1

Inside India’s Army

Ali Ahmed

Ali Ahmed, PhD (JNU), PhD (Cantab.) has been an infantry

officer, an academic and an international civil servant.
He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in and tweets
@aliahd66.
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For comrades in olive green

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Contents
1. Right Wing Ascendance In India And The Politicisation Of India’s Military
2. Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority Lessons from the Gujarat Carnage
3. Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir
4. Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’
5. The Missing Muslim Army Officers
6. Whose army is it anyway?
7. Questioning afresh Indian military’s social representativeness
8. An Army Day resolution for the new chief
9. The land warfare doctrine: The army's or that of its Chief?
10. The army's two impulses in Kashmir: Human rights Doctrine and departures
11. Human Rights: All so unfortunately ho-hum
12. A police wallah as proto Chief of Defence Staff
13. Spiking possibilities: What is the army chief up to?
14. Contextualising the army chief’s news making
15. Selectivity in military justice
16. Command responsibility in relation to good faith
17. Opening up the cantonments: Army in the cross hairs of the right
18. The army chief as regime spokeman?
19. The Hindutva project and India's military
20. Budget let down further strains army-government relations
21. A revolt of the generals?
22. A political army or an apolitical one?
23. Dissension in the top brass?
24. The General is at it again
25. Debating the ‘harder military approach’
26. An Army to fear: The Army’s future?
27. The Gogoi award puts General Rawat on test
28. To the army: Any gentlemen left please?
29. Dark side of Army’s social media groups
30. Internal security duties in their impact on the army
31. Saluting Bipin Rawat but with a caveat
32. The army officer corps: Missing Muslims
33. Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha Ventures Further Than he Should
34. Yoga as prelude to politicization of the military
35. Look who’s doing yoga now
36. Handwara: Going Beyond SOPs
37. What a short, swift war means for the Infantry
38. The military musical chairs
39. Challenges of the brass in a political minefield
40. Doctrine in Civil-Military Relations
41. Where veterans refuse to give up
42. Is the army court’s verdict on the Machhil killings enough?
43. Kashmir: Hooda walks the talk
44. Kashmir : Politicisation of security and its consequences
45. Modi and the Military
46. Wearing Religion on their Uniform Sleeves
47. The Army: Missing Muslim India
48. Why are Muslims Missing From Army?
49. Fixing Responsibility CI Decisions and Consequences
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50. AFSPA: A Question of Justice

51. Do We Need a Chief Warlord?
52. The Sub-Unit Cries for Army Attention
53. Civil-Military Relations: Questioning the VK Singh Thesis
54. Readings for Officers
55. A General’s Unforgettable Legacy
56. Army ‘Transformation’: A ‘Radical’ One?
57. The Third Front: Military Ethics
58. Civil-Military Relations: Under Scan
59. The Army’s Decade in Review
60. The Central Debate in India’s Civil Military Relations
61. Politicisation: In the Context of the Indian Military
62. The Coming Threat of Politicisation
63. India’s Brass: What the Controversy Misses
64. The Military at the High Table?
65. Modi and the Military: Not Quite an Innocent
66. The LoC Incident Calls for Self-Regulation by the Army
67. Countering Insurgency and Sexual Violence
68. Dear General, Please Stay Out of Politics
69. Interrogating Security Expansionism in India
70. The Indian Army: Organizational Changes in the Offing
71. An Issue in Civil-Military Relations
72. Soldiers, not servants
73. Expanding too fast?
74. Uncivil war in South Block
75. An age-old lesson
76. The ‘Age’ of misjudgement
77. Defence reforms: The next phase
78. The Army’s right to its opinion
79. Initiatives to Transform the Army Officer Corps
80. The New Chief and Transformation
81. The Military in Kashmir The Debate Between the Generals
82. An Unacknowledged Vested Interest in a
83. The Army’s Subculture in the Coming Decade
84. The government versus the military
85. Rethinking Civilian Control
86. How deep is the rot?
87. The Indian Army: crisis within
88. Politicisation and the Indian military
89. Hail to the new chief
90. Security agenda: 2006 and beyond
91. Menu for the New Chief
92. Chief of Defense : Implications
93. Elevate Human Rights As the Core Organising
94. Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle: The Organisational Factor
95. Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Service Subcultures
96. Extract from article: ‘Borders and other such lines’, Journal of Peace Studies
97. Review: Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A
Perspective on Human Rights, Strategic Analysis, 35:3 May 2011
98. Review: K.S. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict
99. Countering Insurgency In J&K: Debates in The Indian Army
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Foreword
I have put together my commentaries and articles that dwell on aspects covered by the field of military
sociology. Military sociology is not unfamiliar to India’s national security community, with the famous
Krishna Menon-Thimayya episode being a case to point. Yet, it’s a subject with a rather low profile, no
doubt because of the Indian military’s quest to stay out of, if not above, politics and at a distance from
society, best illustrated by its cantonments. However, its visibility is much less than should be the case in a
democratic society.

Taken collectively, the 99 commentaries here argue that this inattention to the military’s place in a
democratic society – owing to its willing subordination to the civilian sphere – has led to overlooking
perhaps one of the most significant changes within the military – a tendency towards the right wing ideology
that has over the past three decades permeated society. This is understandable, since with society taking a
marked turn to the Right, it is not unlikely that a democratic military can but be a step behind.

Even so, this is an anti-democratic development with constitutional implications. We have witnessed over
the past six years of the right wing regime’s sway over power, a dramatic fall of democratic and state
institutions. The military has proven an exception in that it is only – at the time of writing – in the process
of succumbing. These articles, written over the past fifteen years, trace the manner the military has been
suborned by the right wing. The culmination has been over the last year, evidenced in its marginalization
as merely a militant killing machine in Kashmir and but a border guarding force in Ladakh.

The articles in the main discuss civil-military relations, the troubling aspect of which is in the military
susceptible to subscribing to the ‘nationalist’ ideology of those in power. The major take-away is that this
puts it at odds with the democratic system of alternation in power. This was mildly visible in the earlier
period of the United Progressive Alliance in which the military was forever foot-dragging, be it in allowing
peace initiatives in Kashmir to culminate or over demilitarizing Siachen.

Another major theme is the lack of representativeness of the military in that the articles capture the
phenomenon of the military keeping India’s largest minority out. This has to be boldly said up front since
playing footsie with the compelling statistics that underlie this claim is no longer possible. In short, with a
dramatic right wing turn combined with the Muslim minority missing from its ranks, the military is only
secular in name. In short, we are almost there, where the Hindutva ideologues, under-gridding the strategic
establishment of this regime, want India to be.

On this count, this book is important. The compilation of articles that have appeared at various web-portals
when put together between two covers, as here, make clear that the penultimate bastion of the state – the
judiciary being the last (but one which has already bitten the dust) - is falling. As to whether the situation
is retrievable, I leave it for readers in their capacity as voters to answer. The book compilation is an effort
towards reversing the trend towards a Hindu army of a Hindu India.
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Right Wing Ascendance in India and The Politicisation of India’s Military

12 February 2020
http://yearbook.uran.ru/images/files/4-19_5.pdf
Russian Academy of Sciences, Ural Branch

Abstract:
The rise to taking over state power after elections of 2014 by majoritarian forces in India
has since witnessed weakening of institutions of governance. The ruling Bhartiya Janata
Party [BJP] has returned to power with an enhanced parliamentary majority in the 2019
elections. The rise of hindutva [Hindu-ness], the Hindu nationalist political philosophy of
the formations comprising the BJP and the Sangh parivaar [organizational family of the
Sangh] or affiliates of the right wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh[RSS], has reshaped
the discourse on the ‘idea of India’. Under the extensive reframing in majoritarian
nationalist terms of Indian political verities, it is conceivable that the Indian military,
widely regarded as a professional, apolitical and secular force, will also be impacted.

There has been little academic scrutiny of the possible influence of majoritarianism on
the Indian military. The paper examines impact of the onset of majoritarianism
democracy on India’s military by taking a close look at the movement in civil-military
relations under the BJP government. There is a shift in civil-military relations from
objective civilian control, that enhances professionalism and keeps the military apolitical,
to subjective civilian control, wherein the military is co-opted through subscribing to the
ideology-based security perspective of the ruling party. This shift poses for the military a
risk of losing their apolitical ethic. Erosion of the apolitical ethic of the military will open
up the military’s secular ethic to modification.

The conclusions are both relevant for policy and theory. The relevance for policyliesin
the need for the Indian state and the military to preserve professionalism by persisting
with the objective civilian control model. The theoretical relevance is in discerning limits
to the concept of obedience of the military to the civilian political rulers. Where there is a
threat from a political ideology or its penetration into the military’s intellectual domain
with the potential to dilute the military’s professionalism, the military needs to pushback
for the sake of national security.

Introduction
The Indian military is widely regarded as professional, which is defined in civil–military theory as
embodying expertise, corporate autonomy and social responsibility [Huntington 1967: 8–18]. In
addition, India’s military also has a reputation for being apolitical [Cohen 1971: 166-67, 176] and
secular. Its apolitical ethic has long distinguished it from peer militaries since historically it has
stayed out of politics [Wilkinson 2015: 3; Cohen 2010: 5]. Its secular ethic is its being imbued
with the notable Indian cultural value of secularism enshrined in the Constitution’s preamble
[Ogden 2017: 13-14]. Of late there are concerns over the possible erosion in this apolitical and
secular ethic.
As regards secularism, the apprehensions of a revision in India’s approach to secularism
renewed with the votaries of hindutva [Hindu-ness] or cultural nationalism gaining power in
2014.It was accompanied by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attaining a parliamentary
majorityfor the first time in thirty years[Ogden 2017: 19]. The ideological dominance facilitated
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by power has enabled reelection of the ruling party in 2019 with more votes than in 2014. The
normalization of the world view of the BJP has shifted the high ground in Indian politics towards
their ideas, which has “lastingly altered the Indian political landscape” [Ogden 2017: 19]. It is
possible to predict the incorporation of cultural nationalist verities into the Indian political culture
in its second term [Chandra 2019].
Hindutva is a concept articulated by its leading adherent, VD Savarkar, as defining the Hindu
nation along the lines of special geography, a common language, a shared culture and belief in
the native land as a holy land [Ahmed, H. 2019: 66-67]. The contours of the majoritarian
national project of the right wing have been described by a political scientist as:“[I]deologically
adherent to Hindutva [“Hindu-ness”] and premised on Brahmanical dominance, Hindu
nationalists are amplifying their seemingly irreversible crusade to render India into a Hindu state
[Chatterjee 2019: 398].” The change in political culture is evident from the dropping of the word
“secularism” from the 2019 election manifesto of the leading opposition party, the Congress,
[Business Standard 2019]. The common observation is that the opposition has taken to “soft
hindutva” for its electoral calculations, suggestive of the near hegemonic status of the cultural
nationalist ideology in electoral politics [Palsikar 2019: 101].
The argumentand scope
In theory, there are two options of civilian control over the military. Objective civilian control is
the “maximisation of military professionalism” in order to keep it politically “sterile and neutral.”
On the other hand, subjective civilian control is maximisation of the power of a particular civilian
group in relation to the military [Huntington 1967: 80–85]. Objective civilian control underpins
professionalism. Subjective civilian control entails subscription to the ideological orientation of
their civilian political masters by the military. Ideology is “a set of values and attitudes oriented
about the problems of state [Huntington 2005: 90].”Since political parties differ in ideological
orientations, in a democratic polity the military needs to maintain its ideological neutrality, easing
its deference to civilian authority of any ideological hue.
Thus far, Indian civil–military relations have largely been characterised by objective civilian
control, wherein the military is kept distant from politics by an emphasis on its professionalism.
India has been close to the Huntingtonian ideal of mutually respected political–military distance,
wherein militaries restrict lobbying to such military-relevant matters as budgets, pay, weapons
acquisition etc [Kundu 1998: 1]and protecting bureaucratic turf, without overly indulging in policy
activism. On this aspect, Stephen Cohen’s observation of the early years of Independence, is
that, “[T]o officers [in the Indian Army at least] profession comes first, and “politics” finds no
place[Cohen 1971: 195].”
The paper discusses politicization by visualizing the cultural space as three nested circles:
political, strategic and organizational culture. The three nested circles, with political culture at
the outer layer and organizational culture in the core, have inter-permeable boundaries. Political
culture provides the top-down context for strategic culture or political-military culture. Strategic
culture is also subject to a bottom-up influence from the military’s organizational culture [Kier
1997].
Culture is collectively held at a national-societal-community level as “a set of unselfconscious
assumptions as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable and rarely debated part of the
structure of the world” [Kier 1997: 26]. Political culture includes “commitment to values like
democratic principles and institutions, ideas about morality and the use of force, the rights of
individuals and collectives, or predispositions toward the role of a country in global politics”
[Lantis 2002: 90]. The ruling party operating on a mix of authoritarianism, majoritarianism,
nationalism and populism [Jaffrelot 2019: 4], is undertaking a makeover of India.The New India
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– a phrase coined by Prime Minister Narndra Modi - fostered by the “Hindu nationalist
dominance to establish a majoritarian state in India [Jaffrelot 2019: 1],” may require more of the
military than political inertness. The difference in political culture with right wing ascendance is
in hindutva papering over shared divisions by emphasis on a shared religion. It is attempting to
homogenize Hinduism, otherwise differentiated into several castes and sects.
Political culture impacts strategic culture. Strategic culture is an ideational milieu, setting
pervasive strategic preferences for a state based on widely held concepts of roles and efficacy
of use of force in political affairs by its political and strategic elites [Johnston 1995: 46].
Apprehending a consequent national weakness, the ruling formations have alongside militarized
the social and cultural spaces. Militarism in strategic policy is also much in evidence. Riding on
the back of an upward economic trajectory, military modernization over this century has
recreated Indian military power. This has enabled a shift in strategic culture from strategic
restraint [Cohen 2010: 13] to strategic proactivism in the Modi era, best signified by the surgical
strikes [Ahmed 2016].
Strategic culture abuts organisational culture, which is, “the patterns of assumptions, ideas, and
beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to external environment and manage its internal
structure [Legro 1994: 115].” Since military culture comprises “beliefs and norms about the
optimal means to fight wars [Legro 1994: 109],” organisational culture has an autonomous
influence on military preferences.There are two routes for political cultural impact on
organizational culture: one being the direct influence of political cultural change on the military’s
organizational culture; and second, is through mediation by an intervening strategic culture.
Since the military, as a political community, is resident within a larger political community, its
host society, it is affected by the dominant tendencies within the larger national community
[Rosen 1996: 267]. So far, India’s military as a technical and professional group maintained an
isolation from society – best signified by its inhabiting cantonments distinct from local
communities – not only due to inertia since the days of its origin as a British colonial institution,
but also in order to keep away from the social and political tumult. Rapid political cultural change
is voiding old verities. There is a collapse among the three circles with a monocular – saffron-
political culture engulfing organizational culture, impacting the latter’s apolitical and secular
facets.
The paper only briefly probes for changes in secularism, though a detailed study is separately
needed. Secularism has been under redefinition by cultural nationalism [Chandhoke 2019: 538].
Briefly, the incidence of cultural nationalist thinking has not been unknown in the military. Omar
Khalidi, taking a sociological look at the military of the nineties, made critical observations on
this score [Khalidi 2003: 38-40]. The trend is a continuing distancing from civic nationalism
towards religion-based ethnic nationalism [Ansari 2019].The hindutva version of secularism is
not based on respect of plurality stemming from India’s diversity, but on the belief that India is
secular since Hinduism issecular [Noorani 2019: 376].
The military is predominantly Hindu in social composition. The military’s sociological
composition is unrepresentative of India’s social diversity [Rosen 1996: 206, 239; Jaffrelot 2019:
43-46]. While numbers are not in the open domain, Muslims comprise about three per cent of
the army and less than two per cent of the more consequential officer corps [Ahmed 2018].
Even so, this does not ipso facto imply the military need be any more receptive to hindutva or
political Hinduism.
Hindutva doctrine is essentially politicized Hinduism, a reactionary version of the syncretic
Hindu faith.A case to point on the drawbacks is brought out in Christine Fair’s work [2014] on
the Islamisation of the Pakistan army in the years of President Zia ul Haq. Drawing analogy by
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likening political Hinduism with political Islam, it is averred here that diluted professionalism, or
departure from modern rational-legal norms,could accrue in case of India too.
Methodology and layout
The paper is a qualitative study based on secondary sources. The paper takes the rise of the
political Right in Indian politics as an independent variable and the military’s professionalism as
the dependent variable. There are two intervening variables within the military’s organizational
culture: apolitical ethic and secularism. To observe the impact of hindutva on the organizational
culture, the paper confines itself to observations on the apolitical ethic. It presents the shift from
objective to subjective civilian control as evidence of implications of hindutva for the apolitical
ethic. Change in the intervening variable - apolitical ethic - can be expected to herald a change
in the sister ethic, secularism [discussed briefly in the paper].
The paper has two parts. In Part I, it undertakes a case study of the February 2019 crisis
between India and Pakistan and the immediate aftermath[Nuclear Crisis Group 2019] to
highlight changes in the apolitical ethic of India’s military.This part highlights the manner in
which the military has supported the government’s political interests by egregiously intervening
in the then ongoing election-relevant debates. In Part II, itdiscussespermeation ofhindutva into
organizational culture.As evidence of a direct route of such penetration, the paper presents an
article published in a professional journalof a training institution of the army wherein the author,
the head of the institution,reveals political polarization within the military[Ghura 2018].A brief
sub-section carries illustrative examples of presence of right wing trope in Indian military
professional journals.

Part I - Case study on the India-Pakistan crisis

The political contention

In the run-up to the 2019 national elections, over 150 veterans of the armed forces wrote an
open domain letter to the President of India [Wire 2019a]. Noting the references to military
operations in electioneering, in particular by the ruling party, the letter expressed apprehensions
over the politicisation of the military.The letter served the purpose of bringing the threat of
politicization of the military into the open.
In the run up to the 2019 elections, persuasive narratives spelling a challenge for the BJP built
up around such issues as unemployment, the effects of demonetisation, the implementation of
the goods and services tax, farmers’ suicides, rural distress etc.[1] However, as the elections
approached, the game changer turned out to be the Balakot aerial strike by India on 26
February 2019. The aerial strikewas the first one inside Pakistan since the 1971 War, Balakot
being inside Khyber Pukhtunistan province. Aerial targeting of an alleged terrorist training facility
was conducted by India in retaliation for the 16 Februarycar-borne improvised explosive device
attackon theIndian security convoyin Pulwama in Kashmir that resulted in44 troopers as
casualties.[2]
On the campaign trail, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took credit for the strikes. He had been
rather critical of the preceding Congress-led government’s response - or lack thereof - to the
Mumbai terror attack, 26/11, in November 2008.[3]His posturing over security in the election
run-up met with the opposition’s protests to the election commission that thatviolated the model
code of conduct. The election commission found nothing amiss, though, as it later turned out, its
decision lacked consensus.[4]Over subsequent days, the government’s version was exposed by
international media as lacking substance.[5] This led to the pushback by the opposition seeking
to undercut the ruling party.
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The BJP’s election strategy had precedence in its similarly playing up the land-based surgical
strikes of 29 September 2016, whenacross a wide front the army had launched multiple trans-
Line of Control [LC]raids on terrorists’ camps in retaliation to the terror attack on the army
garrison at Uri on 18 September 2016.[6] In the event, Pakistandenied those had ever
takenplace.[7]The surgical strikes wereput to political use by the ruling party in state elections in
Uttar Pradesh in February 2017, resulting in its sweeping victory. The government hyped up the
surgical strikes yet again in 2018, this time by observing Parakram Parv, Surgical Strike
Day,[8]as elections to three cow-dust belt state assemblies – Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh - loomed large. Nevertheless, later in the year, the BJP lost the three assembly
elections narrowly, setting the stage for the national elections.
The BJP, seemingly checked, was looking out for an opportunity to reframe the election
narrative away from issues of governance. The opportunity came in the form of the Pulwama
terror attack, allowing it to use its bold retaliation at Balakot to elevate national securityas the
core election issue. To assert its strong-on-defence credentials, it also undertook an anti-
satellite weapons test, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi using an address to the nation to
proclaim the success of the test.[9]Sensing the reframing of the electoral agenda, the opposition
Congress party claimed that while in power it had similarly launched trans-LC raids[Scroll 2019].
It specified six such strikes, with former commanders testifying along the same lines in the
media.
The army’s partisanship
In so far as the claims and counter claims played out between the two political parties, it could
be taken as par for electioneering course. However, the military joined the electoral debate on
the side of the government. Whether it was put to it by the government or its action was at its
own behest is unknown. In either case, it was a political intervention on the part of the military.
In the case of the controversy surrounding the surgical strikes, the military contested the version
of a retired general who had conducted the September 2016 surgical strikes. Retired General
DS Hooda had been critical of the government for overhyping the surgical strikes. Hooda had
been contracted by the opposition Congress party to write up its national security doctrine.[10]
The Congress party wary of being accused of being soft on security used Hooda’s doctrinal
ideas to inform its manifesto to pep up its electoral prospects.In response, the northern army
commander, Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh, argued that surgical strikes helped
tocommunicate deterrence to Pakistan.[11]The controversy resurfaced as voting came to an
end. Contradicting the Congress’ claims on overseeing surgical strikes in its time in power, the
army operations branchclaimed that it had no record of any previous surgical strikes[Bhat 2019].
The northern army commander, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, seconded the operations
branch[Business Standard 2019], yet again at odds with the claim of his predecessor, retired
General DS Hooda.[12]
This indirect public exchange at the election time between a former and a serving general - with
the serving general, Singh, contradicting the retired one, Hooda, associated with the opposition
party -is an instance of politicization.[13]It is not known whether General Ranbir Singh was
acting at his own behest or was put to it by his political masters who wanted to refute the
authoritative voice of retired General Hooda seen as favouring the opposition. In either case, it
amounts to an intervention by the army relying on its professional credibility and credible image
in the public eye to back the ruling party’s caseand is, therefore, an avoidable departure from its
apolitical tradition.
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The air force plays partisan

A similar departure from the apolitical credo can be made out from the controversy surrounding
the Balakot episode and its immediate aftermath in a counter aerial strike by Pakistan in the
Rajauri-Naushera sector on 27 February 2019. India lost a fighter plane in the dogfight and
claimed to have shot down a Pakistani F-16. An information war with Pakistan resulted
fromthat.[14] India subsequently awarded a combat medal to the pilot of its downed aircraft for
having shot down a superior Pakistani fighter jet prior to bailing out in Pakistani territory. [He
was later repatriated by Pakistan in a gesture that de-escalated the crisis.] The election time
gain for the BJP is its image of a new, muscular India , which was provided bythe narrative of
exacting a higher damage on Pakistan for the loss of its Mig 21 fighter jet. The air force’s
lending credibility to the narrative – of having shot down an F-16 - amounts to political
partisanship since it obscures its loss of an aircraft.
In addition, a major controversy played out in the national media over alleged procedural lapses
in the acquisition of the Rafale jet aircraft from France. The Rafale aircraft purchase was fast-
forwarded by the prime minister during his visit to Paris in 2015. The modified deal led to fewer
aircraftsto bepurchased than in the original agreement. The departures from the procedures this
entailed led to allegations of benefits from the linked offset contract going to a corporate house
allegedly favoured by the ruling party. In the event, a controversial ruling by the Supreme Court
in the government’s favour stoppedfurther attempts.[15]
As the controversy unfolded at the political level, the air chief publicly rued the absence of the
Rafale aircraft[Peri 2019]inthe inventory. The implicit criticism was that non-realizationof the
deal in a timely manner deprived India of a technological edge. This was suggestive of a
slovenly approach to defence procurements by the Congress-led predecessor government,
which had long negotiated over the deal without finalizing it. In contrast, the BJP had it that the
lack of aircrafts was caused bythe Prime Minister Modi’s decisive intervention in the Rafale
purchase when he clinched the deal in his trip to France in 2015., In the process,he generated
the controversy over the off-sets clause of the deal, the comparative price of aircraft and the
fewer numbers settled for. Given the political backdrop of the Rafale deal, the air
chief’sunbidden reference to it was questionable.
Moreover, the air force delayedan inquiry over the downing of its helicopter in a fratricide
incident over Budgam in Kashmir on 27 February, at the time of the heightened crisis when
Pakistan carried out its counter strike. The cover up during elections was with the excuse that
the black box recorder of the helicopter was stolen by Kashmiri locals, thereby delaying the
inquiry.[16]Thetiming of the release of the outcome of the inquirytill after the elections is
suggestive of a political rationale.Friction is intrinsic to military action. The loss of the helicopter
was dueto the friction from the military action in the crisis, the responsibility for which did not
require to be hidden. To the extent the military kept the reality voters, the military’s actions can
be seen as partisan.
Significantly, after the election, the air chief went on to claim that there was no intervention by
the Pakistan air force into Indian airspace in their counter strike of 27 February [Times of India
2019]. This contradicted the government’s statement complaining of an air intrusion [Ministry of
External Affairs 2019]. No clarification ensued. The air chief used the credibility of the military
uniform and his appointment to rewrite the record of the crisis to the government’s advantage.
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Part II – Political-organizational cultural interplay

The cultural milieu
Stephen Peter Rosen in his book, India and its Armies, recalls noted political scientist Myron
Weiner’s observation of the sixties that there are two political cultures in India: a traditionalistone
– Hindu -, and,the second one - elite - apolitical culture with a modern and national outlook
[Rosen 1996: 33]. The latter – the elite strategic culture - subsumes the strategic subcultures:
hyper-nationalist, neo-liberal and Nehruvian [Bajpai 2002]. The difference in the three strategic
subcultures conceptualized by Kanti Bajpai is in the differing utility accorded to use of force and
alternatives as economic incentives. However, over this decade, the rise of hindutvahas
substantially dominated the elite political culture in India’s ideational milieu. Resultantly,Weiner’s
traditionalist Hindu culture now partially straddles the hyper-nationalist and neo-liberal strategic
subcultural spaces and has decisively edged out Nehruvian strategic subculture.
Tenets of a revivalist strategic subculture are references to a hoary past vandalized by invading
Muslim hordes. A worldview propagated by the prime minister early in his tenure is that Hindu
power was eclipsed by subjugationfor over a thousand years, including two hundred years
under the colonial power, the British.[17]The revivalist strategic narrative acounts that by
disunity within. Consequently, India needs a unifying adhesive, readily available in the shared
Hindu religion, culture and heritage.[18] This puts religion at the center of nation-building, with
access to and control of state power necessary to extend thishindutva project.
Religion has the advantage of being a step higher than a caste, compensating for division
intocastsby religious affinity. Stephen Rosen surveyed the pervasive role of caste in its host
societyand its effect on the army [Rosen 1996: viii-x]. With divisive caste superseded by
harmonizing religion, military power could potentially be optimized. The separation of the military
from society - to keep the divisions in society from being reflected in the army - could then be
minimized. Strategic self-assertion has been largely welcomed by the military.[19]
A view of the military’s internal debates
The polarisation within
The direct route of political cultural impact on organizational culture can be viewed in thearticle
titled, “Keeping the military apolitical: Looking inwards” [Ghura 2018: 20-25], authored by the
then commanding general of the army’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School
[CIJWS] in Veirangte, Mizoram, in the training institution’s flagship journalPratividrohi [Counter
insurgent].[20]The questionhe posesis, “How do soldiers get polarized[22]?”The question he
poses presupposes polarization within the military and a shortfall from his definition of apolitical:
“[A] soldier is said to be apolitical if his biases toward any political party / politicians does not
affect his ability to do his duty in service of his nation on orders of the Govt [government] or that
political party in power [20].”He underlines the touchstone of the apolitical ethic, thus: “The
military needs to be apolitical so that the rule of law and democratic process prevails in the
country in accordance with the Constitution. Military alignments can lead to crating biases
amongst voters / citizens and election of politicians who may be Military favourites, which is
neither acceptable nor desirable in democratic India [20].” By this yardstick, he apprehends “a
real danger - breakdown of professionalism [21].”
In India, polarisation is usually a euphemism for a divide along religious lines. Ascendance of
the ruling party has been attributed to its increasing polarisation within society, furthered by the
ruling party for political gains. The political strategy is to marginalize the minority, India’s
Muslims, and to generate for the BJP, a vote bank ofthe denominational majority, the Hindu
community, comprising 80 per cent of the population[Jaffrelot et al 2019: 8-11].Polarization in
society has been promotedby the personalized style of the Prime Minister Modi’s politics[Jayal
 13

2019: xxix]. In the article, the author appears to refer to polarization within the military between
those in support for the ruling party and those wary of the ruling party and the traditionally
neutral. the extent to whicn support for the ruling party implies support for its hindutvacan only
be definedthrough a wider survey-based study. Itis not possible to conduct in a relatively closed
military domain.
Querying the policy of deep selection
The author apprehends a possibility of compromise of the apolitical ethic in observing a
“perceived change in the attitude of Senior military commanders as a result of the changed
policy of selection of higher ranks with in the Services[22].” To him, in such an environment,
“decision making and risk taking ability becomes casualty[22],”presumably because generals so
afflicted would be looking over their shoulders to a cue from their political masters. He decries
the resulting onset of “political ambitions of serving and retired military personnel[22].”
He refers to politically inclined generals positioning themselves for higher ranks by signaling
political pliability to the government. This change has been facilitated by the government’s policy
of deep selection of higher appointments against the earlier system of seniority based selection.
This may incentivize ambitious generals to political proclivities of the ruling party, as spelled
outby a former general: “Though it is good to have a meritocracy, there must be clear criteria for
determining merit. Otherwise, generals will start approaching politicians who can promote them
to the top, and that will end the apolitical character of the army.”[21]
A case to point is controversial beginning ofthe deep selection system adopted by the
government in the elevation of the army chief, General Bipin Rawat. It resulted in supersession
of two of his seniors.[22]An explanation put out was that the appointment resulted from Rawat’s
operational experience in counter insurgency and on the LC against Pakistan. This would prove
useful for the government in its hardline policy against Pakistan involving retributory surgical
strikes. Rawat had in a previous appointment overseen similar strikes in Myanmar territory in
2015[23] that had set the stage for replication of the tactics on the LC in 2016.[24]
Selected for concordance with the government’s hardline policy, allegations of partisanship
have since plagued Rawat [Wire 2019b]. He courted controversy in conferring an award on the
perpetrator in a signal human rights violations case, the “human shield” episode in Kashmir. The
case in question was in which an army major tied a Kashmiri to the bonnet of a jeep and
paraded the jeep past a few villages as deterrent against stone throwing.[25] Rawat once
ventured out of his remit in controversially referring to domestic politics in India’s north eastern
state, Assam, that has a relatively delicate ethnic balance, claiming a link between a regional
political party and a voter base of illegal immigrants.[26]
Recently, during his 2019 Independence Day speech the prime minister announced creation of
the position of the chief of defence staff [CDS]. The CDS would be a four-star appointment,
mandated to oversee joint operational and support entities of the armed forces.Critics have it
that, “Modi has shown a marked preference for officials either already known to him or those
considered ideologically reliable [Gupta 2019: 12].” A CDS appointed on the basis of like-
mindedness would open up the military further in-roads. The power of the government for
elevating senior commanders to higher appointments may translate into a loyalty test.In the
governance structure, NSA Doval, who was earlier head of theright wing think tank, is incharge
of national security with a cabinet rank.[27] There is a palpable danger to the apolitical ethic.
Direct political-organisational cultural osmosis
The author refers to a second conduit of domestic politics into the military: the retired military
fraternity. The politicized section of the veterans’ community acts as a transmission belt of
political positions.[28]The ruling party has inducted military veterans in large numbers into its
 14

ranks.[29] The first election foray of Narendra Modi in his 2014 bid for national power took
placeat an ex-servicemen rally organized by theretired army chief, who then went on to a
ministerial position in Modi’s council of ministers.[30]
Within the military, pro-Modi elements within the ranks amplify the right wing trope in social
media groups internal to the military, making such spaces politically charged.[31]The military is
a conservative institution with its members being of a largely realist and nationalist persuasion
[IDS 2017: 59]. Therefore, the ruling party ideology holds resonance in a military constituency.
The projection of decisiveness and being strongondefence issues enable Modi’s adherents –
bhakts[devotees] in colloquial parlance - to rationalize their support in national security terms. It
obfuscates their political inclination and political behavior under a populist sway. With the
support of the media, Modi has personalized foreign and security policy for electoral ends
[Noorani 2019: 365; Varshney 2019: 335]. This sets a process of direct interplay between
political and organizational culture.
A pushback from within
In his article, the author perceptively notes, “[H]ighlighting military successes for political gains,
like surgical strikes / success in war and tasking soldiers for unauthorised tasks demotivates the
soldiers[23].” This reflects the resentment within the army for its operational successes being
appropriated for electoral purposes, highlighted by the veterans in their letter to the President of
India [referred to in the earlier section], writing: “…unusual and completely unacceptable
practice of political leaders taking credit for military operations like cross-border strikes, and
even going so far as to claim the Armed Forces to be “Modi ji ki Sena” [Modi’s army][Wire
2019a].”To the extent this is in line with the opposition’s view, the military apparently has within
ita segment responsive to Modi’scritics, too. This underlines the polarization the author
addresses in his concluding recommendation below:
One can keep dwelling on how the Politicians, Media and the society at large is forcing the
Military senor leaders and personnel to take sides or become politically aligned to a party.
….[we must]recognise this challenge and address it upfront. However we must also discreetly
inform the Governments in power not to politicize the Military actions or successes, since it
effects and weakens the organization and Nation[25][italics added].
Evidence of right wing cadence
Evidence of right wing thinking surfacing within the military’s intellectual sphere is visible in a
recent issue of the professional journal, Pratividrohi, Autumn 2019.In the lead article of the
journal on insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir [J&K], the author – a serving colonel – writes:“[A]t
the time of independence, J&K had 77 percent [sic] Muslims favouring accession to
Pakistan…[Gupta 2019: 2].” It is difficult to agree with that since it is well known that the major
Kashmiri political party popular with a substantial section of Muslims wanting accession to India
in 1947 was the secular National Conference. On the current situation in Kashmir, the colonel
goes on to write that, “Proliferation of large number of religious places has led to a constant flow
of radical material for the masses [Gupta 2019: 6].” He equates religious literature in mosques
with “radical material” implying that in his mind’s eye Islamic cultural transmission within the
social sphere of a mosqueequals radicalization, a precursor to terrorism. Frustrated with the
interference with military operations by stone pelting mobs of the Kashmiri youth, a feature of
the last few years in Kashmir, he recommends, “Stone pelters have to be dealt with as terrorists
to negate their nuisance value during operations [Gupta 2019: 5-6].” Remarkably, this rather
extreme measure of elimination of unarmed stone pelting youth, that goes against the army’s
well-regarded doctrine of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in counter insurgency situations, is carried
in its premier professional journal on counter insurgency.
 15

Another illustration in the same journal is from the article by the CIJWS’ present Commandant,
Major General MK Mago, who claims, “Global Jihadists into the country and tacit support and
merger with home grown radicalized groups such as Student (sic) Islamic Movement of India
(SIMI) and Indian Mujahedeen has deeply Radicalized people of a particular faith [Mago 2019:
90].”He defines radicalization as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system including
the willingness to use, support or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change
[Mago 2019: 88].” The reference to Indian Muslims as “deeply radicalized” is arguably false.
Such imagery is usually found in right wing literature for political purposes of Othering and
marginalization of India’s Muslim minority.
The general goes on to conclude that, “there is a need to revitalize India’s and the region’s socio
cultural ethos, wherein countries should not just represent political unions but should emerge as
organic, composite entities. In the absence of a strong social fabric and common cultural ethos,
security measures can never prove sufficiently resilient against the threat of Radicalisation
[Mago 2019: 96].” This extract has echoes of cultural nationalism.It is not known as to whether
right wing motifs finding their way into military literature is part of a policy of the government or
individual proclivities of right wing inclined officers.
Future course of politicization
Polarisation within the military has opened it up to subjective civilian control, the first stage of
politicisation. A closer embrace of the military is made possible bythe right wing’s dominance of
political culture, exercise of parliamentary majority and populist leadership at the helm. This
creates the conditions for the second stage of politicization - indoctrination with cultural
nationalism. This will preclude the military having a different worldview, setting it at odds with
the changed polity. Incentive thus exists for the government to proceed down this route.
Institutions and agencies of governance have been under pressure to conform to a cultural
nationalist dictate[Varshney 2019: 342-345]. The military cannot be an exception. Universally,
military members largely vote for conservative parties; this is valid also for the Indian military. A
former army vice chief, Vijay Oberoi, notes the affinity of the military with conservative parties,
stating, “The language of those on the right of centre has always had greater appeal for men in
uniform in most democracies. I have done a course in the United States and I saw 90 per cent
of the officers were Republican [Datta et al 2008].” This predisposition makes iteasier to bridge
any gaps in the conservative world view of the military and cultural nationalism.
The army cannot be an institution for the autonomous formation of a worldview or ideology
among its personnel. However, besides the usual national security and institutional interest
related lobbying - for arms purchases etc. for instance - the military cannot be a player in
domestic politics. If it is at odds with or is aloof from the cultural nationalist enterprise, it could by
default be taken as favouring the other side in domestic politics; thereby intensifying the struggle
between political forces for its affiliation. This threat of the military being sucked in willy-nilly into
domestic politics makes it necessary to settle on ground rules keeping the military outside the
religion and ideology framework and maintaining objective civilian control.

Being apolitical has the advantage of preserving the three planks of professionalism: expertise,
advisory and corporate autonomy. Expertise is diluted by elevation to apex military positions of
officers inclined to the dominant ideological position. This may be occurring at the cost of their
expertise, since their professionalism may be overlooked in favour of their ideological affinity or
amenability to political manipulation. The second – advisory - function stands to suffer in case
such appointees proffer advice that the political principal may wish to hear. The third – corporate
 16

autonomy – is compromised when the pliant organizational leader subordinates the

organizational interest to the political interest of the governing political party.
More importantly, alternation of ruling parties in thedispensation of democracy implies that the
military owing allegiance to a particular political partybecause oftheir ideological affinity would
run afoul of other political parties elected to power. Exercise of the advisory function would be
visibly affected, in addition to tensions in civil-military relations. Modi’s adoption of a muscular
national security policy has tapped into the doctrinally-expressed strategic preferences of the
military.[32] In Modi, the military has a pro-military leader. Pro-military is a predisposition to
being sympathetic to a military viewpoint [Huntington 2005: 97]. The personalization of the
connection compounds the problem, threatening to compromise the military in its relations with
other political groupings if and when elected to power.
Anattraction for hindutva cannot be withoutits anti-minority baggage,leading todetraction from
secularism. Proximity to hindutva implies disdain for religious and cultural diversity [Jaffrelot
2019]. Contraction of secularism means a setback for modernity and scientific thinking. That the
change is occurring can be seen in the messagefrom the new naval chief. In the letter to naval
members, the navy chief required curtailment of religious rituals in official ceremonies.[33]This
tacitly suggests that religious observance was increasing to such levels that the armed
forceshead had to curtail it.
Finally, the army is heavily involved in internal security operations in Kashmir, where there is a
Muslim population. A major prospective adversary in a possible future war is Pakistan, a Muslim
state. In case military operations acquire a religious colouring, emotive issues may cloud
professional judgment.

Conclusion

India is turning into a majoritarian state. Right wing ideology has it that India’s millennia-long
weakness has been its diversity and its respect of diversity. An overarching sense of affiliation
tying citizens together and to the state can be instilled by pan-Indian Hinduism. The right wing
has acquired democratic power to give effect to their re-imagination of India as a Hindu India.
Since hindutva has not acquired political hegemony so far and is only making a bid for it
politically and socially, having taken over the state through the ruling party, politically ascendant
hindutvavotaries would be inclinedtouse the military as part of their project. To them,
displacement of the apolitical ethic in the military is a small price to pay for the larger national
transformation. Adherence to cultural nationalism will make the military a reliable instrument in
the defence and propagation of hindutva.Thus incentivized, the right wing take-over of the
military willfascilitate cultural nationalism and theirhegemonic status.
This calls for a watchfulness on the military’s partand a self-regulation on part of the political
class to follow the time tested norm on keeping the military out of politics. In case of neglect of
such an early warning, involvement of the military into politics sets the stage for the military’s
involvement in politics on its own volition. If the onset of subjective civilian control keeps the
military subordinate to its cultural nationalist overseers in the initial phases of the national
transformation exercise, it also simultaneously creates the conditions for military interference in
politics subsequently. A cultural nationalism-inclined military maximally could veto democratic
transition to a popularly elected future government not subscribing to hindutva or minimally
prove insubordinate.
Politicisation of the military may prove both, the benchmark of success for the political project of
hindutva,and the instrument of hindutva spread. That the incipient politicisation is underway is
 17

evident in the polarization within the military. cultural nationalism has beendirectly seeping into
the military’s organizational culture by way of the leadership cult around Modi, popular with the
middle classes, from which spring the officership of the military, and due to the wide societal
approval and allegiance of cultural nationalism. Indirectly, this has been reinforced through the
strategic cultural shift to strategic proactivism that has the military’s approval,under Modi.
The manner in which the military’s organizational culture shapes up,will depend on the
consolidation of hegemony of hindutva. Even if cultural nationalists succeed, the military will
remain traditionallypolitically neutered through subjective civilian control. subjective civilian
controlof the military then may arguably be employed as it may be necessary to ensure the
military’s subordination. However, a premature shift to subjective civilian control at the time
when hindutva is contested can end up making the military a site of the competition by ending
its traditional and hypothecated neutrality. This paper states that the apolitical ethic of the
military is currently on the frontlinedue tointentions ofhindutva revivalists to co-opt the military in
their reshaping of India and their desire to find partial resonance within the
military.Consequently, the cautionary word for the government and the military is that both need
persisting with the tried and tested mode of political direction and military subordination
respectively.

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Footnotes
[1]The Guardian, “India”s jobs crisis casts shadow over Modi”s re-election hopes,” 1 February,
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//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68002998.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofin
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27 Feb 2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/modi-played-despicable-politics-during-26-
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[4]Indian Express, “Election Commissioner Lavasa opposed five clean chits to Amit Shah, PM
Modi”, 5 May 2019,
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[5]Suchitra Vijayan and Vasundhara Sirnate Drennan, “After Pulwama, the Indian media proves
it is the BJP”s propaganda machine”, Washington Post, 4 March 2019,
 20

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/04/after-pulwama-indian-media-proves-it-is-
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[7]Al Jazeera, “Surgical strikes: Pakistan rejects India”s claims”, 30 September 2016
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[8] Joshi, Manoj, “Surgical strikes day” is just a pre-election dose of patriotic political fodder”,
Observer Research Foundation, 24 September 2018
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patriotic-political-fodder/
[9] Prime Minister”s Office, “PM addresses the Nation,” 27 March 2019,
https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-addresses-the-nation/
[10] Hooda, D.S., “National Security Strategy”, Indian National Congress Manifesto,
https://manifesto.inc.in/en/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.html
[11]News18, “Surgical Strikes Were a Successful Tactical Operation: Army”s Northern
Command Chief”, https://www.news18.com/news/india/surgical-strikes-were-a-successful-
tactical-operation-armys-northern-command-chief-1965139.html
[12]Indian Express, “Army contradicts Congress” claim, says it carried out first surgical strike in
September 2016 to avenge Uri”, 20 May 2019,
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september-2016-to-avenge-uri-lt-gen-ranbir-singh-1979480.html
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[14]Economic Times, “None of Pakistan”s F-16 fighter jets missing after US count: Report,” 5
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//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68733231.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofin
terest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[15]The Wire, “Rafale Review Petition: Full Text of Written Submissions by Bhushan, Shourie
and Sinha,” 22 May 2019, https://thewire.in/government/rafale-review-petition-full-text-of-written-
submissions-by-bhushan-shourie-and-sinha; Shourie, Arun, “If I Had Got More Than a Minute to
Speak: Arun Shourie on Rafale Proceedings in SC”, The Wire, 20 March 2019,
https://thewire.in/government/arun-shourie-rafale-proceedings-supreme-court
[16] Javaid, Azaan, “Kashmir villagers say didn”t steal crashed IAF chopper black box,
uniformed men took it,” The Print, 2 May 2019,
https://theprint.in/india/kashmir-villagers-say-didnt-steal-crashed-iaf-chopper-black-box-
uniformed-men-took-it/229942/
[17]Prime Minister’s Office “Text of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s address to the Indian
community at Madison Square Garden, New York,” Press Information Bureau, Government of
India, 28 September 2014, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136737
[18] Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, “The tactical Sangh,” Indian Express, 14 September 2019,
https://indianexpress.com/article/lifestyle/books/the-ominous-organisation-rss-a-g-noorani-
5993684/
[19]Economic Times, “Ex-Army chief Dalbir Singh praises PM Narendra Modi for surgical strikes
in Pakistan, Myanmar”, 11 July 2018,
 21

//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/60885703.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofin
terest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[20] Words in initial capitals in the extracts below from the article are of the author, Major
General MS Ghura.
[21] Ajai Shukla, “Controversy Clouds Out-Of-Turn Appointment of Bipin Rawat as Next Army
Chief,” Wire,
https://thewire.in/politics/bipin-rawat-army-chief
[22] Josy Joseph, “Questions about an appointment,” Hindu, 21 December 2016,
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Questions-about-an-
appointment/article16913382.ece
[23]Economic Times, “Myanmar operation: 70 commandos finish task in 40 minutes,” 14 July
2018,
//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/47617871.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofin
terest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[24] Saikat Dutta, “Rawat”s appointment as Army chief is in line with Modi”s aggressive foreign
policy,” Scroll, 19 December 2016
[25] Rowlatt, Justin, “Why Indian army defended Kashmir “human shield” officer”, BBC, 31 May
2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40103673
[26]Wire, “Assam up in arms as army chief wades into political territory, 23 February 2018,
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/army-chief-bipin-rawat-questions-aiudf-expansion-assam-proxy-
game-pak-china
[27] NDTV, “PM’s Office Defines Work For Top Bureaucrats, Security Advisor Ajit Doval,” 17
September 2019, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pms-office-defines-work-for-top-
bureaucrats-security-advisor-ajit-doval-2101719
[28] Other avenues such as family ties, caste affiliations, social media groups, glossy
publications in the national security publications, national security websites are not discussed
here, but form the ecosystem propagating Hindu nationalism.
[29]The Hindu, “Senior ex-servicmen join the BJP,” 27 April 2019,
https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/senior-ex-servicemen-join-
bjp/article26964734.ece
[30]NDTV, “Narendra Modi addresses rally in Haryana, his first as BJP”s PM candidate”, 15
September 2013, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/narendra-modi-addresses-rally-in-haryana-
his-first-as-bjps-pm-candidate-534670
[31]Ali Ahmed, “Dark side of Army”s social media groups,” Tribune, 2 March 2017,
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dark-side-of-army-s-social-media-
groups/371308.html
[32] India”s military doctrines can be viewed at https://www.ids.nic.in/doctrine.php.
[33]The Print, “New Navy chief”s first order — no “quasi religious” functions, please, we are the
Navy,” 6 June 2019,
https://theprint.in/defence/new-navy-chiefs-first-order-no-quasi-religious-functions-please-we-
are-the-navy/245834/
_______________________
 22

Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority Lessons from the Gujarat Carnage
23 November 2018
https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/46/strategic-affairs/armys-robustness-aid-civil-authority.html

The release of the memoir, The Sarkari Mussalman: The Life and Travails of a Soldier
Educationist(2018), written by Lieutenant General Zameer Uddin Shah (retired) was with a
degree of publicity not usually associated with autobiographies of military men. Shah’s life story
was slightly different from most military men, since it culminated with him heading a leading
academic institution, Aligarh Muslim University. But, his significant contribution is drawing
national attention to his revelations in The Sarkari Mussalman in the chapter, “Operation
Parakram and Operation Aman” (Shah 2018: 114–33), on the Gujarat carnage in 2002.
Shah was commanding the Bison division that was earmarked to respond to the call for aid to
civil authority made by the Gujarat administration. The Godhra incident on 27 February 2002, in
which a railway coach carrying Hindu kar sevaks (volunteers)—returning from
the purnahuti yajna organised by the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) at Ayodhya (Hindu 2001)—
was burnt and the bodies of the victims were taken to Ahmedabad and handed over to the VHP
and the Bajrang Dal, led to an explosive situation. The orders for the handing over of these
bodies reportedly originated in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led state government under
Narendra Modi (Hindu 2012).
Under normal circumstances, Shah would not have figured in the story. Shah’s division, which
was otherwise based in Hyderabad, was practising its paces in the deserts near Jodhpur as part
of the then ongoing Operation Parakram, India’s military mobilisation in the wake of the attack
on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. An aid to civil authority call in Gujarat would in the
normal course of events, have had the Ahmedabad-based infantry division scrambling, but the
division was deployed in a defensive role along the border and could not be spared. Shah’s
division, awaiting its marching orders for attack as part of a strike corps, was at hand.
At that juncture, the Indian Army had transited to intensive training to keep up the pressure on
General Pervez Musharraf to deliver on his United States’ brokered de-escalatory promise
made on 12 January (Krepon and Nayak 2006: 13, 18). Shah, therefore, was keyed up but with
nowhere to go. He informs in his book of receiving a call on 28 February from the then army
chief, General Sundararajan Padmanabhan. The army chief ordered Shah to take his formation
and quell the disturbances in Gujarat (Shah 2018: 115), launching him on Operation Aman, the
aid to civil authorities in Gujarat after the carnage had broken out.
An Inexcusable Delay
Shah’s division was airlifted from Jodhpur to Ahmedabad overnight. On arriving on the night of
28 February–1 March, he found that the wherewithal for an aid to civil authority task—
magistrates, vehicles, police liaison, guides, etc—that was to be furnished by the state
administration was missing. As the book suggests, he rushed to see the chief minister,
whereupon, finding the then defence minister, George Fernandes, with Modi, he made his pitch
for the assistance required. The revelation in Shah’s book is that the support of the civil
administration, though promised by Modi with the defence minister in tow, was not forthcoming
through the following day, 1 March. Instead, Fernandes took the opportunity to address troops
at the airfield. Finally, on 2 March, 34 hours since the troops had arrived, the vehicles arrived
and the troops fanning out in them put an end within 48 hours to the carnage (Shah 2018: 116–
17).
Shah’s after action report on Operation Aman is a document calling out for the attention of right
to information activists. Shah makes it clear that the absence of civilian administrative support
for his division was not merely administrative failure (Shah 2018: 212). He takes care to leave
readers with the unmistakable impression that his testimony is yet another piece of evidence
that the carnage was one-sided violence at the behest and under the facilitative cover of the
 23

state administration (Shah 2018: xvii, 121). It is a sign of authoritarian times that even a general
who has “fished in troubled waters” (Shah 2018: xvii) has to remain circumspect.
Coming as Shah’s testimony does, closely preceding the developments in the case related to
the custodial killing of Sohrabuddin Sheikh—in which links have surfaced (in a witness
testimony) between the killing of a former Gujarat home minister, Haren Pandya, and the cover-
up of the Gujarat carnage—it is pertinent in kneading truth into the narrative. According to a
witness deposing in the Sohrabuddin case, Gujarat police officer D G Vanzara, known for
having links with Modi and Amit Shah (once home minister under Modi in Gujarat), allegedly
conspired to have Pandya killed (Times of India 2018a). Pandya, a Modi rival in the BJP, who
supposedly had the goods on the role of the state administration in the Gujarat carnage, was
proceeding to spill the beans (Anand 2002) and, therefore, had to go (Wire 2018).
The right-wing propagated narrative is that the fire on Sabarmati Express was a planned
Muslim-perpetrated one and was followed by riots, implying Muslim-provoked two-sided
violence in which the Muslims, being short on numbers, ended up being on the losing side. In
the counter-narrative, largely based on the testimony of dissenters in the state administration,
Modi, in a meeting on the night of 27 February 2002 at his official residence, allegedly told the
civil authorities and police not to interfere with the letting-off of steam by the incensed majority
over the following 72 hours (Anand 2002). Feeding the BJP narrative, the Special Investigation
Team (SIT) mandated by the Supreme Court has a sanitised version of the late-night meeting
(SIT 2011: 57–58, 392), one under challenge in the Supreme Court in the Zakia Jafri case
(Setalvad 2018).
Shah also disputes as a “blatant lie” the version of the army’s deployment in the SIT’s closure
report on its investigation of Modi’s role in the Gujarat carnage (NDTV 2018). The SIT had
credited Modi with alacrity in calling out the army, dating the decision to call the army to 1 pm on
28 February (SIT 2011: 429) and the provisioning of logistic support by 2.30 pm on 1 March
(NDTV 2018). The SIT reports the deployment of the army beginning 11 am on 1 March (SIT
2011: 447–48), which is disputed by Shah in his book and can easily be verified by the war
diaries—day-to-day records—of the units involved.
The dissenting narrative stands strengthened by Shah’s testimony that his force, some 3,000
troops, remained inactive all through 1 March 2002 on the Ahmedabad airfield as they failed to
be speedily vectored on to the areas of violence. It was only at the end of the 72-hour forced
inaction between 27 February and 1 March that the state administration bestirred itself on 2
March.
The implications of Shah’s reopening of the widely suspect popular narrative on the Gujarat
carnage are far-reaching. Politically, it puts a shadow over the rise of its then chief minister,
Narendra Modi, to a national stature relying on a strongman image. A facet of this image that
appeals to his ideological followers is his alleged boldness in the overseeing of the pogrom.
Today, Modi is bidding for an extension to continue being in power. The concern in the BJP in
the run-up to the elections is that the reality behind Modi’s development plank has been
exposed. This may push the BJP to make an ideological appeal (Times of India 2018b). Political
dividend from polarisation is sought to compensate for the damage from a succession of policy
failures such as demonetisation, joblessgrowth, farmer suicides, the decline of the value of the
rupee, the challenge by stone-pelting youth in Kashmir, and the numerous volte-faces in India’s
Pakistan and China policies. Polarisation is seen as the trump card to carry forward
Hindutvavadis (cultural nationalists) for another 50 years in Amit Shah’s estimate (Hindustan
Times 2018), with the national security adviser, Ajit Doval, in his pitch on national security,
calling for strong leadership—presumably under Modi—for another 10 years (Indian
Express 2018). An extension for Modi in power shall prove an irreversible blow to India’s plural
national ethos, democratic political culture, and inclusive social sphere.
The Army’s Response
 24

It is also timely to revisit the army’s manner of responding to calls for aid to civil authority.
Shah’s going public with the incongruous image of soldiers attending an impromptu sainik
sammelan (a town hall with troops) called by George Fernandes (followed, according to an army
officer and as told to this writer, by an ad hoc barakhana [collective breaking bread with troops]
in which Fernandes reputedly joined the soldiers sitting cross-legged on the airfield’s tarmac),
begs the question as to the role that Fernandes played with respect to the army’s response.
While Shah credits Fernandes with persuading the state government to be forthcoming with the
support for the army, that Fernandes could only manage this after the 72-hour period of
bloodletting by cultural nationalists suggests both powerlessness and complicity. The charade
on the tarmac, as a diversion till the 72-hour period of impunity for mass-killing perpetrators ran
out, makes for plausibility of the latter.
Shah’s chapter on the army’s foray into ending the Gujarat carnage has an interesting aspect.
Chapter VII of the Manual of Military Law (MML), “Duties in aid of civil power,” vide its
paragraphs 15 to 19 (Indian Army 1987: 109) empowers the army to impose martial law under
conditions of extreme disorder when the civil authorities, even with the help of the armed forces,
are unable to bring the situation under control. The provisions have it that, in circumstances that
preclude obtaining of the prior approval of the central government, a military commander may,
on their own, assume supreme authority for the maintenance of law and order (Indian Army
1987: 109). Shah claims that it did cross his mind to recommend martial law, but in the event he
did not pursue the idea believing that it was outside his “mandate” and he was confused since
there is no other mention of martial law, including in the Army Act, 1950 and the other two
volumes of the army’s law manual (Shah 2018: 119). Even so, aid to civil authority provisions
empower the army to fire on orders of an officer even in the absence of a magistrate when
public order is threatened in a circumstance of breakdown of civil administration.
While Shah confesses to prudence informing his actions, it is not impossible to visualise a
divisional commander of a different mould taking the bull by the horns. In military leadership
literature, a popular contrast is drawn between commanders who are cautious and those who
are bolder, bordering on the reckless. A commander in the mould of the mercurial German
general, Erwin Rommel, or of the bold American general, George S Patton (Showalter 2005),
would likely have pressed forward undaunted by the absence of the civil administration, and
empowered by their chief’s order to stunch the violence.
Shah commanded an infantry formation comprising foot infantry, which is meant to be just that,
with its motto being, “to close with and capture and destroy the enemy;” the “enemy” in this case
being the perpetrators of mass violence. It is strange that Shah says, “We could hear gunshots
but do nothing” (NDTV 2018). Vehicles are not essential for infantry to have fanned out into
Ahmedabad. Proactive action could have served as a deterrent and resulted, by Shah’s own
reckoning, in saving “at least 300” lives (NDTV 2018)— a third of those who perished, by cutting
short the duration of the violence by a day.
That Shah was not put wise at the airport on landing can be attributed—but only by a stretch—
to the local army authorities being themselves deployed in Operation Parakram. The system of
static formations, the area and sub-area headquarters that the army has across the country for
interfacing with local civilian authorities, was then involved in providing logistics support to
formations deployed in Operation Parakram. The army can be faulted for not sparing the
concerned commanders and operations staff officers to put Shah’s forces wise on the terrain, on
his civilian and police interlocutors, and on developments. Shah functioned under a curious
arrangement, answering to the Jodhpur pivot corps commander, who was understandably
fixated on
the western front. The operational and area headquarters chain converges at the command
level, in this case in Pune. Thus, the headquarters of the Southern Command cannot escape its
share of responsibility.
 25

Institutions have been under assault as never before. The recent court ruling on the Hashimpura
case which witnessed the largest number of custodial killings in India shows up the susceptibility
of the police in the face of illegal orders (Chisti 2018). Saffronisation of governance is striking,
with India’s most electorally significant state, Uttar Pradesh, being ruled by a mahant (chief
priest of a religious order) known for his anti-minority predilections (Bhowmick 2017). Potential
fuses for bloodletting include the Ram Mandir issue, the National Register for Citizens, spillover
of the Kashmir issue, and terror provocations from Pakistan. A preventive lesson learnt from the
Shah revelations for the army is that it must revisit its powers under Chapter VII of the MML and
clear the confusion that stayed Shah’s hand in Gujarat. The ideological impetus in politics today
suggests that the sooner this is done the better.
References
Anand, S (2002): “A Plot from the Devil’s Lair,” Outlook, 3
June, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-plot-from-the-devils-lair/215889.
Bhowmick, Nilanjana (2017): “Meet the Militant Monk Spreading Islamophobia in
India,” Washington Post, 24 March, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2017/03/24/meet-t....
Chisti, Seema (2018): “In Light of Hashimpura, Recalling PAC, UP’s Controversial Armed Police
Force,” Indian Express, 6 November, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-light-of-
hashimpura-recalling-pac-ups-controversial-armed-police-force-5430170/.
Hindu (2001): “VHP Plans ‘Yajna’ at Ayodhya,” 2
July, https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2001/07/02/stories/0202000w.htm.
— (2012): “Decision to Bring Godhra Victims’ Bodies Taken at Top Level,” 10
February, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/decision-to-bring-godhra-victims-bodies-
taken-at-top-level/article2876244.ece.
Hindustan Times (2018): “‘BJP Will Win 2019; Will Rule for Next 50 Years’: Amit Shah,” 9
September, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bjp-will-win-2019-will-rule-for-next-50-
years-amit-shah/story-uqbwTVtGU1osyJxqZ19XKP.html.
Indian Army (1987): “Manual of Military Law,” Government of
India, https://web.archive.org/web/20090410104934/http://indianarmy.nic.in/rti/....
Indian Express (2018): “Need Strong Government for 10 Years, Enemies Are Within: Ajit Doval,”
26 October, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/need-strong-government-for-10-years-
enemies-are-within-ajit-doval-5418974/.
Krepon, Michael and Polly Nayak (2006): “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks
Crisis,” 57th report, Stimson Center, Washington,
DC, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Twin_Peaks_Crisis.pdf.
NDTV (2018): “‘300 Could Have Been Saved’: Ex-General’s Revelation on Gujarat Riots,” 10
October, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/army-lost-1-day-waiting-in-airfield-ex-general-on-
2002-gujarat-riots-1929445.
Setalvad, Teesta (2018): “Zakia Jafri’s Case Is a Reminder of How the Guilty of Gujarat
Subverted the Law,” Wire, 18 November, https://thewire.in/rights/zakia-jafri-2002-gujarat-
violence-supreme-court.
Shah, Zameer Uddin (2018): The Sarkari Mussalman: The Life and Travails of a Soldier
Educationist, New Delhi: Konark Publishers.
Showalter, Dennis (2005): Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century, New
York: Berkley Caliber.
SIT (2011): “Report in Compliance to the Order dtd 12.09.2011 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in the Complaint dtd 08.06.2006 of Smt Jakia Nasim Ahesan Jafri,” Special Investigation
Team, https://cjp.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SIT-Clos-VolI-1-
100.pdf, https://cjp.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SIT-VolumeII-371-458.pdf .
 26

Times of India (2018a): “Sohrabuddin Said Vanzara Ordered Hit on Haren Pandya, Gangster
Tells Court,” 4 November, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sohrab-said-vanzara-
ordered-hit-on-haren-pandya-gangster-tells-court/articleshow/66494293.cms.
— (2018b): “Riding a Tiger: Ratcheting Up Temple Politics Won’t Help BJP, Focus on
Development,” 6 November, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/riding-a-
tiger-ratcheting-up-temple-politics-wont-help-bjp-focus-on-development/.
Wire (2018): “Mystery over Haren Pandya Killing Deepens after Witness Says Top Gujarat Cop
Gave Order,” 5 November, https://thewire.in/rights/mystery-over-haren-pandya-killing-deepens-
after-witness-says-top-gujarat-cop-gave-order.
_____________________________

Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir

EPW, Vol. 52, Issue No. 8, 25 Feb, 2017
http://www.epw.in/journal/2017/8/strategic-affairs/corrosive-impact-armys-commitment-
kashmir.html

Abstract: The army has had an extended deployment in Kashmir. While it has enabled
operational experience for its members, there is a danger that the advantages of this can make
the army acquire a stake in the disturbed conditions. This makes the army part of the problem in
Kashmir. Its deployment is not without a price in regard to the internal good health of the army.
- See more at: http://www.epw.in/strategic-affairs-0#sthash.mowrHzVP.dpuf

Media reports have it that the Lucknow-based Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) reinstated Shatru-
ghan Singh Chauhan, who had been dismissed from service for an offence a quarter century
ago in Kashmir (Majumdar 2017a). In a search operation in Kashmir in 1991, a recovery of gold
biscuits had been made. Chauhan alleges that these were appropriated by his seniors, while he
was scapegoated for revealing the truth. On his part, the then corps commander, Lt General
Mohammad Ahmed Zaki, recalling the episode clarified in an interview (Majumdar 2017b) that
he acted in response to a complaint from the Advisor (Home) to the Governor that money had
been stolen by someone during a search operation. An inquiry was initiated, based on the
findings of which the proceedings against Chauhan were initiated. Zaki goes on to add that, on
leaving Kashmir at the end of his tenure, he read news reports of allegations that he had
appropriated the gold biscuits. The case testifies to how murky the army’s deployment can get
in Kashmir.
More serious and better known instances of transgression have periodically surfaced in
Kashmir, with some taking on proportions of causes célèbres, such as Kunan Poshpora. It is
debated whether these are—as critics have it—endemic and widespread or—as the army
usually depicts them—instances of “aberrations.” While, to military votaries, the military ethic
holds sturdy with a majority sticking to the straight and narrow, the military’s critics point to the
inability of peer pressure to fully restrict some members from breaking bounds. In the light of
over 2,000 unmarked graves having been found in villages across Kashmir early this decade
and the estimate by the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons that some 10,000
persons are missing, it is clear that, at least for a period of the deployment in Kashmir since
1990, ethically questionable practices were more prevalent than the army would care to admit.
Critics attribute the current day angst in Kashmir to such practices. What this suggests is that
the army could do with some soul-searching on the impact of its Kashmir commitment on its
internal good health.
 27

There are other ways too in which its Kashmir odyssey has had an ambiguous impact on the
army. Take the recent unprecedented elevation of General Bipin Rawat to the post of army
chief, superseding two of his seniors. Among the reasons the government trotted out attempting
to tide over the controversy was his operational record and extensive experience in counter-
insurgency areas and along the line of control (LoC), contrasting this with the background in
mechanised warfare of his two seniors. Controversy attended two aspects. First was the
questionable elevation of operational experience at the tactical level as a necessary and
sufficient condition to pip his two well-regarded rivals at the post. The inflation of this parameter
amounts to incentivising ticket-punching in India’s disturbed areas by ambitious officers and, at
one remove, making the army acquire a vested interest in disturbed conditions.
The second was the controversy over the commandeering of senior appointments in the army
by the infantry and artillery by so arranging the promotion system as to benefit members of
these two arms. The expansion of the two arms has been occasioned in part by the deployment
in the Valley (such as of the infantry-centric Rashtriya Rifles) as also along the LoC (such as for
the artillery in wake of its showing in the Kargil War). The promotion system has been so
engineered that, being larger, they constitute a larger percentage of the brass. Thus, the
Kashmir commitment has led to the removal of professional merit as the singular criterion for
promotion.
The effects are now well beyond the army itself. The “surgical strikes” along the LoC late last
year, avenging the terror attack on the army base in Uri in September 2016, have found their
way into electioneering. In a record of sorts, 19 members of the teams that took part in the
operations have been decorated for valour, seemingly being decorated for participation rather
than—as is usually the case with awards for gallantry—for courageous action in face of the
enemy. The last time such a slew of awards were given out was yet again by a Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) government, when it decorated each of the deceased sentries at Parliament who
died in the dastardly terror attack on 13 December 2001 with the highest peacetime gallantry
award, the Ashoka Chakra. This reveals the political calculation behind the awards by the
government, with the ruling party, fearing the effects of demonetisation on the provincial
elections underway, considering that such politicisation of the military is a small price to pay for
victory in elections.
So, has the Kashmir deployment taken a greater toll on the army than reckoned so far? To the
extent it is implicated in Kashmir, has Pakistan succeeded more than it ever imagined and in
ways it could never conceive of? While there are good reasons for urging a rethink on India’s
continuing hard line in Kashmir—last year’s toll of civilian dead in the unrest in Kashmir hovered
round the three-figure mark—one reason worth examining is whether Kashmir is exacting an
institutional price of the army, one of India’s better regarded institutions.
‘Cold Start’
Rethinking the nature of India’s Kashmir commitment is certainly not one of the
recommendations in the 550-page report submitted in December 2016 of the 11-member D B
Shekatkar Committee on combat capability enhancement. However, Kashmir has been central
to the very need for the report in first place. The perceived decline in combat capabilities, which
the report’s recommendations serve to address, is long-standing. Since India is loath to admit to
any role of nuclear weapons, the venturesomeness of Pakistan in Kashmir is attributed instead
to the decline of conventional deterrence. Incessant force accretions beginning in the early
1990s with the creation of the Rashtriya Rifles have led to further attenuating conventional
deterrence. Since the mid-1990s, a large proportion of the army has been deployed in Kashmir,
perhaps over a third. Even though the army in the period acquired a third strike corps, Pakistan
 28

succeeded in bogging down in Kashmir any surplus conventional advantage India might have
gained, thereby neutralising India’s conventional edge. The conventional edge that remained
was not of the order as to give India any confidence to cross the LoC during the Kargil War, and
made the country settle for coercive diplomacy in the wake of the Parliament attack. The then
foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon’s (2016: 60–81) memoirs of the episode let on—though
he does not admit as much —that as late as in November 2008, India was self-deterred from
conventional reprisal to the terror outrage in Mumbai, even though India was by then half-a-
decade into adopting a new offensive army doctrine, Cold Start.
With Kashmir tying down significant numbers, the army continued down the path of expansion,
this time in response to the growing Chinese threat. Though two mountain divisions were raised
for a defensive role in the North East in the last decade, the Chinese threat, on which India’s
Kashmir-mediated Pakistan obsession had an impact, was projected as a “two-front,” collusive
war possibility. A new mountain strike corps was taken as the answer. The two-front formulation
intended to recreate conventional deterrence on the western front by enabling dual tasking of
the mountain strike corps, which was otherwise advertised and legitimated as a counter
measure to the China threat. This inexorable expansion made the revenue portion of the
defence budget outpace the capital part. As a result, though India had a new army doctrine of
proactive offensive operations—the nuclear factor notwithstanding—it did not have the
wherewithal to see it implemented.
Despite a half-decade long hiatus in Kashmir through the first term of the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government, the continued deployment of the army could not generate the
confidence necessary to think of progressively removing the Armed Forces (Special Powers)
Act (AFSPA). The three successive years of summer turmoil in Kashmir, 2008–10, and a
reminder last year are now taken as the reason why the army, and AFSPA, need to continue in
place. This sets up the circular logic: the need for AFSPA is because of the need for the army,
and the need for the army owes to the AFSPA. In other words, the army becomes part of the
problem in Jammu and Kashmir.
Incentivising it to be part of the solution can be through pointing out that the army’s commitment
in Kashmir is proving corrosive to itself. The counter narrative to this is that Kashmir serves with
blooding in the army, keeping it combat ready. This is only true in a limited sense. From the
honours and awards tally every year, it is clear that the cake is taken by the Special Forces. In
an encounter in Kupwara forests in 2015, a Special Forces officer commanding a Rashtriya
Rifles outfit was killed. While being a testimony to his leadership and bravery, it begs the
question: where was the junior leadership and the soldiery? In 2016, there was a tussle over
wrongly crediting the citation of a Special Forces Ashoka Chakra brave-heart to a Rashtriya
Rifles battalion in whose area his Special Forces subunit was operating (Sawant 2016). The
implication is that the foot soldier is the anvil and the gladiatorial Special Forces or their infantry
counterpart, the Ghataks, are the hammer. In effect, the mainstream army is more or less in
static guard duties, manning the LoC fortifications with Standard Operating Procedures as guide
or carrying out routine population control measures. The spate of suicide attacks over the past
two years has no doubt further tied down the soldier to his sentry post. The demands of the
quick-off-the-blocks Cold Start doctrine, based on a “short, sharp war” concept, might prove
rather heavy for an army if inertia-laden. The question to clinch the argument is: Else, why
would Pakistan—to the extent it does—keep the pot boiling?
A Skewed Representation
The expansion of the army has seen a rise in levels of representation in the officer corps from
the cow-dust belt and hills opening onto the Indo–Gangetic plain. A constant feature this century
 29

of reporting from passing-out parades at the academies is the state of origin of those gaining the
commission. Invariably, the list is headed by Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Haryana. This
narrowing of the social base of intake of the officer—the mainstay of a professional army—has
long-term implications since this complexion of the officer cadre will last a couple of decades.
The social and political mores of their areas of origin will gain currency within the army. Already,
the succession battles of successive army chiefs this century suggest influence of casteist and,
indeed, communal thinking. Unfortunately, the coincidence of the origin in the same region—
Garhwal—of the new army chief, General Bipin Rawat, as the National Security Advisor, Ajit
Doval, has prompted comment. They reportedly hit it off when the “surgical strikes” into
Myanmar were being planned and executed in June 2015 (Dutta 2016). How the social biases
in the catchment areas find expression in the army’s corporate attitude towards, for instance,
gender inclusivity in terms of female officers going the distance, to pensions, and the recently-
in-the-news “soldier-helper” system, is worth study.
A narrowing demographic base that is not representative of the nation lends itself to having
repercussions beyond the army. It is not without a sense of the possibilities that cultural
nationalists have the army in their sights as the next institution to subvert and run aground. The
BJP’s billboards claiming the army’s surgical strikes are only the visible part. Less visible are the
possible numbers graduating from educational institutions subscribing to the cultural nationalist
idiom and self-selecting to officership as a career.
The threat now is of the political formation ascendant in the politics of the moment bidding for
the army. There appears to be in place an assembly-line system of right-wing literature finding
its way through social media into the mind of the officer over this decade. Revelations regarding
the troll army affiliated to the ruling party (Sanghvi 2016) suggest that efforts to capture the
military mind cannot be ruled out. There are military veterans studiously at work purveying the
message that cultural nationalism and nationalism, and indeed patriotism, are one. The
increased mobility of the military veteran with heightened pensions, longer lives and access to
social media, and, in turn, an opening up of the army to the veteran—through, for instance,
offering hospitality for a veteran jamboree for some or the other jubilee—have set up a
transmission belt.
Such transmission would be easier when the brass is divided. Ambitious generals would be on
the lookout for political patronage. The alternative can spell oblivion. Take the case of the
surprise supersession of Lt General Praveen Bakshi. It could well be owing to his lukewarm
reference to “surgical strikes” operations in June 2016, similar to the one in the previous year.
By not going to town over these, he perhaps consciously deprived the government of yet
another opportunity to grandstand on the military’s achievement (PTI 2016). He has since paid a
price.
Apparently, taking his cue, General Bipin Rawat, in his very first interview (Unnithan 2017),
brought the Cold Start doctrine out of the closet. This is to flaunt the conventional deterrent
refurbished by the induction of what can be the mainstay of Cold Start, the T-90 MS tank. With
Pakistan warned off, he has put Kashmiri stone-pelters on notice, that they would be taken as
accomplices of terrorists in case they join the action in areas of military operations (DNA 2017).
This licence to wilfully narrow the distinction between civilian and terrorist by no less than their
chief amounts to a step down the ethical ladder for the army in Kashmir. Clearly, its Kashmir
engagement is exacting a price of it in ways the army does not comprehend fully.
References
 30

DNA (2017): “Army Chief Warns Stone-pelters of Tough Action,” 16 February, viewed on 17
February 2017, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-army-chief-warns-stone-pelters-of-tough-
action-2324584.
Dutta, S (2016): “Rawat’s Appointment as Army Chief Is in Line with Modi’s Aggressive Foreign
Policy,” Scroll, 19 December, viewed on 7 January 2017, https://scroll.in/article/824529/rawats-
appointment-as-army-chief-is-in-line-with-modis-aggressive-foreign-policy.
Majumdar, U (2017a): “Shooting the Brother,” Outlook, 20 February, viewed on 17 February
2017, http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/shooting-the-brother/298454.
— (2017b): “I Didn’t Know Other Soldiers Testified That Gold Was Seized,” Outlook, 20
February, viewed on 17 February 2017, http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/i-didnt-
know-other-soldiers-testified-that-gold-was-seized/298457.
Menon, Shivshankar (2016): Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
PTI (2016): “No Strike Carried Out in Myanmar against NE Insurgents: Army,” Deccan Herald, 6
June, viewed on 7 February 2017, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-
affairs/060616/no-strike-carried-out-in-myanmar-against-ne-insurgents-army.html.
Sawant, G (2016): “Army Demands a Re-write After Martyr Goswami’s Ashok Chakra Award
Gets His Battalion Wrong,” Mail Today, 23 February, viewed on 15 February 2017,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/article-3461055/Army-demands-write-martyr-Goswami-s-
Ashok-Chakra-award-gets-battalion-wrong.
Sanghvi, V (2016): “I Am a Troll: Inside the Secret World of BJP’s Digital Army,” Business
Standard, 29 December, viewed on 12 February 2017, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/beyond-business/i-am-a-troll-inside-the-secret-world-of-bjp-s-digital-army-
116122801182_1.html.
Unnithan, S (2017): “We Will Cross Again,” India Today, 4 January, viewed on 11 February
2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/lt-general-bipin-rawat-surgical-strikes-indian-
army/1/849662.html.
- See more at: http://www.epw.in/journal/2017/8/strategic-affairs/corrosive-impact-armys-
commitment-kashmir.html#sthash.GZ8tlui8.dpuf

________________________________
Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’
EPW: http://www.epw.in/journal/2017/34/commentary/dilating-%E2%80%98half-front-
war%E2%80%99.html

Abstract: The reference to a “two and a half front war” by Army Chief General Bipin Rawat is
critically dissected. The “half front” apparently covers large tracts of India and a significant
number of its marginalised people. The thought of a war on the half front, as conjured by this
term, needs to be controverted outright. The army’s imagining of such a war and preparation for
it is questioned.

