Campos vs.

People of the Philippines GR 187401, Sept 17, 2014

REYES, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos
(Campos) to assail the Decision  dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution  dated February 16, 2009 of the
1 2

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos for
fourteen (14) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as The
Bouncing Checks Law.

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated
checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments.  Fourteen of these checks
3

drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office, however,
were dishonored when presented for payment, particularly:

Check No. Date Amount

138609 August 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138610 August 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138615 November15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138616 November30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138617 December15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138618 December31, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138622 February28, 1996 ₱3,333.33

₱46,666.62

The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account." 4

After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P.
22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned.
5

On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14)
counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of
₱46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full
payment.

With costs.

SO ORDERED. 6

Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the RTC
of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion for
reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit. 7

Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008 its
decision  affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied
8

via a Resolution  dated February 16, 2009. Hence,this petition for review on certiorari which cites the
9

following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH REGISTERED

MAIL IS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.

2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS’] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF THE

CHECKS’ DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR
PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND TO LEND
SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS’] CASE. 10

Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s issuance
that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a notice of
dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a
supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also
invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her
obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.

The petition lacks merit.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 11

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from
FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor,  although not as an
12

element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second
element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds,  as it reads:
13

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her
personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of
the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court
has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover
registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or
served on issuers of checks.  The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order
1âwphi1

for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to
predicate the existence of the second element of the offense. 14

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that
she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she
issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her
petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made
arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the
checks."  Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of
15

dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts  dated January 13,
16

1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for
payments in various amounts ranging from ₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had. not
received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for
Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently
disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been
fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.
Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the
trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While
Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during
the trial,  it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances,
17

the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of
Campos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Chua vs. People of the Philippines, GR 196853, July 13, 2015

 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Robert Chua (Chua) was charged with 54 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22
(BP 22) for issuing checks which were dishonored for either being drawn against insufficient funds or
closed account.

Factual Antecedents

Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different
dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts to
See pursuant to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate, to wit:

PSBANK CHECK NO. DATED AMOUNT

1 018062 December 25, 1993 Php300,000.00
2 018061 December 23, 1993 Php350,000.00
3 017996 December 16, 1993 Php100,000.00
4 017992 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00
5 017993 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00
6 018138 November 22, 1993 Php 6,000.00
7 018122 November 19, 1993 Php 13,000.00
8 018120 November 18, 1993 Php 6,000.00
9 018162 November 22, 1993 Php 10,800.00
10 018069 November 17, 1993 Php 9,744.25
11 018117 November 17, 1993 Php 8,000.00
12 018149 November 28, 1993 Php 6,000.00
13 018146 November 27, 1993 Php 7,000.00
14 006478 November 26, 1993 Php200,000.00
15 018148 November 26, 1993 Php300,000.00
16 018145 November 26, 1993 Php 7,000.00
17 018137 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
18 017991 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
19 018151 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
20 017962 December 08, 1993 Php150,000.00
21 018165 December 08, 1993 Php 14,000.00
22 018154 December 07, 1993 Php100,000.00
23 018164 December 07, 1993 Php 14,000.00
24 018157 December 07, 1993 Php600,000.00
 25 018161 December 06, 1993 Php 12,000.00
26 018160 December 05, 1993 Php 12,000.00
27 018033 November 09, 1993 Php 3,096.00
28 018032 November 08, 1993 Php 12,000.00
29 018071 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
30 018070 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
31 006210 October 21, 1993 Php100,000.00
32 006251 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
33 006250 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
34 017971 October 13, 1993 Php400,000.00
35 017972 October 12, 1993 Php335,450.00
36 017973 October 11, 1993 Php464,550.00
37 006433 September 24, 1993 Php520,000.00
38 006213 August 30, 1993 Php100,000.00
39 017976 December 13, 1993 Php100,000.00
40 018139 December 13, 1993 Php125,000.00
41 018141 December 13, 1993 Php175,000.00
42 018143 December 13, 1993 Php300,000.00
43 018121 December 10, 1993 Php166,934.00
44 018063 November 12, 1993 Php 12,000.00
45 018035 November 11, 1993 Php 7,789.00
46 017970 November 11, 1993 Php600,000.00
47 018068 November 18, 1993 Php 7,800.00
48 017956 November 10, 1993 Php800,000.00
49 018034 November 10, 1993 Php 7,116.00
50 017907 December 1, 1993 Php200,000.00
51 018152 November 30, 1993 Php 6,000.00
52 018067 November 30, 1993 Php 7,800.00
53 006490 November 29, 1993 Php100,000.00
54 018150 November 29, 1993 Php 6,000.00 1

However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to
insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks.
Hence, See filed on December 23, 1993 a Complaint  for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the
2

City Prosecutor of Quezon City. He attached thereto a demand letter  dated December 10, 1993.
3
In a Resolution  dated April 25, 1994, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the
4

filing of charges against Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.

Proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court

During the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its evidence  the demand letter
5

dated December 10, 1993 marked as Exhibit "B."  Chua, however, objected  to its admissibility on
6 7

the grounds that it is a mere photocopy and that it does not bear any proof that he actually received
it. In view of these, Chua filed on April 14, 1999 a Motion to Submit Demurrer to Evidence.  Per 8

Chua’s allegation, however, the MeTC failed to act on his motion since the judge of said court
vacated his post.

Several years later, the prosecution filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation of Prosecution’s
Evidence and Motion to Allow Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence  dated 9

March 28, 2003. It averred that while See was still trying to locate a demand letter dated November
30, 1993 (which it alleged to have been personally served upon Chua), the prosecution nevertheless
decided to rest its case on February 24, 1999 so as not to further delay the proceedings. However,
sometime in February 2002, See decided to have his house rented out such that he emptied it with
all his belongings and had it cleaned. It was during this time that he found the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993.  The prosecution thus prayed that it be allowed to submit a supplemental offer
10

of evidence to include said demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as part of its evidence. Again,
the records of the case bear no copy of an MeTC Order or Resolution granting the aforesaid motion
of the prosecution. Nevertheless, extant on records is a Formal Offer of Evidence  filed by the
11

private prosecutor submitting the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as additional evidence. In
his objection thereto,  Chua averred that the papers on which the demand letter dated November
12

30, 1993 are written were given to him as blank papers. He affixed his signature thereon purportedly
to give See the authority to retrieve a car which was supposed to serve as payment for Chua’s
obligation to See. In an Order  dated November 18, 2005, the MeTC refused to take cognizance of
13

the supplemental formal offer on the ground that the same was filed by the private prosecutor
without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Be that as it may, the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 eventually found its way into the records of this case as Exhibit "SSS." 14

Later, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence.  It again pointed out that the
15

demand letter dated December 10, 1993 attached to See’s affidavit-complaint is a mere photocopy
and not accompanied with a Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Most
importantly, it does not contain Chua’s signature that would serve as proof of his actual receipt
thereof. In view of these, the defense surmised that the prosecution fabricated the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 to remedy the lack of a proper notice of dishonor upon Chua. At any rate,
it argued that while the November 30, 1993 demand letter contains Chua’s signature, the same
should not be given any probative value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly
received the same. Hence, there is simply no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the
law affords an issuer to make good the check from the date of his notice of its dishonor.

In an Order  dated January 12, 2007, the MeTC denied the defense’s Demurrer to Evidence. The
16

Motion for Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied in an Order  dated May 23, 2007. Hence,
17

the trial of the case proceeded.

In a Consolidated Decision  dated May 12, 2008, the MeTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation
18

of BP 22 after it found all the elements of the offense obtaining in the case. Anent Chua’s receipt of
the notice of dishonor, it ratiocinated, viz.:
 xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sen[t] a written notice of
dishonor of the subject check to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In
fact, the defense stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter and the signature
of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter. x x x In view of that stipulation, the
defense is now estopped [from] denying its receipt thereof. Although there was no date when
accused received the demand letter x x x the demand letter was dated, thus it is presumed that the
accused received the said demand letter on the date reflected on it. It has been said that "admission
verbal or written made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not
require proof."x x x

[In spite of] receipt thereof, the accused failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement
for its payment "[w]ithin five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the said checks have not
been paid by the drawee bank. As a result, the presumption of knowledge as provided for in Section
2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 which was the basis of reckoning the crucial five (5) day period was
established.19

Hence, the dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused Robert Chua GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, of fifty four (54) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby
sentence[s] him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each case and to restitute to
the private complainant the total amount of the face value of all the subject checks in these cases
with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the informations until the full amount
is fully paid and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

Aggrieved, Chua appealed to the RTC where he argued that: (1) the complaint was prematurely filed
since the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 had not yet been sent to him at the time of filing
of the Complaint; (2) the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 has no probative value since it
lacked proof of the date when Chua received the same; and, (3) since Chua was acquitted in two
other BP 22 cases involving the same parties, facts and issues, he should likewise be acquitted in
the present case based on the principle of stare decisis.

