PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

169364  
Petitioner, 1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
Present: physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), calling;
- versus - Chico-Nazario,  
Velasco, Jr., 2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
Peralta, and places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
Bersamin*, JJ. visible means of support;
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and  
KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y Promulgated: 3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or
MEFANIA, pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
Respondents. September 18, 2009  
  4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of
DECISION this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to
  another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:  
  5. Prostitutes.
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as  
Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.  
  Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall
Martin Luther King, Jr. be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayorin its medium period to prision correccional in its
  minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order [1] of Branch 11,
 
Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents Petition for
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to
Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Quash[3] on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
 
pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18,
In an Order[4] dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed
2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of
respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
  the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin
 
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi interest of the greater number, thus:
Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and
 
justifiable purpose.[2]
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the
  State. An authority on police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police
power as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides: of liberty and property. (Citations omitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions
  are hemmed in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants: maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the god of the people is the Supreme
1
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
 Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the
greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1
JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted
in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the
two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night
and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a
leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution
and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and
the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment
cant be categorized as a crime.[5]
 
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay
Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the
prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.
 
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City,[6] directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the
definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an
arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who
are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the
equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and
unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Courts ruling
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[7] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech
cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and
constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.
 
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28,
2004, denying the petitioners Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is
ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
 
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated
the equal protection clause. It held that the void for vagueness doctrine is equally applicable in testing
the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,[9] where an anti vagrancy
ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial
court ruled:
 
The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy
Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support offers too wide a
latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these
times of recession when there are many who are without visible means of support not
by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high
unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other
reason than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding
insult to injury.[10]
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our
situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it
offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law and those who
are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are
accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is
imposed upon another in like case offending.
 
2
 Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable
indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of
circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the
proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its
constitutionality.[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE[12]
 
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the
statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the State
may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.
 
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed
rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as
distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately
overthrown.
 
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police
power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful
provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. [14]However, in exercising its power to declare
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts
it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it
is his duty to avoid.[15] This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness
doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.[16]
 
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,[17] the Court recognized the application of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
 
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent
which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in
Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate as
applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in
relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions
which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[18]
 
The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American vagrancy
statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which
was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy. [19] While
historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the
Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to
repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling;
 
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places,
or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3
  
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or
pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of
this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to
another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
 
5. Prostitutes.
 
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
 
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayorin its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
 
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any
person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about
the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second
clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined vagrant as every person found loitering about saloons
or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of
support.The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which
the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms public or semi-public places.
 
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support
mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville[20] case, which
in essence declares:
 
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that
[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law
give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is
allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v.
National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume
they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor
are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a
specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91;
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
 
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern
standards, are normally innocent. Nightwalking is one. Florida construes the
ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at
855, only the habitual wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night
walkers. We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at
night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
 
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that
loafing was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged.
It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons wandering or strolling from place to place have been extolled by
Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification without any lawful purpose or
object may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
 
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a
burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be casing a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife
support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it
may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
 
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill
of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be
nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of
high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
 
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this
ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to
police authority:
 
4
 The common ground which brings such a motley
assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-
type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction'
for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of
Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for
problems that appear to have no other immediate solution. Foote,
Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603,
631.
 
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on
the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered
discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early
student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by
analogy. Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our
constitutional system.
 
xxxx
 
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or
frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look
suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of
law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is
being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of
course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making
easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and
justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales
of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible.
The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well
as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.[21]
 
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute; and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law
enforcement.
 
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2)
in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here
because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
[22]
 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of
exceptions.[23]
 
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific
provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance
Code 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging;
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common
drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen
property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common
railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or
minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court
shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional,
because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are
otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not
found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible
means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose or object. But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202
(2) is qualified by without visible means of support while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering
or strolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to
constitute a trap for innocent acts.
 
5
 Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case. 

purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the

determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets

the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing watch-your-car boys, petty
[24]
things to be seized.  Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go

cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training

relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the

respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or

make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from

which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[25] withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for

Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-

of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets;

of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers,

that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of

supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester

person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and
[26]
with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night. 

The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or

their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the

impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.

the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being  

irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws
[27]
measure agreeable. were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human

  society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our

previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the Constitution.[28] Civilly, they are covered by the abuse of rights doctrine embodied in the preliminary

articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully

6
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would
[29]
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.  This provision is, together with the succeeding engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.

articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State
[30]
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order. should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning,

disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding

possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals
[31]
claims.  Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all

removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark
[32]
breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and
 
establishments for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a mans house is
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public indecencies and
his castle,[35] outside on the streets, the king is fair game.
immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their  

offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime  
[33]
against public order that must be abated.  As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the  

proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be
[34]
public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.  Thus, public nuisances must be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that

abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every

members of a community.  statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
[36]
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against  The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of

the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the

being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which

public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is

license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied,

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[37]

public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which  

orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common

7
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
 It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been

defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all

manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,

not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the

commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and

pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the

general welfare.[38] As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a

constitutional light.
 

