11 kV diesel generator is
rated at 2.08 MW. Also during this initial phase, the 33 kV
permanent power system was not energized and there
was no interconnection between the 11 kV temporary
power system and the 33 kV permanent power system.
After the GTGs were commissioned and ready to
accept load, there was a planned interconnection between
the 33 kV permanent power system and the 11 kV
temporary power system. As shown in Fig. 1 for this
planned configuration, the GTGs, represented by GTG,
would supply power via its generator step-up transformer,
ET-GSU, to the 33 kV switchgear ES-33. The 33 kV
switchgear would supply power to the permanent plant
commissioning loads and would supply power to the 11
kV temporary power system, ES-11, via the delta-wye
step-down transformer ET-1, which was used to
interconnect the permanent power system and the
temporary power system. The 11 kV temporary power
system would then supply the existing construction power
and man camp loads. At that time, the diesel generators
would be turned off (CB-DG opened) which would save
fuel costs.
Fig. 1 Planned Power System Configuration
B. Modified power system configuration
Due to project schedule changes and desire to
accelerate commissioning activities, an opportunity was
identified to utilize the transformer ET-1 in reverse
operation to backfeed, or step-up, from the 11 kV
temporary power system to the 33 kV permanent power
system.
To support this opportunity, modifications to the
planned power system configuration would be necessary.
These modifications include that the diesel generators,
DG1 thru DG5, would continue to supply the 11 kV
temporary power system, which means CB-DG would
remain closed. The 11 kV temporary power system, ES-
11, would continue to supply the existing construction
power and man camp loads. Additionally, the diesel
generators would supply power to the 33 kV permanent
power system by backfeeding the ET-1 transformer. The
commissioning loads connected to the 33 kV power
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system would then be energized. Also, these
modifications to the planned power system configuration
include that the GTGs and the associated generator step
transformer ET-GSU would not be energized and,
therefore, the generator incomer breaker CB-GSU would
be open.
By reviewing Fig. 1, it can be seen that the 11 kV
neutral grounding reference can either be developed by
the diesel generator’s 100 A neutral grounding resistor, by
the ET-1 transformer’s 100 A neutral grounding resistor,
or by both operating concurrently. Also, by reviewing Fig.
1, it can be seen that the 33 kV neutral grounding
reference can only developed by the ET-GSU generator
step-up transformer’s 400 A neutral grounding resistor.
However, since CB-GSU is open, the generator step-up
transformer and its associated neutral grounding resistor
are not connected to the 33 kV permanent power system.
This results in an ungrounded 33 kV permanent power
system.
C. Ungrounded HV System
An ungrounded system is a system where there is no
intentional connection to ground. Since the generator
incoming breaker, CB-GSU, is open, the 33 kV permanent
power system, ES-33, has no intentional connection to
ground and is thus an ungrounded system. However, in
any power system, there exists capacitive coupling
between the system components, i.e. cables, generator
windings, motor windings, transformer windings, etc., to
ground. This has the effect of establishing the neutral
reference point via capacitive coupling to ground.[1]
In a steady state, balanced and unfaulted power
system, the neutral reference point will float at ground
potential. However, in the event of a line to ground fault,
the system’s voltage triangle shifts such that, and
assuming no fault impedance, the voltage of the faulted
phase to ground is 0 V. The line-to-ground voltage of the
other two phases becomes equal to the line-to-line
voltage. Fig. 2 shows a phasor representation of the
normal unfaulted condition and shows a phasor
representation of a single line-to-ground fault condition
from reference [1]. An ungrounded system can continue
to operate with a single line-to-ground fault without
protection operation. Only when a second line-to-ground
fault occurs or a line-to-line fault occurs will protection trip
and isolate the faults.[1]
Fig. 2 “Effect on line-to-ground voltages of a single line to
ground fault on an ungrounded neutral system” [1] D.
Beeman Fig. 6.4 pg 343
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Transactions on Industry Applications
The equipment used for the 33 kV permanent power
system consists of 38 kV rated gas insulated switchgear
suitable for 38 kV line-line voltage and 21.9 kV line-neutral
voltage. The cables used for the 33 kV permanent power
system are rated 19/33(36) kV which are suitable for a
maximum line-line voltage of 36 kV and a maximum line-
ground voltage of 20.7 kV. This includes the 1220 m
cable that connects transformer ET-1 to the 33 kV
switchgear ES-33. In this configuration, if a line to ground
fault were to occur, the line-ground voltage of the
unfaulted phases would become equal to the line-line
voltage of 33 kV. The equipment and the cables are not
rated for this magnitude of line-ground voltage. Insulation
breakdown due to the overvoltage would occur which
would permanently damage the insulation and could result
in flashover. Further, the fault could propagate to a line-
line-ground fault and cause high magnitude unrestricted
ground fault currents. [1]