In a Decision  dated July 1, 2009, the RTC likewise found all the elements of BP 22 to have been
21

sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment;

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause ordered the
bank to stop payment.
As to first element, the RTC held that the evidence shows that Chua issued the checks in question.
Next, on the basis of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 bearing Chua’s signature as proof
of receipt thereof, it was likewise established that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds
with the drawee bank at the time he issued the checks, thus, satisfying the second element. It
expounded:

Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of
funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. x x x

In the present case, a demand letter (Exh. "SSS") was sent to accused-appellant informing him of
the dishonor of the check and demanding he make good of the checks. The prosecution offered this
in evidence, and the accused’s signature thereon evidences his receipt of the said demand letter.
Accused-appellant argues that there is no proof that he received the same considering that there is
no date on his signature appearing on the document. But as borne out by the records of the
proceedings, the defense even stipulated in open court the existence of the demand letter. x x x

Thus, considering that the demand letter was dated November 30, 1993, the reckoning of the crucial
five day period was established. Accused failed to make arrangement for the payment of the amount
of check within five-day period from notice of the checks’ dishonor.22

Finally, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the third element when
it presented a bank employee who testified that the subject checks were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds or closed account.

Anent the defense’s invocation of the principle of stare decisis, the RTC found the same inapplicable
since there is a distinction between the present case and the other cases where Chua was
acquitted. In the instant case, the prosecution, as mentioned, was able to establish the second
element of the offense by way of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 duly received by
Chua. Whereas in the other cases where Chua was acquitted, there was no proof that he received a
demand letter.

Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated May 12, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 23

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)

Before the CA, Chua argued against the probative value of the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 by pointing out that: (1) for more than 10 years from the time the case was filed, the
prosecution never adverted to its existence. He thus surmised that this was because the document
was not really missing but in fact inexistent – a mere afterthought as to make it appear that the
second element of the offense is obtaining in the case; (2) the subject demand letter is not a newly
discovered evidence as it could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence;
and, (3) his counsel’s admission of the physical existence of the subject demand letter and Chua’s
signature thereon does not carry with it the admission of its contents and his receipt of the same.

Unpersuaded, the CA, in its November 11, 2010 Decision  brushed aside Chua’s arguments in this
24

wise:
x x x [A]s aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, See could not have waited for a decade just to
fabricate an evidence against petitioner. The contention that petitioner’s counsel was tricked by the
prosecution into stipulating on the admissibility of the demand letter is without basis. Once validly
entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced
especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy.
When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be
relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts,
and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a
particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the
court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. 25

And just like the MeTC and the RTC, the CA concluded that the prosecution clearly established all
the elements of the offense of violation of BP 22. Ultimately, it ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated
July 1, 2009 and order dated October 30, 2009 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 26

Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  but the same was denied in a Resolution  dated May 4,
27 28

2011.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURTS THAT THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISHONORED
CHECKS HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
CHECKS UPON THEIR PRESENTMENT, BASED MERELY ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
DATE OF THE PREPARATION OF THE LETTER IS THE DATE OF RECEIPT BY THE
ADDRESSEE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DEMAND LETTER
DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1993 AS A NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 29

The Parties’ Arguments

Chua asserts that the second element of the offense charged, i.e, knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, was not proved by the prosecution. He
argues that the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds only arises
after it is proved that the issuer actually received a notice of dishonor and within five days from
receipt thereof failed to pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. Here, the
date when Chua allegedly received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was not established
by the prosecution. Citing Danao v. Court of Appeals,  he thus contends that since there is no date
30
of receipt from which to reckon the aforementioned five-day period, the presumption that he has
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise.

In any case, Chua argues that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 is not a newly
discovered evidence. He points out that a newly discovered evidence is one which could not have
been discovered even in the exercise of due diligence in locating the same. In this case, See claims
that he only found the letter after having his house cleaned. This means that he could have found it
early on had he exercised due diligence, which, however, was neither shown by the prosecution.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), avers that Chua’s contention that there is no proof of the date when he actually received the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 involves a factual issue which is not within the province of
a certiorari petition. As to the matter of whether the subject demand letter is a newly discovered
evidence, the OSG calls attention to the fact that the MeTC, RTC and the CA all considered the said
document as a newly discovered evidence. Hence, such finding deserves full faith and credence.
Besides, Chua was correctly convicted for violation of BP 22 since all the elements of the offense
were sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

Our Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The issues raised by Chua involve

questions of law.