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial

Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the

Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

8
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD and ILIGAN LIGHT & POWER, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ASSOCIATION OF MINDANAO INDUSTRIES (AMI), representing among
others the following member-companies: ALSON/ILIGAN CEMENT CORP., MABUHAY
VINYL CORP., MCCI CORP., MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORP., and NATIONAL STEEL
CORP., respondents
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Normally, electric power generated by the National Power Corporation (NPC) is sold through
private utility firms authorized to operate within a franchise area. In the present case, the private
respondents bypassed the franchise holder in their area and obtained power directly from the
NPC. Petitioner, on the other hand, wants a disconnection of such direct supply. Which agency of the
government has Jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute - the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) or the
Department of Energy (DOE)?
The Case
This is the main question posed in the Petition for Review before us, which seeks to set aside the
September 27, 1994 Decision[1] and November 19, 1996 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 33969. In its assailed Decision, the CA held that it was the DOE, no longer the ERB,
which had Jurisdiction over direct connection and disconnection issues. The dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:[4]
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the order dated April 7, 1994 of respondent Energy Regulatory Board in ERB
Case No. 93-97 entitled 'In re: Petition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power
Sector,' is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and said respondent ERB is 'directed to cease and desist from
proceeding with the trial of and to dismiss said ERB Case No. 93-97 for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition therein."
The assailed Resolution denied the motions for reconsideration filed separately by the ERB and
the Iligan Light and Power, Inc. (ILPI).
The Facts
The factual antecedents of this case are not disputed. They are related by the CA as follows:[5]
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
"xxx The members of the Association of Mindanao Industries are enterprises based in Mindanao and
registered with the Board of Investments which were among those granted direct connection facility by
the National Power Corporation although operating within the franchise area of private respondent Iligan
Light and Power, Inc. (Iligan for short).
"On October 12, 1993, Iligan filed with the respondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB for short) a
petition for the implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, docketed as
ERB-93-97, praying specifically that the direct supply of power to industries within its franchise area be
discontinued by the National Power Corporation (NPC, for short).
"The Cabinet Policy Reforms referred to were among those approved by the President of the
Philippines and her cabinet on January 21, 1987, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
'2. Continue direct connections for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of
Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that
direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or
cooperative meeting standards of financial and technical capability, with satisfactory guarantees of non-
prejudice to industry, to be set in consultation with NPC and relevant government agencies; and
reviewed periodically by the regulatory board.' xxx
"In its Petition, ILPI alleged, inter alia, that it can meet, even surpass, the set of financial standards
adopted by the ERB pursuant to the policy guidelines set by the Cabinet xxx.
"AMI filed its 'Answer with Affirmative Defenses and/or Motion to Dismiss,' 'without accepting jurisdiction
of the Honorable Board over the subject matter of the petition,' on the following grounds, to wit: 1) lack
of jurisdiction to hear the petition for implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector
following the transfer of its non-price regulatory jurisdiction and functions to the Department of Energy
under Rep. Act No. 7638; 2) the petition failed to state a cause of action for non-averment of petitioner's
ability and willingness to match the rates of NPC; and 3) non-joinder of indispensable parties xxx.
"On January 4, 1994, the ERB denied in open court AMI's motion to dismiss the petition. Likewise,
AMI's motion for reconsideration was denied by the ERB in its order dated April 7, 1994 xxx. Hence, the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the aforesaid order dated April 7, 1994 and to
prohibit respondent ERB from proceeding with the hearing of ILPI's petition."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court Justified its ruling in favor of private respondents in this wise:[6]
"To resolve the issues raised in the case at bar, it is necessary to first characterize the petition filed by
ILPI with the respondent [herein petitioner] ERB. It seems quite clear that ILPI sought therein to
discontinue the direct supply of power by the NPC to BOI-registered enterprises operating within its
(ILPI's) franchise area. Although the petition is styled as one seeking the implementation of the Cabinet
Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, the core of the action, as well as the ultimate relief sought, is
9
related to the distribution or marketing of energy resources. The matter treated is thus not concerned
with the fixing of power rates. Under the applicable provisions of law, the matter of direct supply of
power, which is a ma[tt]er of energy distribution and which is undoubtedly a non-price regulatory matter,
is among those granted to the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy under Republic Act No. 7638."
The ERB and the ILPI filed their separate motions for reconsideration, which were, however,
denied in the assailed November 19, 1996 Resolution of respondent court.
Hence, this petition.[7]
Issues
Petitioner ILPI presents the following issues for resolution:[8]
"I
"WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ERB HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
POLICY REFORMS.
II
"WHETHER THE POLICY REFORMS COULD VALIDLY CONFER ON THE ERB THE AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE THAT NPC DIRECT CONNECTIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY;
III
"WHETHER THE DECISION IN THE NPC AND PHIVIDEC CASES IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE."
In sum, the pivotal issue in this case, as stated by Petitioner ERB is "whether the ERB has
Jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving direct connection issues."
The Court's Ruling
The petition has failed to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Main Issue: Jurisdiction
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Petitioners submit that ERB's Jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on direct connection of power
supply with the NPC was conferred by the January 23, 1987 Cabinet Memorandum approving a set of
Policy reforms in the power sector, specifically Item No. 2 thereof which provides:
"Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of
Understanding of 12 January 1981 until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that
direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or
cooperative. xxx"
Petitioners claim that RA 7638 transferred to the DOE the ERB's non-price regulatory powers and
functions relative to the petroleum industry only,  as enumerated under Section 3 of Executive Order No.
172 (EO 172), which they quote as follows:
"Section 3 -- Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board -- [W]hen warranted and only when public
necessity requires, the Board may regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources. Energy resource means
any substance or phenomenon which by itself or in combination with others, or after processing or
refining or the application to it of technology, emanates, generates, or causes the emanation or
generation of energy, such as but not limited to petroleum or petroleum products, coal, marsh gas,
methane gas, geothermal and hydroelectric sources of energy, uranium and other similar radioactive
materials, solar energy, tidal power, as well as non-conventional existing and potential sources.
"The Board shall, upon proper notice and hearing, exercise the following, among other powers and
functions-.
a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas
companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe system;
c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under the provisions of Republic Act No. 387,
as amended, otherwise known as the "Petroleum Act of 1949", as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1700;
d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries that may be organized after the issuance of this Executive
Order, under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest;
e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when
public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary
adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum
industry of such amounts as may be determined by the Board, which will enable the importer to recover
its cost of importation."
While conceding that the regulation of the marketing and the distribution of energy resources has
been expressly transferred to the DOE, petitioners contend, however, that electric power is not an
10
energy resource. They allege that since the authority to pass upon issues of direct electric power
connection was not mentioned at all in the above-quoted provision, it could not have been included
among the functions given to the DOE.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that Jurisdiction over the connection issue in the case at
bar now belongs to the DOE. In support of their stand, they cite the consolidated cases (1)
National Power Corp. v. Court of appeals and Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.[9] and (2) Phividec
Industrial Authority v. Court of Appeals and Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.,[10] in which this Court
stated:
"The determination of which of the two public utilities has the right to supply electric power to an area
which is within the coverage of both is certainly not a rate fixing function which should remain with
ERB. It deals with the regulation of the distribution of energy resources which, under Executive Order
No. 172, was expressly a function of ERB. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7638, the
Department of Energy took over such function. Hence, it is this Department which should then
determine whether CEPALCO or PIA [Phividec Industrial Authority] should supply power to PIE-MO
[Phividec Industrial Estate-Misamis Oriental]."
Consequently, the Court disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:[11]
"WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R. No[s]. 112702 and 113613 are hereby DENIED. The Department
of Energy is directed to conduct a hearing with utmost dispatch to determine whether it is the Cagayan
Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. or the National Power Corporation, through the PHIVIDEC Industrial