D. Modification to HV System to create grounding
In order to avoid damaging the insulation of the
equipment and cables, and to limit ground fault current
magnitudes in the event of a fault, the system must be
resistance grounded. There are multiple methods
available to establish the neutral grounding reference on
the 33 kV permanent power system. These include adding
a grounding transformer or replacing transformer ET-1 so
that the system ground is established when backfeeding
the transformer. Both these methods involve adding a
neutral grounding resistor so that the 33 kV system
neutral point is physically connected rather than
capacitively coupled to the ground potential.
For the application described in this paper and to avoid
the purchase of additional equipment or replacement of
existing equipment, an innovative solution was evaluated.
This innovative solution utilized the neutral grounding
resistor of the generator step-up transformer ET-GSU to
establish the neutral grounding reference. Fig. 3 shows
the modified power system configuration with diesel
generators supplying power to the system.
To implement this, the 11 kV cable connection between
the GTG and its generator step-up transformer ET-GSU
was disconnected and isolated at the transformer so that
the GTG could not be backfed. This is represented in Fig.
3 by the open switch between GTG and ET-GSU. With
circuit breaker CB-GSU closed, the 33 kV permanent
power system is now grounded by the ET-GSU generator
step-up transformer’s 400 A neutral grounding resistor.
Under normal conditions, no current will flow through ET-
GSU. During ground faults, the zero sequence current will
flow through the system to the ET-GSU neutral grounding
resistor and the magnitude of the ground fault current will
be limited to 400A. Additionally, the ground fault current
can now be detected by system relaying and the
appropriate breaker tripped to isolate the ground fault.
As seen in Fig. 3, there are two 33 kV circuit breakers,
CB-33 and CB-GSU, between the 33 kV delta winding of
interconnect transformer ET-1 and the ET-GSU generator
step-up transformer’s 400 A neutral grounding resistor. If
either of these breakers were to be opened or tripped, the
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33 kV neutral grounding reference would be lost. Since it
is important to ensure the system is grounded at all times,
interlocks are implemented in the system to ensure
intertrip of source circuit breaker CB-11 if either of the two
33 kV circuit breakers, CB-33 and CB-GSU, open or trip.
Details of these interlocks are beyond the scope of this
paper.
The modified power system configuration now has two
transformers, rated 13 MVA and 20 MVA, connected in
series that need to be energized from relatively small
sized 2.08 MW diesel generators. Moreover, the ET-1
energization is from the low voltage side of the
transformer which increases the current and the ET-GSU
energization is over a long cable which increases the
system impedance.
Additionally, the applications of using transformer ET-
GSU to develop the 33 kV neutral grounding reference
and using transformer ET-1 in a step-up application when
it was designed for a step-down application were
reviewed with the transformer manufacturer. The use of
transformer ET-GSU in this application was approved
without restriction and without any impact on equipment
warranty. The use of transformer ET-1 in this application
was conditionally approved and without any impact on
equipment warranty. The condition of approval for
transformer ET-1 was that it could not be used in an
application where it would experience generator load
rejection since it had not been designed as a generator
transformer.
If a transformer that has not been designed as a
generator transformer is subjected to load rejection, there
is a risk of transformer core saturation due to over-fluxing
caused by high voltage transient during load rejection
which could cause transformer damage or insulation
degradation. However, by review of Fig. 3, it can be seen
that there are two circuit breakers, CB-DG and CB-11,
between DG1 thru DG5 and transformer ET-1 which
would trip and isolate the transformer and protect it from
experiencing generator load rejection.
Prior to implementation, a design review was performed
for the proposed modified power system configuration and
included representatives from Engineering, Construction,
Commissioning, and Operations, and included members
from both the engineer of record and the client/owner.
The results of the design review was that the modified
power system configuration was approved for
implementation.
Fig. 3 Modified Power System Configuration
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POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
A. Generation and Load Flow Constraints
Although the interconnect transformer is rated for the
total generation capability, the amount of load the
temporary power system can supply to the permanent
power system while still supplying its construction power
and man camp loads had to be determined in order to
define the load limit for commissioning activities. The total
generation capability of the system is 5 x 2.6 MVA which
is 13 MVA. The system limit also depends on medium
voltage motors that need to be started as part of the
permanent plant commissioning activities. This analysis is
done using power system simulation software and it is
found that the modified power system configuration can
support a maximum of 5 MVA of permanent plant load