The OSG argues that the issues raised by Chua involve questions of fact which are not within the
province of the present petition for review on certiorari. The Court, however upon perusal of the
petition, finds that the issues raised and the arguments advanced by Chua in support thereof,
concern questions of law. "Jurisprudence dictates that there is a ‘question of law’ when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand,
there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve
the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or
not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question
posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual."31

Chua raises two issues in this petition, to wit: (1) whether the MeTC, RTC and the CA correctly
applied the legal presumption that Chua has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time he
issued the check based on his alleged receipt of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 and
his failure to make good the checks five days from such receipt; and (2) whether the said courts
correctly considered the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as newly discovered evidence. As
to the first issue, it is not disputed that the subject demand letter, while bearing the signature of
Chua, does not indicate any date as to his receipt thereof. There being no disagreement as to this
fact, the propriety of the conclusion drawn from the same by the courts below, that is, the date of the
said letter is considered as the date when Chua received the same for the purpose of reckoning the
five-day period to make good the checks, clearly refers to a question of law. Similarly, the second
issue is one concerning a question of law because it requires the application of the provision of the
Rules of Court concerning a newly discovered evidence. 32
Nevertheless, assuming that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that
factual findings of the lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions.
One of these exceptions is when the lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. The Court
finds the said exception applicable in the instant case. Clearly, the petition deserves the
consideration of this Court.

The prosecution failed to prove all the

elements of the offenses charged.

In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential
elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment."  "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove
33

as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of

insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount
of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. 34

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the
absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993
prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other
hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual receipt of the subject demand letter is
not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter
(November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s
counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such
stipulation, they all held that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,  the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual
35

receipt of the notice of dishonor, viz.:

In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a person liable
under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It
must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew ‘at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment.’ Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section
2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

‘SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer
knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and,
within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for
its payment."

Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity
to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this
Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer
of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer,
then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period."  (Italics in
36

the original, emphasis supplied)

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22
of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the
demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption
provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently
denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported
demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for
another purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his
actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to
present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It
must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor]
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused."  "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
37

existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases,

however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22
cases, there should be clear proof of notice"  which the Court finds wanting in this case.
38

Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel, the MeTC stated:

In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to stipulate
as to the existence of the demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected on the face of
the demand letter. x x x

xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of
dishonor of the subject checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In
fact, the defense stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter and the signature
of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter. x x x In view of that stipulation, the
defense is now estopped in denying its receipt thereof. 39

As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the
existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. In no way can an admission of
Chua’s receipt of the demand letter be inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered
estopped from claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes that Chua’s admission with respect to
his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his claim that See made him sign blank papers
where the contents of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.
In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently
prove the existence of the second element of BP 22.

At any rate, the demand letter dated

November 30, 1993 deserves no weight
and credence not only because it does
not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of the law
but also because of its doubtful
character.

As may be recalled, the prosecution had already long rested its case when it filed a Motion to Re-
Open Presentation of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion To Allow Prosecution To Submit Additional
Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003. Intending to introduce the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence, See attached to the said motion an affidavit  of 40

even date where he stated the circumstances surrounding the fact of his location of the same, viz.:

2. When we initially presented our evidence in support of these criminal complaints, I was
already looking for a copy of the demand letter personally served by the affiant (See) and
duly received by [Chua];

3. That despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x dated November 30, 1993,
the same was not located until sometime in February 2002 when I was having our old
house/office located at C-5 Christian Street, Grace Village, Quezon City, cleaned and ready
to be rented out;

4. x x x [upon] showing the same to the new handling public prosecutor, he advised the
affiant to have it presented in Court.
41

In Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon,  the Court held that:

42

x x x The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e.,
when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that
in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify
new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into
existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is
essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised
due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been
observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in
support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates
that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances and the facts known to him. 43

"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment." 44

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a
newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law. Per See’s statements in his affidavit, the
said evidence was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also
apparently available considering that it was just kept in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised
reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during
trial. However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at
the time he filed the complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint, which per See’s own allegations, was also not
actually received by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to present the original copy of the
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the existence of the second
element of the offense. Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction
was a mere afterthought – a belated attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the
existence of the second element of BP 22.