Authority, which should supply electric power to the industries in the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate-
Misamis Oriental."
While the core question raised in these consolidated cases was whether the NPC could supply
power directly to the PIE-MO area, where CEPALCO had a franchise, we find the Court's
pronouncements on them relevant to the instant controversy. Corollary to the main question was the
issue of whether the NPC had the power to hear and decide cases involving direct power
connection. This Court held that "the NPC is not  the proper authority xxx, not only because the subject
matter of the hearing is a matter involving the NPC itself, but also because the law has created the
proper administrative body vested with authority to conduct a hearing. [12] As to which was the "proper
administrative body," the Court made the following illuminating disquisition:[13]
"The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy, is tasked with the following powers and functions by
Executive Order No. 172 which took effect immediately after its issuance on May 8, 1987:
'SEC. 3. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board -- When warranted and only when public
necessity requires, the Board may regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources. xxx
'The Board shall, upon proper notice and hearing, exercise the following, among other powers and
functions:
(a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly
franchised gas companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe
system"
(c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 387, as amended, otherwise known as the 'Petroleum Act of 1949,' as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1700,
(d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and
license refineries that may be organized after the issuance of this Executive Order,
under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest;
(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or
when public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary,
including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and
the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund created under Presidential Decree No.
1956 by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as
may be determined by the Board, which will enable the importer to recover its cost of
importation.'
"As may be gleaned from said provisions, the ERB is basically a price or rate-fixing agency. Apparently
recognizing this basic function, Republic Act No. 7638 (An Act Creating the Department of Energy,
Rationalizing the Organization and Functions of Government Agencies Related to Energy, and for Other
Purposes), which was approved on December 9, 1992 and which took effect fifteen days after its
complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, specifically provides
as follows:
'SEC. 18. Rationalization or Transfer of Functions of Attached or Related Agencies. --  The non-price
regulatory jurisdiction, powers, and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board as provided for in Section
3 of Executive Order No. 172 are hereby transferred to the Department.
'The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations,
records, equipment, property, and such personnel as may be necessary. Provided,  That only such
amount of funds and appropriations of the Board as well as only the personnel thereof which are
completely or primarily involved in the exercise by said Board of its non-price regulatory powers and
functions shall be affected by such transfer.
'The power of the NPC to determine, fix, and prescribe the rates being charged to its customers under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, as well as the power of electric cooperatives to fix
rates under Section 16 (o), Chapter 11 of Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, are hereby
transferred to the Energy Regulatory Board. The Board shall exercise its new powers only after due
notice and hearing and under the same procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 172.'
"Upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7638, then Acting Chairman of the Energy Coordinating
Council Delfin Lazaro transmitted to the Department of Justice the query of whether or not the 'non-
power rate powers and functions' of the ERB are included in the 'jurisdiction, powers and functions
11
transferred to the Department of Energy.' Answering the query in the affirmative, the Department of
Justice rendered Opinion No. 22 dated February 12, 1993 the pertinent portion of which states:
'xxx we believe that since the provision of Section 18 on the transfer of certain powers and functions
from ERB to DOE is clear and unequivocal, and devoid of any ambiguity, in the sense that it
categorically refers to 'non-price jurisdiction, powers and functions' of ERB under Section 3 of E.O. No.
172, there is no room for interpretation, but only for application, of the law. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction.
'Clearly, the parameters of the transfer of functions for ERB to DOE pursuant to Section 18, are
circumscribed by the provision of Section 3 of E.O. No. 172 alone, so that, If there are other 'related'
functions of ERB under other provisions of E.O. No. 172 or other energy laws, these 'related' functions,
which may conceivably refer to what you call 'non-power rate powers and functions' of ERB, are clearly
not contemplated by Section 18 and are, therefore, not to be deemed included in the transfer of
functions from ERB to DOE under the said provision.
'It may be argued that Section 26 of R.A. No. 7638 contains a repealing clause which provides that:
'All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. xxx.'
and, therefore, all provisions of E.O. No. 172 and related laws which are inconsistent with the policy,
purpose and intent of R.A. No. 7638 are deemed repealed. It has been said, however, that a general
repealing clause of such nature does not operate as an express repeal because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found[ed] on existing and prior
acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the
rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals shall apply ex proprio vigore.  For the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute
to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and the old laws (Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377; City of Naga vs. Agna, 71 SCRA 176,
cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 Edition, pp. 191-192).
'In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that only the non-price regulatory functions of ERB under
Section 3 of E.O. 172 are transferred to the DOE.' All the powers of ERB which are not within the
purview of its 'non-price regulatory jurisdiction, powers and functions' as defined in Section 3 are not so
transferred to DOE and accordingly remain vested in ERB.'
"The determination of which of two public utilities has the right to supply electric power to an area which
is within the coverage of both is certainly not a rate-fixing function which should remain with the ERB. It
deals with the regulation of the distribution of energy resources which, under Executive Order No. 172,
was expressly a function of ERB. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7638, the
Department of Energy took over such function. Hence, it is this Department which shall then determine
whether CEPALCO or PIA should supply power to PIE-MO."
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The foregoing sufficiently indicates that it is now the Department of Energy that has Jurisdiction
over the regulation of the marketing and the distribution of energy resources. It may be true that this
function formerly belonged to the ERB, by virtue of the "Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Energy Sector"
embodied in the Cabinet Memorandum of January 23, 1987, and EO 172 issued May 8, 1987.However,
pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted by Congress on December 9,
1992, the non-rate-fixing Jurisdiction powers and functions of the ERB have been transferred to the
Department of Energy. The applications for the NPC's direct supply or disconnection of power involve
essentially the distribution of energy resources, not by any incident the determinations of power
rates. Consequently, these application be resolved by the DOE.
It is of no moment that the petition instituted by ILPI before the ERB was captioned "for the
Implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector." The relief it specifically
sought was the discontinuation of NPC's direct supply of power to private respondent's member-
companies. Definitely then, the distribution of an energy resource was its main purpose.
Neither does the Court agree with the petitioners' claim that the regulatory functions of the ERB
that were transferred to the DOE concerned those relating to the petroleum industry only and not to
electric power. Section 3 of EO 172 broadly defines energy resource  as "any substance or
phenomenon which by itself or in combination with others xxx emanates, [or] generates xxx energy,
xxx." Electric power  or electricity  has been in turn defined as "an imponderable and invisible agent
producing light, heat, chemical decomposition, and other physical phenomena." [14] Undoubtedly
electricity produces or generates energy. By simple logic, it is an energy resource. The regulation of its
distribution 's, therefore, among those functions formerly belonging to the ERB, which have been
transferred to the DOE as expressly directed in Section 18 of RA 7638. Nowhere in this provision is
there any restriction of its scope to petroleum and its products only. The reference to petroleum is
merely by way of example of what an energy resource is. In fact, the set of examples of energy
resources enumerated in the law is prefaced with "such as but not limited to." This can only mean that
the enumeration is nonrestrictive.
Moreover, Section 5 of RA 7638 defines the powers and functions of the DOE as follows:
"SEC. 5. Powers and Functions. The Department shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over all government activities relative to energy projects in order to
attain the goods embodied in Section 2 of this Act.
(e) Regulate private sector activities relative to energy projects as provided for under existing
laws; Provided, That the Department shall endeavor to provide for an environment conducive to free
and active private sector participation and involvement in all energy activities."
As to what energy projects  encompass, Section 3 of the same law gives this definition:
"Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. -- (a) 'Energy projects' shall mean activities or projects relative to the
exploration, extraction, production, importation-exportation, processing, transportation, marketing,
distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling or storage of all forms of energy products
and resources."  (Italics supplied.)
12
 Definitely, the exploration, the production, the marketing, the distribution,  the utilization or any
other activity involving any energy resource or product falls within the supervision and control of the
DOE.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DENIED  and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