Army Chief General Bipin Rawat has been in the limelight ever since he was picked up for the
job superseding two of his seniors. This time around, he figured in the media over an interview
to a news agency in which he expressed his satisfaction that the “Indian Army is fully ready for a
two and a half front war” (ANI 2017). The backdrop to his statement is an ongoing face-off with
Chinese forces at Doklam, a disputed territory between China and Bhutan adjoining the tri-
junction of the India–China–Bhutan border. The general, perhaps, felt it necessary to bolster
 31

national morale by reassuring Indians that the army could fight off not only the Chinese, but also
the perennial foe, Pakistan, in case Pakistan—in the circumstance of an India–China conflict—
sensed an opportunity.
Some, such as the acerbic strategist Bharat Karnad, have questioned the general (Karnad
2017). In light of the figures recently put out in a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
on critical shortages in the ammunition for tanks and artillery, their critique is plausible (CAG
2017: viii). Apprehending as much, the defence minister—who, being the finance minister too, is
at best a part-time raksha mantri (defence minister)—declaimed in Parliament that the armed
forces were “reasonably and sufficiently equipped,” cryptically adding that it is not in public
interest to disclose the actuals (Hindu 2017).
As for the “half front,” Bharat Karnad is somewhat glib in believing that, “on the half front, there’s
no issue.” He reasons that the army will “quickly rid the landscape of insurgents at will, if the
brakes on its actions in J&K or in the northeast are removed by the government,” given that,
“[e]ven with the AFSPA [Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act] shackles, the army can do its job
of denying the insurgencies the success they crave” (Karnad 2017).
Though Karnad is sanguine, it bears reminding that the Kargil War—the anniversary of which
India, under its ultra-nationalist ruling dispensation, has begun observing as Vijay Diwas (Victory
Day)—had witnessed an upsurge in insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
Even the additional deployments in the nearly year-long Operation Parakram (2001–02) were
unable to staunch the insurgency. It is arguable that Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s political sagacity in
reaching out to the Kashmiris in April 2003 on the basis of insaniyat (humanity) and to Pakistan
through the back channel resulted in the unwritten ceasefire agreement of November 2003 and
the Islamabad declaration of January 2004. As for the supposed “AFSPA shackles” that the
army has on, according to Karnad, the army only adopted the “iron fist in velvet glove”
philosophy when relative quietude returned to Kashmir through the “healing touch” policy
internally and the composite dialogue with Pakistan externally.
Outlining the ‘Half Front’
In other words, the half front—a euphemism for internal security—is a consequential front. This
is not so only in relation to the communication zone (the rear areas of military operations
through which troops and logistics intended for the front are located or transit). The two parts—
combat zones and communication zones—comprise the theatre of war. While the army,
perhaps, restricts itself to this area, the term “half front” potentially goes well beyond this and
therein lie the dangers.
In case of a “two-front war,” the areas to the rear of the two theaters of war—northern, against a
twin threat from Pakistan and China; eastern, against China, and western, against Pakistan—
are taken as sensitive enough to club into a half front. This would understandably include areas
in J&K and the North East that abut the combat theatres, and the states along the western front.
Further, and more troublingly, in the strategic lexicon, the half front straddles most of the rest of
India. Deeper in the hinterland is the Red Corridor that would, in the imagination of strategists,
kick in in case of a war with China, and Muslim inhabited areas that are taken as likely areas in
which a Pakistan-affiliated fifth column based on “sleeper cells” would activate. At a juncture in
the nation’s life when dissent is being equated with sedition, a redefinition of the half front can
be taken as ongoing, with even liberal bastions and spaces, such as free-thinking universities,
being included.
The formulation “half-front war” conveys the impression of an India at war with itself. It is not
clear as to what the army has to do with any such war inside India, restricted as its mandate is
to the defence of India externally and only secondarily to assisting civil authorities in internal
 32

security duties. Using the term “war” in relation to internal security is questionable as a
dangerous mindset that can set off a self-fulfilling prophesy. The army needs cautioning that,
even if it imagines the half front in a restricted manner as the area directly impinging on its
operations, there is a danger of the expansive interpretation taking over. This would not
necessarily demand the army’s attention as providing an arena for its current-day political
masters and their assorted supportive pseudo-cultural political formations to expand their
takeover of India.
Dissecting the ‘Half Front’
It is a reasonable expectation that J&K could turn restive at the onset of war. Pakistan has not
sustained the insurgency in Kashmir out of a sense of affinity with Kashmiris alone. Its military
overlords have national security and the military’s institutional interests at heart. Operationally,
they wish to undercut India’s conventional military advantage prior to its application on the
western front. Keeping rear areas insecure helps in interdicting and disrupting the Indian forces
en route to the frontline. An example is Pakistan’s choice in the late 1990s of the Hill Kaka area
in Surankote tehsil as a base for terrorism. Not only would the terrorist base prove useful for
disrupting India’s defences in Poonch sector from the rear, but would also help sustain the
insurgency across the Pir Panjal range in the Kashmir Valley. The base was finally evicted in a
division-level operation, Operation Sarp Vinash (2003), on the heels of Operation Parakram
(2001–02).
Sensing Pakistan’s game plan in Punjab and Kashmir, the army had raised the Rashtriya Rifles.
Additionally, the home ministry has at its disposal massive Central Armed Police Forces
(CAPF). However, the interface has seldom been smooth. During the Kargil War, with the
army’s Kashmir-based formations concentrating on operations on the Line of Control, the
Rashtriya Rifles headquarters based in New Delhi were brought forward to Srinagar to handle
the spike in terrorism and insurgency. The move met with backlash from the forces, answering
to the home ministry, which refused to come under operational control of the Rashtriya Rifles
headquarters. From the handling of the stone-throwers in Kashmir last year with the use of
pellet guns, it is evident that under the conditions of war the situation would be considerably
more fraught and human rights that much more expendable.
As for the eastern front, India’s sense of vulnerability is heightened by an unstable North East
stretching behind it. Though insurgency-related deaths in the North East have been the lowest
in 2016 since 1997, the army’s “worst case scenario” most likely has it that insurgent groups in
the North East would be armed by the Chinese. This is especially so since the army itself
probably has plans up its sleeve of waging an asymmetric war in Tibet using Tibetan irregulars
behind Chinese lines. India, however, lives in a glass house of its own making. There are over
two dozen suspension of operations agreements across the North East. These are at best
interim, since peace is not merely the absence of violence. A few hundred AK-47 rifles can set
the accumulation of grievances and greed alight.
The North East’s insurgent groups being under an umbrella organisation—the United Liberation
Front of Western South East Asia—with links to China, heightens India’s threat perception. This
will inform its suppressive reaction in case of hostilities.
A significant stretch of the half front is the Compact Revolutionary Zone, visualised as the Red
Corridor running in an arc through forested central India, from the Terai region astride the Nepal
border to the Telangana region. Manmohan Singh, as Prime Minister, had once referred to
Naxalism as India’s “biggest internal security challenge” (PTI 2010). Noting a declining trend of
left-wing extremism-related incidents since 2011, the home ministry’s annual report in a self-
congratulatory mode claims an “unprecedented improvement” in the current government’s
 33

tenure (MHA 2017: 4). While Naxalism has no external linkage of any military significance, it can
be expected that the opportunity offered by a border conflict, particularly with China, would be
used to legitimise forays of the Operation Green Hunt variety. Operation Green Hunt, disclaimed
by the government after its launch in 2009, was a search-and-destroy mission that continues till
today, though under a different guise and scope.
The least visible aspect of the half-front war is related to “terrorism in the hinterland of the
country” (MHA 2017: 4). The devotion of merely one paragraph to it in the home ministry’s
annual report indicates the actual level of its significance. Nevertheless, prime-time noise and
headlines on terrorism, and the supposed inroads by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
earlier and by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant lately into India’s largest minority, its
Muslims, leave the impression of a large-scale problem.
This politically motivated identification of Muslim communities with terrorism has been going on
for over a decade. This image has been forged by police reflexively picking up Muslim youth in
the wake of incidents of domestic terrorism. Such a perception of Muslims indicates that Muslim
mohallas might well find inclusion within the half front; for instance, Batla House in New Delhi,
the site of a supposed encounter against a terrorist cell in September 2008 (Sethi 2012). In
June 2017, 15 Muslims were arrested at various places for allegedly celebrating a Pakistani
cricketing victory in the Champions Trophy (Suri 2017). In case of a war with Pakistan,
increased security surveillance of Muslims and security-related impositions can easily be
imagined.
Additionally, the spate of lynchings and rowdyism by cow vigilantes suggests how any such war
will play out for Muslims as a part of the half-front war. This identification of Muslims with the
Pakistani “other” is best illustrated by the unsolicited advice of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
leader Inderesh Kumar in reaction to former Vice President Hamid Ansari voicing the concerns
felt by India’s Muslims regarding their security (Thapar 2017). Kumar called for Ansari to leave
the country for “some place he feels secure” (Deshpande 2017). Presumably, after the fashion
lately, Kumar had Pakistan in mind. This conflation of India’s Muslims with Pakistanis can only
reach a crescendo in the case of military setbacks in war. If the war goes nuclear, its
intercommunity impact within India could rival partition.
Last but not least is the opportunity that a war will offer cultural nationalists for further throttling
liberal voices. At a recent observation of the Kargil Diwas in Jawaharlal Nehru University
attended by its vice chancellor, the university was likened by Major General (retd) G D Bakshi,
with his cultural nationalist credentials, to a “fort” that had been conquered, and he called for
similar conquests of similarly oriented universities in Hyderabad and Jadavpur (Shankar 2017).
The overt displays of nationalism are now de rigueur, such as the installing of giant-sized
tricolour flags in public places, including university campuses; playing of the national anthem
before movie screenings; and mandatory singing of the national song, Vande Mataram (I
pray/bow down to thee, Mother), twice a week in schools in Tamil Nadu. This is happening in
peace time with mere border stand-offs with both neighbours as the backdrop. War will increase
the “holy cow” status of national security, legitimising the invasion of liberal spaces.
Prevention as Answer
It would appear that, irrespective of the military showing on either front, India’s national fabric
can only suffer a setback on the half front. This is one more reason—added to several others,
such as nuclear escalation—why war should not figure as an option. Working meaningfully
towards its prevention assumes importance. This means going far beyond, for instance,
diplomatically addressing the Doklam crisis. Instead, India needs to clinch the 19 rounds of
special representative–level talks so far with China on the border issue, with a determined
 34

display of readiness for mutual compromise and accommodation. On the western front, India
must discontinue its current policy against substantial engagement with Pakistan and within
Kashmir of ignoring political outreach as the best and only way to tackle violence and public
disaffection.
Such a line of reasoning might not impress cultural nationalists, who hold the reins of power. To
them, a round of bloodletting might be just the potion the nation needs to unify it and bring in the
discipline, uniformity and cohesion attributed to wars. Though Vajpayee denied likening Indira
Gandhi to Goddess Durga (Vincent 2016), today’s bhakts (devotees) would welcome a similar
profile as a war leader for Narendra Modi. The communalists within their ranks would welcome
the prospects for further marginalisation of the minority community. This explains India’s
strategic direction in terms of the absence of engaging with political solutions. To them, the
possibility of war is an acceptable alternative to negotiated settlement of problems.
References
ANI (2017): “Indian Army Prepared for a Two and a Half Front War: Army Chief General Bipin
Rawat,” Associated News International, 8 June, viewed on 20 July 2017,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-army-prepared-for-a-two-and-a-half-front-war-army-
chief-general-bipin-rawat-4694292/.
CAG (2017): “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the Year Ended March
2016: Union Government (Defence Services) Army and Ordnance Factories, Report No 15 of
2017,” Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi, 21 July, viewed on 27 July 2017,
http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Overview_of_Report_No.15_of_2017_
-
_Compliance_audit_Union_Government_Army_and_Ordnance_Factories_Reports_of_Defence
_Services.pdf.
Deshpande, V (2017): “Go Where You Feel Secure, RSS’s Indresh Kumar Tells Hamid Ansari,”
Indian Express, 13 August, viewed on 15 August, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/go-
where-you-feel-secure-rsss-indresh-kumar-tells-hamid-ansari-4794361/.
Hindu (2017): “Armed Forces Equipped to Face Any Crisis: Jaitley,” 28 July, viewed on 1
August 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/armed-forces-fully-equipped-to-deal-with-
contingencies-says-arun-jaitley/article19377197.ece.
Karnad, B (2017): “Is the Indian Army Ready for a ‘Two and Half’ Front War?” Qrius, 20 June,
viewed on 25 July 2017, https://qrius.com/is-the-indian-army-ready-two-half-front-war/.
MHA (2017): “Annual Report 2016–17,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New
Delhi, viewed on 25 July 2017,
http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/EnglAnnualReport2016-17_17042017.pdf.
PTI (2010): “Naxalism Biggest Threat to Internal Security: Manmohan,” Hindu, 24 May, viewed
on 28 July 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-
security-Manmohan/article16302952.ece.
Sethi, M (2012): “Batla House and the Problem with the Deluded Journalist,” Kafila, 28
February, viewed on 23 July 2017, https://kafila.online/2012/02/28/batla-house-and-the-
problem-with-the-deluded-journalist-manisha-sethi/.
Shankar, A (2017): “JNU V-C M Jagadesh Kumar Wants an Army Tank on Campus as
Inspiration,” Indian Express, 24 July, viewed on 30 July,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/jnu-v-c-wants-an-army-tank-on-campus-as-inspiration-
4764093/.
 35

Suri, M (2017): “India Arrests 15 for Celebrating Pakistan Cricket Victory,” CNN, 21 June,
viewed on 27 July 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/21/asia/india-arrest-pakistan-
cricket/index.html.
Thapar, K (2017): “Asserting Your Nationalism Day In, Day Out Is Unnecessary: Hamid Ansari,”
Wire, 9 August, viewed on 12 August, https://thewire.in/166419/asserting-nationalism-day-day-
unnecessary-hamid-ansari/.
Vincent, P (2016): “Footnote to Fabled Story on Indira,” Telegraph, 27 February, viewed on 5
August 2017, https://www.telegraphindia.com/1160227/jsp/frontpage/story_71657.jsp.
_______________

The Missing Muslim Army Officers

EPW, Vol. 53, Issue No. 4, 27 Jan, 2018
26 January 2018

The second highest grosser of 2017, the blockbuster Tiger Zinda Hai, has an actor playing a
Muslim army officer working in the Research and Analysis wing(R&AW). He is selected by the
team leader played by Salman Khan, for his expertise in sniping. In one of the scenes, another
teammate questions the Muslim army officer’s patriotism, who is shown fishing out an Indian
flag from his rucksack to prove his nationalist credentials. Presumably, the Muslim director of
the film wanted to show that Muslims can be patriots too. The moot question is: Why the doubt?
The Muslim army officer is an endangered species. Official figures are unavailable as to the
number of Muslims in officer ranks in the army. Innovative ways, therefore, are to be found to
get an approximation. One such attempt has been made by going through the Indian Military
Academy’s (IMA) biannual commemorative volumes for each passing out course (Ahmed 2012).
The number of Muslims could be tallied from the name and one-line description of each
Gentleman Cadet (GC) of the passing out course beneath the squadron-wise course photos.
It being relatively easier to pick out Muslim names, it is possible to be more confident of the
numbers, than, say, if educated guesswork is done to compile the numbers for those belonging
to the Scheduled Caste from lists of names, as was the methodological problem faced in one
such exercise (Aggarwal et al 2015).
While there are multiple officer entry streams apart from the IMA, such as short service
commissions from the academies at Chennai and Gaya, these would take the absolute tally up,
but are unlikely to change significantly the relative presence of Muslims in officer ranks.
A perusal of six editions of the biannual IMAjournal over the period 2005–11, covering about
half of the seven-year period, led to a tally of 50 Muslim officers having passed out of the IMA.
This suggests that about 2% were Muslim, excluding those from friendly foreign countries. In the
academy journal’s Spring term 2016 edition, on the 137th Regular and 120th Technical
Graduates’ course, nine out of 469 or 1.9% of the officers having passed out were Muslims. The
figure from the 2016 Autumn term is five GCswith Muslim names out of 403 GCs. The figure
goes up thrice over, to 14 GCsfor the following course, Spring 2017, that had 423 GCsin all. In
effect, Muslims constituted 2.1% of those taking the Antim Pag, the “final step” of training, also
the first step as an officer, to the lilt of “Auld Lang Syne.”
If one contrasts these figures to the figures on GCsfrom Afghanistan—with which India has a
strategic partnership agreement since 2011—who have passed out of the IMA, the journals
indicate that India has trained some 50 Afghan GCsper term; thereby, training about five times
more Afghans than Indian Muslim GCswhile its own Muslim population is five times larger than
that of Afghanistan.
 36

The consistency in dismal numbers of Muslims obtaining the President’s Commission suggests
that there is little know-ledge, leave alone an understanding, that this is a problem calling out to
be remedied. Recall, Muslims, at 172.2 million in India, account for 14.23% of India’s population.
It is apparent that Muslims are under-represented. The unfortunate part is that this is
unsurprising.
The Sachar committee—the Prime Minister’s High-Level Committee for Preparation of Report
on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India—was set up to
seek an answer, among other things, to: “What is the Muslims’ relative share in public and
private sector employment?” (Sachar Committee Report 2006).
The answer it reportedly received from the army was that the army had 29,000 Muslim troops
(Unnithan 2006), which adds up to 2.63%. These are embarrassingly low figures.
A Continuing Decline
The problem appears to be worsening. The latest National Defence Academy course at Pune
commencing in January 2018 and consisting of 371 cadets (including those bound for the air
force and navy), has only 4 Muslims. Only two Muslims joined the 153 cadets of the 10+2
Technical Entry Scheme course that commenced in January 2018 in Gaya. In the Direct Entry
course that commen-ced at the IMAin January 2018, only one Muslim GCfeatured in the list of
103 names. Only one of the nine who joined the Army Education Corps course commencing in
January was Muslim. One Muslim -figured in the list of the 59 who joined the Technical
Graduates course at the IMA. Of the 705 Indian youth signing up for an army officer career at
the start of 2018, Indian Muslims could not even make it to -double digits.1
Further, Muslims’ lack of visibility at the academy is manifest in all dimensions. Not only do too
few Muslims make it to the academy’s portals, but, while there, their performance is indifferent.
The IMAjournals perused for data reveal only one Muslim as having figured in the top
GCappointments (34 appointments per course) at the battalion and company levels.2
In the two recent courses examined (Autumn 2016 and Spring 2017), only two Muslims held a
“tabbed” appointment as the lower-rung Junior Under Officers, responsible for a platoon (the
subordinate grouping to a company). The appointments are indicative of the relative order of
merit of the GCthat is fixed on passing out. Of the surfeit of academy awards, only one Muslim
GCreceived a mention for meritorious performance in equestrian sports.
The effects of under-representation and underperformance persist into their careers. Since only
professionally sound officers land instructional appoint-ments at the IMA, it is possible to see
how Muslims are faring by examining whether they find representation in the IMA’sfaculty. Lt
Gen (Retired) Ata Hasnain, the notable defence commentator, was once an instructor at the
IMAas a major. The instructional staff names appear in lists below the group photos of the
training faculty and academic staff in the IMAjournals. There were no Muslim officer instructors
in two of the terms examined, one each in 2008 and 2011. In the latest two editions of the
journal, there was a single Muslim major visible in the Autumn 2016 edition and two in the
Spring 2017 edition.
Not tenanting such prestigious appoint-ments early on in careers, results in fewer making it to
higher ranks since the steep pyramidal structure of the army weans off underperformers early. It
is apparent that there is a cascading effect of the deficit in Muslim youth making it into the
academy. It is no wonder that the only Muslim officer who reached the army commander level in
this century
is recently retired Lt Gen P M Hariz, one of the two generals controversially passed over for
promotion to army chief in late 2016.
 37

The situation is equally appalling when the non-officer instructor lists are examined in the
journals. In eight of the journals (six of the earlier set from 2005–11 and two of the latest (2016–
17), of the non-officer instructor staff in the consequential training section comprising 100 ustads
(non-officer instructors), none were Muslim. The only field having consistent Muslim presence is
equestrian, owing to the instructors largely coming from the only horsed cavalry regiment that
traditionally has had Muslims in its ranks, 61 Cavalry.
Not a ‘Minority Problem’
Is whistle-blowing on this score warranted? The army values its apolitical and secular image. It
believes that it can only work on the youth the communities themselves forward, and that it is an
-all-volunteer army of a free country into which any eligible citizen can step up for recruitment.
Given that it does not acknowledge that a problem exists, it is unlikely to take any steps to
mitigate it.
However, under-representation is not only a “minority problem,” as Muslim issues are usually
clubbed together. Any claim that the army is an equal-opportunity employer is questionable. The
biannual media write-up on the passing out parades at the IMAinvariably provide a state-wise
break-up of the officer commissions. At the last passing out parade in December 2017, of the
409 GCspassing out, 76 GCs were from Uttar Pradesh (UP), 58 from Haryana and 29 from
Uttarakhand (ToI2017a). The June 2017 passing out parade had 423 GCspassing out, with 74
from UP, 49 from Haryana, 40 from Uttarakhand, 30 from Rajasthan, 28 from Bihar and 23 from
Delhi (Pioneer 2017). Thus, a substantial proportion of the officer corps appears to be coming
from a -narrow, if populous, segment of India’s sub-nationalities inhabiting North India.
At the last passing out parade—one reviewed by the Bangladesh army chief—there were only
six Bengalis. This implies that a majority of Indian communities, taken socially (as in case of
Muslims) and geographically (East and South Indian communities), are under-represented. A
research scholar writes, “Just as Muslims are under-represented in the army, so are the
Bengalis, Biharis, Oriyas, South Indians or Gujaratis. And just as Sikhs are over-represented, so
are the Jats, Dogras, Garhwalis, Kumaonis, Gurkhas, Marathas and others” (Saksena 2014).
Arguably, the army does not reflect India’s diversity sufficiently.
The soldiery is not the focus here. As military sociologist Samuel Huntington (1957: 8) reminds
us, the significance of officership to military professionalism is critical. Being apolitical and
remaining so is a critical aspect of military professionalism. An officer corps that is non-
representative socially or ethnically opens itself to the possibility of losing its apolitical and
secular character.
It is liable to unwarily reflect the political inclinations of its catchment areas. Over this decade,
right-wing ideological trope and memes have been liberally exchanged on the army’s social
media networks (Ahmed 2017). The army chief recently has had to remark that keeping politics
out of the army was necessary (ToI2017b). Since he did not clarify his remarks, there are two
possibilities. Either he is apprehensive of the right wing’s penetration into the military, or he is
against the emerging pushback within the army against such penetration. The latter reflects the
discourse within the middle class, a step back from their falling uncritically for the so-called Modi
wave initially.
Perception of Muslims
Reverting to the scene in Tiger Zinda Hai, it can be inferred that the MuslimR&AWofficer’s
teammate perhaps did not have sufficient professional and social interactions with Muslims
owing to there being very few Muslims in theR&AWand Muslims over the past two decades
having been increasingly pushed into urban ghettos, respectively. TheR&AWbeing in the
intelligence agency keeping a keen eye on the shenanigans of Pakistan, he has perhaps
 38

acquired a prejudiced mindset in this organisation. A similar effect can be apprehended within
the army too. There are too few Muslim fellow officers whose professional showing can help
dispel the negative stereotypes that have come to be associated with Muslims in general. The
army also has a cloistered social space, restricting social interaction outside its cantonments.
Virtually every officer has rotated out of operations in Muslim-dominated Kashmir, where, in one
popular perspective in the army, he is up against a jihad (Hasnain 2016: 157). Army Chief Bipin
Rawat, interacting with the press on the eve of Army Day, hazarded that Kashmir’s education
system is suspect and that its madrasas (religious seminaries) and masjids (mosques) bear
watching (Business Standard 2018).
More Muslims in the officer corps could be preventive, leading to greater self-regulation in social
media exchanges that forge the negative perception of Muslims and Islam. An increase in their
numbers on the ground in operations could mitigate any adverse fallout, such as, for instance,
egregious violence inspired by misinterpreting problems with Pakistan and in Kashmir as a
religious or civilisational war.
Since the army can be expected to be less than forthcoming on change—especially since
ethnicities that are well represented apprehend a loss of employment opportunity, power, and
the welfare slice of the defence budget—for now, only a sensitisation to the problem at hand
can be done. Change can await democratic ousting of the current day government, not known
to be predisposed to the minority in any way. Take, for instance, the discontinuing of the
publishing of the numbers of Muslims in the police force early in its tenure. The decline by one
percentage point of Muslims in half a decade—from 7.55% in 2007 to 6.55% in 2012—was put
out by the National Crime Records Bureau (Sheikh 2015). This was during the United
Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) rule, which the then opposition and current day ruling dispensation
had held to be guilty of the appeasement of Muslims.
Change should not be read as affirmative action, but focused on recruiting processes targeting
India’s missing mino­rities, ethnic and social. An Equal Opportunities Commission and a
National Data Bank, both recommended by the Sachar Committee, are needed. For now, the
army’s outreach programs could be redirected towards absent communities. For their part,
Muslim communities across the country need to identify service in the military as an area for
diversifying their presence and contribution to national life. Quite like how Muslim communities
are endeavouring to get their wards into the civil services by setting up coaching centres, such
centres also need to be set up for cracking the army officer entry exams. A long-term effort
should be to encourage Muslim boys to attend Sainik schools run by states. Alongside, Muslim
girls must be encouraged to opt for the Officers Training Academy, Chennai.
Pluralism and a rejection of intolerance are the sine qua non for Indian demo-cracy. These
stand gravely threatened. The pernicious challenge to democracy that majoritarian extremism
represents has not left any institution unscathed, including the army. Internal diversity, both
social and geographical, can help insulate security organisations from the ongoing attempt by
cultural nationalists to collapse “Hindu” and “Hindustan” into one.
Notes
1 “Merit Lists, Joining Letter Status,” Join Indian Army, Government of India,
http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/alpha/~/merit-lists.htm.
2 A company is equivalent to a “house” in schools. Three GC companies make one battalion.
References
Aggarwal, Ankita, Jean Drèze and Aashish Gupta (2015): “Caste and the Power Elite in
Allahabad,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 50,
No 6, pp 45–51.
 39

Ahmed, Ali (2012): “The Army: Missing Muslim India,” Mainstream, Vol 50, No 27,
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3529.html.
— (2017): “Dark Side of Army’s Social Media Groups,” Tribune, 2 March,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dark-side-of-army-s-social-media-
groups/371308.html.
Business Standard (2018): “Army Chief Bipin Rawat Calls for ‘Some’ Control over Mosques,
Madrasas,” 13 January, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/army-chief-
bipin-rawat-calls-for-some-control-over-mosques-madrasas-
118011300059_1.html?ref=pbn.
Hasnain, Ata (2016): “A Counter Proxy War Strategy for Jammu and Kashmir,” The New
Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India, Gurmeet Kanwal (ed), New Delhi: Harper Collins.
Huntington, Samuel (1957): The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military
Relations, London: The Belknap Press.
Pioneer (2017): “After UP, Haryana, U’khand Tops List with Contribution of 40 GCs in Indian
Army,” 10 June, http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/dehradun/after-up-haryana-ukh....
Sachar Committee Report (2006): “Summary of Sachar Committee Report,” PRS Legislative
Research, http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1242304423~~Summary
%20of%20Sachar%20Committee%20Report.pdf.
Saksena, Amit (2014): “India’s Muslim Soldiers,” Diplomat, 20 May, https://thediplomat.com/
2014/05/indias-muslim-soldiers/.
Sheikh, Zeeshan (2015): “Data on Muslims in Police Will No Longer Be Public,” Indian Express,
30 November, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/data-on-muslims-in-police-
will-no-longer-be-public/.
ToI (2017a): “IMA POP Today, Maximum New Officers from UP, Haryana & U’khand,” Times of
India, 8 December, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/dehradun/ima-pop-today-maximum-
new-officers-from-up-haryana-ukhand/articleshow/61986724.cms.
— (2017b): “Military Should Be Kept Out of Politics: Army Chief,” Times of India, 6 December,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/military-should-be-kept-out-of-politics-army-
chief/articleshow/61946177.cms.
Unnithan, Sandeep (2006): “Sachar Committee: Congress Minority Agenda Comes under
Scrutiny,” India Today, 27 February, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20060227-
sachar-committee-congress-minority-agenda-comes-under-scrutiny-785928-2006-02-27.

___________
Whose army is it anyway?
https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/18337/Whose-Army-is-it-Anyway
20 February 2020

My father having once been commandant of the Indian Military Academy receives a
complimentary copy of the IMA’s biannual journal that covers happenings at the academy over
the past term. Visiting on holiday, I leisurely leaf through the journal to catch up on my alma
mater from which I was commissioned in summer 1987. In this article I share an observation on
the IMA, hoping to redflag a trend I have spotted from my scrolling through some ten journals in
some detail over the last decade.
Perusing through the Autumn Term 2019 issue I found not a single Muslim Indian officer listed
in the faculty, and only one Muslim Indian gentleman cadet (GC) listed among the 306 passing
 40

out comprising the 145th Regular and 128th Technical Graduates courses. There are however
54 Muslim GCs of friendly foreign countries, including 50 from Afghanistan and their two Afghan
army officer instructors.
There is no Muslim Indian officer in the lists below group photos of the headquarters and
administrative staff, the training team, the academic department and the Army Cadet College
Wing. Below the group photo of the commandant with all officers of the academy, of the 123
officers listed, none are Muslim Indians. Two Afghan officers are listed. Of the 59 officers posted
in and out of IMA during the term, none was Muslim.
Of the 146 instructors below officer rank, there are two Muslims in the training team, one in the
drill section, and one with the weapon training section. Of these four, only one is a junior
commissioned officer. Three Muslims are with the equitation section, of whom two are junior
commissioned officer level – only because the only equitation unit in the Indian army, the 61
Cavalry, has a proportion of Muslims. There is no Muslim in the Physical Training Section.
There is a lone Muslim Indian GC, Shahid Shah, most likely from Kashmir. He is also the lone
Muslim to figure in the group photo of GC appointments with the commandant, having made it to
the lowest GC appointment of Cadet Quarter Master Sergeant.
While this is the state of the passing out course, I looked forward to spotting some Muslim
Indians amongst the academy sports teams, since they also list GCs of the junior course on the
team. Not a single Indian Muslim figures in the nine academy sports team photos or the
combined group photo, suggesting that the forthcoming passing-out course of summer 2020 will
also be rather lean in Muslim Indian representation, and with no outstanding Muslim gracing its
numbers. There is also not a single Indian Muslim name in the writeups on hobbies and clubs,
such as the names of winners of debates etc.
To substantiate that this is a long standing trend incontrovertibly, below are extracts from my
earlier articles in various journals highlighting this as a troubling aspect, calling out for
enlightened intervention:

• A perusal of six editions of the biannual IMA journal over the period 2005–11,
covering about half of the seven-year period, led to a tally of 50 Muslim officers
having passed out of the IMA. This suggests that about 2% were Muslim, excluding
those from friendly foreign countries. In the academy journal’s Spring Term 2016
edition, on the 137th Regular and 120th Technical Graduates’ course, nine out of
469 or 1.9% of the officers having passed out were Muslims. The figure from the
2016 Autumn Term is five GCs with Muslim names out of 403 GCs. The figure goes
up thrice over, to 14 GCs for the following course, Spring 2017, that had 423 GCs in
all. In effect, Muslims constituted 2.1% of those taking the Antim Pag, the ‘final step’
of training, also the first step as an officer, to the lilt of ‘Auld Lang Syne’.
• “The problem appears to be worsening. The latest National Defence Academy
course at Pune commencing in January 2018 and consisting of 371 cadets (including
those bound for the air force and navy) has only four Muslims. Only two Muslims
joined the 153 cadets of the 10+2 Technical Entry Scheme course that commenced
in January 2018 in Gaya. In the Direct Entry course that commenced at the IMA in
January 2018, only one Muslim GC featured in the list of 103 names. Only one of the
nine who joined the Army Education Corps course commencing in January was
 41

Muslim. One Muslim figured in the list of the 59 who joined the Technical Graduates
course at the IMA. Of the 705 Indian youth signing up for an army officer career at
the start of 2018, Indian Muslims could not even make it to double digits.”
• “The IMA journals perused for data reveal only one Muslim as having figured in the
top GC appointments (34 appointments per course) at the battalion and company
levels. In the two recent courses examined (Autumn 2016 and Spring 2017) only two
Muslims held a ‘tabbed’ appointment as the lower-rung Junior Under Officers,
responsible for a platoon (the subordinate grouping to a company). Of the surfeit of
academy awards, only one Muslim GC received a mention for meritorious
performance in equestrian sports.”
• “There were no Muslim officer instructors in two of the terms examined, one each in
2008 and 2011. In the latest two editions of the journal, there was a single Muslim
major visible in the IMA Autumn 2016 edition and two in the Spring 2017 edition.”
• “The Platinum Jubilee issue of the magazine of the IMA, published in 2007, has
some revealing tidbits of information. Only six Muslim officers who have passed out
of the IMA have made the supreme sacrifice for the country since the 1971 War.
Only one, the late Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has been awarded a higher
gallantry medal, a Vir Chakra, since then. Only one Muslim Gentleman Cadet has
won the Academy’s Sword of Honour post Independence, with that award being won
way back in 1973.”
• “From the two IMA magazine issues in 2005, it is evident that only eight Muslims
passed out of the portals of the institution to become commissioned officers. In the
Spring Term 2006, there were eight Muslims commissioned. In the Spring Term
2007, nine Muslims took the ‘Antim Pag’ or ‘Last Step’ as GCs, but their first step as
commissioned officers, of the 555 taking commission that term. The following Spring
Term, 11 Muslim GCs passed out of 611. In the Autumn Term 2011, 14 Muslims
passed out. However, this last figure includes those from friendly foreign countries
such as Afghanistan.”
• “In other words, of the six magazines perused for ascertaining the numbers of
Muslims gaining the officer commission from the IMA, 45 have made the grade.
Assuming some were from foreign countries, less than 40 Indian Muslims have made
it over two-and-a-half years into the Army from IMA.”
• “A concerning figure, but less remarked upon, is that of the 291 cadets of the
passing-out course from the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, in the Spring
Term 2019, only five were Indian Muslims; all of 1.7 per cent. The figure is from the
NDA’s magazine, Trishakti. In contrast, seven cadets are from foreign countries.
Among the 132 names below photos of the faculty, only one was Muslim. Two junior
commissioned officer-instructors were Muslim, both unsurprisingly in the equitation
section since the only horsed cavalry regiment is 61 Cavalry.”
• “The IMA’s Spring Term 2016 edition figure is that of the 469 GCs of the 137 Regular
and 120 Technical Graduates courses commissioned on 12 December 2015, nine
were Muslims, making a percentage of 1.9 per cent.”
• “A leading military school in the country recently compiled the list of cadets that had
entered its portals ever since it was founded pre-Independence. Of 2,896 cadets that
have entered its precincts since Independence, only 28 had Muslim names.”
 42

A similar exercise can be undertaken to see if there is similar institutional absence of the
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Caste communities. It can be hazarded that even if these
comprise one per cent each, the tentative percentage from the disadvantaged communities
comprising some 45 per cent of India’s population is about 5 per cent, implying a deficit of nine
times over.
The finding here is that the Indian army is not representative of all India’. From the profiles of the
thirty-odd higher GC appointments of battalion level, only five were from other than north India.
My suspicion is that the under-representation is to the benefit of north Indian, Hindi speaking,
Hindu communities of the erstwhile ‘martial classes’ and emergent Other Backward Classes.
This narrowing of the social base of induction into the Indian army can only have long term,
mostly negative, repercussions. The new Department of Military Affairs must introspect.
__________________________
Questioning afresh Indian military’s social representativeness
12 June 2019
http://www.milligazette.com/news/16701-questioning-afresh-indian-militarys-social-
representativeness

The latest evidence of the political marginalistion of Muslims in India is that a mere 25 Muslims
figure in the lower house parliamentarians, up by 3 from the last one, from among some 172
million Indian Muslims.
An equally concerning figure, but less remarked upon, is that of the 291 cadets of the passing
out course from the National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakvasla, in the Spring Term 2019,
only five were Indian Muslims; all of 1.7 per cent. The figure is from the NDA’s magazine,
Trishakti, covering the events of the just-elapsed Spring Term. In contrast, seven cadets are
from foreign countries, including friendly Muslim, mainly central Asian states.
This is not a statistic easily found in the open domain, since the military – the army in this case –
once famously said that it does not record the religious affiliation of its members. Its reticence is
easy to understand since such a figure would be embarrassing.
The figure has been worked out by counting the Muslim names amongst those of the passing
out course, leaving out those from friendly foreign countries. Among the 132 names below
photos of the faculty, only one was Muslim. Two junior commissioned officer-instructors were
Muslim, both unsurprisingly in the equitation section since the only horsed cavalry regiment, 61
Cavalry, from which the instructors are deputed, traditionally has had some Rajasthani Muslims.
Browsing similarly earlier through some three mid-decade years of commemorative magazines
put out by the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun, the figure worked out to two per cent
of those commissioned from that academy being Muslim.
Since the IMA commissioned some 70 odd foreign officers, including 50 per term from
Afghanistan under a training assistance programme, foreign officer commissions are over six
times the number for Indian Muslims, though the Indian Muslim population is six times that of
Afghanistan and its neighbouring states.
The figure for Other Ranks is different, but inflated. A figure dating to the controversy over the
number of Muslims in the army that attended the Sachar Committee seeking out the same was
29000 Muslims, about 3 per cent. The numbers are higher as Kashmiris are enrolled into the
Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry regiment. These days some are in the territorial army’s home
and hearth units, who unfortunately periodically figure among Kashmiri dead owing to being
 43

targeted by militants since theirs is an intelligence function. For their pains, this year one of their
number got the nation’s highest honour, the Ashok Chakra. This should not detract from the
wide absence of Muslims in the organization.
Should the missing Muslims be concerning? This is a question Defence Minister Rajnath Singh
needs answering as he beings his new innings.
To be sure, the meager number of Muslims in the security forces is not limited to the period of
ascent of cultural nationalism. Little was done to remedy matters in the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) period.
While the UPA took steps to increase numbers of Muslims in the central police forces and the
police, the figures declined over the succeeding years. Of late the government has discontinued
publishing the figures having disbanded the records bureau that put out such statistics. This is
of a piece with the government’s allergy to unflattering - if revealing – statistics. While numbers
of toilets constructed and gas cylinders distributed are kosher, numbers such as that of
unemployed and the gross domestic product are a state secret (at least up until elections are
over and done with).
Given the bleak numbers for Muslims, it can be confidently asserted that the numbers for
members of the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in India’s officer corps is equally if not
more abysmal. Under-representation in the professionally consequential officer corps cannot be
compensated by higher numbers in the soldiery. In their case, the scheduled castes are
represented in the Mahar regiment, with Ambedkar’s father being a prominent member; while
the scheduled tribes are in the Bihar regiment. Even the numbers in the soldiery cannot push
their representation to a decent contrast with their proportion of the population.
In effect, by extrapolation it can be seen that some 40 per cent of India’s population – roughly
14 per cent Muslims, 16 per cent scheduled caste and 9 per cent scheduled tribe – have a
presence of about 4 per cent in the officer corps – short by 10 times in proportion to their
numbers. With New India appraising the 75 years mark in independent existence, the
competitive capability of disadvantaged communities is stark.
It can be argued that in an all-volunteer military only merit prevails. However, that the regimental
system is an unacknowledged bit of affirmative action for the ‘martial races’ needs airing to, first,
bust this myth, and, more importantly, to act as precedence for increasing numbers of
unrepresented communities in the military.
During election run-up, commentary surfaced on certain political parties wishing for new
regiments to increase the numbers of their constituents in the military. Given the military
largesse in terms of a bloated revenue budget, cornering a piece of the pie for respective
communities is unexceptionable. Conversely, this also accounts for the defence of the status
quo by votaries of the regimental system.
The defenders have it that India should ‘not fix what ain’t broke’. Cohesion is taken as a force
multiplier and not to be compromised by politically motivated meddling in the recruiting system.
This is an operational level argument that could do with superseding by a political level
consideration.
Firstly, the cohesion argument is dated. The seventy-plus years of a shared national life has
leveled out differences considerably. There is sufficient mutual comprehension and empathy
between Indians from different ethnic groups to generate the cohesion necessary for operational
effectiveness. Incidentally, cohesion is liable to being cemented by the rigour of military training
and the dangers of combat, as routinely obtains in the all class units across the armed forces
and paramilitary. Is it the military’s case that there is a deficit in such units?
 44

Significantly, a military that does not reflect India’s diversity belies the principle of unity-in-
diversity underwriting India’s democracy. The defence minister is of a party that takes pride in
flattening out differences. The prime minister believes that the minorities have been taken for a
ride by the Congress over the past seventy years. The employment and developmental indices,
such as lack of representation in the meritocratic officer corps even seventy years after
independence, show this up starkly. While the ‘sabka vikas’ slogan if fine, it would yet take two
generations before these communities measure up to the competition.
More needs doing, not in terms of affirmative action, but in terms of targeting their best to sign
up for a life in uniform. This could include targeted advertising, more National Cadet Corps
(NCC) units in their areas and funding coaching academies through universities in areas
inhabited by them. Only then will ‘sabka vishwas’ come on the horizon. Since such a measure
would be targeting the 40 per cent disadvantaged population and not 14 per cent Muslims
alone, it would amount to yet one more measure to pull up by the boot straps the lower of the
two castes – the poor – mentioned by the prime minister in his reworking of the caste system
into two castes – one of the poor and the second who help them out of poverty. It would thus not
suffer the ‘appeasement’ tag.
The ball is now in Rajnath Singh’s court. Armed here with the arguments necessary he can
reclaim his ministerial space, denied earlier in the first round of distribution of cabinet
committees. He can undo at long last what Ambedkar described in his inimitable exposition on
caste: ‘Some closed the door: Others found it closed against them.’

_____________________
An Army Day resolution for the new chief
15 January 2020
http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=98358

On taking over as the chief of defence staff, General Bipin Rawat was asked about his often
figuring controversially in headlines for some or other political intervention by him. His latest was
his decrying of the counter citizenship amendment act protests. He had this to say in reply: “We
stay far away from politics, very far. We have to work according to directions by the government
in power.”
On the face of it, this is as uncontroversial a statement as can be. The military keeps a distance
from politics and is obedient to the government, irrespective of the ruling party in power. The
new army chief, General MM Naravane, in his interaction with the press on taking over, when
asked about military politicization asserted as much, saying, “I totally disagree. We are totally
apolitical. It is a misperception of a few people which is totally incorrect.”
However, in light of precedence of military’s parochialism prominently featuring Bipin Rawat all
through his army chief days, interrogating whether the military retains its pristine apolitical status
is necessary. The plethora of political interventions by General Rawat, and his counter-part air
force chief, BS Dhanoa, does not need reiteration here. These cannot be summarily dismissed.
General Bipin Rawat’s statement has clues as to whether the suspicion that there is more to
politicization of the military than mere difference of perception holds water. The statement can
well be interpreted to mean that though the military maintains a distance from politics, any
action that smacks of intervention in politics is in obedience to directions of the government in
power.
 45

Such an expansive interpretation of the military’s idea of duty of obedience to the civilian
political leadership calls for interrogation. While it does have to answer to the civilian political
leadership, it can reasonably be understood that the duty of obedience does not extend to illegal
or illegitimate directions.
On this, General John Hyten, head of the United States’ nuclear weapons related Strategic
Command, clearly set the gold standard in a modern, democratic civil-military relationship,
stating in the context of President Trump’s inconsistent decision making:
I provide advice to the president, he will tell me what to do,”… “And if it’s illegal, guess what’s
going to happen? I’m going to say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal.’ And guess what he’s going to
do? He’s going to say, ‘What would be legal?’ And we’ll come up with options, of a mix of
capabilities to respond to whatever the situation is, and that’s the way it works. It’s not that
complicated.
This means a military needs to have (and does have) an internalised yardstick against which it
measures the legitimacy or otherwise of its marching orders. In case the departure from the
constitutional letter and norm and past practice is inexplicable and unwarranted, the military
instead has the obligation to revert to the civilian master with its reservations and the two
together are to arrive at a via media, whereby the civilian will prevails and the military does not
overstep any constitutional line.
In effect, the constitutional straight and narrow is the yardstick. The military brass has acquired
its stature in the national scheme so far by its adherence to this. Even Bipin Rawat’s public
gaffes through his tenure so far has not shifted the normative goal posts. On the contrary, he
has been upbraided for transgressing the constraints on political speech and behavior by a
senior of the veteran community, Admiral Ramdas.
The military is not obligated where directions fail the appropriateness test. Whereas the duty of
obedience is primary, it is not sacrosanct or unconstrained. The military leader has to apply his
mind to received instructions and act as per the mandate in relation to the Constitution and -
normatively - in relation to the nation.
In other words, in case a military receives instructions to make political statements, it really
ought to politely fob these off. With time, deterrence against illicit action and mutual respect
would set the relationship on even keel. The military needs to stand up for its constitutional
obligation and tradition of apolitical and secular ethic, reminding political masters when
necessary not to ask of it anything it cannot deliver on.
This is predicted on a dialogue between the two tiers – civilian and military – wherein the
political tier respects the military’s space and the military does not attempt transcend it and
resists attempts to prevail over it to act otherwise. Needless to add, such a ‘pull and push’ would
require to be done discreetly within the corridors of power, so that the relatively delicate
democratic edifice is not buffeted unduly.
Admittedly, this is a tall order, since, as Anit Mukherjee suggests in his new, eponymous book –
The Absent Dialogue – dialogue is absent within the ministry. His finding reinforces Bharat
Karnad’s colourful portrayal of the prime minister’s disdain for the anglicized military leadership,
of the brass unavailable for discussion after sunset since they are presumably at the bar.
 46

The last resort is of course for a military commander to resign. Civil-military theory has it that the
civilian has the ‘right to be wrong’ and, in the agent-principal linkage, the civilian leadership is
answerable to the electorate. It is for the electorate to punish the civilian leadership for wrong
decision making. All a military professional can do under the circumstance is to resign.
This responsibility is not unknown to the military brass. Both socialisation and a professional
military education underscore the importance of democratic civilian control, with its limits also
forming part of the military acculturation. Exposure to civil-military relations (CMR) theory is part
of military curriculum for higher ranks. The military is also cognisant of the place of tradition in
military culture. Learning from peer militaries is also constantly ongoing. There is a hiatus of a
year at Delhi’s Tees January Marg where those destined for apex ranks are exposed at the
defence ministry controlled National Defence College to India’s democratic mores and practices.
In his rumination on his responsibility of the US’ nuclear arsenal, John Hyten, went on to say, “I
think some people think we’re stupid. We’re not stupid people. We think about these things a lot.
When you have this responsibility, how do you not think about it?” Basically, he underlines the
extensive training and military professional education that prepares the brass for their jobs. In
India’s case, an officer while getting to general rank spends a minimum five years in class
rooms. This enables political sensitivity and knowledge of civil-military relations red lines.
The good sense in a professional distance from politics is as brought out by a former vice chief,
Vijay Oberoi: that in a system of democratic alternation in government, the military can
seamlessly transfer its loyalty between dispensations irrespective of who is elected to power. If
and since political parochialism is not within the remit of the military, any insistence by the
temporal political masters on this must be determinedly sidestepped by the military.
There are bureaucratic ways to ‘shirk’ – a Peter Feaver phrase - dodgy tasking. General Panag
in an advisory piece for the new army chief recommends resort to cryptic military phrasing when
interacting with the media, so as not to stray into political turf. This indicates that situations can
be tactfully handled. The brass has over three decades of human relations management
experience before getting to flag rank.
The unfortunate tendency today is in personalisation of power, an example is in the manner
Narendra Modi supervised the annual conclave of director generals of police with a regimen that
included yoga with Modi in the lead. The effect on policing in the national capital and India’s
largest state is self-evident in the handling of the counter citizenship amendment act protests
there.
Reminding the military of this verity at this juncture is timely in that there is a change of guard at
5 Rajaji Marg, the residence of the army chief. It is heartening to note the spoken reputation of
General MM Naravane, the new incumbent. Any indoctrination residue from his schooling at a
prominent right wing run school in Pune cannot but have been washed off in his close to four
decades of imbibing and practice of military mores.
Going forward, the onus is on the military to stockade itself within its professional space.
Adoption of a prickly posture – reminiscent of a porcupine – may send the message and deter
the regime from abusing its authority over the military. Naravane has begun well by drawing
attention at his first Army Day press conference to the preamble of the Constitution, which is
echoing across the land today in student protests. It remains to be seen if he is prepared for a
personal cost for better serving national security.
 47

The land warfare doctrine: The army's or that of its Chief?

7 February 2019
https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/16224/New-Land-Warfare-Doctrine-
May-Be-the-Garrulous-Army-Chiefs-Alone

The Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) was put out in the public domain rather quietly in mid-
December. The non-descript manner of introduction of a significant output of the army was
markedly different from the release in 2004 of its predecessor document, Indian Army Doctrine
(IAD), that had been preceded by briefings to the media and was released as a book by the
Army Training Command. The first version of the document was also brought out in a book
format by ARTRAC in 1998, Indian Army – Fundamentals, Concepts, Doctrine. Curiously, this
time round the army has settled for a release of the document only in soft copy and without any
front matter, explanatory preface and introductory foreword. There was no mention of it at the
last army commanders‘ conference, though the media carried details of the four high-level
studies that were discussed at the conference. In 2004, on the other hand, the army
commanders had discussed the doctrine in their spring meeting and the document was put out
later at their meeting in autumn. Also, equally surprisingly, there has been no reference to the
document either by the usually talkative Chief or any army commanders. What this points to is
that the document likely did not command a consensus within the army. This dissonance is easy
to explain by going through the document. It has within it three favourite hobby horses of the
Army Chief. The first is admittedly not his alone, but one inherited by chiefs since the turn of the
decade. This is regarding ‗two front‘ war. The second on the gray zone of hybrid war is the
Chief‘s contribution to management of the Kashmir conflict, one he presumably felt entitled to
make since his elevation as chief was predicated on his supposed expertise in the subject
having spent his last three command tenures involved in it. The third also goes back a long way
to the 2004 IAD, that had spelt out the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) without putting a
name to it. The first controversial aspect, the ‗two front‘ thesis, is referred to as ‗multiple fronts‘
in the document, presumably to include the ‗half front‘ that is the Chief‘s personal contribution
to doctrinal development as part of his hyping of hybrid war. Indelicately put, the half-front is
apparently the potential front open to manipulation by the two adversaries, Pakistan and China,
inside India: its Muslims (particularly Kashmiri) and Maoists respectively. On the back of a
growing economy sometime in mid 2000s and increased interest of the United States in helping
India get to great power status, the army sought to switch its focus from its western foe by
measuring itself against a more respectable – size-wise – foe, China. There was also a lull on
the western front owing to the peace process kicking in around then. The China threat was
therefore timely, which if not for real was one that would have had to be conjured up.
26/11 brought the Pakistan threat back into the equation, making for the ‗two front‘ threat
thesis. Though officially adopted in end 2009, it did not lead to a tweaking of the IAD then, since
it apparently did not carry the day with the national security establishment. That two successive
governments have not bit into the army thesis is evident from the key take-away from the army‘s
closed door seminar of end 2009, the mountain strike corps, not receiving the kind of support
the army has hoped for. It can be inferred from the reiteration of the thesis in this document that
this lack continues. By no means does this imply that the thesis lacks traction, but currently from
a grand strategic perspective it would be untimely to name the collusive foes or create a self-
fulfilling prophesy by doing to till the growing economy furnishes the means to take on both over
time. This bit of good sense appears lost on the army that instead wishes to use the heightened
threat to fight back the marked decline in defence budgets over the past two years. While for the
ruling party it is to keep China placated till it gets another term soon, for the army it is to justify
 48

its share of the pie. In short, this is a temporary disconnect between the army and its civilian
masters, while the thesis amounts to common sense within the army. The second is the hybrid
war hoopla. This is important to flag since it is evident that it is subscribed to by the national
security establishment, so much so that the speech writer of the prime minister at his rally south
of the Pir Panjals had the prime minister mouth bombast such as ‗We will break the back of
terrorism with all our might‘ or words to that effect. Rebuke from national security watchers was
not long in coming with a senior commentator pointing out that terrorism and militancy are not
quite the same. Unfortunately, the hybrid war thesis in the words of the LWD has it that what is
happening in Kashmir is a sponsored proxy war and trans-border terrorism. Such a reading
leaves little scope for a peace process, notwithstanding the presence of the representative of
the Union government for a year and half now and the recent appointment of a former
bureaucrat, with experience at the Kashmir desk in the home ministry, as an advisor to the
governor. This is a self-serving interpretation of the problem since it leaves only the military
template operational in Kashmir. It cannot be missed that this serves the interest of the army
chief since it allows him scope to display his expertise in his final year as chief. Though not
against the institutional interest of the army in terms of keeping it in the national eye – if through
the recent hit, Uri - it is uncertain if it commands a consensus since the indefinite engagement it
spells cannot but keep the army tethered to the twentieth century. Finally, the LWD seeks to
operationalise the CSD, one that the Chief was the first to acknowledge as the army‘s doctrine,
even though his predecessors had demurred from doing so as it neither had support of the
ministry nor of sister services. There is no certainty that it has the missing backing now. This
also impacts the ongoing cadre review of the officers at flag rank. The internal disagreement
perhaps owes to IBG operationalising finding its way into the document, preempting the spring
exercises at which the concept is to be tested. In a way, the LWD appears to have jumped the
gun and could be updated later in the year, which begs the question why was it not held back till
then. Maybe the Chief was in a hurry to get it out for gaining a sense of ownership. It is almost
certain that should there be a change in government, he is liable to have his wings clipped and
will likely be serving out the balance of his tenure rather tightlipped. All told, the LWD appears a
self-centered exercise, put out the army‘s perspective planning directorate and containing its
Chief‘s pet projects rather than as a document that has undergone the test of due diligence and
due process – yet another piece of evidence on the manner of handling national security at the
five year mark of this government.

________________________

Divide and kill

30 October 2018
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=84300

In the last quarter, 78 militants have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir, with 90 per cent of
these being local recruits. This is the culmination of the summer campaign, a befitting cap to
Operation All Out. The army is presumably battening down for keeping out the 300 odd militants
awaiting induction into the Valley from across the Line of Control. The other 300 odd militants in
the Valley, largely operating in south Kashmir, are in the army's sights over the winter.
Hopefully, by the time the nation goes to polls, the victory bugle will sound in Kashmir,
enhancing the poll prospects of the Modi-Shah combine. The script can be directly attributed to
Mr. Doval, the national security advisor, since it is of a piece with the strategy unleashed in the
mid-nineties. Back then, the turn-coat militants were deployed to turn the tables on the
insurgency. Once their utility was exhausted in the fraternal bloodbath in Kashmir, they were
dignified by a police job - some in its sword arm, the Special Operations Group (SOG). The
move to rely on the Ikhwan to divide Kashmiris and best those with a Pakistani affiliation is
 49

variously attributed, with at least one bio-sketch crediting Ajit Doval. The strategy continues,
with intelligence-led operations relying on information from the community. Credit for the
intelligence inflow is generously given to the Kashmir police by the military and former military
men, the latter on social media.
This explains the unfortunate targeting of Special Police Officers (SPO), and the police, by
militants, who no doubt wish to stanch such inflow. The fratricide for a period mid this year
included tit-for-tat atrocities, including kidnaps and killings of off-duty uniformed members of the
community and some innocent relatives of members of both sides.
The strategy is a variant of the well-known one employed by outside powers: 'divide and rule'. It
has intelligence provenance going back to the several groups India's intelligence agency
spawned to counter the Tamil Tigers in north and east Sri Lanka. There, Prabhakaran gave
these groups short shrift and they departed Sri Lankan shores along with the Indian army. In
Kashmir, the army can only remain. The host community can only suffer the strategy. In its
earlier avatar of the mid to late nineties, it was used to effect by a fledgling Rashtriya Rifles to
compensate for its lack of cohesion as a fighting force. The hatchet job on the insurgency was
Kashmiri led, with not a few military careers benefiting in the process. The relative peace of the
early 2000s - brought on by factors other than military pressure - resulted in covering up of the
tracks, with the Ikhwan jettisoned, but the strategy kept alive through the territorial army's 'home
and hearth' battalions, SPOs and the SOG. The village defence committees (VDC) south of the
Pirpanjal was the essential precursor to the communalization of the area today. It is as futile as
the 'chicken or egg' conundrum to argue whether terrorism preceded the VDC or otherwise. The
strategy of proxy groups was exported to Assam, where the surrendered Assamese militants
were put to pressure the Assamese insurgents. The fratricide there included killings by these
proxy groups of relatives of their former comrades. Some 30 deaths were at their hands. The
governor in Assam in the period was a former general with a known predilection for the right-
wing party then in power in the center. He was duly rewarded with yet another gubernatorial
assignment, this time in Kashmir by the pretender Loh Purush, LK Advani. The general in
charge of the operational group of Assam's unified command in the period at end last century
had earned his spurs in the Valley, who in one bio at the end of one of his pieces of writing
takes credit for the policy of surrenders in Kashmir. The period he commanded a tactical
formation in Kashmir was when the Ikhwan was forged. That's perhaps where he arrived at his
Islam-terrorism linkage: 'Unfortunately, terrorism has been linked to religion and this is very
dangerous. Unfortunately, Islam has come under shadow of doubt and it is creating all the
problems.' (His latest foray into the headlines has been in his Pune based think tank first making
the link between 'urban naxals' and Bhima Koregaon, one lapped up by the police of the saffron
party run state.) The SPO template was then transferred to central India in the form of the Salwa
Judum, where it - yet again - successfully divided the tribal community. Operation Green Hunt
ongoing in the jungles out of sight of the media is on the backs of tribal fighters, with the central
armed police forces and paramilitary deployed on hand to reap up any credit for outcome of
operations. Notably, the strategy's transfer was in the mid 2000s when our very own James
Bond, Ajit Doval, was heading the lead internal intelligence agency and the national security
adviser was his former boss.
In central India, the strategy was frowned upon by the Supreme Court in a case brought to it
and pursued by scholar activists. The militia was responsible for ethnic cleansing, which is what
the corralling of tribal communities into detention camps essentially was. The spirit of the court
judgment against use of the militia appears lost on the police, with the fighters morphing into
irregulars, for instance, those depicted accompanying the armed police guarding the character,
Newton, determined to bring electoral democracy to the interiors of Bastar in the eponymous hit
film.
The tragic SPOs are as much the victim of the strategy as the targets. SPOs salary was
doubled this year, after six years of bureaucratic deliberations, to Rs. 6000 per month, and after
 50

the counter insurgency of the last two years virtually riding on their backs. The recent abduction
and killings of SPOs led to another hike by a third of the amount, to keep them to the till. This is
a case of the state taking advantage less of commitment than of desperation. With no
employment opportunities, the apologists for the hardline are plausible when they claim that
stone pelters - who brave pellet guns - are on the payroll of the Hurriyet. To strategists who
double as devotees, the ingenious scheme thought up by Messiah Modi - demonetization -
ended stone throwing since it dried up these funds. Wonder what to them accounts for the stone
that felled the unfortunate 22 year old trooper, Rajendra Singh, this week. The fissures from
desperation - rendered crevasses by conflict - are easy to manipulate by an imperial successor
state, India. It is natural for the intelligence community denizens to think up such strategies, for
they are predisposed to chicanery and deception as part of their trade. They are also not the
ones implementing it intimately. That is the domain of the army in Kashmir (and the paramilitary
in central India). The security forces should know better. Whereas this cannot be said of the
khakis - not ever after the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) saga dubbed CBI vs. CBI - this
should be the case with the army. It has an intellectual counter insurgency trove and a doctrine.
It has a reputation to protect. It is aware of the political preceding the operational; of the national
superseding its parochial interest. And yet, for it to profit from a strategy that is messing up
society in the long run - an Indian community at that - is abdication of its agency. It is no longer
a strategic actor, one that includes long term ends to offset short term ways and means. This
lessens the distance between it and doormen sporting camouflage these days. Doormats are
not strategic beings.

________________________

The army's two impulses in Kashmir: Human rights Doctrine and departures
10 July 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/14342/The-Armys-Two-Impulses-in-
Kashmir-

Below is advice for policy makers and Indian army strategists on the website of an armed forces
think tank: There is a need to implement few of hardline practices followed by Israel or USA in
tackling terrorists. Policy of restraint needs a quick overhaul. SF personnel must have clearly
defined rules of engagement in terms of stone throwing public. Collateral damage has to be
acceptable in such cases, but a single SF casualty must not be tolerated.‘
Superficially, it is merely explicating what the army chief once famously warned: that stone
throwers would be taken as ‗over-ground workers of terrorists‘ and disposed-off accordingly.
The commentator wishes that they form part of ‗collateral damage‘ here on, elaborating what
the army chief included as the ‗harsh way‘ to deal with stone pelting.
While, in light of killings of three stone pelters, including a sixteen year old girl, it is uncertain if
the ‗harsh way‘ was merely a threat held out or is being implemented, the army chief can be
given the benefit of doubt on his assurance that security forces are mindful of ‗people friendly‘
rules of engagement. Rawat had claimed, ‗that the SFs (security forces) haven‘t been so brutal
— look at Syria and Pakistan. They use tanks and air power in similar situations. Our troops
have been trying their level best to avoid any civilian casualty despite huge provocation.‘ The
commentator thus appears to be arguing against his boss‘ view that the Indian way is different.
The commentator, a former senior fellow at the think tank, instead wishes for a ‗quick overhaul‘
of such restraint, now that the elected government in Srinagar has been sent packing and
Kashmir is under governor‘s rule. This despite his army chief putting a stop to such hankering
with his admonishing that ‗there is nothing such as stepping up … the army continues to
operate with formulated rules of engagement.‘ Clearly, there are two impulses within Kashmir.
 51

One is the only sensible recourse that makes the army chief proud of the army‘s human rights
record. Dismissing the recently released report of a UN human rights body, he said that the
army‘s record is ‗above board‘, well known also to Kashmiris. To nevertheless deter stone
throwing, he occasionally vents his exasperation in the media on stone throwers, hoping that by
repetition to convince Kashmiri youth that being ‗carried away unnecessarily‘ after azadi is
futile.
The second impulse leads up to references to the ‗harsh way‘ being taken rather too seriously,
for instance, in the case in which an officer ended up with a first information report lodged
against him.
These two impulses have always been incident in Kashmir, and indeed elsewhere in counter
insurgency employment. Doctrine is expected to mediate between the two and the doctrinal
tenets are to prevail. In this case, the chief appears to be referring to the longstanding doctrine,
articulated in 2006 as ‗iron fist in velvet glove‘. There is always present the second – perhaps
subversive -counter narrative, referred to by the commentator in question as ‗open steel glove
policy‘. It is always possible for the second to overwhelm the first. India‘s Kashmir record
provides instances when this has been so. While the official narrative has always been one of
being human rights cognizant in operations, that these have not always been upheld is
unfortunately also true. A couple of extracts from missives dating to the early and mid-nineties
from the Unified Headquarters, presided over by an adviser to the governor in J&K, to the
security forces operating there is indicative: ‗Attitudinal change must take place. Indian citizens
must not be degraded, ill treated or thrashed;‘ ‗Merciless beating of one and all during cordon
and search operations. At some times such beatings take place in full view of the public.‘ The
understanding behind such departures from tenet in practice is that perception management,
including media management, can cover up. It is no wonder the commentator in question urges,
‗Media management is paramount…‘
The counter narrative has a healthy following. Take the case where human rights has been
taken seriously and its violation followed to its logical conclusion, that of the firing of about two
score bullets into a car that sped past a check point at Budgam, killing its two youngsters. It was
not particularly popular, requiring the army commander having to explain the action to his
command in a demi-official letter.
Even so, later his prompt redressal action was harangued in a journal of the think tank in
question by a former head of that think tank now with the Hindutva-linked India Foundation. The
cultural nationalism-inspired criticism implied that the action of the army commander had
‗political considerations‘ at heart. This reading of the approach to human rights in the army
implies that for the army to walk the talk, its commanders need to first be persuaded and must
be exert accordingly to sensitise their command. This is easier said than done. The army has a
command culture which is considerably personalized. The tyranny of the confidential report
keeps tactical level subordinates responsive to the command climate that the commander puts
in place. The operational level commander could well put in place a laissez faire approach,
escaping censure by scoring high on the bean count such as on terrorists killed. Since families
alienated are not quantified, the army has in such periods settled for tactical success in return
for strategic failure.
The phenomenon appears to be recurring. The army chief in his pitch against azadi admitted as
much, stating, ―These numbers (of militants who are killed in gunbattles with the army) don‘t
matter to me because I know this cycle will continue. There are fresh recruitments happening.‖
It did not occur to the chief that his ill-advised condoning a brazen violation in the ‗human
shield‘ episode has arguably contributed to militancy continuing into Operation All Out‘s second
year though the operation accounted for some 225 terrorists. It would not do to restrict the focus
on the army alone. There are central police forces numbering in the six digits in Kashmir. There
is no known doctrine that informs their conduct. It is well known that they have hands-off
supervision. It is no secret that khaki-clad leaders such as late EN Rammohan are an exception.
 52

At the height of insurgency and its counter, he expressly forbade paramilitary combining in itself
the roles of ‗judge, jury and executioner‘. A leadership deficit lends itself to human rights short
cuts; the most egregious of which is the slothful retention of pellet guns in a day and age of
availability of substitutes in plenty and monies to access these. While differences can be aired
on pages of think tank wares, having divergences within the ranks over fundamentals requires
greater vigilance in doctrine dissemination and implementation. Doctrinal dissonance cannot be
allowed to take any more Kashmiri lives.

________________________

Human Rights: All so unfortunately ho-hum

3 July 2018
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=80581

It is entirely understandable that in the role playing that attends the Kashmir conflict the
positions of those in authority and that of activists on the mid-June release of the report on the
situation of human rights in Kashmir from the office of the UN high commissioner for human
rights would be antipodal. It is interesting that even those bearing the mantle of liberals in
mainland India have sought to belittle the report. So much so for its case, inter-alia, of over a
hundred deaths resulting from excessive use of force against the agitations after the killing of
Burhan Wani, quite as many as those in agitations after the Machhil killings episode in 2010. If
and since the matter is so well known and for so long, putting it together between covers makes
for little excitement here. Even as the situation calls for urgent remedial attention (such as
trashing pellet guns) as recommended by the report, that this would not be forthcoming is
equally clear. The ruling party, fearing its coalition partnership in Kashmir would cost it votes in
the soon-to-be-held national elections, ditched its Kashmiri partner. While the army chief
stopped at calling the report 'motivated', the ministry of external affairs, went further in shooting
the messenger, calling it 'fallacious, tendentious'. To take cognizance of the report's findings
would be to admit to wrong doing, which obviously India would not like to. As mentioned at a
place in the report - on the lack of compensation for the victim of the human shield incident
since compensating him would be to admit to violating his rights - the report will be forgotten
soon enough.
There is little human rights appetite in India, particularly when the national security narrative
over-lays. This was true in the nineties and appears to hold true twenty years down the line.
Many believe that India is doing the best it can under the circumstance of an externally
sponsored proxy war. To most, things are not as bad as they might have been, with nothing of
the sort as has been undertaken by other militaries being replicated in India, such as in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and even in the areas along the Durand Line. It has a professional military.
Though this cannot also be said of its paramilitary, the assumption is that these forces are under
police officers who are thoroughly under the thumb of their civilian bureaucratic and political
masters. Nothing more can be demanded from poorly equipped forces, especially as one
whistle blower in a social media outreach to the public let on are also ill fed. Many also believe
that security forces are severely challenged, by jihadists on the one hand and a complicit public
intent on supporting jihadists escape security forces' dragnets. While for some there is ill intent
behind instances such as drivers of security forces vehicles seemingly mowing down protestors
(twice captured on amateur camera this year), for others the pressures at the scene of stone
throwing lead to pardonable over-reaction not warranting punishment for such perpetrators. The
wider Indian public appears willing to give the benefit of doubt to the security force trooper on
ground, doing what it sees as inescapable dirty work, the dirtiness being attributed to its
nefarious neighbour. Finally, the Leetul Gogois - men on ground - are not alone responsible for
violations. Recall, Major Gogoi was facilitated by his army chief for his innovative move to use a
 53

human shield. As to whether he has since been disciplined by the army for sexual exploitation of
a vulnerable women in a conflict zone is unknown. It can be inferred that the laxity of the chain
of command that translates as permissiveness is also to blame. The chain of command does
not stop at the military apex. It ends at the civilian - political - level, advised by the bureaucratic.
Since this level has not been exercised by human rights issue, it is either sanguine of the 'above
board' record (as per the army chief) or is willing to look the other way. Both are likely. Not only
is the civilian leadership held accountable through democratic or judicial means but would prefer
to see human rights as untroubling. To take a dim view of human rights would require it to act.
This it would not be willing to do since it would be take responsibility. The current situation in
which the security forces are blamed is preferable. For instance, one of the key
recommendations of all human rights feedback reports - such as the one under discussion - is
the need for either the impunity conferred by the armed forces special powers' act being rolled
back or the prosecution of offenders be granted on a case by case basis by the authorities. The
current report brings out that though requested fifty times, the central government has turned
down the request of the state government forty-seven times, while three cases are under
decision. This consistency owes to an unwillingness on part of the civilian side (politicians and
their bureaucratic advisers) to bell the cat thereafter. There is a belief that this would demoralize
security forces, leading to the military leadership passing the buck to the civilian side. It is no
secret that the civilians are both ignorant and inefficient. They would be a disaster in hands on
security management. They therefore need to have the security force leadership up front. A tacit
bargain ensues in which civilians look the other way while security forces soldier on without
political resolution in sight. 98
As for judicial means of accountability, the judiciary is snowed under to begin with. The report
brings out the fate of cause célèbre cases such as the Kunan Poshpora incident and the letting
off on bail of custodial killers in the Machhil killings case by the armed forces tribunal. The latter
case was one in which the military court to the credit of the enlightened military leadership then
in place went the distance. Other questionable cases, such as the Pathribal one, had the judicial
intent in its enabling a choice for the army to try the accused being waylaid by the army in a
deliberately botched military judicial follow up. That the court has not had the case reopened
indicates the sway of the national security imperative over the judiciary's levels of commitment
to truth and justice. To end on an anecdotal note, the Kunan Poshpora case was among the
backdrop to an exchange in the early nineties in the letters to the editor column of the military's
counter insurgency journal between this author and the brigade commander of the outfit that
was implicated in the Kunan Poshpora case. The brigadier in an article had written up his
command philosophy in which as a factor aiding success he had it that formation commanders
refrain from accompanying troops on operations. To him, lesser checks led to a force multiplier
of greater initiative by junior leaders. He advocated healthy rivalry between units through
publicity and quantification of weapons recovered etc. I had in a letter to the editor opined that
the competition and quantification could lead to ends justifying the means since the name of the
unit would be at stake. In his rejoinder the brigadier argued that the formation commander must
not breathe down the neck of junior leaders in the conduct stage and concentrate instead on
creating the ethos and discipline conducive to counter insurgency operations. The editor in his
comment agreed with the brigadier. It is ironical that despite the brigadier's faith in small team
operations over large operations, the eddies from a night search operation - against extant
orders in the corps zone then - by a unit under his command continue a quarter century later.
(The brigadier later as a major general died in an unfortunate helicopter accident in the north
east.)

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 54

A police wallah as proto Chief of Defence Staff

26 April 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/13644/A-Policewallah-As-Proto-Chief-
of-Defence-Staff

The armed forces have been delivered another blow. The national security adviser, Mr. Ajit
Doval, who, as everyone knows from the hagiography that accompanies his actions, has a back
ground in the police and intelligence, is now to also head among his other onerous duties, the
defence planning committee. A noted analyst, Manoj Joshi, discerns the new job as equivalent
to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. In a
way, the armed forces had this coming for two reasons. One is that they have not put their act
together on this score for some three decades. The air force has always held out against a CDS
like appointment. Frustrated, the army backtracked from its advocacy some mid last decade and
then got back to renew its support for the appointment. The silent service, the Navy, has kept
itself aloof from the controversy.
As a result, the three major committees that have looked at the matter since the turn of the
century, the Arun Singh Committee as one of the four committees set up after the Kargil Review
Committee recommendations was relatively clear on the CDS functions. The Naresh Chandra
Committee set up by the comatose United Progressive Alliance government, was mealy
mouthedin its recommendation, no doubt because it was headed by a heavy weight bureaucrat.
Even the Shekatkar committee, that turned in its report to the previous defence minister, was
unable to make a dent in the status quo.
If the army chief is to be believed on his ‗two front‘ formulation, the need to have the three
horses pull together has seldom been greater. The air force in its latest exercise, advertised as
the largest ever, shifted from a focus on the western front to the eastern front midway through
the exercise, underlining how seriously they take the collusive threat from India‘s two
adversaries.
This accentuates the need to optimize India‘s resources devoted to defence. The prime minister
in his first address to the commanders of the services at their conclave aboard the INS
Vikramaditya had intoned as much. If this requires a head umpire over the three chiefs to have
them work out of one script then the higher defence organization must have it. Service
parochialisms cannot be allowed to stand in the way of national security. If and since the three
services were reluctant to see eye to eye on this, then the appointment has to be thrust on
them. However, the quasi CDS is yet another stop gap measure. It is evident that it is not only
service reluctance at play but bureaucratic chicanery. The bureaucrats are loath to have a high-
ranking serviceman at the upper reaches of the hierarchy, not only for protocol and reasons of
privilege but that the appointment would carry powers and responsibilities that they currently
revel in, conferred by allocation of business rules dating to just prior to the Sino-Indian war. If
the defence minister, the cabinet committee on security and the national security committee
were to get a single point advice, they would not be able to play off one service against the
other, that service veterans inform is a favoured pastime in the defence ministry. The series of
defence ministers over the tenure of this government – known to be short on talent - have not
been able to fill the chair they occupied. The over-worked Mr. Jaitley (who has been in and out
of hospitals) had two innings in the chair; Mr. Parrikar was home sick when in it; and the current
one has yet to overcome her hangover as party spokesperson. That the defence planning
committee has been foisted on the defence establishment suggests as much. The second -
more significant if less visible - reason is that the defence planning committee is not so much to
stream line the work and output of the defence sector as much as to revisit civilian control over
 55

the military. Every institution in the country has been hollowed out. The spate of exonerations by
the courts of people involved in carnage and terror – specifically Maya Kodnani and Swami
Aseemanand respectively – and the Supreme Court‘s reluctance to get to grips with the
mysterious death of fellow judge, Loya, suggests that the armed forces are the last institution
standing. Since their professional and apolitical character makes it difficult to trammel them, as
has been done with the media, police and bureaucracy, they need further lynchpins to tie them
down. 120
The hurried setting up a defence planning council through executive order with barely a year to
go to elections can only have a rationale outside of the strategic lamppost under which most
would look. There is more to be done in the reset of India over the forthcoming term of the
government, once the matter of elections between then and now is out of the way. The declining
support in the people at large and the masses after a series of hit-wickets by the Modi
government, such as demonetization, general service tax, and the laxity in condemning and
action against rapes, polarization appears the only card left. Retention of power can now only
be through letting the foot-soldiers of Hindutva crawl through society. On this count, the only
institution left that can put the foot-soldiers of Hindutva back into the bottle needs tight control.
Furthermore, the armed forces need an ideological dose of cultural nationalism, that can be
safely administered when the government is back in saddle. Consequently, the committee
needs to also be seen in the light of civil-military relations, in addition to any strategic sense it
may make. It is for this reason that the national security adviser, renowned as an intelligence
czar, has been appointed as head of this committee. He has long had a foot in the Hindutva
camp. In fact, he can be credited with organizing the support for the Modi wave within the
strategic community well before it became a tide. The social media blitz of 2013-14 by the
brigade of saffron trolls, that led up to the Modi tsunami, also has an intelligence man‘s
fingerprints all over it. With his mastery of the national security apparatus and his impeccable
ideological credentials, besides a lifetime in high risk appointments, has him well suited for the
post. The links between his erstwhile think tank and the military are deep. There are several
retired members of the brass associated with the VIF. On leaving its directorship he had handed
over the reins to a retired army chief. Thus, he has a constituency in the military, that in turn has
amongst the ranks of its veterans some hypernationalists. In effect, he has an organic support
base that would not find it odd for him to be virtually at the military apex, more or less displacing
the minister. If there are doubts in the strategic community they can outshout the opposition. Not
to forget, the army chief is a Doval acolyte and ethnic cousin, who owes his elevation to the rank
over two of his seniors to intercession on his behalf by someone. It‘s a job tailormade for Mr.
Doval. In discussions on the CDS appointment, the usual refrain is that the appointment should
carry weight in the hierarchy conscious military by being either be first among equals among the
chiefs as another four-star general since, in India‘s case, a five-star general makes for field
marshal, a rank not readily conferred. Though Mr. Doval has cabinet rank in his capacity as
national security adviser, he would be rather pleased with the arrangement on two counts. One,
as a policeman he would have likely nursed a grouse against the military‘s chip on the shoulder
against counterparts in khakis. Two, as a military school product, he would have dreamed – as
with any other cadet - of making it to general rank. In short, the defence planning council has
more to it than meets the eye. Its true role will only emerge if this government has a term
following this one and then, it would not only be in better strategizing by the Indian military, but
in revising the very ethos of the military.

________________________
 56

Spiking possibilities: What is the army chief up to?