including capability of starting the 2 medium voltage
motors required for commissioning activities which results
in requiring five (5) diesel generators to be running. The
details of the associated power system analysis
performed to obtain these results are beyond the scope of
this paper.
While the diesel generators may be adequately rated to
supply electrical power in the steady state condition, it is
necessary to verify their short term capability during
transformer energization. According to the diesel
generator data sheet, generator rated stator current is
equal to 137 A, with the short time rating of 786 A. The
total short time rating of five diesel generators running in
parallel is 5 x 786 A = 3,930 A.
B. Protection and Coordination Constraints
The minimum and maximum short circuit currents of the
modified power system configuration are required to
determine appropriate protection settings of the modified
system. The original protection settings of the system
were based on the planned power system configuration
and modified protection settings are to be determined.
The minimum short circuit of the modified power system
configuration is based on 2 diesel generators running and
is found to be 1.148 kA at the 11 kV bus and 0.305 kA at
the 33 kV bus. The maximum short circuit of the system
is based on maximum diesel generators running and is
found to be 7.743 kA at the 11 kV bus and 1.396 kA at the
33 kV bus.
III. TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION AND
INRUSH
A. Transformer Energization and Inrush
When a transformer is connected to a power source
and energized, a transient current flows known as the
magnetizing inrush current. This current lags the applied
voltage by 90 degrees electrical. This transient current
flows because of the difference in the pre-energization flux
of the transformer and the steady-state flux. [2]
The magnitude of inrush current is variable and
depends on conditions of energization. If the transformer
is energized at the positive peak voltage, there would be
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little inrush current and exciting currents would be 2% to
5% of the full load current. If the transformer is energized
at the zero crossing voltage, the peak current during first
magnetization can range between 8 to 30 times the full
load current. This event can last from 10 cycles to as long
as 1 minute in highly inductive circuits. [3]
In the modified power system configuration, the ET-1
transformer is being applied and energized in the reverse
direction from the low voltage side, transformer inrush can
be higher than expected. In fact, when a core-type
transformer is energized from the low voltage side, the
inrush currents may be double the inrush current when
compared to inrush current upon energization from the
high voltage side. [2] Knowledge of transformer design
details is important when an accurate value of transformer
inrush is required [2].
The transformer manufacturer was contacted to obtain
details of the transformer design and expected inrush
values when energizing the transformers from the low
voltage side. The manufacturer provided design data are
used in transient magnetizing simulation discussed in the
next subsection. The inrush current provided by the
transformer manufacturer is based on zero-crossing
voltage, assumes a zero impedance source and is
conservative for the system design.
As seen in section III of the paper, the maximum short
circuit result of the new system is 7.743 kA at 11 kV and
1.396 kA at the 33 kV bus, the estimated inrush current for
the 13 MVA transformer provided by the manufacturer is
5.109 kA at the 11 kV side and for the 20 MVA
transformer it is 1.664 kA at the 33 kV side. With the
maximum fault currents and estimated inrush currents
within comparable range, it is important to obtain a more
realistic estimate of the actual inrush when the
transformers are energized from the actual diesel
generators rather than the zero impedance source. This is
also critical because the impact of this energization on the
source diesel generators should be analyzed to evaluate
the impact on the diesel generators and determine if
diesel generator short time rating is adequate for
transformer energization. The transformer energization
simulation is discussed in the following subsection.
B. Transformer Energization Simulation
Before the modification is implemented, the magnitude
of the expected inrush current, the expected decay in
inrush current over time, and its effect on the temporary
power system diesel generator should be evaluated. This
is achieved with the help of a switching transient analysis
software model to simulate transformer energization. The
details of how to perform such analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper. An example of how to develop a
software model to perform the transformer switching
transient simulation is given in reference [6].
Design details of the transformers and diesel
generators are obtained from the respective suppliers and
applied as input to the analysis. Several scenarios with
different number of diesel generators running were
simulated to validate the model. The scenario to be
implemented involved energizing both the transformers
ET-1 rated 13 MVA and ET-GSU rated 20 MVA from five
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diesel generators. The results of that case are shown IV. PROTECTION
below in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
A. Challenges in determining new settings and
coordination