13
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ZACARIAS COMETA and HERCO REALTY & AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE FRANCO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 25, 1999 [1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 48277, entitled Zacarias Cometa, et al.
v. Hon. Perfecto Laggui, et al., and the Resolution dated January 27, 2000 [2] denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The pertinent factual antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
On July 2, 1976, the quondam Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 15 [3] at Makati
rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17585 for Damages, entitled Jose Franco v. Zacarias
Cometa, awarding to herein private respondent Jose Franco, the sum of P57,396.85.[4]
The judgment became final on March 9, 1978. Subsequently, a writ of execution was
issued. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff levied on execution three (3) commercial lots of petitioner Zacarias
Cometa[5]located at Guadalupe, Makati.
On October 17, 1978, two (2) of the lots were sold to respondent Franco at public auction for the
amount of P57,396.85. The sheriffs return was made on March 12, 1981.[6]
On November 17, 1981, petitioner Herco Realty & Agricultural Development Corporation (Herco)
filed Civil Case No. 43846 with the same CFI Rizal, Branch 15, to annul the levy on execution and sale
at public auction of the real properties.[7] The complaint alleged that the ownership of the lots had been
transferred by Cometa to Herco before the execution sale. It assailed the validity of the levy and sale on
the ground that the sheriff, in disregard of the proper procedural practice, immediately proceeded
against Cometas real properties without first exhausting his personal properties; that the lots were
sold en masse and not by parcel; and that the said properties which are commercial lots situated in
Guadalupe, Makati, and are conservatively valued at P500,000.00, were sold only for P57,396.85, the
amount of the judgment.[8]
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1982, the same court, now designated as Regional Trial Court, Branch
60, issued an order in Civil Case No. 17585 directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel petitioner
Cometas certificates of title to the lots and to issue new ones in favor of respondent Franco. Cometa,
who died during the pendency of the proceedings, was substituted by his heirs, who filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari questioning the said order. The petition was, however, dismissed on
February 28, 1983.[9]
On May 13, 1983, Franco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 140, a motion for
issuance of writ of possession. Cometa opposed the motion on the ground that there was pending
before another Regional Trial Court an action for annulment of levy and sale of the properties in
question.[10]
On August 12, 1983, the trial court issued an order granting the motion; but the same was
reconsidered and set aside on November 18, 1983 on the ground that the issuance of the writ of
possession was premature,[11] considering that the RTC of Makati, Branch 60, had not yet decided the
case filed by Herco and Cometa for the annulment of the levy and sale of the properties.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Franco then instituted a special civil action for certiorari with this Court on June 27, 1984, but the
case was referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which subsequently reversed the ruling of the
RTC, Branch 140, on October 4, 1984, and granted the issuance of the writ of possession in Francos
favor.[12]
Cometa and Herco elevated their cause to this Court, where the same was docketed as G.R. No.
L-69294 and entitled, Zacarias Cometa and Herco Realty and Agricultural Development Corporation v.
IAC and Jose Franco. In a Decision dated June 30, 1987,[13] this Court reversed the appellate court and
withheld the granting of the writ of possession pending the promulgation of the resolution of the RTC,
Branch 60, on the issue of whether or not the levy and sale of Cometas properties are valid. In the said
judgment, this Court said:
In the case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the properties is directly put in issue in another
case by the petitioners. This Court finds it an issue which requires pre-emptive resolution. For if the
respondent acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled to
its possession.
The respondent appellate courts emphasis on the failure of the petitioner to redeem the properties
within the period required by law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is inconsistent with
petitioners claim of invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of
the sale and would estop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that ground.[14]
Moreover, equitable considerations constrain us to reverse the decision of respondent court. The fact is
undisputed that the properties in question were sold at an unusually lower price than their true
value.Properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only P57,396.85. We do not comment on the
consequences of the inadequacy because that is the very issue which confronts the court below in the
pending case. It appearing, however, that the issuance of the writ of possession would and might work
injustice because the petitioner might not be entitled thereto, we rule that it be withheld.
Thereafter, in Civil Case No. 43846, Branch 60 of the Makati RTC issued an order dated July 21,
1993 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of interest in the prosecution of the complaint for failure
of the representatives of Cometa and Herco to appear.
The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 16, 1996 and by this Court on
January 20, 1997 in G.R. No. 126760. On February 26, 1997, this Courts Resolution which, in effect,
upheld the validity of the assailed levy and sale, became final and executory.
On May 2, 1997, Franco again filed, this time with Branch 60 of the RTC of Makati City, a motion
for issuance of writ of possession and cancellation of lis pendens.  The heirs of Cometa opposed the
motion claiming that they intended to redeem the properties.
On December 4, 1997, Cometas heirs consigned with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC,
Makati City, the sum of P38,761.05 as purchase price for the lots, plus interest of P78,762.69 and
P1,175.25 as realty tax.
On June 8, 1998, Branch 60 of the Makati City RTC issued an order [15] which reads in part as
follows:
14
6.2. With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 43846, did HERCO and the HEIRS still have the right to
redeem?
x x x x x x x x x
11. What may be inferred from the aforesaid decisions (except Sumerariz v. DBP) is that the running of
the period of redemption is suspended if the validity of the sale is questioned at any time within the said
period of redemption.
12. When the validity of the sale is questioned after the period of redemption has expired, the rule that
the filing of the action questioning such validity suspends the running of the period for redemption no
longer applies. This is only logical for there would no longer be any period to be suspended it has
already expired. Where the sale is declared void in such action, there would be no right of redemption to
speak of thereafter, for legally speaking, there was no sale at all. A void sale would be inconsistent with
a right of redemption. For in such case, the buyer has not acquired any right over the property sold to
him. Hence, there is nothing that could be redeemed by the owner of the property.
13. The certificate of sale of the two (2) lots was registered and annotated in the corresponding
certificates of title on January 25, 1980. The period of redemption expired twelve (12) months thereafter
(Section 30, Rule 39, Rules of Court) or on January 20, 1981. Civil Case No. 43846 was filed on
November 27, 1981 or more than ten (10) months after the period of redemption expired. Hence, when
Civil Case No. 43846 was filed, there was no longer any period of redemption that could be suspended.
x x x x x x x x x
23.3 Accordingly:
23.3.1. The Officer-in-Charge [is ordered] to issue the corresponding writ of possession over the lots
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 113114 and 113115 in favor of JOSE FRANCO.
Dissatisfied, Cometas heirs and Herco filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48227, asserting that
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING NO LESS
THAN THE SUPREME COURTS DECLARATION IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT  THAT COMETA STILL HAS A RIGHT TO REDEEM.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COMETAS
REDEMPTION IN THAT EVEN ABSENT THE SUPREME COURTS PRONOUNCEMENT
IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,  COMETA WOULD STILL HAVE THE
RIGHT TO REDEEM UNDER SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COMETAS
REDEMPTION IN THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THE LAW RESOLVES ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR
OF THE RIGHT TO REDEEM.
The appellate courts 10th Division thereafter promulgated a Decision dated January 25, 1999,
[16]
 affirming the order of respondent presiding Judge of Branch 60, Makati City RTC, and denying due
course to the petition.
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was likewise denied by a Special Division of Five
Justices.
Hence, this petition for review on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT OR HAS DECIDED IT NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THAT:
A. COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT  HAS ALREADY DETERMINED
THAT COMETA STILL HAS A RIGHT TO REDEEM
B. EVEN ABSENT THE PRONOUNCEMENT IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT,  COMETA WOULD STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM UNDER SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE
C. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE LAW RESOLVES ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHT
TO REDEEM.
Considering the pleadings filed by the parties, this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of
memoranda, give due course to the petition and decide the same.
The questions raised by petitioners can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not
petitioners can still redeem the properties subject of this litigation.
In ruling in the negative, the appellate court opined, among others, that
Section 30, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is very explicit: (t)he judgment debtor or
redemptioner may redeem the property from the purchaser at any time within twelve (12) months after
the sale, xxx. (italics ours) In the case at bar, the sale took place on October 17, 1978. The Certificate
of Sale was registered and annotated on the TCT Nos. S-79894 and 79895 on January 25, 1980. The
Officers Final Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Franco on March 2, 1981. Petitioners questioned
the validity of the sale only on November 27, 1981 or more than three (3) years after the said sale. We
agree with respondent judge that (w)hen the validity of the sale is questioned after the period of
redemption has expired, the rule that the finding of the action questioning such validity suspends the
running of the redemption period, no longer applies. This is only logical for there would no longer be any
period to be suspended it has already expired. We likewise agree that to still allow redemption counted
from February 26, 1997, when the Resolution in G.R. L-126760 became final and executory xxx would
give rise to mischievous legal consequences. For this would be a device to revive a lost right of
15
redemption.Under this theory, a party who lost the right of redemption could just file an action to set
aside the sale on the ground that it was a nullity confident that if the action does not prosper, he would
still be entitled to redeem thereafter. This could not be validly done. xxx The failure of petitioners to
redeem the properties after the expiration of the redemption period vests title over the property to
private respondent.[17]The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that redemption from execution sales
under ordinary judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should be made within
twelve (12) months[18]from the registration of the same xxx.[19] In Juan Mateo vs. The Court of Appeals
and Severino Alberto,  99 Phil. 1042 (unreported), the High Court categorically said that (t)he right of
redemption in execution sales being statutory, it must, to make it effective, be exercised in the mode
prescribed by the statute. We therefore find petitioners invocation of the liberal ruling of the Supreme
Court on the exercise of the right to redemption to have neither factual nor legal basis. The Court has
no alternative but to apply Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the letter.[20]
We disagree.
Paraphrasing what we trenchantly pointed out in Hermoso v. CA,[21] we test a law by its result. A
law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular sense because of its peculiar circumstances. We are