It may not be amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed against
Chua, 22 involve checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the lower courts
grievously erred in convicting Chua for those 22 cases on the basis of a purported demand letter
written and sent to Chua prior to the issuance of said 22 checks. Checks can only be dishonored
after they have been issued and presented for payment. Before that, dishonor cannot take place.
Thus, a demand letter that precedes the issuance of checks cannot constitute as sufficient notice of
dishonor within the contemplation of BP 22. It is likewise significant to note that aside from the
absence of a date, the signature of Chua appearing on the questioned November 30, 1993 demand
letter is not accompanied by any word or phrase indicating that he affixed his signature thereon to
signify his receipt thereof. Indeed, "conviction must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense."  In view of the foregoing, the
45

Court cannot accord the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 any weight and credence.
Consequently, it cannot be used to support Chua’s guilt of the offenses charged.

All told, the Court cannot convict Chua for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.

Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.  "An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award
46

of civil damages."  For this reason, Chua must be directed to testitute See the total amount of the
47

face value of all the checks subject of the case with legal interest at the rate of 12% per
annum reckoned from the time the said checks became due and demandable up to June 30, 2013
and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. 48

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The assailed Decision dated November 11, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 33079 which affirmed the Decisions of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 finding
petitioner Robert Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 54 counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Robert Chua is hereby ACQUITTED on the
ground that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
ordered RELEASED immediately / unless he is detained for some other legal cause. He is ordered,
however, to indemnify the private complainant Philip See the total value of the 54 checks subject of
this case plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and
demandable until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Ongson vs People of the Philippines, GR 156169, August 12, 2005

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the June 27, 2002 decision of the Court
1 

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 which affirmed with modification the March 8, 1995 decision of2 

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435 to Q-43442,
finding petitioner Victor Ongson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eight (8) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on separate occasions, private complainant Samson
Uy extended loans to petitioner and as payment therefor, he issued to Uy eight (8) post dated
checks. Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and despite demands, petitioner failed to
make good the bounced checks. On April 15, 1993, eight (8) separate Informations were filed
against petitioner and docketed as follows:

Criminal Case Check No. Date Amount Drawee Reason for the
No. Bank dishonor
Q-93-43435 3
119789 Nov. 23, 1992
4
P200,000.00 PSB Payment
Stopped/Drawn
Against Insufficient
Funds (DAIF)
Q-93-43436 5
492837 6
Nov. 4, 1992 24,000.00 FBTC Account Closed
Q-93-43437 7
492615 8
Oct. 15, 1992 3,117.00 FBTC DAIF
Q-93-43438 9
492319 10
Oct. 15, 1992 11,887.10 FBTC DAIF
Q-93-43439 11
492482 12
Oct. 15, 1992 50,000.00 FBTC DAIF
Q-93-43440 13
492581 14
Oct. 4, 1992 25,500.00 FBTC DAIF
Q-93-43441 15
492666 16
Oct. 2, 1992 200,000.00 FBTC DAIF
Q-93-43442 17
492580 18
Sept. 28, 1992 68,145.62 FBTC DAIF

Except as to the check's drawee bank, number, amount and date of issue, the Informations were
similarly worded in this wise:

That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to SAMSON UY to apply
on account or for value Philippine Savings Bank Check No. 119789 dated November 23, 1992
payable to Cash in the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that
at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds/Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Samson Uy the amount of said
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 19

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.

At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signatures on the checks, the stamps of
dishonored deposit, the dates thereof and reasons for dishonor. 20

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented Rowena Carbon but since she failed to
appear for continuation of the cross-examination, the trial court ordered her testimony stricken off
21 

the record. The defense also presented Evelyn Villareal who testified that Liana's Supermarket,
22 

where Uy was sole distributor of petitioner's beverage products, issued check vouchers to Uy. 23

On March 8, 1995, the trial court rendered a one-page decision finding petitioner guilty as charged,
the full text of which reads:

The consolidated Informations, above-numbered, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for eight
(8) counts are on record.

Upon arraignment accused pleaded Not Guilty and at the pre-trial, he agreed to and signed the Pre-
trial order on Page 108, dated July 14th, 1993, wherein accused admitted the authenticity of the
signatures on the checks in question, Exh "B", Exh "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and submarkings
thereon, showing the fact of dishonor, the reason therefor and the dates thereof, reserving only for
trial on the merits the issue of the correctness of the amounts and the consideration.

The private complainant testified as to the consideration, which is also presumed under the law,
unless rebutted by accused, which he failed to do, convincing the court beyond reasonable doubt of
his guilt as charged herein.

WHEREFORE, accused Victor Ongson is hereby declared GUILTY of Violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 on eight (8) counts and sentenced to serve 6 months imprisonment for each of the eight (8)
counts and to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the said checks mentioned in the above-
numbered informations or a total of P582,149.72, and to indemnify, as actual and compensatory
damages, the private complainant Samson Uy in the same amount of the said checks, or
P582,149.72 plus interest at 12% from the date of this decision.