The magnitudes of short circuit current for the modified

power system configuration are significantly lower than
their corresponding values for the planned power system
configuration. The minimum and maximum short circuit
currents of the original system design are 8.36 kA and
35.6 kA at the 33 kV bus. The protection settings of the
planned power system configuration are based on those
short circuit currents and need to be modified for proper
protection.
The challenges in determining new protection settings
of the system are as follows:
Fig. 4 Expected Inrush current at 11 kV 1) The high harmonic content in the current during
transformer energization contains dc currents that decay
slowly and can cause CT saturation and nuisance trip of
sensitive protective functions applied on the transformer
or adjacent equipment [4].
2) The magnitude of the modified system short
circuit currents are comparable to the expected
magnetizing inrush currents of the transformers. Table 1 is
a comparison of the fault currents with the peak inrush
current as tabulated in Table 1. The settings should be
such that the overcurrent functions protect for the fault
current but do not trip on transformer inrush current.

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF FAULT CURRENTS AND
Fig. 5 Expected Inrush current at 33 kV EXPECTED PEAK TRANSFORMER INRUSH
CURRENTS
Bus Minimum Maximum Estimate
Based on the switching transient analysis, the following Fault current Fault current d Total
is estimated for the system: (kA) (kA) Peak
1) Magnitude of the peak inrush current when Inrush
energizing both transformers in series from the Current
diesel generators is 2.115 kA on the 11 kV side. (kA)
Duration of decay to fully dissipate is approximately 11 kV 1.148 (L-L) 7.743 (3 PH) 2.115
5 seconds (full-scale of x-axis in Fig. 4). bus
2) Magnitude of the peak inrush current when 33 kV 0.305 (L-G) 1.396 (3 PH) 0.798 a
energizing both transformers in series from the bus
a
diesel generators is 0.798 kA on the 33 kV side. Inrush current for the 13 MVA transformer does not flow through
Duration of decay to fully dissipate is approximately the 33 kV secondary circuit.
1 second (full-scale of x-axis in Fig. 5).
3) The diesel generators in the temporary power
The short time rating of 3,930 A for five diesel system were already in service and supplying power to
generators running in parallel is greater than the the associated construction power and man camp loads.
maximum expected peak inrush current of 2,115 A, with The new settings should coordinate with the existing
sufficient margin of 3,930 A – 2,115 A = 1,815 A at the 11 settings of the temporary power system such that the
kV level to supply the running loads in the temporary diesel generators do not trip for a fault due to the
power system. The short time generator rating is interconnect transformer. A trip of the diesel generators
considered adequate for transformer energization. will disrupt service to construction power and man camp
Based on the switching transient analysis, it is found loads and impact the ongoing construction activities which
that the system should be capable of energizing the potentially would impact the project schedule.
transformers. The transformer inrush current waveform is 4) The arc-flash incident energy levels with the new
used in the next section for proper protection of the settings should be within acceptable levels for personnel
transformer. safety. The system arc flash incident energy levels without
modifications for the protection settings causes the time
taken to trip longer. This increases the system incident
energy to unacceptable levels.