not bound to apply them in servile subservience to their language. More explicitly
. . . we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons.  We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of the law, so we were warned,
by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond them.[22] While we
admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to
reflect the will of the legislature.  While we may not read into  the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it  the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to
the letter that killeth but to the the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.
The spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent.  For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within
the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers.[23]
Stated differently, the legal perspective within which the right to redeem can still be availed of or
not must be viewed in the light of the dictum that the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat
theright of redemption.[24] In short, the statute, being remedial, is to be construed liberally to effectuate
the remedy and carry out its evident spirit and purpose.[25] Thus, the Court allowed parties in several
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
cases to perfect their right of redemption even beyond the period prescribed therefor. [26] We can do no
less vis--vis  the prevailing facts of this case for the following reasons:
First, we are confronted with the grossly and patently iniquitous spectacle of petitioners being
made to pay a money judgment amounting to P57,396.85 with their two (2) parcels of prime land
conservatively valued at that time at P500,000.00, on account of the lapse of the period given for
exercising their right despite their apparent willingness and ability to pay the money judgment. Although
this was the very fact in issue in the second case, the gross disparity of the money judgment to the
value of the levied real properties was not lost on the Court when, in Cometa v. IAC,[27] it said that
Moreover, equitable considerations constrain us to reverse the decision of the respondent court
(Intemediate Appellate Court). The fact is undisputed that the properties in question were sold at an
unusually lower price than their true value. Properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only
P57,396.85. We do not comment on the consequences of the inadequacy because that is the very
issue which confronts the court below in the pending case. It appearing, however, that the issuance of
the writ of possession would and might work injustice because the petitioner might not be entitled
thereto, we rule that it be withheld.
There is no question that petitioners were remiss in attending with dispatch to the protection of
their interests as regards the subject lots, and for that reason the case in the lower court was dismissed
on a technicality and no definitive pronouncement on the inadequacy of the price paid for the levied
properties was ever made. In this regard, it bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights as in this case. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only when for
the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
[28]
Such compelling justifications for taking exception to the general rule are strewn all over the
factual landscape of this case. Pertinently, in Dayag v. Canizares,[29] we said that
where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.  Litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. [30] xxx Given the
foregoing, it seems improper to nullify Youngs motion on a mere technicality. Petitioners
averments should be given scant consideration to give way to the more substantial matter of
equitably determining the rights and obligations of the parties. It need not be emphasized that
rules of procedure must be interpreted in a manner that will help secure and not defeat
justice.[31]  (emphasis and italics supplied)
In short, since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided. [32] Technicality should not be allowed to stand in
the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. [33] It was thus
towards this sacrosanct goal that this Court in the recent case of Paz Reyes Aguam v. CA, et al.[34] held:
. . .The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The courts primary duty is to render
or dispense justice[35] A litigation is not a game of technicalities.[36] Law suits unlike duels are not to be
16
won by a rapiers thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes
its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.[37] Litigations must be
decided on their merits and not on technicality.[38] Every party litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.[39]. . the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice.[40] It is
a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. (emphasis
and italics ours)
Second, while there is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a
judicial sale of real property, nevertheless, where the inadequacy of the price is purely shocking to the
conscience,[41] such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly or
indirectly be likely to consent to it,[42] the same will be set aside.[43] Thus, in one case,[44] the judicial sale
of land worth P60,000.00 for P867.00 was considered shocking to the conscience. So also, the sale of
properties at around 10% of their values, as when a radio worth P1,000.00 was sold for P100.00 and a
matrimonial bed costing P500.00 was sold for P50.00, the price was held to be grossly inadequate.
[45]
 How much more the judicial sale of two (2) prime commercial lots located in Guadalupe, Makati,
conservatively valued at P500,000.00 in 1987, to satisfy a money judgment of P57,396.85?
Third, the questionable manner in which the said lots were levied upon and sold at public auction
has, likewise, caught the attention of the Court. The manner of execution of money judgments is
governed by Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was then in force, thus:
SEC. 15. Execution of money judgments.  The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment
by levying on all the property, real and personal property of every name and nature whatsoever, and
which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a
sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the
judgment creditor or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in
the proceeds over the judgment and the accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor,
unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the
judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the
officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the
judgment  and costs. xxx  (emphasis and italics supplied)
In relation to the foregoing, Section 21, also of Rule 39, provides that
SEC. 21. How property sold on execution; Who may direct manner and order of sale. All sales of
property under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of
nine in the morning and five in the afternoon. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution, no more shall be sold. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known
lots,  they must be sold  separately; or, when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third
person, he may require it to be sold separately.  When the sale is of personal property capable of
manual delivery, it must be sold within view of those attending the sale and in such parcels as are likely
to bring the highest price. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which
property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such property shall consist of several known lots or
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the officer holding the execution nor his
deputy can become a purchaser, nor be interested directly or indirectly in any purchase at such sale.
(emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the subject lots were sold en masse, not separately as above provided. The
unusually low price for which they were sold to the vendee, not to mention his vehement unwillingness
to allow redemption therein, only serves to heighten the dubiousness of the transfer.
Fourth, with regard to the applicability of prescription and laches, there can be no question that
they operate as a bar in equity. However, it must be pointed out that the question of prescription or
laches can not work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. [46] As explicitly stated by this
Court in Santiago v. Court of Appeals:[47]
As for laches, its essence is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[48] But there is, to be sure, no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.  The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine,  its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. [49]  In the
case under consideration, it would not only be impractical but well-nigh unjust and patently iniquitous to
apply laches against private respondent and vest ownership over a valuable piece of real property in
favor of petitioners . . . It is the better rule that courts under the principle of equity, will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result.[50]  (Emphasis provided)
Lastly, petitioners have demonstrated, albeit tardily, an earnest and sincere desire to redeem the
subject properties when Cometas heirs, on December 4, 1997, consigned with the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Makati, the sum of P38,761.05 as purchase price for the lots, plus interest of P78,762.69
and P1,175.25 as realty tax. The rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner
of the property and the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat him in the exercise of his right of
redemption.[51] Thus, we allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption even
beyond the period prescribed therefor.[52]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 25, 1999, which affirmed the trial courts denial of petitioners right of redemption, as well as the
subsequent Resolution dated January 27, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 48227 entitled Zacarias Cometa, et
al. v. Hon. Pedro Laggui, et al.,  are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and another one hereby rendered
ordering respondent Jose Franco to accept the tender of redemption made by petitioners and to deliver
the proper certificate of redemption to the latter.
SO ORDERED.
17
GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the
remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan * City (hereafter
MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.
YAOs legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing
Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As
the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation
considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983.PEMCO
commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark
specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE
starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their
source. Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with
the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the
issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes,
each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCCs President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a
member of TCCs Board of Directors. The indictment[1] charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and
in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and
containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to
believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to
establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the
Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO
in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCOs
marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having a stenciled silk-screen printing
which includes the GE logo... back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a
condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and
examined random samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that
the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original. They also observed that
some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not
shaped like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz
added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by
PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCCs starters cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed
that the glaring differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably proved that TCCs GE
starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has
overall supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is
not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since
(1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not
attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no
participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCCs
suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with