4 January 2018
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=75112

In quick succession the army chief has taken care to set out the army's position in relation to
developments that portend peace. When the representative of the Union government was
appointed in October last year for a sustained dialogue with stakeholders in Kashmir, the army
chief was quick to point out that his appointment would not affect army operations in Kashmir.
Apparently operations facilitate a position of strength for the government conducive to
negotiations. Recently, in the context of the news from across the border that the Pakistan army
was softening up and its chief had called on the civilian authorities to progress matters with
India, Gen Rawat immediately drew attention to Pakistan's continuing interference in Kashmir.
However, this was of a piece with the foreign ministry line. Thus, two peace possibilities were
nipped at the outset. To be fair, it would be stretching credulity that peace is at hand and the two
possibilities were evidence of a dawn of sorts. It is widely reckoned that India and Pakistan are
in yet another hiatus phase, with the Pakistani elections crowding 2018 and India's run up to
2019 crowding out any other demands on attention and effort. Upcoming election times are
taken as precluding policy initiatives, such as exploring peace possibilities. This was also the
case early this decade when Manmohan Singh's Pakistan policy was stumped by election time,
first in Pakistan and then in India. The policy at that point in time heralded possibilities, with the
two sides having gotten across the Mumbai terror attacks episode in a tentative reaching out
between the foreign policy establishments. Internal to Kashmir, the three interlocutor's report
was with the government, but - as P Chidambaram, the then home minister confirmed later -
there was no stomach for the Manmohan Singh-Sonia Gandhi combine to stick their neck out
for the sake of peace. Therefore, there is precedence for a glacial pace to events stemming
from the compulsions of election time and to expect a peace outbreak is wishful.
Currently, prime time is exercised positively by the US president's tweet that to some presages
a turn of heart in the US, finally distancing it from Pakistan. The US president appears to be
taking his Afghanistan policy, unveiled in August, further in tamping down on the Pakistani
sanctuary available to anti-US terrorists. In Indian commentary this has been credited to Modi's
Washington visit of June last year. He is taken as influencing the US decision to turn the screws
on Pakistan soon thereafter. Since the Indian diplomatic policy of isolating Pakistan appears to
be coming to a head, there is little likelihood of India cashing in on the dividend just yet.
Pakistan would require being in the corner for longer before it is mellowed sufficiently to rethink
its policy of export of terror to its neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Therefore, for India to be
overly effusive over the Pakistani army chief's message - delivered at a meeting of the senate
committee - on repairing ties with India, would be premature. This explains the foreign ministry's
response to the feelers from General Qamar Javed Bajwa. It reiterated India's long standing
position that talks and terror cannot go together - echoed by General Bipin Rawat in the media.
In the event, India has reportedly taken care to keep the communication links going, with media
reports on the military operations heads interfacing now and then and keeping a covert channel
between the two national security advisers open - who if the media is to be believed met
secretly at a foreign location. This is deemed sufficient to keep the pressure on Pakistan,
without allowing event to boil over. This policy context provides a rationale for the army chief's
staking out of a hard-line position on the intertwined external and internal fronts - Pakistan and
Kashmir. So to arraign the army chief for speaking out of turn or off-key - the dimension
explored here - is to be hypercritical and motivated. Leaving matters at that happy pass for the
status quo would not do. At the risk of sounding hypercritical and motivated, issue needs being
 57

taken with the army's unnecessary weighing in on the side of war and hate mongering, for that
is the political dividend for right wing formations within India from the standoff with Pakistan and
in Kashmir. Since this criticism arises from the realm of internal politics, a defence of the army
line can be anticipated at the outset: that the army - being apolitical - is oblivious to this and
therefore cannot be faulted on this count. The contention here is to the contrary. The repeated
chiming in of the army in favour of a policy line that has internal political dividend for its political
masters lays it open to such criticism. The repetition - and likelihood of being the domesticated
'his master's voice' into the future that this suggests - compels pointing this out timely. It is to
prevent the army from becoming yet another legitimising source for policy lines that are only
chimerically anchored in public policy, but actually have origin in domestic political calculus.
Should the army get so entangled it ceases to be apolitical and ends up a political player,
unwitting at first but a committed one as its role deepens. Firstly, neither of the two policy
domains - the home ministry's Kashmir peace initiative and the foreign ministry's domain of
response to Pakistani overtures - is the army's turf. For the army to stake out a position can only
be as part of an orchestrated policy rollout. This is unlikely since the Indian policy making and
implementation framework is not known for such finesse. The army chief was likely as not
speaking out of turn. That this is in sync with the party line has kept 125
eyebrows from being raised, besides the supposed proximity of the army chief with the national
security adviser on account of likemindedness. How much shared ethnicity has to do with this,
history shall no doubt uncover. Secondly, militaries are universally known to be conservative
and realistic. They are slow to anger; prefer to stay out of a fight; and if forced into one, like
operational freedom. In short, they are less likely to be spoiling for a fight than their civilian
masters. This is in regard to external antagonists. The implications for internal security
commitments of this bit of civil-military theory is that the armies prefer not being involved
militarily in what are seen as political problems and if so engaged prefer early disengagement
brought about by developmental and political ministrations by the civilian authorities. Contrary to
the received civil-military relations theory, the Indian army appears to be belligerent, aggressive
and straining at the leash. It seemingly prefers an unsettled Kashmir and appears happy that
there is a reliable enemy at the gates, Pakistan. The army chief's operational persona as a
spirited commander overshadows the strategic level expectations of him, of sobriety and
restraint. This is an unfortunate deduction that the army - and its chief - need to hereon work
overtime to dispel. It warns of an internal change in the army, warranting a closer study by
military sociologists. Here is parsed that this is handiwork of the industrious band of cultural
nationalists in the veteran and strategic communities, apparently reaching into the military.
Finally, and importantly, time and again the ruling party has demonstrated its penchant for
furthering polarization for political gains. The substrata of right wing pseudo cultural political
formations have been busy deepening this. For the ruling party and its supportive majoritarian
base, Pakistan is a handy foe and Kashmiri militancy a useful target. In the trope in the bylanes
- that the otherwise verbose prime minister does little to stem - there is an identification of
India's Muslims with Pakistan; accentuating thereby a Hindu ownership of India. It helps project
India in a defensive war with Islamism, if not historically with Islam, itself. This transforms an
essentially territorial dispute with Pakistan and an internal security problem in Kashmir into a
civilisational war. This enables and justifies a single policy stroke - the hard-line. Within this
political context, the army's role can at best be restricted to the operational. It cannot buy into
the party line. It must step back from the information war frontline. In this, the army chief needs
to lead by example.

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 58

Contextualising the army chief’s news making

6 December 2018
http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=6

The army chief, General Bipin Rawat, has taken to an innovative means to get the army‘s
position across figuring in the media often to voice his views on national security. While a
charitable explanation is that the deficit in the system that keeps him out of the policy loop
compels him to use the media for conveying the army‘s position, a skeptical position is that he is
being used as a cat‘s paw by the national security establishment. . On the first, an instance is in
his voicing reservations in the run up in May to the suspension of operations in Kashmir when
he said, ―But who will guarantee that there won‘t be fire at our men, at our vehicles? Who will
guarantee that policemen, political workers, our men returning home on leave aren‘t attacked,
aren‘t killed?‖ Not having a forum for conveying such a position is not an excuse to go public.
Reportedly the ceasefire initiative was that of the home minister. For the army chief to question
it was to play bureaucratic politics. With the constitutional scheme having the home ministry as
lead on internal security, it is improper for the military to buck it publicly. However, the current
army chief is considerably advantaged in having his view heard since he was handpicked for the
chair. Reports then had it that his elevation owed in part to an ‗ease of working with‘ calculus,
with the national security adviser being acquainted with him in their interaction over the surgical
strikes on the Myanmar border, forerunner to the more famous ones on the line of control. This
brings up the second explanation. Is the chief being deployed to give voice to the position of the
national security establishment? The latest controversial remark of the chief has been on India-
Pakistan relations in which while talking to the media on the sidelines of the passing out parade
of the National Defence Academy, he said, "If they (Pakistan) have to stay together with India,
then they have to develop as a secular state." In his statement on Pakistan, the army chief has
effectively shifted the goal posts on peace overtures to Pakistan. The time-tested Indian position
voiced most recently by the foreign minister while rejecting the possibility of Indian attendance
at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Islamabad is that Pakistan
must first end terrorism from its soil directed at India.
Willy-nilly the army chief has added another rather wishful one, a secular Pakistan as a
precursor to closer India-Pakistan ties. While reminiscent of the democratic peace thesis, in
which democratic neighbours are peaceable, the chief has made a new contribution to
international relations theory that is patently outside of the known realm of his expertise. Since
this is an area of foreign policy outside his remit, the chief‘s venturing into uncharted territory
can only be because he has been given a long rope. In a government that has acquired a
reputation for centralization and under a national security adviser known for hands-on approach,
this leeway for the army chief cannot be on account of absent mindedness on part of national
security minders. That leaves the possibility of deliberate delegation, for the reason the army
chief can be relied on to voice the party line. It is not the chief‘s job to be publicist for the
national security system. He needs reminding that in the current administration the national
security apparatus appears answerable beyond the democratic veneer to right wing formations.
The media may bait him for sound bites and his doctorate in media studies may lend him
confidence to court them. controversy. There is an underside to this. Take the army chief‘s off-
the-cuff remarks at a speaking engagement. The army chief has let on that he is willing to
deploy armed drones in prosecution of India‘s counter to Pakistan‘s (proxy) war in Kashmir but a
possible backlash from public opinion and the international community has stayed his hand. It
was only in answer to a clarification that he was being asked if drones had any utility externally,
that the chief went on to say that the same problem of collateral damage restricted their
 59

employment on the other side of the Line of Control. The army chief seemed to suggest that
should the public be ready to find that collateral damage acceptable then it would be fine to use
weaponized drones, quite like – in his view - the Israelis do against the Hamas. The chief
referenced the public reaction to the hardline of security forces taking on stone throwers to
suggest that public opinion may be averse to use of weaponized drones. He was alluding to the
flak he received from the liberal commentariat when he had suggested that stone throwers were
liable to be taken as ‗over-ground workers‘ and tackled accordingly by his troops. This is
concerning. The army chief, who was selected for his counter insurgency expertise acquired
from extensive service in Kashmir and the North East, appears unable to see that India needs to
respond differently to militancy involving own people than Israel and the United States - the
other state using drones extensively - which use drones offensively in an imperial context
against non-citizens. There is one good coming out from the chief shooting from the hip. The
army chief, in his representational function as an institutional leader, not only voices but sets the
institutional position. For him to find use of drone unproblematic shows up a dangerous
tendency within the army.
The tendency led some 350 of its members to approach the Supreme Court to recognize the
impunity from lodging of first information reports against army men when operating under the
Armed Forces Special Powers Act. In the event, the Supreme Court recently dismissed their
plea. It also accounts for the army‘s reservations, publicly voiced, over the mid-year ceasefire in
Kashmir. The tendency is symptomatic of a significant, less visible, area of damage that India‘s
unending insurgency commitment is causing. The army‘s institutional culture appears to be
changing. The experience of countering insurgency over three decades has diluted the liberal
orientation of an army answering to a democratic polity. The worry is that if the mainstream
opinion in the mainland is manipulated by perception management and a complicit media into
conceding the military greater latitude, permissive operations may result. The ongoing cultural
nationalist inflexion in politics, collapse of the external and internal ‗Other‘ into one, prevalence
of fake news, prevailing populism and polarization, and incipient authoritarianism make this a
plausible future. The tendency is outcome of the subterranean effort on part of the right wing to
suborn institutions. The army is no exception. It is subject to their attention through the social
media and the conveyer belt of ideas routed through veterans with a leg in both camps, the right
wing‘s intellectual ecosystem and the military. This is yet another reason for India to consider
wrapping up its multiple insurgencies politically. The lesson of sixty years from the north east
and thirty from Kashmir is that there is no military solution. There is an unseen cost being paid
by the country, the good health of its military. If the military‘s democratic ethic is itself under
threat, the medicine would become increasingly less effective, calling in turn for more of the
same, including escalation, such as in the call for the use of armed drones. The army chief is a
political ingénue and the army politically naïve. He enjoys the limelight, while the hardline gets
aired for free and acquires respectability. While the army chief serves as his master‘s voice
currently, the aberration of the current chief‘s practice of courting the media can end up a norm.
While today‘s chief may be manipulable, tomorrow‘s may be less so. Thus, the chief‘s courting
of the limelight has one good, revealing what this spells for the military‘s democratic ethic and
civil-military relations.

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 60

Selectivity in military justice

3 November 2018
https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/15440/Selectivity-in-Military-
JusticeMilitary-Justice
Unedited Version

A former army commander ruing the possibility of extraneous considerations informing the
army‘s decisions, writes: ‗it would be very unfortunate if the Army‘s approach to human rights
violations is influenced by extraneous – regional, political or demographic – factors.‘ His
observation was in wake of the army‘s summary general court martial sentencing human rights
violators in a custodial killings case in Assam, the Dangari court martial, going back some two
decades. The general brought out a little-known facet of the case, in that it was one of two
cases that the army volunteered to take on when offered a choice by the Supreme Court in May
2012. The other case was the infamous Pathribal case in Jammu and Kashmir in which five
innocent men were killed by the army and presented as the terrorists who had carried out the
Chattisinghpora massacre of Sikhs in Kashmir on the eve of the visit of United States‘ President
Bill Clinton to India in March 2000. In the event, the army did not keep its commitment to the
Supreme Court of conducting a trial by a court martial, instead letting off the accused for want of
evidence. The Supreme Court in August 2017 admitted a petition by the aggrieved families
against the army‘s stonewalling. The petitioners had earlier faced a rebuff at high court level.
Though respondents were given six weeks to furnish their positions, the Supreme Court has –
over a year later - yet to hear the case. The contrasting trajectories of the two cases does beg
the poser framed by the former army commander, an additional possibility no less troubling is
discussed here. Apologists for the Pathribal killings suggest that immense pressure on the army
in wake of the Chattisinghpora massacre led to the staged encounter killings. Since it was an
unidentified armed group that carried out the massacre of the Sikhs, suspicions were of a
possible ‗black operation‘ intended to malign Pakistan and its proxy war agents in Kashmir. In
order to influence perceptions, the army may have staged the encounter, presenting those killed
as the perpetrators of the massacre.
Given the strategic level context of the killings, the Rashtriya Rifles unit that carried out the fake
encounter could hardly have thought up the cover-up idea itself. It was clearly put to the task.
That its commander went on to the next rank – despite botching a high-profile operation -
implies he was acting on orders. If so, it is fair to also look higher up in the food chain. Such
orders can be expected through the chain of command, with some links bypassed for
confidentiality or over fears of incumbents having a mind of their own. The informal ‗blue-eyed
boy‘ links also serve as the conduit. In this case the origin of the orders was likely outside the
army‘s provenance. The outpourings now - at a time of ascendance of former spooks in the
strategic community - indicate that the Kashmir file in New Delhi then had an intelligence
minder. The strategic game at the time was to get Pakistan on to the US‘ ‘list of terrorist states’.
The Kandahar hijack incident and the supposed Pakistani fingerprints all over it had not quite
succeeded in this. Kandahar appeared to have been a fortuitous last halt of the hijacked plane,
having been allowed inexplicably to take off from Amritsar in first place and denied a landing in
Lahore. In the conspiracy narrative, more was therefore needed. A black operation thus
acquired the legitimizing rationale of raison d'etat, with covert ministerial imprimatur concerning
itself at best with the scope for plausible deniability. That the perpetrators were implementing
orders explains their being let-off by the army, even without the court martial being convened
even though mandated by the Supreme Court. Prosecution of the perpetrators would lead to
spilling of the beans on Pathribal and, in turn, opening up the official narrative on
Chattisinghpora to scrutiny. The reasons-of state implicit in the Pathribal case did not attend the
Dangari court martial case in Assam. That is a case of a unit acting largely autonomously, even
if it kept its hierarchy in-the-loop on its actions. It is not a unit gone rogue, but one unfortunately
 61

attuned to the culture of the formation it was operating in. The eventual elevation of the
commanding officer to the rank major general suggests he earned a good command report,
which means the brass were happy that he kept the bean count register ticking. It is not entirely
a separate issue that his luck ran out in a case of moral turpitude, a case of cutting of one
corner too many. He fell prey to a command climate of careerism attenuated by the need in
those serving in the north east to rival the showing of their comrades in Kashmir, who were in
comparison bagging militant scalps by the dozen in the mid-nineties. Thus, his was an easy
case for the army to duly follow through on in its commitment to the Supreme Court.
This is of a piece with the mantra ‘aberration’ the army trots out when confronted with its record
on human rights. To it, the violators in the Assam case being held to account, the aberration
stands addressed, notwithstanding that this was eased by the former major general‘s sacking a
decade back. The verdict in the Dangari case compensates for and attempts to mellow the view
of the Supreme Court on the Pathribal case when it comes around to vetting the petitioners‘
case made over a year back. The delay at the court‘s end – hopefully inadvertent - helped.
Unfortunately, it cannot be said with any conviction that shorn of the ‗national security‘
connotation, a Pathribal like case would have gone the way of the Dangari case. The Machil
case, in which three innocent men were killed in a fake encounter depicting an infiltration
attempt on the Line of Control, was one pursued at the behest of enlightened leadership at the
army command level. That its outcome was derailed in a questionable judgment of the armed
forces tribunal suggests that a Pathribal could have met a like fate. Even where there is no
‗national security‘ cover, such as the in the killing of Manorama Devi in Manipur, the army has
been known to close ranks and protect perpetrators, under the mistaken belief that it shores up
morale and as a defence against opening-up the of its human rights record. Its leadership
forgets that it is paid for just that, leadership. By this yardstick, petitioning of the Supreme Court
by hundreds of army men against any dilution in the reading of the impunity clause in the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act must be called out as a failure in leadership. It has not ingrained a
command climate in which the higher obedience is in disregarding illegal orders even at the peril
of a career. While the competing explanation here to the Pathribal case being at variance with
the Dangari one apparently holds water, the unfortunate part is that the Dangari case went the
distance because a Bharatiya Janata Party government, in power both in the province and at
the center, was perhaps the elephant in the court martial room.

________________________

Command responsibility in relation to good faith

31 August 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/14821/Command-Responsibility-In-
Relation-to-Good-Faith

The case of an alleged extrajudicial killings in Manipur, being investigated by the Supreme
Court mandated Special Investigation Team (SIT) of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI),
came to a head with the SIT filing a first information report last month against a serving army
officer who it claims led patrol action in which a 12 year old was killed when deployed in
Manipur with the Assam Rifles.
The development triggered an unprecedented petition by 356 army men to the court asking for
status quo on the Armed Forces Special Powers‘ Act (AFSPA) under which the army is
deployed in disturbed areas. They want their cover from prosecution to continue as hitherto, in
order that military operations and morale do not suffer. From the details in the media it appears
the officer over-reached the limits of plausible ‗good faith‘ in his conduct of the operation.
Apparently, the pre-teen youth was dragged out from his house and with his parents locked in,
was thrashed and killed outside his house. The ‗good faith‘ argument in this case would have it
 62

the youth attempted to escape the dragnet and resisted being subdued, leaving the military men
no recourse other than use of force in self defence. However, the self-defence argument did not
fly since none of the score-strong team was injured. They could have overpowered the youth.
Civilian witnesses present – parents and neighbours – testify otherwise. The officer has since
gone on to become a colonel. The case was one among the six sample cases probed in 2013
by the Supreme Court-appointed Justice Santosh Hegde committee. It found that the self-
defence argument was not sustainable in any of the cases. The CBI has vindicated the finding.
The question that arises is as to why the facts were not ascertained by the army itself nine years
back when the then major returned to camp with his report on the encounter. It appears the
army took the story of the major that he was acting in good faith at face value. In doing so the
army has itself struck a blow to the credibility of the position that its members act in good faith
and in compliance with its rules of engagement, duly informed by the ‗ten commandments‘
regulating actions under AFSPA. The major‘s version of events was not verified with due
diligence, a lapse in command responsibility. Alternatively, even if it was known the encounter
was a fake one, the army covered it up as a genuine one for institutional reasons. These could
be to protect its image of being mindful of human rights. Conspiracy theorists would have it that
such reasons could also be personal, intended to show the perpetrator and his superiors in
good light in the bean count game. The latter, if amounting to a pattern are less personal than
institutional, with the institution taking the rap for fostering a command climate in which bean-
counts count. Command responsibility in internal security deployments entails ensuring that the
rules of engagement are widely known and followed. In case of operations resulting in killings,
the version of events needs to be verified in the debriefing of the returning patrol. The command
channel is sensitive to the good faith provisions and is more than likely to empathetically view
events from the eye of the ground soldier caught in inevitably fast moving and high tension
environments. Commanders have sufficient acumen and experience to be able to sift facts and
arrive at a prima facie impression on credibility. Their reporting responsibilities entail checking
on reliability and credibility. Where the circumstance is likely to generate controversy, it makes
sense to dwell on the incident in more ways than just a verbal de-brief and a paragraph-worth
situation report. In this case the command channel appears to have privileged the reliability of
its source – the patrol commander – over the credibility of his report. It is also possible that
enlightened reporting attend such cases. Such reporting can involve an informal transmission of
the facts, even while the situation report might apply the gloss over some or other pertinent fact.
Any superior condoning the report takes on the onus of departures. Shouldering of the
responsibility of lack of action against violations of the good faith clause is delegated upwards in
the chain, thereby seemingly absolving those down the line. Under such commanders a laissez-
faire command climate tends to develop in relation to human rights, with the nation having to
pay a strategic cost. Commanders need measuring up to their pay scales. The concept of
command responsibility and failure to act is a feature in international humanitarian law (IHL).
The Indian position is that IHL is not relevant since there is no internal conflict on, and, in any
case, India is not a signatory to the relevant additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Be
that as it may, under AFSPA, good faith actions are covered by the impunity clause that
requires prosecution be undertaken only on clearance by the defence ministry. None of the fifty
such cases from Jammu and Kashmir calling for waiver of immunity have received approval
from the defence ministry so far. The ministry has passed up its responsibility. The command
responsibility to ascertain operational actions are in good faith ends at the military‘s door. As a
corollary, in case of shortfalls, command responsibility entails initiation of disciplinary action by
the military. Army men who have approached the courts are apprehensive that the very
investigation of alleged over-reach by security forces would be detrimental. Personally, they
would be held to scrutiny by what is perceived as investigation agencies of the local police
biased towards the local vested interests. Institutionally, this will impact effectiveness of the
military by making its personnel unnecessarily wary of the consequences of their actions, even
 63

those done in good faith. Surely, none of the signatories of the petition would like egregious and
willful violence to be exonerated by the good faith clause. Taking cue, a potentially win-win
outcome is for the army to increase its oversight of operations. This does not imply doubting the
word of its tactical commanders from challenging situations on the ground. One manner can be
for a forward-pull command culture, where a look-see is considered better than a dozen reports.
The concept of command responsibility suggests that while members are individually culpable,
the context and command climate they operate in is framed by the command hierarchy.
Incidentally, this does not stop at the brass, but must encompass their political supervisor. In the
case of Manipur, the previous Congress government reputedly had a liberal approach to
elimination of insurgents. As seen, the defence ministry – then in the Congress‘ charge - has
long abdicated its responsibility. A wider view by the Supreme Court may help pin the buck
where it should belong – up the uniformed, safari-suited and dhoti/sari-clad heirarchy.

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Opening up the cantonments: Army in the cross hairs of the right

29 May 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/13948/Opening-Up-the-Cantonments-
Army-in--the-Cross-Hairs-of-the-Right

The latest buzz on social media circles of the military is the opening up of cantonments, the
cloistered military administered spaces, to ‗poor bloody civilians‘, supposedly at the behest of
the novice defence minister. Interestingly, there is little mention of the this in the media though.
After the brazen and horrific attacks on cantonments (and an airbase) in J&K, the military has
been understandably rather paranoid on security of its families residing in the cantonments. It
turned these into fortresses along lines recommended by a committee headed by a former vice
chief, using up Rs. 14,097 crores on perimeter security. A longstanding grievance in
surrounding communities has been that cantonments had over the years progressively been
placed off limits, with the army citing security. This limited thoroughfares, forcing circuitous
routes on harried civilian commuters. In one instance, in Pune, a village on the outskirts was cut
off from the city by the College of Military Engineering walling itself off, making villagers
reportedly take a 30 km wide detour. Naturally, the courts were marshalled by the affected
people, such as in Secunderabad, home to one of the larger cantonments.
As cities surrounded cantonments on outskirts, the military‘s breathing space was throttled little
by little. Further, the military, fearing covetous eyes of defence ministers with a reputation for
land deals, such as, for instance, Sharad Pawar, fenced off its land, imposing on communities
historically living within cantonment limits and those cheek-by-jowl with the boundaries.
Hurriedly, the military converted golf courses into night training areas or some such innovative
cover. Golf course memberships were much in demand in the neighbouring civilian elite. Also,
apart largely from north India, it‘s members were a relatively alien presence elsewhere,
temporarily forced to reside alongside people of a different look, colour and language. Walling
themselves in was a rough and ready answer. One good thing to come out of this self-
incarceration has been that cantonments now account for the green lungs of unplanned
metropolisis that have since grown up around them. Even this added to the enticing allure of
cantonments, with neighbours wanting a breath of the fresh air. Almost as if in response to the
grievances of communities in vicinity of cantonments the defence ministry reportedly suddenly
lifted the barricades, opening up garrisons to sundry morning walkers and those out for a tree-
lined short cut. It would seem the ruling party is out for a set of additional votes, which by the
yardstick that it is ruling in some 20 states does not really need. This begs the question then as
to what motivated the order. Perhaps the regime best knows that the security measures were
never needed in first place, other than in J&K. The jihadist threat was never what it was made
 64

out to be, inflated by cultural nationalists in the media and propagated by a communalized
intelligence community. The spate of exonerations of Muslims incarcerated in terror cases for
lack of evidence is proof. That saffron terrorists have also been left off suggests where terror –
taken as Muslim perpetrated – originated. The purpose was polarization, to pave the way for a
messiah to centerstage from his provincial perch. Therefore, for a government aware of this to
call off the pretense of a Muslim threat to its security forces billets, now that it has been milked
for all its worth – the levels of Muslim marginalization becoming rather embarrassing - is
explicable. For its part, the army - that otherwise surely knows as much - was quick to use the
opportunity to preserve its islands in urban sprawls. In quick time it turned the greenery and
training grounds into concrete under accelerated housing schemes, needed for recuperation of
soldiery before being relaunched back into India‘s largest and longest lasting security
commitment, J&K. The army kept up the charade, investing in guard towers and sandbagged
bunkers for those garrisons in sight of Muslim localities (such as the author‘s locality down
south). The southern army commander opined as recently as April this year that anti-nationals
have appeared as the new challenge across India. He took care not to define who he meant,
knowing which community the label would stick to. He was referring to the expectation in the
army of being interdicted enroute when off from a cold start in cantonments to launch pads near
the border. It is no wonder then that the social media lauds the purported go-slow by Southern
Command, under the guise of reviewing security concerns, on the order to throw open the doors
of cantonments. His action has been inadvertent. Here the answer is only superficially a
conspiracy theory. The right-wing government wants more visibility into the cantonment, to be
able to see what is brewing in those restricted spaces. Advisedly, it does have a worry. The
army is the last institution standing. Outside the sarkari remit, the Cobrapost revelations on
youtube has shown up the state of institutions, in this case the fourth estate. This explains why
the storm in the military‘s social media teacup on this issue has not found its way into the media
this time round. The ruling party best knows what can originate in a cantonment. It has within its
ministerial ranks a general who reputedly spooked South Block bureaucrats by ordering a
movement of a military outfit, on the eve of a court case hearing he had foisted on the defence
ministry. Quite sensibly, the ruling party does not want to be in a similar situation. Increased
visibility into the cantonment, the democratization of its reserved spaces, its invasion by all and
sundry and the normalization of its landscape with noise and pollution, insures against the
cantonment keeping any secrets. This is part of a wider assault on the military. The salacious
book on army wives and a movie with a rising star in lead role on corruption in the army are not
unrelated. The right wing‘s head honcho‘s unfavourable comparison of the army with his storm
troopers, in relation to mobilization timings, was to put the army in its place in the new schema.
The army needs to lose its sheen, so that it is vulnerable to subversion from within and control
from without. Merely placing an amiable chief at the helm, under the doctrine of ‗relative ease
of doing business with‘ as voiced by a propagandist of the previous defence minister, is not
enough. That India has a subordinate military is not enough, especially when the complexion of
India is to change after the coming elections. Unfortunately, with the opposition bouncing back
after the Karnataka elections, the election outcome has acquired a question mark. Compulsions
of polarisation, a Chanakyan turn at the elections or a majoritarian turn thereafter, all could lead
to a Constitution-under-threat backlash. The military could turn bulwark of an India as it should
be and must remain. It needs being neutralized well before that.

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 65

The army chief as regime spokeman?

16 May 2018
https://m.dailyhunt.in/news/india/english/kashmir+times-epaper-
kashmirtimes/the+army+chief+as+regime+spokeman-newsid-87965003

The regime deployed two information war heavyweights over the past week to counter stone
throwing Kashmiri youth. The first was the chief regime apologist, Chetan Bhagat, who writing in
the Sunday Times, sought to deter stone throwers by advocating they be locked away for
indulging in criminal activity. The second was the army chief, no spring chicken himself in info
war having done his doctoral work on media and conflict. He advised Kashmiri youth that both
stones and guns are futile since they cannot fight the army. He warned, Azadi is ‗never‘ going
to happen. Two salvoes together might suggest to the stone throwing youth they are getting it
right. It would be too much to expect the regime to be embarrassed - even on behalf of India - at
the sorry spectacle of the army having to fire on unarmed stone pelters. Since Israel is at it too
at the Gaza border, resulting at last count some 52 dead Palestinians (at the time of writing
even as the figure rises with Nakba Day nearing), India is in the same boat as its role model,
even if India‘s figures are somewhat (thankfully) less. Nevertheless, stone throwers might read
in the two info war stalwarts going at them that they have managed to somewhat disconcert the
regime. Of course, they would know that it is not a case of ‗ek dhakka aur do‘ (‗give it one
more push‘). They don‘t need the army chief to remind them that the army ‗will fight you (them)
with all our (the army‘s) force‘. They don‘t need reminding by the Underage Optimist (a
sobriquet bestselling Bhagat has coined for himself) of the opportunity costs such as exacted of
tourism, economy etc. Hurriyet patriarch Geelani put it rightly that the army chief (true for Mr.
Bhagat too) does not understand what‘s going on. Attributing the ‗Intifada‘ look-alike (the IIM-IIT
graduate Bhagat helpfully informs that the word means ‗to shake off‘) in Kashmir to Pakistani
incitement by the Chief is a dead give way. But, to his credit, the army chief admits that he is still
wracking his mind as to what motivates the youth (‗I am still trying to understand where did all
that anger come from.‘)
He has been at it for a year now. The last time he admitted mystification is when he hoped that
the youth would take to arms, enabling the army to shoot them down without a qualm. While
some youth have obliged, such as the doctoral student from Aligarh Muslim University and
recently the assistant professor from the Kashmir University, most have stuck to stones. This
has prevented the army chief from using tactics from Syria and Pakistan where, according to the
chief, ‗they use tanks and air power in similar situations.‘ Yet again a betrayal of ignorance, or,
more likely, a willful distortion of reality – an info war tactic. There is little comparison between
the Kashmiri insurgency and the terrorism in those countries. There the terrorists are rather well
armed (as their Western backers (once) would know) and in instances hold, or have held,
territory. This has required the application of additional firepower to dislodge them, necessitating
the tactics involving tanks and air power. This is not the case in Kashmir. Where it was so in one
instance, in Hil Kaka in Surankot, helicopters were deployed in an offensive role during
Operation Sarp Vinash that had the terrorists vacate the area. India has not fought shy of using
airpower in Aizwal. Given this, the army chief appears to be practicing intimidation, hoping the
scenarios might scare where employment of pellet guns, snipers and bullets have not. Info war
usually has multiple targets in the cross hairs. The army chief‘s interview also had his own
military constituency to influence. In his explanatory interview last year in the aftermath of
awarding Leetul Gogoi – of the human shield infamy - with his commendation card, he admitted
that one of his key focus areas was to keep up the morale of his force. This time too he had this
to say, ‗My officer felt that he is being abandoned. I can‘t let my officer feel that.‘ Another officer
had figured in an first information report, this time for his patrol shooting dead two stone pelters.
An institutional head having his internal constituency to fore amidst addressing a long standing
national security challenge should give pause. Sympathetic commentary may have it that this is
 66

explicable given that a military chief is expected to give out the military‘s position. To them, the
political class has to temper the military position by taking a political – higher – line. That said,
strategic myopia that prevents looking beyond one‘s nose, cannot be excused of those
operating at the strategic level. The problem – admitted to sotto voce usually – is that the
mentality of those climbing the military‘s greasy pole seldom matures beyond their first
appointment as corporal at the National Defence Academy. The mindset gets reinforced with
successive appointments beginning with sergeant and cadet adjutant, and by the time they get
flag rank, it is rather frozen. Bluntly put, the army chief has kept his strategic acumen rather well
hidden so far.
As if on cue, he stepped in to spike yet another peace possibility. His last hatchet job was in
puncturing Dnyaneshwar Sharma‘s car, even as Mr. Sharma got into it last October, saying
military operations will not be affected by appointment of an interlocutor. This time round it was
to put the state‘s political parties in their place. The 9 May all party meeting in Srinagar had
promise. Their idea of a ceasefire had potential, so much so that even the otherwise comatose
special representative of the union government, Mr. Missing-in-Action Sharma, admitted to a
spying a ‗positive‘ turn. The army chief – true to form - quickly reminded the nation that the
ceasefire idea was unmindful of the military‘s concerns. He asked helplessly, ―But who will
guarantee that there won‘t be fire at our men, at our vehicles? Who will guarantee that
policemen, political workers, our men returning home on leave aren‘t attacked, aren‘t killed?‘‘
Using his shoulders to fire, his political master – who according to the sympathetic theory should
have moderated the military‘s position – instead jumped to clobber the budding peace initiative,
virtually repeating the chief‘s lines: ‗―Indian army has to firmly handle any terrorism which
threatens the peace and harmony of Jammu and Kashmir as a state and of the rest of country.
The army‘s position is that it has to be firm on terrorism.‖ The lady minister can be excused for
informing of the army‘s position (‗The army‘s position is that…‘). She is learning on the job.
Rather costly for national security, but it‘s the price of democracy, foregrounding the flotsam and
jetsam deposited in power by the Modi wave. It begs the question why did the government need
the army chief as mouth piece, and, worse, why does the army chief need to fit the bill as
spokesman? The long and shot of all this is that as with its other policies – China, Pakistan,
internal security, employment, Make-in-India etc – the government is also floundering on
Kashmir. It is unable to finesse the exercise of force over the past three years with dividend on
the table in relation to either Pakistani good behavior or Kashmiri quiescence. Force is meant to
have purpose. If it is not yielding result on the lines expected, then it is being misapplied.
Continuing with it is therefore insane, as a famous definition of stupidity has it. India could well
claim victory and count its eggs. The Pakistani army chief has been helpfully providing the
necessary peace verbiage for some six months now. The Pakistani bail out enables India to
claim victory and call a truce. However, choosing to instead continue with it – as is the case
announced by the defence minister – implies that its purpose is to bludgeon a population, an
Indian community and its constituents, Indian citizens. The cover of terrorism – so usefully
passed on by our strategic partners, the United States and Israel – is to only figleaf. It is no
wonder that chief trumpeter Chetan Bhagat warns, ‗While efforts must never stop to listen to
the other side, the moment the youth chooses violence all bets are off.‘ The youth have been
left with little choice. The government is in an unnecessary ‗pehle aap‘ (after you) situation with
youth. Perhaps it is the one believing in ‗Ek dhakka aur do‘ (one more nudge). If their provincial
government has no voice, the youth cannot expect to be allowed any. To deny them their choice
of voice – stones – is to be complicit. The army chief needs introspect whether his spokesman
role interferes with him bringing strategic sense to his ethnic cousin Doval‘s table.

________________________
 67

The Hindutva project and India's military

8 April 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/13423/The-Hindutva-Project-and-
Indias-Military

As per its chief, Amit Shah, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) intends to get 50 per cent of the
votes at the next hustings. It has enough time to put its act together, having been forewarned of
the mood through its losses in the recent by-elections, particularly in the stronghold of India‘s
most electorally significant state, Uttar Pradesh. Even though it now runs the governments
across India‘s landmass in some nineteen states, the ambitious figure set by Amit Shah for the
BJP showing is seemingly implausible. It is nevertheless the kind of figure the ruling party needs
to get on full throttle with its political project. Liberal conspiracy theorists see the BJP as the
political front of the wider right wing ‗parivar‘ led by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
The pseudo- cultural political formations comprising the parivar reputedly have a political project
for the transformation of India in mind, termed Hindutva. To the extent the BJP is not quite a
normal conservative political party, but a Trojan horse in national politics of the parivar, it is set
out to implement the Hindutva project. This is not a conspiracy theory as much as a self-
confessed project of the ruling party. Since the political masters of the military – the current day
lead party in the ruling coalition – answer to a far right conglomerate with uncertain obligation to
the national Constitution, it bears reflection as to what the Hindutva political project implies for
the military. The ruling party has now been in charge for nearly two terms over two separate
stints in government as the primary partner in the coalitions. The clue therefore lies in how the
ruling party has approached civil-military relations over its two terms. The two terms are
markedly different, in that the first term was under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was very much an
insider to Delhi‘s politics and a traditionalist. Thus, besides showing its fangs early in its innings
in the sacking of the naval chief by the defence minister, himself a leader of a marginal party in
the coalition out to prove his loyalty to the ruling party, it left the military largely to its
professional self. The tone was set by the nuclear blasts early in Vajpayee‘s second stint as
prime minister. Drawing the right conclusions from the blasts and their echo across the border in
Pakistan, the government launched the Lahore peace initiative. In the event, the initiative was
aborted by the Pakistani army‘s intrusion into Kargil.
The conflict aftermath kept the military to the professional till, particularly with Kashmir boiling
over. Operation Parakram, launched in wake of the parliament attack, set the stage for the
remainder of the Vajpayee tenure. That the army could not deliver conventional retribution led to
the mobilization being covered up as coercive diplomacy. Suitably chastened, the military
busied itself with reworking its conventional doctrine. The second term of the BJP has been
under an outsider, a former provincial chief minister, out to overturn the Lutyen‘s Delhi-based
‗establishment‘. An elaborately manufactured electoral ‗wave‘ led to elevation of the chief
minister to 7 Race Course Road. The military was part of the forming of the wave, with its
veteran‘s rally in Rewari enabling its build up, along with other momentum-imparting factors as
the anti-corruption foray by former military man, Anna Hazare. The arrival for the first time in
three decades of a majority government and its promise of a corruption-free development
agenda, conferred on the ruling party greater scope for re-engineering governance, and, at one
remove, India. The national security policy promised was a muscular one. The stage was set by
first creating the illusion of working for peace, with a hand outstretched towards Pakistan‘s
civilian government. That was equally speedily withdrawn, with the Line of Control reactivated in
the very first year of the government. The situation along the LC has been steadily downhill
since, with the surgical strikes across it being the high water mark. On the eastern front, there
was a similar reverse, with the front being seen as the second of a ‗two (and half front)‘ war.
Current-day headlines portend a Doklam II, with China reportedly resuming road construction
activity that led up to the seventy three day stand-off last year. The additional ‗half‘ front
 68

presumably is the prognosticated tie up between fifth columnist Muslims and the Maoists in the
hinterland. Even as the military has the two-front mantra as the government‘s strategic doctrine
for a guide, it has been left out in the cold without the wherewithal to fend off its two collusive
enemies. Its vice chief recently let on to the parliamentary standing committee on defence that
the decline in the defence budget to its lowest level in relation to the gross domestic product
since the 1962 War was insufficient to cover for inflation and provide for the 125 odd
procurement projects the military currently has underway, leave alone cater for modernising its
equipment of which sixty per cent is vintage. In short, the military is left to tackle an active
western front and potentially active eastern front and to the extent it falls short, it would be left
holding the can. The government has taken care to have an amicable army chief, superseding
two of his seniors.
The Chief has been faulted not only by the liberal portion of the commentariat but also by
sundry politicians and the opposition for being rather inclined towards the party line of the ruling
party. The army chief‘s latest speech was at the right wing think tank, the Vivekananda
International Foundation. Controversial godman, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar was invited to address a
naval function. The air chief in his remarks at the air force day was criticized for being overly
welcoming of the controversial turn in the Rafale deal. These and ever increasing incidence of
such instance are seen as a departure from the hitherto apolitical utterances and practice by the
military. Clearly, the military cannot remain unscathed from Hindutva‘s reset of Hindustan.
However, it is intriguing that the military appears as being sidelined, even as its derring-do –
such as in the surgical strikes - is used as political capital by the ruling party. This needs an
explanation. The Hindutva political project of a reset of Hindustan is an expansive one, which
down the road could conceivably include rewriting the Constitution. Traditionalist institutions,
such as the army, need to be softened timely for the rollout of the more consequential aspects
of the project over the coming term of the ruling party. The military – so far - sees itself as
professional, apolitical and secular. The ante on the professional part is upped by the need to
defend the borders on the two fronts. The military is also given full play in a portion of the ‗half
front‘, Kashmir. A professionally engaged military is unlikely to have any interest, attention span
and energy for political pushback. Keeping the military to the professional till is termed objective
civilian control of the military. The apolitical characteristic - glimpsed earlier - is endangered in
the military leadership buying into the ideology of the ruling right wing formations. The self-
confessed ideological agenda of the ruling dispensation is to revise secularism. The secular
characteristic of the military is alongside its sister characteristic – apolitical - in direct line of fire.
The precedence set of deep selection of the military leadership enables elevation to its apex of
those who show such propensities. This form of civilian control of the military is termed
subjective control. Seen is a blend of objective and subjective civilian control in action. In short,
the Hindutva project entails a movement away from objective civilian control to subjective
civilian control. It is at the expense of the apolitical and secular character of the military, even as
the professional characteristic is temporarily boosted to cover the dilution of the former two.
Even this boost is a chimera in that the military continues as a supplicant for the monies to meet
professional ends. From a civil-military relations perspective, it promises to be an interesting
second term for the Modi government, should Mr. Shah deliver as he reckons. Since objective
civilian control is a characteristic of democratic states, the shift away portends alongside a shift
to an authoritarian and ideological state.

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 69

Budget let down further strains army-government relations

21 March 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/13334/Budget-Let-Down-Further-
Strains-Army-Govt-Relations-COAS-Supportive-Vice-Chief-Disappointed

Through in its budget presented on February 1 the government hiked the defence allocation by
just short of eight per cent over last year. This pegged at a mere 1.58 per cent of the gross
domestic product, making it the least allocation by this yardstick since the 1962 War. The push
back from the military on the straitened defence budget was not long in coming. The Army‘s
candid deposing in front of the parliamentary standing committee on defence came to light with
the release on March 13 of the committee‘s forty-first report on ‗Demand for Grants 2018-19‘.
The report carried the Army vice chief‘s lament that this was far short of its expectations on
several counts, including rendering it unable to cover ongoing modernization projects, leave
alone cater for the Army‘s pet project of creating an ability to fight a ‗two front‘ war. The
standing committee‘s report has not drawn attention over the recent past. Though the defence
budget has been declining in relation to the GDP over the past four years, there was little
appetite in the strategic community to critique this. This was in contrast to the vociferous
criticism of the government in the UPA period that usually followed these annual, routine
reports. The reports invariably carried a stricture on the government to be more attentive to
matters of defence, alighted upon by the strategic community less as a stick to beat the
comatose Manmohan government but more to set the stage for a ushering in a different ruling
party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, which promised to be strong on defence. The declining
defence budget escaped being targeted thus far since the government created an illusion of a
strong defence by taking a proactive stance on both borders, activating the Line of Control (LC),
while staring down the Chinese along the Line of Actual Control (LOAC). A key indicator for the
operation of a national security doctrine is the defence budget. The relatively measly defence
budget thus seemingly contradicted expectations of a government wishing to be seen as strong
on defence. Yet, the usual critique was somewhat absent because the strategic community –
honourable exceptions apart - did not wish to berate those it had championed. Even the
standing committee‘s report has not attracted the critical commentary the UPA was subject to.
The strategic community appears to be taken in by the government‘s explanation that it is taking
out a defence investment and manufacturing policy that would compensate over the long term
for any shortfall. More plausibly, the fall in allocations to levels that could raise eyebrows owed
to the budget being seen as more of an election budget, possibly the last one prior to elections
either later this year or early next year. With monies for schemes such as the national health
insurance scheme to cover some 10 crore vulnerable families needed, the amount was
presumably found by axing the defence budget. Having created an image of being mindful of
defence, the government perhaps thinks that it could trade this for shoring its image in the
electorally more consequential social and welfare sectors, especially since its development
promise has faded considerably. Equally, the government in election year is unwilling to chance
a crisis on either border. The budget is a means to signal potential adversaries of intentions.
The government is perhaps unwilling to set off a self-fulfilling prophecy, with heightened
allocations posing a security dilemma for adversaries, thereby bringing about a scenario better
avoided. At least in election year, the government would not want threat perceptions to spike,
since the outcome of aggravation is both out of one‘s sole control and can never be guaranteed.
A Doklam replay that goes awry this year could prove fatal for the government‘s longevity. It
would not want to put its electoral cards in the Army‘s basket, howsoever alert and professional.
The government would not want India‘s claims of defence preparedness – such as finance
minister‘s budget speech boasts on border infrastructure improvement - tested prematurely, and
certainly not in election year. However, continuation of artillery duels on the Line of Control (LC)
can be indulged. The electoral dividends of a continuing low intensity conflict along the LC can
 70

be had without the costs of conventional show down. The ruling party‘s need for polarisation for
elections does not require a costly war. Though the Army trotted out the threat of the worst-case
scenario of a two front war in its reservations expressed to the standing committee, the
government has other instruments of state to ensure that the worst-case is avoided. In relation
to Pakistan, the intelligence game can continue under tutelage of the national security advisor,
who while lining up for the post had famously warned Pakistan that it stood to lose Baluchistan.
As regards China, India now has as its new foreign secretary the diplomat credited with
defusing the prolonged crisis at Doklam.
Finally, the government perhaps thought that it could get away, leaving perception management
surrounding the exercise to the Army chief, by now known for his proximity to the ruling party
line. There was no pushback by the Army chief over being shortchanged by the government in
the budget. Instead, his first remarks since budget day came a month later, on the defence
expenditures being a sine qua non for economic growth. These were characterized in the media
as a defence of the budget allocation. However, his deputy made amends in speaking of the
army‘s disappointment. Of late there appears to be dissension in the brass. At a university
seminar in Chandigarh late last month, the western Army commander thought that to fight a
two-front war was not ‗smart‘. His training command counterpart went further, observing that
brinkmanship is no substitute for statesmanship that alone can bring about de-escalation along
the LC. Both, speaking in wake of the budget downsizing, were no doubt cognizant of its
implications. The vice chief has joined them in calling out the government‘s playing fast and
loose with defence matters. Potentially this a juncture of unravalling of the Army‘s illusion of a
government keen on shoring defence, that accounted in part for the Army‘s seemingly
unnecessary cozying up to the ruling party over the past few years. As momentum built up to
the Modi wave prior to last national elections, the military was one of the first converts, best
illustrated by its former chief VK Singh escorting PM Modi to the podium at a veteran‘s rally at
Rewari. Modi-military equations have since been patchy, peppered with controversies over the
seventh pay commission, the one-rank-one-pension, the status-equivalence issue with
bureaucrats, fishy arms deals such as the turn-round on Rafale, arrest of a former service chief,
dithering over the chief of defence staff etc. Not to forget, the claim by the head of the right wing
political formation supportive of the ruling party that his outfit – the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh - can outdo the Army in mobilization. What the Army does in three weeks, it can do in
three days. The chequered relations have now been capped by a budget let down. Discernible
is an unraveling of the Army‘s illusion that a conservative-realist government that best
understood it and national security is at the helm. Instead, the fallout of the reduced budget
could be in the Army beginning to see a self-interested ideological formation furthering its own
electoral interest while preying on the Army‘s need for self-esteem.

________________________

A revolt of the generals?

12 March 2018
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/a-revolt-of-the-generals/556256.html

An editorial in The Tribune ('Generals speaking', March 2) has it that there is dissension in the
ranks. The editorial follows two generals who, while speaking at a seminar in Panjab University,
Chandigarh, seemingly contradicted earlier utterances of their Chief. Recounting recent forays
by the Army Chief into political territory, the editorial concludes that the generals, including the
Army Chief, should drive in their respective lanes. At the Chandigarh seminar, the head of the
Army's Western Command said that the idea of a two-front war is not 'smart'. Recall, a 'two and
a half front war' was the Chief's innovative formulation last year, referring to a collusive threat
from China and Pakistan, alongside a domestic 'half front' unsettled, presumably by a Maoist-
 71

jihadist insurrection. The second general, its training command head, called out the lack of
traction of the political track with Pakistan, even though the Line of Control (LoC) has been
activated with artillery crunches, resulting in deaths and displacement on both sides. The Chief
is part-owner of the policy reversal of ceasefire on the LoC, having under his belt the proto-
surgical strike in cross-border raids on the Myanmar border that were then grafted on to the
LoC. Predictably, escalation resulted and with little prospect of a negotiated return to the pre-
existing ceasefire. Both generals have a point. They are mindful, perhaps, that with the defence
budget this year reaching its lowest level since the 1962 war in terms of percentage, it would be
prudent for India to cut its coat according to the cloth on hand. A textual view is that the two are
drawing attention to the advantages of strategic prudence. Since there can always be two views
on strategic matters, their querying the Chief's perspective is unexceptionable. A professional
diversity of opinion such as this must enliven Army commanders' conference, enabling robust
policy input from the Army's side. However, strategic debate apart, can a subtextual view be
taken of their remarks, one perhaps unintended by the two, but one informed by the subtext of
their remarks? The two army commanders were speaking at a seminar on Pakistan. Drawing
analogy from Pakistan's case, the training command head had this to say, "This (Pakistani
praetorianism) is in stark contrast to India where the armed forces owe allegiance to the
Constitution, and not to any party, person or religion (italics added)."
Normally, there would be no need to give voice to this homily. The distinction between India and
Pakistan would appear to be self-evident. However, the times are changing. A cautionary word
that Indian politics is headed the way of Pakistan is not infrequently heard. The training
command head said as much, likening Pakistan to a mirror on the wall, which India needs to
look at so as not to "make the same mistakes, particularly in light of growing radicalisation and
intolerance within our own society over mundane issues." The two statements together indicate
an unease with the political forces causing distress in society, and an apprehension of the
military's growing proximity to such forces. The seeming proximity is seen in the Army Chief's
utterances. His latest remarks in the context of elections in three north-eastern states drew
attention to the threat of illegal immigration. At the start of the ongoing run-up to the Karnataka
elections, the Chief went down to Coorg and pitched for the Bharat Ratna for a son-of-the-soil,
Field Marshal Cariappa. Rawat's positions have constantly been at odds with one of the two
coalition partners in J&K, where the Army is the protagonist. It is increasingly evident that the
Army Chief's remarks are aligned with the political plank with the right wing ruling party. The
benefits in a tough-on-national-security image are, perhaps, excusable. More problematic is
ballast for the political project under way of the ruling party and its supportive pseudo-cultural
formations. This has led to a growing suspicion that the Army Chief is down a political route, out
of sync with the tradition of public reticence by military chiefs and the apolitical character of the
Army. Since political and professional are inversely proportional, this impacts military
professionalism. The Army's leadership needs to cauterise the Army from the influences from
without. The Army commanders form the Army's collective leadership. The subtext in the words
at the seminar of the two army commanders — perhaps unintended by the two — appear to call
on their Chief to pull back from the brink. It is a timely call worth heeding.

________________________

A political army or an apolitical one?

6 March 2018
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=76946

Lt Gen Devraj Anbu, commanding general in Udhampur heading India's northern command was
posed a question at a press conference at Srinagar. Responding to a question, he said, "We
don't communalise martyrs, those making statements don't know the Army well." The context of
 72

the question was the statement by Member of Parliament Asaduddin Owaisi, who, as is his
wont, was taking on Hindu communalists who denigrate Muslims. Owaisi, in the context of the
details emerging of the martyrs in the Sanjuwan camp attack by terrorists, had taken potshots at
the so-called '9-PM nationalists' who delight in questioning the patriotism of Muslims in general
and Kashmiri Muslims in particular. He said, "In this (Sanjuwan attack) incident, five Kashmiri
Muslims have laid down their lives. Why aren't you talking about it? This is a reminder to all
those nationalists who question my integrity and the love for this country." The good general's
taking down Owaisi a peg or two was lapped up by the 9-PM media. The general was seen as
buttressing the army's secular credentials, while the head of the largely Hyderabad based party,
AIMIM, was put in his place. Missed in the aftermath was the political position taken by Anbu.
Anbu is head of India's largest field army. Surely, it must have the largest headquarters too, one
that contributes to Anbu's situational awareness and provides him options for considered
decision making. This headquarters also has elements of an information warfare (IW) staff. The
IW staff no doubt monitors the media, including newspapers, television and social media. That it
is efficient and effective, and has the ears of the general, is clear from the general going on in
the interview in question to talk about how social media is contaminating young minds in the
Valley. His staff surely conveyed to the general that Owaisi the previous day had remarked on
the Sanjuwan camp attack. It can be assumed Anbu also received options of response, since
his press conference was impending and questions related to the Owaisi statement could be
anticipated. Thus, Anbu was prepared by his staff. No doubt he had his answer up his sleeve
when he was shot the question. So it's not an off the cuff response by the general, but a thought
through reply. That it provided fodder for Owaisi baiters provides a hint as to who or which kind
of Indian found the answer heartwarming. The assumption of good staff work suggests that
there were other answers served up for the generals' choice. After all, Anbu was himself a staff
officer in the temple of staff officers, the Military Secretary's Branch, where the top order of the
army's staff qualified officers are posted. One answer simple enough to divine is 'No comments.'
It would have sent out Anbu's displeasure at Owaisi's words, without getting into the mud with
him. Another answer Anbu did not choose was to acknowledge the politician's observation. The
politician was, by his account, taking pride in the Muslimness of the martyrs, exulting in the fact
that Muslim blood mingles with that of their fellow comrades as does their sweat, rejoicing that
Muslims have a role in keeping this country together, happy that this shuts up Muslim baiters,
sanguine that their sacrifice will be acknowledged as proof - even when none is needed - of
Indian Muslims on the frontline and numbering among the dead while there. This opinion piece
would have turned out differently had Anbu empathized with the politician and his Muslim
constituency. It would have shown Anbu had knowledge of his Muslim brethren and fellow
citizens. It is a pity that the general needs reminding that Muslims feel pride in seeing
Azharuddin take stance, in Sania's back hand, in Hariz's rise to army commander rank, in the
long rule of the Khans over Bollywood, and, likewise, are proud to see Muslims number in
awards lists and that of the army's martyrs. Their pride is in one of their kind contributing on par
with others in a national endeavor. What is better advertisement of a sense of ownership of and
belonging to the nation? Obviously, just as Anbu accuses Owaisi of ignorance of the army,
surely Anbu can likewise be challenged on his knowledge of and empathy with fellow citizens,
Muslims. Or does he take the stereotype Muslim conjured up by the media seriously? As army
commander in a Muslim majority state, commanding troops battling insurgency amidst a
disaffected population, an affirmative answer to this would be troubling. If this is the Muslim
reaction to seeing their ilk up front in the battle against terror, it behooves on their
parliamentarian to give voice to it. Owaisi needs highlighting this - if in his inimitable fashion - so
that even those deafened by the majoritarian din can hear. Additionally, Anbu surely must know
of the siege Muslims have been over the past half-decade. Is he not aware what the Modi wave
has done to them politically? Anbu watches primetime too. The marginalization of Muslims,
using one stick after another to beat them with - triple talaq, lynchings, love jihadis - has been
 73

upfront and in-your-face. They have to go the extra distance to overturn the labouriously
contrived canard that terrorism is a Muslim brand. Following the Sanjuwan attack, there was vile
suggestion that the Kashmiris in the ranks had snitched to the terrorists where to find the army's
solar plexus and hit. Now, the army is reportedly doing a survey of the neighbourhoods of its
installations, no doubt with some or other template in mind of subversibility or otherwise of that
neighbourhood. Would it harbor terrorists who would at an opportune moment upturn normality?
This is not restricted to Kashmir. My neighbourhood far south, abutting Owaisi's constituency
also sees the army barracks lined with sandbag topped walls and bunkers that could do
Kashmir proud. We are suspect, because the army has drawn up some stereotype. Maybe they
would find Neyaz Farooquee's 'An Ordinary man's guide to radicalism' helpful.
With a ghetto for a pocket borough, Owaisi has little choice but to be combative. He could not
have passed up an opportunity to dispel the notion that Muslims belong to Pakistan. In this,
statistics such as over 1500 J&K policemen dead in the line of duty are vital ammunition for the
community to break out. Anbu shot the messenger at the cost of the message. Not a week later
the army yet again showed its stripes. Its army chief, seemingly unmindful of north east states
going to the polls, extravagantly intoned that the illegal immigration into the north east, that
profited a particular regional party, was a proxy war by Pakistan, and - hold your breath - China.
His apologists suggested that he was speaking his mind under Chatham House rules, at a
closed door event. Even if so, the leak was well timed. When the regional party head -
Badruddin Ajmal of AIUDF - remonstrated that his is a democratic and secular political outfit, the
army PR minders rose to put him in his place, stating, "There is nothing political or religious in
the talk." Yet another Muslim politician perfunctorily struck down, when the community has no
national level leadership. Recall the farewell speech in parliament for the outgoing vice
president by the prime minister. Muslim politicians are fair game. What else is politics and
indulgence in it? As for the Kashmiri leaders, there is nothing they can get right. AFSPA cannot
be rolled back. The Kashmiri education system requires overhaul. Its madrasas require
surveillance. The plea for talking with Pakistan can be drowned out by the artillery duels on the
LC. Stone throwers are over ground workers. The lodging of an FIR when two were killed
recently was a step too far. All justified solely on security grounds. There is nothing political to it.
While there is a potential dread in the direction the army is headed, it can yet be redeemed. At a
recent seminar at the Punjab University, Chandigarh, one of Anbu's counterparts, the western
command head, distanced himself from the formulation of 'two front war', cautioning against war
with a nuclear armed neighbour. His other Shimla-based colleague went further. He said,
"Kashmir still remains far from normal despite the strategy of matching response being followed
by both nations. Be that as it may, there is no shying away from the fact that a lasting peace can
only be found at the negotiating table." Both seemingly registered dissent at the (ruling) party
line toed by their boss, the army chief. More importantly, the training command head likened
Pakistan to a mirror on the wall, saying, "We need to look at it and not make the same mistakes,
particularly in light of growing radicalisation and intolerance within our own society over
mundane issues." Anbu could take heed and not play to the gallery of the radicalized, radicalism
in this case being of the saffron hue. Clearly, then the apolitical status of the army is under
stress. While those cautioning against going down this route are also taking a political position -
against penetration of a particular ideology into the army - they are status quoists, calling out the
politically active and for a return to the pristine. The army must reclaim the apolitical island for
itself.

________________________
 74

Dissension in the top brass?

15 March 2018
http://indiatogether.org/dissension-in-the-top-brass-op-ed

An opinion piece in The Tribune referring to the subtext of the statements of two army
commanders speaking at a seminar late last month at Punjab University, Chandigarh, calls for
the army chief Bipin Rawat to listen to those statements and pull himself back from going down
a political route and taking the army down the same route with him.
At the Chandigarh seminar, the head of the army‘s western command said that the idea of a
two-front war is not ‗smart‘. The army chief had dwelt on the concept of ‗two and half front war‘
with the Doklam crisis as context mid last year. The second general, its training command head,
called for activation of a political track with Pakistan. He seemed to suggest that even though
the Line of Control (LoC) has been activated for some three years now, there is nothing to show
for the political utility of the military operations there.
Both generals have a point. While the western command head advocated a patch up with China
so as to put Pakistan on the hook, the training command head wanted political engagement with
Pakistan. Their strategic good sense apart, they are also likely sending a message to their boss,
the army chief Rawat. In an editorial in The Tribune, a daily widely read by the retired fraternity
in north India, the army chief has been called ‗loquacious‘. He is well on his way to challenging
one of his predecessors, VK Singh, now a union minister, in terms of a penchant for
controversy.
His latest remarks in the context of elections in three north eastern states drew attention to the
threat of illegal immigration. While it cannot be said that BJP‘s good showing in the elections
was a result of those remarks but the timing unfortunately rules in the possibility that they were
designed to be helpful. The timing has a precedence. In the run up to the Karnataka elections,
the Chief went down to Coorg and pitched for the Bharat Ratna for a son-of-the-soil, Field
Marshal Cariappa. His comments were criticised by the commentariat and assorted politicians.
Over his tenure, the army chief has through his public remarks been rather useful for the ruling
dispensation. Not only is the army chief voluble, but his utterances are political. This explains
the latitude he has been given to discourse on aspects that are much outside the army‘s
domain.
The right wing government wants a hostile neighbourhood, to reinforce its tough image on
national security. Their internal ‗othering‘ of Muslims is advanced by having an active front
against Pakistan. Their unwillingness to engage on a political track with Kashmiris is self-evident
from their latest interlocutor taking home a salary with nothing to show over the past six months.
Rawat has brought about a return to the nineties with his Kashmir initiatives, such as his
likening stone throwers to anti-nationals.
The western army commander cautioned: ―…sometimes you can get pushed into the conflict
due to public opinion. Therefore, sometimes it becomes the case of the tail wagging the dog.‖
The ruling party and its support base might not be entirely averse to this, to advance their
political project of a cultural nationalist makeover of a secular, pluralist and democratic India.
The two army commanders were speaking at a seminar on Pakistan. Drawing analogy from
Pakistan‘s case, the training command head had this to say, ―This (Pakistani praetorianism) is
in stark contrast to India where the armed forces owe allegiance to the Constitution, and not to
any party, person or religion (italics added).‖
This follows the joint doctrine (p.2) of the armed forces that reiterated the national interest as
being:
To preserve the democratic, secular and federal character of the Indian Republic.‘ This
is a corollary to the national values encapsulated in the documents as: ‗sovereignty,
socialism secularism, democracy, republican character, justice, liberty, equality,
fraternity, human dignity, unity and integrity of our Nation, respect for our diversity,
 75

peaceful co-existence, pluralism and tolerance and international peace defined by a just
international order.‘

The training command head said as much, likening Pakistan to a mirror on the wall, which India
needs to look at so as not to ―make the same mistakes, particularly in light of growing
radicalisation and intolerance within our own society over mundane issues.‖
An unseemly political proximity is visible between the army and the right wing. While traditionally
only personages of national stature are allowed to speak at the military‘s haloed training
institutions, a captive military audience is now being treated to talks by cultural nationalists such
as Zee News anchor, Sudhir Chaudhary, at the staff college at Wellington and former major and
current day Republic TV host Gaurav Arya at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Former
Chief VK Singh donned his true colours by taking up the RSS uniform. The extent to which the
strategic path adopted by the army is sustainable in strategic terms has been questioned, not
just by the General heading perhaps the most consequential command in case of conventional
war, but also by a retired General who served as military adviser in the national security council
system of the previous administration.
Referring to the ongoing barrages on the LoC, General Prakash Menon opines that,‗The
germane question for India is the feasibility of force application in imposing costs that will affect
Pakistan‘s will and, therefore, restrain it from supporting terrorism.‘ He ascribes this to a
‗visceral hatred between the two societies‘. Promoting such hatred is part of a right wing
political project. The LoC is where the internal and external part of this project intersect. The
benefits for the ruling party in a tough-on-national-security image are perhaps excusable;
though taking electoral advantage of this, such as by having hoardings of Kargil and surgical
strikes as backdrop for electioneering, has attracted criticism.
The army chief in the context of nothing specific had at a conference this winter called for
keeping the army out of politics. It is unlikely the advice was for himself. Army‘s discipline and
sense of obedience cannot be an excuse to ignore the change in its public profile brought about
by a Chief, deliberately given rather a loose rope by a self-interested government.
The two army commanders need to pay heed to the subtext of their own remarks and, at the
closed door conference of army commanders, discuss the new phenomenon of the army flirting
with politics. Hopefully a Chief suitably cautioned by his peers would then steer a strictly neutral
course, particularly as national elections are on the horizon.

________________________

The General is at it again

2 March 2018
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/2/13170/The-General-Is-At-It-Again

He may wish to be remembered as a tough operationally inclined commander who stood up to

the Chinese along the Line of Actual Control and brought hell down on Pakistanis on the Line of
Control (LC). It is not a co-incidence that the Uri bulge is currently the hottest place on the LC.
Rawat, served there when in the battalion, and later as a division commander on that portion of
the front. However, it appears he also wishes to leave a legacy of a no-nonsense hard-talking
chief. With a doctorate and a US Command and General Staff College course under his belt,
followed with military leadership experience in an international environment, with the UN as
commander of a brigade group in its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it can be
inferred that he feels somewhat circumscribed by the norms of discreet utterances that go with
being a service chief. Instead, he wishes to step out of a stifling tradition of silent – even if tough
– chiefs. The last time a Chief felt so constrained was some fifty years back, when Jayanto Nath
Chaudhuri decided to let off steam writing for the Statesman anonymously. Snide remarks at
 76

Krishna Rao‘s proximity to the Gandhi family refer to his complimentary statement on the
Congress party as head of Eastern Command in the context of an election in one of the seven
sister states. The tradition of keeping a low profile has been reinforced over the years. With an
occasional aberration.Former Army Chief Sunith Francis Rodrigues frustration on Kashmir came
through with his comment describing Pakistanis as ‗bandicoots‘ and his take on political good
health also being the military‘s business. His concern was prompted by the repeated political
mishandling of situations in those days that brought the Army from the barracks to the streets.
Similarly, Ved Malik‘s frank admission of the state of the army at the end of a decade of defence
austerity on the eve of Kargil War, when he said that the Army will make do with what it has,
drew frowns. VK Singh‘s run in‘s with the Defence Ministry are too many to recount; suffice it to
refer to his moving forces then under a relative‘s command – a wanna-be chief – for spooking
South Block on the night before his ‗date of birth‘ court case.
The liberal manner in which Bipin Rawat has been giving voice to his opinions indicates that he
feels better positioned than chiefs hitherto. He last commented on the education system in
Jammu and Kashmir wanting surveillance of madrassas, besides asking why a map of the state
needs to grace classroom walls when a map of India is quite enough. Rawat warned off stone
throwers last year, but has had little impact on the youth but more on his own soldiers. An Army
Major last year, taking his chief seriously, precipitated the ‗human shield‘ episode last year. He
was awarded by Rawat for his pains. This year another Major taking his chief at his word ended
up with his name on a Kashmir police FIR, when his patrol shot dead two stone throwers.
Unfazed, Bipin Rawat has waded into yet another controversy. To those monitoring the strategic
discourse, his take on illegal immigration was of a piece with the widely and strongly held view
that Bangladeshi immigrants upsetting the demographic balance in the north east are a national
security threat. Bipin Rawat went further: he voiced what was said sotto voce so far in military
circles, that political interests are enabling this in reference to the perceived benefit derived by
the Congress from its ‗vote bank‘ among the illegal immigrants. Outside military circles, there
was no compunction to keep quiet on this. The long-retired General SK Sinha, displaying his
right wing credentials, made an extensive report to the President in 1998. (No stranger to
politics, in his day, he had reportedly been outpointed by General Arun S.Vaidya for the chief‘s
seat, supposedly because Vaidya was seen as pro-dynasty. Vaidya‘s chestful of medals as
against Sinha‘s operational record presumably did not matter.) Separately, in an article he wrote
that he had been warned of the threat posed by immigrants by an eastern army commander in
1992, late Lt Gen Jameel Mehmood, a Muslim, who – or so Sinha claimed – had made a
negative observation on this to the army headquarters. He used a Muslim‘s shoulders to fire his
right wing ammunition. As Governor of Assam, he leaned over right even further, projecting a
local warlord‘s military exploits in beating off the (Muslim) Moghul army. (Stone throwing is
today his legacy in Kashmir, since he set off the peoples‘ agitations with his munificence to the
Amarnath Yatra board with Kashmiri land.) Privy to strategic literature generated by think tanks
in Delhi in particular, Rawat is not remiss in taking illegal immigration as a looming national
security threat. A think tank nursed by his headquarters, the Center for Land Warfare Studies
(CLAWS), has this to say: ‗Such a massive inflow did not go undetected, but official apathy and
the compulsion of electoral vote bank politics allowed it to continue. This was an invite to
disaster as it radically altered the demographic balance in many areas. A close scrutiny of the
population increase since 1951 indicates a high population growth in the state presumably due
to the heavy influx of the illegal migrants.‘
The serving army officer who wrote the article went on to write a book on it, published under
CLAWS aegis (Changing Demographics in India's Northeast and Its Impact on Security, New
Delhi: KW Publishers, 2016); no doubt with the same conclusion as his article: ‗While local
political compulsions have led to a soft stance in the approach of the security forces in their
operations against insurgent groups, a decisive and resolute action is the need of the hour to
thwart any reprehensible designs on India‘s security while taking steps to lower ethnic tensions
 77

as well as checking illegal migration into the state.‘ It does not take much imagination to know
which party is being referred to as profiting politically, for the Tarun Gogoi led Congress was in
power for a decade and half. Bipin Rawat‘s speech writer, probably a bright young Colonel from
the perspective planning directorate, cannot be faulted for picking up the trope from a website
he thought was credible and with official imprimatur. A Colonel could not have gone further. It
takes a Bipin Rawat for that. He perhaps recalled some intelligence briefing from his time at the
headquarters in Dimapur, when he commanded a corps in charge of India‘s own far-east,
including southern Assam. He was not updated that in the last elections the AIUDF count went
down from 18 to 13 and its chief, Badruddin Ajmal, lost his Dhubri seat, besides failing to play
kingmaker by weighing-in – as he perhaps intended - on the side of the Congress. Rawat as is
now his wont went out on a limb on three counts. First is for which he has been roundly (and
rightly) upbraided, needlessly putting a prime time spin on his observation. No doubt taking the
name of a ‗Muslim‘ party helped him elevate the issue as a national security threat. Now that
the Congress is down and out, merely alluding to some unnamed political party making political
capital would not help. The supposed ‗Muslimness‘ of the AIUDF was necessary to prop up the
Chief‘s second observation: that the illegal immigration is the face of silent and glacial proxy
war. It is no wonder Ajmal went out of his way to point out that his party is based on
‗democratic and secular‘ values. Third, it is not enough to have the ISI as bogeyman anymore.
The CLAWS article‘s analysis was too staid for the general. It had said: ‗A shift in demographic
pattern has given an opportunity to fundamentalist groups to exploit the demographic fault lines
in the state and the Northeast. SATP lists 14 Muslim insurgent groups, out of which Muslim
Tigers Liberation of Assam (MULTA) has been active in the areas adjoining Bangladesh. The
linkages of these groups with ISI and other insurgent groups in the region pose a long term
threat.‘ This is both too staid for Rawat and it pitches India at Pakistan‘s level. Nothing less than
the ‗northern‘ neighbor as threat was called for, and, look and behold, we have a speech that
measures up to Rawat‘s stature.
Rawat‘s apologists have it that he was under the impression that he was at a closed door
seminar and speaking under Chatham House rules. Be that as it may, Rawat would be unfazed
by the storm that he set off. Not only is he now used to it, but he is sanguine that by speaking
the (ruling) party line he is on safe ground. No wonder a predecessor of his as chief, now in
government, came to his defence, saying, the army chief can be allowed to speak as he wishes.
It needs remembering that the front runner to the chief‘s job that Rawat nabbed – Lt Gen Bakshi
- made the mistake of underplaying a cross border raid in mid-2016 into Myanmar, depriving the
Modi-Doval duo of yet another feather to go with others from their ‗surgical strikes‘. To be fair to
Rawat, it is not that he does not know which side the bread is buttered, but he perhaps believes
what he says. And therein lies the rub.
________________________

The Army: Introspection is warranted

10 February 2018
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=76326

Basant Rath, a J&K cadre IPS officer, writing in The Wire (5 February,
https://thewire.in/221165/citizen-shukla-secular-character-indias-police/) berates a senior in the
IPS of the UP cadre for taking the oath to build the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. He calls for the
commitment of uniformed officials the Constitution. He was reacting to a social media video of
his IPS senior participating in a right wing organization‘s ceremony at which attendees took the
oath on building the Ram Mandir, that went viral recently. This invited Rath‘s wrath. Quite at the
same time, there was another video clip that went viral on social media. This one showed an
army officer, presumably serving in J&K, motivating his listeners with cultural nationalist trope.
This suggests Rath‘s advice is valid for all uniformed services, including the army.
 78

This is a counter intuitive claim since the army is known for its apolitical and secular character.
That the army needs reminding of this commonplace is unfortunate. In the clip in question
(https://youtu.be/1WALwLOYJV8), the officer claims prior service in J&K and attests to have
had a trigger-happy time. Downing rum, he is seen dashing the glass to smithereens against his
head, after the fashion of para-commandos who reputedly do so in their messes on occasion.
The officer in question sports the para wings on his chest. He is perhaps participating in the
annual Republic Day ritual in which the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) are invited to
drinks at the Officers‘ Mess. JCOs reciprocate by inviting the officers over to the JCOs‘ mess on
Independence Day. The officer is entitled to his views. However, since he is sharing these and
speaks in the video in Hindi, he is apparently speaking to persons below officer rank. Since he
is in uniform and in an official capacity, he has to exercise caution in airing his views. Assuming
that drink has loosened his tongue, it is worth taking him at his spoken word and reviewing his
spoken reputation as a Rambo of sorts. The army can do without misguided elements within its
ranks in an age of the ‗Strategic Corporal‘ (an age in which media amplified tactical decisions
potentially have strategic effects). He certainly must be prevented from misusing the cover of
AFSPA and the human terrain in Kashmir for his pathologies. Even if the officer‘s views are
forged at the increasingly respectable fount of cultural nationalism, there is no official legitimacy
conferred on such ideological views as yet – particularly since the poem he recites reportedly is
of genocidal content. There is no guarantee the army would take appropriate action. The army
is liable to clamp down on social media footprint rather than address its warts. The ‗human
shield‘ episode of last year – endorsed by no less than the army chief with a commendation -
indicates a certain permissiveness in the internal social environment within the army. That
perhaps emboldened the mentioned officer to go the distance in his motivational talk. Another
misstep by the army in course correction would lead to the discourse only expanding and
nauseating the conversation and exchanges within the army. The army needs to be vigilant on
this score and officers‘ circumspect. Little propels the military (universally) to action more than a
threat to its corporate values and culture. It is best advised of the extant threat to these and from
within. It is time for the army to back track from the limb it went on to in the ‗human shield‘
episode. Then, under seeming assault from the liberal media and usual suspects in the
commentariat (including this columnist), it closed ranks behind unacceptable behavior. The
price has been in a fraying of its internal fabric. Internally, an advisory could serve as a deterrent
to help the army track back to safety. It would reinforce traditional norms and messaging, while
warning off closet purveyors of cultural nationalism lurking in the officer corps. Externally, a leak
of the action taken in disciplining this particular officer is warranted. It would show those
interested in the good health of the army that the contaminating possibilities from the spread of
majoritarian nationalism in India are contained. The virulence is particularly rabid in the northern
cow-dust belt: the catchment areas of majority of its officers and its soldiery. Besides it would
reassure the Kashmiris – in whose area the officer boasts of multiple tenures – that the security
is in the right hands.
Rambos are never absent from a ticking force. The challenge is to positively articulate their
energy, innovation, spirit, strength and enterprise. Even so, not all who project a Rambo
personality are strong internally. Some are hiding from or running away from inherent infirmities.
They use the cover of outsized moustaches, swagger, braggadocio and bluster to impersonate
fighting men. It is unclear which category the officer in question belongs. In either case, there is
a requirement of supervision, lest the autonomy of subunit command is taken as license to
impose on the populace – the center of gravity in subconventional operations - or subject them
to gratuitous violence. This is the case with the terrorists too. Their recent violent grab from
police custody of a terrorist at a hospital in Srinagar is a case to point. There are swashbucklers
among them, with sterling fighting and leadership qualities. In the case of the hospital attack,
while the participants apparently had the gumption to pull off a rescue, they had no compunction
of sparing a hospital as the site. They too are self-indulgent in the liberal rope they are
 79

mistakenly bestowed with by society. Most are undeserving dregs, drop outs and ‗losers‘ in
Trumpian terms. The community, in the false belief that the wider interest of liberation requires
their forbearance, allows them untold liberties – including unspeakable ones with womenfolk.
Often the community‘s choice as to how long and to what extent to persist with the challenge to
state authority is snatched away. Those profiting from the troubles take charge, relegating
original aims and superseding traditional authority structures. This happened in the late nineties
in Kashmir. The phenomenon appears to be making a reappearance. Kashmiris would require
exerting to reacquire agency, lest they are ground down yet again. Troubled times bring out not
only the best in men – on both sides – but also the worst. A conflict environment – as it gets
increasingly brutalized – allows for impunity for both sides to indulge their worst instincts.
Supervisors and handlers respectively have little interest in monitoring and restraining fighters.
While for terrorist there is little incentive to rein them in; for the army, a misunderstanding that
morale suffers holds up action. While Pakistan can be expected to shed crocodile tears, and
use the troubles to further its agenda, that India is increasingly in the same boat is a new
dimension. The Hindutva lobby, poised to use the Kashmir issue – among other Muslim centric
issues – to hoist themselves into another stint in power have no love lost for Kashmir or
Kashmiris. In so far as these are body count based and not dependent on picking up a wound
medal alongside, you can be sure creative writing is in evidence in citations.
Acknowledging this does not detract any from the daredevils, such as the citation of the gallant
deceased Air Force corporal that made our President tear up on Rajpath at Republic Day. In
standing through the reading of the citation in front of the spouse and bowing deeply to her in
respect as he handed over the highest national honour, the Ashoka Chakra, the President
conveyed national sentiment. The army knows this sentiment does not and cannot carry over to
fakes. While the army men have a choice of models to follow between the Air Force corporal
and the army officer in the video in question, the army must ensure – through a regulated
internal environment - the wrong model is no option.
________________________

The Chief has spoken; but is the Chief listening?