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B. Avoiding trip on inrush breaker CB-DG. This is discussed in further detail in

subsections C and D.
Industrial power transformers are typically furnished The transformers that are being energized, ET-1 and
with differential protection that is fast operating and set to ET-GSU, have dedicated relays for transformer differential
pick up for small magnitudes of in-zone fault currents. and restricted earth fault protection with harmonic block
nd
Magnetizing inrush currents are seen as in-zone faults by and harmonic restraint function that is set to detect 2
th
the relays. The leading component of the harmonics in the and 4 harmonics and is utilized with a maximum time
inrush current is the second harmonic component which delay of 0.9 seconds to avoid transformer differential
forms about 25% of the fundamental value [5]. Many of functions tripping during a non-fault inrush condition.
the modern microprocessor relays have inrush detection Although all sensitive differential functions will not trip
function that detects inrush condition based on harmonic during energization, it should be noted that the
content in the current flowing through the system. This overcurrent relays need to be set for the new lower fault
feature in the relay is available for some of the relays in currents that are comparable to the expected inrush.
the system and will be used in implementation of the Relay logic that is implemented in the transformer
modified protection scheme to avoid trip due to inrush differential relays is utilized as an interlock for the
current. overcurrent relays over a communication link. This
The temporary power system relays that are already in interlock would block tripping of the overcurrent relays
service have inrush detection function that has not been during a non-faulted inrush condition for a maximum of
utilized because it wasn’t required for the original system 0.9 seconds. This ensures the overcurrent functions do
design. The differential relays for transformers ET-1 and not trip due to inrush. The actual settings are discussed in
ET-GSU, and overcurrent relay from the 11 kV feeder subsections C and D.
breaker CB-11 have inrush detection function. The
overcurrent relays for the 33 kV circuit breakers CB-33 C. Phase Overcurrent Protection
and CB-GSU do not have harmonic detection function.
Since the temporary power system is already energized Fig. 6 shows the power system with protective devices
and serving construction and camp loads, disrupting its and relays identified. Fig. 7 shows the phase overcurrent
service due to trip on inrush should be avoided. In order to protection settings implemented in the interconnect
do that, the current transformers to unit protection relays transformer 33 kV side for the modified system.
need to be checked for adequacy for saturation against
the inrush. In this case, the generator differential
protection relay is the only unit protection relay in the
temporary power system for which this verification is
needed.
In normal operation, the existing temporary power
system has three generators in service and two are out of
service. Each diesel generator has generator differential
protection relay receiving input from a 200/1, 0.1PX 15 R
0.5 current transformers (CTs). For a peak inrush current
of 7.743 kA, the current is divided equally among the three
generators as 2.581 kA. Accounting for the CT ratio, the
current seen by the CT secondary circuit is 12.905 A. With
an internal resistance of the CT as 0.5 Ohms, the
secondary voltage developed due to peak inrush will be
6.45 V where the knee voltage of the CT is 15 V. It is
Fig. 6 Power system with protective devices and relays
found that the current transformers for generator
identified
differential protection are adequately rated and that the
differential function will not trip on inrush due to CT
saturation.
Further, the phase and ground overcurrent protection
settings of the diesel generator incomers should
coordinate with the relay for CB-11 such that the CB-11
circuit breaker is always the first to trip. Although this
feature may impinge upon the ability to actualize the
modified scheme, the likelihood of system black out
should be avoided
To ensure that in the event of energization, the diesel
generator incomers do not trip, the harmonic restraint
function in the overcurrent relay for CB-11 is also not
utilized. The phase and ground overcurrent settings of the
CB-11 overcurrent relay are set to coordinate with the
diesel generator incomer overcurrent relay on circuit

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to coordinate with the existing setting of diesel generator

incomer.

D. Ground Fault Protection

The ground fault relay setting of the 11 kV feeder relay

in the system CB-11-RELAY should be set in a way that it
meets below criteria:

1) It should coordinate with the existing ground fault

settings of the temporary power system.
2) It should be set high enough to avoid trip on zero
sequence component of the magnetizing inrush
current.