the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[2] the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In
acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the
Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the
following: (1) YAOs admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GEs line products when he
applied with PEMCO for TCCs accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecutions evidence (Exhibit G-7),
a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel
noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were
China starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and
that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public;
(3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or
imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4)
presence of the elements of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition
under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code ... i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of
the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him identified in open
court during the trial, he is acquitted of the same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for ... PEMCO ...
Considering that no document was submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim
ofP300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court is not in a position to
make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay
PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil
Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of
another P20,000.00 as PEMCOs attorneys fees under Article 2208 (11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was
reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines.[3]
18
 YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order[4] of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order[5] directing
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[6]
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed only on 20
August 1994,[7] Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision[8] which
affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC
and stated that [a]after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration [9] and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule
20 of the Rules of Court.[10] In its order[11] of 28 September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal.[12]
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution[13] of 28 February
1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12
March 1995 within which to file the Appellants Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution[14] declaring that [t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 121, has long become final and executory and ordering the records of the case
remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the Resolution
reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20)
days from February 10, 1995, or until March 12, 1995 within which to file appellants brief.
To date, no appellants brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan
City, it would appear that:
xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTCs decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTCs
order, dated September 28, 1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAOs
motion for reconsideration were sent to and received by YAOs counsel.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case
to this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for
reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he had
one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for
review. Yao, however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC
that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15) day period had
already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire
records of the case, thru a transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal
Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAOs counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a
motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already elapsed even
when Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice
of appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995
resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no judgmenton which an
entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the
appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20)
days from 10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellants brief and in
compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellants brief on 2 March 1995.[15]
In its Resolution[16] of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set
Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having in
effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995... was proper.
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent
Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment
was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the
procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the
Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a judgment on his
appeal nor was it a final resolution contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss
his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was cured when the
RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued
19
on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellants Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within
which to file the appellants brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of
unfair competition are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a petition for
review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the
case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme
Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities; decided [the case] on
merits and not on technicalities; found manifest in the petition strong considerations of substantial
justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of technical rules, or heeded petitioners cry
for justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying
circumstances; discerned not to sacrifice justice to technicality; discovered that the application of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and or a bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for
lack of merit. It maintains that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that the
appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the
appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO
failed to challenge the RTC decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the
same with the Court of appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed
an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy
had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC
decision. It is clear from the records that YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16
August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30
August 1994, YAO opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of
the period. He received a copy of the RTCs order denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October
1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review. [18]However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of appeal. He
palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of
statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. [19] Since the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.[20] Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional.[21] Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal,[22]for it renders the
decision sought to be appealed final and executory,[23] with the end result that no court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.[24]
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAOs petition appears to be patently without merit and
does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his
petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even be
discussed here.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an
important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The
decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim.
Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao; beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20,
1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with
the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written
and even if there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based,
[25]
 as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the
modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability;
[26]
 or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information,
and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; [27] or quoted the facts
narrated in the prosecutions memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence,
before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case.[28]
20
 We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,[29] a specie of succinctly written
decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 [30] on the
grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also
declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.[31]
In Francisco v. Permskul,[32] however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of
memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation
by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum
decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the
law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will
rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an
extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and
deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to
the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as
a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet
them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is
starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and
attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its
inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it
failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an
appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34] in that
while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot
be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul,[35] where we cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional
requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at
the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears
expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in  Romero v. Court of Appeals[36] come true, i.e., if an
appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the
appellant of due process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and
responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where
not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably
a paramount component of due process and fair play.[37] It is likewise demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution.[38] The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. [39] More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in
the justness of his decision.[40]
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of
Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier
attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the
Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties
nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of
the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any
legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous;[42] consisted
merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of
parricide;[43] consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters
decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2]
sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings [44]; was merely based on the findings of another
court sans  transcript of stenographic notes;[45] or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the
award of moral damages.[46]
21
 In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently
invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong
mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford
every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities.[47]
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance, may be relaxed.[48] In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in
absurdity and manifest injustice[49] or where the merit of a partys cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, [50]procedural rules should definitely
be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.
[51]
 We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply
with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all
magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and
paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the
nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is GRANTED. The questioned
25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27
July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate
jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