15 December 2017
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/2/12522/The-Chief-Has-Spoken-But-Is-
the-Chief-Listening

At an unspecified event at the United Services Institution of India (USI) - the haunt in New Delhi
of retired generals fading away - the army chief, reportedly intoned, "The military should be
somehow kept out of politics. Of late, we have been seeing that politicisation of the military has
been taking place.‖ Though not elaborated in the media report, the observation was likely
triggered by a query on the building of three foot over-bridges by the army in Mumbai at the
location of the recent stampede at Elphinstone station that left 22 dead and 35 injured. Inspired
by its earlier showing in New Delhi in the run up to the Commonwealth Games, when an under
construction footbridge near the Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium collapsed, the army had taken up
the gauntlet to assist Mumbai commuters when put to it by the defence minister in a visit to the
site along with the Maharashtra chief minister and the railway minister. At the time, it was
unclear whether the army has been consulted prior for this assistance by the defence minister.
In the event, it elicited considerable social media outpourings by veterans miffed at the call by
the civil authorities on the army when there are sufficient resources with the civil administration
– in this case the railways – to fight their own fires. Analogy was drawn to the period early in the
Modi era when the army was tasked by the previous defence minister to put a pontoon bridge
across the Yamuna in order that the Sri Sri Ravishankar‘s yoga jamboree on the Yamuna
riverbed could proceed. Following Nirmala Sitharaman‘s announcement at Elphinstone bridge,
in the company of party stalwarts, the army chief dutifully took on the task, justifying it later as a
 80

public relations exercise useful for image building of the army. This is the second instance of
Sitharaman‘s proactivism in tapping the army in her short stay so far at the helm of the defence
ministry. Early in her tenure, she had required the army to clean up the mess tourists leave
behind in the mountains and high altitudes where they are deployed. In particular, this is in the
pilgrimage belt along the upper reaches where the Ganges originates. The army clicked its
heels and fell in line, with social media awash with photos of colonels taking to the broom –
along with army wives. One such much-forwarded image was from Gulmarg, where presumably
the army is deployed in tackling terrorists infiltrating into the Valley besides protecting the Line
of the Control (LC).
This background suggests two possibilities behind the army chief‘s cryptic remarks at the USI
event (he reportedly did not elaborate). The first is that he was telling off his critics to lay off the
army in their criticism of the army‘s seemingly currying favour with its right wing overseers, the
BJP government, by being more available than necessary to step up and fill the breach. The
criticism has it that the BJP as part of its subversion either brazenly or by stealth of most
national institutions, would unlikely leave the army alone. In light of the advance of cultural
nationalism and constriction of liberal-secular space across the land, the army could not
possibly escape the attention of the emerging ‗deep state‘ in India. Critics have therefore been
calling for greater self-regulation by the army in the civil-military domain, lest cultural nationalism
contaminate its secularity and compromise it. That this is the more likely possibility is visible
from the chief going on to say, ―I think we operate in a very secular environment. We have a
very vibrant democracy where the military should stay far away from the polity." To him, there is
little cause to be wary of the right wing dispensation. He is sanguine that the society remains
unchanged. Nevertheless, as traditionally, the army needs to stay at a distance from the hurly
burly world of democratic politics. At the event, he explained the army‘s stepping up at
Elphinstone as part of its aid-to-civil-authorities mandate, though leaving unclear as to how
normal rush hour pedestrian commuting can be equated with natural disasters, for which the
army can be tapped to lend a shoulder. Clearly, the army chief takes his words seriously of
‗stay(ing) far away from the polity,‘ leaving him blind to the political lurch towards the right that
India has taken over the past half-decade. Since more situational awareness is expected of an
institutional head, he needs alerting to the reality of India today. This ab-initio rules out the
second possibility, that of the general tacitly cautioning his civilian political masters to keep a
distance from the army. This is unlikely in light of the general being beholden to the
dispensation for his surprising elevation to the appointment. The general‘s public utterances
since his controversial elevation to his position as chief have unfortunately impacted his
credibility. His recent dilation on surgical strikes in Myanmar under his tutelage as corps
commander in the North East – that were precursor to the ones in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir –
were ill timed from point of view of the Gujarat polls. The ruling party can do without any ballast
for its political fortunes. The government has been at pains to distance itself from its supposedly
weak-kneed predecessor. In this it has used every opportunity to demonstrate a muscular,
martial, risk-taking and war ready India, be it against the Pakistanis in the surgical strikes of last
year or the Chinese with the Doklam standoff. It has thereafter duly milked the opportunities for
their political worth, such as using the halo from the surgical strikes to good effect in the
consequential Uttar Pradesh polls. Modi has most recently used the strained relations with
Pakistan over the past two years to depict the Congress as in league with Muslims and
Pakistanis to meddle in the Gujarat elections. Over the period, the army has kept Pakistan to
the till along the LC, having reactivated it early in the BJP‘s New Delhi tenure, and has through
the year undertaken Operation All Out for cleaning up the Valley floor in a hark back by some
two decades. The general was quick off the blocks early in his tenure to pull out the Cold Start
file from the operations closet and wave it at Pakistan. The Cold Start doctrine reputedly is the
conventional punishment up India‘s sleeve in case of Pakistani trespass of India‘s threshold of
tolerance. Since this is the utilization of the army for its professional worth in line with national
 81

policy – albeit one propelled by domestic political purposes – the army cannot be averse to the
professional opportunity it espies and the institutional spaces (such as budgets, seat at the
policy table etc.) it opens up.
However, institutional leadership needs being wary of use of the national security card for
political interests, in this case continuing friction with Pakistan enabling the political polarization
within India for political gains by the ruling party. The ruling party has chosen its chief well, one
who would plough a narrow professional furrow. The problem is that at the apex level of the
military sensitivity to the political context of professional activity, including its internal political
dimension, cannot be elided by clichés such as apolitical military. The military apex needs to be
sufficiently clued up politically to detect that in the context of the times it needs to be porcupine-
like to ward of unwanted political attention. The Chief needs to heed his own words.
________________________

Debating the ‘harder military approach’

4 August 2017
Kashmir Times

In wake of the attack on the Amarnath pilgrims that took a toll of

eight innocent lives, Lord Meghnad Desai in an op-ed lamented that, ‘A
harder military approach will be urged. That has been tried since 1989.
Time may have come to try something different (http://indianexpress.
com/ article/opinion/columns/the-opportunity-in-kashmir-deathof-
pilgrims-amarnath-yatra-attack-hurriyat-jihadists-naga-tribes-
4752306/).’
As if on cue, a hardy contender for the vacancy coming up soon in
the Raj Bhawan in Srinagar, while agreeing that ‘… no proxy conflict
of this kind can ever be defeated by military means, ‘countered that, ‘I
disagree, however, that India’s approach to the proxy conflict has so far
only been militaristic or through the security prism and not from the
angle of winning the support of the people (http://blogs.timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/after-the-attack-on-the-amarnath-yatrawhy-
meghnad-desai-is-both-right-and-wrong-on-kashmir/).’
He gives an article long summary of the army’s engagement in
Kashmir covering inter-alia its Operation Sadhbhavna initiatives. More
pertinently, perhaps referring to his tenure at the helm of Srinagar corps,
the author, who is a retired member of the army brass, has this to say:
‘2011-13 saw the conscious calibration of the balance of hard and soft
power through the Hearts Doctrine which created hope and attempted
restoration of dignity to the conflict stricken people, incidentally
by the army itself; a situation not politically exploited (http://blogs.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/after-the-attack-on-theamarnath-
yatra-why-meghnad-desai-is-both-right-and-wrong-onkashmir/).’
The general appears to have drawn cudgels with the academic over
the latter’s understanding that a ‘harder military approach’ has been
tried since 1989 and has been found wanting. His article attempts to
highlight two aspects to the military’s engagement in Kashmir. One
that the military is indispensable to managing the situation of such
violence as encountered in the ‘proxy war’ in Kashmir; and, two, that
despite this, the army has attempted to win ‘the support of the people’,
by largely following the counter insurgency doctrine of ‘winning hearts
and minds (WHAM!)’.
 82

The academic, however, was questioning whether India’s Kashmir

policy that has been rather military dominant, could succeed, and on
that count advocating a shift in tack from a military reliant to a political
approach. A politics-up-front approach would have political outreach
to Pakistan on one hand and an internal political settlement with the
Kashmiris on the other. Lord Desai appears to believe that India has
erred in not taking the two prongs of the political strategy to their
logical conclusion in a settlement in Kashmir, even though its Kashmiri
citizens have been imposed upon as a consequence for over a quarter
century.
Since Lord Desai’s remark is a concluding one in his article on the
routinisation of conflict and approaches to conflict in Kashmir, space
constraints precluded his articulation of his position in these terms.
But this appears a fair interpretation of his position, since he calls for a
change of tack from the direction Indian has been on since 1989.
He is entirely right. The political prong of strategy has never been the
dominant one in tackling India’s Kashmir problem. Over the preceding
two score years to 1989, India firmly retained a hold in Kashmir, by
lining up its military along the Line of Control and deliberately foisting
corruptible regimes in Kashmir. The Swaran Singh-Bhutto talks of the
early sixties were not sincere. This was brought out in an evening talk
by PN Haksar at the India International Center in the early nineties at
which this author was present. Haksar recounted asking Swaran Singh
what the aim of the talks had been, with Swaran Singh letting on that
it was a charade to keep the Americans at bay. The Simla Agreement
is similarly a promise regarding the representatives of the two sides
to meet ‘to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the
establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations … a final
settlement of Jammu and Kashmir … (italics added).’ It is about ‘talks
about talks’.
The story of the nineties is little different. The weak coalition
governments then - even if led by a bleeding heart at one time, Inder
Gujral - were hardly in a position to change tack on Kashmir. When
Nehru and Indira in their prime were unwilling to walk down the road
to peace politically arrived at, it would be too much to expect of the
prime ministers in the nineties. The late nineties saw some political
activity, such as the composite dialogue initiation under Gujral and its
spirit carried forward by Vajpayee. However, the leeway either had in
clinching the issue through compromise was non-existent. Gujral was
a stopgap, while Vajpayee had Mr. Advani on his flank to be mindful
of, as revealed unmistakably at the Agra Summit a few years on. Since
India was also rather hard pressed through the upturn in the proxy war
in Kashmir in wake of the Kargil War, it could hardly be seen to be
compromising in face of such pressure.
Even so, it is to Vajpayee’s credit that he allowed the backchannel
to enable a start to the composite dialogue, by creating the conditions
for this in an unwritten ceasefire along the LC and on its heels with
the Islamabad declaration. However, in retrospect, it is questionable
whether Vajpayee could have gone the distance, even if the BJP’s India
Shining campaign had worked out. Within Kashmir, the ‘healing touch’
campaign could not even get the AFSPA sway diluted, though some of
 83

the army was depicted as returning to barracks - which incidentally was

a sleight of hand since only additional troops deployed for Operation
Parakram reverted to barracks.
This remained the case even as the indices of terrorism were
brought to negligible as the composite dialogue progressed desultorily
under Manmohan Singh. Manmohan Singh’s incapability was stark in
his inability to convert the quiet in Kashmir to India’s advantage by
acting purposefully on the feedback from his three roundtables, five
working groups and his team of three interlocutors. For its part, the
Congress was unable to convert the penalty corner into a goal owing to
its political sense telling it that India was then veering away to the right,
buoyant from a high growth rate, increasing great power aspirations,
diaspora influence into its polity, imbibing of cultural nationalism and,
therefore, was unlikely to countenance any let up on Kashmir. All it’s
tuning in to the national mood could not keep the Congress from being
swept into history - as history will record soon enough.
Mr. Modi’s strategy is what Lord Desai was ruing. An opportunity to
foreclose a deal with Kashmiris internally has been lost. The PDP chief
minister in alliance with the BJP, Mehbooba Mufti, is right that Modi
holds the cards. She is only naïve in thinking he would play it in the
way she hopes. The unnecessary standoff with China on the Doklam
plateau suggests the lengths the two - Modi and Doval - have invested
in a militarized template for India’s security policy. In this, resort to
politics is a sign of weakness. The Hindutva cultural paradigm entails
revitalization of Hindu masculinity. Muscles, brawn and testosterone
now matter, since India’s eclipse a thousand years ago is attributed to
their absence. A national security policy on steroids cannot but singe its
Kashmir policy.
This exposé of the absence of a political prong to India’s Kashmir
policy, leaves one just enough column space to touch upon one of the
general’s pet projects, which happenstance he does get to Rajbhawan he
will surely thrust onto a hapless state administration. In his own words,
this is:
…if the chief minister has to walk this talk it will need the
support of one organisation which can make all the difference,
the Army; it has the deployment, reach, contact with people and
the robust ability to secure a grand engagement plan. It cannot
be a creeping plan. It just has to be bold with transformational
approach. All the talk about not talking will vanish once the
government, the politician and security forces are speaking with
the people and not the leadership (http://www.ipcs.org/ article/
india/handling-jk-what-is-right-and-what-more-needs-to-5333.
html).
Perhaps an elaboration is merited: absent politics, there is only the
military left. But the matter is best left to the reader.

________________________
 84

An Army to fear: The Army’s future?

12 June 2017
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=67858

The jury is out on whether the army chief was put up to it by his political
masters or whether his rewarding the protagonist in the infamous
‘human shield’ case was of his own volition. From the broadside by
one commentator likening the chief to General Dyer, it is clear that
there are some who believe that the army chief acted on a suggestion
from his superiors. That broadside from an academic would likely have
been directed, less at the army chief himself, as much as the one whose
bidding he was doing. But with the army chief going out on a limb (yet
again) with his defence of not only the indefensible action of Mr. Tactical
Innovation himself, Major Leetul Gogoi, and his own award, it is quite
clear that the army chief has the courage of his conviction. That is the
good news.
The bad news is that the conviction is itself wrong-headed. Courage
of conviction in such cases leads to persisting in the wrong direction.
Precedence in the case of a predecessor of his pursuing an age related
case for a year’s extension at the helm of the army suggests as much.
Incidentally, that general titled his memoirs, Courage and Conviction.
Worse could follow. The generals of the First World War were not for
nothing dubbed ‘donkeys’, for their outsized determination in trying
to breakthrough trench lines with tactics that failed to work for several
successive years at the cost of a million lives.
The pattern of persistence in wrong headedness in Kashmir is
discernible. There has been a reversion to cordon and search operations.
The unwritten cease-fire dating to end 2003 is in tatters. Just as the army
went after the JKLF in the early nineties, believing it was wrapping up
the indigenous insurgency then, this time round too it has a list, a score
entries long of local militants it wants to take out by summer’s end. The
army chief has warned off people from complicating military operations,
lest they be taken as overground workers. Since it is well known what
happened to overground workers, among others, through the nineties,
he is harking back by a decade and more. The earlier measures having
failed to end the insurgency, it beats imagination as to how these can
possibly succeeded in their second iteration.
This time round the difference is in the army chief setting the tone
out loud. He has required that the army be feared. Earlier - at least
up front - the army preferred being respected, if not quite loved. It
certainly wished to inspire fear in the enemy. This enemy was usually
the adversary state across the border and its army, and in Kashmir, the
jihadi mercenary, usually Pakistani Punjabi.
However, in terms of internal security, Jawaharlal Nehru had early
on clearly spelt out how the army needed to be appreciated in such
circumstance as a protector of the people. The then army chief taking
cue in sending the army into Nagaland in 1955, had in his Special Order
of the Day phrased the political terms of reference given out by Nehru
in these words:
You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are
operating are fellow Indians. They may have different religions, pursue a
 85

different way of life, but they are Indians and the very fact, that they are
different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s greatness. Some
of these people are misguided and have taken up arms against their own
people and are disrupting peace of this area. You are to protect the mass
of the people in the area from these disruptive elements. You are not to
fight the people in the area but to protect them.
General Rawat has upturned this. He has pronounced that ‘Adversaries
must be afraid of you and at the same time your people must be afraid
of you. We are a friendly army, but when we are called to restore law and
order, people have to be afraid of us.’ He argues that the proxy war the
army is coping with is a ‘dirty war’. He cannot have people throwing
‘petrol bombs and stones’ while his soldiers ‘wait and die’. He needs to
keep their morale up by allowing them to fight innovatively, including
through use – in the incident that prompted his defence of himself – of
human shields.
Happily, he was quick to clarify that, ‘It (human shield) is not a
general norm. As a practice it is not supported.’ What he misses is that
tactics is to be guided both by norms and the humanitarian legal code, be
it in war or internal conflict. Situations cannot guide tactics. Tactics are
responses to situations that have to be ethically and legally compliant. By
shifting the goal posts the army chief is arbitrarily changing the accepted
doctrinal principles of Indian army in subconventional operations.
This could possibly be on his initiative. His extensive experience in
counter insurgency that got him his job, perhaps persuades him that the
doctrinal principle of ‘one hand tied behind the back’ is superfluous. It
was never quite popular within the army, with its counter insurgency
trope largely bewailing the imposition. This is what prompted the army’s
somewhat tough approach and action in the nineties in Kashmir, such
as through use of proxy groups as Ikhwan, disappearances, firing on LC
without concern for collateral damage etc. The new fangled technique -
perception management - was to manage the fallout. The army’s flagship
publication on subconventional operations - ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ -
coincided with the start of the decade long hiatus of peace in Kashmir. It
is apparent that the tenets on the use of force in the document are liable
to be liberally interpreted by those who have cut their teeth in counter
insurgency operations, such as the army chief.
In other words, has the army dropped its veneer? Though veterans
with equal claim to operational experience are aghast at the brazen shift,
that its slip is showing does not appear to embarrass the army any.
This brings one to the second possibility. The shift away from the
central doctrinal pillar of people-friendly operations is perhaps an
imposition by its political masters. They have chosen well in choosing
an army chief with like sentiment. The government is explicit that talks
are not the way out, even if its home minister promises a solution to the
troubles in Kashmir. The army will therefore be held to the till. A tough
line to go with the image of its national security minder – the national
security adviser - and his boss - the prime minister - is politically useful.
In any other dispensation, even if it was not knocked on its knuckles
privately, the army could not have been this willful.
The problem with doggedness is that it can be in the wrong direction.
The army in Kashmir is on such path. It mistakenly insists that it is
 86

confronted with a proxy war. There is surely Pakistani chicanery, but

a decade long talks process with several false starts cannot but have let
Pakistan continue as an interested party and ill motivated player. The
equally long and coextensive engagement with a political solution in
Kashmir has been abandoned, leaving the people – even girls - with little
choice than to take to stones. Whether this is a product of information
war on social media - as the army chief suggests – is up for debate.
Instead, a self-fulfilling prophesy will likely develop, with a jihadists
supposedly in search of Khorasan overrunning the indigenous dimension
– yet another throwback to the mid nineties when the JKLF was eclipsed
by the Hizb and the late nineties when the Hizb was outshone by the
Lashkar. This would be welcome in New Delhi. Turning the army into
one feared by people would be small price to pay and it would exactly
what is needed by an authoritarian regime. Hopefully, this is not a future
the army envisages.

________________________

The Gogoi award puts General Rawat on test

25 May 2017
http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/NewsDetail/
index/1/10769/The-Gogoi-Award-puts-General-Rawat-On-Test

That Major N.L. Gogoi has earned the Army Chief ’s commendation is
not in doubt. He has received it for consistent display of grit in line of
duty. As a Rashtriya Rifles company commander he can be expected to
have led patrols, sat in night long ambushes, kept roads open through
rain and fog, reacted to spot intelligence on terrorist movement and
participated in events organized by his unit to bring the army close to
the people.
He has evidently done all this at a time when the going has been
getting tougher in the Kashmir Valley and the people are more hostile.
There can be no envying him his recognition. But for the likes of junior
leaders like him the Valley would have been lost to India a long time
back. If the award was for his work preceding the incident that brought
him fame – infamy to some – he can enjoy full credit for it.
Placing him in front of an array of microphones to tell his side of
the story bespeaks of the army’s confidence that his act of tying the
Kashmiri young man to the jeep in early April was an act in good faith.
Gogoi for his part thought that was the best way to save lives which
would have been the case had he shot his way out of trouble. It is possible
that the court of inquiry that investigated the incident has found him
credible.
Let us leave Major Gogoi at that without begrudging him his award.
One can imagine him over at his company operating base or out on
some patrol on election day. With the SOS coming in from the ITBP,
the adjutant of his unit might have scrambled him to the location,
not necessarily because he was closest but because of his hard earned
reputation as a man of action. He proved as much in thinking on his
feet, in his own widely telecast description of the event. The rest is
 87

beyond that of the fighting man.

The significant aspect of this story instead is the timing of the
award. While usually awards await the Army Day, Republic Day and
Independence Day, in this case, Gogoi got his out of turn. This is not
unknown as commendations are a great way for the brass to exercise
their morale building function. A good deed timely recognized by an
award has a wider effect than merely pepping up an individual but
of energizing a whole outfit. The Military Cross was pinned to Sam
Manekshaw’s chest while many thought he might die of wounds without
knowing of the acclaim of his peers.
By likewise handing the award bearing his stamp to Major Gogoi
out-of-turn, the Army Chief has been bold to open himself to scrutiny. It
has not been long in coming. The usual suspects have gone to town over
the implications for human rights and humanitarian law and possible
disrespect for Kashmiris. The liberal brigade has alighted on the side of
the Farooq Dar’s story, the ‘human shield’ in this incident.
Allowing that the crowd of 1200 – in Gogoi’s numbers – was one
kilometer deep, along his exit route, they wonder why Dar needed to
be strapped down for the rest of his 25 kilometer long journey through
three-four other villages. Also, what accounts for his beating that even
now reportedly gives him the shivers at night?
If the inquiry did not address these questions, it does not hold water.
To them, it is one of a piece of inquiries that litter the Kashmir record
of security forces: beginning from the controversial Kunan Poshpora
incident; not forgetting infamous Pathribal; and, to clinch these, the
finding of yet another as ‘death by drowning’ of two able bodied women
in Shopian, all in two feet of flowing water. They would surely have died
from drowning if their heads had been held under water long enough.
The inquiry did not pursue who might have wanted to do that and
why.
All this brouhaha could easily have been anticipated. This Army has
remained unfazed and it’s chief, rather brazen. It well knows that the
‘national’ media – as against the Lutyens’ media – would have lapped
up the Gogoi press appearance. With fire assaults simultaneously on
Pakistani pickets along the Line of Control broadcast in virtual real
time, it is playing to the gallery in India’s heartland and hinterland.
Perhaps it thinks that this display helps prove its responsiveness to
civil authority, doing what its acting minister set it to do in wake of the
beheadings of its soldiers early this month. There is little else the Army
could do on the Line of Control, in light of precedence dating to the late
nineties. But surely it has gone beyond the necessary in the Gogoi case.
It must know this is unnecessary additional wind in the political sails of
its civilian masters that the Army did not really need to provide.
The problem is that it is not the Army’s mandate to be providing
political ballast. The apex level must not only know that it has to keep the
Army out of politics but also know how to keep it so. Even if the Army
is not interested in politics, in India today, politics – right wing politics
– is interested in the Army. Recall, in its earlier avatar, the BJP led NDA
government had the Army organize Sindhu darshan for its homesick
ideologue, LK Advani. This time round the right wing’s embrace of the
Army has been more than just on election posters.
 88

The Army brass has a representational function that entails ensuring

the Army stays apolitical. The more it lends itself to providing egregious
political comfort to its civilian masters, the more it opens itself to
manipulation. The more it is manipulated, the less it is apolitical. A
Chief who cannot understand this - leave alone one who is complicit in
this - is not worth his salt.
Where does this leave the Army chief? He has two years to go, long
enough to help line up his political masters for an extended tenure at
the political helm. Or conversely, it gives him enough time to retest his
ability to say ‘thus far and no further’, if not ‘no’ itself.
________________________

To the army: Any gentlemen left please?

22 April 2016
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=66132

The company commander implicated in the human shield case has

come up with an innovative defence. He claims to have used the human
shield tactics to make his way out of a tight spot, along with a group of
paramilitary men and voting officials. This has been taken as an instance
of innovative quick thinking on his part that has saved lives, in that had
he shot his way out of trouble instead, some stone pelters might have
died. That would have put the army in a bigger spot than its current one
of embarrassment at best. So instead of censure for violating the letter of
the humanitarian law, he should be commended if not awarded for his
bold, if unorthodox, action.
Media reported some in the brass as willing to overlook his crime,
even as the army quickly went into crisis management mode by ordering
a court of inquiry. That would tide over the interim till the noise
subsides or till the prime time minders of India’s national body clock
find another - inevitably Muslim related - diversion. While mid May has
been bandied about as the time given for the inquiry to come up with
its verdict, the case would likely be shrouded in legal confidentiality –
‘since its subjudice we cannot speak of it’ – till it is buried in the files
and dust. The major in question would be a minor celebrity for his quick
thinking and more importantly ability to get away from liberal hounds
baying for his blood.
Would such an outcome be good for the army?
The army clearly needs officers and men who think on their feet. They
must not only be able to think but bold enough to act on their instincts.
Thinking out-of-the-box is not enough. Tactical results require boldness
and effort. The army prefers to select and nurture such leaders. Therefore,
if one such junior leader has gone beyond the pail momentarily and
with demonstrated effect in saving lives not only of his men but also of
the groups nailing them down, he cannot outrightly be pilloried.
As for the brass that has reportedly backed the major, they have a duty
to protect junior leaders who have acted in good faith in line with their
exhortation. The senior level leadership requires the juniors to exert
in way of an aim set for the hierarchy. They require this be done with
gusto, with the least spilling of own blood and in the acceptable mode of
 89

counter insurgency, with as little imposition on the people as possible.

Given this leadership culture, it is not impossible to envisage that the
leaders so inspired could condone – if at a stretch - what happened in
Budgam.
Now, if this was all there was to it, there would be little to worry
over. The junior leader would be publicly knocked on the knuckles but
privately feted and the army and Kashmir would brace for the next bout
of public anger.
The story has since been complicated by the narrative of the human
shield in question. Apparently, he was a weaver set to vote; picked up
and tied to the vehicle, after a dose of beating for good measure. He
claims to have been paraded around the neighbouring villages for a few
hours thereafter, as an exhibit to deter emulators. It is in this journey
that the video was made that brought his plight to public knowledge.
There after there have been photos from various angles of him and his
chariot, the army jeep. These appear to have been done in a more staged
manner by army men themselves, partaking of the event, perhaps in a
bit of fun.
The court of inquiry would require covering the murky side of the
story too. Assume it does, it could come up with the conclusion that
the idea was a good one but in enacting it, it went too far. Had the
poor sod not been beaten; had threatening placards not been put on
him; had been let off once the danger zone had been traversed; it would
have been difficult to be too harsh on the major. Had the major let
off the weaver and would-be-voter with a hot cup of tea, a handshake
and an explanation if not an apology, it could yet have been argued
that the major was perhaps over-zealous but not quite a villain. His
nimble extrication from a tricky situation could have figured as a case
study at the counter insurgency school in Khrew, even if it violated the
sensibilities of the purist.
Why was the ending of this story different? Why did the major lack
chivalry? Why did he blow his part? Why did he seize ignominy for
himself and the army, where he could well have ended up an example of
junior leadership?
This owes to the difference between the army and its image. The
hypothetical ending just provided to the story stems from an image of
the army, one that takes it at its word: as an army mindful of human
rights; of the soldier’s dharma; of the kshatriya code; of the examples of
the Gurus; inspired by Rana Pratap and Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj; in
the footsteps of Shaitan Singh, Albert Ekka and Abdul Hamid; imbued
with the spirit of the Bhagwad Gita; its officer code reverberant with
the Chetwode dictum; and its officers, the last of India’s gentlemen. The
more treacly this sounds, the more the gap.
It is easy to see that the major did not just get carried away with his
brainwave – excusable in the heat of things. The long drawn out agony of
his victim suggests his act was vindictive and vicious. It was he and his
outfit enacting what they wished to do to the wider public collectively
but have not been able to in full.
This has both a positive and an underside. The positive is that there
appears to be some restraint against which they seem to be pushing, one
that does not allow them to go after the people in the manner they could
 90

after this individual. This left the hapless individual to bear the brunt.
The negative is that they were able to push past the restraint, and have
managed some accolades in doing so.
The army must see how it can retrieve the restraint, embellish it and
put it back in its rightful, controlling place. Simultaneously, it needs to
exorcise what corrodes this restraint. The restraint referred to is selfcontrol,
self-regulation, self-discipline and an inner light that enables
orders to be correctly given, correctly interpreted and rightly obeyed.
This is the meaning of thinking on ones feet, doing the right thing and
doing it right. The higher expectation of the army man is that he is
supposed to get it right, the odds be damned.
That the major messed up is a warning that the army is in difficult
straits. One way to be sure of the way the wind blows is to see how the
court of inquiry turns out. Getting it right is one way to begin to fix
things. The major difficulty is in the context being framed by what is
happening not only in Kashmir itself, but in the rest of India. The army
can at best be unambitious: try to stay afloat and not allow its image to
float away.

________________________

Dark side of Army’s social media groups

2 March 2017
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dark-side-ofarmy-
s-social-media-groups/371308.html

One of General Bipin Rawat’s early concerns into his tenure is social
media. He had barely taken charge of the Army when the BSF trooper
at a post under Army jurisdiction, along the Line of Control, sent out
a social-media salvo on poor food being served. It set off posts by
uniformed personnel, including Army soldiers, similarly exercised by
myriad perceived impositions on them, such as “Sahayak” (batman or
soldier-helper) duties.
The Army has since revisited its social media policy. Essentially,
its call for restraint is intended to keep personnel from washing dirty
linen in public. Tightening internal grievance redress, the Chief has
opened a direct line of access to his staff in case lower levels fail to prove
responsive. On the batman system, there are innovative proposals in the
pipeline, at least for peace stations, substituting for soldiers undertaking
domestic work in officer accommodation.
It is apparent that the Army has constructively seized opportunity
to make the necessary, if overdue, changes. However, there is one aspect
that is likely to have missed its eye. It is the extent of right-wing trope
being exchanged on social media in military networks. It is now so
commonplace as to be unremarkable. It is unexceptionable therefore in
case the Army is oblivious to this. Precisely for this reason, the matter
needs airing.
The trend of social media penetration of right-wing jargon,
thinking, positions and propaganda line began at the same time as
in other middle class social media groups, sometime prior to the last
 91

General Election in 2014. It is now in the open that the “Modi wave” was
partially manufactured in troll factories by paid agents and committed
volunteers.
The Army was no exception to this trend since its officer class is
middle class. The earlier insulation of the Army in its cantonments and
being tied down to its professional till has been eroded in the internet
and mobile age. Consequently, the political winds that swept the
dysfunctional UPA II government away found their way into the minds
of the officer corps.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that liberal voices on social media
networks were feeble and easily overwhelmed. Protest was silenced
through cyber bullying, with the majority being silent spectators.
Political posts were widely shared, most with a degree of endorsement.
It is easy in retrospect to identify that the Army had its share of what
have since come to be called bhakts. These self-anointed monitors out
shouted any group managers who dared intervene on groups ranging
from old-boy networks of military schools, course-mate groups to
battalion groups.
While earlier, politics was a taboo subject in officers’ messes, and
perhaps continues to be so, reservation on espousing a political line
failed to extend to regulating the social media behaviour of members of
the armed forces. The enthusiasm for the conservative party’s victory is
explicable as it is in keeping with the universal political inclination of
an officer corps; the attractions of the allusion to development; its anticorruption
packaging; and the BJP’s largely pro-security agenda.
The problem is that the ideological baggage that attends the politics of
the BJP — Hindutva — was part of the package. One popular propaganda
line that was seemingly heartily consumed — judging from its traffic on
the social media group — was the conflation of the two “others” in the
Hindutva world view, the Indian Muslim with Pakistan.
This was easy to sell since a majority of the military has been through
Kashmir and has seen the Pakistani hand at play. Exposed to the media
attention to the terror attacks in the hinterland, that seldom went beyond
the reporting on the blasts to the investigations that have attended these
blasts, the theme of a strong government was easily sold. Lately, the
letting off by courts of Muslims incarcerated for alleged complicity in
the blasts suggests that India was well into the post-truth age before the
term was coined.
Any collateral damage in terms of marginalisation of the minority
and social relationships was found acceptable. The distasteful
experience of this writer on social media chatter on Army groups led
to his withdrawing from the three social media groups comprising his
military cohort and former comrades. It was not so much on account
of religious affiliation but constraints on expression of a liberal world
view encountered.
The military leadership needs alerting to this unseemly underside of
social media. The military’s social media policy is a work-in-progress.
It needs updating with stipulations on the content that is exchanged.
While self-regulation is best, it has proven insufficient. This has
implications for the freedom of expression intrinsic to social media. A
case can be made that those who do not wish to receive such posts can
 92

opt to leave. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it divides the
officer corps, leaving the turf to the cultural nationalists in uniform,
for whom patriotism is just not enough. The Army’s social media policy
has further steps to take. It needs to be possessive of its social turf. Its
cohesion and apolitical nature is at stake.

________________________

Stolen gold: A ghost from the past that scares none

24 February 2017
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=63979

Media reports of a former officer dismissed from service for stealing

money let off a quarter century later by the Armed Forces Tribunal. The
Tribunal as reportedly asked the government to pay him Rs 4 crores as
damages caused. The media report on the case says that the petitioner
claimed that his search party in a military operation had recovered some
25 kgs of gold biscuits. These he says were appropriated by his seniors,
among whom he reportedly includes the then corps commander.
When he remonstrated he was accosted, brutalized, declared mentally
unsound, shot at and finally dismissed from service.
The corps commander for his part in an interview carried alongside
the article in a leading weekly clarifies that on hearing from the
Adviser Home to the Governor that a theft had occurred in the locality
where a military search operation had taken place, he had ordered an
inquiry that yielded up the officer, then a second lieutenant, as culprit.
Thereafter military law had taken its own course and after the corps
commander had demitted his appointment, the military court had
punished the offender. Later, rumours had reached his ears that he as
corps commander had allegedly misappropriated the recovered gold.
Apparently, he had given no cognizance to the rumours and these had
died down. In his interview, the corps commander stood up for his
administrative staff that handled the case and the chain of command
including the commanding officer of the alleged offender in question.
The Tribunal in its verdict - that is currently not on its website - is
reported in the media as stating that the procedural lapses and the failure
of the corps commander to investigate allegations of the young officer
that his seniors had stolen gold owed to ‘extraneous considerations’.
The implication appears to be that the corps commander had conspired
with the seniors of the officer - presumably his commanding officer and
others - to pocket the gold. Since this is from media reports - likely to
have been released by the petitioner who has liberally given his version
to the media - it requires to be treated with a pinch of salt.
In case taken at face value, it is clearly the Tribunal going overboard
in not only swallowing the petitioner’s story but going beyond it to
implicate others. The judge and air marshal on the panel have asked for
the army to conduct an inquiry into the gold stealing episode and revert
within four months. Perhaps the Tribunal could have kept its comments
to itself for four months longer rather than attribute ill intent to the
corps commander.
 93

It is one thing to say procedural shortfalls undermined the case of

the army against the officer and another to say that these were deliberate
in order to hide the tracks of the stolen gold. It is difficult to believe
that the court had the evidence not only on a messed up court martial
but from that could deduce that gold was stolen. A court cannot hide
behind the logic that it is now the post truth age.
What the court has in one fell swoop done is to attempt destroy
the credibility of the first corps commander in the trouble times in
the Valley. This is tragic in that his tenure has turned out to be the
touchstone of leadership in the Valley. His successors have had the
disadvantage of their endevours being reviewed against the bar he had
set as a professional and leader. Unfortunately, not all of them have
measured up, while some have failed spectacularly, including those who
went on to hold high office.
Take the case of the phone call from the Adviser Home to the corps
commander that set off this episode. The Adviser Home surely would
have reckoned that the corps commander would have been exercised
by the information based on his reading of the man. Such a reputation
can only be that of an upright officer, unable to bear with equanimity
that his soldiers have exhibited moral turpitude in stealing money from
a house that has been searched. His response was predictable. Instead
of defending the indefensible, he did the right thing - ordered an
investigation and finding that wrong doing had occurred, had followed
through with the military judiciary.
Not a few commanders have looked the other way wrong doing has
occurred in their command, worrying how it will look on their leadership
and wondering what it would mean for their record and careers. Some
have believed that since it would show up the army in poor light, it is best
swept under the carpet. Others worry that it would give ammunition to
the army’s critics both within the people and outside the Valley amongst
liberals. A few would rationalize inaction thinking acknowledging
wrong doing would provide grist to the opposition’s propaganda mill.
To some, since others have not taken action in such cases, it would not
do to set a precedent or rock the boat. A few might take non-judicial
action, using cultural punitive practices to dispel the need for military
judicial action, which is known to be most cumbersome and tiresome
for those engaged in operations.
Ignoring responsibility in such ways leads to a culture of impunity,
which has manifested in the Valley in worse ways - evidence of which
is in the two thousand or so unmarked graves all over the Valley and
the some 10000 missing persons, some of whom are surely in those
graves. It is clear that the rot did not set in with this corps commander.
He instead set the standard against which we can now measure the
military’s record and find it wanting, not wholly, but only episodically
and along segments of its mandate.
That the corps commander’s tenure was a standard setting one is
clear from Jagmohan’s memoirs of the period in Kashmir. Apparently,
Jagmohan was apprised of allegations that the corps commander was
being ‘soft’ on people, by ensuring food distribution to the people
inconvenienced by military operations. This was taken as evidence
of his communal bias, since he was a believer, a practicing Muslim.
 94

Jagmohan was dismissive of the allegations, but the fact that these were
swirling and brought to his ears by interested parties indicates the ugly
and conspiratorial climate that prevailed at the outset of the troubles
in Kashmir. If a military leader in such circumstance hewed a lonely
furrow, it is to his credit as a person and professional and that of the
army that put him in a position of leadership.
If the Tribunal has been unmindful in its judgment of the collateral
damage it is causing by its ill considered statements, then it is a disservice
to the reason why Tribunals were set up in first place. They are to redress
wrongs inf licted on individuals by a strict military judicial system,
which being overseen by non-judicial professionals can lead to injustice
to individuals. By no means does redressing such injustice permit the
Tribunal to trespass on logic and judicial standards by tarring others
with a broad brush under cover of judicial impunity.
Even if procedural shortcomings are pointed to, the air marshal
on the panel should have harked back quarter century to when he was
a squadron leader and imagined how the situation was in the Valley
back then. Even if he merely sat through his tenure on the Budgam
airfield, surely he would have known there was a situation outside that
precluded churning out of doctoral length judicial proceedings. It is for
this reason former professionals sit on these Tribunals, those expected
to understand the system and its circumstance.
Clearly, there is an equal case to be made of ‘extraneous circumstances’
driving this particular judgment. Is it that standard setting done a
quarter century back needs dismantling? Is there a purpose to such
tearing down of hard earned military reputations? Is it of a piece with
the recent revision by the army chief no less of the distinction between
combatant and civilian? Does the petitioner’s association with the BJP
tell us something?
________________________

Internal security duties in their impact on the army

Aakrosh - Jan 2017

India’s internal security commitment in the north east is well over the
half century long mark. In Jammu and Kashmir (J & K), it has gone
beyond a quarter century. In both cases it can reasonably be argued that
there have been periods of quietude in which peace process could have
been progressed to see a viable termination of respective insurgencies. In
neither case has this apparently been possible. A consequence of political
inattention to conflict resolution has been in a continuing deployment
of the army under an unpopular law, the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act (AFSPA). It can be inferred that the belief underlying the status
quo is that the army can indefinitely sustain such a deployment and its
effects.
Successive army chiefs have, usually while demitting office, pointed
out that this is an unsustainable belief. Internal security duties have
a long term and deleterious effect on the army and therefore they
have urged political engagement in restoring normalcy. However, the
situation has remained largely unchanged. There is even a danger of the
 95

army itself buying into the belief that its deployment is indispensible
to national integrity. An argument could go that though there was a
respite from 2004 onwards in Kashmir, its disruption in 2008-10 and
more recently this year, suggests that army deployment is inescapable.
Not all effects of such deployment are harmful and those that are can be
mitigated by requisite leadership and training. The army has sufficient
depth in terms of numbers and moral resilience to be able to sustain
such deployment indefinitely; or so an argument can go.
This article argues that the assumption of the army’s ability to
sustain army deployment in a counter insurgency role in numerous
states indefinitely is fallacious. The army has to push back on the
internal argument that this is possible and to push on with persuading
the political leadership that democratic solutions politically arrived at,
are answer to disaffection of people. Lack of energy in a narrative along
these lines is a pointer that winning the argument for this internally
will probably as difficult as selling it to the political class. The danger
is in the counter argument – of the army’s indispensability militarily
propping up national integrity – making the army acquire a stake in the
disrupted security situation. It should not be that institutional interests
keep the army from a strong case arguing for its return to barracks
where such a distancing from an internal security situation warrants it.
The Pakistan factor
Doctrinally, the distinguishing feature between internal security
situations that call for army deployment appear to be the prevalence of
or potential for an ‘external’ hand. For instance, where this is stark - such
as in J & K – for the army to have a role is perhaps understandable. On
the other hand the army’s reluctance to get into anti-Maoist operations
in Central India had the absence of the external factor marking it.
Interrogation this rather easy distinction yields up some startling
revelations.
A popular portrayal of Pakistan is that it is out to repay India for
India’s success in East Pakistan. Pakistan wishes to go further by
administering India a thousand cuts. Its army being in charge of that
state ensures adversarial relations in order that it gains a giant cut of
the state pie. In nutshell, there are cultural and organizational theory
relevant arguments explaining Pakistani hostility. The realist argument
is somewhat muted, since it shows up Pakistan’s security dilemma
that might be prompting Pakistani action. The realist argument needs
unpacking further since it provides a rational basis for Pakistani
actions; something Indian analysts are largely in denial over. Their
view is that India is a non-threatening power and a counter view that
it is threatening to its neighbor is an unsustainable aspersion. To the
extent that the power imbalance is taken into account, it is to arrive at
a conclusion that Pakistan should instead choose to bandwagon with
India rather than try and balance it.
The argument here is that Pakistan, led by its army, is a rational
actor in the realist mode. It espies a power imbalance with India that it
then proceeds to respond to with external and internal balancing. The
external balancing is in the form of action as a rentier state, renting
out is strategic location for use by great powers, both US and China.
Internal balancing is in creation of ideational resources, such as a
 96

jihadi sentiment and proxy forces, as force multipliers. The external

imprint of the latter is in the proxy war. The latter is less on account
of rationalizations such as Kashmir being a ‘jugular vein’ but for
tying down India’s surplus military power in troops intensive counter
insurgency operations.
India emerged as a preeminent power in South Asia in wake of cutting
Pakistan down to size in 1971. It continued on its power trajectory
with one doctrinal and organizational move following another. India’s
going nuclear and mechanization date to the seventies. Continuing of
mechanization, regional power aspirations and covert nuclearisation
were in evidence in the eighties. A third strike corps, expansion through
raising of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and over nuclearisation were
hallmarks of the nineties. The 2000s saw doctrinal evolution to ensure
the continuing utility of conventional forces into the nuclear age. The
current decade has seen an arming so as to make doctrinal aspirations a
reality. The security dilemma India posed Pakistan through its periodic
military upgrades and power aspirations, led to a Pakistani counter.
Analysts selling the notion that India is a reactive and defensive
power purvey the narrative that it is Pakistan’s covert nuclearisation that
spurred India down the nuclear path. It is Pakistan’s proxy war in Punjab
that furthered mechanization, so as to enable India to conventionally
deter this and to administer a punch if needed. Its raising of the RR was
to refresh its conventional deterrence against proxy war that shifted from
Punjab to Kashmir. Its doctrinal movement was once again to refurbish
conventional deterrence since Pakistan upped the ante in Kargil and
through mega terror attacks. India’s spending on arms is only kept pace
with its economic trajectory and is designed to keep Pakistan from yet
again stepping up proxy war in Kashmir. Pakistan’s irrational attempted
matching of India has led to its own security dilemma in India’s counter
action.
This essay cannot settle this debate. Suffice it to point out that
Pakistan’s India strategy is rational in the realist vein. Armies universally
are known to be realist and conservative institutions. Pakistan’s army
has trained in US military institutions since the fifties. Realism has
been the dominant perspective in the US all through its super power
years. Realism provided Pakistan the best perspective to cope with its
tragic halving in 1971. It enabled the Pakistan army to ignore its own
actions in East Pakistan and see India’s actions and power as accounting
for this debacle. It has therefore deepened the realist hue with which
Pakistan views India. It sees India’s power unmistakably, something
Indian analysts are unable to see themselves. Further, there are aspects
of India’s power and its instruments that escape scrutiny in India but
are not lost on Pakistan. Amb. Rasgotra in his memoirs describes an
encounter with Musharraf in which Musharraf cryptically refers to
Indian actions that Pakistan is best positioned to register that account
for what Pakistan does back to India. This requires factoring in to
understand Pakistan’s view of India.
Further, Pakistan has largely proved a rational actor. It did not
provoke a war in 1971 War till the very last minute when it was obviously
into its third week. Emerging history of the war indicates that India had
ventured across the IB sometime 20 November onwards. Musharraf ’s
 97

memoirs tell of his frustration at missing out the war when Yahya Khan
refrained from opening up the southern Punjab and Rajasthan front.
Another example of Pakistani rationality is in its Kargil intrusions.
Whereas this example might not readily be taken on board, it can be seen
as a limited incursion with limited aims as part of conflict expansion
along the LC. What India did along the Neelam valley and earlier in
taking Siachen, Pakistan attempted to replicate in Kargil. Pakistan
rationally kept to its limited aims even while being evicted by not upping
the ante and stepping down when it knew its game was up, even at the
cost of loss of face. Attributing expansive aims to Musharraf prevents
grasping the limitations. The relatively insignificant locale enabled
India to keep its counter limited and Pakistan to retrace its steps. The
bonus Pakistan got, and perhaps the gains it was really seeking, was
in enabling an extension of the proxy war in Kashmir by another half
decade. The spurt was such that India was unable to regain the status
quo ante without upping the military ante in Operation Parakram.
The resulting pressures led up to the tacit ceasefire and the Vajpayee-
Musharraf deal that brought about a hiatus in Kashmir in 2004.
This recounting is necessary to establish Pakistan’s army is rational.
It is seized of the power asymmetry with India and imbued with realist
rationality, seeks to address it. A counter-factual helps prove the point.
A liberal perspective might have helped it to bandwagon. We know that
the confidence building route via civil society and commercial interest
convergence in thinking on peace has had its limitations. The holdup has
been from the side of the security establishment, seized as it is with the
power differential. This worries them that in case of a peace embrace,
it would still throttle Pakistan in terms of identity and imbalance in
power, economic and cultural.
The cultural argument that Pakistan is out to wreck ‘Hindu’ India is
to resort to mirror imaging. It is an argument trotted out in majoritarian
nationalist circuits to serve the prescription that this is what India ought
to be doing to Pakistan in first place. The institutionalist argument that
Pakistan army needs an Indian bogey to keep its bread buttered is an
after-the-fact argument. It focuses on the institutional bonus for the
Pakistan army, rather than on what prompted Pakistan’s view of India
as a bogey in first place.
This appears charitable to Pakistan by letting it off the hook as the
sole South Asian villain. However, it is a sobering view of India in that
it establishes that India’s growing power and India’s adeptness in its use
will prompt certain actions by actors subscribing to realism. Pakistan’s
sandwich of India’s conventional prowess with action at the other two
levels – subconventional and nuclear – is better explained thus. This
explains proxy war. Understanding this is necessary to examining its
impact on the Indian army.
Impact of interminable operations
Seeing Pakistan’s hand in Kashmir is easy. Assuming that it is to wrest
Kashmir is to overstate Pakistani aims. As seen, Pakistan fears India’s
power. It deems it necessary to tie this down. It got an opening it exploited
fully in Punjab when India was moving towards mechanization. It gained
another opening in Kashmir even as India was able to best the situation
in Punjab. The Kashmir pot has been kept boiling so as to keep India’s
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shoulder to the wheel. This has in some estimates kept up to a quarter

to a third of India’s army tied down in Kashmir. This includes the 740
km length of the Line of Control, in Siachen and in counter insurgency
operations – protective, defensive and offensive. Since the expectation is
that insurgency will spike in case of conventional operations, India raised
the RR so as to recreate its offensive capacity. The Kargil War experience
suggests that loosening the grip in conventional conflict might rebound
over the long term. The disturbances this summer indicate that the RR
might not be readily available for relieving the infantry from defensive
tasks on the LC. It would have its hands full in its primary task. The
Mountain Strike Corps has reportedly been aborted temporarily as
being too manpower heavy. Thus, India might not have the offensive
capability necessary to expand the scope of offensive operations in the
mountain sector.
This leaves the plains and deserts for a conventional punch, deemed
necessary for refurbishing conventional deterrence to begin with. In the
deserts, Pakistan has taken care to brandish its tactical nuclear weapons
that can only be used where there is little collateral damage. This leaves
the developed terrain for offensive operations. Analysts have pointed
out that this is the place to apply military power since it neutralizes
Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons. However, this suggestion was first
made when the power of irregular – jihad inspired - forces to stump
conventional forces in urban terrain was not quite so evident. In wake
of Iraq and from the experience in Syria, it is clear that venturing into
urban space would be to step into a meat grinder. Even if this is so for
both sides, it is not a sane strategic choice to make at the outset when
one has the initiative.
This brings one to the salient point in this essay: Pakistan appears to
have succeeded beyond its expectations. It has tied down surplus Indian
military power. This is what it wished to do but it has manipulated India
into believing in a narrative that enables keeping India tied down. Indian
army sees its indispensability to conflict management in Kashmir. This
prompted the army to stay on though the insurgency indices did not
warrant this through the mid to late 2000s. The summer disturbances
through three consecutive years did not alert the army to the possibility
that its continuing presence might be part of the problem. Instead, the
resumption of disturbances this year have only served to impress the
army that it needs to stay on, and obfuscate the possibility that doing so
sets up a self-reinforcing loop – its staying on provides the rationale for
it to stay. It’s staying on keeps the AFSPA intact and popular disaffection
alive.
The army would be loath to accept this view widely held in liberal
circles. It can be expected to the more responsive however if spelt out
in the realist lens. As seen, the army’s conventional deterrent is under
siege. Equipment injections are one manner of resuscitation. But there
are other – perhaps less clear – areas that need equal attention. Most of
these fall in the organisationnal realm. Take for instance the current
day fracas between the arms and between the arms and services.
The infantry and artillery officer corps have largely cornered the top
echelons through the idea of pro-rata representation being extended
into the general cadre. Their numbers elbow out other officer cadres
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from upper echelons. This has to some analysts contributed to a

mandalisation of the army, with the elevation of mediocrity resulting
in a deficit in operational art. The rise of the infantry and artillery in
the ranks makes the brass from these corps secure what got them there
in first place. Thus, counter insurgency and LC fire assaults are set to
enter into the third decade. The second underside is that the army as a
sop to the mechanized lobby has not been able to reconfigure the strike
corps that are veritable steel dinosaurs in the nuclear age. Thus, we see
the baleful effects of the counter insurgency era taking its toll.
Equally less remarked on – and in retrospect this might be deliberately
so – is the continuous expansion of the army. The army realizing that
its forte is manpower is ready with manpower accretions as solution to
each operational challenge, be it RR in face of insurgency in Kashmir
or a mountain strike corps to face up to the Chinese. There is the twofront
rationale thrown in for good measure. This is at the cost of quality
at intake which an assembly line system of training cannot remedy. The
officer corps is an example. The army intake of officers is of the order
of over a thousand per year, and a third more than the civil services.
While the officers are to regulate a million strong and disciplined army,
the civil services help run a billion-strong country that is dysfunctional
in some respects. This implies that there is no premium being placed
on leadership or strategic sense since manpower is solution to every
challenge.
This has a drawback best viewed through military sociology. The
composition of the army gets impacted in case of increase since this
increase can only be serviced by regions that have recruitable manpower
and without employment opportunities in other sectors. The figures
routinely put out by the academies in relation to the recruitment base of
graduates on their commissioning suggest a steady narrowing to a certain
north Indian belt. In a voluntary army, this is taken as unremarkable,
but needs to be seen in relation to their subsequent employment in
counter insurgency in Indian regions with little resemblance to where
they come from. There are also political tides in the north Indian belt
that cannot but permeate the consciousness of the citizens from such
areas and impact their attitudes. This implies there is a potential political
bias in officers from such areas which might colour their professional
showing.
Finally, the military leadership that has risen on the counter
insurgency tide of the nineties has to reckon with the ethical shortfalls
some of its members took while in such operations. It is widely held
that the agitating generation of today in Kashmir was witness to much
gratuitous violence, some of which spurred leaders under whose watch
this took place up the military hierarchy. Their sphere of impact has
risen with their rise in rank. How this has affected the overall ethos of
the army is a moot question. Since these issues are seldom discussed,
this is liable to be mistaken as impressionistic. The point is that just
as while viewing the Pakistani army’s institutional wellsprings for its
military actions, the focus on similar thrusts from within the Indian
army must not elide analyses.
Countering insurgency politically?
An institutional argument for exiting counter insurgency commitment
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is not the best line to take. Because counter insurgency is having a

negative effect on the army is not the quite the reason to advocate otherthan-
military-operations counter to insurgency. The realist argument
is perhaps the more saleable one. The institutional argument is not one
the military can easily admit to and the realist argument is one that
it can acknowledge and sell to the political class better. The argument
made here is that the army has fallen into a trap set by Pakistan and it
has done so with open eyes. This is a criticism seldom heard, especially
in a day and age when speaking bluntly is mistaken for sedition. But
then retaining institutional good health and regaining an uncluttered
realistic picture implies stating and hearing some home truths.
While the army has tried to bring home to the political class that it
needs to get its act together and address national problems politically,
this has been somewhat low key. It leaves the political class the impression
that the lid can continue on the army with army deployment. The
bureaucratic class that interposes can be expected to reinforce this
impression in the political class since it keeps the army from being
professionally state-of-the-art and embroiled in internal squabbles. The
resulting national security scene in one in which the army’s actions
suggest it cannot rely on the diplomats to keep the external sphere
tranquil and on home ministry bureaucrats to keep the internal sphere
so. It sees itself as the answer, failing to see that the host populace in
counter insurgency areas might think otherwise.
Realistic appraising of its presence as part of the problem bothering
the people can help it reappraise solutions. For instance, the graduated
removal of AFSPA from either of the counter insurgency prone regions
can do more for easing the insurgency than the respective army-based
paramilitary in the two regions can do. In its environment scan the army
needs factoring in its presence and its affects not only on the insurgency
but vice versa too, of the counter insurgency on itself.
The army’s disengagement should not imply a corresponding
militarization of the central armed police forces or the provincial police
service. The lesson from counter insurgency in Central India is that it
is better to have the army undertake such operations than to have army
clones incompetently led by men in khakhi to undertake the same.
Asking for political solutions politically arrived at is a tall order. The
Naga talks for instance are closing on to their third decade. A government
that promised to deliver on these has lost its way midway into its tenure.
Therefore, it might be a tad too pat to advocate a politically driven
counter insurgency strategy. It is a liberal delusion. Since this finding
leaves the army with the baby, it is best that army look deeper and for
longer into the mirror held out for it here.
It is clear from the nomination of the chief designate that the
requirement of having operational experience is being taken too far.
Operational experience is largely in the context of counter insurgency,
the last war – Kargil War – having seen about a division worth of troops
in actual combat. Counter insurgency experience is no guarantee of
strategic insight necessary at higher military leadership levels. Without
prejudice to the capabilities of the candidates involved, the selection was
apparently on the basis of counter insurgency experience. This proves
the point being made here that such deployment is now part of the
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service DNA. It is no longer taken as a secondary role, albeit one ably

discharged. It has now a defining function for the army. As pointed out
here this is not entirely welcome. There needs to be a break out from
the counter insurgency cul de sac. The realist perspective needs to be
adopted afresh to view the insurgency as a Pakistani ploy to tie down
the army. The current doctrinal answer that this then entails continuing
army deployment has to be debunked in first place. The comfort levels
with this argument are such that even where Pakistani hand does not
exist or exists only potentially and marginally, such as in the north
east, the army continues its deployment. This indicates that there are
institutional blinkers on, which can only be jettisoned once a realist lens
is put back on to see such deployment in all its negative finery.

________________________

So Who Are the ‘Men in Shadows’ Guiding Top Army

Appointments?
28 January 2017
https://thewire.in/103104/army-selection-bipin-rawat/

Muttering ‘All’s well that ends well’ with a sigh is all that is left for
military watchers in the wake of the supersession episode. In the
traditional media conference on the eve of Army Day, army chief
General Bipin Rawat let on that he and the man he had pipped to the
post, Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi, who was his former boss in
Kolkata when he served as corps commander in Dimapur, had assured
each other of mutual support. This brings out the quality of character of
the men involved and retrieves somewhat the image of professionalism
of the higher ranks in the Indian army.
Unfortunately, this is not uniformly the case. Prior dust-ups over
the army chief post have dented the idea of professionalism, leaving
behind a poor image of the contenders for the job. The starring role
goes to General V.K. Singh and his fracas with General Bikram Singh
and General Dalbir Singh Suhag.
Both cases witnessed unsavoury manoeuvres. In Bikram’s instance,
the case of a death in cross firing during an encounter in which he was
wounded as a brigadier in the Valley was made to resurface by a newly
minted NGO, which disappeared from the public eye as quickly as it had
appeared. V.K.’s brainchild, the Technical Services Division – reportedly
an intelligence outfit that has since been disbanded – was implicated in
this. To spike Suhag’s chances, the mishandling of an intelligence outfit
under his command when he was the commanding general in Dimapur
was trotted out.
A conspiracy?
In a new year’s eve address to officers at his headquarters in Fort
William, Kolkata, Bakshi, who lost out in the recent race for army
chief, is reported to have said that a ‘deep rooted conspiracy’ by ‘men in
shadows’ accounted for his missing out on the promotion – an apparent
reference to ‘intelligence games’ (or political ones) in the process of
selection.
Bakshi reportedly said that he had expended Rs 85 crore of his special
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financial powers over the past 18 months as head of Eastern Command,

in comparison to his two predecessors – both of whom went on to
become army chief – who had spent a mere Rs 3-4 crore each. Among
other things, this difference suggests two things: the self-confidence of
Bakshi, befitting a prospective army chief, and, conversely, the play-safe
attitude of his two predecessors.
Bakshi indicated that rumours were spread by certain parties over
the accountability of such unusual – if legitimate – spending. With the
rumours reaching the defence ministry, the spending was inquired into
by the defence accounts and no wrongdoing emerged. To his mind,
these rumours nevertheless influenced the government in overlooking
his strong case, based not only on the traditional principle of seniority
but also his sterling professional record. (Retrospectively, it may
unfortunately be surmised that his two predecessors were wiser in
adopting a ‘do nothing’ posture when at the penultimate step in the
ladder to the top.)
For his part, defence minister Manohar Parrikar has clarified that
the selection process was pristine. As a process, there is little to quibble
over. He is also right in saying that if seniority was the only criterion
then a computer could well substitute for the cabinet process. But, the
question is that if the expenses withstood scrutiny, to what extent was
the rumour - mongering effective?
Going forward
Seemingly explaining his decision to stay on rather than hang up his
spurs, as is the precedent in cases of supersession at his level, Bakshi has
indicated that he is staying to clear his name by – or so the media alleges
– exposing those behind the conspiracy, including those in the media
and in the army veteran community.
While the exposure of such a nexus is necessary for the continued
good health of the army, it should not be the preserve of Bakshi, the
aggrieved party. He may scar himself in the process, going down in
history as a sore loser. Instead, it is a cross the supposed – albeit unaware
– beneficiary, Rawat, must bear.
Rawat’s move to become the 26th chief of the Indian army has been
rather well choreographed. Media speculation has it that he caught
national security advisor Ajit Doval’s eye when Doval had dropped out
of the prime ministerial visit to Bangladesh in order to supervise the
‘surgical strike’ along the Myanmar border against Naga militants who
had killed 18 soldiers in an ambush in Manipur in June 2015.
From Dimapur, Rawat moved to Mumbai as a stepping stone before
taking over as southern army commander in Pune. This enabling of
an operational command was presumably at the expense of Lieutenant
General P.M. Hariz, who was then presiding over the training command
in Shimla. Hariz replaced Rawat when Rawat was elevated as vice chief in
the run up to his trotting across South Block to the army chief ’s room.
Hariz could well have taken over the southern command prior to
Rawat, with Rawat having to cool his heels in Shimla awaiting his turn.
While there is no case for training command to be part of the musical
chairs, unfortunately this is the reality, with 19 changeovers in the
quarter century since its founding. Hariz’s staying put in Shimla was
not as much a move to rule him out of the race as it was one to position
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Rawat better.
Since this happened way back at the beginning of last year, the
writing has been on the wall since then. When these moves were afoot,
conspirators – if Bakshi is to be believed – were at work pulling the rug
from under him.
Bakshi appears to point the finger at a nexus between the ‘men
in shadows’ and sections of the media and veterans. With military
intelligence operatives having figured in the previous two schemes to
influence the nominations of the army chief, the ‘men in shadows’ may
well be members of the intelligence community. It bears pause as to the
link between the three sections – intelligence, media and veterans.
Irrespective of the cabinet process Parrikar refers to, given Doval’s
charge in the national security sphere, it can be inferred that the
intelligence czar, Doval, took the call.
A comprehensive debunking of the arguments made to back the
government’s decision to supersede two able officers – ranging from
operational experience to adeptness at surgical strikes and being savvy
on the Line of Control – says much about the cabinet process touted by
Parrikar.
The rumour campaign that Parrikar took cognisance of – enough
to have an inquiry ordered – only reinforces his by now well-earned
reputation of lacking good judgment. The campaign itself was an
insurance to help the government sell its narrative on the unprecedented
supersession of two generals. By that yardstick, it is simply not the
work of over-enthusiastic subordinates but is better attributed to the
congenital habits of men in shadows.
What about the sections of the media and veterans alleged to have
played a role? The media’s role is not very clear and, in light of the
manner sections of it purvey the cultural nationalist trope, should not
in any case detain us overly. However, the spotlight should not escape
army veterans with links to Doval, especially those belonging to his
stable at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF).
On Christmas Day, two retired VIF - affiliated generals shared the
dais with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh luminaries in Pune. They
potentially serve as a means of cultural transmission between Hindutva
formations and the military. It is not improbable that, in turn, they
informally input national security minders on military matters, not
excluding, as it turns out, on vital military appointments.
The intelligence community is long known to have been compromised
by such linkages. Is it now the military’s turn? The first observation
of Army Veterans’ Day, preceding the Army Day this year, suggests yet
another avenue has been forged for present-day politics to penetrate
into the military. That V.K. is a government minister today is a warning
of sorts on the veteran-political linkage.
As the dust settles, Bakshi would be well advised to serve the rest of
his tenure with dignity, placing the onus on Rawat to clean up the stables.
Rawat has gone on record to indicate that action will be taken should
Bakshi voice his grievance formally. While procedurally sustainable,
Rawat should know that more needs to be done.
Rawat needs to surprise his anonymous benefactors and disabuse
them of any notion that the army is now in their corner. Comparatively,
 104

clamping down on whistle blowers on the army’s social practices is rather

tame. Rawat should broadcast through precept and action that the army
is off limits to ideological penetration. In this, tackling former comrades
would be the easy part. What will test his moral mettle over his threeyear
tenure is getting his current political masters to acknowledge this.

________________________

COAS selection and the doctrine of ‘relative ease of

working’ with
25 December 2016
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=61802

In wake of the selection of the next army chief, the notion that an
abundance of operational experience is an indicator of strategic good
sense has been debunked competently elsewhere. Some have argued
that seniority is also not the best guarantee of enabling the best hand at
the military helm. One argument that has been bandied about in favour
of the double supersession, that of ‘relative ease of working’ with.
This has surfaced in two prominent publications, no doubt discreetly
put out by the information warfare machinery at the ruling party’s
command, both governmental and through its army of trolls. The
underlying assumption is quite akin to selling demonetization, which
in Amit Shah’s words needs being repeated a hundred times to become
the logical thing to do to tackle black money, corruption, terrorism and
to make India a cashless economy. Before it becomes a doctrine that will
inform subsequent selections, it needs debunking.
A retired major general writes in The Wire:
A decision is more likely to be based on the ‘relative ease of
working’ rather than just seniority. Relative ease implies certain
qualities which are essential at that level, especially when, for
example, the government is following a pro-active policy against
India’s immediate neighbours … In simple terms, it is mutual
understanding and commonality on thought and operational
issues.
Josy Joseph writing for the once-credible The Hindu, lets on that,
‘Those close to the present government also argue that a factor taken
into consideration was the ease of doing business with the new chief.’
He suggests that sources in-the-know have given out why the Modi
government has gone in for its latest Tughlakian maneuver. This might
just be the real reason why the army chief designate made it past two
equally competent generals.
A long-time military and intelligence watcher Saikat Dutta, writing
for the scroll.in, informs that the army chief designate caught the eye
of the national security adviser at a previous interaction between the
two during the planning and conduct of the supposedly trans-border
operation in Myanmar against Naga rebels who had ambushed an
army convoy. As the former army man, the information minister, had
indicated then, it was the precursor to the more touted ‘surgical strikes’
of late.
 105

Dutta writes: ‘Discussions at Army headquarters during the

planning of this operation saw a close interaction between Rawat and
Doval. Though the two men are years apart in age, the fact that both are
Garhwalis helped them cement a working relationship.’ In hindsight, it
can be said that this led up to Bipin Rawat’s move to South Block as Vice
Chief and his subsequent elevation over the heads of his former boss at
Eastern Command and his successor at Southern Command.
It appears that this is the most likely reason for the supersession and
therefore calls out for like scrutiny by commentators as attended the
other plausible reason touted, namely, operational experience.
At the outset it bears mention that it was not Bipin Rawat who
invited the national security adviser over to his operational area. Mr.
Doval accompanied the Army Chief who landed up there to oversee
a tactical level operation that perhaps directly involved at best two
companies that could have well be overseen by a brigadier. More
accurately put, it would be vice versa, with the army chief accompanying
the super sleuth. Observers, noticing his omni-presence, had pointed
to such hyper-activity not translating into strategic acumen. At the
operational briefing, and perhaps when the operations were underway,
there is no reason for Bipin Rawat to exercise self-censorship when
sharing his views with Mr. Doval. That Mr. Doval found these palatable
is now apparent.
The point that ‘sources’ in government and/or from the cultural
nationalist front have put out is that the government required a chief
who was amenable to its strategic shift, from strategic restraint to
strategic proactivism. This they have now managed to get. What are the
implications?
There is potential for politicization. An aspiring general can read the
tea leaves. He can align his world view with that of the government. He
can project himself as being ‘easy’ to work with. This obviously is not
the case with Bipin Rawat, but those who follow would be keyed into
this new-fangled principle of selection of apex military brass.
The famous case of BM Kaul, an officer of the service corps, being
placed in charge to implement Nehru’s forward policy is rather well
known. The officer who was against this policy, General Thorat, was
shunted out. The supersession of General Sinha has a similar story
attending it. He was reluctant to get the army involved cleaning up the
Sikh unrest. His successor at Western Command, Sundarji, and the
general who pipped him at the post, General Vaidya, were more willing
to align with the government. A different angle to aligning with the
government’s views or otherwise is from the episode in April 1971
when the army was asked to go into East Pakistan. General Manekshaw
rightly demurred and gained control over the timing of the invasion.
The results of the three examples are rather well known.
There is also one on potential possibilities. Take for instance the
briefing by the then military operations and air operations heads to the
BJP national executive at its party headquarters during the Kargil War.
They were possibly corralled into it by the defence minister, a party ally
of the BJP. Imagine a scenario in which General Vij, the then DGMO,
declining the duty in light of its political repercussions. He would
unlikely have made it to chief in his turn. On the other hand, his turning
 106

up for the briefing makes him out as pliable. That he succeeded Doval
as head of the think tank, the Vivekananda International Foundation,
suggests a like mindedness that well preceded his retirement.
The doctrine of ‘ease of doing business with’ therefore fraught. In
the current case, the government wishes to have at the helm someone
it believes shares its strategic orientation. This has the underside of
giving rise to group think. The expectation of the army is that it would
willingly say ‘Yes Sir’ on receiving its marching orders; that the army will
be less process driven in terms of providing its input and feedback on
the directions it receives. The ‘ease of doing business with’ formulation
suggests a like-mindedness that is detrimental to national security
decision making in that it deprives the government of unpalatable
alternatives and diversity in options.
This is the practical manifestation of what in theory passes for
subjective civilian control in which the government appoints a military
brass that shares its views, rather than for professionalism that will
enable it to receive a corporate view from the military that might be
at variance with its own view or clash with the other inputs it receives
such as from the foreign policy bureaucracy or intelligence agencies.
Subjective civilian control was to the originator of the concept of military
professionalism, Samuel Huntington, abusive of professionalism. It
compromises the advisory role an apex military leader is to perform.
An example of the ‘ease of doing business with’, albeit one somewhat
stretched, is from the last time round India wished to show its muscles.
In the mid-eighties, Rajiv Gandhi and his whiz kids, that included
Arjun Singh, were inclined to take India to a regional power status. This
included moving from a brown water to blue water navy, upgrading its
air force with the latest planes such as Jaguars, and allowing the army
the run of the deserts to instill fear into Zia’s Pakistan. They had a
visionary general in command who likewise liked painting on a wider
canvas. By Rajiv Gandhi’s own admission, Exercise Brass tacks that
Sundarji organized, took Indian an untimely a whisker away from war.
Sundarji, tamed by the experience, was thereafter willing to fall in line
with India’s viceroy in Colombo, JN Dixit, and the R & AW line that the
Tamil Tigers were ‘our boys’.
The upshot is that there is no place for individual heroes in the
national security pantheon. Neither Mr. Doval’s by now rather wellknown
intelligence exploits nor General Rawat’s operational experience
can serve to substitute for robust institutional strength. This can
only be obtained from institutions in national security performing as
constitutionally and traditionally mandated. It cannot be through a
measure of placing seemingly like-minded individuals at the helm.
In fact, the demonetization debacle suggests India direly needs leaders
who can stand their ground. In the military sphere this is even more
so since they have nuclear weapons and strike corps in their custody
that the Modi-Doval duo may like to employ to embellish their 56 inch
image, not necessarily the best and right use of these national assets.
The deep selection of heads was done earlier with the foreign service
bureaucracy and now with the army. In both cases, the credibility
of the individuals in question is not in question. Indeed, that India’s
foreign policy is in doldrums owes perhaps to a pushback of the foreign
 107

policy bureaucracy led by redoubtable S. Jaishankar, to dictation from

the national security bureaucracy. Bipin Rawat is by that yardstick
equally credible as a military leader. His test is how he does not allow
his supposed buy-in to a ‘nationalist’ world view – or so spin doctors
are rationalizing his elevation - get in way of his professionally arrived
at input in and follow through with decisions involving Indian use of
force.
________________________

Saluting Bipin Rawat but with a caveat

20 December 2016
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=61560

The recent announcement at long last of the name of the new army chief
provides merely an entry point for discussing the fallacy of operational
experience as a pointer to either tactical sense or strategic judgment.
The army chief designate has a formidable military reputation and
matching record. There is no begrudging his elevation to the august
appointment. There may however be issues over the supersession of two
equally competent generals.
That the BJP government slept over making the appointment for
almost a month and half is suggestive of the politics that inevitably
attend the discussions. The BJP would like to be sure it has a candidate
that would either be complicit or silent, the latter being preferred since
it would be in keeping with the apolitical ethos of the army. The former
attitude in a chief would be rather obvious and would compromise
him and the service, whereas the latter can be rationalized as a sign of
professionalism.
Silence of course does not imply pliable, but an attitude that is wary
of politicization of the service and therefore one that keeps the military
to the straight and narrow. The ruling party, that is the political face of a
larger national reorientation project, needs to be sure that a future chief
would be of this kind. By that yardstick, all three candidates would have
met the bill. Neither has Bipin Rawat done or said anything that endears
him to the ruling party, nor have the other two – Praveen Bakshi and
Hariz - disqualified themselves by doing or saying anything that the
ruling dispensation could take amiss.
Therefore it bears speculation as to why the supersession. It is
easy to neglect Hariz’s claims to the post since he was the second in
line of seniority. There was nothing in him that could make him pip
Bakshi at the post. So the face-off is between Bakshi and Rawat. The
possibility that Bakshi’s claims to a top job have not been altogether
neglected is evident from rumours that he might make it to being
India’s first permanent chairman chiefs of staff committee.
Currently, it is an appointment that goes to the senior-most serving
chief, a thoroughly inadequate arrangement given the increased need
for a single-point military adviser to the government, jointness and to
oversee the nuclear deterrent. Should Bakshi get the slot it would only
be befitting and the twin appointments would amount to a successful
‘surgical strike’ by the government.
In the fitness of things, if the rumours are proved right, the
 108

surgical strike would have been better executed in case news of the
two appointments had been released together. This indicates current
potential for yet another hit-wicket for the government in case it forces
Bakshi to turn in his papers, quite like Lt Gen SK Sinha did three
decades back. It appears yet another self-goal by this government is in
the offing.
Be that as it may, one aspect needs interrogation. If Bakshi was
ruled out for the army top job if only for being lined up for an equally
significant one soon as India’s chief of defence staff equivalent, then
Hariz resurfaces as a candidate. Over looking his claim for the top job
requires explanation. The easy explanation is to see it in his name. As the
first muslim in quarter century to make it to army commander level, he
has already accomplished much. Elevating him, alongside Bakshi, would
have been least controversial. Thus, the possibility of the government
being unable to swallow the fact of the religion he was born into cannot
be easily wished away, in light of the prime minister’s well known ad
often ventilated levels of regard for India’s largest minority. The ruling
party did not even think it fit to have a muslim name, if only for its
propaganda value for it to debunk allegations that it views muslims
somewhat warily. The BJP election victory had one emphatic lesson for
it and democratic India: that it can afford to ignore the minority owing
to its successful consolidation of the majority through majoritarian and
cultural nationalist gimmicks. That said, it would be tad too easy to
ascribe Hariz being overlooked to his religion, though the case itself
cannot in light of Hariz’s supersession ever be ruled out.
Media speculation has it that Rawat had operational experience
behind him to a degree that the other two did not. This owed in large
part to Rawat being an infanteer and the other two from the mechanized
forces, Bakshi being a cavalier and Hariz a mechnised infantryman. The
start of their military journeys naturally made them gravitate to areas
of deployment and expertise of their parent arm. Eventually, as they
neared the last goal post, the goal posts were shifted for the two from
the mechanized forces. This is not a new issue in the army. It has been
controversial for at least a decade and a half now. This time round the
situation has been shown up too glaringly on the radar to sweep under
the carpet as the army has continued to do over the duration.
It is no secret by now that the infantry and artillery have under
successive chiefs from these two arms appropriated the upper ranks of
the army for those belonging to these arms. This has been under the
pro-rata system, called by its critics as mandalisation of the army. The
two arms having a large proportion of the army have a correspondingly
large cadre of officers. They have so arranged the promotion system that
the proportion of higher rank officers is proportional to the numbers
signing into the arm at entry. This makes for an uneven playfield for
the other arms such as the mechanized forces. It also has impacted the
services, reducing their vacancies in higher ranks disproportionately.
This has led to considerable heartburn in other arms and services and
several court cases. The overlooking of the claim of at least one form
the mechanized lobby for the highest rank is just one more nail being
driven in. In this case, an unwary government could well be carrying
the can for the army’s inappropriate career progression policies.
 109

The assumption is that the infantry and artillery officers are exposed
to an operational environment on account of their postings in hardship
and operational locations either on the line of control, high altitude or
counter insurgency situations. It is not explained how this experience
conditions them better into being better higher commanders. If hardship
is a criterion, then they should certainly be compensated perhaps by
higher allowances.
But to reserve higher slots for them rules out more credible candidates
from arms that cannot serve in such environments on account of their
expertise being restricted to mechanized warfare that can only be
undertaken in the deserts and plains. They cannot be penalized for
their success in deterring conventional war to the extent that Pakistan
is restricted to keeping the pot boiling in Kashmir. They should not
be made to pay for their success which inadvertently only serves the
infantry and gunner lobby. The infantry and artillery cannot be allowed
to ticket punch their way through India’s troubled lands under cover
of AFSPA. It would amount to having these arms, and the army, gain a
stake in the troubled conditions, with the ‘disturbed areas’ serving as
training grounds for officers to gain operational experience.
This scrutiny would be entirely incomplete without drawing blood.
It needs being said out and loud that far too many officers have gained
their next rank using ‘operational’ experience as their card. Not a
few of them can reasonably be charged with war crimes for egregious
rounds of violence that have been visited on the people in their areas of
operational responsibility.
The troubled period of the nineties in Kashmir is a case to point.
There was a bean count syndrome for a proportion of the time. There
was not only inadequate operational level attention but such officers
might have even detected a permissive atmosphere to further careers
on the back of broken lives. This has not gone away yet. The killing of
Burhan Wani’s brother in unknown circumstances for his reportedly
being an over ground worker is a case to point. Bluntly put, multiple
tenures in counter insurgency mean nothing. How officers conduct
themselves ethically and professionally while in it is everything.
And even then, great achievement at tactical level in counter
insurgency – any command division and below is at that level – is no
guarantee of strategic good sense, required in military brass at the apex
level. The case of the current chief is a live example. His exemplary
tenure as company commander in Operation Pavan did little to prepare
him as chief. Pin a medal on their chest for such showing, but do not
allow such showing to get them into war rooms where we rue their over
promotion. Else the likes of the national security adviser and his ilk will
run rings round the service, such as through letting loose the NIA on
military bases subject to terror attack.
The broader observation has nothing to do with Bipin Rawat. He
has gained what he rightly deserved in the right way. It is about the
media speculation on why he made it past two of his compatriots.
Even if he was the more illustrious - and this can easily be proven - do
his advantages justify supersession? Is the army over-relying on false
indicators of strategic good sense? To take up his place in history, Bipin
Rawat needs to roll back the policies that militate against competence
 110

and privilege mediocrity in the general cadre.