Fig. 9 shows the ground fault protection settings

implemented in the modified configuration.

a. When coordinating settings on a system with

multiple sources, the relay curves need to be
Fig. 7 Phase Overcurrent Coordination Curve – 33 kV multiplied with the appropriate factor to
circuit account for contribution from each source.
1) The inrush curve is plotted on the time current Each diesel generator incomer is set to
curve to avoid tripping of phase overcurrent operate at 30 A, 300 ms. This setting will be
functions when inrush current has reduced from its maintained to avoid DG shutdown to modify
peak value but still significant enough to cause and test new settings.
relay misoperation. The peak inrush current b. With three diesel generators operating, all
provided by the transformer manufacturer is also three diesel generator incomers will trip if the
plotted on the curve as a point to avoid trip on total zero sequence current is 90A (3 x 30 A
inrush. per DG).
2) Discrimination and selectivity on the interconnect c. If five diesel generators are operating, all five
transformer has been sacrificed due to the diesel generator incomers will trip if the total
intertrips implemented in the system that would zero sequence current is 150A (5 x 30 A per
initiate trip of all interconnect breakers to avoid an DG).
ungrounded system. d. The CT ratio of the 11 kV feeder is 1250:1 and
0.1 is the minimum pickup available for the
relay. The 11 kV feeder ground fault setting is
set at 125 A (0.1 pickup) with a time delay of
100 ms to coordinate with the source relay
setting with five diesel generators in service.

Fig. 8 Phase Overcurrent Coordination Curve -11 kV

circuit
Fig. 9 Ground fault protection coordination
Fig. 8 shows the phase overcurrent protection settings
implemented on the 11 kV circuit breaker CB-11-RELAY

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This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIA.2017.2774767, IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications

Therefore, five diesel generators are required if existing
temporary power system settings are to be maintained.
The increase in the number of generators also increases
the system capability to meet the reactive power demand
during inrush condition. Five generators are also required
for motor starting of the medium voltage motors in the
permanent power system, the details of which are beyond
the scope of this paper.
V. RE-EVALUATION OF SYSTEM ARC
FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY LEVELS
Before implementation of the modified protection
settings and energization of the transformer, it is critical to
re-evaluate the system for arc-flash incident energy levels
to ensure personnel safety. Although the fault currents in
the modified system are low, the incident energy levels
may be higher due to much slower relay trip times at the
lower fault currents or fault currents that were below the
pickup values of the original protection settings. The
system is re-evaluated for incident arc-flash energy levels.
This analysis was done using a power system simulation
software. Relay settings of permanent power system that
were going to be commissioned as part of the modified
power system configuration are also part of this
evaluation. After modifications to system protection
settings, the analysis confirms the incident energy levels
are within acceptable levels and are bounded by existing
arc flash incident energy levels and PPE requirements.
be expected since the actual energization may occur on
any point on the voltage waveform while the simulation is
done for the worst case energization at the voltage zero
crossing.
The relay recorded a distorted current waveform with
second harmonic content which is expected during
transformer energization. Since the inrush current is a
non-symmetrical event and different inrush magnitudes
occur in different phases, the relay recorded the presence
of the zero sequence current component. Zero sequence
component of less than 10 A occurred for both, residual
element IGW2, and the direct measurement by IN1 from
the ground CT in the transformer neutral.
The voltage waveform presented in Fig. 10 shows the
sag expected during transformer energization. The
voltage peak dropped to 84.6 % of the nominal value in
the first cycle after energization and recovered to 95% by
the fifteenth cycle.
Similar waveforms were captured on the 33 kV side
where measured peak inrush was equal to 370 A, which is
less than the expected 798 A obtained by simulation for
the worst case energization scenario at voltage zero
crossing simulation presented in Fig. 5 in Section IV B.
Due to modifications in protective relay settings
explained in Section V and implemented prior to
transformer energization, the relays did not trip during the
energization.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions can be made from this case