SO ORDERED. 24

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending he was denied due process and that the trial
court's decision violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court. In the assailed decision of June 27,
2002, the Court of Appeals found no infirmity in the trial court's decision and affirmed the conviction
of petitioner, but modified the penalty as follows:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of fine is hereby DELETED and appellant
sentenced to a prison term of thirty (30) days in each of the eight (8) counts whereof he was found
guilty by the lower court, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal
DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 25

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant petition. The issues
for resolution are:

1) Was the decision of the trial court violative of the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court?

2) Was the conviction of petitioner proper?

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based.
Pertinently, the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires
judges to make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of
the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form
conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.

We emphasized in Velarde v. Social Justice Society, citing Yao v. Court of Appeals, that:

26  27 

"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court
cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that
without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so
he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by
the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the
life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -
much less an assessment or analysis thereof - or of the court's findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue
presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are
tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or
specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO
ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct
facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the
factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions? None
were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTC's Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly
and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the
constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so
if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are
unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual
comparison?

Based on the foregoing considerations, we find that the trial court's decision in the case at bar did
not state the material facts, i.e., the transaction that led to the issuance of the checks, their
respective amounts, the date and reason for dishonor. The decision likewise failed to discuss the
elements of B.P. 22 and other pertinent facts. Clearly, the absence of relevant antecedents as well
as the lack of evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties and justification for its conclusion
render the instant decision void.

The Court would ordinarily remand this case to the court a quo for compliance with the constitutional
requirements. However, we deem it proper to resolve the case on the merits to avoid further delay. 28

Section 1 of B.P. 22, states:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

The elements of violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on
account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 29

The first element, i.e., making, drawing, and issuance of any check, requires that the check be
properly described in the Information to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Without a sufficient identification of the dishonored check in the Information,
the conviction of the accused should be set aside for being violative of the constitutional requirement
of due process. 30

In the instant case, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-93-
43442, because the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in the Informations vary with
the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, which inconsistencies violate petitioner's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged.

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43437, described Check No. 492615 as dated
31 

October 15, 1992, for P3,117.00. The records, however, show that said check differ from Exhibit "I,"
because the date and amount stated therein are October 17, 1992 and 3,117.50, respectively.
Likewise in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43442, the date of Check No. 492580 as reflected in the
Information is September 28, 1992, while Exhibit "D" shows October 2, 1992.
32 

As held in Dico v. Court of Appeals, citing Alonto v. People, these inconsistencies justify the
33  34 

acquittal of the accused. Thus -

In the information filed by Felipe C. Belcina, Prosecutor II, the check involved is described as Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Check No. 364903 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of
P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation. However, after going over the records of the
case, the parties, including the courts, overlooked the fact that the check being identified in court
was different from that described in the information. The prosecution marked as its Exhibit "B"
FEBTC Check No. 369403 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable
Banking Corporation. The issue as to the identity of the check, though not raised as an error, should
be considered in favor of the petitioner.

The variance in the identity of the check nullifies petitioner's conviction. The identity of the check
enters into the first element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 - that a person draws or
issues a check on account or for value. There being a discrepancy in the identity of the checks
described in the information and that presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the offense charged will be violated if his conviction is upheld.

In the case of Alonto v. People, this Court had this to say when there was a variance involving the
date as regards the check described in the information and that adduced in evidence:

This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged that petitioner issued a
check dated 14 May 1992 whereas the documentary evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit
"I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount of P25,000 dated 05 April 1992. Prosecution witness
Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and I), but
categorically stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated 14 May 1992, which was
contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No. 831258 dated 05
April 1992. In view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal Case No.
Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is
tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992
in the amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the
check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a
person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and the date thereof involves its
second element, namely, that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she
did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right
to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby
rendering the conviction for the third count fatally defective.
With respect to Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-43439, Q-93-
43440 and Q-93-43441, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the checks were issued without valuable
consideration. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist
either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes
the contract, such as the maker or endorser. 35

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received
money in various amounts from private complainant. Whether the amounts were loans or investment
in the business of petitioner, the checks were issued for valuable consideration. Either way,
petitioner is under obligation to pay private complainant. Likewise, the prosecution proved that some
of the checks were payment for private complainant's commission from selling the products of
petitioner. Hence, the latter cannot successfully claim that the issuance of the checks were not for a
valuable consideration.