________________________

The army officer corps: Missing Muslims

Milligazette, 1-15 October 2016
3 October 2016
http://indianmuslimobserver.com/2016/10/23/the-armyofficer-
corps-missing-muslims/

The Army’s response to the query of the Sachar committee, investigating

the socio-economic status of India’s largest minority, on the numbers of
Muslims in its ranks, was intriguing. The army had responded that it
does not maintain such statistics. General JJ Singh, its Chief at the time,
writes in his autobiography, A Soldier’s General, that when queried by
the media on the army’s withholding of the information, unlike their
naval and air force counterparts, he said: ‘the system for entry into the
armed forces and for enrolment is based on merit and qualifications;
on the ability of an individual to perform the task assigned. We never
look at things like where you come from, the language you speak, or
the religion you believe in ... Therefore we consider it important that all
Indians get a fair chance of joining the armed forces.’1
This appeared questionable on two counts. One is that there are
ethnic reservations in the army, since its infantry – the largest arm -
still maintains a regimental structure. Secondly, the army certainly
knows the religious affiliation of its members since in war conditions it
needs to know whether to bury or cremate martyrs. Perhaps it has not
aggregated the data religion-wise as apparently there is no call to do so:
it being an all-volunteer army. However, even this is also hard to believe
since bureaucracies – and the Army Headquarters is reputed to be no
less awesome as any other – thrive on statistics.
Such caginess can only give rise to suspicion that it knows it has
something to hide. I had in a previous article on this issue in this
publication2 had brought out that the figure is so abysmal as to be

1. JJ Singh, A Soldier’s General, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2012.

2. Ali Ahmed, ‘The Army: Missing Muslim India’, Mainstream, Vol L No 27,
June 23, 2012, available at http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3529.
html, accessed 17 July 2016.

somewhat embarrassing if revealed officially in public. A figure dating

to mid-last decade had it that there were some 30000 army men, of which
most – presumably more than half were in about 25 infantry battalions
with Muslim representation, some of which were of the Jammu and
Kashmir Light Infantry (JAK LI). Thus, J&K with a merely five million
Muslims offered up a larger proportion of Muslims in the army as
compared to India’s other Muslim communities comprising some 34
times Kashmiri numbers. This contrasts starkly with the proportion of
Muslim population in the country which the 2011 census puts short of
14 per cent.
Of the officer corps, Muslims reportedly comprised 2-3 per cent.
 111

Since the army is not parting with the figures, some unilateral spade
work was required. My father, who was once Commandant of the
Indian Military Academy (IMA), receives a complimentary copy of the
twice-yearly IMA journal. The journal lists the names of the passing
out course Gentlemen Cadets. In my previous article, I arrived at a
figure of 2-3 per cent by counting Muslim names amongst the list of
GCs passing out of the IMA. I counted about 45 Muslim names from
lists of five passing out courses at the turn of the decade. Discounting
the foreign GCs being trained at IMA from friendly foreign countries,
about 40 Muslim GCs got commissioned in two-and-half years from
IMA. About 600 officers get commissioned from IMA every year. Since
officer commissions are also from the Officer Training Academy, while
the absolute figure would go up, it is unlikely that the relative presence
of Muslim officers increases by much. It can thus be said that about two
per cent of army officers are Muslim.
A recent perusal by me of the latest journal – IMA’s Spring Term
2016 edition, led to ascertaining that the figure has remained static
in the four years since. The figure from the current IMA journal is
that of the 469 GCs of the 137 Regular and 120 Technical Graduates
courses commissioned on 12 December 2015, 9 were Muslims, making
a percentage of 1.9 per cent. Evidently, half-decade on, nothing has
changed.
These figures by themselves do not spell discrimination. The figure
for Muslims completing graduation is about six per cent, below that of
Scheduled Castes advantaged by reservations. Consequently, they are
unable to compete for a position at the IMA and OTA, the eligibility
requirement of which is a bachelors’ degree. Muslim graduates, in
particular from South India, are finding avenues elsewhere such as in
the Gulf and therefore are not quite headed for Dehra-Dun, Chennai
and Gaya, the pre-commission training establishments. Finally, there
are no Muslim ‘martial races’, Indian ethnic groups that continue to
be privileged over others by the quota for the regiments bearing their
name. Muslim ethnic groups that were so privileged in the pre-Partition
era have ended up in Pakistan. So, Muslim numbers being down in
the army is easy to explain. But, the question is: should the numbers –
revealing as they are - be explained away?
When I joined the NDA in the early eighties, I was one of six Muslims
in my course of some 300 cadets. Little appears to have changed
since, though the socio-economic indices of Muslims have registered
a growth since and there is reportedly an appreciable and growing
Muslim proportion in the middle classes. Clearly, looking towards the
government may not be wise. The UPA-I heard out the army chief on the
Justice Sachar’s inquiry without comment. By no means could Sachar’s
team have turned in a recommendation of positive discrimination in
Muslim favour in the military. At best it would have put forward a
practical agenda on how to increase the numbers, without affecting the
principles of secularism, professionalism and apolitical held by the army.
The army certainly lost an opportunity to critically reflect on the larger
implication of the absence of Muslims in its ranks. By not admitting to
the numbers, the army denies itself an opportunity to take the measures
to burnish its credentials as an equal opportunity employer.
 112

The under representation of Muslims in the police and central police

forces was remarked on in aftermath of the Sachar Committee findings
and steps taken since have led to an increase in Muslims in these
organisations to six per cent. This increase does not owe to positive
discrimination - which is neither possible nor recommended – but to
other measures that can only be taken once a problem is acknowledged
to exist.
Simple measures can do the trick. One significant intake into the
officer corps is from Sainik Schools and military schools across the
country. In my five years at a reputed military school, I was one among
three other Muslims of about 225 cadets. I later was horrified to find
from a list of about 3000 cadets that had passed out of the school since
Independence till early this decade, only about 30 were Muslims. A
higher number of Muslim cadets in these schools will lead to a higher
number of Muslim candidates for the National Defence Academy
(NDA). Since these schools are under state governments, the states must
increase advertising of entrance exams in Muslim areas and upping the
numbers of examination centers in such areas.
Successful candidates are usually products of coaching centers. This
explains the higher numbers of army officers from Uttarkhand, UP and
Haryana, making up at a rough estimate over a third of army officers.
Setting up such coaching centers through community initiative in Muslim
concentrations - such as in Jamia Nagar, Azamgarh, Murshidabad,
Srinagar, Goalpara, Kottayam etc - can result in increasing candidate
numbers and their competence levels. Members of Parliament from
Muslim populated areas and Muslim MPs can take the lead on this.
Since Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), Jamia Hamdard and Jamia
Millia Islamia organise successful coaching for the administrative
services entrance exam, they could use the same model for upping the
armed forces’ Muslim intake too. With the current focus, the community
manages to put in 30 odd candidates into the central services yearly
with an intake of about 800; of which about 2-3 per cent make it to the
glamourous trio – IAS, IFA and IPS. This figure can be improved on by
increasing the tally in the armed forces UPSC merit lists since these are
taken out twice yearly.
Both levels of entry - one to the NDA and other services academies
and the second targeting the UPSC’s combined services exam for
graduate entry – can be targeted. The AMU initiative of starting
schools with a public school ethos in Muslim majority areas, can server
to send Muslim youth to NDA. Also, women candidates need to be
encouraged since Muslim girls are apparently doing better at schools
than boys. The likes of Sophia Qureshi, who commanded a training
component in a multi-country military exercise, and Waheedah Prizm,
the first Kashmiri naval officer, are inspiring, but cannot compensate
for concerted community action aimed at increasing women officer
candidate numbers. This might require a cultural change, but with
avenues in the armed forces opening up, the change can be reinforced
by such measures.
Measures ‘targeting them young’ will also serve to alleviating
quality. A further perusal of IMA journal reveals that, Muslims are
absent from achievers. Amongst the GC appointments of the passing
 113

out course, there was only one Muslim, and a relatively modest Cadet
Sergeant Major at that. None figured in the list of end-of-term prizes
and sporting achievements. It appears this lack of achievement carries
over into service, with not a single Muslim officer figuring in the IMA
faculty. There are only four Muslim instructors below officer rank, three
of whom are outside the military mainstream serving in the physical
training and equitation sections. Scarce numbers and limited capability
on entry can only translate into absence up the hierarchy in the future.
For the first time in a quarter century, a Muslim figures among the army
commanders, with Lt Gen PM Hariz taking over Southern Command
recently.
For the army, the gains from increasing Muslims in its ranks and that
of its officers would be in dispelling stereotypes of the minority amongst
its officers and prospective officers. Training alongside Muslims would
negate negative images they may carry over from society, which has been
increasingly exposed to Islam-sceptical narratives over the past two
decades. This could have useful operational spin-off in case of military
operations in areas of minority concentrations such as in Kashmir and
in conventional war within Pakistan. The JAK LI, which has a reasonable
proportion of Muslims from J&K, has acquitted itself well in counter
insurgency operations in J&K owing to its feeling of ethnic affinity and
the intelligence inflow that this enables, besides ‘winning hearts and
minds’.
That said, the onus for increasing Muslim officer intake is not that
of the army. However, the army can help with taking measures such
as targeting Muslim areas with its recruiting publicity and setting up
exam centers in such areas. To make such initiatives palatable, this
can be done in conjunction with similarly targeting other thinlyrepresented
ethnic communities, such as from the North East and
South India.
For the nation, the gains imply a better endowed minority and
it’s mainstreaming. The benefits for the community are in terms of
heightened socio-economic indices and increased national participation.
Quite clearly then, the onus of change is on the Muslim community – or
the several Muslim communities across India. They must offer up their
youth – both young men and women - for military service and enable
their facing the competition on entry.
________________________

Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha Ventures Further Than

He Should
9 September 2016
http://thewire.in/64961/air-chief-martial-arup-rahaventures-
further-than-he-should/

Speaking at an international conference organised by the Centre for

Air Power Studies in New Delhi early this month, Air Chief Marshal
Arup Raha said India was a ‘reluctant’ power in not being ‘pragmatic’ in
its use of military power, especially the air force.
For the air force chief to use a forum on energising aerospace power
 114

to present the IAF’s corporate view about the under utilisation of air
power is understandable. However, since he also carries the onus of
being India’s senior most military man as chairman of the chiefs of staff
committee (COSC), his words bear additional scrutiny.
Critical of the end state achieved in the 1947-48 Indo-Pak war that
in his view allowed Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to end up as ‘a thorn’ in
India’s side, he said the further use of force could have settled the issue
in India’s favour. While the historical accuracy of this view is debatable,
of consequence here is the air chief ’s view on conflict termination.
As COSC chair, he is the officer the government turns to for military
input on the end state. Though his position on India’s strategic approach
is a long-standing one – and perhaps the more popular – it needs probing.
While laypersons can be permitted this indulgence, professions need
to consider the consequences of encouraging India into an avoidable
strategic over-stretch. Instead, it is preferable that the military’s advice
be tinged with prudence and practicality – especially so on account of
the nuclear backdrop to conflict today.
The long-standing critique in the popular strategic discourse – voiced
by the air chief – has it that India has constantly pulled its punches,
encouraging adventurism in the adversary. The follow-on prescription
usually has it that India needs to be ‘doing more’ militarily and with
other coercive instruments of national power.
If the apex of the military brass is persuaded along these lines, the
resulting military counsel on conflict management and its termination
would tend towards being more assertive than warranted. This has
implications for escalation control in a nuclear setting. As scholarstrategist
Bernard Brodie opined early in the nuclear age, the principal
purpose of military force is no longer to win wars, but to deter them.
The military needs strategic sobriety to inform its input in higher
conflict decision-making. On this, Samuel Huntington, though
infamous later for his ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, was spot on in his
very first intellectual intervention in the 1950s. In his classic book,
The Soldier and the State, he outlined the advisory role of the military
brass.
Huntington wrote that the conservative-realist military ethic
urges ‘limitation of state action to the direct interests of the state, the
restriction on extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose
or adventurous policies.’ Since this coincided with developments in the
Cold War accelerating the nuclear age, his prescription is valid for South
Asia in the formative years of its own nuclear era.
The fashionable argument that India needs to ‘do more’ strategically
and militarily trespasses on this sage advice. In his talk, Raha weighedin
in favour of the 1971 war model of use of military force as against the
model of strategic and military restraint that featured in India’s 1962
and 1965 wars.
The significant aspect of the 1971 war model was in the mission creep
that resulted in India’s original war aims being jettisoned in favour of
delivering a body blow to Pakistan. The difference in the two previous
wars was in the political leadership favouring war limitation. Arguably,
fascination with the latter model could prove fatal for belligerents in a
future war.
 115

The injection of uncertainty into India-Pakistan relations by the

national security establishment makes war plausible. Ideological
predilections embedded in the Modi - Doval security doctrine could
result in contamination of conflict strategy. Under the circumstances,
an apolitical military cannot be seeing as buying into the party line.
Instead, it needs to maintain strict self-regulation over its advisory
function. The timing of the air chief ’s allusion to PoK leaves a worrying
impression that the apex military leadership is not sufficiently sensitive
to this need of the hour.
Further, conflict termination is based primarily on political
parameters. For instance, the end state in the first Kashmir war was
determined by Indian forces reaching the ethno-linguistic divide
between the Kashmiri and Punjabi dominant parts of J & K at which
ended Sheikh Abdullah’s influence. Such factors, being largely outside
the military purview, tend to be under-appreciated by it and are brought
into strategic deliberations by other wings of government.
Consequently, for the military to pronounce on issues outside its
remit implies an agenda. Is this an avoidable political foray in which the
military is genuflecting to its new politico-strategic minders? Even if the
motives are more prosaic – such as being soon-to-retire Raha’s gambit
for a post-retirement sinecure – his words are no less troubling.

________________________

Kashmir Killing: When Soldiers Commit a Crime,

Honesty is the Best Policy for the Army
22 August 2016

The Northern Command of the Indian army is its largest formation,

responsible as it is for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir on both the
Pakistan and China fronts, as well as for internal security. With more
than a third of the soldiers deployed under his command, the northern
army commander’s job is a consequential one. The current incumbent,
Lt General D.S. Hooda’s, latest intervention has been a public expression
of regret over the death of a lecturer in army custody, picked up during a
night operation by the troops. The general minced no words in accepting
that it was an ‘unauthorised’ operation and that the death by beating
was ‘intolerable’ and ‘unjustified’.
The operation in question was carried out by troops of the Rashtriya
Rifles (RR), reportedly accompanied by special operations group
personnel of the Jammu and Kashmir police. Apparently, there had
been a bout of stone throwing earlier in the day against the army. Angry
troops barged into homes by night and thrashed the residents, including
women, resulting in 18 people being hospitalised. The lecturer was
beaten and whisked away along with 30 others. Later, his body was
handed back to the family.
Hooda went on to admit, “The instructions are there to exercise
maximum restraint but these are difficult times. The security forces
are facing tough times and sometimes things get out of hand.” Clearly,
the situation is indeed getting ‘out of hand’ if normally stolid troops of
the Kumaon regiment – who are seconded to the 50 RR – are affected in
 116

such a manner as to storm into a village for a night of mayhem.

Even so, there can be no excuse for this descent to barbarity. The
army constantly reminds itself of its commitment, with one exhortation
going, ‘When the going gets tough, the tough get going.’ It is at junctures
like these when discipline is tested that the army is expected to pass the
test. Parade ground discipline is the easiest to display, for it is in peace
time.
However, it would not do to blame those at the bottom of the food
chain alone. Such actions by the Kumaoni soldiers on their RR tenure
is difficult to comprehend in light of the reputation of the troops for
discipline and solidity. Indeed, their sense of discipline is such that, in
this case, it appears that they may well have obeyed illegal orders. The
responsibility for this, then, must rest on the shoulders of their leaders.
The leadership of RR is largely drawn from the regiment, but there
is also an assortment of other officers who are on their field tenure.
The structural problem with the RR is that the officers and troops find
themselves together for a field tenure. Not only do they have to get to
know each other, but also have to do so under the challenge of counter
militancy operations. As a result, the premium on leadership goes up. In
this case, if the officers set the troops on a questionable operation, then
they must bear the consequences. If instead, the operation went awry –
with soldiers running amok – the officers are liable for not exercising
leadership.
The buck cannot stop at the unit level. The command environment
and command climate need probing too. The environment of command
is set at a formational level by one or two star levels of brass. This level
sets the bar in terms of ethical conduct – be it financial probity, social
mores or operational rectitude. In terms of counter insurgency, this
spells the difference between the prevailing doctrinal approach or
a bean-counting approach, where officers at lower level take cue and
either follow the leader, or their conscience.
In case of the Pulwama operation, the level to which the unit was
pushed by a higher headquarters to dampen the stone throwing ardour
in its area needs to be examined.
The command climate is set at the operational level. It is easy to spot
the command climate in place by the spoken reputation of the generals
at the apex. In the current case, the theatre commander has set very
high standards. Even so, operational level commanders can only make a
finite difference; especially in the face of a command culture that is wider
than their swathe of influence. The culture of command extends across
the army. This can be one of professional rectitude, moral courage or,
of cut-throatism. This might explain the dissonance between Hooda’s
desire for ethical conduct and the recurrence of avoidable incidents in
the Valley.
Hooda’s public commitment to legal action needs to be swiftly
followed up. There has been no closure for the case that occurred
early this summer in which a girl was molested inside a ladies toilet,
allegedly by an army man. Her forced testimony, exonerating the army,
was over zealously coerced out of her and recorded by the police. It was
unethically circulated by the army public information officer on social
media. Promised results of the inquiry have not been made public. Even
 117

though the bunker has since been removed from the location near the
public toilet, in case action is not taken against the errant soldier, the
army would have a child molester in its ranks.
By taking appropriate action, the army must measure up to its public
adulation and in so doing, it will set a model for the other uniformed
forces. A case in point is the tardy action of the CRPF at the headquarters
level in replacing pellet guns, while at the ground level, 500 injuries have
resulted from pellet guns being fired vindictively rather than being
aimed below the waist.
Hooda had set the bar high, having early in his tenure ensured
judicial sanction in the 2010 Machil encounter case, taking strict action
against trigger happy soldiers at a barricade in Budgam, where two
teenagers lost their lives. His kind of military leadership makes India
proud. The army must ensure a command culture that throws up such
leaders. Doing so implies endorsing Hooda’s standards. Sweeping dirt
under the carpet under the mistaken belief that morale would suffer or
its image would go down, is quite the opposite.
http://thewire.in/60693/general-hooda-shows-whyaccepting-
faults-desireable/

______________________
Nurturing Radical Professionalism
5 May 2016
http://www.claws.in/1567/nurturing-radicalprofessionalism-
ali-ahmed.html

With the conduct of the first Lt Gen Hanut Memorial Lecture, the
Center for Joint Warfare Studies has taken on annual yeoman’s task.
While the lecture topics will over coming years no doubt reflect the key
themes of professional interest of the times, they would hopefully also
serve to highlight the significance of radical professionalism, associated
with the likes of Hanut Singh.
India’s martial history is replete with instances reflecting and
personalities imbued with radical professionalism, ranging from epic
heroes to medieval soldier-saints. The two – episodes and personalities
- can hardly be separated. Indeed, only leaders and warriors with radical
professionalism can pull of feats of radical professionalism.
Rather than defining the term, illustrations serve the purpose
better. Episodes of display of radical professionalism are easy to spot:
Saragarhi; Rezangla; capture of Haji Pir; the first step on the Saltoro
ridgeline; the battle for Quaid post are some such. Others do not readily
spring to mind, but are of no less a category: Dewan Ranjit Rai’s stand at
Pattan; the occupation of Namka Chu; the miscued heliborne operation
in Jaffna; and the unshod assault with a prayer on the lip into the holy
precincts of Golden Temple.
Equally, figures embodying the phrase are easy to identify, more
so in retrospect. For instance, the figure immortalized by the words
‘dil maange more’, Capt Batra, was distinct from the more modest but
equally inspired and inspiring, Manoj Pandey. Charismatic leaders also
fit the bill: Menekshaw, Bhagat, Hanut are among those reaching higher
echelons. However, that is not a necessary condition for qualifying as a
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radical professional. While ‘NJ’ Nair’s Ashok Chakra and Kirti Chakra
attest to his radical professionalism, those who knew him recount that
they were aware of it even when he was not decorated.
Also, it does not require rendering conspicuous service to qualify.
For instance, anyone in the National Defence Academy in the early
eighties could spot the colossus Subedar Major Darbara Singh striding
across the parade ground as personifying the traits. Only apparently
prosaic, another example is of the redoubtable Gorkha soldier with
his Khukri single handedly fighting off bandits on a train. All have
acquaintances meriting inclusion in the category. All have been privy
to mess conversations in awe of such feats, such as professional stands
taken and personal sacrifices made.
This recounting is necessary to highlight that radical professionalism
remains ticking, testifying to its good health when challenges
arise. However, complacency on that account is unwarranted.
The bureaucratization of the service; the eclipse of amateurs; the
impersonalisation of processes and procedures; the substitution of
the man behind the machine with a dazzling array of acquisitions; the
assembly line system in place for ingestion and turning out of soldiers and
officers; the inexorable expansion; organization innovation suggestive
of dilution in rank and status; displacement of the leadership ethic by
management etc., all conspire to degrade radical professionalism.
In face of such onslaught, either at a minimum alertness is
required and at a maximum concerted action protective of radical
professionalism. Since alarmism is undesirable, this article merely
serves to alert. Being article length, its discussion is confined to the
officer cadre.
Moments in the life of the officer corps that did prompt introspection,
such as the more visible one in the shadow of defeat of 1962 and the
less obvious long interregnum after the end of 1971 War till the tests
of Operations Blue Star and Pawan. The 1962 defeat did energise the
army through the sixties, resulting in its good showing in the 19 65 War,
brought home to contemporary attention during the observation of its
fiftieth anniversary, and culminating in the 1971 victory. However,
relative peace thereafter was jolted by onset of irregular conflict in the
mid eighties. The jolt was best expressed in the famous Sundarji DO to
all officers.
However, there has been no cataclysm such as the Vietnam War was
for the US officer corps. That debacle inspired the junior who served
there, enabling a makeover of the US army in its turning out leaders
such as Colin Powell, Stormin’ Norman Schwarzkopf and later, David
Petraeus. The latter’s doctoral dissertation was on the effect of Vietnam
on the US military.
It is apparent that among other measures, in its recovery the US
military nurtured and preserved radical professionals. The commander
of the Hail Mary maneuver that truncated the Gulf War I to only 100
hours was an amputee from the Vietnam war, General Franks heading
VII Corps. Take Petraeus himself. When shot accidentally in a battle
inoculation, he arranged a premature discharge from the hospital for
himself by knocking off fifty push-ups.
Learning from others implies recognizing and valuing radical
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professionalism. This is not unknown to the army. This author’s research

into the battle histories surrounding the 1965 War at its anniversary
enabled insight into such traits and testimony of their in-service value.
Research turned up a citation, written largely by the Field Observation
Officer that accompanied the company in action that reads:
Major A (to remain unnamed here) was van guard company
commander. The enemy consisted of a coy plus of 7 BALUCH
with detachments of 5 HORSE…. When the van guard was
practically taken by surprise and came under heavy small arms
fire, mor and artillery fire, Major A appreciated the situation
and put in a lightening attack with his company … Major A led
the attack personally and with the (regimental) war cry ... over
ran the enemy defences. In the close dog fight ... he was himself
severely wounded in the left arm but continued the assault 600
yards deep till the objective was captured. Profusely bleeding
and growing with pain (sic), he led his coy and ‘reorganized’
beyond the objective. He refused to be evacuated till another coy
was sent up…Throughout this fighting battle he was up and in
the assault line encouraging and leading his coy…
The officer decorated for gallantry as company commander in the
war went on to three star rank in command in an operational area. His
ADC there recounts that once, the general officer under fire led his
QRT in a house clearing drill and suffered a head injury when lobbing a
grenade through a window. Berated by the then Chief for the potentially
dangerous action, the general officer replied that so long as he was the
senior on the ground, it would remain his privilege to be first to put his
life on line.
This remains the case. An officer who stood up for what is right while
at MS Branch went on to be army commander. Another officer who
reputedly did so too only to be packed off to Siachen, nevertheless today
continues on the ladder. When the army was held up momentarily by
LTTE in its assault on Jaffna, General Sundarji handpicked a few rough
and tough officers and sped them off southwards to do their thing.
An army commander known for moral courage reportedly warded off
pressures for attack at the onset of Op Parakram, citing preparedness.
The current day army chief, known for being no mean runner of 10k
even today, forewent staff course selection in order to be alongside his
Gorkhas in Sri Lanka.
Clearly, the army continues to be cognizant of the indispensability
of radical professionals in its ranks. The conclusion here is that it must
continue doing so irrespective of inevitable technology upgrades,
managerial compulsions and profusion of equipment.

___________________________________
Yoga as prelude to politicization of the military
http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/11/commentary/yoga-prelude-politicisation-military.html
EPW, 2016, Unedited version

This January, 250 army men of Western Command attended the Yoga Teacher's Training
Course organised by Ramdev's Patanjali Yogpeeth in Haridwar. They are the first lot of 1000
yoga trainers who are then to return to barracks and conduct yoga for troops. That the media
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finds this association between the army and Baba Ramdev’s outfit as news worthy suggests the
link needs further query.
The aim ostensibly is to de-stress the army in cantonments in Western Command’s peace
stations before they return for yet another tour of duty in some or other counter insurgency area
or high altitude picket.
Superficially, this is for the good in so far as physical and mental fitness goes. The army has
figured in the news earlier for the wrong reasons: soldier suicides, fratricide and affrays between
officers and men. Among the enabling conditions for such avoidable incidents is stress. Yoga is
meant to mitigate such stress.
Yoga caught on in the military long before the three chiefs along with a brigade of Delhi based
troops lined up behind the prime minister on the Raj Path for yoga last June. It has been in
practice for about a decade, with the army turning its attention to the psychological scars of
countering insurgency once the situation in Kashmir started stabilizing mid last decade. Art of
Living had also made an advent at about the same time for similar reasons.
The problem is not so much yoga as much as the army’s institutional association with Baba
Ramdev’s organization. The Baba is controversial with his business deals having come in
for investigative scrutiny. The premises in Haridwar where army men spent couple of weeks
hosted a convention for the RSS year before last. The Baba is a known cheerleader for Prime
Minister Mr. Modi.
Such proximity is not without its underside. Yoga is enwrapped in a cultural context. Cultural
transmission can be expected, such as of ritual, intonations and interpretation of Sanskritic
texts. Since the program requires residence on campus, dietary mores and ashram routine
would also be conduits.
A right wing associated organization is not about to pass up an opportunity for influencing the
army with its world view. Even if tacit, the exposure of 1000 troops this training year, and
perhaps more to follow in subsequent years, will enable a window of penetration of the right
wing perspective into the army.
This raises the question as to why this apprehension escaped the army’s exercise of due
diligence in going about its yoga training program.
I suggest that the impetus is from both directions. While it can be expected that right wing
organizations are interested in the military, counter intuitively, it appears that the military is not
averse to such attention.
The growing grip of Hindutva forces across polity and into society, such as over the education
sector, the army should be alert to the possibility that it cannot escape like attention. This should
have made it defensive, if not prickly, so as to reduce the politicization and corresponding effect
on professionalism that penetration of cultural nationalism entails.
Its yoga program does not suggest that it is mindful of the otherwise obvious dangers. Since
these are easy to apprehend, a plausible inference is that the army is courting Hindutva. Since it
takes two to tango, are there are elements within the military opening the door wider?
An illustration is the appearance of articles on Vedic leadership in military publications,
specifically in the Infantry Journal and on the website of the army think tank. This is of a piece
with a leadership in the nineties by the Army’s Training Command on the leadership philosophy
of the controversial godman, Sai Baba.
Is politicization underway? This is not in the usual sense of the term in a convergence of
institutional and political interest of the military leading to its displacing of the government, as in
Pakistan. This is better described as incidence of subjective civilian control in which the civilian
ruling dispensation connects with the military by ensuring that the military shares its world view,
in this case, of Hindutva, such as is the case in communist states.
This is as against objective civilian control in which the military is rendered politically inert by
being left to its professional devices. The difference between the two is that where objective
civilian control is exercised, the military not a political player. Where the military is under
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subjective civilian control, the military is kept out of politics because, in subscribing to the
dominant perspective, it does not feel the need to intervene.
Such a move by Hindutva forces can be expected. Once they go about their reset of India in
right earnest, they would prefer to keep the military to its professional till. Whereas the
mechanism of objective civilian control is available to this end, the ambitious Hindutva agenda
for India forces a preference for a tighter embrace of the military. This will ensure, firstly, that it
can be kept out by decree and does not feel the need to intervene, and, secondly, that it can be
made to weigh in on the side of Hindutva, in case Hindutva forces find the going tough over the
longer term.
In light of Indian military’s apolitical record, it can be argued that such apprehensions of
convergence of interest are outlandish. This is true in so far as the military’s interest, unlike that
of its peer militaries in developing states, was never in a takeover of the state. This would
continue to be so, the difference this time round is that the military will increasingly subscribes to
the world view of the regime in power.
This is not troubling in so far as the paradigm is a conservative-realist one that militaries,
universally, subscribe to. However, the makeover of India in the image of majoritarian
nationalism is unlikely to remain a political and democratic exercise. Aware of this, Hindutva
forces would like a placid military when they contrive to remain in power and their agenda goes
beyond governance.
On this count, the army’s association with Baba Ramdev is only superficially innocent, to do
only with yoga. The army is not so politically innocent as to be unaware of the upfront social and
political changes ongoing in India. Its choice of Baba Ramdev suggests that it needs watching
as much as the moves of the Hindutva combine to influence it.

______________________

Look who is doing Yoga now

indiatogether.org
Normally, it is only at the Republic Day celebrations that one would expect to find India’s three
military chiefs (along with troops) at the centre of the national capital’s Rajpath, the main road that
witnesses the annual march past. However, when last spotted on the Rajpath the three chiefs
were with a brigade worth of troops arrayed behind their prime minister in breaking the world
record for the highest number of participants at a Yoga event.
That India was out to get into the Guinness Book for a record that ought by right to be its own,
corralling all, ranging from civil servants to the brigade close at hand at Delhi Cantonment, is
understandable. However, news from Tezpur (Assam), was that another three thousand troops
turned out with a similar purpose. These troops presumably otherwise stand guard on India’s
sensitive McMahon line with China.
The army’s association with such initiatives of the government illustrates a deepening proximity
between the government and its army. This is a departure from the earlier practice of a dignified
distance between the two that has served India well enough so far.
Such association with government ‘events’ is easy to spot, since the military has publicised such
participation. The Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India campaign) too witnessed cadets at the
Officers Training Academy, being duly photographed cleaning up Elliot beach in Chennai on
World Environment Day, when they really ought to have been at training.
Digital India Day was used by the army to launch the automation of the service records of its
soldiers, Arpan – an inauguration that would be expected to have its own rationale and not one
predicated on delivering any political dividend for the government.
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On Army Day this year, the army promised to serve up a day’s pay to the Prime Minister’s relief
fund for flood relief in Kashmir at a time when the ruling party at the centre, the BJP, was angling
to be part of the government then under formation in J&K. In the event, a set of officers reportedly
cried foul and instead of the amount finding its way to the fund, the army has since controversially
billed the government Rs 50 million for its flood relief effort.
Other such ‘events’ include commemoration of the sixteenth anniversary of Kargil War in New
Delhi this month, when army bands reportedly regaled mall-visitors in Delhi to military music.
Earlier, local army formations would observe such anniversaries, some involving locals who
helped win the war, with a modest celebration at the regimental level meant to be motivational for
units that had taken part in the operations.
Where a mere sixteenth anniversary of a small border war is being marked in such a manner, it
is easy to understand month-long celebrations for the 1965 War on its fiftieth anniversary. This is
largely an attempt by majoritarian political formations to militarise Indian society, seen in their
world view as relatively placid and inert. Unfortunately, the event places the military at the centre
and therefore can been seen as a potential avenue of politicizing it.
From a narrow political perspective, it is perhaps to form the backdrop for a grand announcement
by the prime minister of his government acceding to the One Rank One Pension demand, a raging
current controversy in India in which military pensions are set for a hike. A narrow political
perspective also perhaps explains participants of the first operation that was carried reportedly
inside Myanmar against Naga rebels who ambushed a military convoy being hosted to tea by Mr.
Modi in early June. This is surely overkill in exultation over a controversial raid with questionable
provenance and results.
Even if discerning an increasing proximity of the military with the government is an overkill, the
government for its part appears to be projecting as much. A glossy brochure, In Defence of the
Nation, has been put out by the defence ministry on its website toting up its initiatives over the
past year, including the military’s participation in the much-vaunted ‘Make in India’ programme.
Earlier governments were content to let the ministry’s annual report do the talking.
There also appears to be a change in the government-military relationship. The military has been
favouring this for long, resentful of the insertion of what it saw as a bureaucratic layer between it
and the political master. The ruling party however is apparently using the defence as yet another
prop in its refashioning of India.
Increasing incidence of instances raises the question: Is there a movement in Indian civil-military
relations in which civilian control of the military is shifting from objective military control to
subjective military control?
Otherwise notorious, Samuel Huntington was most credible in his first foray into theorising. He
had it that military professionalism was expertise in the management of violence. Since the
military was a profession, they were best left to manage themselves but under civilian oversight.
To Huntington, the preferred model of civilian democratic control of the military was through the
exercise of what he termed objective civilian control. In this model, the military was distanced from
politics, though it did own a part of decision-making owing to its expertise and social responsibility
as a professional group. The military leadership was to represent the military’s opinion based on
objective security indices and their analyses.
On the other hand, subjective civilian control was through the politicisation of the officer corps in
which the military leadership was part of the governing structure and imbued with its political
ideology.
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It is clear that thus far objective civilian control has been at play in India, even if partially so, in so
far as the military has remained outside the decision-making structure by unnecessary insertion
of a bureaucratic layer between it and the political level.
However, since the BJP’s coming to power there appears to be a putative shift away from what
the military called bureaucratic control towards subjective civilian control. Leveraging its defence
initiatives for political mileage and the government’s use of its military muscle to embellish the 56’’
chest of its head is unexceptionable. However, the incipient tendency worth cautioning against is
the proximity emerging between the government and the military.
Extreme examples such as the proximity between the German General Staff and National
Socialism are staple for military sociology buffs. These are however ‘ideal types’. Approximation
of reality with the ideal type can be taken as a measure of social health or otherwise. Currently, it
would not be fair to mistake the conservative bias intrinsic to all militaries, which is also
understandably present in India’s military in the form of subjective penetration of the ruling
dispensation into the military.
However, this joint subscription to an otherwise worthy political tradition, conservatism, increases
the likelihood of the military going further down the route of cultural nationalism alongside.
Amartya Sen has blown the whistle on the manner in which institutions, in particular academic
ones, are facing the full weight of government interference as part of the long term reset of India.
Can it be that the army will be eventually spared similar attention?
It would not do for the military to be bought off by governmental largesse such as the seventh pay
commission in lending itself to governmental jamborees. Late realisation of the fact that subjective
civilian control is here to stay will not augur well either for military professionalism or for national
security.

________________________________
Handwara: Going Beyond SOPs
19 April 2017
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=51914

Northern Command has ordered an inquiry into the Handwara incident

that it termed ‘highly regrettable’. The army chief has thought it fit to
fly in for a day’s visit to the state to take stock of the security situation
that has witnessed five deaths so far. The aim would be to defuse the
situation from snow balling into one reminiscent of the successive years
late last decade. Youth who gained their political awakening in those
years have since been depicted as tinder waiting for a spark.
This is the situation after over a decade of return of relative stability
if not near normalcy. With two oversized corps deployed amongst
a suspicious host population in the sensitive regions of the state, it
is inevitable that there would be sparks of this kind. Absent conflict
resolution that would push the situation indubitably into a post conflict
mode, the authorities would likely be resigned to these occurring
periodically, irrespective of preventive standard operating procedures in
place. For response, there would also be standard operating procedures
predicated in information management in a manner as to defuse the
situation.
The army court of inquiry has much on its hands. Not only must
it investigate whether the SOP was followed in opening fire, if indeed
it was the army that did the shooting and not the police, but also who
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released the video of the girl’s narration of the incident, if it was not the
police. These two lines of probe have the police equally in the sights.
If the police has gone overboard particularly in respect of the second
point - violation of the juvenile female’s rights - then ‘the nation needs
to know’.
However, the army must pin point whether its soldier was in the
female wash room. This must surely already be known through the
peers of the soldier to the chain of command. The release of the video of
the girl was perhaps with a view to indicate that there was no army man
involved. However, since it already stands contradicted as under duress,
no doubt owing to police over zealousness, it has succeeded in just the
opposite: being taken as a possible cover-up.
Quite like the layers of obfuscation that papered over the death
of two young women that sparked the outrage in 2010, truth in this
case might meet the same fate. Whereas the earlier case involved the
paramilitary, little better could be expected from a police-paramilitary
combine. However, this time round it is the army and it has a reputation
to protect.
The army has failed to be inspired by this imperative earlier, the
infamous Manorama Devi case being a case to point. Eastern Command
had lamentably clammed up and hidden behind AFSPA. Can the army
in J & K be relied on to be different? Can this case have a different
outcome?
If a benign view is taken then the army in not having owned up to the
alleged molester in its ranks so far can be taken to suggest that the girl’s
video version of the incident may be true. The latest turn to the issue
carried in the media is that the girl deposed before the magistrate to the
effect that she was not molested in the wash room but was accosted by
two males outside, one of whom was in school uniform. Clearly, to its
relief, this does help vindicate the army.
Nevertheless, the Northern Army commander’s direction of a speedy
inquiry must result in its results reaching the open domain quickly. Once
the girl is released by the police from ‘protective custody’, these findings
would then be borne out by the purported victim more fully. However,
in case the army is aware of its soldier being implicated in preliminary
inquiry in some manner, such as for instance needlessly deploying or
positioning near a female wash room, it must punish as necessary.
Morally, this is the least the army owes host communities. As the
powerful actor it has to protect the vulnerable, particularly women.
Institutionally, its reputation stands to go up in conflict areas in case of
action against its errant individuals as against the mistaken notion held
by some that sweeping things under the carpet protects its reputation.
It would serve as deterrent to potential violators. Outside such areas
it would justify the faith of citizens in it. Strategically speaking, the
government would not be averse to such self-regulation either. Averse to
resolving conflict in both J&K and the North East, it would prefer its lid
on such conflicts remain as still as possible. The state government for
its part headed by a woman for the first time would find it politically
useful.
Now that the situation has cleared somewhat, the army cannot stop
at punishments and fixing SOPs. Surely, its rules of engagement need
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a review. However, immediately, there is need to follow up on how the

video footage was released. It rides rough shod over individual rights,
particularly of women in such situations and of a juvenile one at that.
Over the long term, the episode can be seen as opportunity for army
wide action in reorienting rank and file to a modern take on gender
issues intrinsic to counter insurgency. It’s not merely a discipline
matter; it must be taken as a facet of a modernizing, twenty first century
military.
Sixty years of political inaction of successive governments of all
hues implies that the army would continue on internal security duties
indefinitely. This requires that its approach to gender questions – of how
to relate to women in host communities – be subject to self-critique.
Rather than training, it is education it must rely on. There is a huge
cultural distance between its soldiery and people in areas of conflict.
This is particularly stark in the levels of freedom of women, particularly
in the North East, as against where the main body of soldiery springs
from, India’s cow dust belt. The fairness of Kashmiri women likewise
cannot but have outsized effect on troops from catchment areas known
for their notorious views on skin colour. Under the circumstance, zero
tolerance is a fine disciplinary yardstick, but needs supplementing by
mainstreaming gender into military education.
That tremors will persist in Kashmir owes less to what the army does
or does not do than that absent political initiatives, both internally and in
relation to Pakistan, many if not most Kashmiris will remain alienated.
This episode appears have sparked the well spring of alienation, fanned
by India’s detractors. This is all the more reason to go beyond mere SOPs
and rules of engagement to renewing the army’s gender lens.

__________________________
What a short, swift war means for the Infantry
4 April 2016
http://www.claws.in/1548/what-a-short-swift-war-meansfor-
the-infantry-ali-ahmed.html

India expects that the next war will be swift and short. It would be
swift in not being a replay of Operation Parakram in which, as critics
would have it, India took time to mobilise, thereby, risking losing the
initiative. It would be a short in that the nuclear threshold would tend
to loom larger as the war lengthens in duration and with added dangers
of escalation. What does such a war imply for the Infantry?
The infantry would be at its best in the mountains sector, leaving
the fighting in the plains to its sister arms. Since the infantry deployed
in J & K is already in field conditions, it would be easier for it to shift
gears. The defensive formations are virtually in combat mode on the
Line of Control. The immediate reserves meant for offensive are largely
well practiced, though there may be requirement to shift from a counter
insurgency mentality and profile to one that lends itself to conventional
operations.
In this, the Kargil War experience and its lesson learned would prove
handy. The switch over from anti-terrorism to conventional mode was
more difficult then, owing to a higher intensity of the former. Now,
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while this gear change would be smoother owing to negligible militancy,

correspondingly the shock effect of outbreak of hostilities in short order
can be expected to be starker.
The second set of lessons learned date from the 2001 experience, with
the then army commander, known for his moral courage, reportedly
weighing in against an offensive without due preparation. Another
factor then was the snowy weather in early 2002 rendering a prospective
offensive considerably handicapped at the very outset. While neither the
army commander’s concern of equipment shortages nor snow could be
expected to tie down infantry, in operations more demanding of ‘results’
and aversive to setbacks, the risk of non-performance is higher.
Offensives in mountains are inherently fraught and the crust of
defences on the Line of Control has been thickened over three score years
of face off. Therefore, the going would be rather tough and consequently
more reliant on firepower rather than bayonets. The higher reserves,
such as the Mountain Strike Corps, may fetch up in a later time frame.
They would be less relevant for making territorial gains and more for
posturing and deterrence.
Territory gained would unlikely be returned this time round, unlike
it was fifty years back. Holding on by reconfiguring these in real time
in face of enemy counter attacks would be the primary challenge.
Alongside, preventing any enemy riposte or counter offensive succeeding
elsewhere would be at a premium in light of the optics that would make
it prohibitive for a visibly stronger power and an offensive one at that
losing ground. This would yet again be an infantry heavy exercise,
supplemented by Rashtriya Rifles, close at hand, in a reinforcing role.
In comparison with the challenge facing the infantry in the plains,
the showing in Northern Command would be relatively easy. The
essential difference is in the plains and desert sector having infantry
begin from a peace time mode. This degree of difficulty is accentuated
by the cantonment mindset that is heavily manpower – read infantry –
intensive.
Infantry as part of defensive formations being closer to the border
can be expected to manage to reach operations locations and undertake
pin prick offensive tasks, particularly if the time differential exists in
India’s favour as can be expected in a ‘cold start’ scenario. Such infantry
would have sufficient time to adapt from a peace time culture to a war
time one, since Pakistani reaction to India’s offensives will take time
to materialise, if at all. However, that Pakistan has practiced reflexive
response to the so-called ‘cold start’ scenario suggests any complacency
could prove embarrassing, as was the case to cite an instance at
Hussainiwala in 1971.
The major question is whether the infantry undertaking an offensive
role can at all shift gears by the time it races from its cantonment
locations serving as concentration areas through assembly areas in
launch pads. While it would not be the queen of the battles in this
sector, leaving the privilege to armour assisted by mechanised infantry,
it would be required for defensive tasks along shafts, f lanks and in
bridgeheads. Its showing would call for a high degree of psychological
preparedness. Does cantonment soldiering today permit this?
A dignified respite in a peace station is indeed a must for the infantry,
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recuperating as it would be from a preceding high altitude or counter

insurgency tenure. However, providing for an easy life and one with
family entails higher pressure in the form of ‘events’ and ‘institutes’. This
implies an inordinate – perhaps inescapable - attention to fatigue details
and ‘working parties’. The terror threat post the Pathankot airfield
terror attack has presumably also heightened static guard details.
In fact, it is no longer remarkable to see soldiers who ought to be in
barracks, living in tents near gates. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
soldiers with families get to sleep over for a full nights rest at their houses
only every other night. The upshot of such commitment is mixed. While
the hectic pace of life in visits, inspections and events keeps the infantry
on its toes and the guard details keeps it camouflage-clad and helmeted,
it does not afford the infantry the much-needed rest.
The danger is in infantry outfits compensating through short cuts
in training, physical fitness parades and battle efficiency – physical
and firing - tests. To create time and breathing space, a unit could for
instance do without inter-company games competitions. It might even
club ‘langars’ together since manpower in barracks is scarce. The effect
of such innovation can be in a deficit in subunit identity and cohesion.
Absent horizontal bonding it is not certain such an infantry outfit
would be able to carry the objective. This begs the question: What needs
doing?
Clearly, there is a case for reducing the weight of higher headquarters
on infantry units. This means a cut in duties devolving on units by
employing camp manpower suitably. The system of privileges with rank
has to be reviewed in light of the top-heaviness of late in headquarters,
since this invariably adds to demands on infantry. To reduce the pace
of life, formations need to identify the ‘must do’ and restrict activity
to these alone. Doing away with the ‘should do’ and ‘could also do’ at
formation level will create the time, energy and attention spans at unit
level to recreate the infantry ethos. Increasingly formations have resorted
to inculcation of elitism, through celebrating formation days etc. Since
there are only 24 hours to a day, this can only be at the expense of lower
echelons, notably that of subunits. Company commanders are hardput
today to instill company spirit. Assisting this crucial level of command
must be priority, for this is the level at which fighting gets done.
Whereas there have been considerable doctrinal, planning, equipment
and training upgrades to fight a short, swift war, a conclusion from the
brief appraisal above is that, even so, winning such a war requires a
fresh look at the human element.

________________________
The military musical chairs
22 October 2015
http://indiatogether.org/military-musical-chairs-op-ed

With the Bihar elections hogging all the attention in the news, an
interesting development noted by military watchers is liable to be missed.
A former military secretary informs that an unprecedented number of
army appointments are currently vacant, including two very sensitive
posts - Director General Military Operations, and Military Secretary.
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What does this imply?

A positive answer to this could be that the government may be
looking to create the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or
permanent Chairman of the Chiefs’ of Staff Committee (COSC), as the
case may be. This could entail a wider reshuffle and this may be holding
up the filling in of vacancies.
The appointment of the CDS has been a constant recommendation
of many committees deliberating higher defence reform, dating back
to Arun Singh’s first foray into this in the early 1990s. His subsequent
submission to Subrahmanyam’s Kargil Review Committee was similar.
The recommendation was accepted then by the committee of ministers
empowered to work the recommendations of the Kargil report. The
appointment has however remained on hold ever since.
The latest review, the Naresh Chandra Committee, likewise pitched
for a first-among-equals in the form of a CDS equivalent, permanent
Chairman of the COSC. This patently has many benefits including
furthering jointmanship, provision of integrated advice to the Cabinet
Committee on Security and the National Security Council, and for
overseeing India’s nuclear assets and operations.
In addition to the joint commands, Andaman and Nicobar Command
and the Strategic Forces Command, and the HQs Integrated Defence
Staff, there are a host of joint commands in the offing that would require
single-point oversight: special operations command, cyber and space
commands etc.
This government is reportedly mulling the creation of a CDS.
Implementing this may require elevating one of the chiefs or deeper
selection. If from the army, then this opens up the possibility of a wider
shake up. The possibility of this puts a positive spin on the deliberateness
seemingly accompanying the current holdup.
However, if this was the plausible reason there would likely have been
a corroborating media report or leak to this effect. The converse is also
possible that such news would have attracted the usual fight back by
political parties not interested in the military acquiring such salience,
and by the bureaucracy that has been dead set against such a move. This
might explain why the move, if impending, is under wraps.
This column has consistently pointed to the risk of politicization
of the military under an ideological regime. It is not in the form as
usually assumed and well studied, of a politicized military out to seize
power spurred by its institutional interests. Instead, it is the reverse, a
neutralization of the military as a politically significant actor so that
the ideological agenda of the regime is furthered without checks and
balances.
The pre-WWII German government, for example, neutered the
General Staff of the military as part of their totalitarian scheme. The
tactics included implicating one leading general for marrying a prostitute
and another for homosexuality.
Military musical chairs by political leaders is not new In India,
either. One reference is from the 1970s - to the passing over of Lt Gen
Bhagat, a Victoria Cross winner and general with a formidable military
reputation, by giving General Bewoor another year as Chief. This led
to Bhagat, the next in line for the appointment, retiring and paving the
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way for Mrs. Gandhi anointing General Raina to succeed Bewoor. As is

well known, the Emergency soon followed.
The better known case is that of Pandit Nehru sidelining the popular
Chief, ‘Timmy’ Thimayya, with a public put-downer in parliament.
He had earlier required Thimayya to withdraw his resignation and let
him down while favouring his defence minister, Krishna Menon. The
outcome of that error was quickly evident in the result of the 1962 War.
It is well recognized that the appointment of the Chief is a political
one, not only procedurally so with the Appointments Committee clearing
it, but also substantively. While the senior most in line between the vice
chiefs and the army commanders is usually made the Chief designate,
allegations of the proverbial ‘line of succession’ being manipulated have
often attended such successions, particularly in the more recent past.
The most infamous one was brought to fore by General V K Singh’s
insinuations that General J J Singh, the first Chief of Sikh faith, worked
the succession line up to favour the chances of V K Singh’s successor,
Bikram Singh, another Sikh, to take over. That VK Singh employed
considerable energy and invested his reputation to undo this was evident
from his ‘date of birth’ controversy.
V K Singh however hit himself in the foot when it emerged that his
attempt at deflecting Bikram Singh from his destiny, may have been to
ensure that Bikram Singh’s successor was not the current Chief Gen
Dalbir Singh, but another general, Lt Gen Ashok Singh, who is the
father-in-law of his daughter! Ashok Singh had organized the troop
movement in the vicinity of Delhi when V K Singh’s court hearing had
come up in January 2012.
What this look-back suggests is that higher echelon appointments
have a political angle. However, since the professionalism of the various
candidates is seldom in doubt, this has not been very controversial thus
far. So why should it be different this time round?
Firstly, this government, unlike previous governments, has not
stopped after reshuffling gubernatorial appointments in its first foray
into an ideological takeover of institutions. It has moved into education
and culture. This suggests the military cannot expect to remain
unscathed; some anticipatory concern is warranted.
Secondly, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) and
Military Secretary (MS) posts are critical for keeping a check on and
control of the military. The criticality of the DGMO post is obvious
from V K Singh’s moving of military formations in the vicinity of New
Delhi, without the then DGMO being in the loop.
Historically, troop movements in Delhi’s environs have been
sensitive. The first scare of a military coup was raised when troops
were moved to Delhi for Shastri’s funeral. The military had apparently
made the arrangement in anticipation, knowing from the experience
with handling Mahatma Gandhi’s funeral that more numbers would
be needed. That the government is well aware of the criticality of the
appointment is in its sudden diversion of the corps commander in
Srinagar, who had already moved to take over the coveted DGMOpost.
The MS post is even more critical from an ideological regime’s point
of view. The MS is in charge of promotions and postings of the officer
corps. The apprehension is that the ongoing saffronisation of India
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will engulf the military leadership eventually. Having a known entity

controlling this process, in the form of a hand-picked MS perhaps sharing
its world view, would be better from such a government’s perspective.
Hopefully, the cautionary word here will be proven false, and officers
with impeccable spoken reputations for professionalism and integrity
are appointed to the coveted posts. The continuing spate of divisiveness
in the country’s politics, however, is bad enough that such apprehensions
must be plausibly raised.

_________________________
Challenges of the brass in a political minefield
10 February 2015
http://indiatogether.org/articles/army-brass-caught-inpolitical-
minefield-under-bjp-government-op-ed

The army chief at his ‘At Home’ on the occasion of Army Day on 15
January announced the donation of a day’s pay by all ranks of the army
to the prime minister’s relief fund for the floods in J&K. On the face of
it this is a noble gesture and has precedent in the army having similarly
risen to the occasion in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster. Given
that a major proportion of the army is perpetually deployed in J&K and
played its usual sterling role even during the recent floods, this generous
act aiming to build bridges with the Kashmiris is yet another feather in
the army’s cap.
However, soon thereafter, the media reported on the intention of
at least three colonel-rank officers to take the army to court over the
deduction of a day’s pay without due consultation. The army for its part
clarified that the idea had been mooted in last year’s army commanders’
conference and had been suitably acted on procedurally. But the sting
in the media report was the contention of the unidentified colonels, one
of whom reportedly stated: ‘The donations in Jammu and Kashmir have
political ramifications and the Army should refrain from sending any
such signals.’
The politics surrounding the donation escalated with a former
colonel, Karan Kharb, writing in the RSS mouthpiece, the Organiser.
Kharb writes that these ‘few superseded disgruntled officers and
subordinates with perceived grievances’ foretell the ‘creepy rise of Fifth
Columnist elements within the Armed Forces’. The author justifies the
army’s decision, citing the relevant orders permitting its leadership to
take such decisions on behalf of the rank and file.
While the aggrieved colonels had apparently given vent to their
feelings incognito on social media, that the right wing flagship
publication, Organiser, has been chosen as the forum to launch the
counter attack is interesting in itself.
Incidentally, the retired colonel has earlier also written for the
Vivekananda International Foundation, whose founder director is
India’s current National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval. In his hagiography
of the NSA, Colonel Kharb had called Doval, ‘Chanakya’. What does this
linkage suggest?
Earlier the politics surrounding the issue was somewhat muddled. It
was not clear whether the aggrieved serving colonels were against the
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donation because it was for a cause in J&K. From their social media
post, it appeared that they did not want this given to J&K since similar
contributions had not been given in equally grave instances earlier,
such as the floods in Uttarakhand. This suggested an animus against
Kashmiris receiving army largesse.
Alternatively, it could be read as the colonels pointing out that the
army’s contribution was at the government’s behest. The ruling party is in
the midst of setting itself as part of a coalition in Srinagar. Such gestures
could help ease its way into an agreement with the other Kashmir-based
party, the PDP. In that context, the colonels appear to be pointing out
that the government was merely playing politics with the army through
its move and the army should distance itself from such (ab)use.
The article in Organiser can be credited with clarifying the issue
somewhat. With the publication jumping in to justify the contribution,
the latter interpretation of the serving colonels’ grievance gains credence,
thus implying that the ruling dispensation possibly had a hand in it.
The initial discussion on the contribution took place in October when
the BJP was attempting to do the impossible, its ‘Mission 44+’ plus in
Kashmir. Now, it is yet again poised to do the unprecedented, govern
from Srinagar.
Author Karan Kharb’s VIF-mediated links to the NSA indicate that
the idea may have sprung from outside the army. Else, there is little
reason for the Organiser to involve itself in the defence of the act, even
though on Twitter, the author takes pains to distance his article from the
RSS, which is strange given that it appears in an RSS publication.
If this reading is true, then it implies that the apprehensions on which
the aggrieved colonels acted were well-founded, even if their action itself
is lacking in legitimacy. The retired colonel, likening their action to
‘insidiously planned subversion’, has given enough grounds to suspect
as much.
An alternative explanation cannot be discounted. The army brass,
aware that there was an image makeover necessary in Kashmir, was
counting on the army’s show of response to floods and the contribution
of a day’s pay to help with this. Theirs is a well-intentioned move with
the strategic purpose of perception management. However, the regime,
prompted by its political agenda in Kashmir, is attempting to take the
credit by seeking to be identified with the move.
Let’s take another example from Kashmir. The army commander
there had courageously taken the blame for the killings of two youth
at Chattergam. He came under fire in social media apparently from
serving officers and from telegenic veterans for his unprecedented
apology. Consequently, he had to explain himself in a follow up demiofficial
letter to his commanders in wake of the terrorist attack in early
December in Uri.
Explaining his act as prompted by the nuances of the changed
situation in Kashmir, he reminded all not to fall ‘prey’ to the media. The
army commander was evidently not acting at political behest but under
the conviction, in his words, that, ‘Our Army’s ethic and values, backed
up by a strong military justice system, are the best in the world. These will
serve to guide us and also protect us.’
Nevertheless, his action was used to wrest political advantage, as the
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then defence minister Arun Jaitley, on a trip to Srinagar, cited a call

from the prime minister as the trigger for him to get the army to act.
The prime minister on the campaign trail appropriated the credit too,
stating it was ‘proof of his good intentions’.
Under the circumstances, there is ample reason to fear for institutional
good health. The former foreign secretary on being shown the door has
alerted all to the fact saying, ‘‘It’s not about individuals … it’s about
my Ministry as an institution.’ The country’s defence research head has
been put to pasture. Earlier, a string of governors owing allegiance to
the previous regime were eased out. The latest is the home secretary
being axed.
Arbitrary behaviour has not spared even the BJP itself, with its Delhi
unit having a chief ministerial candidate parachute down on it. Clearly,
if other institutions are in the firing line, being forced to fall in line,
then the army cannot be too far behind in the queue.
One of the first acts of the government on taking over last year was
to allow the chief designate appointed by the previous government
to continue in saddle, despite his run in with the political general,
VK Singh, by then a junior minister in the government. This was in
the event a well thought-out decision, in that it kept stability even
while serving notice to the brass on the unspoken possibilities. In its
messaging on unspoken possibilities, it was equivalent to the somewhat
untidy dismissal of Admiral Bhagwat on the accession of the last NDA
government to power.
Whereas political heads can be expected to take advantage of the
government’s showing on defence, the brass needs to remain ever alert
to the political impeccability of their actions. That political missteps are
being pointed out from within the ranks is a new phenomenon brought
to fore by the ready availability of social media. It is no wonder that
the brass is rightly frowning down upon its use. In the absence of such
checks, the onus is on the brass to keep up the institution’s hard-earned
and arguably well-deserved reputation for political impeccability.
________________________
Doctrine in Civil-Military Relations
16 May 2015
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/doctrinein-
civil-military-relations/

Supervision of doctrine making is one way by which civilian control

is exercised over the military. Military doctrine writing is largely done
within the military. However, it is to be in close coordination with the
Ministry and national security institutions. This is clear from the fact
that, firstly, military doctrines are based on the government’s strategic
doctrine; secondly, the civilian part of government has to have a sense
of ownership of the doctrine by being part of the process; and, finally,
military doctrines must receive ministerial imprimatur to signify that
they are outcome of a shared process and responsibility.
As for the first, the fact that India does not have a strategic doctrine in
the form of a white paper or an open-domain strategic defence review is
well known. While the National Security Advisory Board does undertake
defence review, it is not within the pail of government. As seen when it
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released the Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999, the government indicated

that it is merely advisory. As for the second -civilian participation in
doctrine making – it is not self-evidently the case in India. And, the last
– governmental ownership – can be assumed from the press statements
that accompany release of doctrine.
This article reflects on the second aspect: ministry participation in
doctrine making.
It is not known as to the extent the Ministry of Defence is part of the
process of doctrine formulation in India. Its website carries no mention
of doctrine formulation. There is also no reference to conventional
doctrines in the Annual Report of the Ministry. This suggests the
Ministry is keeping at a distance from the doctrinal sphere, perhaps
under the mistaken impression that the doctrine function is solely the
military’s preserve.
If this inference is a fair approximation of reality, it is certainly yet
another area of deficit in civil-military relations in India. It indicates
that the ‘lesson’ of 1962, of civilians keeping out of military matters
has possibly been over-learnt. Since there is considerable overlap with
the civilian sphere, the doctrinal space is not one that can be left to
the military alone. While the overlap is self-evident for subconventional
doctrine involving as it does the defence and home ministries, it is
equally so for conventional doctrine.
The region now into the second decade of the nuclear age, the
nuclear and conventional doctrines are intertwined. Since the nuclear
doctrine is a politico-strategic function, with apex level military input
and participation, the nuclear doctrine making is understandably a
civilian led process. Military conventional doctrines are to be sensitive
to the demands of nuclear doctrine on the conventional space. For
instance, conventional doctrine cannot envisage operations that are
overly escalatory. Since conventional military doctrines have to be
cognizant of the civilian led nuclear doctrine, they cannot be without
reference to civilian expertise in the national security establishment.
Such participation of civilians is at two levels: at the ministry and at the
National Security Council institutions.
Military doctrines give out the manner the military wishes to fight
future wars. Consequently, in peacetime they are critical to the type of
military being formed in terms of strength, equipment, training and elan,
and serve to inform military plans. In wartime, they inform military
strategy. Since the Ministry has a role to play and an interest in all these
aspects, such as for instance in platform acquisitions necessitated by
doctrine, it needs to play its part in the doctrinal process. In case the
Ministry’s engagement with the process is suboptimal then problems
emerge down the line.
An illustration is the indication by the defence minister of a stepping
back for financial reasons from the creation of the mountain strike
corps. 17 Corps is reportedly to be pruned so as to make its additional
manpower and necessary equipment acquisitions affordable. The corps
has been under discussion for over half a decade. It is a result of the
revision in army doctrine that was reported in the press in end 2009.
The army doctrine of 2004 had thereafter been revised and released
internally in 2010. The revision of doctrine was however not revealed in
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the public domain through a press release as is usually the case.

The revised doctrine, unlike its 2004 predecessor, being confidential,
press reports on doctrinal change of the period suggest a ‘two front’
doctrine with a similar offensive turn on the China front being envisaged
as had been adopted on the Pakistan front under the 2004 doctrine.
The ‘two front’ doctrine envisages a counter offensive capability also be
created for the China front, akin to the strike corps in the plains. The
implications for size and equipment of the army are of such magnitude
that a doctrinal shift cannot obviously be taken without governmental
imprimature.
The previous UPA government authorized two mountain divisions
late last decade and with reluctance gave approval for the mountain strike
corps only in mid 2013 after much stalling by the finance ministry. It
would appear that the present government’s reservations on the costs are
a legacy of the period. It can therefore be concluded that had a ‘whole of
government’ approach been part of doctrine formulation at the outset
itself, this awkward stepping back on 17 Corps would not have been
necessary.
A second illustration of disconnect between the ministry and the
military concerns subconventional doctrine. It has recently emerged
that in 2013 the army adopted a new edition of the Doctrine on Sub
Conventional Operations of 2006. As with the 2010 revision of the
conventional doctrine, Indian Army Doctrine 2004, the DSCO 2013 has
been kept confidential. It is not known as to the extent the changes are
merely cosmetic making the 2013 version merely a new edition or are
substantial enough to reckon that it is indeed a revised doctrine. Since it
is confidential, it cannot be known as to the levels of participation of the
two ministries in internal security – defence and home – in its revision.
The DSCO 2013 was released internally without intimation in the
open domain through a press release. Therefore, it cannot be known
if the doctrine has ministerial imprimature. Clearly, subconventional
operations overlap the civilian sphere almost wholly. Since the DSCO
2006 version was in the open domain and well received for its ‘iron
fist in velvet glove’ thesis, that the 2013 version has instead been kept
confidential is intriguing. Had the two ministries been hands-on
participants in doctrine making then this situation would unlikely have
arisen.
This underlines the point of ministries distancing themselves from
the doctrine sphere. It can be argued that this owes to ignorance of
matters military. This is probably quite right, but cannot on that account
be allowed to stand unchallenged. The ministry cannot abdicate the
doctrinal space owing to its deficiency. It has to be instead to be held
accountable. It has to create the structures necessary to participate
actively and exercise oversight effectively. This can be done, for instance,
by empowering the affiliated think tanks of the ministry and the forces
HQs. Just as the ministry of external affairs has ratcheted up its policy
and planning division under the new foreign secretary, the defence
ministry could likewise upgrade itself with an in-house think tank of
academics, bureaucrats, veterans and practitioners.
Clearly, there is a case for governmental ownership of the doctrinal
space even if the military is in the lead.It must begin with an NSCS
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strategic review followed by a ministry driven doctrine process with

the product minimally being acknowledged in the open domain or,
maximally, being democratically placed in it

_____________________________
Where veterans refuse to give up, what does
the future hold?
19 December 2014
http://indiatogether.org/articles/influence-andpolitics-
of-veterans-in-the-indian-army-op-ed

A former army vice chief exasperatedly writes of the ‘loose cannons’

among the ‘highly active group of veterans’ who add their own experiencebased
‘mirch-masala’ to events unfolding that involve the army, thereby
distorting the picture. In the aftermath of the two recent incidents in
Kashmir – the Chattargam killing of two youth at a check point and the
terror attack at an army base in Uri - these ‘e-mail warriors’ are urged
to ‘hold their horses’ instead. (http://www.thecitizen.in/NewsDetail.
aspx?Id=1709).
The general’s concern is apparently also shared by the senior
army general in Jammu & Kashmir who reportedly wrote to all his
commanders explaining certain uncharacteristic army decisions that
the veteran community had taken umbrage to. These were the verdicts
of the courts martial in the Machhal case in which three innocents
depicted as infiltrating terrorists were killed by the army in 2010 and,
second, the apology made by the general in response to the army’s use
of overwhelming force at the checkpoint in which the two youth in the
car died.
Both cases were also somewhat without precedence in that they
impinged on the impunity that critics saw as the bane of counter
insurgency operations, under the cover of the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act. Media commentary originating from the veteran community
had been by and large critical of both actions, holding that this would
demoralise the army and amount to tying its hands behind its back
when combating terrorism.
Consternation in the veteran community, expressed in their writing
for the media and on social media, apparently forced General Hooda
to explain himself to his men through their commanders. This best
illustrates the growing influence of veterans and consequently requires
understanding.
The growing visibility, if not power, of the veterans was not lost on
the BJP that used it to good effect in its election campaign. Narendra
Modi shared the dais with a group of veterans including former chief,
VK Singh, to depict a strong-on-defence image during his campaign.
This helped create the ‘wave’ that brought him from Ahmedabad to
Delhi. In return, he cleared the long-cherished desire of the veteran and
service communities for a national war memorial.
Modi has also crafted his national security policies according to the
hardline blueprint, staple of the strategic writings of veterans. He has
energised the defence production sector and has a $40-billion defence
equipment shopping list. Environmental concerns have been summarily
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set aside as India embarks on strategic road building in the Himalayas.

While all this keeps the veteran community largely appreciative, its
media savvy members and would-be strategists also project these as
inevitable and desirable advances for national security, initiatives that
awaited Modi’s displacement of the previous moribund regime.
It is the latter that is a greater cause for concern on the ascent of India’s
veterans, who simply refuse to fade away. They are living longer, and in
an age of liberalisation and information that gives them, respectively,
disposable income to live actively and the reach to project their views.
This makes them a useful human resource base in communities.
However, there is an underside.
Since universally militaries vote conservative, the service community
and veterans have had a soft corner for the right wing party currently
in power. The nationalism that the regime espouses is also attractive
to the patriotic vein in former military men. Also, being a part of the
upper middle class that widely, and perhaps wildly, favours the BJP, the
veterans form a reliable support base.
As with the rest of the middle class, they are swayed by the economic
dividend they hope to achieve through Modi’s hitching of corporate
power and politics. They are also vicarious recipients of the redeemed
national glory that comes with the ascent of an unrepentant Hindu
nationalist to power for the first time after, in their reading of history, a
millennium. This makes them, as it does the wider middle class, blind
to the seamier side of current day Indian politics, brought to fore and
respectability by the ascent of the BJP to unchecked national power.
By no means do these elements have the power to shape policy. For
instance, their limits can be seen in the ascent of the current army chief
to the post was in face of bitter opposition by the V K Singh camp, even
though V K Singh was in the government as a junior minister. Yet, they
certainly serve as foot-soldiers for justifying policies, particularly on
prime time from which, in any case, reasoned discourse has fled in fear
of crusading television hosts.
A case in point is the ballast lent by veterans in outshouting their
Pakistani counterparts to sell the new - harsh and arguably dangerous -
turn to India’s Pakistan policy.
By no means would there be there any cause for concern if this was
all that there was to the situation. After all, democracy is a playing
field for different interest groups, with politics harnessing these to its
ends. In this case, the politics of the ruling political formations deploys
approbation of veterans for its ends. They serve as a useful conduit for
the militarising of India, a muscular India to face down centuries of
humiliation by invaders and to face up to the Chinese after six decades
of it.
A recent instance is the celebration of Vijay Diwas with greater gusto
in order to emphasise the military dimension of the 1971 War over its
diplomatic and political facets, highlighted in the Congress years.
The problem is when veterans, armed as they are with a cultural
transmission belt into the serving uniformed fraternity, transmit their
politics alongside. This was mildly observable in the previous stint
of the NDA regime in government when less-than-secular strategists
made their first appearance writing for both in-service publications
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and journals of institutions patronised by veterans. The Vivekananda

International Foundation, made famous by Doval’s move from its
directorship to national security adviser position, took root then.
This time round, there is not merely greater acceptability for cultural
nationalism, it is the dominant discourse. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that e-bullying of secular voices on the Internet from the military
fraternity started with the onset of campaigning in the last elections.
The military has over the past decade also extended its domain of benign
interest to cover veterans, deemed to be neglected by the ministry
department that is mandated to look after them, Department of Ex
Servicemen Welfare, thereby increasing the inter-permeation.
With the opening up of the travel segment, in particular air travel,
and its affordability, the incidence of interaction between veterans and
those serving has also increased. As a result, veterans are avid users of
service facilities such as messes and institutions, the ethics of such (mis)
use of service facilities notwithstanding. For instance, media informs
us that former chief JJ Singh acted as convener of his course’s golden
jubilee reunion at the Indian Military Academy earlier this month.
The potential dangers are already evident. News from the two passing
out parades, from IMA and OTA, suggest that about three quarters of
officers are from the North Indian belt, within a half-day reach from
Delhi by train. Also, most are wards of servicemen, mostly of those from
the ranks. This area is also the heartland of veteran political activism,
symbolised by the ex-servicemen political rally at Rewari that really
mainstreamed Modi at the outset of his campaign.
Veterans appear to be at the centre of much more going on in military
affairs than catches the eye. The missive from the general in Kashmir to
his men is warning of more to come.

______________________________
Is the army court’s verdict on the Machhil killings enough?
17 November 2014
http://indiatogether.org/articles/recent-court-verdicton-
machhil-army-killings-afspa-and-military-justice-oped

An army court in its judgment on the Machhil killings of three

civilians has awarded life sentences to the army men involved, including
the commanding officer of the unit. This is a praiseworthy verdict
underscoring the army’s keenness in keeping itself free of such cases.
This follows earlier army action against the likes of the infamous
Ketchup Colonel and Siachen Major who had faked military action to
bid for medals. Since the Machhil killings were also similarly inspired,
the recent action makes it clear that the army frowns upon such action.
However once appreciation of the army’s action is done with, the
shortfalls in the military justice system need to be noted alongside.
Firstly, news commentary accompanying information on the judgment
suggests that the officers and soldiers succumbed to temptation
stemming from the ‘rewards’ on offer for troops and units performing
‘well’ in counter-insurgency. These rewards include good performance
reports for individuals and units, medals, perks accompanying medals
 138

and unit citations. Those who benefit perhaps continue within the
army. For instance, an officer let off in the Pathribal case retired at
major general rank.
Secondly, it is easy to explain away such cases as individuals taking
short cuts. There is little reason consequently to pursue other more
demeaning reasons that may, in the event, be more relevant. In fact the
faking of encounters by the Ketchup Colonel and Siachen Major are
at best comical. The several hundreds of cases of unmarked graves in
the Valley indicate that there is more to the permissive action regime
prevalent in times of heightened counter insurgency than merely the
pull of rewards. Even if some of those killed could be taken as victims
of the dictum, ‘those who live by the sword die by the sword’, at least
a few of these killings can be attributed to psychopathic and others to
ideological reasons.
The former may not be as troubling as the latter on account of the
fewer numbers. The latter, killings done for ideological reasons, perhaps
inspired by hyper-nationalism or misapplied religious zeal, are more
dangerous since they paint a picture of an environment in which
such ideology may have penetrated the service. It bears recall that the
military intelligence officer Purohit, implicated in the Malegaon blasts,
was posted in J&K, before he took his operation into central India. Even
if he is dismissed as a lone wolf, these are dangers that the army needs
to be cognizant of and warned against. With cultural nationalism now
having gone mainstream, and if analysts are to be believed, the threat
of resumption of insurgency in J&K not quite receded, there is scope for
vigilance.
Secondly, military justice has been held in abeyance in graver cases.
Three cases come readily to mind: the Malom killings of ten civilians
being protested by Irom Sharmila over the past fifteen years; the possible
rape and murder of Manorama Devi; and the infamous Pathribal
killings in J&K.
In the Malom killings of people waiting at a bus stop in the vicinity of
firing, the military insists it was fired on first. In the case of Manorama
Devi, it is possible that those who carried out the murder were acting on
illegitimate orders since Manorama was alleged to have been involved in
insurgent activities. Even though they took their brief too far by allegedly
carrying out a sexual assault alongside, the army protected them.
As for the Pathribal incident, it is linked to the Chittisingpora killings
of Sikhs. Again those involved were likely acting on orders and therefore
the army court this year chose to let them off for want of evidence.
While the army should not be held hostage in cases blown out of
proportion as part of the propaganda war that is intrinsic to proxy war,
where egregious violence is patent, it needs acting of its own accord and
for reasons other than the internal good health of itself as an institution.
Even in such cases the army’s reluctance to take action is sometimes
evident, such as in the case of the boy burnt to death last month by
unknown persons at the Hyderabad garrison of the army. It took the
suicide of a soldier to put the needle of suspicion firmly on the army
over its earlier premature and unnecessary denial.
Even in the Macchil case, unfortunately the credibility of military
justice is such that the timing of the judgment in a four-year-old case
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suggests politics, given that J&K is set to go to the polls with both the
parties in power in Srinagar and Delhi vying for the electorate. The
former has already staked claim for the credit, the latter can be seen to
be more subtle when this is taken in conjunction with the apology that
the army has issued over the Chattargam killings.
Action does not get taken in the graver cases owing to ‘reasons of
state’. In such cases it is only fair to take action against perpetrators
if such action takes within its dragnet the bigger fish alongside. Those
culpable in the higher rungs are seldom held accountable. The wheels
of justice continue to turn ineffectually in regard to the 1984 and 2002
pogroms. It would not do merely to trace command responsibility only
within the uniformed service. To the political level can be attributed
negligence in exercise of control.
While Nehru did call for self-restraint when he deployed the army in
Nagaland in the mid-fifties, which is found reflected in the famous special
order of the chief of army staff, there was no overseeing mechanism in
place either then or later. An officer known for his integrity, Lt Gen
Sardeshpande, recalls an army chief ’s visit to his location while in
command of a brigade in the north east. The visiting chief told him to
keep a close eye on a village in his area of responsibility that the chief
in his time in command over the area had had occasion to set fire to,
twice over.
Structurally, the situation has not changed much since. The army
answers to the defence ministry though internal security is a home
ministry responsibility. For instance, in the case of the recent killings
of two youth early this month in Chattargam, media informed us of the
home ministry writing to the defence ministry, asking for details.
If Section 6 of AFSPA is to be applied (the corresponding Section
7 in case of the AFSPA in J&K), it is the home ministry that waives
protection against prosecution. For this, it has to have the facts from
the defence ministry. The defence ministry invariably applies the ‘good
faith’ principle as cover, leaving the home ministry no one to proceed
against even if it wishes too.
The cultural aspect is that those charged with ensuring a democratic
regime is in place across India are let off for allowing a permissive regime
on their watch. Those democratically accountable at best merely stand
to lose their seats for unconnected reasons. By this yardstick, ‘we, the
people’ are as much to blame.
Therefore, neither should the Machhil judgment blind one to the
wider canvas in which justice is central to reconciliation, nor be allowed
to paper over the other areas of justice denial that continues to place
reconciliation out of reach.