VI. FIELD RESULTS FROM TRANSFORMER study:
ENERGIZATION 1. An ungrounded system can cause severe power
system problems including overvoltage and stress
on equipment insulation. Grounding the system to
After the anticipated inrush currents have been
avoid such conditions and to limit the ground fault
analyzed as described in Section IV and relay settings
currents to reasonable limits is important.
and interlocks have been modified as presented in
2. When energizing transformers with small or
Section V for the new temporary system configuration, the
comparable sources:
transformer backfeed energization from five parallel diesel
a. It is preferred to ramp the system voltage
generators was successfully implemented.
from low voltage to system voltage while
Transformers ET-1 rated 13 MVA and ET-GSU rated 20
the transformer is connected. This would
MVA were energized in series, and transformer protection
reduce the undesired effects of high
relay at ET-1 captured the 11 kV side waveforms as
inrush currents on system voltage
shown in Fig. 10
sources and sensitive protective devices.
However, in this application, existing
loads had to remain energized and this
was not an option.
b. Effect of energization on source voltage
should be evaluated.
c. Effect on high harmonic content on
current transformers and sensitive
differential protection settings need to be
evaluated to avoid tripping due to
Fig. 10 Waveforms and signals at the 11 kV side during energization.
transformer energization d. Harmonic restraint feature within the relay
that block operation in the event of inrush
From Fig. 10, the peak inrush equal to 1,020 A occurred should be utilized where available.
in phase A, which is less than the expected maximum e. Transformer energization is a non-
inrush of 2,115 A obtained by simulation presented in Fig. symmetrical event with transient currents
4 in Section IV B. Such difference between the actual far exceeding the normal system currents.
peak inrush and the maximum simulated peak inrush can Analysis of the impact of transformer

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This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIA.2017.2774767, IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications

inrush on protective relay functions is [8] G. Bhatt, T. Tadlock, D. Ristanovic, “Transformer

necessary, and implementation of relays energization from low voltage side with limited
with inrush restrain feature may be generation — Power system constraints and
required to avoid nuisance trips during protection considerations — A case study,” in Proc.
transformer energization. 2016 Petroleum and Chemical Ind. Tech. Conf.
3. When modifying power system configurations from (PCIC), Philadelphia, PA USA, pp. 1 - 9, DOI:
their original design, system studies, short circuit 10.1109/PCICON.2016.7589246
studies, protection settings, arc flash analysis need
to be revalidated to confirm implementation of the
scheme and identify power system operating limits,
if any.
4. When potential exists to interconnect the
temporary and permanent electrical systems in a
bidirectional manner, such interconnection should X. VITAE
be evaluated and, if determined beneficial,
incorporated in early stages of the design process. Gautami Bhatt received her B.Tech from the Jawaharlal
Considerations for the design of interconnected Nehru Technological University in 2009 and M.E.E from
systems are further explained in reference [7]. the University of Houston in 2010. In 2011 she joined
Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals Inc. in Houston as an
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS electrical engineer with responsibilities including power
system analysis and protective relaying studies. She is a
The authors would like to thank Ajit Tiwari from Bechtel member of the IEEE and serves as the Co-Chair for the
Oil, Gas & Chemicals for his valuable comments. The IEEE Industry Applications Society Houston Section. She
authors would also like to thank Todd Turner and Kevin is a registered Professional Engineer in the state of
Hackart from Powertech Services for performing the Texas.
transformer energization simulation.
Terry Tadlock received his B.S. in Electrical
IX. REFERENCES Engineering from the University of Washington, and
received his M.S. in Systems and Engineering
[1] D. Beeman, Editor, Industrial Power Systems Management from Texas Tech University. He joined
Handbook, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Bechtel Corporation in 1992 and has worked on various
Company, Inc. 1955 types of projects including Power, Telecommunications,
[2] Electrical Transmission and Distribution Reference Mining, Petrochemical, Coal Gasification, and Liquefied
Book, ABB Power T&D Company Inc., Raleigh, Natural Gas projects. He is currently an Electrical
North Carolina 1997 Principal Engineer with Bechtel Oil, Gas & Chemicals
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Principles and Applications, New York, NY: Taylor protection and control applications. He is an IEEE Senior
& Francis Group, LLC 2006 Member and a member of the Industry Applications
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nd
Currents on Sensitive Protection Functions, (32 states of Texas and Washington.
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2005) Dragan Ristanovic (S’01, M’03, SM’12) received
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Power Systems, Vol.10, No. 3, August 1995 Texas A&M University in College Station in 2003. He has
[6] I. Hassan, H. V. Nguyen and R. Jamison, Analysis 17 years of experience in the industry. He worked for 4
of Energizing a Large Transformer from a Limited years as electrical engineering consultant on power grid
Capacity Engine Generator, IEEE Power projects in the Middle East performing substation design,
Engineering Society Winter Meeting, Pg. 446 - 451 relay coordination studies and relay testing and
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State of Texas and RPEQ in Queensland.

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