Interestingly, while petitioner denied existence of consideration, he at the same time admitted that
his obligation was P358,872.72 and not P582,149.72. It appears from Rowena Carbon's testimony
36 

that, as sole distributor of petitioner's product to Liana's Supermarket, private complainant received
from the latter 3 checks in the amounts of P41,748.00, P78,840.00 and P105,209.00, but were not
remitted to petitioner. Hence, Carbon claimed that the total unremitted amount of the checks should
37 

be deducted from the indebtedness of the latter.

These declarations of Carbon, however, will not warrant the acquittal of petitioner because Carbon's
testimony was stricken off the record by the trial court. Even if Carbon's testimony was retained, the
alleged receipt by private complainant of the P41,748.00 and P78,840.00 checks will not warrant the
acquittal of petitioner because the same were without documentary basis; and while the amount of
38 

P105,209.00 was supported with a voucher dated July 29, 1992, petitioner failed to positively show
39 

that private complainant did not remit said amount. Likewise, Carbon did not specify whether the
check was drawn to cash or to the order of Beverly Food Ventures Corporation. If it was drawn to
cash, then it is petitioner's burden to prove that the payment was intended for Beverly Food Ventures
Corporation and not for private complainant. If it was paid to the order of the corporation, then the
latter must at least establish that private complainant was able to encash and profit from said check.
Moreover, Evelyn Villareal never validated the alleged receipt by private complainant of the
P41,748.00, P78,840.00 and P105,209.00 checks. While she declared that Liana's Supermarket
issued checks to petitioner, the subject 3 checks were not specified in her testimony.

Then too, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The mere act
of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. So also, it is not the nonpayment of the obligation
that is being punished, but the making of worthless checks. What the law punishes is such issuance
40 

of a bum check and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms or conditions
relating to its issuance. Thus, even if there had been payment through compensation or some other
41 

means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. 42

As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's
presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from
notice of dishonor.43

Sec. 2 of B.P. 22, provides:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check
fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in
full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima
facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee
bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received
by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day
period. Furthermore, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enough.
44  45

In the instant case, petitioner through counsel, admitted receipt of private complainant's demand
letters sent via registered mail, informing him of the dishonor of the checks and the reason therefor;
and demanding that the value of the check be paid in cash. Pertinent portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes, reads:

ATTY. YABUT [private respondent's counsel]:

... Exh. "J" is the demand letter dated November 27, 1992 and the signature of the counsel therein
marked as Exh. "J-1" to prove that a demand letter was sent to the accused and to his wife, Mrs.
Grace Tiu Ongson, demanding therein that the said dishonored check be encashed or be replaced
and the Registry Receipt which is Exh. "J-2" and Registry Return Receipt which is Exh. "J-3" is
being offered to prove that the said demand letter was sent by registered mail and the same
was sent as per Exh. "J-2" and received [on December 7, 1992] by the accused thru his
representative which is Exh. "J-3"; and Exh. "K" is the same demand letter dated November 27,
1992 and signed by the counsel which is marked as Exh. "K-1" addressed to the accused and/or his
wife, Mrs. Grace Tiu Ongson and demanding therein that the said check which is stated in the said
demand letter which bounced be replaced with cash; Exh. "K-2" which is the Registry Receipt;
and Exh. "K-3" which is the Registry Return Receipt is being offered to prove that the demand
letter was sent to the accused by registered mail and that the same was received [on
December 7, 1992] by his authorized representative ; Exh. "L" is the demand letter dated
December 3, 1992 addressed to the accused demanding therein that the said check contained in the
demand letter be replaced with cash or be made good and the signature therein of the lawyer which
is Exh. "L-1" is being offered to prove that the demand letter was sent by the lawyer and that the
registry receipt marked as Exh. "L-2" and the Registry Return Receipt, Exh. "L-3" is being offered
to prove that it was sent by registered mail and that the same was received by the accused
[on December 7, 1992]; Exh. "M" which is a demand letter dated December 15, 1992 sent to the
accused demanding therein that the check bounced and that the same should be replaced with cash
or be made good accordingly, and the signature of the lawyer which is Exh. "M-1" to prove that the
said lawyer sent a demand letter to the accused; and the Registry Receipt marked as Exh. "M-2"
and the Registry Return Receipt Exh. "M-3" to prove that the demand letter was sent to the
accused and received by his representative [on December 18, 1992] ; we are therefore offering
for the admission of this Honorable Court the exhibits from Exh. "A" to Exh. "M" accordingly and the
testimony of the private complainant to this Honorable Court.

COURT:

Any comments?