_____________________________
Kashmir: Hooda walks the talk
10 November 14
Kashmir Times

Lt Gen Hooda as a colonel attending the higher command course for

upwardly mobile officers won the best dissertation prize. His abridged
thesis, published in the journal of the College of Combat in January
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2001, was titled, ‘Ethics and Morality in the Military’. That when it
came to the crunch in his command tenure of all troops in J&K, he
has measured up to what he wrote must be applauded. In his accepting
the responsibility for the killings of two youngsters at a check point in
Chattargam, Kashmir, he has set the bar higher for an army that prides
itself for its professionalism and integrity.
His elevation to high rank and his appointment as commander in
chief in J&K bespeaks well of the army and its systems and processes.
It is comforting to know that the army has within its ranks the likes of
Hooda and also of the commanding general in the Valley, Saha, since it
is no doubt that Hooda would be acting in consultation with the latter.
These are not exceptions. They are among several thousand officers
who over the years have rendered a signal contribution to Kashmir and
Kashmiris, and at one remove to the nation.
That said, there is also a subset of officers who are differently
moulded. They are also in sufficient numbers to qualify as a subculture
able on occasion to set the army’s moral compass. The film Haider bears
testimony on that count. That they are not absent in the Valley is clear
from the Chattargam episode in which apparently the lower rungs of
the hierarchy attempted to paper over the killings citing a pre-existing
terror alert of terrorists in a ‘white car’. The police acting courageously,
has debunked that. This subculture was inclined to sweep the blatant
killings under the carpet. In earlier periods in Kashmir, they might
well have succeeded owing to the sway of the negative subculture in the
conducive environment of insurgency and counter insurgency.
As for the soldiers on duty at the check point, it would be unfair to
make them scapegoats, even if the preliminary inquiry that prompted
Hooda to take a stand points out that they made a ‘mistake’. They did
indeed make a fatal mistake, but there are mitigating facts. A car screech
at a check point can trigger unpremeditated action with unforeseen
consequence. Had the check point not been there, the tragedy would
not have happened. The check point is there owing to the protracted
conflict situation, exemplified by the AFSPA. Therefore, while not
ruling out individual culpability, those responsible for inability to shift
the situation from one of conflict to one of post conflict must be held
equally accountable.
While fair to expect rules of engagement to hold since the situation
is relatively stable and the army reportedly better trained, it also needs
factoring in that the soldiers have no doubt been fed with the staple
intelligence fare of dastardly terrorist actions imminent. ISIS related
reports have surely permeated down the hierarchy and so has the need
for greater alertness in light of upcoming elections. Also, they would
likely have been told that the increased firing on the LC and rain
wrought havoc on the LC fence has led to an increased induction of
terrorists out to wreck the elections. Therefore, if the soldiers fired off
their weapons in haste and fear, it is not quite a willful violation of rules
of engagement, but due to a situation only ‘waiting to happen’.
The fact that it is not otherwise - a Kashmir without AFSPA - is
to be blamed on those in power over the past decade, both in Delhi
and Srinagar. So even if the soldiers fired off the shots and Hooda is
taking responsibility for this, the Congress and the NC respectively
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are not above blame. The parameters for removal of AFSPA have been
there for most part for about a decade. Mr. Manmohan Singh, and
the powers behind the chair, the two Gandhis, proved unmindful
owing to improved security indices making it politically unnecessary
to go further. Mr. Omar Abdullah preferred making noises against it
rather than offering his resignation. In so far as the army’s input has
been against its removal, decision on AFSPA is a political prerogative.
Therefore, it would not do to blame the jawans on the check point alone,
even if they end up serving as unfortunate ‘fall guys’.
Admittedly, the UPA was disadvantaged by the BJP on its flanks ever
ready to call any thought of AFSPA removal as anti-national and typically
‘soft’ national security thinking on the Congress’ part. Mr. Abdullah
would also be right in claiming in his defence that his resignation would
not have made a difference.
However, with the BJP in power in Delhi and set to take Srinagar
in the reckoning of its chief Mr. Shah, is not impossible for AFSPA to
get a relook. There are good political reasons for this. It can always be
lifted over most places and can be reinstated when and where necessary.
Internally, the BJP can profit by such a promise in the run up to elections
as also from the fallout of lifting it if and when in power. It will mark
out the BJP in Delhi, if not in Srinagar, as different from its predecessor.
It will fulfill the promise embedded in Mr. Modi’s Diwali foray into
Kashmir. Externally, it will help prevent Kashmir serving as a continued
attraction to jihadists from AfPak. It will set the stage for renewed
engagement with Pakistan, one put off temporarily in August.
The military’s input would likely have had a strategic logic. With the
US departing Afghanistan, it needed the AFSPA as cover while it ‘waited
and watched’ the outcome. To its credit, it appears from the Chattargam
episode that it put in place rules of engagement suited for a restrained
military, even if one empowered with AFSPA. The episode proves that
‘zero collateral damage’ is a fallacy. Therefore, it too can reappraise
AFSPA that makes such incidents inevitable.
While strategic reasons determine the army’s input, sociological
considerations cannot be discounted altogether. The Chattargam
episode makes it apparent that there are two subcultures within the
army: one based on the professional military ethic and the other on a
nationalist ethic. The latter could yet again dominate in case the Kashmir
engagement continues under AFSPA and worsens among other reasons
on that count. In such a case, Hooda’s action could prove the last gasp
of a rational military considering that a right wing dispensation is set
for a long innings in Delhi.
____________________________________________________________
Kashmir : Politicisation of security and its consequences
15 October 2014
Kashmir Times

Politicisation of security has figured in the electoral rhetoric between

the BJP and its opponents with both blaming the other side. In the runup
to state elections in important states and in J&K soon thereafter,
that political use of security issues will be made is axiomatic. While the
linkage between security and politics is easily comprehended in respect
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of Pakistan, it is less so in case of India. This article makes the case that
India’s central government has indeed politicised security. It is but one
step away from politicising the military.
In Pakistan, politicisation refers to political intervention by the
military; most visible recently in the manner it has sponsored the holdup
of the Nawaz Sharif government. Whereas in Pakistan, politicisation
of the military is furtherance of institutional interest of the military
disguised as national interest; in India, politicisation of security is the
use of security issues and its instruments for the political purposes of
the ruling party. It shall be demonstrated ahead that this can culminate
in development of symbiotic relations between the ruling party, one
mediated by its leader, and the military.
Both profit from a certain direction in security, and therefore
can forge a sustainable, invisible bond. The ruling party’s defining of
national security through its ideological lens can over time infiltrate
the military, making for loss in professionalism i.e., the politicization of
the military. This is reverse of the Pakistan case in which the military
interferes with politics.
The army’s upping-the-ante on the border cannot be taken amiss.
It was in response to increasing ceasefire violations and on provocative
action in which it lost a soldier to an IED attack in early October. The
last army chief had already made it clear that he expects vigorous tactical
action on the Line of Control (LoC0. The current army chief on taking
over made a pledge not to have a repeat of the beheading incident of
January last year. With the new right wing government having given the
go-ahead for a robust response, the army is only following through on
what has been long advertised.
Would the case have been different in case there had been any other
government at Delhi? The military’s tactical level reaction to provocation
has unlikely been in question. The previous government broke off the
talks owing to the LoC incident and did not resume them due to policy
paralysis thereafter suggests it would have been amenable to a vigourous
response. In the event, it was not tested.
Certainly, the state of talks with Pakistan would have impacted the
firing on the LoC, in that not only would Pakistan have likely not been
provocative, but India may have been more restrained. However, the
last government had given the go-ahead for tactical trading of ordnance
as the army thought fit, but with the caveat that this should not impact
the strategic level moves. Therefore, there would have been no lack in a
‘befitting reply’ at the tactical level, even if escalation would have been
ruled out.
This time escalation has been ruled in. In so far as this can be
strategically rationalised, it makes sense. Firstly, India having broken off
talks abruptly needed a fig leaf. The border incidents provided the alibi
and its recent escalation enable India to blame Pakistan for continuing
to be difficult. Secondly, that the escalation was soon after return of
the PM and NSA from the US suggests an AfPak angle alongside. The
messaging to Pakistan, with tacit US imprimatur, is that India be a
minder in the region in case Pakistan does not play ball in the unfolding
US strategy in Afghanistan. Lastly, Pakistan’s military by unsettling
Sharif made it amply clear that it calls the shots on the India policy.
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With Mr. Modi’s opening gambit coming to naught, the escalation is

India’s reply.
However the timing of the escalation in relation to internal politics
cannot be ignored. The ruling party had received a warning of a waning
Modi wave in the bye-elections across the country. With significant states
going to the polls, its internal political mobilisation strategy of using
the internal ‘Other’, India’s minority, as bogeyman was not enough, the
‘love jihad’ trope notwithstanding. Mr. Modi to facilitate his US trip
had made placatory statements including acknowledging Muslims are
ready to die for their country. The external ‘Other’ lent itself better for
internal political use.
This explains the manner Mr. Modi has used the army’s response on
the LoC to project his image as strongman. Questioning security policy
is a duty for the opposition. By no means is questioning security policy
casting of aspersion on the military. It is an absurd notion to have a
consensus on security policy in a democratic society. There are multiple
ways to achieve security. The government’s manner of doing so is not
necessarily the only or right one. Therefore, the charge made by the BJP
that questioning by the opposition amounts to demoralising the force
is itself politicisation. This amounts to the politicisation of security and
one done by the ruling party for its short term political ends.What are
the consequences for knock-on politicisation of the military?
In so far that the military is currently carrying out faithfully the order
of the government, its action is unexceptionable. To call for the targeting
to have taken into account collateral damage as a factor is trite in light
of the manner collateral damage is increasingly being interpreted in
light of operations in the Middle East, including the Israeli one in Gaza.
However, of consequence is in case the military develops the notion that
here is a government that delivers, that does not keep it on leash and
one that allows the military strategic space otherwise constricted by
diplomatic dynamics.
This has to be read alongside the manner defence ministry is being
left without a minister. The nominal oversight by the finance minister
has been subject to his good health. The military’s key grouse, that it
is second guessed by the bureaucrats, is likely much eased. There is
considerable largesse coming its way in terms of armament infusion
with major initiatives by the government such as opening up the defence
sector further to foreign investment and its proximity to the US as an
arms source. The political use of the military enhances its profile, both
in relation to the ruling party and in the voting public. All this can
tend to inflate the military’s self-perception, thereby increasing political
propensity, latent in any military.
Weak indicators are already on offer on the way the wind blows. The
military has unnecessarily offered its services for cleaning the Ganga,
visualising 40 officers under a retired general assisting the minister,
Uma Bharati. It was needlessly on the front pages in the Swach Bharat
campaign in cleaning up its cantonments.
Even if the contrast in the response of the army and the administration
in J&K to the floods has been stark, the army’s placing of the spotlight on
itself was at the expense of the administration. With the BJP making a
strong bid for J&K, if Mr. Amit Shah is to be believed, this was unfortunate
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in terms of timing in that the army has albeit coincidentally improved

the chances of the BJP. It could have moderated such an outcome by
keeping the focus on the state government and projecting itself as in
support to the state government, which is the correct legal position and
is normally the case.
The PM promised the situation will soon subside. The timing
is also suggestive of internal politics. With the harvest from the
forthcoming elections behind him, the PM can be expected to revert to
his grandstanding on the regional stage, with the SAARC gathering in
Kathmandu providing an opportunity.
He will project that he and the army have ‘shut up’ the Pakistani
military. The potential for identification of the military with the PM,
and at one remove his party, therefore exists. This is the knock-on
consequence of the politicisation of security that bears watching.
______________________________
Modi and the Military
October 25, 2014
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/10/25/modi-andthe-
military/

Universally, militaries are conservative-realist entities. India’s is no

different. Therefore, though an apolitical one, it is probably not unhappy
with the election of a conservative government to power in Delhi. Whereas
other governments have been constrained by their parliamentary strength
and have used the military sparingly, this government does not need to
look over its shoulder. In fact, it is already delivering on several of the
military’s long standing demands. Mr. Modi’s Diwali foray to Siachen
suggests there is more to the Modi-military relationship than mere photo
opportunities. What might this be?
Commentators, citing the recent disruption of the decade long cease
fire on the Line of Control (LOC), have it that India has changed its policy
from passivity to greater aggressiveness. It is also being prickly on the
China front, so much so that analysts have advised greater caution. While
the army has been given a ‘free hand’ in one report on the LOC owing
in the defence minister’s words to India having greater ‘conventional
strength’, on the China front, since India has a lot of catching up to
do, India is probably more restrained, even if it is projecting a tougher
stance.
Assuming Indian strategy is, in the words of its National Security
Adviser, ‘effective deterrence’, then India would have strengthened its
fences early and then settled down to concentrating on its economic
development. As a grand strategy, this is unexceptionable, even if the
initial phase could well have been different with Mr. Modi following up
on the promise of the meeting with Mr. Sharif in Rashtrapati Bhawan
forecourt.
Mr. Modi rightly reasoned that Mr. Sharif was not the best interlocutor
in Pakistan and that he could not deliver on what the only other credible
interlocutor in Pakistan, its army, can possibly settle for. This best
explains India’s strategic line taken. It has essentially told Pakistan off,
even if has not ‘shut up’ that army as Mr. Modi imagines. Mr. Modi’s
 145

going to Siachen only strengthens this message, that even the supposed
low hanging fruit, a solution to Siachen, is out of reach. By aggression
on the LOC, Mr. Modi and his hard-line security adviser, Mr. Dovel, are
messaging that if Pakistan does not accept the new status quo, then India
can and will inflict ‘pain’ for ‘adventurism’ in the words of its defence
minister.
Messaging thus can only be based on prior strategic calculation that
the Pakistan army would play along. So while Pakistan’s army may use
its former maverick chief, Musharraf, to plug the hard line for its part
and have its spokesperson mimic India’s warning with his own on Indian
‘misadventure’, as a calculating strategic player, it will see the strategic
imbalance and lay off India. In any case, it is somewhat busy warding off
its own Jihadis. India can aggravate its western front at will through its
higher profile in Afghanistan and proximity with the new government
in Kabul. Will the Pakistan army see things this way?
India is no doubt aware that Pakistan’s army has proven irrational
before, be it in 1971, when it lost half the country; and more recently,
at Kargil. Therefore, if India is going in for an aggressive strategy, it is
aware that Pakistan army may not get the message of deterrence and
there could well be conflict.
This can also be taken as a form of deterrence in that it is India that
is playing irrational. It is seemingly in the game of ‘chicken’ in which it
has got into the car and stepping on the accelerator, has thrown away the
steering. This way Pakistan will have to veer away lest it be crushed by
the Indian juggernaut. This is indeed deterrence strategy of sorts.
Even if it does not work, India has readied itself over the past decade
with its switch over and its practice of the ‘cold start’ doctrine. India has
therefore catered for the worst case. While most would cry ‘watch out
for the nukes’, India is perhaps banking on these not coming into the
equation in a brief, limited war, irrespective of the spent-force, General
Musharraf’s vainglorious threats.
While to most war spells economic downslide, to India’s decision
makers it may well stimulate the economy. As it is, India is privileging
the defence sector. It has opened it up to foreign investment. It is set
to stay at the top of the arms importers table for the remainder of the
decade. The US has displaced Russia as its largest supplier. More widely,
the government is itself fronting for big corporations interested in the
defence sector. The ‘make in India’ slogan can be defence sector led.
Therefore, the only restraint on war, the notion that it would be bad for
the economy, is not one that the government may find overly persuasive.
In fact, the political gains from a short, sharp war in which Pakistan is
taught a lesson or two may be worth the risk. Externally, it may displace
Pakistani military from the decision apex in Pakistan, enabling finally
the ascendance of the peace lobby there. Internally, a victory would prove
as good for the BJP as it was for Indira Gandhi.
Therefore, the Indian strategy is a win-win one—for itself. In case
Pakistan takes the hint, then India can proceed with its economic
trajectory unmolested. In case Pakistan does not play ball, then India
can use the economic stimulus of a brief bout of hostilities to continue,
after a short pause, down its economic trajectory.
As with any strategy, there is an element of risk. However, are
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assumptions such as of Pakistani rationality; on the economic fallout

of war; and unlikelihood of a war going nuclear, one too many? Can
it be that the conservative-realists, new to power and it sexercise, in
presenting themselves as different from their predecessors, are stretching
tad too far? Or are there military-societal explanations for the military-
Modi chemistry on display that strategic analysts cannot quite capture?
Answers will emerge, and hopefully not through a mushroom cloud.
_________________________
___________________________
Wearing Religion on their Uniform Sleeves
October 4, 2014
http://www.millenniumpost.in/NewsContent.aspx?NID=71129

If a recent newspaper report is to be believed, a Maulvi in the army has

been censured for using the salutation ‘Jai Hind’. Reading the rest of the
news story reveals that he declined to use the regimental salutations, Jai
Mata Di and Ram Ram, in vogue within his regiment, the Rajputana
Rifles. He preferred using Jai Hind instead, citing religious reasons.
Media reports have it that the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) has
alleged in his court submission that the army has denigrated Jai Hind as
a greeting.
This is far from the truth since the salutation between officers in
the army is Jai Hind. However, by not following the traditions in the
battalion, the JCO is indirectly calling these into question. He not only
thereby detracts from the entire edifice of regimental traditions but in
his public challenge to this particular one brings a major issue to the fore,
that of relationship of an orthodox version of religion with the military.
Regimentation is part of the course for members of fighting units
which all frontline infantry units are, including 3 Raj Rif, the JCO’s
current outfit. This is the difference between norms, ethics and the law.
Norms go beyond the written word. Compliance is necessary since these
units are not tasked for ‘normal’ activity. They are to go into battle, the
daunting sounds and sights of which are familiar to all across the country
post Kargil. This requires a bonding between members of the units and
a horizontal cohesion in sub-units that will enable them to go the last
hundred yards under fire.
While this can come about by shared dangers and privations of war
as conscript armies have demonstrated in military history, our army
has chosen the regimental system to keep the regimental spirit alive
and well. This owes to undemarcated borders, unresolved disputes
with neighbours and live insurgencies sometimes compelling sudden
deployment in operations. In such situations, pre-existing bonds can
sustain the fighting man. Such bonds are created in peace times through
practices that go back three centuries such as eating the same food,
speaking the same language, wearing the same uniform and sharing the
same greeting.
His challenge to the salutation in his present place of posting has
critical morale sapping connotations. A religious teacher (RT) is usually
authorised where there is a company worth of troops from a particular
religion. He has in his challenge adversely impacted the practices that the
Muslim jawans are used to. In case they see their religious teacher not
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following traditions, they can begin to doubt these. This will bring about
an avoidable divide between them and their Hindu comrades.
At one remove, Muslim soldiers who have gained immortality in
fighting for the country, ranging from Brigadier Usman to Haneefuddin,
are icons for their co-religionists. A commanding officer in Kargil swears
by their role there. Such inspiring feats have wider repercussions, leading,
for instance, to the politician Azam Khan in a display of patriotic fervour
claiming the Kargil victory as a Muslim contribution to the nation! The
prime minister was right in his observation that Muslims both live and
die for the country. Such sacrifice is generated by the identification
of soldiers with their comrades, sub-units and units, a sentiment that
traditions help foster. The RT JCO in questioning traditions and practices
is disrupting the harmony that gives rise to martial exploits. These are
important not only in themselves but also serve as a building block for
the the wider mosaic of Indian Muslim communities across India to
identify with and be proud of their army and their country.
The RT JCO cites his religious convictions as standing in the way.
Several Muslims, some of whom have been staunch believers and avid
practitioners, have gone through service without having their religion
come in way of their regimental duties. Aligarh Muslim University Vice
Chancellor Zameeruddin Shah has acknowledged as much in a recent
interview. At least one such Muslim with an unmatched reputation
of never having missed a fast in the month of Ramzan, even when in
exercises or operations, or his five-times prayer is Lt Gen Zaki, former
vice chancellor of the Jamia Millia Islamia. He was from a regiment that
continues to use Ram-Ram as its salutation.
Nevertheless, since India allows freedom to profess religion and
followers of all faiths have the right to contribute to the country’s defence,
the question is how can the RT JCO’s rights be preserved? He could well
have been transferred out of his unit to another where the traditional
greeting is Jai Hind. This would have preserved his religious convictions
and prevented the cohesion from being threatened in his unit. Since he
has chosen instead to go to the press, military justice must now take its
own course.
However, the more significant point from this episode is of the
relationship of extreme forms of religion with the military. In this case,
it is possible that the RT JCO subscribes to an orthodox version of Islam
that is seemingly less tolerant of the traditional face of subcontinental
Islam. The eclipse of the greeting ‘Khuda-hafez’ by ‘Allah-hafez’ is
symbolic and symptomatic of this version. He has perhaps been a victim
of taking a particular trend in Islam as the correct and the only version of
Islam. As a result his ultra-orthodox religious convictions have got better
of his score years of military service and his sensitivity to the injunctions
in Islam of service to the country. The trend bears watching since in
both majority’s religion, Hinduism, and Islam are each witnessing a
tussle within, in which less tolerant forms are vying to be the dominant
version of respective religion. The army cannot afford to serve as a site for
such tryst. It cannot afford controversy in which its secular credentials
are questioned. It is clear that the agenda of its Institute for National
Integration in Pune that graduates religious teachers has suddenly got
heavier.
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_______________________________
The Army: Missing Muslim India
Mainstream, Vol L No 27, June 23, 2012
June 28, 2012
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3529.html

This article begins with a set of statistics and thereafter proceeds to

discuss these. The Platinum Jubilee issue of the magazine of the Indian
Military Academy, published in 2007, has some revealing tidbits of
information. From the lists of various officer alumni who have done
the Academy proud, it is obvious that Muslims are few and far between.
Only six Muslim officers, who have passed out of the IMA, have made
the supreme sacrifice for the country since the 1971 War. Only one,
late Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has been awarded a higher
gallantry medal, a Vir Chakra, ever since then. Only one Muslim
Gentleman Cadet has won the Academy’s Sword of Honour postindependence,
with the award being won way back in 1973.
These achievements appear somewhat meagre in the light of the
Indian Muslims forming the country’s largest minority numbering
over 175 million. It naturally raises the question: Why?
An answer can seen in a further set of statistics gleaned from the
biannual magazines of the Indian Military Academy, published at the
end of the Spring and the Autumn terms respectively. In the magazines
a one-line pen-portrait is given of each Gentleman Cadet (GC) passing
out, below the course photo of each company (equivalent of a House
in schools). From the two magazine issues in 2005, it is evident that
only eight Muslims passed out of the portals of the institution to
become commissioned officers. In the Spring Term 2006, there were
eight Muslims commissioned. In the Spring Term 2007, nine Muslims
took the ‘Antim Pag’ or ‘Last Step’ as GCs but their first step as
commissioned officers out of the 555 taking commission that term.
The following Spring Term, 11 Muslim GCs passed out of 611. In the
Autumn Term 2011, the latest one for which the magazine is available,
14 Muslims passed out. However, this last figure includes those from
friendly foreign countries such as Afghanistan, the numbers for which
have gone up since the strategic agreement with that country.
In other words, of the six magazines perused for ascertaining the
numbers of Muslims gaining the officer commission from the IMA, 45
have made the grade. Assuming some were from foreign countries, less
than 40 Indian Muslims have made it over two-and-a-half years into
the Army from the IMA, that commissions more than 1200 officers a
year. This compares somewhat poorly with the civil services yearly list
on which 30 Muslims figured this year amongst about 900 who ‘made
it’. Admittedly, there are other routes for officer commission these days
into the Army, such as through the Officers Training Academy and
through the Technical Officer 12th class entry stream. This means that
the numbers making it into the Army are marginally higher and must be
viewed against the total getting commissioned in a year, which a back-ofthe-
envelope calculation puts at 1800 plus a year.
Clearly, the overall number can only be as abysmal as the statistics
accessed here reveal. While reckonings elsewhere place the percentage
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of Muslims at three per cent of the overall total of Muslims in the Army,
the statistics in regard to officer numbers have been uninformed guesses
at best. It is perhaps for the first time here that a figure of about 1.1 per
cent of officer commissions being of Indian Muslims has been arrived
at. The numbers of Muslim women officers can easily be imagined, with
the OTA magazine being the right place to look for exact numbers in the
absence of the government owing up to a problem.
The absence of information suggests that the statistics that are no
doubt known to the government are somewhat embarrassing to reveal
from the point of view of India’s and its Army’s secular credentials. It
is no wonder then that a former Chief, General J.J. Singh, had put his
foot down in revealing the details of Muslim representation in the Army
when approached by the Sachar Committee for its report. The laconic
answer given then was that the Army, being a secular institution, does
not maintain such records. This explanation begged the question of how
the mortal remains of dead soldiers were to be disposed-off in a war if
the community to which a dead soldier belonged was not known.
The intake being so limited into the commissioned ranks, it is no
wonder then that the martial achievements of Muslim officers can be
covered in less than a paragraph as in the first paragraph here. The
Autumn Term 2011 issue can be mined for more telling statistics. For
instance, not a single Muslim name occurs in the list of names below the
group photos of the Academy faculty, the administrative staff, the training
team and, worse, even the academic department. This is the same case
in the Spring Term 2008. Among the non-officer instructor staff in the
drill, physical training, weapons training and equitation sections, there
are nine Muslim instructors. Incidentally, even at this non-officer level
there are no Muslims in the consequential Training section. The relative
absence of Muslims is of a piece with the fact given in the Platinum
Number that the IMA has had only one Muslim Commandant and one
Muslim Subedar Major post-independence. (For the record the National
Defence Academy, a feeder institution to the IMA, has had two Muslim
Commandants.)
While the numbers are few, the performance of Muslims at the
Academy is also revealing. All six magazines carry photos and writeups
of the 34 top GC appointments, no doubt as incentive. Of the 136
appointments scanned only one was Muslim. Beginning with this
leadership deficit, it is easy to reckon as to why there were no officer
instructors in the two terms examined, 2008 and 2011. Not tenanting such
prestigious appointments early on, the problem persists with very few
making it to the higher ranks. This is accentuated by the steep pyramidal
structure that the Army has. In other words, there is a cascading effect
of the deficit of Muslim youth making it to the Indian Military Academy
and beyond. The Army’s stock answer to this can be anticipated. The
Army merely selects from those self-selecting to it as a profession. The
onus is on India’s various communities to offer up their best youth for
the noble profession of arms. This could easily have been accepted but for
two facts. One is that General V.K. Singh’s exertions over the past year
suggest that ‘community’ is a consequential factor, at least in the higher
ranks. The second is that, given this under-representation, it is clear that
this is compensated by over-representation of some other communities.
 150

What are the effects of such under/over-representation?

In case the answer to this question is found to be negative and
consequential, then there is a case for correction. This is a controversial
point to make since it is suggestive of affirmative action. This is not how
this article recommends corrective action. But, first, it is necessary to
ascertain whether a diverse country such as India is better off with its
Army reflecting its diversity. The reflexive answer of a traditionalist
would be, ‘Why fix what ain’t broke?’ In other words, if the Army is
working as an apolitical and secular organisation, there is no need to
tinker with it. The answer offered here is an impressionistic one to the
contrary. It is that the internal health of the Army does not give ground
for complacence.
The Army officer corps is from the lower middle class and confined
geographically to North India and more narrowly to a certain set of
communities traditionally advantaged by the recruitment patterns over
at least a century-and-a-half. The officer corps will therefore reflect the
opinions and attitudes of the social class to which it belongs. It is no
secret that there has been a churning in Indian society over the past
two decades, brought about by liberalisation and the ascendance of
cultural nationalism. This influence has been in the face of the Army’s
involvement in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism in J&K. While,
as is the wont of armies universally, the Indian Army can be expected to
exhibit a conservative-realist bias, this is accentuated by the social origin
of the officer class. The discourse in this social space has the Muslim
‘Other’ taking on greater dimensions, the proportions of which have been
enhanced by the global security discourse centred on Muslim extremism.
A terror-based ‘inside-outside’ linkage between the Muslim Indian and
Pakistani intelligence, sought to be established by the media and some
political formations, has greater play than otherwise would be the case.
A content analysis of in-service publications can prove this to an extent.
(That is not gone in here for want of space.) The absence of Muslims
from an officer’s social space as colleagues and peers does little to dispel
misinterpretations. The problem that occurs is in the perception of the
social class in which the officer corps is anchored being elevated to the
institutional threat perception and at one remove that of the state.
The disadvantage for under-represented communities is that they
are unable to take advantage of the expansion in the security sector,
incidentally the only sector growing in neoliberal climes. The Sixth
Pay Commission bonanza thus gets channelled narrowly to those
advantaged, reinforcing the inequity. Given that Muslims have been
shown up as under-represented here and knowing that most are from
the equivalent of backward classes, it can be surmised that the problem
afflicts the backward classes in general as well as SC/STs, given that the
military does not have reservations (and rightly so). This means that the
only government sector that is expanding caters for a certain section of
society. (The Army has expanded by two divisions over the past three
years and is set to add 86,000 men as part of a mountain strike corps over
the next five year plan.) Continuing with the present intake pattern can
deepen divides.
It is therefore with a view to correcting this perceptual and attitudinal
bias that it is recommended here that the telling statistic of a mere oneto-
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two per cent of officers being Muslim be taken seriously by both the
state and Muslim community. As a first step, the pattern of intake must
be ascertained in-house to find out if what is surmised here carries water.
Its implications, as discussed, can also be thought through. The Army,
if the reasoning given in the previous paragraph is persuasive, must
for its own reasons carry out a campaign to make itself attractive to a
whole host of communities that are under-represented. These include
those from the North-East and South India, leave alone Muslims. Civilmilitary
liaison conferences in these States must be geared to energising
the State administration to take corrective measures. This could include
establishing Sainik Schools, increasing the representativeness of Sainik
and Military school intake etc.
Additionally, communities, such as India’s various Muslim
communities across the country, can rig up swotting classes to help its
youth qualify and clear the induction hurdles. This is how States overrepresented
in the officer cadre prepare the youth. The Chancellor of Jamia
Millia Islamia and the Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim Universities,
coincidentally being military men, can guide the community’s reaction.
Affirmative action is not being suggested here, only targeted advertisement
campaigns being followed up suitably by state and civil society action.
________________________________
_________________________________

Why are Muslims Missing From Army?

Financial Times, 16 June 2012
June 20, 2012

The commemorative platinum jubilee issue of the Indian Military

Academy magazine tells us that only six Muslim officers who have
passed out of IMA have made the supreme sacrifice for the country since
the 1971 war. Only one, late Captain Hanee fuddin of Kargil fame, has
been awarded a higher gallantry medal, a Vir Chakra, since then. Only
one Muslim gentleman cadet has won the academy’s sword of honour
post-independence. Such meagre statistics for a minority community
comprising 13 percent of India naturally raises the question: Why?
Gen JJ Singh declined to permit access to the statistics on the numbers
ofMuslims in the army to the Sachar Committee. The reason was that the
army, as a secular institution, does not maintain religion-based statistics.
However, that it has such records is self-evident since it needs to know
how to dispose off the mortal remains of deceased soldiers in war.
Presumably, it has never got round to toting these up. This could well
turn out to be a wise decision, since the numbers would have proved
embarrassing to the secular credentials of India and its army. One
educated guesstimate puts the figure of Muslims in the army at 29,000 or
2.5 percent. To arrive at the number of officers, the consequential ranks,
the biannual magazines of the Indian Military Academy provide an
opening. The magazines carry a one-line pen portrait of each gentleman
cadet (gc). From a study of six issues over the recent past (2005-11), it
is evident only 45 have made it to the ‘antim pag’ or final step to the
cadences of Auld Lang Syne. The figure includes those from friendly
foreign countries such as Afghanistan. Since the IMA commissions over
 152

1,300 GCs a year, this implies that just about one per cent Muslims gain
the officers’ commission from the Academy.
Admittedly, there are other routes for officers’ commission. This
means that the numbers making it are marginally higher and must be
viewed against the 1,800 getting commissioned a year. The number of
Muslim women officers can be easily imagined. These compare some
what poorly with the civil services list on which 30 Muslims figured this
year amongst about 900 that ‘made it’.
Not only are Muslims few, but are also wanting in leadership potential.
Of the 136gc appointments scanned in the six biannual issues, only one
was Muslim. Beginning with this leadership deficit, it is easy to reckon
as to why there were no officer instructors in two terms (2008 and 2011)
examined by studying faculty photos. There is not a single Muslim name
in the training faculty, the administrative staff and worse, even the
academic department. Among the non-officer instructors there are nine
Muslims. Not tenanting such prestigious appointments early on, the
problem persists with very few making it to higher ranks. The academy
has had only one Muslim Commandant and one Subedar Major since
Independence.
In other words, there is a cascading effect of the deficit of Muslim
youth making it to officer ranks. Assimilating these facts, first one has to
ascertain whether a diverse country such as is India is better off with its
army reflecting its diversity. The reflexive answer of a traditionalist can
easily be anticipated:
If the army is working as an apolitical and secular organisation, there
is no need to ‘tinker’ with it.
A view to the contrary would be that there is a double disadvantage
to under-representation: one is that fewer numbers represent a handicap
at the standing start, and second is not gaining access to consequences of
representation such as the Sixth Pay Commission bonanza. The former
makes the equity gap only widen, adding to the deficit at the start.
This makes the representativeness of the army, or otherwise, a political
question.
While affirmative action is not the answer, an internal review by
the ministry can throw up any attitudinal and structural biases these
statistics suggest. As a firststep, the army must carry out a campaign to
attract a whole host of under-represented communities, such as those
from the Northeast. This has been done by the central armed police
forces over the past decade of expansion that has brought up Muslim
numbers to 6 percent.
Additionally, Muslims can set up swatting classes to help its youth.
The courts cannot be oblivious to the fact that India’s Muslims are wellOn
Peace in South Asia 79
represented only in prison statistics, comprising 19 percent of inmates.
The government must gear up political courage to put the courts, and
wider society, wise to facts that otherwise stare India in the face.

_______________________________
 153

Fixing Responsibility CI Decisions and Consequences

Kashmir Times
August 29, 2011

Over 2100 bodies are reportedly in 80 odd graves scattered across four
districts of North Kashmir. These are apparently unidentified, of which
over 500 are reckoned to be of local residents with little to do with
insurgency. It is possible that some of the 10000 cases being pursued by
Parents of Disappeared Persons can be laid to rest in case the bodies are
identified. By extrapolation, there could be a similar number in South
Kashmir and south of the Pir Panjals, totaling, say, 5000. Assuming
that one third were militants validly engaged and another third were
collateral casualties in firefights, there are still over 1500 who may
have been innocent victims. Where does the responsibility rest for such
uncalled for deaths?
That those who pull the trigger cannot escape responsibility is quite
clear. This would imply the soldiers and their immediate superiors are
culpable. This is the legacy of the Nuremberg trials in which the excuse
of acting on a superior’s orders does not hold water. Manifestly illegal
orders are not to be complied with. The faculties of judgment of counter
insurgents are expected to adequately sensitised to the legal regime while
in training for deployment. This implies that they have the ‘software’
necessary to discern the legality of their acts as also verify against their
internal moral and rational compass, whether orders received are legal
or otherwise.
The legal regime in question is centered round Common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions. It makes clear that violence to life of persons
not taking active part in hostilities is prohibited at any time and place
in the setting of a conflict not of an international character. Article 13
of Additional Protocol II which develops Common Article 3 protects
civilians not taking part in hostilities. The international tribunals set
up for trials of international humanitarian law offenders in the Balkans
and Africa, would term such deaths as ‘grave breaches’ of international
humanitarian law for which perpetrators bear an individual criminal
responsibility. The Rome Statute includes murder in Article 7 on ‘crimes
against humanity’.
The responsibility cannot, however, be restricted to those who pull
the trigger. Those who give such orders and those who are responsible
to oversee that such orders are not given are also blameworthy. While
Additional Protocol I restricts itself to international armed conflict, it
makes clear in its Articles 85-87 that there is a duty of commanders to
repress breaches and a responsibility to act in case of such instances. That
the Additional Protocol II is barely one third the length of Protocol I
resulted in these provisions not finding mention. Article 6 of the Rome
Statue of the International Criminal Court includes within individual
criminal responsibility the superior’s act of omission or commission,
stating that an act done by a subordinate ‘does not relieve his or her
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.’
 154

There are two rungs so far addressed in this discussion – the tactical
one at which the breaches occur and the supervisory – operational level.
Since the security forces in Kashmir have been under control of their
respective hierarchies, that such instances have occurred, implies that
the operational level, from the division to the corps, is culpable. However,
this is to restrict responsibility to the sword arm of the state. What
about those at the directional politico-military level both in uniform
at Udhampur and those out of uniform, the civilian administration at
Srinagar and Delhi?
While it can be taken for granted that no orders to the effect have been
given in writing, at this level is responsibility for the kind of command
climate extant that makes for a permissiveness or otherwise of such a
situation. An argument can be anticipated that a permissive environment
was occasioned by the complexity and compulsions of the situation.
The challenge to the state, particularly acute in the nineties, required
regrettable measures for the self-protection of the state. The survival of the
state calls for a higher order morality over riding the otherwise credible
concerns with human rights. In any case, the state was functioning under
the limitations of its instruments, such as the criminal justice system.
Further, the situation could have been much worse as can be witnessed
from counter insurgency actions taken by peer states. At one remove, the
silence of public opinion, the power of which is so visible currently on the
streets in the anti-corruption agitation, apparently vindicates the state.
This is taken as mitigating the state’s position somewhat.
Yet, the onus of this cannot be laid at the door of India alone, but
must be shared with the terror minders across the Line of Control. The
proxy war they unleashed was with the very intent of resulting violations
of human, political and civil rights bringing the population on to their
side. In other words, those who provoked the violence in first place and
stand to benefit from the consequences need to be apportioned their fair
share in any blame.
It can be seen that affixing responsibility makes the exercise end up a
blame game. What then must emerge from the finding of the preliminary
finding of the SHRC? Two parameters are consequential. One is of justice
to the victims in the instant case and, second, safeguarding against
future such instances, possibly already ongoing elsewhere in the country
such as in Central India and in the glacial action in the Gujarat carnage.
Realistically, it is hardly likely that the state has the capacity, or indeed the
intent, for the former. Given this, preserving India from future instances
would be difficult.
As for the future, a lesson needs being drawn from the anti-corruption
agitation culminating currently. There appears scope for exerting civil
society pressures. Marginalisation of the human rights discourse, despite
the valourous endeavour of activists, owes to the framing of the wider
discourse in inter-state, ‘us versus them’ terms. This needs over-turning
to make human rights violations anywhere an existential threat to India’s
democratic credentials and aspirations. For this, the argument in defence
of policy, covered earlier, requires refuting.
India creates itself or is constituted through its actions. Middle class
India cannot be indifferent to human rights violations of people on the
periphery of its consciousness and expect India’s hard won freedoms to
 155

be preserved. A rephrasing of Anna Hazare’s take on the ‘second’ freedom

struggle is necessary. The struggle for freedom is continually ongoing. If
all pervasive corruption can take a beating, so can and must the idea of
impunity.

_________________________________
AFSPA: A Question of Justice
June 1, 2012
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/news.aspx?ndid=28532

A report in The Hindu has it that, ‘In the past four years alone, the Home
Ministry has rejected at least 42 requests to sanction the prosecution of
military personnel found by the police to have engaged in crimes such
as murder, homicide and rape in Kashmir …’ Since the government does
not have a written policy, its policy has to be inferred from its actions.
In this case its action, or inaction, suggests that it is wary of permitting
prosecutions of members of its armed forces, even though it has the
power to do so under the AFSPA Section 6 (for North East) and Section
7 (for J&K).
The report acquires significance due to the Supreme Court pulling up
the Army on the eve of Republic Day for stalling the prosecution in the
2000 Pathribal encounter case, initiated by the CBI against five officers.
This is one among a few high profile cases that include Macchel in which
three men killed were portrayed as crossing the Line of Control; the
Malom case that provoked Irom Sharmila’s fast and the Manorama Devi
case that had led to the Jeevan Reddy committee review of the operation
of the AFSPA in the North East.
Procedurally, the cases that come up to the Home Ministry for
decision have had preliminary investigation done by the police making
apparent that the armed force investigated has exceeded its brief in
acting in aid to civil authority. The Home Ministry’s hand is possibly
held up by the recommendation it receives from the Ministry of Defence,
where the Army is concerned. Where the Central Armed Police Forces
are concerned, the Ministry has direct accountability for these. Yet it is
reticent.
Where the military is concerned, the Army can dispose-off the
case under the Army Act in case the Home Ministry does not permit
prosecution by civil courts. This can be expected to preserve military
cohesion and morale, prevent military men from being prosecuted in civil
courts where their rights may be ignored in the surcharged atmosphere
and it will strengthen the military judicial system and command
authority. Such prosecutions could well have been proceeded with but
for the case pending a decision with the Home Ministry. The time lapse
makes the case more difficult to pursue, but it can still be opened under
military law. In any case, for the Army to proceed, it would first require an
indication that the Home Ministry is not permitting prosecution by the
judicial system, since a person cannot be tried twice over. This explains
why no action is usually taken in some cases of egregious violence: the
reason being that that file is awaiting decision.
The problem with such a defence is that it virtually negates the utility
 156

of Section 6/7. While the section was to prevent motivated litigation

against military men in the performance of duty, insertion of the section
enables democratic control over the military. While military law can
cope with most acts of omission and commission, where acts are ‘beyond
the pail’ or have acquired strategic contours, there is a case for the Home
Ministry to exercise of its powers. If the Ministry needs a ‘push’, the
parliamentary committee overseeing the Ministry could scrutinise its
action and members of parliament can raise parliamentary questions as
to the process followed.
The problem that arises in not using the power with the Center is that
it sends the wrong message to the people in the disturbed areas. Healing
gets postponed. Second, the military gets a feeling of impunity. Allowing
prosecutions helps deter violations. This is useful for military discipline.
Third, good governance implies upholding the laws and the Constitution.
Where it is felt that the military may not do justice adequately for
organisational reasons, such as preserving morale, protecting the chain
of command, hiding misdemeanours, covering up earlier misreporting
etc., then the civil courts must be allowed to step in.
A valid concern would be that the judiciary in affected areas may
be more harsh than warranted and the very process, that is bound to
be extended and emotionally charged, would expose military men to
personal risk. Innocent army men may suffer the indignity of being
mishandled by over-zealous policemen, prosecutors and mischievous
lawyers of the opposition. This can be addressed by having either fast
track courts appropriately located in secure areas, or by moving the
trials to a neighbouring state. Alternatively, the Defence Ministry must
monitor the cases in question and the results broadcast. Withholding
prosecution with the laconic comment that ‘no cause is made out’ does
little to inspire confidence in the system.
Another valid concern would be on the consequences of such
prosecution. A view is that morale will go down of the armed forces if
extremists are allowed to get away with legal hurdles. The rank and file
would be less willing to take initiative and risk. This would impede future
counter insurgency effort, allowing the insurgent greater space. The
problem with this line of argument is that it seems to suggest that cutting
corners should be permissible. It disregards the overall counter insurgency
paradigm that the means are as important as the ends. Permissive
atmosphere for violations only fuels the insurgency. Lastly, it downgrades
the premium on leadership. The military leader is expected to deliver on
morale, discipline and effectiveness, even while the state must hold his
hand. The criterion of ‘good faith’ is a leadership judgment that must be
judiciously exercised by the military leader in appraising the act.
Details of exemplary punishments awarded since the start of the
insurgency in Kashmir, given on the Northern Command website, are
given in the table:
It is clear that only the first serial amounts to a consequential
punishment. That the numbers have been released into the public domain
suggests that the military is satisfied with its record. A second opinion, of
its civilian masters, can be necessary balancer, since it is not self-evident
that the military can be relied on entirely for dispensing justice. Its efforts
need to be supplemented by the civilian judicial system, for which the
 157

two Ministries need to exercise their powers.

One aspect that acts as hold up, liable to be missed, is that some
actions are under the rubric of intelligence operations, a kind of reverse
‘propaganda by deed’. For instance, the link made out by, among others,
Pankaj Mishra, of the Pathribal case to the Chittisingpora massacre of
Sikhs, and in turn the Clinton visit to India of 2000, suggest an intelligence
operation that went wrong in its cover up. It possibly had clearance at a
higher level than which it was executed. The government’s reluctance is
therefore understandable. It perhaps does not want to allow prosecutions
in some cases and not in others.
A suggestion by Siddharth Varadarajan was that the government
must give more than a one line answer as to why it is not permitting
prosecution. The government could withhold permission in such cases
by resort to the ‘national security’ excuse, even as it allows the other cases
to go through.
Setting a precedent is important. If the past is guide, India will be
faced with similar problems ahead. It must establish a ‘best practices’
scheme now by facing up to the detritus of its otherwise comparatively
remarkably successful and humane counter insurgency campaigns.

_________________________________

Do We Need a Chief Warlord?

The Financial World—Delhi
September 10, 2012

In a recent article, former Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak

Kapoor, has weighed in against the idea of a permanent chairman of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee. One among a series of selective leaks
of the Naresh Chandra Task Force report suggests that the task force
has recommended making the appointment of the head of the COSC a
permanent one.
The leaks are themselves trial balloons sent up by a government unable
to arrive at decisions on the merits. Aware of lacking the political heft to
implement the seeven if it could do so, the leaks create a storm that it can
then point to for lack of consensus and consequently a decision. It does
not see its role as exerting to create the consensus. In this case, Deepak
Kapoor’s article, taken as reflecting the position of his former service,
will help forestall decisions, since he would be seen as voicing the army’s
position. That would be a pity, since holding out for a CDS as Deepak
Kapoor’s ‘all or nothing’ position has it, is the worse option.
This owes to the nuclear context and the ever-present possibility of
war, brought home most recently in the foreign minister’s remark on the
eve of his meeting with his Pakistani counterpart, ‘The consequences for
Pakistan would be disastrous.’ This was to reinforce India’s deterrence
of terror provocation. However, the problem is in India being hoist by
its own petard, which in theory is the ‘commitment trap’. To ensure that
such disaster for Pakistan does not also turn into a disaster for India,
there is a need to have a military bridge between India’s conventional and
nuclear capabilities.
Currently, none exists. The Strategic Forces Command manages
 158

India’s nuclear deterrent. However, its C-in-Chas two masters. In theory,

he reports to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is hard to see
how the Chairman COSC, a rotating appointment that Naresh Chandra
seeks to make permanent, can possibly oversee the SFC.
While challenging enough in peacetime with the chairman, doublehatted
as boss of his service alongside, it would be quite a tall order in war.
He would require conducting the operations of his service, integrating
those of the three services for a joint campaign, and also overseeing the
nuclear-conventional interface. It is for this reason that Naresh Chandra
perhaps wants a permanent incumbent. At least he would not be straddled
with overseeing any particular service and would, hopefully, be beyond
its parochialism in order to serve as a single point source of advice to the
civilian master.
While the discussion could benefit by reflection, such as General
Kapoor’s, on the demerits of the organizational reform, it would need to
take on board the advantage. The primary one is in monitoring impact
on the nuclear level of what is going on militarily on the conventional
level in war.
Currently, it is possible that in practice the National Security Adviser
oversees the SFC in his capacity as head of the Executive Council of the
Nuclear Command Authority.
This is, to say the least, a strange arrangement. Nuclear watcher
Bharat Karnad, in a recent expose of the arrangement suggests that the
NSA relies on a retired head of SFC for fulfilling his nuclear-related role.
This arrangement clearly calls for further institutionalisation. Naresh
Chandra possibly has an answer.
SM Krishna’s terse observation, if not threat, recounted above
suggests that India is preparing a military counter to any major terror
attack by Pakistan. In such a case, escalation could occur depending on
the Pakistani counter.
If this results in a conventional tryst, then limitation needs being
foregrounded. Advice on this, alongside linked nuclear related reactions,
would be required. This has to be done at a mechanism one step removed
from the action, such as by a permanent chairman of the COSC.
He would be on the Executive Council to both advise the Political
Council alongside the NSA and work the nuclear-relevant reaction as
ordered by the Political Council through the NSA. This way there is a
military link between the Nuclear Command Authority and the SFC.
Secondly, the headless HQ Integrated Defence Staff would gain aleader
and an agenda. It could provide the control staff for the SFC since a line
headquarter as is the SFC cannot also be its own judge.
Lastly, Kapoor’s CDS imagined as a warlord over all three services,
has an underside. He would not be in a position to advise the government
since it would amount to judging his own case. Such an appointment has
potential for a folly of Hindenberg-Ludendorf proportions, praetorian
figures from Germany’s World War I past.
Therefore, to write off the task force report may not do for the
government. It will have to demonstrate it exists. If it fears that push
comes to shove as its foreign minister thinks, then it had better emerge
from somnolence. Better still would be if it gives up threats and settles
with Pakistan through getting SM Krishna to talk meaningfully. Then it
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would not manufacture a threat where none need exist.

______________________________________
The Sub-Unit Cries for Army Attention
The Financial World—Delhi
August 27, 2012

The army has been in the news for the wrong reasons lately. The reasons
have to do both with the good health at the top, among the brass and
at the lower levels, the spear end. While the former has hogged the
headlines, there are good reasons to leave the latter to the army’s own
ministrations.
It is quite obvious that with over 200 years’ institutional memory of
man management practices, increased interaction with foreign armies,
academic exposure to management studies, first-hand knowledge, and a
better educated threshold on intake, the army is competent to navigate
the social and material change it is inevitably beset with. The aim here is
to bring to fore the aspect of cohesion, one that can help it tide over the
problems.
When a candidate officer or soldier looks up at a billboard demanding
to know: ‘Do you have it in you?’, what exactly is ‘it’ is left to the
accompanying photos to suggest. These depict a life extraordinary: of
fun, adventure, odds, risk, outdoors, technology, camaraderie. In effect,
the poster asks whether he has a ‘need’: a need for adventure, glory,
friendship, physical and mental challenge, altruistic service etc. Those
with such needs are to self-select the profession of arms to help them
fulfill these needs. The youth pledges his life in return. While the service
environment, both in field and peace, caters to this, the possibilities are
maximised in war.
In peace time, needs are met largely by the organisational hierarchy
from the wider army to the rifle company. While pay, perks and welfare
form the formal package, the operational environment in the field either
of counter insurgency and high altitude deployment and hectic round
in peace stations of competitions, visits, operational exercises, firing
practices, military relevant ritual like parades, socialization practices,
courses, patrols etc. All this makes for organisational cohesion. In war,
the organisation provides the operational context that enables fulfillment
of needs. However, the critical difference is that the horizon of the soldier
constricts from the vast expanse of the cantonment, counter insurgency
grid or parade ground plenty, to his foxhole, tank and gun. Thus, in
the outbreak of war, the organisation is suddenly and dramatically,
substituted by his subunit and, more immediately, his squad, troop or
section. What needs ensuring then is that the identities of these seemingly
less significant entities at the bottom of the organisational ladder are
fostered and maintained.
In war, the members of this primary group rely on the group for
their mutual, collective and individual needs. This is enabled through
the process of primary group bonding in which the member relies on
his team mates for survival and they in turn on him, thereby not only
enhancing his life chances but also fulfilling his needs ranging from
physiological to psychological.
 160

Since the primary group exists for an organisational purpose in

the form of operational objectives, positive articulation of horizontal
integration is by vertical integration, or cohesion of the command
channel. Horizontal and vertical integration therefore are prerequisites
for combat success. This is a bare bones distillation of received knowledge
from an academic field enhanced by the contributions of the likes of
Lord Moran, Bartov, Stouffer, Marshall, Shils and Janowitz, Gabriel and
Savage, Charles Moskos and Nora Kinzer Stewart, among others. India’s
wars, as any reading of regimental histories and autobiographies tells
us, have only reinforced the observation that the identity of the subunit
needs nurturing.
A reiteration of this timeless piece of military wisdom may well be
against the management ethic increasingly in evidence and universally
so. With the organisation looming large, particularly in military stations,
subunits and sub-subunits are under the threat of marginalisation in the
hectic scheme of things. There is no gainsaying that the smell of cordite
and crack of the weapon can easily recreate the primary group in quick
time. Nevertheless, the expectation of short wars in future suggests that
a higher threshold of primary group bonding may well be the difference
between effectiveness and efficiency.
The remedies are no doubt at different levels. As has been pointed
out by a former vice chief in a recent newspaper column, incessant
deployments in unending counterinsurgency or on unresolved borders
is one area for the government’s intervention.
In any case, that would still leave the military to revert to the radical
ethic. Its problems finding their way into the headlines suggest that the
balance between the organisations’ space and that of the subunit has been
upset in favour of the former. It is time to recreate the primary group, a
task well within the military’s capability and hopefully its attention.
____________________________

Civil-Military Relations: Questioning the VK

Singh Thesis
June 13, 2012
General VK Singh’s perspective on civil-military relations needs
interrogation for it can be expected to carry at least some subscription
within the services. The general, now retired, outlined the perspective
that in case civilian supremacy is not rooted in ‘justice and fairness’, it
must be ‘resisted’. A PTI report has him elaborating on the concept five
days into retirement that military obedience was meant only for ‘correct’
orders.
The general is right in saying, “If the order is wrong, stand up
and say that the order is wrong.” The assumption is that the level of
understanding at the level at which the order is received is appropriate
for arriving at a judgment if an order is ‘wrong’. The military obligation
is then to ‘stand up’ for what is ‘right’. However, there are two problems
with this assumption. One is when an issue has a political and a strategic
dimension. While the military is entitled to determine the latter, it has
its limitations in respect to the former. The second is what to do next. Is
resistance the best recourse to take?
Military ethics are clear on this. Where there is a disagreement with
 161

civilian authority, the military professional having tendered his military

advice, can opt for being relieved of his responsibilities or resign.
‘Shirking’ or not following up with due energy and dispatch is one way of
going slow on orders. However, General Singh’s advice - to ‘resist’ - will
find few supporters.
Can a military ‘resist’? When can it do so? To General Singh, this
can be done “if we are to protect the institutional integrity of the armed
forces.” The argument would imply that it is the responsibility of an
institutional head to protect institutional integrity. This is necessary
in order that the institution fulfills its social obligation effectively and
efficiently. Failure to do so will open it up to abuse.
For instance, the manner in which the political and bureaucratic
players have been allowed to interfere in the police function reflects
poorly on the police leadership, and also contributes to the decline in law
and order. The military cannot afford to go down the similar route. This
would require the apex military leadership to take a ‘stand’, wherever
appropriate and appropriately at that.
However, defining the threats and judging whether orders violate
‘justice and fairness’ is difficult. Take, for instance, the case of the Kargil
War. The aim set by the political leadership was that the intruders be
evicted. The parameter set was that the Line of Control should not be
crossed.
This parameter forced the army to take more casualties during the
military operations than would have otherwise been the case. In fact,
General VP Malik had admitted as much later. But, in the event, he went
about the task without demur, even if with reservations.
Taking a counter-factual example, in case he had appreciated that
this was not possible, does it mean he could have ‘resisted’? There would
have been other steps that could have been taken, such as asking the
political leadership to review the parameter. No self-respecting political
leadership could conceivably have gone against military advice in such a
case. Assuming for the sake of argument, if the political leadership had
been adamant, despite its error, would that have justified resistance from
the military leadership? The general could have tendered his resignation,
forcing the political head either to review the decision or get a new chief
with a different plan.
Resorting to Peter Feaver’s concept on ‘principal-agent’ relationship,
elaborated in his Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military
Relations (Harvard University Press, 2003), can help answer this. The
principal in the democratic scheme is the civilian leadership. It is
authorised to set and approve the grand strategy. It has greater access to
information since other instruments of power, such as the intelligence
and the foreign service, are answerable to it. It has a better sense of how
to integrate the military instrument in the wider scheme of things.
The military, being but an agent, is handicapped in judging the ‘justice
and fairness’ of orders received. While fully empowered to vigourously
present its case, it can only do so through established channels and
to the extent that it is not insubordinate. These limits are a matter of
judgment in which socialisation has a role to play. Feaver concludes that
the civilians have the ‘right to be wrong’ and will be held accountable by
the democratic processes, and not by the military.
 162

That VK Singh’s version is contrary to the above argument perhaps

explains some civil-military problems over the recent past. A leading
military theorist, Srinath Raghavan (‘Soldiers, Statesmen, and India’s
Security Policy’, India Review, 11(2), 2012, pp. 116–133), suggests that
the army virtually exercises veto on AFSPA and Siachen. The question
is moot whether institutional integrity is being mistaken for national
security.
Even though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent response on
controversies in the military was that ‘silence is golden’, it is perhaps time
the government too ‘stood up’ for its own ‘right to be wrong’.

___________________________________
Readings for Officers
June 4, 2012
http://www.claws.in/SW-Autumn2010.pdf

The profession of arms has a striking disadvantage for its practitioners.

This is that opportunities for its practice are few and far between. In all of
India’s wars, only a partial fraction of the army has been exposed to the
cut and thrust of combat. Therefore, the substance of the profession has
to be acquired vicariously. However, the nature of continual deployment
in field areas comprising either counterinsurgency or in difficult terrain
and weather conditions makes up for the lack of exposure to high
intensity war. Ironically, a job well done in the former leads to deterrence
and consequently lack of experience of war. Nevertheless, even while
accretion of experience may be had along a career span, there is a case for
reading not only to supplement it but more importantly to make sense
of it.
The army is already cognizant of this. It has an introductory course
to military studies at the academy stage in the form of a military
history capsule. The text for this requires a definite makeover, not only
in content and readability, but also its presentation. Even though the
subject is broached in sessions with the DS, rather than left solely to AEC
instructors, serious academic attention is recommended.
The next stage is in the unit, under a watchful 2iC. But given the pace
of life these days, the mentorship system has all but vanished. Reading is
more eclectic and less curricular. The Part B and Part D promotion exams
are there for enhancing exposure. But, connotations associated with
‘exams’, do little to nudge officers into reading. Reading is nevertheless
a popular pastime, with officers usefully taking to self-development and
management related books. This is all for the good, indicating that the
intent and energy exist and could be usefully capitalized on. What then
needs to be done?
A change over at the Staff Course entrance exam stage from replicating
the pattern of promotion exams in the Military History paper, of a
campaign study and biographies, to a more contextual Military Studies
paper may be useful. A wider mandatory reading can be prepared by the
MT 2, comprising selections from its Golden Hundred. This could cover
the gamut of military studies including technology, military history,
military sociology, strategy and international relations. This need not be
confined to Indian texts or experience. Since an officer is aware of when
 163

he is to come up for the exam, preparation in terms of reading can start

even half a decade earlier. This would get the officer acquainted with the
context of his profession, even while the other papers test the content bit.
The exam questions can be framed in line with that of the net for defence
and strategic studies. Past papers are available at the UGC website for
reference.
It is an ill-informed belief that officers at the spear end and tactical
level can do without contextual knowledge and sensitivity. This is a sure
fire way to create Colonel Blimps. This conception has already changed.
Great strides have been made such as placing a plethora of reading on the
intranet and Wan, such as notably that of the Junior Command course.
It is important to keep the challenge stern enough for those rising in
their careers to ultimately make their minds receptive to demands at
the operational and strategic levels. While all would of course not be so
privileged, they would be none the worse off since it would better prepare
them for exit into the civilian world.
As part of reading habits, once the initial set is consumed such as the
timeless one by Major KC Praval, the officer is ready for the next higher
level. The India specific set need not be restricted to wars and biographies
of military heroes. While books such as those of LP Sen, John Dalvi,
DK Palit etc are available information libraries, academic works need to
supplement their narration. These include earlier output of authors such
as Sumit Ganguly and the more recent one by military historian Srinath
raghavan on conflicts of the Nehruvian era. Works by academics, such
as Kaushik Roy and Sundaram, need the encouragement of purchase,
review and mention.
Ever since India’s rise, its military has gained academic attention.
Works interpreting India’s rise, such as by Stephen Cohen, S Paul
Kapur, Peter Lavoy etc., are useful since these are based on access to
india’s strategic community. The work of Kanwal, Manpreet Sethi and
Raja Menon helps grapple with military issues including the exotic
nuclear ‘backdrop’. This helps in acquainting the practitioner with the
significance of operational engagements, such as, for instance, proactive
stance preparedness or raisings of mountain divisions. There being an
anachronistic sanction against talking ‘shop’ in messes, it is perversely
taken as infra-dig to discuss such issues. Suffice it to say this can only be
tyranny of insecure seniors.
Care needs to be taken by libraries to tap the higher end book
market such as that of Routledge and Sage. The Sixth Pay Commission
emoluments surely make these accessible. Numerous defence ‘glossies’
now are in the market with veterans and the defence industry driving
ideas and selling products. Websites of Service think tanks, such as
this one, keep the officer updated. Web groups of course-mates enable
circulation of material for reference at leisure. A discerning eye needs to
be cultivated so as to not lose time chasing down quality reading. The
military profile of generals such as Petraeus, Panag etc indicates that
reading provides ballast to careers. That should be incentive enough in
this competitive world to sometimes also take a book to bed!
 164

A General’s Unforgettable Legacy

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main52.asp?filename=Fw250512general.asp

If a party was to be held in South Block on the day the chief dons civvies,
on 31 May to be precise, it would be understandable. He has exposed
the underbelly of the ministry’s procurement system in going public
with the Tatra bribe offer; disrobed the Defence Estates’ civilians over
misappropriation of land in the Adarsh scam; and by bluntly referring to
the ‘hollowness’ of his force, has shown up the bureaucrats as the stumbling
block within. He may well go down in history for the chasm inadvertently
revealed between the ministry and the military, in his supposed ‘spooking’
of the ministry through unprogrammed military movements.
To his detractors, he would be remembered for his self-interested
exertions to extend his tenure into the next year by the unprecedented
dragging of the government to the Supreme Court. Even well-wishers
in the Army and in civil society cringe at the implicit suggestion that at
least one of his predecessors was communal, favouring his community
in a proverbial ‘succession’ list, and that at least two of his predecessors
were corrupt.
And now, his swan song. The general appears to have attempted the
last-minute sabotage of the career of one of his successors, who stood
to gain by the alleged manipulation of the general’s date of brith in his
show cause notice this week to the 3 Corps commander on a botched
intelligence operation. The unfortunate implication—that in doing so he
may firstly be exhibiting a communal prejudice of his own, and secondly,
be helping someone as yet unidentified who he is more inclined towards
thereby furthering the malady—seems to escape him.
However, his lasting legacy would be in his fight to get his brainchild
through, that of getting the government to accept an expansion on the
China front by a mountain strike corps comprising two specialised
divisions amounting to another 86,000 troops. This has been his
handiwork beginning with his study report on the army’s ‘transformation’
in his previous appointment as Eastern Army Commander.
At least some of the impetus of his differences with the bureaucracy
owed to the government’s going slow on this proposal. It had earlier cited
the downslide in the economy to undercut it. In the event, the leak of
his letter to the prime minister—part of the wider mudslinging match
between the two institutional sides—resulted in the parliamentary
committee’s endorsement and the government’s acceding to the
expansion at the Unified Commanders conference.
While security concerns have been deployed for legitimising the
expansion, the factor of institutional interest is intrinsic. A way the army
can continue setting the agenda in face of big ticket purchases impacting
relative salience of the services, such as the MMRCA, the Vikramaditya
and Arihant etc, is through gaining a strike corps. For a chief to have
gone out on a limb to progress this amounts to an investment in not only
a legacy but also a future.
His pro-Anna campaign remarks of last year have already elicited an
invite from the Anna campaign to join up. Further, the chief’s ending
of his tenure in a flurry of addresses at ex-servicemen rallies provides a
clue on his motives, since, incidentally, ESM are the lookout of a civilian
 165

department within the ministry. Given that the chief has blown any
chance of a post-retirement sinecure from the government, he has taken
care to create a constituency for himself. Since recruitment will benefit
traditional recruiting areas, the Chief has single-handedly gifted these
communities a lifeline.
BUT GERMANE to the legacy is the strategic course he has set
India on. The mountain strike corps follows raisings of two mountain
divisions in a defensive role. This means that India’s erstwhile posture
of ‘dissuasive deterrence’ on the China front is firmed in. However, the
military thrust lately has been towards an ‘active deterrence’ posture.
This means adding offensive punch.
This is of a piece with India’s proactive and offensive posture on the
Pakistan front, exemplified by the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Though the
general had earlier placed the doctrine in cold storage by disavowing
from it, he backtracked at the peak of his DOB crisis on Army Day by
saying that it remains on the cards.
Whether this helps Indian security is moot. The jury will have to
consider whether this generates an avoidable security dilemma between
neighbours. Theory has it that even defensive exertions can lead to an
action-reaction arms race cycle, that can precipitate the conflict they are
designed to deter. The ‘two front’ scenario is crystallising, not least by
India’s actions.
The general in setting off a self-fulfilling prophecy is set to have the
satisfaction of saying while fading away, ‘I told you so!’

____________________________________________
Army ‘Transformation’: A ‘Radical’ One?
January 17, 2011
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
ArmyTransformationARadicalOne_aahmed_170111

The defensive orientation of India’s strategic culture was pinpointed

by George Tanham in the early nineties. This approach has been much
criticised in strategic commentary and in military literature. A consensus
for a more assertive strategic culture and posture is in the process of
being built up.
A news report suggests that this impetus for change has finally put
military reforms on the anvil.1 The proposed changes, due to be effected
beginning March-April, are likely to be as follows:
According to the news report, ‘One of the most critical proposals is
the creation of a Strategic Command, under which the three Strike Corps
would be brought together.’
Either the South Western or the Southern Command headquarters
will be changed into the headquarter of the Strategic Command.
A proposal for the raising of a mountain strike corps is with the
ministry.
Governmental imprimatur to the plan has in all likelihood been
given. The report states: ‘A dependable Army source said the plan is now
set to be rolled out. A defence ministry source said the ministry would go
along with the proposed reforms.’
The change is part of the ‘transformation’ study undertaken under the
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leadership of the chief of the army staff, during his earlier stint as eastern
army commander. Rumors regarding the study have been around for about
three years. Since it was confidential, little discussion has been possible
on the subject. Now that the contours of the makeover are in the public
domain, more informed analyses and critiques have become possible. This
commentary attempts to pinpoint the issues on which a debate is likely to
ensue - with the caveat that the report is taken to be partially factual rather
than a red herring, for the purposes of sustaining a debate.
1 Josy Joseph, ‘Indian Army set for its most radical revamp,’ Times of India,
January 13, 2011.
Contextualising the change involves locating it in the continuum
of organisational evolution. The mechanisation of the eighties had
two strike corps poised for riposte or counter offensive, based on the
assumption that an offensive, military-led Pakistan would be first off
the block. Thereafter, the holding corps were to absorb the offensive and
the strike corps would be deployed to either retrieve losses, or better still,
to punish Pakistan. The conflict ending would see the two sides at the
negotiation table trading the gains made in terms of captured territory
-the victor being the one who makes greater territorial gains and suffers
less damage. The HQs of the IPKF on its return from Sri Lanka, were
re-designated the HQ 21 Corps and the newly raised 33 Mechanised
Division was converted into India’s third armoured division. India thus
managed to gain a 3:2 advantage over Pakistan in terms of strike corps.
The straitened circumstance of the nineties and the opportunity smelt
by Pakistan in Kashmir contributed to India’s inability to deter proxy war.
India had the ability to deter any Pakistani intent to follow up its subconventional
offensive with a conventional offensive (The ‘Op TOPAC’
scenario). The nuclear backdrop, the economic circumstances of the
early years of liberalisation and coalition governments limited offensive
options. The offensive mindset was instead evident on an ‘active’ Line
of Control from the mid nineties onwards. This, among other reasons,
culminated in the Kargil War - if Musharraf’s autobiography and other
Pakistani sources are to be believed. By then the Shakti tests and the
counter tests at Chagai had altered the nuclear dimension from ‘recessed’
to overt.
Increased provocation by Pakistan under nuclear cover to the extent
of targeting the Parliament in a terror attack combined with the NDA
regime’s self-image of being more defence-oriented, fostered the offensive
tendency in strategic culture. This has been consciously built into the
‘Cold Start’ doctrine. The ‘holding’ corps became ‘pivot corps’, with a
capability for a limited offensive in real time. The strike corps with faster
mobilisation were to be launched or located in a game of posturing. This
enabled the creation of a wide-front with multiple pivot corps offensives
going in and a strike corps under each command, poised in its wake,
creating a decision predicament for the adversary whose assets would be
under attrition from the air. The disquiet this generated in Pakistan has
prompted the Army Chief to lower the profile of Cold Start.
It is at this juncture that ‘Transformation’ comes into the picture.
The first question is ‘why?’ The Army HQ gets so involved with
the business of running the war or posturing, that it risks losing sight
of the bigger picture. Having intervening HQs to manage operational
 167

level offensives would allow it to take the strategic view. The latter is
particularly important in the nuclear backdrop and in the absence of
a CDS. This intervening HQ will free the Army HQ for inter-theatre
issues, central logistics, monitoring, advice and support etc, since it is
impossible to micro manage a war from the Military Operations room.
The ex-Army Chief General V.P. Malik, speaking from his Kargil war
experience, underlines the necessity of a wide angled view for the higher
HQs thus:
‘Continuous control of the escalatory ladder requires much closer
political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore,
essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic
decision-making loop and having a direct politico-military interface.’2
The next question logically is ‘so what?’ This change implies that
India has the capability of undertaking deep operations. This may seem
anachronistic in the nuclear age. However, the change is not so much for
deployment as much as for bolstering the conventional deterrent with
an escalation dominance capability. General Malik writes, ‘Capability to
wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary deterrent.
A war may well remain limited because of a credible deterrence or
‘escalation dominance’ (which means that one side has overwhelming
military superiority at every level of violence).’
This ability is necessary to enable the political decision maker to
have confidence in military means. This is better illustrated by General
Malik’s observation that ‘Militarily, the greatest challenge could be in
the political reluctance to commit to a pro-active engagement…’ While
2 Fighting Limited Wars: A Major Challenge for the Military,” Article no.
1590, July 3, 2010, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, http://www.claws.in/
index.php?action=master&task=591&u_id=49.
political prudence is essential in the nuclear era, it is for a professional
military to serve up military options. These have of course to be in
cognizance with the nuclear dimension. A counter argument that can be
anticipated is that reconfiguring the offensive forces away from gigantic
strike forces may be a better way of acknowledging this.
In terms of ‘jointness’, the strategic command can serve as a
precursor to a joint offensive command. Once the CDS is in place at an
indeterminate future, the offensives of the pivot corps could be controlled
by the Army HQs and those of the strategic command by HQ IDS for
better integration with air power and the evolving nuclear scenario. For
the initiative to be practical, the command headquarters should instead
be an army group headquarter and led by a Colonel-General given the
vast ambit of its responsibility.
This makeover indicates that interesting times are in store for the
military over the next decade.
The commentary has benefited from the critical inputs given by Brig.
(Retd.) Rumel Dahiya.
_____________________________________
 168

The Third Front: Military Ethics

November 4, 2010
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
TheThirdFrontMilitaryEthics_aahmed_041110

That the Colaba land scam has knocked CWG corruption off the
headlines indicates the differing yardstick used for viewing corruption
in the military. It cannot be otherwise. The nation invests materially in
the military, bases its self-image partially on it, spares its better youth
for martial endeavour and rests secure in the belief that its security is in
safe hands. That the Army Chief is seized of the issue is evident from his
very first interview in which he highlighted that its ‘internal health’ was
a priority. His latest directive that commanders ensure zero-tolerance for
departures from Service ethic proves that military ethics constitute its
‘third front’, the other two being China and Pakistan or “Chipak” (the
China-Pak axis referred to by MJ Akbar and popularized by Sandeep
Unnithan in his India Today article, ‘The Chipak Threat’).
A seemingly reasonable approach could well be that there is no
‘crisis’ and over-reaction is unwarranted. Media hype should not lead
to pressure on the military, as it would impact the institution adversely.
The media and activists have a role to play, one they inevitably overplay.
The state of affairs can instead be attributed to society from which the
human material is drawn. Departures from the norm are ‘aberrations’.
Given that it is over a million strong, defaulters would exist. The military
has internal procedures to cope.
In any case, the downward spiral goes back some decades, dating at least
to Sundarji’s famous ‘Brother Officer’ DO. Rahul Bedi, a keen military
watcher, observes in The Hindu, that the moral fabric began to erode
beginning with the upgradation of military ranks in the early eighties.
Allegations of declining standards have persisted with each successive
generation of officers being compared less favourably with the preceding
one. Friction has been known to exist between the KCIOs and ICOs, the
pre-war and war commission, the pre and post Independence commission,
the post Independence and the Emergency Commission etc.
Essentially, those with plebian antecedents have replaced those with
privileged backgrounds. In the cliché, ‘Officer and Gentleman’, the
trend has been towards professionalism in the ‘Officer’ and away from
character and conduct signified by the term, ‘Gentleman’.
Inroads made into the warrior ethic are due to three factors.
Firstly, the Army has been relentlessly involved in counter insurgency
operations and in several crisis points since the mid eighties. Internal
security operations permit considerable autonomy to the military and
an extensive interface with the non-military environment. Expansion
entailed by deployment on disputed borders, coupled with changing
doctrine towards proactive defence and expanding internal security
demands, have increased the ‘mass’ of the Army. This conspires against
sustaining quality within the Service and quality control at entry. Belief
that the military can handle problems precludes urgency in wrapping
these up by other organs of government, either externally or internally.
This betrays a lack of understanding of the military instrument by the
bureaucrat aided civilian leadership.
 169

Secondly, the growing economy has led to an appreciation deficit in

the military. The perception is that the growth owes to stability provided
by the military, but compensation in terms of remuneration received has
not been commensurate. The military continues to remain outside the
policy and decision loop due to a cosmetic delegation of powers to the
Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry. The values of society having
changed, the military would be subject to peer pressure from without.
This has considerably been eased by the Sixth Pay Commission award,
but only after the Brass had to stretch out in an unseemly manner. The
hold up over the OROP (One Rank One Pension) is vicariously felt by the
military.
Thirdly, the Army’s internal policies could do with a constructive
critique. It has countenanced initiatives of questionable worth such
as expansion in all directions, making for more ‘Chiefs than I’njuns’.
Discipline and service traditions can only go so far in socializing its
members. Being a mass military, there is greater difficulty in having a
warrior culture override the preexisting and pervasive social influences.
Now the Army is set to bring about a caste system in the officer corps
in terms of upwardly mobile long serving cadre and a supporting short
service cadre as Phase III of the AV Singh recommendations. Yet the
social fallout has not been discussed. Absorbing change such as the
Army’s Transformation initiative cannot be sensibly commented on
since its contours have - despite the Age of Information - been kept off
scrutiny.
What is the Army already doing? A report this week has it that the Army
has jettisoned its quantification-reliant assessment system. This made
points obtained in confidential reports consequential for promotion. In
a liberalizing economy, upward mobility that enabled keeping up with
peers outside the service was dependent on promotions, predicated on
tenanting command responsibilities. This accounted for vulnerability of
officers being held hostage to a senior’s priorities. Ambition, that usually
drives sharp practice, has utility in pushing up men with drive and
encouraging innovation. Where combat ‘friction’ has to be overcome
with the exercise of ‘will’, a ‘can do’ officer is useful. In a force transiting
from a traditional leadership culture to a managerial ethic, the quality is
not necessarily negative. However, character was no longer the referent,
managerial effectiveness was. An ‘occupational’ ethic has replaced the
‘institutional’, as observed by the doyen of military sociologists, late
Charles Moskos, in other militaries. The Army is rightly beginning with
reforming its promotion policies.
In-service measures such as increasing the vacancies for benchmark
career courses, such as the National Defence College and the Higher
Command courses, leveling out the playing field for the graduates of war
colleges and Defence Management etc are useful measures. The culture
of command is changing to a more democratic and transformational
style of leadership. Collegiate, staff-driven policy and decision making
is being encouraged. This helps detach self-esteem needs of individuals
from being overly determined by rank. Additionally, the pressure of
upward mobility stands diluted by the Sixth Pay Commission award.
The AV Singh Committee report’s implementation of its first two phases
has increased numbers in higher ranks. This implies that emoluments
 170

continue to accrue irrespective of promotion, reducing any need for

sharp practices. Further, the expanding economy indicates that there is
a life after service.
What more needs doing? Firstly, the fixation on ‘image’ needs
dilution. This builds a tendency to paper over problems. It is the onus
of the military leadership to manage consequences on morale of action
taken against erring military members. This must go beyond corruption
into the domain of the military’s relative autonomy, for instance, human
rights matters in counter insurgency.
Secondly, peer disapproval has proven an insufficient deterrent
for those overstepping privileges. Privileges have been confused with
entitlement. Undue impositions on the system for personal requirements
need to be curbed. Corruption begins in misuse of manpower, the Army’s
chief resource.
Thirdly, in case the One Rank One Pension is acceded to by the
government, the understandable attractions of rank would remain only
for those aspiring to it for the right reasons.
Fourthly, the Ministry’s archaic structure of relying on less than a
score administrators leads to misapplied autonomy and omissions, not
only in the military, but as is increasingly evident, in other departments
as estates and audit. Second generation reforms of the apex structure are
overdue.
The embarrassing juncture can be an opportunity for renewal for the
military.
_________________________________________

Civil-Military Relations: Under Scan

July 14, 2010
idsa.in

Using the firing of McChrystal as his entry point, the Director General
of IDSA, N. S. Sisodia, initiates a debate on a significant issue in civilmilitary
relations. He makes two points: the first is that the top brass
should not pre-empt politicians; and the second that the media needs
handling with care. While the second is self-explanatory, the former
deserves attention. Mr. Sisodia makes the case that, “the principle of
civilian supremacy means not only carrying out the policy directives
of civilian authorities, but also refraining from pre-empting them. By
discussing in public questions of force or when and how to deploy it,
generals can pre-empt their leaders or vitiate policy choices.” This
Comment looks at both sides of the argument to enable a debate. That
the author intended to initiate a debate can be seen in his concluding
statement that, “This is just one side of the story about the maturing
principle of civilian supremacy.”
Mr. Sisodia alludes to an episode last year in which McChrystal
overplayed his hand in using a speaking engagement at the IISS in
London to press for the policy option for AfPak that he favoured over the
one represented by Vice President Joe Biden. The bureaucratic politics
indulged in then also included leaking of McChrystal’s operational
assessment of the AfPak predicament. Both strategems resulted in
McChrystal and the military receiving an admonition from Secretary
 171

Gates. In the event, Obama had decided to back McChrystal with the surge
he desired and the counter insurgency strategy he favoured. It is apparent
that the General, otherwise well regarded as a thorough professional, did
not learn his lesson in civil-military relations and therefore virtually
invited his marching orders on publication of his profile and that of his
‘Team America’ in the Rolling Stone magazine.
This example is used for lessons closer home, possibly prompted by the
sometimes controversial and possibly motivated media attention received
by remarks of the top brass in the recent past. Such instances include: the
earlier Army Chief’s remarks on integration of Maoists into the Nepal
Army, on the military’s ‘two front’ strategic problem, on deployment
against Maoists; and of the present Army Chief’s take on the petty
political motivations of those against AFSPA, and on lost opportunities
for political engagement in Kashmir. Likewise, the Air Chief’s remarks
on the use of air power in Central India and that of his Vice Chief on
the politics behind arms deals are other examples. The issue in debate is
not that the military cannot have a position on a question with military
implications, but the extent to which it can go in furthering its case or
expressing its concerns.
Samuel Huntington provides the best entry point into civil-military
relations theory through his landmark study dating to 1957: The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations. He
has it that the responsibilities of the military to the state are threefold:
representative, advisory and executive. The representative function is
to represent the claims of military security within the state machinery.
Huntington requires of the soldier that “he must keep the state informed
as to what he considers necessary for the minimum military security of
the state in the light of the capabilities of other powers.” Huntington
admits that it is difficult to define the extent to which the soldier may
carry his view, but the military must be cognisant that limits exist. The
military has both ‘the right and duty’ to present its views to public bodies
involved in apportionment of the state’s resources. The advisory function
is to advise on alternative courses from a military perspective. The
military cannot sit in judgment on which alternative is most desirable,
but report on military implications. Lastly, the executive function enjoins
the military to implement decisions even if these run ‘violently counter’
to the military’s judgment or interest. It is the statesman’s job to set aims,
allocate resources and set priorities and parameters. The military is to do
the best it can in the conditions determined by the political leadership
and circumstance. [Dehra Dun: Natraj, Indian edition 2005, p. 72.]
The military, being a profession that provides military security, is
responsible, on account of its expertise, to project its point of view. It is to
do so within the prescribed channels of authority and communication. In
case it does so outside these limits, then it becomes a political player. As
such, it is liable to be taken as yet another lobby protecting and furthering
its interests. That the military is also a corporate entity lends its actions
to be mistaken as motivated by institutional interest. This is reinforced
by organisational theory and the experience in civil-military relations
globally. That militaries further their corporate interests under the guise
of national interest is not unknown. That such a phenomenon can be
expected to exist in India is a given, since the military is a bureaucratic
 172

actor and would participate in decision making through bureaucratic

politics quite like any organisation. The question is to what extent can
the military press its case.
One view has it that while the military input is essential for and
invaluable in considerations on security, the concept of security today
is wider. Military strategy in any case flows from national security
strategy, itself an outflow of grand strategy. Grand strategy today, as
Kissinger wrote, is “a combination of political, economic and military
factors replacing the incongruity of the present system which seeks to
compromise two incommensurables, ‘purely’ military and ‘purely’
political considerations.” Additionally, demands of the nuclear age exist,
articulated by Liddell Hart thus, “Old concepts and definitions of strategy
have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the development of
nuclear weapons.” Movement in concepts of security and strategy has
diluted the earlier place of the military factor and input.
In India’s case the national aim is for socio-economic uplift. This
necessitates continuing on the current economic trajectory. Grand
strategy, currently conceptualized in the neoliberal framework, is to
preserve and further the gains made. Down flow activities comprise
security strategy formulation and the military’s place in it. The cabinet
has the requisite committees – CCS and NSC – in which the military
factor is represented and articulated by the Defence Minister. The
defence ministry has a bureaucratic component to render impartial
advice to the minister. The Service Chiefs have access to the minister to
fulfil their right and duty of presenting their position and arguments.
Parliamentary standing committees also interface with the military.
Some of their reports have been considerably critical of the government.
Thus, the Indian system, comprising as it does checks and balances,
not only takes the military position on board but has the advantage of
merging it within governmental priorities. Extra-procedural exertion by
the military in favour of its case places it outside the constitutionally
and traditionally delimited bounds. In a rambunctious democracy with
a super-ordinate media, this can be mistaken as questioning of policy,
thereby embarrassing the government and reducing its credibility and
authority.
On the other hand is the vociferous critique of this view. This
perspective has it that there is an imbalance in India’s civil-military
relations brought about by an intervening bureaucratic layer in the
Ministry of Defence between the military and the political head. The
military position therefore is rendered askew. Since the military owes a
service to state and society, in the straitened circumstance of national
security it requires to be more assertive than would have otherwise been
the case. In case the military and the government were enmeshed at
the apex level through for instance the creation of the Chief of Defence
Staff, merging of the Integrated HQs of the Services with the ministry
and greater representation of the military across the national security
system such as in the NSCS and the MEA, the military would not require
to use the media route to influence government policy. Denied scope
due to the bureaucracy - seen to be operating as a bureaucratic player
- the military is compelled to join in bureaucratic politics intrinsic to
democratic political structures. The suggestion that the military is over
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stepping limits is itself seen as a ploy in a turf war. The argument made
for going the extra mile is that success of the economic miracle requires
that the military makes itself heard, lest – and this is the trump – hard
learned lessons of 1962 stand neglected.
It is apparent that the contours of the two positions outlined here
reflect dissonance in the national security system. The possible
directions of mitigation have been noted in the final paragraph by Mr.
Sisodia: “This will involve providing greater space to the Armed Forces
in relevant decision-making structures, seeking their partnership in
national security and defence policy-making and addressing issues of
modernisation and ‘jointness’ on priority.” And he aptly bridges the two
positions in his concluding sentence: “A democratic polity is not just
about civilian control but also about a military strong enough to protect
it.” Let the debate begin, even as his recommendation is implemented.