22
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF MARCELA FRANCISCO, NAMELY: ROSARIO BERNARDO and PACIFICO
BERNARDO; HEIRS OF JUANA FRANCISCO NAMELY: BUENAVENTURA CRISOSTOMO,
ANDRES CRISOSTOMO, FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO; HEIRS OF BRIGIDA FRANCISCO,
NAMELY: LIWANAG JAVIER, EUDOSIA JAVIER, ANAPURA JAVIER, AURORA JAVIER,
DOMINADOR JAVIER and FRANKLIN JAVIER; and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAVITE, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition to
annul the decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite, Branch III, [2] in Reg. Case No. N-440,
LRC Rec. No. 26961. This case stems from proceedings to annul a 1965 decision of the said land
registration court which adjudicated to private respondents certain parcels of land.
The antecedents are as follows: On April 22, 1964, the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, represented
by its Mayor, Pablo G. Sarino, sold Lot Nos. 317, 318, 330 and 356, Psu-164199, with an approximate
combined area of 3.1437 hectares, located at Barrio Salinas, [3] in the said municipality, to private
respondents predecessors-in-interest for P188.20 pursuant to Act No. 3312 [4] and Municipal Resolution
No. 89 as amended by Resolution No. 289. Prior to the sale, private respondents predecessor-in-
interest, Brigida Francisco, had been in possession of the subject lot and paid the real estate taxes
thereon as early as 1907. On October 27, 1964, private respondents filed an application for land
registration before the above-mentioned CFI of Cavite, covering the aforesaid lots, docketed as LRC
Case No. N-440, LRC Record No. N-26961. On August 4, 1965, a decision was rendered adjudicating
to the applicants, herein private respondents, the subject parcels of land, as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming its previous order of general default, hereby adjudges and
decrees lots 356, 318, 319 and 330 of plain AP-1377, AP-1378, AP-1379 and AP-1380, respectively,
situated in the barrio of Salinas, municipality of Bacoor, province of Cavite, free from any liens and
encumbrances to applicants, jointly and equally in undivided shares, in the following manners:
1. to MARCELA FRANCISCO, widow 1/3 undivided share.
2. to the HEIRS OF JUANA FRANCISCO, namely:
BUENAVENTURA CRISOSTOMO, married to Librada Crisostomo;
ANDRES CRISOSTOMO, married to Esperanza Legaspi;
FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO, married to Gregorio Javier;
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, single (these four own 1/3 undivided share.)
3. to the HEIRS OF BRIGIDA FRANCISCO, namely:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
LIWANAG JAVIER, married to Anastacio Dominguez;
EUDOSIA JAVIER, married to Ernesto de la Cruz;
AMAPURA JAVIER, married to Angel Sebastian;
AURORA JAVIER, single;
DOMINADOR JAVIER, married to Luz Manalili;
FRANKLIN JAVIER, married to Elina Jose (These six own 1/3 undivided share.)
All applicants are Filipinos, of legal ages, and residents of Mabolo, Bacoor, Cavite.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Pursuant to said judgment, Decree No. N-105464 and the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. O-468 were issued on October 7, 1965.
Twenty-five years later, or on October 15, 1990, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to annul the decision of the CFI of Cavite, Decree No. N-105464 and OCT
No. 0-468 issued pursuant thereto; and to order the restoration or reversion of the subject parcels of
land to the mass of the public domain. The OSG alleged that the registration proceedings were null and
void for lack of jurisdiction because the parcels of land subject thereof were still classified as forest land,
having been released therefrom only on February 21, 1972; that the OSG was not furnished with a copy
of the application for registration and other records as mandated by Section 51, of the Public Land
Act; and that the applicants have not shown possession and occupation of the lands in the manner and
for the length of time required by section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. On August 13,
1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, dismissing for lack of merit as aforesaid, the petition
to annul the Decision dated August 4, 1965 of the CFI of Cavite, Br. III in Reg. Case No. N-440, LRC
Rec. No. 26961.[6] The Court of Appeals ruled that by virtue of Act 3312 enacted by the Philippine
Legislature on December 2, 1926, the subject lots were previously classified as communal in character;
that the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents were able to purchase subject lots as
authorized by said Act; that there is no question about the validity of Act 3312 especially the power of
the Philippine Legislature at that time to authorize the sale of land then classified as communal land;
and that the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents acquired the subject lots pursuant to this
law and their right has acquired the sanctity of a vested right which cannot be adversely affected by the
subsequent passage of C.A. 141.
Hence, the instant petition questioning whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) relying
solely on Act No. 3312 as basis for its conclusion that subject lots are alienable and disposable, in total
disregard of the Public Land Act; (2) in holding that the registration court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
subject lots as private property of private respondents predecessors-in-interest despite their being
communal lands and, hence, not agricultural lands subject to disposition; (3) in holding that a vested
right had been acquired by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent over the subject lots
23
which could no longer be affected by the Public Land Act; (4) in not finding that the Office of the Solicitor
General was never furnished with a copy of the application and other records in the registration
proceedings as mandated by Section 51 of the Public Land Act; (5) in considering as non-issue the lack
of approval of the provincial board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
the sale of subject lots to private respondents predecessors-in-interest; (6) in not declaring that the
subject lots were only classified and released as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in
February, 1972, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the registration court; (7) in not holding that the
applicants predecessors-in-interest had no registrable title over the subject lots at the time the same
were adjudicated to them by the registration court; (8) in not declaring the sale of the subject lots by the
municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, a mere trustee thereof, as void ab initio for lack of approval or consent of
the provincial board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by
law.
As the Court sees it, the assigned errors cognizable by this Court may be reduced into the
following, to wit:
1. Whether the sale of communal lands of the Municipality of Bacoor to private respondents
predecessors-in-interest was authorized by law; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the parcels of land covered
by the decree issued on October 7, 1965 pursuant to the decision of said court of August
4, 1965.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First of all, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Act No. 3312, known as the   Act Authorizing
the Sale of the Communal Lands in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, and for other
purposes, which was enacted into law on December 2, 1926, was the law governing the sale and
acquisition by private respondents of the subject parcels of land. It provided:
SECTION 1. The sale to private parties of the communal lands situated in the municipality of Bacoor,
Province of Cavite, Philippine Islands, and held in trust by the municipal council thereof for the benefit of
the inhabitants of said municipality, is hereby authorized: Provided, That the present tenants and
lessees of the different parcels composing said lands shall have the right to buy their respective
leaseholds subject to such rules and regulations which shall be adopted by the municipal council of
Bacoor subject to the approval of the Provincial Board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources: Provided, further, That if any parcel of land is the subject of litigation in court the
sale thereof shall be suspended until after the litigation is finally terminated.
xxx xxx xxx.
ACT 3312 authorized and recognized the sale of communal lands in the municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, to qualified applicants. By express declaration of Section 1 of Act 3312 quoted above, lands
designated as communal lands of the municipality of Bacoor were open to disposition to private
parties. Pursuant thereto, the Municipality of Bacoor issued Resolution No. 289, Series of 1962,
entitled, A Resolution to Amend Resolution No. 89, Series of 1956 Authorizing the Sale of Communal
Lands in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, and Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the
Purpose of Implementing the Provisions of Philippine Legislature Act No. 3312 as approved on
December 2, 1926. Among others, Resolution No. 289 imposed as conditions, the following: 1. Buyers
should be tenants and lessees as of December 2, 1926 of the different parcels composing said lands as
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
recorded in the communal lands register in the Office of the Mayor; and 2. they must pay the
corresponding rental in arrears and other obligations due to the municipality. Presumably, with no proof
to the contrary shown, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents have met all the
requirements of the law and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto for the execution of the
sale.
Notably, petitioners petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals contended that the
decree in favor of the private respondents was issued at the time when the subject land was still forest
land, based primarily on the Final Report of Investigation of Senior Land Management Officer Romeo B.
Manicat dated December 28, 1989. According to his report, the subject parcels of land were found,
among others, to be within the forest zone at the time they were adjudicated to the applicants by the
land registration court in 1965, as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 2376 under Project No. 6-
A.However, a scrutiny of the foregoing documents fails to conclusively establish the actual classification
of the land prior to its release as alienable and disposable in February 21, 1972. The aforesaid Land
Classification Map drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1965 merely shows that the
subject lots were part of Project 6-A, a big tract of land in Bacoor, Cavite which was certified and
declared as alienable or disposable land on February 21, 1972 under Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1253. Contrary to petitioners posture, the Report of Senior Land Management Officer Romeo B.
Manicat who conducted an investigation of the parcels of land does not prove the real nature and
character of the subject lots at the time of their sale and registration. In fact, he indicated in said report
that the lands were cleared, converted into a modern community, with permanent improvements. More
important, the subject lots were previously classified as communal lands, which were then held in trust
by the Municipal Council of Bacoor, Cavite, for the benefit of the inhabitants of said municipality. The
private respondents were able to purchase the same pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Resolution No. 289
of the Municipal Council of Bacoor prescribing the Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Act
3112.
Secondly, it is error to say that private respondents, as qualified applicants, could no longer avail
of the benefits of Act 3312, due to the subsequent passage of C.A. 141. True, the sale was perfected
and consummated only on April 22, 1964 and the application for registration was filed only on October
27, 1964. But we agree with the Court of Appeals that the right of private respondents had already
acquired the sanctity of vested or acquired rights which cannot be defeated or adversely affected by the
passage of C.A. 141. The right was vested by the fact that their predecessors-ininterest have been
occupying the said communal lands embraced by the law since 1907, as found by the registration
court. While petitioner contests this finding of fact, we cannot depart from the well-entrenched rule that
uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
are binding upon the Supreme Court. [7] Further, review by the Supreme Court in a petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law.[8]
Thirdly, we are not persuaded by petitioners argument that Act 3312 was repealed by C.A.
141. According to petitioner, as between Act No. 3312, an earlier enactment passed by the Philippine
Legislature on December 2, 1926, on one hand, and C.A. 141, enacted on November 7, 1936 on the
other, the latter should prevail over the former because the assailed disposition of the subject lots took
place in 1964-65, or at a time when C.A. 141 had long been in force and effect.  Petitioner adds that
while the sale of communal lands situated in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, was authorized under
Act No. 3312, the same should now bow to C.A. 141 limiting the disposition of the lands of the public
domain only to agricultural lands. There can be no implied repeal of Act 3312 by the subsequent
enactment of C.A. 141 as it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored.[9] If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is
to so express it.[10] The Public Land Act is a general law governing the administration and disposition of
24
the lands of the public domain; while Act 3312 is a special law on the sale of lands designated as
communal situated in the Municipality of Bacoor in Cavite. The presumption against implied repeal is
stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general; and this rule applies even though the
terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special statute.
[11]
 Therefore, we apply the rule that unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first and
fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. [12] The other issues raised by petitioner pertaining to
the non-transmittal of the records in the registration proceedings to the Solicitor General and that the
sale did not bear the approval of the Provincial Board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources deserve scant consideration as these are not jurisdictional prerequisites for the valid
exercise of jurisdiction by a court in a land registration case. It must be stated that a petition to annul
judgment which is void, is anchored on want of jurisdiction or that it has been obtained by extrinsic
fraud.[13] Conformably with this rule, the issues raised must be limited to a discussion of lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
Finally, the Republic as petitioner, does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the said
parcels of land had already been declared alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion in
favor of the Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to
other private persons. It would be grave injustice and would not serve any declared national land policy
to dispossess private respondents of the said parcels of land at this point, where possession has been
found to date as far back as 1907, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered
thereby to subsequent applicants.[14] Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was
released in 1972. In a few more months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions
they adversely possess through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or good faith, pursuant to
the Civil Code.[15]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and challenged judgment of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