ATTY. GIRONELLA [petitioner's counsel]:

With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. GIRONELLA:

With respect to the various demand letters marked as Exhs. "H", "J", "K", "L" and "M", we
admit them insofar as we intend to prove that there was such a demand letter and demand
these letters were received by the accused (sic); 46

In King v. People, it was held that the accused's admission through counsel, made during the trial,
47 

binds the client. Similarly, in Rigor v. People, the Court ruled that the accused cannot pretend that
48 

he did not receive the notice of dishonor of the check because the transcript of records shows that
the accused admitted knowledge of the dishonor of his check through a demand letter received by
him.

Section 4 of Rule 129, states:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

That only a representative of petitioner signed the registry return receipt in the case at bar is of no
consequence because of the unqualified admission by the latter that he received private
complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. Said admission binds him considering that he
never denied receipt of the notice of dishonor. Neither did he contradict said judicial admission of
receipt of the notice nor alleged a palpable mistake in making the same. Thus, petitioner's receipt of
the notice of dishonor without paying the value of the checks or making arrangements for its
payment within five (5) days from receipt of said notice, established the prima facie presumption that
he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the
issuance of the checks. Failing to overcome this legal presumption, the findings of the courts below
must be sustained.

The third element of violation of B.P. 22, i.e., the dishonor of the check by the drawee bank, is also
attendant in the present case as shown by the reason for the dishonor as stamped in the dorsal
portion of the checks which are also prima facie presumptions of such dishonor and the reasons
therefor. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, it was held that while it is true that the presumption is
49  50 

merely prima facie, the accused must, nonetheless, present proof to the contrary to overcome this
presumption. Here, other than the bare allegations of petitioner, he presented no well-grounded
defense to prove that the subject checks were not dishonored by the drawee banks.

Likewise, in Recuerdo v. People, the court emphasized that it is not required much less
51 

indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee bank's representative as a witness to testify
on the dishonor of the checks. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only private
complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. Said witness is
competent and qualified to testify that upon presentment for payment, the subject checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank.

Furthermore, the dishonor was bolstered by the pre-trial order duly signed by petitioner where he
admitted dishonor of the subject checks. Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that
52 

the pre-trial was irregular because it was held in his absence and before arraignment. Records show
that the May 17, 1993 pre-trial held in the absence of petitioner was annulled by the trial court. Pre-
53 

trial was re-set and conducted on July 14, 1993, after arraignment in the presence of petitioner, who 54 

affixed his signature in the pre-trial order with the assistance of counsel.

All told, the Court finds that all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 had been established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Nevertheless, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
should be modified.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on those found guilty
of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001, vests in
the courts the discretion to determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, whether the imposition of fine (of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check, but in no case exceeding P200,000.00), would best serve the interest of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence
on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. 55

In Recuerdo v. People, and Young v. Court of Appeals, it was held that where there is neither proof
56 

nor allegation that the accused is not a first time offender, imposition of the penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment is proper. Likewise, in Lee v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the policy laid down
57 

in Vaca v. Court of Appeals, and Lim v. People, of redeeming valuable human material and
58  59 

preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, should be

considered in favor of the accused who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. Said
doctrines squarely apply in the instant case there being no proof or allegation that petitioner is not a
first time offender.

Finally, petitioner should be ordered to pay interest of 12% per annum pursuant to Cabrera v.
People, that when an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the
60 

interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. In the absence of such
stipulation, the rate shall be 12% per annum computed from judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this
case, there was no stipulated interest on petitioner's obligation to pay the value of the dishonored
checks. Demand for payment was made extrajudicially as evidenced by petitioner's receipt of private
complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. The applicable interest rate is therefore 12%
per annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992 for Check Nos.
492666, 492482, 492581 and 492319; December 10, 1992 for Check No. 119789; and December
18, 1992 for Check No. 492837 until finality of this decision. From the finality of this decision, the
total amount of the dishonored checks inclusive of interest shall further earn 12% interest per annum
until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 27, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-93-43442, petitioner Victor Ongson is ACQUITTED of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-43439, Q-93-43440 and Q-93-
43441 petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and is
sentenced as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43435, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P200,000.00 with 12% interest per
annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 10, 1992, until the finality of this
Decision;

(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43436, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P48,000.00 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P24,000.00 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 18, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;

(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43438, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P23,774.20 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P11,887.10 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;

(4) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43439, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;

(5) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43440, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P51,000.00 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P25,500.00 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;
and

(6) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43441, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and to
indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of P200,000.00 with 12% interest per
annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this
Decision.

The total amount of the dishonored checks inclusive of interest shall further earn 12% interest per
annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.