___________________________________________
The Army’s Decade in Review
May 31, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheArmysdecadeinreview_
aahmed_301109

Just as the US would likely date the first decade of the millennium to
9/11, for India it needs be dated to nuclearisation in May 1998. The
Army has had a busy decade beginning with its triumph at Kargil. As
it contemplates the coming decade it can be justifiably proud that its
exertions have placed it reasonably well to take on the coming one. This
commentary attempts to retell how the decade unfolded for the Army
and to discern how it will navigate the coming decade.
The Kargil Review Committee Report set the reform agenda. In
its recommendations made available in the form of the book, From
Surprise to Reckoning, it attempted to forge a strategic culture from the
popular interest generated by the media in matters military. The Army,
embarrassed by the intrusions, set to work to ensure that these did not
recur by raising HQ 14 Corps for Ladakh. It also had to roll back the
impact of the conflict in the Valley in increased terrorism, reinforced by
action of suicide squads called fidayeen. The government tried out the
political approach in a period of ‘non-initiation of combat operations’
followed by the Agra Summit but to no avail. It was only with the
induction of additional troops for Operation Parakram - the military
mobilisation in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament - that the
situation was mastered. Thereafter, there has been a steady improvement
in the situation in Jammu & Kashmir in part due to successful counterinsurgency
operations such as Operation Sarp Vinash in Surankot. The
ceasefire since November 2003 along the Line of Control has enabled
construction of the fence, dubbed ‘Vij line’ by Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha. Adoption
of an ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ policy, in line with its sub-conventional
warfare doctrine of 2006, has helped with winning hearts and minds.
The innovation in this direction has been Operation Sadhbhavna.
The operational aspect, however, is perhaps not the most significant
one. Instead, it is in doctrinal developments amounting to what a
Pakistani analyst has characterised as ‘doctrinal awakening’. Immediately
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prior to the Shakti tests, the Army had already rolled out the first explicit
edition of its doctrine in the form of the HQ Army Training Command
publication, Indian Army – Fundamentals, Doctrines, Concepts.
Coincidentally, the techniques of multi-directional attack and cliff assault
were also disseminated timely for employment in Kargil. The Army’s
introspection in the wake of Kargil resulted in its leaning towards Limited
War thinking. The idea was to exploit the gap between sub-conventional
operations and the nuclear threshold along the Spectrum of Conflict for
conventional operations. This was to reinforce conventional deterrence.
Kargil had demonstrated that credibility of the Sundarji-era conventional
doctrine of ‘strike hard-strike deep’ needed refurbishing. Operation
Parakram in 2002 revealed another shortcoming, that of a relatively longer
mobilisation time period. This eventuated in the 2004 release of the second
edition of the Army doctrine, referred to colloquially as ‘Cold Start’. Several
exercises have followed in which the Army has tested its doctrine and its
preparedness to face a nuclear future. It has reorganised with an additional
Corps and Command HQ each along its western border. Essentially, it has
transited from a defensive to a proactive and offensive mindset.
In addition, firstly, since the Army does not defend the country alone,
there have been complementary movements. The Arun Singh Task Force
recommendations at the beginning of the decade have firmed in, except for
the crucial institution of the Chief of Defence Staff. In its absence, efforts
towards Jointness have been sub-optimal. Secondly, the Strategic Forces
Command, under the Nuclear Command Authority, is now a reality. The
Army component only last week test-fired the Agni II missile. Though a
failure, it has proven its ability to operate in trying night time operational
conditions. Thirdly, the Army has shifted its focus decisively away from
Pakistan to the over-the-horizon strategic challenge posed by China.
It is in the midst of raising two mountain divisions and infrastructure
improvement; in tandem with similar efforts by the Air Force. This would
help cope with the Chinese challenge by shifting from ‘dissuasive defence’
to ‘active defence’. Fourthly, the Army has had an expanding interface with
foreign armies in training over the period in addition to its long standing
commitments in peacekeeping. Lastly, it is currently contemplating
‘Transformation’. The study undertaken by Eastern Army Commander,
Lt. Gen. V.K. Singh, is likely to be released for implementation as early
as the coming Army Day. The significant point is that the Army remains
an adaptable and learning organisation, an essential characteristic in any
organisation facing the speeding up of time.
Without doubt and without getting perturbed, plenty needs
doing still. There is scope for the higher defence organisation being
streamlined through formally institutionalising the military input into
strategic decision making. Presently, there appears to be friction between
the military and the bureaucracy, moderated somewhat by personal
equations. But national security would do better than to rest on informal
networks and chemistry between players. Secondly, while an aligning
of the acquisition process has been done, the military concentrates
on delivery of their requirement; not on better procedures. This gains
importance in light of the likelihood that the next conflict could well
begin without strategic warning. Therefore, for prevailing in short order,
equipment at the start of the conflict will determine the outcome. The
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situation of the Army Chief saying ‘We’ll fight with what we have’ should
not recur. Lastly, the effect of the vibrant economy has been such as to
place a premium on the ‘right’ officer material. The present largesse,
in conjunction with the recession, has given the Army a breather. But
its recruiting and retention policy would require a long term facelift.
Additionally, in mid-decade, there was the avoidable spectacle of the
military pleading with the government for better emoluments. The next
time round, the military will have a separate Pay Commission, which
could ameliorate this aspect.
These problem areas would form the agenda for the next decade.
However, doctrinal evolution must continue at the forefront. Rightly, the
Army doctrine is in for another iteration. Its direction would be determined
by the Transformation initiative. Two areas need urgent attention.
The first is that the nuclear era requires a rethink on the higher-end
of conventional conflict, Total War. The issue that needs rethinking is
the implications of the nuclear threshold on continuation of the strike
corps as they are presently configured and employed. The concept of
Integrated Battle Groups could be fleshed out in exercises. This important
issue can do without retarding turf battles. There is a need to orchestrate
diplomacy with military moves to achieve objectives. There needs to be
a shift from the aim of inflicting punishment that informed thinking on
war earlier to an aim of avoiding damage as much as possible. This owes
to increased lethality and cost even of conventional arms, the nuclear
overhang and that increasingly, because of its socio-economic advance,
India has more to lose.
Secondly, the social culture within the military needs changing. This
is a prerequisite for the Transformation initiative to succeed. Military
sub-culture has dispensable legacy from the Mughal era and undesirable
accretions from civil society. This would be the difficult part. One, the
top-heavy structure the Army has acquired since implementation of A.V.
Singh Committee II will retard the top-down approach for cultural change.
The shedding of ‘privileges’ will not come easily. Two, ‘mandalisation’,
resulting from pro-rata arms and services vacancies, requires revising
in order to bring in meritocracy. Self-esteem should not be predicated
on a ‘jhanda and danda’ definition, but on specialisation. Towards this
end, training and subsequent employment of middle piece officers would
require streamlining. The idea of a core ex-NDA (National Defence
Academy) cadre, supported by a short service supporting cadre from an
additional feeder academy, has the potential to make the hierarchy leaner
and needs careful handling. Three, the Army Wives Welfare Association
should be made autonomous of military resources in manpower and
finances. Lastly, broad basing recruitment to include under represented
ethnic groups, even at the expense of groups advantaged by the outcome
of the 1857 War of Independence, is recommended.
Crystal gazing into the coming decade is a fraught exercise. Over the
short term, events in Pakistan dictate higher order readiness. Over the
middle term, managing equations with China should be so as to gain time
to get the second strike capability and infrastructure organised. In both
cases, a conflict avoidance strategy based on military deterrence would
be in keeping with India’s economy-centred grand strategy. Recourse to
writings of the military sociologist, the late Charles Moskos, indicates
 176

that the Army would change from ‘war readiness’ to ‘war deterrence’,
even as society moves to being a ‘warless’ one. It can be predicted that
this endeavour would make the decade eventful; the Army a ‘happening’
one; and watching it, an absorbing academic exercise.

_________________________
The Central Debate in India’s Civil Military Relations
July 6, 2009
http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/CentraldebateinIndiascivilmilitaryrelations_
AAhmed_060709

Critics have it that the last bout of reforms in India’s defence sector in
the wake of Kargil has not been taken to its logical conclusion. There
are two key areas over which there is considerable debate. One is the
continuing absence of a Chief of Defence Staff, and the second is the
cosmetic integration between the Ministry of Defence and the Service
Headquarters. It is asserted that the latter is the result of bureaucrats
protecting their turf in a perverse interpretation of civil control. While the
military prefers political control exercised by politicians, the intervening
bureaucratic layer between the brass and the political leadership results
in ‘bureaucratic control’.
It is acknowledged that India’s military has historically been
apolitical. Unlike other militaries in developing countries early in the
post colonial period, there has never been an instance of the Indian
military transgressing its bounds. This has consistently been among
the indicators of India’s democratic good health. However, it is averred
that this has resulted in the military’s marginalisation in core security
decision making structures and processes. This refrain in security
studies commentary testifies to the continuing distance between the
apex military leadership from political decision makers on policy issues.
Details of the critique are well known. These include: the strategic grasp
of the generalist bureaucratic cadre dominating the ministry is suspect;
in modern defence systems elsewhere officials in uniform share desk
space with civilians having appropriate background in national security;
the current system results in manipulation of service differences by
bureaucrats playing arbiters, thereby precluding efficiencies, jointness,
etc. But the fact that the system persists begs the question: Why?
Firstly, at the general level, it is attributed to a tightening grip of the
‘steel frame’ over the governmental sphere that has not been subject to
post-liberalisation deregulation. Secondly, the merit in the system is
perhaps that the bureaucrats, with a greater grasp of India’s developmental
needs, are better able to keep a restrictive check. In the absence of such
a check, inadvertent militarisation would result. Thirdly, ministerial
attention spans are of necessity limited. For a balancing opinion on the
military perspective, they require inputs from their civilian staff, itself
mandated by the rules of procedure to furnish a frank opinion. Bringing
in a fair consideration of pros and cons in this manner leads to better
policy and decision making. Fourthly, officer education leaves military
professionals narrowly, if highly, qualified for tactical and operational
levels of combat. Running a ministry is a wholly different, administrative,
exercise that the military training and rotation system does not easily
 177

lend itself to. Fifthly, there is no restriction on the brass taking up

issues with the political head, best demonstrated by their piloting of
amendments to the Sixth Pay Commission award. They are represented
in all committees, with the Chiefs being part of the Strategic Policy Group
of the National Security Council and can be invited to meetings of the
Cabinet Committee on Security. Lastly, there would occur role conflict,
with the military-bureaucrat in an integrated ministry required to pass
judgement on cases initiated by the parent service.
Vociferous counter arguments exist. It is argued that as has happened
in countries with advanced national security systems in place, the
military can learn or forced to adapt by the political leadership. Training,
drawdown of inter-service competition and an unbiased ethos would
result over time. In any case, the demerits of the current system outweigh
the merits. These include the more compelling issue of lack of strategic
direction by the ministry owing to its strategic incapacity. For instance,
a draft of the National Security Strategy forwarded by the Head Quarters
Integrated Defence Staff is still awaiting clearance of the ministry. It is
believed that this results in a weakening of India’s deterrence posture.
A coherent response to the emerging challenge of China would also in
this perspective require ‘fusionism’ at the apex. Continuing security
challenges at the sub-conventional plane and the nuclear overhang over
conventional conflict further necessitate an integrated approach to
national security with appropriate structural and process changes.
The moot question however is whether, and to what extent, the state
of affairs in South Block is attributable to bureaucratic politics alone. In
case, as in the arguments recounted here, this is so to a considerable extent,
it is amenable to correction through appropriate political intervention.
However, the debate misses out on a key factor. Votaries of change
believe that India’s power maximisation, required for meeting current
and growing security threats, is being hampered by inadequacies in civil
military relations. This commentary argues that it is a political choice to
retain current military power indices and the pace of its accretion. This
is being adequately delivered by the system in place and therefore there is
no compelling need for immediate changes. While not averse to change,
in the Indian political conception, the timing is equally important and
India would cross the bridge at an appropriate juncture.
Political India is better connected to the Indian reality. It is aware of
India’s reality being one of scarcity. Therefore, the grand strategy in the
post liberalisation era has been one of ‘growth with equity’. While India
has done credibly with respect to growth, more is required in terms of
spreading the benefits. Therefore, a continuing period of growth, internal
consolidation and creation of a viable delivery system are required. The
verdict of the electorate in the recent elections testifies to this agenda.
India should therefore maintain the current course. While national
security is crucial in this endeavour, an integrated ministry and resulting
salience of the military perspective could skew the developmental agenda.
At an extreme, instead of civilianising the military, civilian militarism
could result.
More tangibly, the ‘relaxed’ strategic posture that critics rile against
has the advantage of averting the security dilemma in neighbours. In
case of overt power maximisation by India, theirs would be a predictable
 178

response. For instance, current commentary on Chinese military

presence in Tibet and unfriendly stances has prompted the prescription
that India urgently undertake appropriate military steps, ranging from
building roads in Arunachal to operationalising its strategic deterrent.
Though the threat is acknowledged, in the development-first approach,
the sense of urgency is whittled so as to hold steady and not precipitate
a Chinese over-reaction. The latter would in turn impact upon Indian
security calculus, resulting in a further departure from the developmental
agenda. Since India requires at least a decade without distraction to
improve its developmental record and human developmental indices,
deferring India’s great power ambition, and its precursor in the form of
further defence reforms, is politically desirable.
This philosophical contestation has not been articulated in the
discourse on the military-bureaucrat stand-off so far. Since India’s
national security doctrine is not available as a written document or white
paper, the rationale that could be driving Indian policy has been divined
here. At the heart of the central debate would appear to be a conceptual
difference. While the critics prefer ‘prosperity through peace’, statusquoists
privilege ‘peace through prosperity’. Absence of movement on
further defence reforms, to the chagrin of critics, suggests adjudication
by the political class in favour of the status quo.

__________________________________

Politicisation: In the Context of the Indian Military

Fri, May 23, 2014
http://www.thecitizen.in/politicisation-in-the-contextof-
the-indian-military/

Politicisation of a military is usually uncritically accepted as ‘bad’.

In the democratic scheme, politicization implies impetus within the
military to displace an elected government. Since a rash of such action
was visible in newly independent states across the fifties and sixties, there
was a consensus in political science theory and military sociology that
politicization was a negative phenomenon. In the subcontinent’s context,
the experience of Pakistan and Bangladesh with political militaries more
or less sealed the argument against politicization. However, a milder
interpretation of politicization is in the military aligning its perspective
to suit the political positions and interests of the government. This is the
current threat of politicization in India. The military may be inclined to
play spectator, under the professional instinct of keeping out of politics.
A third variant of politicization arises in the circumstance of the
incoming government having an expansive agenda that may not be readily
visible in the near term, the military would require acting as a deterrent
against any fundamental changes to India’s polity that the government
in keeping with its ideological inclinations may want to engineer over
the long term. In this the military may end up taking on a political role,
but one that is in keeping with a third interpretation of politicization
that is relatively benign. In this version, in case the government attempts
to reframe constitutional fundamentals, then there have to be checks
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and balances that include the military in a last-resort political role.

Since other bastions of state and society may fall along the way side, the
military may require standing up for India.
The current debate in India surrounding politicization is over the
propriety of the outgoing government to appoint a new chief in its final
days, namely General Suhag. However, the controversy itself goes back
a bit to the ‘date of birth’ controversy raked up by a former chief and
recently elected legislator from Ghaziabad, retired general VK Singh. His
argument was that denial of his case for a year’s extension at the helm of
the army was to keep alive the proverbial ‘chain of succession’ that had
been forged earlier with the appointment of General JJ Singh as chief.
Since seniority and age left to retire are crucial criteria for back of the
envelope calculation of the ‘chain’, it gets easy to see who are in the queue.
An extension for VK Singh would then have resulted in the incumbent
Chief not making it and ditto for General Suhag. An alternative line up
would then have made it.
That the government nevertheless acted the way it did is taken by
those criticizing this as politicization of the military. Specifically, they
are apprehensive that the government was responsive either to what it
perceived as a political inclination of prospective chiefs or that of those
in the alternative line up. Either it found the former relatively amenable
or the latter comparatively worrisome. Amenability does not necessarily
imply that those in the line-up were politically inclined, but it could even
mean that they were politically neutral or could be expected to remain
so. Therefore, for critics to say that either the incumbent chief or the
chief designate is political is to stretch things too far.
Instead, the Manmohan Singh government would have been more
inclined to be worried by political inclination of those in the alternative
line up. By this reasoning, in taking a decision against that line up, by
showing VK Singh the door, it was persuaded not so much by a desire
to have its man in place as much as to ensure that India does not end up
with an inappropriate chief. Such a chief would have been more likely to
be politically inclined rather than professionally grounded, particularly
when answering to a government of a different political complexion.
The danger itself is pretty old going back to the fifties when Krishna
Menon sought to politicize the military through foisting on it generals
acceptable to Nehru, such as general Kaul, whose names lives in the
ignominy of 1962. For Nehru, the aim was perhaps to have his man
– an ethnic kin to boot – in charge so as to control the militaristic
tendency that military’s in newly independent states had started showing
across the then decolonizing world. Nehru, fearful of the first form of
politicization, pitched for the second form of politicization in trying for
a subjective control over the military through Kaul. Kaul clearly was
an ‘inappropriate’ choice for it did lead to politicization with Kaul and
‘Kaul boys’ trying to outmaneuver professionals such as SD Verma, SPP
Thorat, ‘Timmy’ Thimayya and not to forget, Sam Bahadur himself.
In the event, both Nehru and Kaul burnt their fingers with the 1962
debacle. Not unreasonably, politicisation has thereafter got a bad name
so much so that today charges of politicization are used by both sides in
the current controversy to deride the other.
Therefore, it behooves investigating what exactly does politicization
 180

mean in the context of the present as the hindu nationalist party, the BJP,
seeks to stride up Raisina Hill to take the oath of office. The proposition
here is that the BJP will try for the second form of politicization –
subjective civilian control – to keep the military politically inert and
create the necessary space thereby for it to go about its agenda for India
that goes beyond its election-related focus on development.
While a ‘normal’ government would likely prefer a politically neutral
professional military, in the case of the BJP led by Mr. Modi, it is selfconfessedly
an ideologically inspired government coming to power not
merely for tenure at the helm, but to reboot India. There is an expansive
agenda of the government not readily obvious from manifestos and
speeches. It can be better discerned from the program of the right wing
and religion-inspired political formations on whose back it has partially
ridden to power.
While politicization is negative in general, in such circumstances the
third variant of it may not be such a bad thing. In case the reimaging of
India is pursued with the vigour that is predicted here to attend it and
doing so generates instability for India as a nation and society, then there
may be a case for a military to step in to deter and if necessary make
such a government back track or step aside. The ability of a military
to see its role in this circumstance will amount to a political judgment
and action in line with this will be political action. In effect it would be
politicization, but a benign one at that.
While traditional politicization with the military on horseback is not
the threat, there is likely in the near term the turn to subjective civilian
control of the military. This could be sooner than later in case General
Suhag finds himself on the block. It could be later since the regime is set
to outlast him. The military would need self-regulation not to fall for
this lest over the long term it is unable to fulfill a guardian role it may be
called upon to fulfill to preserve India’s constitution when majoritarian
push comes to extremist shove.
_____________________________________________
The Coming Threat of Politicisation
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=32718

The Indian army’s infamous brush with politicisation was counterintuitively

in the Nehru era when arch liberal Nehru, using Krishna
Menon, wanted to ease his ethnic kin, General Kaul, into the helm of the
army. Placing him, an officer of the support services, as chief of general
staff and later in command of an active corps in the mountains, 4 Corps,
he hoped to elevate Kaul into the chief’s chair once the incumbent, pliable
general Thapar, retired. In the event, the Chinese attack of 1962 proved
inopportune for the trio. The good part was that India learnt a salutary
lesson on the perils of politicisation of the military.
However, in all fairness to Nehru it needs being said that the
inappropriateness of Kaul apart, he perhaps wanted to assure that his
flanks were covered as he went about his modernisation agenda for
India. The example of post-colonial democratic regimes falling to army
takeovers was surely not lost on him since the phenomenon was on
not only across the newly independent countries but close at hand in
Pakistan.
 181

Whereas the threat to democratic regimes from respective militaries

was one form of politicisation - that of the ‘man on horseback’ - the other
form was the one Nehru spectacularly failed at, that of subordinating the
military through what in theory passes for ‘subjective civilian control’.
In this the regime controls the military through placing a like-minded
leadership at the helm, thereby having a compliant military
Since 1962, India has been notably different in the developing world
in largely practicing what is termed ‘objective civilian control’. In this the
government prefers an apolitical military providing it with a professional
input and carrying out its decisions obediently. Whereas the Indian
military can be critiqued for on occasion allowing its institutional interest
to colour it’s otherwise objective input to national security decisions,
such as for instance on Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Siachen,
politicization of either kind - ‘man on horseback’ and subjective civilian
control - has generally been absent.
There has been little threat to civilian power holders in Delhi; the
controversy over General VK Singh moving troops towards Delhi during
his ‘date of birth’ fracas with the ministry of defence notwithstanding.
Nor have the powers that be attempted to make inroads into the military
by having it subscribe to their ideological worldview for subordination.
However, this happy state may be set to change in India soon.
The new government that takes control of Delhi has in its campaign
promises projected a developmentalist agenda. It would attempt to deliver
on this with a neo-liberal turn or with the second generation economic
‘reforms’. In so far as this remains the primary agenda, civil-military
relations can be expected to remain on even keel. The military for its part
is internally pleased since universally militaries vote conservative under
the impression conservatives are usually ‘strong’ on defence. India’s
military would perhaps be happy with the reversal of Indian ‘weakness’
associated with the UPA years starting from its perceived inaction to
26/11. The military would also be recipient of further monies from the
growth oriented regime. With poll promises on being tough with both
China and Pakistan as guide, it can be expected that the military would
be pretty busy professionally. Therefore, it would have little time or
attention span for the internal political scene.
However, the prognosis is that internal politics are the area the
incoming regime would likely want to distinguish itself. It would attempt
not only economic reforms as it has advertised but also the less visible
agenda of its supporting political formations, the Hindutva brigade. The
latter will likely be more subtle initially, with the former being the key
area to gain time and legitimacy. The intention in the initial phase would
be to placate corporates that have backed Modi to power. It would also
gain his regime another term for a more decisive turn to the right since
rebooting India would require additional time. This is a lesson from
the BJP’s earlier stint cut short by the Shining India campaign coming
a-cropper.
But how could affairs turn out this time round? Economic measures
over time leading to ‘have nots’ and the articulation of their resentment
can be apprehended. India’s recent elections and the ability for massive
police ‘bandobast’ and its showing in managing Central India suggest
that the government has suppressive capabilities in place. However,
 182

second wave reforms could trigger wider alienation. This may entail
government leaning on the paramilitary.
The right wingers behind the incoming ruling party will also want
their piece of pie. In fact, even as the economy is the visible area of
concentration, the manner it fought the elections in the cow-dust belt
suggests that it has a wider social agenda. It may well be that this agenda
is the more significant. The actions that it would take in pursuit of this
will over time generate its own backlash not only from minorities, but
liberals and those alienated by the resurgent Brahmanism. The national
broadcast of Mr. Modi’s prayers on the banks of the Holy Ganga indicates
a possible direction of the future. As has been seen elsewhere, storm
troopers may make an appearance as the answer to the possible internal
security problems that will likely arise.
The twin-rise of the paramilitary and that of storm troopers - will
be one element that could trigger civil-military tension since militaries
traditionally see themselves as the sword arm of the state and are averse to
competitors. Additionally, the military would likely be getting embroiled
in the suppressive template that would now be applicable across the
poorer segment of society that includes India’s minority subject to right
wing imposition.
It is to ensure against any reservations that the military may have
at this stage that the politicisation in the form of exercising subjective
civilian control will kick in. While initially the military may continue
under objective control principles and mechanisms, over time the
government would feel the need to preemptively shift towards subjective
civilian control. This would be in the form of placing officers at the helm
who share its ideology. Mere conservative views are not enough. They
would need people in place who would turn a blind eye, if not participate
actively, in the India reset. In fact, the military itself would be a site for
culmination of Indianisation, with Hindutva defining India. To illustrate,
the greeting Jai Hind, introduced by the current army chief, may possibly
be jettisoned in favour of Jai Bharat Mata. Perhaps the threat of this
prompted the chief to institute the shift out-of-the-blue to Jai Hind
Whereas politicization is most often derided, for the military to activate
its political rudders, under such circumstance, may be politicization that
is welcome. Challenging the government for conservative policies, such
as the Egyptian army’s current foray into politics, is not what is at issue.
In fact, a reading of publications by former military men suggests that
they would not be averse to a rightward shift. However, once the extreme
right wing kicks in then there may be a case for the military to play the
role of a guarding praetorian in protecting the Constitution.
This would be praetorianism of a third kind in which the military
launches into politics not for it self-interest but as a guardian praetorian,
particularly as all other institutions of state would likely have hollowed
out by then. The possibility of such politicization must continue in the
backdrop in order to be there as a deterrent for the government going
down this route in first place, given its proclivities, ideology and the fact
that there is no opposition to balance it.
It is hoped that India would not need to wait as long as the German
general staff, eleven years from 1933 till 1944.
 183

___________________________________
India’s Brass: What the Controversy Misses
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=32003

The movement of a particular filewithin the corridors of South Block

is being watched very closely by partisans involved who then speedily
convey its location to their acolytes in the media. The file’s movement is
expected to result in an announcement on nomination of General Suhag
as the next army chief on Bikram Singh demitting office in end July.
The defence minister has assured that all procedures will be followed.
Media commentary has nevertheless served up yet another agenda item
to divide the attentive public into two: those for the government or those
against it, not only in general but also on this particular score.
In the discussion the major point emphasized is that the military must
not be politicized. It is interesting that both sides are using the same
argument. Those on the BJP side suggest that undue haste in declaring
the successor by the Congress-led government is to ensure that their
nominee is in place. This would ensure a ‘line of succession’ forged by
its pushing out of VK Singh from the chief’s office a year before he was
due to leave. The opposite view is that not nominating the next chief’s
successor timely would be to allow BJP to politicize the process by its
possibly passing over Suhag as chief. Currently, the next senior in line is
an army commander who incidentally is related to VK Singh.
However, this is only the ongoing row. Anticipating the forthcoming
row would also be in order. In the widely expected case of the government
changing to one headed by the BJP what could likely happen will make
the current controversy pale in comparison. If the BJP gets into power,
it could consider overturning the announcement of the successor of the
chief and undertake the same process yet again to arrive at a different
name of successor. Procedurally it will no doubt be well taken care of
by bureaucrats piloting the file past the Appointments Committee of
the Cabinet; this will by far amount to greater politicization.
By no means is this the only possible future. Firstly, the Congress
may get cold feet and leave the appointment to the next government.
Secondly, the BJP may not come to power and a third front or a Congress
led minority government may have no problem with the changeover.
Thirdly, the BJP may choose to stick out the tenure of the next chief. The
latter is not impossible to visualize since the BJP may well be deterred.
It would be blamed for politicising the appointment. If it appoints
the general related to VK Singh, it could be fingered for favouritism,
particularly since VK Singh may also be in the legislature by then.
It may also be able to live with Suhag since Suhag would be on the
defensive from the beginning under the impression that the government
is averse to him owing to the controversy preceding his appointment.
Compromised thus, he may be more willing to play along. The example
of the sacking of Admiral Bhagwat in the initial period of the earlier
BJP government could make Suhag bow even where he need not. Even
if it does not pressurise Suhag, as a professional he would be faced with
a choice of complying or resigning. In case it does show Suhag the door,
the BJP would reason that it is not so much politicising the brass as much
as applying a necessary corrective to politicization by the Congress.
 184

Therefore, the possibility of a forthcoming controversy over the

near term that is much worse than the ongoing one over the impending
announcement of the chief designate is yet at an arms distance, though
not remote. It can unfold as early as month end.
However, the more significant point is not so much the personalities
involved or the issue of politicization of the appointment of army chief.
The latter while important in itself is more so because of the subsequent
politicization could upturn the apolitical character and image of the
forces.
Even if in a hierarchical structure such as is the army, the chief carries
much weight, the military’s apex functioning is collegial with the major
decisions being taken at the biannual army commanders’ conference.
Therefore, having a politicized chief is not enough to have critical mass
in politicizing the army. The top order needs working on equally. A
politicized chief serves a useful function in opening up the military for
further politicization over time by enabling the conditions that make
only those with right political credentials to rise in the hierarchy setting
its political tone and texture as an organisation.
For most part, the scope for politicization is restricted by the
professional and technical content of the military’s social function.
Since by all accounts it is kept out of the loop on key decisions, it is not
particularly worrying as to who gets to be chief. Most reaching the rank
of army commander are of equal professional worth, so individuals are
not of much consequence either. However, the significant issue is that the
shift in grounding of professionalism of the military, from an objective
to a subjective mode.
Currently, the military is taken as exhibiting objective professionalism.
This implies that its input to national security decision making is
unbiased, frank and forthright. While it can be accused of having
organizational interest clutter such input often, such as in the case of its
input on Siachen or on AFSPA for instance, overall, the Indian military
has been credited with practicing objective professionalism.
However, the problem is that with the BJP coming to power,
particularly if it is unencumbered by any coalition partners, it may prefer
a subjective model of military professionalism. This is the critical issue
that will face India and its military over the forthcoming BJP tenure, if
it comes to it. It would be a tribute to the professionalism of the Indian
military in case it survives the encounter with religious nationalism with
its moorings intact. It has been hypothesized earlier by this writer that
this may prove difficult in light of the nationalist subcultures waiting
on wings for just such an opportunity to ‘take over’ as the dominant
subculture and to eventually dissolve other subcultures, including that
of professional and radical professional within the military.
Subjective professionalism in a military implies an obedience that
comes from imbibing the ideological predispositions of its civilian
superiors rather than basing input on the objective coordinates of a
situation. This implies that even if in olive green, the brass could well think
saffron. Not only would the government have to bear the opportunity
cost of an advice it wishes to hear, but also its consequences. To illustrate,
even if retention of Siachen is taken as strategically sustainable, in the
nationalist subculture this would owe not to the strategic coordinates of
 185

the argument, but for a ‘weak’ India to overcome its millennial strategic
sloth and display its six-pack finally.
Therefore, if an act is to be judged as politicization, a key criterion
would be the intent and consequence. The unseemly controversy being
raised is only partially about the ambitions of VK Singh, a BJP party
candidate. It betrays an intent to take over what is widely regarded as
a professional institution with an intent to subvert its professionalism
from objective, to the extent it is, to subjective, that it has lately exhibited
a potential towards (as pointed out in this column from time to time).
The threat of politicization is not about a military taking over the
government but the government’s ideological orientation taking over
the military. A possible future is that the military will no longer be a
professional military of a secular state, but a religious nationalisminspired
military serving a majoritarian state. However, by no means is
this a ‘done’ deal yet.
Considered against this yardstick, the Congress’ move to get a new
chief in place before it demits office, in keeping with the supposed
‘chain of succession’, is positively benign. It is a defensive maneuver out
to protect the army from appointment of a political chief, who would
then open up the army to right wing inroads. Consequently, the current
controversy over the appointment of the army chief is but a symptom of
a wider syndrome out to beset India that may manifest in the army as
politicization, soon.
_______________________________________________
The Military at the High Table?
October 2, 2013
http://www.tehelka.com/the-military-at-the-hightable/?
singlepage=1

General VK Singh, now retired for over a year, is fully within his rights
to share the dais with a political personality of his choice. That he is
energised by a grouse against the incumbent government for not granting
him an extension is plausible. Additionally, it has been reckoned by
watchful security commentators that this has come to pass as yet another
episode in the sorry civil war on in South Block between the brass and
the bureaucrats.
The perception is that national security structures are so awry that
the security prescription of the military is not taken on board. Further,
military veterans have been kept from receiving their due in the form
of ‘one rank one pay’ by a heartless bureaucracy. Given their perceived
marginalisation, veterans are courting the opposition that in turn wants
their endorsement to best the ruling party at the forthcoming polls. This
could lead to politicisation of the military due to an existing beltway of
intellectual and cultural traffic between the veteran community and the
military.
The argument begs the question: Is the military really outside the
defence policy loop? From the army’s stonewalling on the issue of AFSPA
in the Northeast and in J&K and on Siachen, it would appear that not
only does it have a voice, but also a veto. A defence budget of over Rs 250
thousand crores spells that the military has the outlay it could possibly
bid for. This suggests that even if the military is not sitting on the table,
 186

its position has not been ignored; perhaps because it cannot be ignored.
So what more can the military really want?
The military’s acquisitions suggest that all that is demanded by
its doctrine is being met. All it can possibly ask for additionally is a
chance at working the doctrine in practice when terrorist push comes to
conventional shove. This is a policy decision that the government keeps
the military out of, reserving the policy choice and decision space for
itself.
This is unexceptionable since the military is only a tool and the
government is the one empowered to use it or not as per its rationale.
At best the military can input such a decision but it cannot arrogate the
decision for itself or demand that it be as per its lights. The government
fears that it may be stampeded into decisions it could come to regret,
overawed by the argument and stature of the military professional. It
may require arguing its case against that of the military, which in the
circumstance of a conflict, would put it in a less favourable position. The
upshot could well be a decision based on military logic rather than the
overriding political logic.
While in theory the political coordinates of a conflict situation must
supersede the military perspective, in practice this may not happen.
Firstly, a government would be shy of going against professional advice.
Any government would hate to have a national security decision labeled
as politically motivated out of parochial ends. The usual skepticism with
which political actions are greeted in the country, it would be difficult
for a government to persuade the people that it was acting on the political
compulsions of the situation rather than thinking of its own longevity.
Secondly, the military’s input need not always be professional. While
the military is apolitical, it has corporate interests that influence its
input. It does exert for having its perspective heard, sometimes using
indirect pressure on decision makers by manipulating public opinion.
For this purpose it has a two-star headed public information cell and is
increasingly resorting to the military intelligence directorate.
General VK Singh’s revelations on the army making payments to
politicians in J&K must be seen in this light. The leaked on the internal
inquiry of the doings of the now defunct military intelligence outfit, the
Technical Support Division, during VK Singh’s tenure allege that a bid
to topple the J&K government was also on the cards during the troubles
in 2010.
It is for these reasons that the military is only invited to participate in
military relevant decisions, rather than figuring in the National Security
Council organogram. The service chiefs though part of the strategic
planning group along with the secretaries of relevant ministries, feel
that, due to this clubbing with bureaucrats, their input is stifled.
They also perhaps have reservations on retired three star officers as
advisers in the secretariat. This arrangement harks back to the Curzon-
Kitchener controversy, with Kitchener objecting to his security input
being second guessed by a serving major general in the viceroy’s council.
As a result, the military is wary of ending up implementing decisions it
is not party to.
There is danger in neglecting this structural deficit further. Yet a bigger
problem is in the political moves of the veteran community that can be
 187

read as another indirect attempt by the uniformed fraternity to press for

change. Such moves prove the point that the military is a political player
that can skew decisions that are essentially political. The military at the
high table is a greater danger, especially one that is a political player.
On this count, there is a case for keeping the military alongside in
the room, rather than outside it or on the high table. If General VK
Singh’s latest controversy is to have something positive come of it, then
innovation on these lines is it.
___________________________________________

Modi and the Military: Not Quite an Innocent

Beginning
September 21, 2013
Countercurrents.org

Mr. Modi’s political sense was on display at the very first rally on his
nomination as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate. Addressing exservicemen
at Rewari he laid out his security agenda that would no doubt
have been music to the ears of the gathering. Declaring an intent to make
Pakistan behave, China back off, the civilian defence sector deliver and
have the coffers cough up ‘one rank one pension’, he suggested that since
all this would require a ‘strong’ leader, he was the best man for the job.
Missed in the deconstruction of his speech has been the more significant
aspect: that of politicisation of the military.
Flanked by General VK Singh of the DoB (‘date of birth’) fame, a
score of retired generals and an Olympic silver medallist to boot, Modi
was not merely playing to the gallery. He was instead attempting to gain
the military’s endorsement on two counts. The more obvious one is
that it would be useful to have the military alongside as he goes about
resetting India in the Hindu nationalist image. With their longed-for
goodies, both in terms of military toys and seventh pay commission
largesse, close at hand, the military can be expected to go about their
business with redoubled intensity since the security environment would
simultaneously be vitiated by worried neighbours reacting to ‘Hindu
India’ flexing its muscles.
But more important and urgent for Modi is that politicisation timely
may prove useful if his past was to catch up with him in the Gujarat
related cases that are yet unspooling in various courts. If judicial push
comes to policing shove, he could ‘Cry foul!’, citing Congress chicanery,
and, having the military’s weight behind him, deter any deflection from
7 Race Course Road.
Given the apolitical image of the army, it does appear counterintuitive
that a dais heavy with the brass as witnessed at Rewari could
amount to this. However, that conservative parties universally carry
the military’s vote is a verity in military sociology. The BJP therefore
has the advantage and doubly so, on account of the uninspiring defence
minister the Congress, fearing another Bofors, has foisted on the army
over two terms. As a senior minister, his political engagements meant the
hijack of the policy agenda by the bureaucrats. A resentful military can
be expected to take its civil war with bureaucrats in South Block into the
political arena.
 188

The military, no monolith, is internally differentiated. It has

subcultures, some of which are at variance with its public image that
can make a bid for dominance. While the majority in the military is
apolitical, secular and professional, it could in this circumstance end
up as the silent majority. It would be the politically alive element that
would set the military’s position on what promises to be a momentous
run up to elections over the coming year. Evidence of its existence and of
precedence is in the manner this segment had dominated the military’s
counter insurgency campaign, leaving the Valley littered with unmarked
graves.
This politicised segment could firstly perform the function of
keeping the military inert to the goings on in politics brought on by the
right wing’s philosophy of ends justifying the means. The cover of being
apolitical will sit easy in such a circumstance as the right wing attempts
steal the election with its communalisation of the political and discursive
space. Muzaffarnagar is a mere trailer.
Secondly, it could even prompt an intervention in case Modi falters
at the last hurdle, even as the majority looks on nonplussed. There is
precedence in which General VK Singh is alleged to have moved
mechanised formations in the dead of the night ostensibly to check if
they can react to contingencies in the midst of Delhi’s winter fog, but, to
some, to influence any government decision to sack him for taking the
government to court over his ‘date of birth’ controversy. Such innocuous
movements can be resorted to by formations with commanders
subscribing to the reactionary political subculture as messaging to
the government against any moves to permit the judicial noose from
tightening around Modi’s neck.
The fact that the government vets the military’s chain of succession
very carefully was very obvious from the accusations and counter
accusations during VK Singh’s ‘date of birth’ episode. This suggests that
apprehension of the military going political is not as far-fetched as the
popular image of the military suggests. Predisposed to conservatism and
desiring a turn to realist foreign and security policies, this segment could
delude itself into believing it is acting in national interest. Absolving itself
thus, it could seek to install Modi to power irrespective of the election
verdict and perhaps because of the returning to power of a dynastic order
revolting to the segment’s sense of self-worth.
The military’s views are set by its officer cadre that increasingly
identifies with the middle class. The reactionary discourse of late in
the middle class is well known and finds resonance in officers’ messes.
Ex-servicemen serving as a right wing catchment and their increasing
beltway into the consciousness of the military through cyber space,
defence periodicals and presence in cantonments, strengthens the
politicised subculture.
The BJP had attracted several generals, including respected ones
such as Jacob and Sinha, in its earlier foray. The difference then was that
Vajpayee was at its helm. This time round not only are the generals on
the BJP bandwagon of dubious standing, but the BJP is led by a figure
no stranger to controversy. Therefore, the relationship is no longer an
innocent one but is one pregnant with forebodings not only till the
elections but also beyond them.
 189

____________________________________
The Loc Incident Calls for Self-Regulation by the Army
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=21158

The divergence between the press release of the defence ministry and
the defence minister’s statement in parliament has hogged headlines and
primetime. The contretemps owes to the government in its wisdom, and
perhaps rightly so, privileging the opening up to Pakistan’s newly elected
Nawaz Sharif dispensation over the tactical details of the incident. The
army for its part appeared more intent on getting the message implicating
the Pakistani army across.
It cannot be certain that there was active involvement of the Pakistani
army as the press release of the defence ministry’s PRO in Udhampur,
now rescinded, would have us believe. A 20 man strong ambush in an area
reportedly on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), even if across
the fence, is difficult to digest in light of the army’s own publicity to its
surveillance measures in place over the past decade. It is not impossible
therefore that the ambush was carried out by a smaller party, as would
plausibly be the case.
Attributing the ambush to an ambush party numbering about a
score owes perhaps to the army’s embarrassment at being caught off
guard and to explain away the high loss of lives. It is to compound the
embarrassment to admit to terrorists getting the better of the army. It
would be better from the military’s institutional point of view instead
to highlight the Pakistani army as an active participant rather than in a
supportive role.
It is also debatable whether the Pakistani army was directly involved.
The army does not need to participate since it has its proven proxies to
do the damage. It is also not interested in seeing a breakdown in the
ceasefire, since it would put the army directly in the sights of the Indian
army. The Indian army rightly prefers to have Pakistan’s army directly
pay a price for its proxy war. In case the Pakistani army involves itself
directly, then it would lay itself open to retribution by Indian army -
a circumstance it would prefer to avoid by having its proxies bear the
burden instead.
Without a doubt, there would be active connivance of the Pakistani
army with it, if not active participation. The tit-for-tat at the LoC has
been now on for some time if the incidents stretching back to the January
beheadings are included. Armies typically, as the army chief reminded
us on the last occasion are expected to be ‘aggressive’. They also prefer
the time and place of their own choosing to respond. This means that
the latest LoC incident cannot be taken in isolation but must be seen as
part of a series. Given that mutilation has figured earlier; the stronger
possibility now of the direct involvement of the Pakistani army; and the
numbers of dead in the incident increasing as of this time round, there
appears an escalation on the LoC.
In the event, the details of the incident and their veracity have proven
political capital for the opposition. This owes to the political implications
of the incident that are arguably the more significant. As rightly
editorialised elsewhere, there are powerful political and institutional
 190

forces on both sides. A pattern has emerged in which such forces sabotage
any possibility of warming of relations. It can easily be reckoned that the
Pakistani army, standing to lose most from such a warming of relations,
would be opposed to it and such incidents are a handiwork of that army.
That certain forces in India too stand to lose in case of change is also well
known. These can therefore be expected to take advantage of Pakistani
army chicanery and lay the blame for the continuing of frayed relations
on that army. The question raised here is not whether such forces have
a constituency within the Indian army - which is patently not the case
- but the utility of the army’s position for political forces in India in the
run up to national elections.
The readiness of the army for identification of the Pakistani army
as participant-perpetrator of the latest outrage on the LoC, thereby
putting it at variance with the statement of its minister in parliament
suggests more than just bureaucratic bungling. This time round instead
of its traditional secrecy on identifications of units and access to the
units in question on the LoC of the media, the army has instead behaved
differently. It has not only given out the unit identifications, but also
permitted the visual media access to posts on LoC for the media to do
its rabble rousing bit. Taken along with the opposition tirade, this not
only heightens the aspect of government incompetence but brings into
question the government’s recent policy tack reaching out to Pakistan.
What emerges is that the army is a player in the bureaucratic game
of influencing policy. Widely perceived by analysts and its own selfperception
that it is not part of the proverbial ‘policy loop’, it is possibly
exerting overtime to record its position on the issue in question. That in
the process it is resorting to indirect means of pressuring the government
makes it less than professional, and makes it, in this instance, certainly
fall far short of its own yardstick of professionalism. No doubt, there is a
case for including the army position in policy deliberations and there is a
strong case for having its apex officials on all such bodies. Nevertheless,
resort by the army to such measures is less than ‘kosher’.
The problem is in the fallout of such professional shortfalls, having
origin in structural deformities in the Indian security establishment,
on the ‘Kashmir issue’. The army using the media adroitly for voicing
its reservations on policy matters ends up exercising a ‘veto’. Kashmir
is no stranger to this in the internal security policy domain where the
vexed question of AFSPA continues unchanged under what is widely
perceived in Kashmir, and not least by its chief minister, an army veto.
If the apprehension here of extension of the army’s policy space to
restrict government foreign policy initiatives holds any water, then some
cautionary measures are called for.
Firstly, the army’s case for inclusion in policy deliberations, that
has wide backing in the strategic community, must be taken on board.
The game by bureaucrats that keeps it out is apparently having a higher
price than the nation can afford in terms of unintended fallout, such
as in Kashmir. Secondly, there has to be a rap on the knuckles in this
case. The army, using the cover of transparency, has served the media
hysteria. In this it has flirted with the role of a political player. Leaving
this unattended would lead to emergence of a marriage of convenience
between the political opposition with elections in its sights and the army
 191

over a policy question of levels of proximity with Pakistan. This has to

be nipped in the bud by the ministry, lest it resurface over the remainder
of the election year.
Lastly, the army could well do some soul searching. It is hardly likely
that its minister charged with also untangling the Congress’ Telangana
knot, can also supervise it effectively. If the bureaucrats were to attempt to
do so, it is more likely than not that the army will take umbrage that this
is an instance of ‘bureaucratic’ as against ‘political’ control. Therefore,
the army leadership has to be more circumspect. It is not politically
savvy enough to know how information it lets out and its position will be
manipulated by political forces in India advantaged by adverse relations
with Pakistan. It needs to reappraise its apolitical credentials to ensure it
remains equivalent of Caesar’s wife.

____________________________________
Countering Insurgency and Sexual Violence
6 May, 2013
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=16237

The Indian Army’s powers under Armed Forces Special Powers Act have
rightly figured in the debate surrounding sexual violence particularly
since the barbaric rape in New Delhi early this year. To the pro-army
side, the army is self-regulating and any incidents that do take place are
‘aberrations’. To the activists, the army is high on testosterone all the
while in counterinsurgency and therefore requires its powers clipped. The
army’s own position when faced with allegations of sexual transgressions
in operational areas by its members is that it takes action where warranted
but notes that most accusations are propaganda of anti-national forces.
The truth is, as is usually the case, somewhere in between.
The debate understandably was taken on board by the Justice Verma
Committee and the outcome has figured in its speedily-arrived-at
recommendations. Justice JS Verma requires that the infamous provision
of the AFSPA that calls for sanction by the central government for
initiating prosecution against armed forces personnel be removed where
a sexual offence is alleged. This has something for both supporters of the
army and its critics. It does not degrade the powers the military thinks it
needs in such areas. But it does remove the cover of impunity that critics
of the military argue allows the military to get away.
However, the army’s view that it would open the army up to false
allegations needs to be taken on board. The counter insurgency
environment is considerably complex. The insurgents have an active body
of over ground workers who can be deployed as a dirty tricks department.
Once in the dragnet of the Indian court system, particularly one subject
to militant intimidation, well meaning soldiers acting in good faith could
find themselves on the firing line. Truth will be the first casualty and
morale the second. Vindication, after the better part of youth has been
expended fighting off the allegation, is hardly the fate a nation would
want for those who have signed up to defend it to the peril of their lives.
If soldiers are sent into such environments by a government, all they ask
is a fair cover.
Such cover from military excesses no doubt must be afforded citizens
 192

in the affected areas also. Justice Verma’s second point on ‘command

responsibility’, a senior’s duty to prevent and take action in such cases,
is pertinent here. If the senior leadership sets a command climate that
encourages juniors to take an unfair advantage of additional powers, the
central government must demand of the military hierarchy the reason
why it has not proceeded with prosecution on its own under the Army
Act. Tactical level commanders such as the infamous Major Avatar
Singh are as much a product of the command climate set by their seniors
as they are subject to their inner psychological pathologies. Where
explanation offered by the army is found wanting, it must be entered
into confidential records of culpable commanders under supervision of
the ministry and where necessary administrative, and depending on the
gravity, criminal proceedings be launched against erring commanders.
Merely shifting them out to other assignments as was the case with the
division commander in the Pathribal incident is not enough. That this
was done in the case suggests that the state had much to hide and could
not risk having its officials prosecuted, lest they spill the beans.
Command climate, the degree of permissiveness (or otherwise) of
violations in conducting counter insurgency operations, is perhaps the
most significant variable that either promotes or deters violations. A
command climate is permissive when it allows greater leeway to tactical
commanders in pursuit of quantifiable ‘results’ such as militants killed.
The tacit bargain is in the commander overlooking cutting of corners in
such pursuit so long as ‘results’ in terms of statistics of militants killed
keep rolling in. Such commanders end up having to look the other way in
cases of transgressions since they would be implicated for abetting short
cuts in means and methods in case they quarrel with their tools.
The infamous Manorama Devi case is apt example. Why did the
army defend the indefensible? The popular narrative of the case holds
water. Believing Manorama Devi to be an explosives expert, the army
had ordered her elimination in custody, lest she be let off by the courts.
Obviously, those the army ordered to carry out the killing took advantage
of the situation. Fearing that the officer would spill the beans if tried
for rape and custodial death, the hierarchy had to protect him and the
troops involved. The logic in higher command echelons was perhaps that
the image of the army was more important than justice. The government
for its part, equally privy to the facts of the case, and unwilling to
face down the army or face uproar in the North East, played for time
by ordering a committee on AFSPA, the BP Jeevan Reddy Committee,
and having outlasted the agitations, dispensed with the committee’s
recommendations.
Even where the command climate is strictly professional, as was the
case in Kashmir in the early nineties, a Kunan Poshpora can yet occur. At
the time the commanding general in the Valley was MA Zaki, described
by Manoj Joshi in his book Lost Rebellion as: ‘fortunately for India the
man commanding the Indian Army’s 15th Corps was a cool professional
soldier, a Hyderabadi Muslim who had served the Army with distinction.
The courageous and deeply religious officer was fated to play a major role
in the affairs of the state.’ MA Zaki later led Jamia Millia Islamia out of
troubled times in the late nineties. That Kunan Poshpora dates to his
tenure suggests that there is more to the case than the cult status the case
 193

has through its retelling become as one of a mass rape.

Reputed bureaucrat, Wajahat Habibullah, divisional commissioner in
the Valley when the incident occurred, refers to it in his book on Kashmir,
Kashmir: The Dying of the Light, informing that he had recommended
an inquiry in his preliminary inquiry report. The government instead
had the then chairperson of the Press Trust of India, BG Verghese, look
into the incident as part of his remit that had wider terms of reference.
That the press was exploited by the over-ground militants to replicate
their narrative of Kunan Poshpora was one reason why BG Verghese
headed to Kashmir. In his autobiography, First Draft, Verghese recounts
that he was provided with the fullest access by Zaki to all relevant actors,
including officers and soldiers of the offending infantry unit. He was
unable to find evidence either of the act or of an attempted cover up.
In the event, the brigade commander had ordered search operations at
night against explicit orders in the corps zone, thereby creating conditions
in which sexual assault could occur. The opportunity was seized on by
the militant sympathizers, irrespective of the facts of the case and the
long term implications for the lives of the women of the village. Blowing
the case out of proportion in an information war campaign, truth was
lost and so was justice. Had Wajahat Habibullah been more assertive
then or not moved out of the Valley to a post in Delhi, a separate inquiry
could have established the truth. The army was open to this.
Tavleen Singh in her book, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, recounts
how Zaki reacted to her critical questioning of an incident of army high
handedness in early 1990 resulting in civilian deaths. Zaki had admitted
to it being ‘unfortunate’. There was no attempt to underplay or avoid it.
This indicates that an incident of the proportions of Kunan Poshpora
could not have escaped Zaki’s professional eye, particularly due to his
renown as a commander leading from the front. Incidentally, he suffered
a graze to his head in a fire fight with militants in one such encounter
as head of the army in the Valley. Given such a record of integrity and
grit, insinuations as attend the Kunan Poshpora now need revisiting.
Stridency does not alone make for truth. It instead has the effect of the
army’s case becoming more plausible in their pointing out the perils of
ambush by litigation.
Siddharth Varadarajan has suggested an improvement to deter the
government from sitting on decisions or denying clearances altogether,
while preserving the provision of prior governmental permission. The
government must be required, by an amendment to the Act, to furnish
reasons for refusal for prosecution. Its reason must also be subject to
judicial review. In case the court decides that the evidence outweighs
the reason given, it can either override the government or, where reasons
of national security and state are furnished, it could order the army to
exercise military justice. This has precedence in the Pathribal killings
case in which the army has been asked by the court to proceed with
the court martial of those who killed innocent civilians to pass off the
killings as those of militants involved in the Chittisingpora incident.
That in its judgment the court has upheld the cover from prosecution
in the Act implies that the provision is here to stay. Therefore, ensuring
accountability of the ministry in its power to withhold or grant sanctions
for prosecution must be built into the Act through amendment.
 194

Justice Verma’s third point on review of the AFSPA in areas where

it is applicable adds to the weighty voices against AFSPA. Yet, despite
the solid case against the law and the credentials of those, such as late
Justice Verma, arrayed against is, it appears set to stay on. Clearly, India
is not out of the woods yet in terms of armed challenges to the state
that require an armed response. What Justice Verma’s report succeeds in
doing is to push the argument past the tipping point that the law must
be amended. Even then the law by itself is not enough. The command
climate in the theatre of operations must - and can be - such as to make
the law’s existence irrelevant.
___________________________________________

Dear General, Please Stay Out of Politics

Tehelka Magazine, Vol 8, Issue 36,
10 Sep 2011

ARMY CHIEF VK Singh’s comment on the state of the nation as

equivalent to “daldal” (morass) comes as no surprise. The remarks were
part of his take on social activist Anna Hazare’s high-voltage agitation
against corruption. As a citizen, Singh has every right to an opinion.
As a member of the defence services, the right to voicing it is curtailed
considerably. As army chief, it is much less so, particularly on politically
charged issues and especially so in politically charged times as now.
That the army chief is currently in a tussle with the defence ministry
over the controversy surrounding his date of birth makes his remarks
mistimed. The decision of the ministry has been in favour of the earlier
date of birth, resulting in Singh having to retire next year. The adjutant
general has reportedly asked the ministry for the reason. Therefore,
his comments cannot but be read with his personal predicament as
backdrop.
More importantly, the chief has laid himself open to questions from a
different angle in his take: “Interesting in terms of how we are witnessing
the power of democracy, the power of the people.” The democratic
protests that the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has attracted,
both in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast, have not displaced the
army from its position on the continuance of the Act. The fast of Irom
Sharmila is into its second decade, to little avail. The move on dilution of
AFSPA’s ‘draconian’ provisions has become a political football between
the ministries of home, defence and law, since the army refuses to budge.
Clearly, it appears that the democratic sensibilities of the chief are only
selectively aroused.
To the chief’s credit is his own record on tackling corruption. That
he has identified himself closely with curbing it within the ranks can be
seen in his remarks on taking over the baton, “We will focus attention on
improving internal health.” In his previous billet at Kolkata, he had taken
action in the infamous Sukhna land scam. The graver Adarsh Housing
Society scam, involving politicians and bureaucrats, has since scarred his
predecessor’s name. Therefore, his desire to personally provide ballast to
the national focus on the issue is understandable.
For the military as an institution, the message is loud and clear. A
series of scandals has dented its image. Because it expends 10-15 per cent
 195

of public monies, being untainted is more than an issue in ethics — it

is one of combat effectiveness. Singh is only echoing what he once said,
“Until the time our internal health is good, we would not be able to fight
the external threats.”
However, the immanent issue is one of civil-military relations. The
fragility of our democratic polity, currently fully on display, suggests
greater exercise of circumspection on part of the brass. Any overt
overstepping of the line of deference rightly calls for a formal check by
the minister. The brass is already reportedly under a ‘gag’ to curb its
tendency to snipe at the bureaucracy, which in their mind’s eye runs
the government. The problem with this is that it further weakens the
credibility of the government, showing it up as ‘weak’. This redounds to
increase the relative power of the army internally. This may not be in the
best democratic interest.
As it is, democratic good health in terms of Parliament’s authority to
legislate autonomously is under challenge. That the occasion has enabled
a diversionary rallying of conservative formations behind the agitation
indicates that the democratic upsurge is equally political as civil societyrooted.
The military as an institution is in danger of an unwitting alliance
with the conservative forces. Because it has weight in prestige, the army’s
position can be misappropriated by forces it has little comprehension
of, being politically naïve. Democratic good health can do without
gratuitous buffeting of civil-military relations at this juncture.
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50asp?filename=Op100911proscons.asp

___________________________________________
Interrogating Security Expansionism in India
#3441, August 23, 2011
Ipcs.org

The head of a think-tank writing in The Tribune (http://bit.ly/o0qXbO)

lists military capabilities that India requires up to fifteen years. In
strategic circles, ever since remarks of the former army chief were,
possibly deliberately, leaked, the ‘threat’ has been magnified to becoming
a ‘twinned’ threat from Pakistan and China combined.
The capabilities deemed desirable are to include a mountain strike
corps both in the Northeast and in J&K. It is possible that with time that
would mean two for J&K; one for each front there. Offensive capabilities
for defensive formations are to be created in imitation of those done in the
plains prompted by ‘Cold Start’. The three strike corps in the plains are to
continue for conventional deterrence purposes. Firepower resources, in
particular precision guided munitions, are to be augmented for stand-off
degradation, since territory may not be as relevant as an objective. Two
rapid reaction-cum-air assault divisions (with an amphibious brigade
each) are suggested.
It may be recalled that elsewhere the former Chairman Chiefs of
Staff Committee had required a wide-ranging intercontinental ballistic
missile capability. The DRDO is keen on working on technology for
a BMD system, despite its known shortcomings to deliver on more
mundane equipment. Further, the Army has requested for placing of the
ITBP under its command on the China border. The budget for internal
 196

security, handled by the MHA, has gone up three times over the past
decade.
This article makes two observations on the foregoing threat-mongering.
One is that this indicates expansionism in the security sector, with the
consequences that amount to militarization. The second is on possible
social consequences, generally neglected in strategic discussions.
The NSA in his Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture asked for moderation
in the criticisms mounted by think-tanks, stating, “This also requires that
some of our media and commentators, whose unquestioned brilliance
is regularly on display lambasting other countries for their politics and
policies, learn the virtues of moderation.” His take was, “why create selffulfilling
prophesies of conflict with powerful neighbours like China?”
Our goal must be defence, not offense, unless offense is necessary for
deterrence or to protect India’s ability to continue its own transformation.
The think-tank recommendations, in their own words, go well beyond
this: “Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the
fight deep into the adversary’s territory through the launching of major
offensive operations.”
Clearly, there is a case for debate within the national security system
on this divergence, with the NSA persuading the army that their recipe -
‘the defence of porous borders requires us to learn new rules for the use
and combination of force, persuasion and deterrence, alongside other
more benign means’ - holds water.
The second neglected dimension of the social impact of militarization
requires acknowledging, firstly, that recruiting patterns in the security
forces have a built in bias towards the ‘Hindi heartland’. In theory
this is based on the recruitable male population of a state. Those
traditionally contributing to military numbers stand to gain. There are
two implications. One is in the channelling of revenue expenditure of the
government in terms of VI pay commission enhanced salaries and perks
into certain areas. It is symptomatic of hidden affirmative action.
The second is in the diversity of the country not finding reflection in
the composition of security forces. A narrower concept of nationalism,
emanating from the Hindi heartland, finds sway. This may be at odds
with ethnically and culturally diverse host communities, where the
deployment takes place. In areas of insurgency, it accentuates the cultural
gap.
A result of increased deployment, particularly in thinly populated
borderlands, is on the social landscape. For instance, Gautam Naulakha
records that the move to provide the Rashtriya Rifles with cantonment
accommodation in Kashmir has elicited a negative response from the
people and the state administration since it involves land allocation.
Likewise, the increase by two divisions in the Northeast and the
recommendation of a strike corps there, implies that there would be
a larger visibility and imprint on the consciousness of the people of a
different ethnic stock. This remains an understudied dimension.
Also, an over-developed security sector draws discourse, policy
direction and resources away from a development to a defence template.
Higher returns in the defence sector will draw human resources into it.
This has qualitative implications for the competing sectors. A fallout is
in advantaged groups developing a stake in India’s identity as a ‘garrison
 197

state’, at the expense of groups on the territorial and economic margins.

While economic growth has released the monies, this has alternative
uses overlooked in threat-induced expansion. Sole reliance on strategic
considerations amounts to strategic determinism. This could prove
particularly hurtful if the strategic calculus is misinformed and, worse,
possibly motivated by parochial concerns.
The NSA is right in his warning on the dangers of India as a ‘premature
superpower’ (Martin Wolf): “Their rise, as that of Wilhelmine Germany
or militarist Japan, was cut short prematurely.”
_____________________________________________

The Indian Army: Organizational Changes in the

Offing
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-indian-armyorganizational-
changes-in-the-offing-3318.html

The recent headline in a leading national daily, “Indian Army set for
its most radical revamp,” is entirely believable. The article informs that
“proposals include setting up of a Strategic Command, comprising of
Army’s offensive capabilities” which may be implemented as early as
March 2010. The reorganization involves the “creation of a Strategic
Command, under which the three Strike Corps would be brought
together” as “part of the ‘transformation study’ done by a high-level
team under Army chief, General VK Singh, when he was heading the
Eastern Command.” The article examines this move in relation to India’s
Pakistan policy and the inescapable fact of South Asia’s nuclearization.
India will reengage Pakistan after the long gap since July last year
with their Foreign Secretaries meeting on the sidelines of a SAARC
meeting in Thimpu next month. This will set the stage for talks between
their Foreign Ministers during the first quarter of this year. The strategic
changes in India would occur around this time. The message to Pakistan
is stark. How will Pakistan react? Although there is no direct link between
resumption of the peace process and military restructuring, this exercise
has long-term implications for the peace process.
The implications for the peace process arise at two levels - overt
and less visible. The overt message is that India is ‘upping the ante’ by
establishing a capability for escalation-dominance. Pakistan, led by
its Army, will receive the message that India now has an answer to the
problem of proxy war. Pakistan would, in response, need to rethink its
India strategy. The less visible message is that India has little faith in
the peace process. These changes would prepare India for the worst case
scenario in which it may need to credibly coerce and possibly compel
Pakistan.
Bringing the strike corps under one command headquarters would
bring synergy to India’s offensive capabilities, making them seem more
potent when employed together. The headquarters enables this capability,
although these strike corps can be deployed in the geographical
commands, if required.
This capability harks back to the ‘Sundarji doctrine’, in which the strike
corps was designed to slice Pakistan at its waist in a counteroffensive.
During Operation Parakram, Pravin Sawhney and VK Sood reported
 198

that the three strike corps were deployed for this purpose in mid 2002,
when they were co-located in the desert after the Kalu Chak incident. By
making this capability more ‘doable’ through the creation of a strategic
command headquarters, the Army seems oblivious of the nuclear
dimension that is present since 1998.
The implications of the nuclear dilemma are of equal consequence.
Currently, Pakistan has an unstated nuclear doctrine, that one observer
interprets as ‘asymmetric escalation’. Most believe that its nuclear
threshold is high enough to permit limited conventional operations, even
at strike corps levels and up to a limited depth. This can be triggered
by India’s strike corps operating together under a single command
headquarters, which highlights the limitations in rationale of a single
command headquarters.
The doctrinal trend has moved from the Sundarji doctrine to limited
Cold Start offensives. Now, with Cold Start in cold storage, it is to a
‘proactive strategy’. This movement was broadly in consonance with
the imperatives of nuclearization. The current reported moves amount
to risking a nuclear showdown, which is a strategy that India can do
without. It is a strategy that can be adopted in a war situation with one of
the command headquarters, Central Command, for instance, playing a
role. However, to establish a permanent strategic command headquarters
will amount to keeping a sword pointed at Pakistan’s innards, given the
message that India, with its offensive capability enhanced, would be able
to continue operations even in case of nuclear first use by Pakistan.
Possible Pakistani reactions may occur at two levels – one, its
peacetime equations with India and second, in wartime. If the nature of
the Pakistani regime is any indication, it would first attempt to balance
India. Pakistan could increase its reliance on the nuclear deterrent and
its dependence on China. For Pakistan’s reliance on the Chinese, the
Indian Army has a ready answer - ‘two front’ doctrine.
In conflict, this change indicates an expectation that nuclear deterrence
will work. In other words, the proposed changes would require rethinking
whether India’s nuclear doctrine is adequate. Since the conventional and
nuclear levels are interlinked, changes in one cannot be considered in
isolation from the other. The consequent changes in the nuclear doctrine
are not known. However, could the tail end up wagging the dog?
Mr. AK Antony, who will have to take the ultimate call, needs to
thus ask himself the question: “Does the proposed change meet India’s
security interests?”
_________________________________
An Issue in Civil-Military Relations
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/an-issue-in-civilmilitary-
relations-3000.html

The Army Chief has said, “US has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen.
Indonesia has not allowed a second Bali bombing to happen. India has
allowed people to get away after the Parliament attack, the Delhi blasts
and finally the 26/11. It’s time for all of us to say no more.” In light of
weightier civil-military relations issues in question, that both analogies
are inappropriate is not worth a pause. But first a consideration of whether
this is indeed a defining juncture in India’s civil-military relations.
 199

The context is the forthcoming anniversary of 26/11, which India

would like to traverse without incident. The urgency owes to the situation
in Pakistan worsening. It is possible that the government is putting the
pressure on Pakistan to rein in the jihadis to the extent it can. This
explains the Home Minister’s earlier warning, “I’m warning Pakistan for
the last time. If Pakistan attempts to send terrorists into India again,
India will not only foil those attempts but also give them a crushing
response.” Such a ‘good cop-bad cop’ routine helps balance the prime
minister’s extending a ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan on his trip to the
Valley late last month. The Chief said this in the presence of the Minister
of State for Defence. News that the latest terror plan, bust by the FBI in the
US, was to target the prestigious National Defence College, was perhaps
the provocation. The statement of the present Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee is in keeping with precedent of policy influencing
pronouncements set by the previous COSC Chairman, Admiral Sureesh
Mehta, in his address at a National Maritime Foundation lecture recently
– the statement in question then being on India’s China policy.
But is India capable of such finesse in signalling? Answering this
question in the ‘affirmative’ would mean that treating the Chief’s
statement as a departure in civil-military norms as an attempt at
generating a conflict where there is none. Since whether there is a plan
to the government’s moves cannot be known with any certainty, giving
the benefit of doubt is warranted. The government is using the Chief’s
broad shoulders to unmistakably convey to Pakistan that India is poised
precariously on its proverbial ‘tolerance threshold’.
Nevertheless, even as an academic exercise, it is worth probing what
the juncture implies. Keeping civil-military relations under scrutiny
periodically helps keep militarization in check and democracy in good
health.
Firstly, the statement was at a CII-Army seminar. This indicates
the vested interest corporate India, and external arms dealers, have in
arming India. The Minister of Defence having indicated that India is
likely to spend $ 50 billion over the middle term, this is not surprising.
Of consequence is what this implies for policy choices. This can only be
to facilitate military expenditure in pursuit of capabilities allowing India
to prevail in case of exercise of the military option, an inevitability since
the Chief has spoken.
Secondly, with the Home Minister and the Chief having, in their
utterances sealed India’s policy choice, whether it is the right one needs
questioning. Higher end options, such as war, can be ruled out for the
very reasons that have stayed India’s hand earlier. These are economy,
US presence and the nuclear overhang. However, surgical strikes on any
of the list of 5000 targets that the Air Force Western Command boss has
said they have drawn up, is possible. This could perhaps be supplemented
with Army action across the Line of Control, so that all services have a
piece of the action.
Would this make sense in a situation in which Pakistan finds itself
in currently? The expectation that India can pull off a mini Israel style
punishing strike is to mistake a nuclear armed state with Palestinian non
state actors. Since madrasas can reasonably be expected to be part of
jihadi training complexes, bloodied madrasa children on CNN would
 200

make for a avoidable political debacle.

Thirdly, in case India has not foreclosed its options, then credibility of
the minister and the Chief, and in turn that of India, would suffer. With
credibility at stake the pressures for the military option would increase.
This would be in addition to right wing pressures that would be strident,
in the hope of regaining the ground lost in recent electoral battles.
Therefore, even if the option is open, it has been virtually foreclosed.
This brings to fore the most important implication. Can the military
pronounce on policy choices? It can discuss and advise on options. Making
choices in democratic systems are patently a political prerogative. Military
positions on issues command credibility that a government would find
hard to challenge. The leaking of the MacChrystal report is an example
from civil-military relations in the US. In the current circumstance, were
the government to choose the saner option once again, it would fall foul
of the opinion, albeit inadvertently generated by the Chief’s remarks, in
favour of an overtly militarised response.
While not over dramatising the juncture, any lessons it has can only
serve deepen India’s democracy and military professionalism.