25
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
LAMP vs The Secretary of Budget and Management, et al. GR No. 164987
DECISION
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for
in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country,[1] also sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing
budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP
likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the
questioned provision.
On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed
a Reply thereto.[2] On April 26, 2005, both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated
hereunder ₱8,327,000,000.00
Xxxxx
 
Special Provision
 
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to
fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-
assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released
directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit
concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be
realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE,
That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be
used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased
from the National Food Authority.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Petitioners Position
 
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were
the main features of the pork barrel system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004). [3] In its
memorandum, LAMP insists that [t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by
members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to
scrap and do away with the pork barrel system.[4] In other words, [t]he omission of the PDAF provision
to specify sums as allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus signifying an
omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply.[5] Hence, LAMP is of the
conclusion that the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004.[6]
 
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the
DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual
Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which
projects are to be actually funded by PDAF.
 
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect
intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the
appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress
cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayers money. [7] Further,
the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction,[8] and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
nothing less than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making
26
of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are appropriations for substantially similar, if not the

Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not same, beneficial purposes, [14] the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,[15] where CDF was

include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are described as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority

to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual

Executive Department.[9] By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely

fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of Congress far

implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant. more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the

Respondents Position needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

   
[10]
For their part, the respondents  contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual

grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,[11] they argue that the former should The Issues

not be equated with pork barrel, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring to government  

projects affording political opportunism.[12] In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and

gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial reviewan actual case

conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant or controversy.

consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes  

from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the The Courts Ruling

supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is  

a source of dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites

allocations. These facts have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of

public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the claim that PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF allocations  

and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
[13]
budget for a particular project.   Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial

PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject

barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such

from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause. that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

27
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
[16]
the very lis mota of the case.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United
States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of
the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.  In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.[17]
 
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute,
as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of directallocation and release of funds to
the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of
the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of
public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding
of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn,
cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.
 
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of
advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the
implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution.
For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of
Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal
expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of
government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be
discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
before the Court.
Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. [18]  The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[19] In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person, and could be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer. [20] Thus,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[21] Of greater import than the damage caused by
the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[23] is authority in support of the
petitioner:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.]
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
28
  on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but

Now, on the substantive issue. also of the executive which approved it.[27] This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only

  by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it

Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.[28]

another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the

unconstitutional.[24] The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of unconstitutionality of the PDAFs enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA

government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latters encroachment on executive power in

capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack
[25]
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of

  funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not

With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question: In even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress

allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of

own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a

violate the Constitution or the laws? common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners

  request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like

The Court rules in the negative. this, the Courts hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court

  commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie. [29] Again, newspaper or electronic

presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Farias v. The Executive Secretary, reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, not because of any
[26]
 the Court held that: issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established

  in accordance with the rules of evidence.[30]

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further  Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was
than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every
committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold
presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden
of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment
the Constitution.
and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004. The process was explained in this wise,
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
in Guingona v. Carague:[31]
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
 
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based
29
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
 1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive
Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. The DBM lays down the guidelines for
budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available
the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to
revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and
activities into expenditure levels. recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of
Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the
Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC). reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic the priorities set by the Executive.[33] This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and
foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for
all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court
following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the
law.
xxx Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said
obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds
releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary
comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual process remain intact.
performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired
While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils
and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency
budgets were approved. propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and
 
arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option
that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. [32] While the budgetary process commences from
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible
the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by
bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
and purposes.Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to
adopted.[34]
objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this
execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of
petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons.   
the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending
30
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. 196425               July 24, 2012
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-
officio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and
Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office
of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from administratively proceeding against
petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent
portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(a) x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its
agencies or instrumentalities xxx
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or hearing,
the Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the
penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS
INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote
economy and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the
Philippines to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the National Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or
integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National Government, as well as, expand,
amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act
of 2010) authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or key
positions in any department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
31
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and
efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the
President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive
Department including heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and other
powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In
addition to the Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and duties
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be
affected by the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under existing
laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the
necessary funds for the benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel,
Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition
or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in
accordance with the applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing EO 72
(Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the President) dated March 15, 2002.
The winding up shall be implemented not later than 31 December 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management, shall ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and
winding-up of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio
Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course
of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following
grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE
TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE
TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized
under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct
office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to
create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies
but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process requirement and
equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
32
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for
such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's authority to
carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by
the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power
– that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in
this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.
(Emphasis supplied)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or
a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way
around.7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the
Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or
merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of
EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and
Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also
insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions
undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under
E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the
other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292
for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the
abolition of an office but the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid
down by the Court in several cases does a reorganization include the act of creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization
33
required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre,12 We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued
in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy
and efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the
President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating
corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the
economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially
appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual budget,14 no separate or added
funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the
IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and
maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's
Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since
Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to
be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal
appropriation by the President. The contention is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend
the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the necessary
authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency in the executive
department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.17 Hence, the express
recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s
authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency."
The aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes
the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which
is, "even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in
other items of the appropriation for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department
which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for
the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing
any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds
when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his
office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to
the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to
administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof
itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory"
appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited
to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13
explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President."24The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to
the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth
Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the
Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
34
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive
department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the
earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is
only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the
investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to –
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-
ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate
both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means
exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and
the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is
limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until
acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional
duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of
the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the
arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying
upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form
of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.29 It is embraced under the due process concept
and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."30 The equal protection clause,
however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive
Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis
supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds
from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline
is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove
and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such
public officials and look into their conduct in office.33 Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the
high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his
informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in
government. In Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial
distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power
of the people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of
the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed
officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,35 which simply means
having the opportunity to explain one’s side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to
explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with
35
because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that
petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to
the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite
notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA.
Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality

cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had
unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been
presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's
duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS
indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.

36
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent,
to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of
December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were
issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy
to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen
(14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining
the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for
bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed
with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said
assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
37
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied
by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time
that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision
on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even
in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2)
the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty
of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have
been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the
other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained
in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the principles set forth in that Declaration
are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among
the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.
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 First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to
secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him
as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not
a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the
Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if
the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing
its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
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convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section
20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may
be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of
the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings,
the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of
flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda  demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
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An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the
trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

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