_______________________________________
Soldiers, not servants
17 October 2013
indiatogether.org

The last decade witnessed a spate of suicides and fratricides

within the military. The pressures from counter insurgency over
the preceding decade and a half were taking their toll. Measures
put in place for prevention and response such as the suggestions
of the Defence Institute for Psychological Research on the dignity
of the soldier, and administrative measures as sending soldiers on
their full leave entitlement three times a year, have reduced such
incidents.
Not entirely fortuitously, the culmination of the problem and
its reporting in the press coincided with the Sixth Pay Commission.
The services used the instances as an indicator of low morale,
and argued, to good effect, that they needed upward revision
of salaries and allowances. The Pay Commission’s otherwise
controversial recommendations were nevertheless acclaimed for
its furthering of the interest of those below officer rank.
This time around the army is beset with the problem of affray
within the ranks. Six cases have been reported in the press of
fisticuffs between officers and other ranks. The latest is the Meerut
incident, involving a Delhi-based unit of a fighting regiment. Earlier
incidents too involved combat units - an artillery unit in Nyoma
and the armoured unit in Samba.
With the Seventh Pay Commission having been announced
recently, the army can be expected to use its problem strategically
to influence the outcome. The army has put in place new human
resources development policies designed to make up for the
deficit in officers numbering 37,509, down about 10,000 from
its authorization of 47,916. With a projection of an additional
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16,222 officers needed for new formations such as the mountain

strike corps, the deficit would be about 25,000 by the end of the
decade.
The service will likely make the case that the ‘root cause’
of the cases of indiscipline is lack of officers in the frontlines.
While other measures such as bettering leadership training, by
introduction of a leadership course, and using the cadre of 91,000
junior commissioned officers optimally are reportedly in hand, the
army will press for the Seventh Pay Commission to deliver not only
for the personnel below officer ranks, but more so for officers.
The upshot of the organization using the issue of indiscipline in
the ranks for feathering its institutional nest will be the continuing
decline of professionalism in the service. Given the prospects of
politicization currently staring the military in the face as the
right wing forces vie for its tacit endorsement, mediated through
the veterans’ community, the two coincident and intertwined
facets will ensure a degraded military capability by decade
end, notwithstanding the armament acquisitions and higher
technological thresholds in the pipeline.
Not only are troops present in officer accommodation in
cantonments but, more questionably, are also in their homes with
officers’ families when the officers are out on field postings.
Timely preventive action needs accurate diagnosis and
prescription. Most commentary on fracas within the ranks has
rightly highlighted that this is due to a narrowing of the socioeconomic
differential between the soldiers and their officers. The
two now come out of the same social classes and are differentiated
by an increasingly narrow educational background.
The fact that the notable instances of indiscipline have been
in fighting arms suggest that this is because the army attempts
to maintain feudal privileges of the officer ranks by using troops
to furnish the same. It is apparent that this is increasingly being
resented by troops. The same problem has not been reported
in technical and supporting arms and services, and this suggests
that the relationship between officers and men in these is more
work-oriented. This prevents any arbitrary behaviour on the part
of officers, no doubt deterred in part by the higher standards of
education of those in the other ranks. This is the case also in the
air force and the navy, where work relations are work centric and
not patriarchal.
Therefore, increasing the number of officers will only compound
the problem since the weight of the officer class will increase. It can
be argued that a higher remuneration to increase attractiveness
of the service for youth will enhance quality of life, making the
officer rely less on the service for privileges. This could reduce
the pressure on the service to compensate officers for lack of
remuneration with privileges.
The fact is that the Sixth Pay Commission did increase the pay
and emoluments. Yet, the pressure on the army to compensate
through provision of privileges for its officers has apparently not
reduced appreciably. Even if it potentially could have, since the
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numbers of officers has gone up and inflation in the ranks due to a

cadre review has made the army top-heavy over the past decade,
those gains have been wiped out.
A cultural change is needed. This is clearly easier said than
done since the military does not see itself any more in isolation
from society, as a professional island in its cantonments and at
remote fronts.
Firstly, the army would not likely reduce its officer privileges
since it sees its peer group as the IAS and IPS. A statistic has it
that in Maharashtra, 2600 cops work in the homes of the 280 IPS
officers in the state. There are seven to ten constables, three
to four orderlies, one cook and two or three telephone runners
and two drivers each deployed at homes of superintendents and
commissioners. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the case with
army officers is not very different in kind even if the numbers
involved are less odious. Not only are troops present in officer
accommodation in cantonments but, more questionably, are also
in their homes with officers’ families when the officers are out on
field postings.
Secondly, the feudal profile of fighting arms owes to the
hangover of the martial race theory that has carried on into this
century since its birth two centuries back through the regimental
system. The recruiting continues to be caste based. For instance,
the soldiers in the Sikh Light Infantry unit in question are from the
lower castes in Punjab, while those from the Sikh Regiment are from
higher castes. Such a recruiting profile leads to preponderance in
representation of north Indian communities in the fighting arms.
As a result their subcultures are imported into the army along with
certain negative features as feudal, non-modern, relationships
between those in power and authority and those in the ranks.
The army has closed its ranks against any change to this, even
fighting off access to statistics involved, such as in the case of
Sachar Committee inquiring after the numbers of the Muslims in
the service. It can be expected that the advantaged communities,
specifically those within a circle with a 300 km radius from
Delhi, and their legions of veterans, will strengthen the army
in its reactionary foot dragging. Increasing officer numbers
will compound this problem, since the army will target these
communities to deliver up more sons. These communities will in
turn be more than forthcoming, making a vicious circle.
The problem in the ranks is deeper than the current assessments
make it out to be. Cosmetic changes, taken with an eye to impress
the Seventh Pay Commission, are in the offing, whereas a more
proactive and holistic approach is required.

_______________________________________
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Expanding too fast?

23 May 2012
indiatogether.org

The details of the Nyoma Incident need not detain us here.

It can be predicted that there will be multiple versions of the
unfortunate incident floating in cyber space soon. The military
court of inquiry will ascertain the facts, justice will be meted out
and the artillery regiment that served as the site of the incident
disbanded. The standard operating procedures for the rest of the
army will be firmed up and will no doubt include a stricture against
families accompanying officers when out in the field.
While all this can understandably be expected to be internal to
the military, it bears reflection as to whether this is an isolated
case, an ‘aberration’ to anticipate an army spokesperson. Or, is
there something in it on the good health of the army for the ear
of wider society?
The army has been expanding incessantly over the past three
decades. The first round was over the turn of the eighties of
mechanisation. The following decade witnessed the raising of the
Rashtriya Rifles. The last decade saw the doubling of Rashtriya
Rifles and raisings of two mountain divisions for the China front.
This decade will see the raising of a mountain strike corps,
promised recently by the Defence Minister.
The message that emerges is one of insecurity. While earlier
it was insecurity prompted by Pakistan, lately there is the
China threat to contend with. For the first time this month the
government accepted the possibility of a ‘two front’ threat, one
the army has been plugging for the past three years. India, relying
on its limitless resource in manpower, has decided that expansion
of the service strength is one part of the answer.
The other focus is on acquisitions - that have placed India as
the top most arms importer. This status India will continue to have
over the coming decade. India has also gone in for nuclearisation,
with the Agni V test and INS Chakra making their mark this year.
The nuclear future consists of multiple warheads for the Agni
and mating of nuclear ballistic missiles with the nuclear powered
submarine.
Taken together the three prongs - manpower, material and
nuclear - can reasonably expected to keep India safe into the
future. But this expectation can be thwarted if the army proves
unable to absorb the changes. Tritely put, it’s the man behind the
gun that matters.
Expansion has been managed quite well by the army earlier. In
wake of the 1962 debacle, Emergency commission officers were
inducted. The showing of the army in 1971 war vindicated the
decision. However, this time around, the expansion has been in the
wake of incessant deployment in operations. The story begins with
Siachen and Op Blue Star in Punjab in 1984. It is followed by the
IPKF sojourn and a near simultaneous deployment on deinduction
from there into Punjab, Kashmir and Assam. Thereafter, as one
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Chief put it, the army has only been ‘officially at peace’.
Expansion has been in the wake of incessant deployments, but
it must not be at the cost of quality.
The army has proven responsive. It has over time firmed in a
rotation policy for Rashtriya Rifles that caters for primary group
cohesion to an extent. The army website indicates that several
training schools have been opened up for preparing junior leaders
under a ‘train the trainer’ system. News reports of summer
exercises at field army level, such as the recent Exercise Shoor
Vir, indicate a heavy schedule for collective training. Socialisation
has been furthered by greater military interface with veterans.
Nevertheless, the challenge continues to be daunting.
Universally, the army’s good health is dependent on professionalism
of the officer corps. Therefore to focus here on this facet first
makes sense. The intake is over 1500 officers a year. (Compare
this to the 900 who make it to the civil services every year.) The
tension between quantity and quality can only be expected to
be resolved in favour of quantity, since the army never tires of
pointing to vacancies in the officer cadre pegged consistently in
the low five figures.
This was the case in wake of the Kargil War, when it was
rumoured that standards had been diluted for expanding intake
in real time. Also there was reportedly a one-time truncating of
pre-commission training length. The chickens have apparently
come home to roost, with the incident in question suggesting a
breakdown in discipline of officers commissioned post Kargil War.
There is also deficiency in socialisation into military mores.
Rashtriya Rifles and field postings having created such personnel
turbulence that both horizontal and vertical integration have
been impacted at both the officer and soldier level. Additional
raisings mean the transfer of empathetic leadership and stolid
manpower to the new set up; the vacancies so created in existing
organizations being filled up by raw recruits.
Further, the age and service of officers holding appointments
at unit level has gone down, and with good reason. However, the
pressures on them of performance and demands from the wider
army, that has in turn gone top-heavy, are higher. And all this is in
face of higher career pressures stemming from competition to go
up a wide-based but steep sided pyramid.
Acknowledging the latter, the army’s response has been to
compound the problem. The army has opened another Officer
Training Academy at Gaya, intending to have a higher officer
intake but of short service commission officers. While resolving
the problem of the pyramidal structure of its promotion system, it
could deepen the other one of fraying officer-soldier bonding.
The army may be intending to overcome this problem by higher
levels of manpower and higher technological levels in relation
to the adversary. The Kargil War was won by concentrating two
divisions and a large proportion of the firepower available in
J&K, thereby overwhelming the enemy. However, neglecting the
idea that ‘the man behind the gun’ is consequential may prove
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debilitating over the long run.

This point has a wider import. Expansion has not been restricted
to the army. In fact the security sector has been perhaps the
only sector that has expanded over the past decade, given that
the neoliberal paradigm believes in contracting government. Even
more ambitious expansion has been witnessed in the central armed
police forces, with the Central Reserve Police Force becoming the
world’s largest internal security force. And yet, it is unable to
penetrate into the forests of Abujmad!
The point that emerges is that expansion is the easier answer.
And in any case it must not be at the cost of quality. Since this
has been the case with both the army and the paramilitary,
compensation needs to be done by heightened training, accentuated
socialization and intimate supervision. This is doubly important
since these forces are operationally committed, particularly in
people-centric counter insurgency.
The gravity of the problem can be inferred from the fact that
its most significant facet has been pushed right to the very end:
impact of societal turbulence, especially so in an officer cadre
springing from the lower middle class. Given this, it can be sensed
that Nyoma was only waiting to happen. The army leadership that
has been enmeshed lately in peripheral matters needs now to
return to its bread and butter.

____________________________________

Uncivil war in South Block

05 April 2012
indiatogether.org

The snarling between the military and the bureaucracy continues.

It appeared as though the matter was settled, with the Supreme
Court ruling in favour of the government in the case of the age of
the Army Chief. However, the uncivil war that broke out in South
Block - in the form of motivated leaks - between the babus and
the brass continues to unfold on prime time.
Varied explanations have been offered for why we are seeing
this controversy. One is that the Chief, since he did not get a
year’s extention, is a ‘frustrated man’. Second is the good-versusbad
story: a corruption-fighting Chief battling it out with the usual
suspects. The third theory is as old as the Army itself, the tussle
for supremacy between bureaucracy and the military. Finally,
there is the view that the Chief is exposing a dithering ‘Saint’
Antony, who has happily prioritised honesty over everything else,
and left the Army without arms and ammunition.
The actual problem is in differing strategic perspectives between
the civilians and the military. The differing perspectives have led
to the civilians going slow on defence acquisitions and stymieing
the military’s preferred response of expansion in numbers. The
divergence is also evident elsewhere - in the military’s position on
the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), its incidence in
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Kashmir, and on the question of demilitarisation of Siachen.

Given that democratic civil-military relations require
subordination of the military to the civilian, the military’s insistence
on its views amounts to a challenge to the principle of civilian
supremacy. However, in this the Army has been emboldened by
precedent - whenever it has held fast to its position, the civilian
leadership has eventually accepted it, so why yield now? The
natural escalation of this cycle is a military that has stepped out
of control.
The military, necessarily and universally conservative and
realist, has a threat perception of a ‘clear and present’ danger
in the form of a ‘two front war’. This has been upscaled by the
collusion between China and Pakistan, going back to the 1980s in
the nuclear and missile fields, most visible lately in the presence
of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan. The possible military use of
infrastructure created by the Chinese has the military similarly
fixated.
Its answer has been to ask for additional forces. While the
ministry has granted two divisions, forming up now on the eastern
front, it has been less amenable to clear the mountain strike corps.
The military wants this for making gains elsewhere as trade-off
against the gains China will likely make in any military contest.
The military wants to sit in judgment of its own views, not only
in this case but also in AFSPA, Siachen, and other instances.
The additional forces forming up suggest that the two are in
agreement about the need for a robust defence. The civilians,
however, are not in favour of the offensive, ‘strike’ component.
Publicly, the reason given is that India cannot afford this additional
cost, with the economy now slowing down. But the real reason is
that the civilians have a different idea on how to tackle China.
Their concerns are reasonable. India is already putting in place
various capabilities by building roads and resuscitating air strips
in the border areas. Anything more than this would only trigger a
reaction by the Chinese, leading to a threat to India where none
might have existed in the first place. India, wanting to concentrate
on its economic growth trajectory, does not want to get diverted.
An arms race would make India incline towards the US, which is
wary of China’s rise, at the cost of Indian autonomy.
This concern has spiked the Chief’s pet project, the
‘Transformation’ study done by him in his last appointment as army
commander in Kolkata. The project explains why the Chief’s was
so keen for an extension of his term - which would have allowed
him to remain at the helm long enough to see it through. Its critical
element of adding 86,000 troops, which has been held up for
financial reasons, is attributed instead to bureaucratic obduracy
and political ignorance. Therefore, the fightback, showing up the
bureaucracy and its political master in poor light by pointing to
their tardiness in acquiring machines and ammunition.
In this, the military wants to sit in judgment of its own views.
This is also the case with AFSPA; one can argue that this law
is not needed at all in India’s counter insurgency arsenal. The
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military has been firm in its position that the Act’s provisions are
indispensable not only to its deployment but also its effectiveness.
One can concede that this is a professional view, but the fact that
the military does not want to permit prosecution of its officers
who violate the people’s rights suggests that its influence is much
wider.
This can be seen in the stand-off in court in the Pathribal
case - in which the CBI’s view is that the deaths amounting to
murder cannot be covered under the AFSPA, but the military will
not allow a single prosecution, because allowing any officer to be
charged with violations will lead to a precipitate drop in morale
and effectiveness of the military. Faced with this and unwilling
to countenance political solutions to its insurgency problems, the
government has been reticent in confronting the military. It can
easily be predicted that the amendments to the AFSPA now being
introduced for discussion by legislators will be the next arena of
contest.
Next is the case of Siachen. Here too the hardline position
is evident. The government wants to progress peace talks with
‘doable’ issues like Siachen and Sir Creek being tidied over and
providing momentum for and trust necessary for tackling the more
fraught outstanding issues in composite basket. The military has
repeatedly put its foot down, nipping any initiative to turn Siachen
into a ‘peace park’ as once envisaged by the prime minister.
We must also not ignore the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine that the
military autonomously conjured up. The capabilities are to enable
it to take off for operations well inside Pakistani territory. This
denies the political head the requisite time for engaging in crisis
management and diplomacy. This attempt at commandeering the
political decision space has led to a predictable response from
the politicians - who simply thwart the military’s plans to build
up this capacity. The military is striking back by labeling this
as ‘holding up’ the capacity building exercise, but conveniently
forgets that this was not approved by the political leadership in
the first place.
Too often the military has carried the day in these essentially
political decisions. This suggests not only that the political class
has abdicated its role, which is bad enough, but also that military
expansionism is the norm, and that is much worse. The problem is
structural. Perceiving itself as outside the policy making tent, the
military tends to dig in.
The answer is to integrate the military into the ministry. Unless
the distinction between the uniform and safari suit is removed, the
civil war will continue. The Naresh Chandra task force currently
working on the specifics of next steps in defence reform, needs to
complete its job urgently.

_________________________________________
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An age-old lesson
19 February 2012
indiatogether.org

The case of the Army Chief’s date of birth has been laid to rest
finally, in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Before leaving for
a two-day trip to Saudi Arabia, the Defence Minister said that,
“the government has confidence in the present chief and that was
conveyed in the Supreme Court also. Everything is clear and we
have confidence in him.” He has followed up on his return saying,
“We have learnt the right lessons from it ... there is no strain.”
The Chief, for his part, has also put the episode behind him,
stating while on tour to the UK, “there is no controversy if you
are meaning or implying a particular controversy.” However, his
statement alongside, “I followed a particular path for a particular
aim and that was achieved”, is pregnant with implications for the
‘lessons learnt’, referred to by the minister.
The Chief’s statement apparently suggests that he set out to
make clear to the bureaucrat-dominated ministry that their’s is not
the last word. If the episode is taken as a symptom of a problem
in civil-military relations, the foremost lesson is to configure the
apex system using the aegis of the ongoing Naresh Chandra task
force deliberations to provide the government early impetus for
reform.
Three long standing problem areas exist in the national security
system. These have contributed in some measure to the Date-of-
Birth episode getting as difficult as it has. While by all accounts it is
merely a ‘personal’ matter, the structural contribution cannot be
ignored. Doing so would make its recurrence over time inevitable,
if only in a different manner, but most surely as a higher order
crisis in civil-military relations.
The apex military leadership needs social communication skills,
political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership acumen -
skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms.
Firstly, a service Chief is now an over-burdened appointment.
The appointment subsumes both commander and staff duties in
one office and individual. Since the Chiefs do not usually divest
themselves of other commitments, such as the antediluvian
appointment of ‘Colonel of the Regiment’, the burden is inordinate,
irrespective of the efficiency of the secretariat and staff. Besides,
the age of retirement having been raised, there is less vigour into
the tenure and it shows visibly.
Centralisation, reinforced by a command culture (resonant
in the ‘This has the Chief’s blessings’ argument!), detracts from
effectiveness, leave alone efficiency. For instance, in the current
case keen observers such as Rahul Bedi have reported a ‘go slow’
by the ministry on files emanating from the army. These maladies
have been pointed out earlier, not least by K Subrahmanyam, but
seemingly to little avail.
Secondly, is the issue of merit in the choice of the Chief. The
long-standing criticism has it that the ‘age’ criterion detracts from
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merit and limits the choice to survivors of the steeply pyramidal

hierarchy. This accentuates a ‘play safe’ attitude, with operational
spill-over in possible command inadequacy in case conventional
push comes to nuclear shove. The advantage of the system is that
it preserves the apolitical nature of the military, since there is no
incentive for ambitious members of the brass to catch the political
master’s eye. The case of General Kaul and Krishna Menon has set
the precedent to avoid.
Given the multiple affiliations that Indians can forge on account
of India’s diversity, institutional cohesion could unravel. One aspect
of the present case itself was the question of ‘succession lineup’,
with the implicit suggestion that parochial affiliations were at
play. In any case, the defence would be that there ‘ain’t no need
to fix what ‘ain’t broke’.
This debate needs to be settled in favour of merit and
youth. Stability and predictability have proven useful but these
characteristics may not be the most apt ones in face of challenges
of 21st-century conflict. This is a good juncture to move beyond the
tried and tested, to adapt practices used elsewhere. For instance,
Colin Powell and Petraeus reached their positions not because of
seniority, but competence.
The characteristics needed by today’s apex military leadership
are not necessarily the traditional ones demonstrated so well by
the Chief in his challenge: resolve and standing up for one’s beliefs.
Instead, the apex military leadership needs social communication
skills, political savvy, and democratic and collegial leadership
acumen - skills more visible in board rooms than operations rooms.
In the case of the current Chief, he had no tenure at the Army
Headquarters, other than a sheltered appointment in a former
Chief’s secretariat. Socialisation absent, he thought it fit to rock
the boat.
The Indian military needs help in moving forward. In India’s
case, the military’s ‘holy cow’ status ever since India over learned
the lessons of 1962 means that this is unlikely until the issue
acquires some momentum in public debate. Now is the appropriate
juncture to start.
Thirdly, the abiding perception in service circles, voiced
repeatedly in in-service journals and by veterans in seminar rooms,
is that rules of business are such that the ministry is overbearing
both in weight and attitude. The hollowing out of the Indian
Police Service has lent urgency to the military’s actions for selfpreservation
from the bureaucratic layer; otherwise the same fall
may befall it too.
This acquires added importance from the military’s professional
obligation to provide security. In theory, the military is answerable
to the the political heads, not an intervening bureaucracy.
However, in practice the rules of governmental business have been
devised in such a manner that the bureaucracy, in discharging its
role of giving ‘advice to the minister’, has appropriated the policy
space from him more or less fully. This has resulted in a sense of
alienation among the brass, voiced by its former chiefs, such as
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Arun Prakash, that even the Chiefs do not have voice. The ministry
does not appreciate this.
The structural remedy to this problem is in following other
democracies - in integrating the two sides. This would bring the
role of the Chief to the forefront, either as head of staff or as
commander, and along with it the need for a Chief of Defence
Staff. The current system would favour the Chief as commander,
with the CDS heading the joint staff in an integrated ministry
alongside the defence secretary. Arriving at the right choice is
what will ensure Naresh Chandra, currently grappling with the
issue, a place in history.
The mantra that India’s military is apolitical has potential
to lull political alertness and sensibilities. Even an elementary
acquaintance with military sociology will reveal that militaries are
political players as institutions. They have the ability and inclination
to forge alliances in polity for consensus building on their national
security concerns. The legitimacy for such behaviour is in their
self-image as custodians of national security.
This does not necessarily imply partisan politics. However, if
the civil war in South Block worsens, and the political scenario in
the country vitiates for any reason, politicisation in a conservativemilitary
semi-covert quasi-alliance can occur. The current ‘game’
of bureaucratic politics, explicable in organization theory, can yet
get murkier at a national cost. The political role and ministerial
responsibility at this juncture is therefore clear cut.
The happy fallout of this otherwise sorry episode can be in the
form of new directions. Reforms that place the Chief inside the
policy loop are needed to help avert a future ‘perfect storm’ in
such crises. It is better, as the old Arab fable goes, to have the
camel inside the tent than outside it.

_____________________________________
The ‘Age’ of misjudgement
19 January 2012
indiatogether.org
The legal assault of the Army chief on the ministry of defence
is set to keep national attention affixed for a while. Partisans of
both sides of the case, backed by vested interests, will chip in to
enliven prime time. What is likely to be missed in the debate is the
meaning of the chief’s action for military ethics.
The chief’s stand indicates his valuing of ‘integrity and honour’
and his determination. These two character traits are highly
laudable in military men. However, the chief is not just another
military man. He is a general officer and head of the army. A
chief has certain responsibilities that necessitate characteristics
over and above those in other military men. In fact, these traits
otherwise praiseworthy need being leavened by others that
enable shouldering of responsibilities that go with the rank and
appointment. Judgment, in particular, is key.
For illustration, while the generals in the First World War
exhibited great steadfastness in steadying the frontline in the
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trenches, they ended up sending a generation to its death. No

wonder, they are known to military history as ‘donkeys’. Candidates
for promotion to higher rank must not only have resolve but
also exhibit judgment; else firmness ends up as dogmatism. In
the present case whether the chief has exhibited judgment is at
issue.
The present case has potential to get dirtier. The problem now
is that the Chief has taken on the ministry instead.
His unprecedented action, redolent with moral courage, is
unexceptionable on the surface. He has taken legal recourse, as
is his right, to protect his ‘honour and integrity’. However, the
best measure of judgment happens to be sense of timing. He had
occasions twice over in the past to take an equally legitimate
position, while coming up for consideration for appointment as
corps commander and army commander. At those junctures, he
had the military hierarchy to take on. He chose not to do so and
instead was ‘pressurised’ into sending in the letters in which he
accepted the wrong date of birth to be communicated to the
ministry.
Had he taken a firm position then, his sense of honour would
not have been trifled with. Now, he had the opportunity of either
resigning or waiting to retire before taking the action.
Additionally, the credibility of his citing of ‘honour and integrity’
has been diminished by the earlier punishment by courts martial
of two generals in the Sukhna land scam case. This has been
presented as his high minded anti-corruption stance to clean up
the stables. It turns out that the Military Secretary who faced
courts martial for influencing the general in command in Sukhna
was the one instrumental in holding up his case for amending his
date of birth with the Military Secretary’s branch, no doubt at the
behest of the then chief. The case can now be re-read as personal
vendetta.
[To recall, the case was of a No Objection Certificate to
construct a school on land adjacent to a cantonment. While the
NOC was apparently obtained by pulls and pressures, it does seem
to be an over reaction since the land did not belong to the army
in first place, but happened to be a tea garden.]
The present case has potential to get dirtier. The problem now
is that he has taken on the ministry instead. Since the military is
steeped in a ‘command’ culture, he represents the service. His
position requires him to perform both a representative function and
an advisory function. This constricts the personal domain, making
the chief’s action consequential for civil-military relations. His is
therefore a challenge to civil control, critical in a democracy. He
neglects a principle in democratic civil-military relations: civilian
masters have the right to be wrong.
Veterans with a bone to pick with what they consider as a
usurpation of civil control by the bureaucrats by insertion of
an intervening bureaucratic layer between the military and its
political masters will make this a bureaucrat versus brass case,
and one of national security. The veteran community, that
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universally has a pronounced preference for social and political

conservatism, can end up unwittingly as vanguard for cornering
the government, backed by cultural nationalists embedded in the
strategic community. In a season of elections, with implications
for the national direction not too far distant in time, the political
opposition will gain a stick.
The first shots have already been fired - with insinuations that
the army’s demand for a mountain strike corps has been held up
due to bureaucratic games. The idea of this corps is part of the
Army chief’s major ‘Transformation’ initiative; it entails Rs.60,000
crores in expenditure on expanding the army by 86,000 troops,
including 12,000 officers. The allegation made now is that the
ministry is responsible for ‘going slow’ on this, while there is
relative smooth sailing for the projects of the air force and navy.
This is damaging for the government, that requires contending
with the effects of a global slowdown as well. The figure of 8 to 9
per cent growth having been revised downwards, knock-on effects
on the defence budget can be expected. The military has built up
a new ‘two-front’ threat perception to justify the expenditure.
The government will be shown up as ‘soft’ on defence, if it does
not accede to the expenditure demands of the military. Other
measures to mitigate the threat - such as arriving at a joint border
management mechanism with China, as undertaken in the recent
talks - get lost in the cacophony.
The case is therefore only seemingly one of an individual’s
besmirched honour. It is instead one in civil-military relations.
Drastic, and eminently avoidable, precedent is available to the
government for guiding its action. The last time such a challenge
occurred, in Admiral Bhagwat challenging the government’s right
to appoint a deputy chief of its choice, he was sacked. This time
the chief is in effect asking to continue for ten months longer;
something that in the government’s domain to decide on.
Clearly, a government cannot be comfortable with a litigious
chief for longer than necessary. Yet, for the sake of keeping civilmilitary
relations on even keel, it has to compensate for lack of
judgment on his part by displaying maturity. One option is to make
a distinction between the rank of general and appointment of
army chief. The government can appoint a chief of its choosing,
as is it’s prerogative. The general can then serve out his tenure as
a general without an army, even as the new chief navigates the
army beyond eddies.
But more importantly, measures to streamline civil-military
relations need be taken. There is little doubt that the perception
of a bureaucratic substitution of political control has led the chief
to go the distance he has. The general impression in the military
that it is ‘outside the loop’ on policy making, and this needs to be
dispelled by co-opting the military into decision making through
appropriate institutional arrangements. The military for its part
must develop a collegiate command culture. This is one good
purpose that can be served by the otherwise unsavoury case
unfolding on prime time.
 213

__________________________________
Defence reforms: The next phase
24 June 2011
indiatogether.org

A high-level task force has been set up under former bureaucrat

Naresh Saxena to take defence sector reforms forward. The remit
is to review progress since the last bout of reforms were carried
out pursuant to the report of the Kargil Review Committee in
2001.
This second round of reforms is timely, in the sense of a decade
having elapsed since the last deep look at the defence sector. India,
and the regional security situation, has moved on considerably
and the outlook for the next decade also promises similar change.
China is now the principal security concern, necessitating a changeover
in defence from being Pakistan-centric. A changed manner of
conduct of war has been on display over the past decade in the US
military practices, made possible by organisational changes in the
face of changing technology.
It is not as if the sector has been static. Not only have the
approved changes from 2001 been effected, but considerable
organisational restructuring has been carried out within the
services. For instance, the Army has operationalised its limited war
doctrine called ‘Cold Start’. That resulted in the creation of a field
army, among other things such as a shift in organizational culture
towards the offensive. Its China-oriented makeover is underway,
with two divisions being raised and talk of a mountain strike
corps also in the air. Last week, the Army bid for taking the Indo-
Tibetan Border Force, in charge of a section of peacetime border
management with China, under ‘operational control’ even during
peace. Likewise, the civilian side has also witnessed movement.
The Kelkar Committee looked at defence procurements and the P
Rama Rao Committee energised the defence technology sector.
The second round has been prompted by aspects that have
remained undone since - specifically the creation of the position
of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and integration of service
headquarters into the ministry. Naresh Saxena is likely to encounter
some debate around these two aspects.
Politicians are not interested in seeing a concentration of
military power in one office. And the services themselves have
not evolved a consensus.
The CDS was mooted with the idea that it is important to
bring in jointness in the services, and through that to infuse them
with doctrinal sync and operational synergy. In a conflict under
nuclear conditions, the CDS would have the task of fine-tuning the
conventional-nuclear interface. The hold-ups over the appointment
of a CDS have been many.
Vast changes, turf battles
Politicians are not interested in seeing a concentration of
military power in one office. The bureaucrats would prefer to play
 214

the role in its absence, since it helps play one service against the
other. The services themselves have not evolved a consensus. The
Air Force is against the idea. The Army appears to have distanced
itself ever since General JJ Singh, prior to retiring, said that even
the Army could do without it.
While superficially the face-off is over turf, it is actually about
deep doctrinal differences on how to fight wars. The Air Force
sees a ‘strategic’ role for itself involving infrastructure busting,
military attrition, etc. The Army thinks that the next war would
require to be fought more jointly than the Air Force is willing to
let on. The doctrinal dissonance requires adjudication that only
an empowered CDS can provide. The way the Saxena task force
inclines on this score will be critical to its recommendations.
That could also end up defining the remit of the CDS. Would his
be an operational function or a staff function? The service chiefs
currently combine the two roles in their person. They are loath to
give up either and don’t want their powers transferred upwards.
Additionally, if the service chiefs are relegated to a staff function
of creating, managing and provisioning respective services as part
of an integrated ministry, the operational side would need to be
handled by theatre commanders. This means that organisational
restructuring would be very vast indeed.
The committee’s role can only be recommendatory. Reforms of
such a sweeping nature would require consensus in the political
class as well. This may not be forthcoming. In India’s evolutionary
approach - as against a revolutionary one - grand sweeps are unlikely.
Therefore, the task force faces a huge, possibly insurmountable
challenge. Consequently, it may choose realistically to inch forward
one step at a time.
As for the second task of integration into the ministry goes, this
could be better done if and when the chiefs are willing to shed
operational responsibilities. Currently, the command culture is so
strong in the services that it would be impossible for an officer
posted in an integrated ministry to sit in judgment on the service’s
case. This would be possible in case the chiefs become heads of
staff, as their nomenclature suggests.
Anticipating the task force, the outline of reform that emerges
then is an integration of service headquarters into the ministry in
more than name. Service HQs are now called ‘Integrated HQs’ and
several functions are now delegated to them, including financial.
However, much of this is cosmetic, with bureaucrats sitting in
judgment over service cases and - in the perception of the services
- shutting them out of the policy loop.
Remedying this may require the chiefs to divest their
operations function and become respective departmental heads.
The operations function could be performed either by command
headquarters reporting to an operationally empowered CDS,
or by integrated theatre headquarters headed by a integrated
Commander in Chief, for example C-in-C Western Front, or C-in-C
Special Forces Command, etc. The current reforms may produce
a half-way house, creating a CDS responsible for the nuclear
 215

dimension operationally and a staff function, so that the next step

of integrating the sword arm in integrated commands can await
the third bout of reform.
The moot question is: Would any of this make India more secure?
This is the expectation. Military power would be made more
usable and efficient. A rising power requires greater effort at selfprotection
and higher responsibilities to bear. The US $35 billion
being set aside for defence purchases would be better utilised. A
wieldy scalpel or scalable hammer means rationalising structures,
doctrines and procedures. So upfront there is no problem with
proceeding on course.
A colonial stance?
The problem is with the impulse behind the reform. In case
self-defence was the sole motive, this would have been easy to
concede. A case for dealing with a ‘two-front’ security threat
would be persuasive, if the threat was manifest. It is debatable if
this is so. Instead, the proposed ‘reform’, in this case, would make
India more powerful, and in doing so it would make India appear
a threat to its neighbours. If anything, it is this that would lead to
the ‘two-front’ threat.
In other words, the effect of the reform would itself legitimise
it. Since India would have the power and the reformed structures
to use it, it would be seemingly secure; but assuredly at higher
levels of threat. While what is needed now is to mend fences with
alacrity, with more muscles there would be less need or inclination
to do so.
Secondly, the reform would enable ‘out-of-area’ capability. A
rising India has been asked to shoulder more global responsibility.
This would be made possible by easily deployable capabilities,
resulting from such reforms. The argument in favour of such a
development is that India would need to protect its economy
linked to resource bases elsewhere, and a stronger capability for
projection of force is warranted, therefore. But this also implies
lending its military to purposes that India itself would have in an
earlier era labeled ‘colonial’.
The government, being of a center-right orientation, has been
open to accusations of being ‘soft’ on defence, particularly after
persisting with the strategy of restraint in face of 26/11. Arraigned
on multiple fronts, it has also suffered the indignity of witnessing
its service chiefs’ inapt interventions in the public debate on
several occasions over recent past. Compensating for this, and
admittedly sensibly also wanting to integrate the services into
policymaking, it has perhaps embarked on the next generation of
defence reform.
Such reforms being politically useful, the government would
find it hard to side-step the recommendations once they are
received. Going along would make India more nimble and able no
doubt, but also place the country in greater harm’s way. Political
inability to be responsive to the vast reforms likely to be suggested
would place the government once again in the awkward position
of seeming ‘weak’ on defence: a case of doomed if you do and
 216

dead if you don’t. Watch this space six months from now, when
the call is due.

__________________________________________
The Army’s right to its opinion
24 December 2010
indiatogether.org

The right of the Army to voice an opinion has been defended by

Minister of State for Defence, Pallam Raju. The background to his
defence was Omar Abdullah’s complaint to the Prime Minister on
an Army press release of a day earlier. The press release indicated
that the decision to remove certain bunkers from Srinagar did not
have the Army’s concurrence.
The press release had stated: “Though it appeared to be a
well-considered decision, the latest incident has raised many
questions. It may have pleased a few separatists and their handlers
in Pakistan, but what about the common man in the Valley? Will
the reduced security and visible absence of security forces raise
uncertainties, fear and doubt in the minds of the population during
the long winter ahead?”
The Army Commander has since apologised for the offending
press release saying it was unauthorised. The press release has
been explained away as the ‘personal predilections of a junior
officer’. Yet, the Army being a highly centralised system, it is
likely that the press release on a sensitive subject would have
been vetted in the Command Headquarters Information Warfare
section. The Army Commander, in tendering an apology to the
Chief Minister, has apparently taken responsibility, as a good
leader must, and there the matter could rest. However, does the
contretemps have any ramifications?
This case can be seen as part of the continuum of the
Army’s unease with the security implications of moves towards
normalisation of the Valley. These initiatives include the reported
dismantling of 20 bunkers, removal of 1000 CRPF jawans and
contemplation of removal of the notification of disturbed areas
from some parts in Srinagar. The latter was to presage the
progressive withdrawal of the AFSPA from the Valley where the
security situation made it feasible.
The Army, understandably focused on the military dimension of
the security situation, has apparently missed the larger gameplan
unfolding.
This is as per the eight-point formula of the Center to defuse the
agitations that rocked the Valley over the summer. The formula
had included sending interlocutors to further the peace process.
The state government’s efforts at drawing down the presence and
visibility of security forces in Srinagar, is to enhance the levels of
trust necessary to make the political plank work.
The Army, understandably focused on the military dimension of
the security situation, has apparently missed the larger gameplan
unfolding. It has two aspects. One is wider regarding AFSPA as law.
 217

Deliberations in North and South Block have focused on diluting its

less ‘humane’ parts by either reframing it or incorporating the legal
cover the Army needs into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act. The Army Commander had earlier made his reservations on
any dilution of the AFSPA, terming it a ‘holy book’.
The second is of local significance, relating to the security
aspect of the draw down in Srinagar. The Army had been called
out in July for the first time since early nineties in ‘standby’ in
case the agitations in the run up to the foreign minister’s meeting
in Islamabad got out of hand. Such a situation would have placed
the Army in a delicate position, that it no doubt apprehends in
case control over Srinagar by the central police forces is diluted.
With regard to the latter, the Army has the Corps Commander
in Srinagar as the advisor to the Chief Minister in the Unified
Headquarters looking after the Valley. His position, taken with
approval of the next rung in hierarchy at Udhampur, has doubtless
been taken on board in its decision making by the Chief Minister.
In any case, Srinagar town does not have Army deployment and
is the responsibility of the state police assisted by central police
forces. The onus is therefore of the state, legally and structurally.
Therefore, the apology was due.
But it does indicate a major perspective in the military.
Outside the small print is the fact that the Army Commander is
due to retire at year end. He can therefore choose to go the extra
distance in firming up the military position. Army Commanders in
the Indian system have considerable stature and power. This has
proven disruptive at times in J&K, since the Army Commander
curiously does not figure as the security adviser, though corps
commanders, reporting to him, do.
That the Army has a right to an opinion is well understood. This
enables it to perform its advisory function in a democracy. That
it should voice its opinion is also useful - in providing access to
its view for the attentive public. This helps make the democratic
debate better informed. However, the question is whether it can
voice it openly in a manner as to bring a policy and the policymaker
under cloud.
Watchful commentators, such as AG Noorani and Srinath
Raghavan, are of the opinion that the military’s repeated assertion
of its position is an attempt to expand its role. Such views are
based on the recent publicly-voiced position of the military by
multiple personages at different occasions against deployment
in Central India and against reformulation of the AFSPA. The
point these critics make is that this ties down the policy maker’s
hands, since the politicians who make policy are often short of
wide political capital, and would not like to be pilloried for going
against professional judgment if things go wrong.
In the political process unfolding in the Valley, there is a need
for calculated risks to be run to bring about a modicum of trust
necessary for talks to proceed. Over a hundred youth have died in
the summer agitations, and something substantive must be done
to reverse this downward spiral. The slow and limited draw-down
 218

of visible security in Kashmir is part of this effort. The problem is

that the Army is apparently not on board with this agenda.
This is a structural deficiency and a political gap that needs
to be filled. The state government which is taking the initiative,
backed by North Block, has only limited oversight over the Army,
since the latter reports up its channel to South Block. Compounding
this, the top brass of the armed forces is skeptical of political
processes in general.
The Supreme Court judgment in the Nagaland Human Rights
case against the AFSPA for the North East in 1997 had required that
the armed forces maintain a relationship of ‘cooperation’ with the
state when in ‘aid to civil authority’. They are however outside
the scope of authority of the state government. This means that
the military is accountable neither to the state nor the Ministry of
Home, responsible for internal security. It is instead accountable
to the Raksha Mantri, who has no answerability for internal affairs.
This divergence requires reconciling.
In the interim the onus is on the military leadership to navigate
the structural deficiencies of the system by better formulation
and articulation of the military’s institutional position.
Soldiers in our own images
‘Pipping’ ceremonies at the Indian Military Academy were
solemn occasions. With the media revolution and the need to attract
officer material, the Academy has over the past decade resorted
to ceremonial innovation, such as singing a patriotic song during
the oath taking ceremony. TV grabs and photos accompanying the
twice-yearly news reports on officer commissions usually feature
jubilant newly commissioned officers throwing their regimental
caps in the air, in an imitation of the scene in the cult film, An
Officer and a Gentleman.
Lately, the expression of exultation has gone even further, and
now includes tossing each other into the air in full dress regalia.
So it was this time when 625 cadets took the Antim Pag (The Final
Step) of pre-commission training. What is more interesting than
the total number, however, is the passing mention made in news
reports to the origins of the cadets.
While 23 were from friendly foreign countries, 132 were from
UP, 56 from Haryana and 51 from Uttarkhand. Thus, more than
one third of the Indian’s newly commissioned officers were from
this belt. It can be assumed that other areas from which cadets
have always come - such as Delhi, Punjab and nearby areas - were
not very far behind. In other words, it can be hazarded that about
50 per cent of newly commissioned officers are from a narrow
region in North India. The breakdown of the officer cadre of the
paramilitary and central police forces is not known. It is very
likely that their intake patterns are similar. Is this good for India’s
security?
And as for the soliders, what is their representation pattern?
The figures are not known. The Ministry of Home Affairs sets ratios
of desirable recruitment for its forces. In case of the Ministry of
Defence, the recruitable male population serves as the index.
 219

Unfilled vacancies are to be carried over. However, this only

accentuates over-representation.
While there are stipulations on vacancies for intake below
officer ranks in the military and paramilitary, the officer cadres of
both have all-India recruitment.
It can be conjectured that the general lack of transparency in
recruitment is a defensive move, since the figures if known could
prove embarrassing. The recruitable male population is supposed
to serve as the index for recruitment. However, for instance in
the Army, this can be expected to be weighted in favour of ethnic
groups traditionally contributing to respective infantry regiments.
Besides, some ethnic groups have representation in other arms
such as in Engineers groups, artillery regiments etc.
The example of the Air Force is instructive. It has jettisoned
the recruitable male population index in favour of an ‘All-India’
recruitment pattern. As a result, those self-selecting are mainly from
UP and Bihar. The reason for departure was lack of response from
non-traditional areas of recruitment. In the interest of efficiency,
the Air Force opted to sacrifice broad representation. Even if this
was acceptable from a point of view of military effectiveness, is
this in the overall interest of the service and the nation?
While there are stipulations on vacancies for intake below
officer ranks in the military and paramilitary, the officer cadres
of both have all-India recruitment. This implies that a selection is
made from those volunteering. Given the information available and
anecdotal evidence, it can be reasonably inferred that the intake
for the security forces is biased towards a narrow region in North
India. Those volunteering from other regions are apparently fewer
or found to be less qualified. This means the nation is getting the
best on offer.
It should be pointed out that the officer cadre is still as good
as it has ever been, and has not been found lacking in any way
as a result of skewed intake. The military remains a respected
and independent institution, focused on professional training
and goals, and with no participation in the political affairs of
the country. Coups have been ruled out by every expert on civilmilitary
relations in India. If the officer corps is less alluring to
some, it could be partially due to the draw of other occupations.
For instance in South India, other avenues in Bangalore and
Hyderabad and abroad such as in the US and the Gulf perhaps
lead to fewer officer candidates.
We could conclude, therefore, that there is no reason to be
concerned if the intake of officers or soldiers is particularly high
from one region, and less so from elsewhere. Nevertheless, the
case of Pakistan is illustrative. Up to two thirds of the officer
cadre is filled by Punjabis, and many of the ills of that country
can be attributed to this, including the primacy of Punjab over
other states. Though Indian socio-political reality is much more
complex, the implications of having majority of officers and lower
ranks originating from one region still bears consideration. Some
concerns are highlighted below for the attention of policy makers
 220

and their political overseers.

Firstly, in principle, the multi-ethnic reality of India must find
expression in its institutions, especially those charged with security.
While ‘recruitable male population’ may be the basis of filling in
the rank and file, the practice in case of under-representation
of states is not known. The Army’s reluctance to share figures
regarding Muslim presence, in response to the query from the
Sachar Committee, is well known. It indicates that shortfalls exist.
Parliament should examine how the military compensates.
Indeed, going further, it could be argued that even police
forces in our increasingly cosmopolitan cities should be drawn
from different communities - in most metros, it is evident that
the police are not anywhere as diverse as the general population
of those cities. This happens because recruitment is usually statewide,
whereas the metros are much more diverse than the rest of
the states in which they are found. The experience of New York,
whose police forces were severely criticised for not being able
to empathise with large sections of the city’s population, should
serve as a warning - this is one pitfall India needs to avoid, given
the potential politicisation of so much of our differences.
Secondly, although the military has been spared the operation
of caste-based reservations, it still has anachronistic recruitment
practices. These may not have any self-evident negative
connotations for military effectiveness. However, recall that the
Punjab problem did lead to changes in recruiting policy. Broadbasing
recruitment is the best manner of preempting problems.
For instance, modernisation may require a different type of officer
candidate and recruit, more technology-inclined. This may prove
beyond the capacity of the unwittingly favoured recruiting area.
Additionally, over representation also owes to coaching centers in
these areas offering intensive coaching on how to crack the exam.
This results in poor standards at intake. This original debility
cannot easily be corrected through training.
Thirdly, given the unexceptionable largesse of the latest Pay
Commission, it would be unfair if the same is channeled into only
one region, as seems to be the case. Higher order gains - such as
regional equity, and a stake in the system for all including the
social and geographical periphery - need to guide decisions over
recruitment.
Fourthly, fighting insurgency can be expected to continue as a
preoccupation. A narrow recruiting base, particularly of the officer
corps, would lead to problems with perception. A Mainstream vs
Other perception tends to emerge, clouding judgments on the
applicability of force. This only accentuates in case the social
origin of the officers in the lower middle class is added to the
consideration. For instance, dilution in the intake of percentages
from the North East in Assam Rifles has been done in favour
of Gorkhas and other hill people from North India. This affects
the culture of the Assam Rifles defined by its motto Friends of
Hill People, changing it towards a more militarized paramilitary
resembling the Army from which it draws its officer cadre.
 221

Likewise, imbalanced representation would lead to institutional

bias or neglect of some or other feature in security concerns. Such
imbalances in perceptions can creep into institutional inputs, for
instance, on India’s Pakistan or Kashmir policy. It is well said that
the manner the equanimity with which these problems are viewed
increases with distance from Delhi. Keeping relations with Pakistan
adversarial would keep the hardline policy option underwritten
by military power in play. Such a policy input could result from
ethnic imbalances since parochial considerations could override
the rational alternative or national interest.
Happy with the status quo, institutional leadership is likely to
advise: “Leave well enough, alone.” Political sagacity, however,
calls for initiating the change.

___________________________________
Initiatives to Transform the Army Officer Corps
May 31, 2012
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/
InitiativestotransformtheArmyOfficerCorps_
AAhmed_050309

The defence forces have prided themselves in their consistent

engagement with the frontiers of their profession. This is an index of
their professionalism. India’s military, in particular, is rated highest
on the key index of being apolitical against any peer military in the
developing world. Owing to high economic growth, the military, through
expanding defence budgets since the turn of the century, is also being
‘RMA enabled’. Defence cooperation with other professional militaries
such as the US military and service in UN peacekeeping operations is
expanding its repertoire of skills. In keeping with these positive trends,
there is a ‘transformation’ initiative within the Army. This comment
deals with the ongoing changes in the officer corps of the Indian Army.
The Indian Army officer corps has a daunting British legacy.
Indianisation since the 1920s culminated in Indians being appointed up
to brigade command during the Second World War. Post independence
military deployments in four wars and insurgencies kept the professional
ideal alive. Absorbing emergency commission officers in the wake of the
1962 War was a major landmark of the period. A cadre review in the
mid-1980s was a major institutional advance. Over the past two decades
force expansion and deployment in the newly raised Rashtriya Rifles
has severely stretched the officer corps. There are reports of an officer
shortage of up to quarter of the authorized strength of 46,615. Additional
increases in the wake of the Kargil War and Operation Parakram, for joint
headquarters and post modern warfare, information war and missile
regiments, are adding to the pressures. The changed war doctrine of the
Army to Cold Start necessitates a higher readiness level and consequently
a smaller gap in officer availability against authorization at the spear end.
There has been a decline in attractiveness of the Army relative to the civil
sector affecting officer recruitment. These cadre management pressures
are being addressed through far reaching measures.
The final outcome of the Sixth Pay Commission, delayed by avoidable
 222

bureaucratic politics, has catered for increasing the monetary profile of

officers, stanching exit from middle ranks to the corporate world. The
Ajai Vikram Singh Committee recommendations enabled officers to rise
to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in an earlier time frame making for a
younger age profile, financial benefits and satisfaction levels. Placement
of these officers in the IV pay band has been a judicious decision. In the
second phase of the AV Singh Committee recommendations for cadre
restructuring in the forces, allowing for greater promotional avenues
for officers, the Army will get about 1,051 new posts upgraded in select
ranks over a five-year period. The upgraded or created posts included 20
Lieutenant Generals, 75 Major Generals, 222 Brigadiers and 734 Colonels.
For decreasing the gap in officer availability at the unit level, there is
a scheme to enhance reliance on short service commission officers for
which an additional Officer Training Academy is to be opened in Gaya,
Bihar. Officer commission through the direct entry scheme of Indian
Military Academy is to be discontinued. Thus those graduating from the
National Defence Academy would largely go up the ladder with greater
assurance of reaching the higher rungs, while the short service stream
would leave after a ‘golden handshake’ and retrenchment training. The
long term import of these initiatives deserves examination.
The Army’s ‘approach paper’ on the increase in short service
commission to regular commission officers to a 2:1 proportion is under
consideration with the Ministry. At the entry level, increase in young
officers to the short service stream is designed to contribute to the
readiness levels of units as also limit the promotional pyramid base to
those exiting the NDA. This would combine the key advantages of the two
streams. It would lead to greater competitiveness for getting into the NDA
and therefore a better product. The professionalism of a homogeneous
ex-NDA officer cadre would be higher and so would be its amenability
towards the sine qua non of today’s combat operations – joint warfare.
Increasing the number of officers would help fight counter insurgency
better. However, a converse decrease in attractiveness of a short service
commission may result, thus reducing quality. With increased proportion
of short service commissioned officers, there is also danger of lowered
average quality. The loss of the direct entry scheme officers would impact
the versatility of the long serving officer corps. Over the long term the
Army would require avoiding a distinction developing between the two
sets of officers that might prove detrimental to cohesion. Also with more
officers, utility and roles of Junior Commissioned Officers and Non
Commissioned Officers would require preservation from dilution.
The second major initiative is on multiplication in higher ranks. ‘Will
this result in a top heavy army’ is a key concern. There are fresh RMA
mandated areas of expansion. Therefore a proliferation in numbers is
inevitable. Also changing the shape of the hierarchy from steep pyramid
to a shaft with almost parallel sides would decrease careerism. With
promotion prospects better assured, the core ethics of officership
would be better adhered to by officers, thereby increasing combat
effectiveness. Increasing attractiveness of the service is a hoped for result
with service benefits at higher ranks being made available to officers
who have sacrificed their youth and family life for the nation. However,
when viewed against the perspective that prevalence of Information
 223

Technology should really be reducing numbers, increasing number of

officers at the top appears to be biased towards career management and
satisfaction level. Heightened morale would require the Army relating
it to efficiency. Upgrade in ranks also has the downside of diluting the
aura of rank. In the earlier cadre review in the mid eighties, colonels
were made unit commanders; unheard of in other armies. In emulating
the civil services and the police, among whom proportionately larger
numbers make it to higher ranks, there is danger of the service losing
its core concerns of efficiency and ethos. This situation would perhaps
stabilize eventually when the NDA entrant rises to higher ranks with less
career related angst.
The aspect of officer cadre composition in the general cadre ranks has
also entered the discourse. This has been brought out by Rahul Bedi, who
likens the issue of reservation in general cadre numbers in proportion to
the officers in various combat arms and supporting arms to the ‘caste’
system. Presently, there is pro rata vacancy in the general cadre. This
results in more infantry and artillery officers entering higher ranks than
from the mechanized infantry and armoured corps. The advantages of
this system are many, which is why the move was made towards this
system about a decade ago. Spirit for one’s own combat arm is one of the
abiding characteristics of military life. The danger lies in parochialism.
This caused the change to a fixed vacancy based system in the first
place. Infantry officers who largely serve in difficult areas have a greater
chance of making it to higher ranks. They are ably qualified by their
very experience to command infantry troops and formations in counter
insurgency. The counter argument is that officers with mechanized and
armoured formations are by the nature of their role in relatively better
stations. This should not undercut their chances of reaching higher rank.
The capabilities at higher rank are of a different order and the Army and
nation could do with only the best entering into the general cadre.
Clearly a 1.13 million strong Army requires an expansion in the
numbers of officers at all levels. The Army, in exercising autonomy
that characterizes it as a distinct profession, has already embarked on
this expansion. Currently the IMA has a capacity to train 950 officers
per year, while OTA at Chennai trains half this number. The capacity
at both these academies is being increased by a 100 cadets every year.
Increased numbers of every order risks lowering of instructorship
and intake standards. Attention at Services Selection Boards and intraining
regimen would require an increase. Socializing young recruits
to the military ethos is vital in this regard. The change in ethos from
institutional to occupational is already evident in the Army. Therefore a
reemphasis on a radical professional ethic may be necessary at the tactical
level. In order to prepare the increased numbers occupying higher ranks,
there may be a need to bring in a soldier-scholar model for command at
operational and strategic levels. The current revolving-chair nature of
command at higher levels needs to be arrested lest the nation get underprepared
generals. Last but not least is that an enlightened look needs to
be taken in increasing induction of lady officers into the service in billets
with added responsibilities.
The ongoing radical reengineering after considerable thought in the
Army needs to be appreciated as a gallant attempt to stay ahead of the
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times. Nevertheless, it needs reminding that implementing the changes

without reducing its compact with the nation would be even more
demanding.

___________________________________
The New Chief and Transformation
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-new-chief-andtransformation-
3080.html

The new Indian Army Chief expectedly, has much on his agenda. The
most significant item is how to progress “transformation” in the million-strong
army. He led a study into this issue, over the past year and he is best
placed to implement it. It would be a challenging management exercise
involving questioning verities, unlocking the status quo, realigning the
organisation and then fixing the change. The details not being in the
open domain, this article deals with what could figure on that agenda.
First, the Indian military has been so committed in sub-conventional
operations over the past two decades that the engagement has possibly
impacted its conventional preparedness. Equipment shortfalls have
found mention, but of greater importance is the operational orientation.
While the earlier thesis was that sub-conventional shortcomings were
attributable to a conventional orientation of the military, today the
reverse is possibly true. This may require attention in case the promise of
‘Cold Start’ is to be achieved.
The commitment in holding terrain and deployment on counterinsurgency
grid is manpower intensive. Given the relative ‘normalcy’
in both, there are dangers of routine, stasis and fixity. Nevertheless,
that these are ‘field’ and have challenges from altitude etc, there is a
need for recharging when in peace locations. Thus, peace tenures have
served as interregnums between deployments, particularly for the
crucial component, the Infantry. While commanders with shortened
time to prove themselves have been busy driving offensive and pivot
formations in peace station, that such tenures serve as ‘rest and recoup’
for consequential deployments later, limits their efforts. Therefore,
transformation requires reorienting the major portion of the Army to
conventional operations once again.
The sub-conventional experience has been useful in ‘blooding’
the force and getting it attuned to small team operations. The subconventional
dimension set to emerge in occupied territory would be
easier to tackle. However, the preceding conventional operations would
require attention. While armoured formations are likely to be readily off
the block, having internalised the changes to a proactive and offensive
doctrine, it is uncertain that the Infantry can make that switch as easily.
In cantonments, it is usually imposed in myriad ways that do not
require spelling out here. In particular, cantonments all over the country
are gaining the appearance of fortifications brought on by the terror
threat. This is further evidence of the Pakistani aim of its proxy war –
to tie down and tire out India’s military – being met in some measure.
Deployment in penny packets on CI grids or on LC has already done its
wrought. With the cantonment tenure taken as a breather, the challenge
of injecting mental agility and cohesion exists. As an Infantryman, the
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Chief has the insight and empathy to bring about the change.
Second, though useful as an energiser for change, “transformation” has
its limitations. The Army remains a ‘mass’ one, given the commitments.
Current security demands need a rethink. Where troops can revert to
barracks, such as for instance from Assam, the shift needs to be made.
While some formations have been de-inducted from the south of Pir
Panjal, this can be affected to the north also. The vacating RR needs to
be demobilised in case they are not being considered for redeployment
in Central India. Currently, it appears that institutional momentum and
interest in appearing relevant to the end game in Kashmir is keeping
the Army reluctant to disengage. In case the Chief is serious about
transformation, rethinking the Army’s size and its levels of commitment
in operations needs to be done.
The aspect of size is not one that the Army can engage with
autonomously, being at present a combination of threat-dependent and
capabilities based. The absence of resolution to the border problem with
the neighbours and the final settlement of the Kashmir issue are immediate
problems. The additional security problem ahead is that of China being,
in the Prime Minister’s words, more ‘assertive’. Deployment in Central
India is not ruled out, since it is inconceivable that the paramilitary
can wrap up the Maoists. The totality of this would be an increased
reliance on the ‘mass’ aspect of the Army, making “transformation” not
only more important, but equally more difficult. The ambitious way
to address this would be at a national security policy level in resolving
border issues and internal security problems politically. This would help
the Army draw down its operational commitments, down size where
possible and modernise not only in equipment and organisation, but
more importantly in ethos. Until that happens, “transformation” would
remain a useful catchphrase to lend focus to an initiative, but would not
be able to fulfil its promise or potential.
Lastly, the Chief has already indicated the direction of his thrust
while in command in his exceptional stand on the Sukhna land issue.
The inference is that he apprehends that things have come to such a pass
that a stand was needed. A mature follow through would bring back the
balance in the organisation that had seemingly moved away from an
institutional-transformational to a managerial-transactional ethic. The
Chief has the nation’s good wishes.

____________________________________
The Military in Kashmir The Debate Between The Generals
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=26382

A piece in the column by Shekhar Gupta, National Interest, has prompted

a rebuttal from Ata Hasnain. Gupta referred to a senior ‘soldierly’
general with five tenures in Kashmir telling him that with ‘victory’
over the Lashkar achieved, the military had little to do. Hasnain, who
was commanding general in Srinagar a little while back, disputes this.
He opines that ‘victory’ needs to be measured against politico-military
aims.
Absent government action, the military had to unilaterally set for
itself this yardstick: “integrate Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream
 226

India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically”. He lets on

that the aim has not been achieved and it ‘would take years of committed
campaigning’ before it is. Since the army is the only agency with ‘the
capability to strategise, plan and stay committed to such a campaign’, he
argues against overturning the gains made over the past quarter century
in getting the army step back.
He invites his fellow former member of the brass - Shekhar Gupta’s
informant - and other ‘arm-chair strategists’ - presumably a tonguein-
cheek reference to Shekhar Gupta himself - to visit the many guest
rooms the army has prepared all over the state to get a better vantage
on the situation in Kashmir. The elements in this situation, to him,
include a separatist-radical nexus; a body of surrendered militants who
could revert to militancy due to non-materialisation of what has been
promised them; and the precedence of Pakistani effort to get people to
rise along with their conventional attacks may find resonance, since
‘finally’ what matters is what ‘people think’. These, together with the
expected geopolitical changes in the vicinity, suggest that the ‘context’ is
not right for ‘declaring victory prematurely’.
To the general, ‘victory’ is ‘not against the people of Kashmir but
for them, and against the intent of Pakistan, the separatists and terror
groups.’ Therefore it is ‘for’ the people of Kashmir that the Rashtriya
Rifles needs to remain in place, with the AFSPA for cover. Furthermore,
he reminds that the RR cannot be moved off to Chhattisgarh since it
would be required to defend strategic arteries. After all, there are more
surrendered militants who have not received their promised recompense
as a ‘potential source of home terror’ in Kashmir than those waiting in
staging camps across. More importantly, he reveals that the RR is an ‘add
on force for conventional operations’ in order to balance the 110 Wings
of the Frontier Corps that Pakistan has reequipped for similar ends.
Therefore, it is a misunderstanding at the tactical level if ‘to neutralise
just a handful of terrorists each year’ is mistaken as the RR’s task; it is
instead to ‘cement the separatist population with the mainstream’ as
befits a counterinsurgency force.
In admitting to a wish that ‘Gupta had faulted the army for not
demanding the articulation of a politico-military aim’, the general
reinforces the well-known secret that India does not have a strategy.
As a result of this, the army has arrived at a strategy of its own. This
has been articulated candidly by the general in his rebuttal of Gupta’s
argument that the army having done its job militarily, must now vacate
the hinterland and concentrate on the Line of Control. The army’s
position therefore seems to be that the populace is potentially restive and
the neighbor can yet take advantage of the situation. Therefore, the army
needs to stay on, but with a better understood and implemented purpose
of cementing the population with the ‘mainstream’.
Gupta makes the point that Kashmiris could do with sharing the
‘peace dividend’ by a ‘disarming’ of Kashmir, referring to statistics on
the return of peace. To Hasnain that is an illusion. Since the general ends
on a note exhorting the reader - and perhaps Gupta - to ‘learn to trust the
army’ since ‘it is your (the reader’s) army’, it would be too much to expect
the general to dwell on how much the army is itself causing the alienation
that the general admits to exists in Kashmir.
 227

There is little doubt that army presence in their midst and the
continuance of AFSPA are disliked by many in Kashmir. These are then
red rags that feed into a situation in which ‘separatism and radicalism
run hand in hand in the Valley’. In other words, the Hasnain’s solution
is part of the problem. The advantages for the army are many. Guest
rooms at ‘Keran, Machel, Gurez, Uri, Sopore, Tral and Shopian’ for one;
even if Hasnain’s refutation that new golf courses have come up is taken.
Second, the RR gets to stay on in the cool climes of J&K rather than clear
Bastar’s jungles. Third, this would be for an indefinite duration since
as Hasnain deems it there are no ‘agencies who can take it (Kashmir)
forward to “peace”.’
Hasnain’s praiseworthy plain-speak must be taken seriously. It is
clear that Kashmir remains potentially unstable. Also the dreaded ‘2014’
- bandied about since the advent of Obama on the world stage - is barely
round the corner. However, it is equally clear that unresponsiveness to
Kashmiri demands on AFSPA and military presence, referred to by Gupta
as the army’s ‘veto’, is part of the problem in Kashmir. Hasnain’s solution
is that since the army is going to be part of the scenery in Kashmir, it
should be put to better use as befits a counter insurgency force. Gupta’s
view and that of his general informant, is that the military must step
back. Hasnain thinks that would be premature. To Gupta, the time is
ripe to trust people to hold back the separatist-radical-terrorist tide.
Whichever side of the debate one is, the debate is academic.
What is clear is that the status-quo will prevail over the near term.
With the national and state elections close at hand, experimentation with
the security grid is most unlikely. From the results of the recent state
elections it is clear that the next dispensation in Delhi is very likely to be
different from the present one. The current government in its lame-duck
year is unlikely to make any changes. The next one if of the saffron hue
has already declared its intent obliquely: to review Article 370. When it is
so engaged it would be equally unlikely to make any changes, particularly
since as it goes about debating Article 370, all of Hasnain’s fears would
likely be a reality on the ground.
Therefore, it is not, as Hasnain seems to suggest, the reality in the
Valley that will end up precipitating matters and also not what happens
across the border, but what happens in Delhi and how it (mis)manages
Srinagar.
____________________________________
An Unacknowledged Vested Interest in a
Disturbed Kashmir
http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=24632

That Kashmir remains disturbed suits several otherwise competing

interests. Counter-intuitively then, there is cooperation between these
forces with stakes in Kashmir for keeping it simmering. While vested
interests in the conflict are well known in certain quarters, such as for
instance in the ISI and Jihad, Inc. across the border, this article deals
with the less easy-to-find that are unfortunately much closer home
and on that account are probably more significant. The thesis here is
that north Indian ethnic groups have developed an economic stake in
 228

the military’s expansion, which makes them unwittingly amenable to

continuing military commitment in Kashmir, mirroring in a manner the
better known Punjabi-military nexus in Pakistan and its well recognised
stake in a disturbed Kashmir.
In the popular narrative, much furthered by army veterans, the
army is merely doing a distasteful piece of work foisted on it by a hapless
administration. It would much rather be in its cantonments in training
for its primary task of guarding frontiers rather than manning an
unforgiving Line of Control (LoC) and chasing down foreign jihadists
and assorted Kashmiri nationalists. The inability of the diplomats of
the two states to arrive at an agreement, minimally on a peaceable LoC
and maximally on turning it into an IB, results in a military necessity of
guarding it all along its often hostile length. Internally, the politicians and
bureaucrats having messed up and unable to clean up thereafter, results
in the army’s retaining of its hold despite in its view having created the
security conditions enabling a political resolution. Therefore, it is not a
‘vested interest’ but is instead merely fulfilling its obligation.
There is little to argue over the fact that the LoC continues to defy
final settlement despite the passing of over half-a-century. It is also true
that the security situation has been under enough control for most part
of the preceding quarter century - not necessarily due to military means
alone but also due to diplomatic and political measures - for India to
have hammered out a political resolution. That it has not done so is
not only due to a deficit in political strength, with Delhi perceiving,
largely mistakenly, an inability to sell any ‘solution’ internally to the rest
of the country. It also owes in part to the interests at play in Kashmir
that have little to do with the conflict configuration but with dynamics
elsewhere, including within the social composition of the security forces
in general.
The Kashmir problem has served as a windfall for uninhibited
expansion of security forces. The momentary Khalistani insurgency of
the eighties has brought home that changes in the social composition of
the army, in particular, was necessary. Even as this was being proceeded
with discreetly in terms of reduction of Sikh percentages within the
military, there was an expansion in the army owing to its multiple counter
insurgency commitments in the nineties ranging from the North East to
Kashmir. Since the conventional deterrent needed to remain in place lest
the proxy wars escalate inordinately, troop strength needed expanding.
This necessity gave birth to the Rashtriya Rifles.
With Pakistan becoming more venturesome under its overt nuclear
capability by its mounting of the Kargil misadventure and the parliament
attack, further expansion was needed to be able to deliver it a quick, but
not lethal, blow through what was termed the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
The LoC fence that came up in the same timeframe also required more
regular troops to man. Thus, another round of expansion took place
of the army over last decade. China, and the latest ‘two front’ ‘threat’,
provide a limitless rationale for expansion into the future, limited by the
economics of it.
While the army, a professional force that it is, can be expected
to be cognisant of the strategic dimension informing, and in its view
necessitating, its expansion, the issue is anchored not in the strategic
 229

coordinates as the army prefers to believe and the popular narrative

would have it, but in the wider societal factors. In particular, the ethnic
groups that have stood to be advantaged by such expansion are the ones
propelling it. In the absence of statistics, these groups can be said to
reside within a 100 km from the Jaipur-Delhi-Chandigarh-Jammu line.
In the case of Kashmir, the advantaged groups are rather easy to spot.
It is no wonder then that given a choice security force members would
prefer postings in Kashmir rather than in the North East, positioned as
they would be within a night’s journey from their leave destinations.
Therefore, a restive Kashmir as now - but not with a full blown insurgency
as earlier - is not such a bad proposition.
In the straitened times of liberalisation, the only sector that has
expanded continuously is the security sector not only in terms of
employment but also the monies devoted to it. These groups do not have
the advantage of certain other Indian nationalities, such as those on the
western sea board who can look towards the Gulf and certain others on
the Deccan plateau and southwards who have leap-frogged on the back
of the IT sector. Therefore, the security sector’s expansion has enabled
these groups to keep up. Additionally, the largesse of the Sixth Pay
Commission has channelled a majority of army’s revenue budget into
their ‘pinds and mohallas’.
These groups are the ones that keep New Delhi frightened of its
own shadow when it deals with Pakistan. With a collective memory
marred by Partition, suffering a hangover of the martial race theory
and influenced by cultural nationalism, these groups have a stake in
continuation of an unacknowledged subcontinental civil war. This keeps
them wary of Pakistan and at odds the liberal conception of security in
which the alternative security approaches, such as prospects of economic
engagement in diluting animosities and creating new power centres,
are based. Therefore, even if India succeeds in forcing a penalty corner,
for instance in entering into a dialogue with Pakistan, it is, quite like
its hockey team, unable to convert it, in this case into a substantial and
meaningful round of talks.
Given this, it can, in summation, be said that the army is right in
saying that it not yet another ‘vested interest’ in Kashmir; but only by
its lights. As pointed out here, these lights are both narrow and dim.
Expanding the theoretical template from military sociology to the
‘military and society’ plane helps identify more consequential vested
interests that lie elsewhere.
Identifying this is merely the first step. It begs the question: What’s
to be done?
The national security question needs revisiting afresh. Challenging the
popular trope, hung out to dry by veterans with Goebbelesian regularity
in op-eds in the ‘nationalist’ press, is useful. But the intellectual battle
also needs taking into the academia, the government’s policy rooms and
back-rooms of political parties. Security has for too long been held hostage
to ‘strategic’ thinking, fixated without. It requires instead a lens more
sensitive to social and political forces within society. That way China
and Pakistan would fall behind as ‘threats’ and instead forces, closer
home, that unwittingly masquerade as ‘answers’ to security problems,
would rise to claim their space. A redefinition of security will help India’s
 230

peripheral population groups overthrow what in their perception might

amount to an internal colonial yoke attributable as hypothesised here to
its ‘heartland’ groups.

_________________________
The Army’s Subculture in the Coming Decade
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheArmysSubcultureintheComingDecade_aahmed_221209
December 22, 2009

A decade is long enough to leave an imprint of change on any institution, including those
generally regarded as conservative, such as the army. While informed commentary is plenty on
the operational and technological environment, there is little on the cultural aspect. This article
dwells on the challenges and likely changes in the Indian Army’s subculture as it navigates the
coming decade.
The changes in equipment profile through impending acquisitions, organisational expansion in
terms of inducting a mountain strike corps, technological absorption of net centricity, and
doctrinal innovation reflected in the army’s doctrine, would all no doubt continue in the coming
decade. The problems that remain would continue to attract attention, such as assimilating the
impact of nuclearisation on warfighting; furthering jointness; competing for bureaucratic space,
etc. However, despite the importance of these issues, the major change would instead be in the
sphere of military subculture.
Even as the military as a social entity has witnessed considerable change since liberalisation,
such as induction of women officers into the army, it has retained its distinct identity. But this is
likely to come under assault from changes occurring within society which are predicted to speed
up considerably over the coming decade. The conclusion therefore is that the army would do
well to be forewarned and therefore proactive, instead of being defensive and buffeted by these
changes.
The Army’s record of coping with change has been impressive so far. Each of the preceding
decades since Independence has left a mark. The fifties witnessed the development of the
remarkable apolitical character of the Army, for which General Cariappa was retrospectively
elevated to Field Marshal. To the sixties can be dated the Army’s professionalism. This flowed
from the army’s expansion, particularly in emergency commission into the officer cadre, the
passing on by decade end of the reins of the army to IMA-commissioned officers, and the
learning experience of a loss and a draw in two wars. These changes resulted in the triumph of
1971, but which in its wake left the remainder of the decade look like a jaded anticlimax. The
transformation through the eighties has been possibly the greatest change in a single decade.
The main features were mechanisation and, secondly, a greater willingness to use force, be it
conventionally in Siachen, subconventionally in Punjab, in out-of-area operations in Sri Lanka,
or in exercises such as Digvijay and Brasstacks. In the nineties, the army was only ‘officially at
peace’, to quote a Chief of the period, and by decade end had fought what may yet turn out as
the first limited war of the nuclear era. Coming to terms early with the changed context, the first
decade of this millennium has been one of doctrinal and organisational adaptation.
The coming decade bears comparison with the sixties and eighties; decades that saw
expansion in the midst of social change. Lessons from the responses in both instances may
prove useful. Traditional military anticipation, caution and preparation should help meet the
challenge of the onrushing decade.
The changing social landscape will impact the army. The most significant aspect is that the
promise of liberalisation has ensured high economic growth. This has been transformational for
India, evident from changes in entrepreneurial energy, political concerns, aspirations, and shifts
in the urban and rural landscape, youth attitudes and social mores. India is looking to leverage
the demographic dividend of its youthful profile to gain great power status over the decade.
 231

The army has been responsive to these developments. It has taken steps such as catering to
higher aspirations by implementing the A.V. Singh committee proposals and insisting on a fair
pay commission package for its members and veterans. With higher budgets, its cantonments
have the look of modern townships and there are additional married quarters. The format for
interaction with the soldiery has changed over the last decade. It is more attuned to self-esteem
needs, reflected in institutes such as NCO Clubs, Sainik Institutes and conduct of functions like
Sainik Sammelans and Barakhanas. Thinking on how to manage the marital relationships better
is ongoing, particularly with the profile of the Army Wives Welfare Association (AWWA) coming
under judicial scrutiny over the last decade.
The direction of the future is in moving from authoritarian to a democratic leadership model;
privileging and respecting specialisation; preserving institutionalism in the face of an expanding
occupational ethic; and remaining in sync with changes in society. Some areas that require
intervention are highlighted here.
Firstly, societal queries about the ‘peace dividend’ are likely to arise. Even as the region is
currently unstable, it is possible that with increasing prosperity society would move towards a
‘war less’ one as obtains in developed states. And it would not like to put its economic gains at
military risk. The long awaited ‘trickle down’ effect may catch on, plateauing out India’s
insurgencies. With the precedent set by Op Green Hunt of increased reliance on central police
forces for internal problems, the military would be able to concentrate on its core functions. The
manner in which the border is currently being held is also likely to end. The implications for the
army are that it would be nudged from ‘war readiness’ to a ‘war deterrent’ state. This would
mean downsizing, increasing manpower efficiencies, higher per capita manpower costs, a
‘capability’ as opposed to a ‘threat’ based force, and a shift in the internal balance away from
the infantry and armoured corps.
Secondly, recruitment could prove a site for competition, particularly given increasing self-
selection to the soldier’s occupation by hitherto under-represented regions and communities.
Increasing revenue budgets imply greater transfers through the pay cheque into local
economies. The army would need technology savvy manpower, perhaps from urban centres.
The regimental system may get a rethink. Communities traditionally providing manpower may
not continue to be the source of recruitment. The controversy over the Sachar Committee’s
query on army recruiting figures of Muslims prefigures a possible future. Instead of affirmative
action, information strategies bringing the army as an employment opportunity to such sections
is desirable.
Thirdly, increasing representation of women in the officer corps, to handle technology intensive
armament and management functions would heighten quality. Their average qualifications are
of a higher threshold than those of male candidate applicants. The jobs that they can tenant in
the future army are many. This implies that the glass ceiling may be pushed upwards, as
elsewhere in all modern armies. The present restriction of fourteen years service, based as it is
on the army’s ambivalence on whether a woman officer should tenant command appointments
as colonels, would require review. This aspect would clash with the army’s intended switch to an
officer profile in which the NDA officer is in for the long haul, while the short service commission
would exit at mid-career level.
Universally, armies have a conservative social orientation. In this perspective, ferment in society
is seen negatively, reinforcing a tendency for preserving the martial space from intrusion from
without. Insularity has its underside. The antidote is openness. The army trying to hull-down as
an anachronistic island of social conservatism would render it susceptible to political forces that
similarly look askance at change. Also, the privilege system may require review in light of better
emoluments. Lifestyle changes that do not rely on soldiery furnishing officer privileges need to
be instituted, top-down. The suggested parameter for non-operational tasks is that manpower
be employed only for tasks in which the benefit directly accrues to them. The traditional,
paternalistic, relationship with the soldiery has changed for a transactional style in the technical
 232

arms. This is inevitable in the fighting arms too. Presently, there is considerable scope for
exercising a personalised leadership model. This creates dissonance in subordinates. An
institutionalized style needs to be encouraged, so that there is a reasonable predictability in
senior-subordinate relationships.
The sister services are ahead in this regard and their experience have a few lessons. The fresh
winds from peacekeeping duties and from the expanded and multifarious experience on military
exercises with foreign armies need to be harvested. Army War College in conjunction with
College of Defence Management could act as a resource centre for the direction and design of
cultural change. It could answer the question as to how a warrior ethic can be nurtured even as
shifts occur towards a managerial style. The primary instrument for building the constituency for
change would be the military education system. A review of how this could be best used can
form part of the study. The study leave system could be so directed as to tap the thinking in
corporate schools and technology management institutions. A higher leadership that has a
greater proportion of soldier-scholars may be useful in managing the change.
The usual disdain of the tumult in civil society, fashionable in military circles, needs to be
tempered. The ongoing RMA in slow motion can only complete itself in a contemporaneous
army, and the army would have to make a conscious effort to remain so.
_________________________________________
The government versus the military
06 March 2010
indiatogether.org

An exasperated defence watcher, former Colonel of the

Armoured Corps, Ajai Shukla, in his blog, Broadsword, calls on
India’s Defence Minister A K Antony to ‘Go’ because in Shukla’s
reading, “It is harder to determine what this country pays to
perpetuate Defence Minister A K Antony’s reputation for honesty,
but the monetary penalty alone is thousands of crores per year.”
The minister, he says, is holding up acquisitions for the necessary
preparedness to deter Pakistan.
Another knowledgeable defence commentator, Manoj Joshi,
in his blog, referring to the Comptroller and Auditor General’s
report informs, “The Army’s towed artillery is a quarter century
old, two-thirds of its tank fleet comprises outdated T-72s which
joined service some 30 years ago. The Army has no self-propelled
artillery or attack helicopters, and mobile air defence in the form
of Tunguska systems is limited.” Consequently, he too is no fan
of the defence minister, and this is evident from his view that,
“A great deal of blame for this state of affairs must fall on Union
Defence Minister A K Antony. His leadership of the department
since 2005 has been uninspiring, if not downright disastrous. His
sole aim, critics say, is to preserve his image as “St Antony”, the
honest.’
Clearly, there appears a disconnect between what the military
desires and the government is willing to deliver. While each
service has drawn up its wish list, the government has wrapped
these up in procedures that would only deliver the capability over
a considerable length of time. For instance, the Army’s list will
materialise in full only by 2027.
Why is the ministry going much slower than the services would
like? One answer is that it is being careful not to have a repeat of
 233

its infamous scams - dating back to ‘Bofors’ and ‘coffins for Kargil
martyrs’. Once bitten by exposure in the Bofors case, the ruling
party for certain is twice shy or doubly wary. But is the ministry
only being wary that such scams should not repeat themselves, or
are there other reasons too? Since the ministry itself is not saying,
it is impossible to know for sure.
Since the government intends spending over US $50 billion over
the coming half decade under the defence capital account, there
is a considerable push among those in the arms industry - that
includes the private sector these days - to steer matters their
way. This is partially behind the bad press coming Antony’s way.
One reason the ministry is going much slower than the services
would like may be that it is being careful not to have a repeat of
its infamous scams like Bofors.
Another possibility is that the ministry is not too happy with
the strategies for defence articulated by the services. As Joshi
informs, the Cold Start strategy, which is the basis of the Army’s
demands, has not received political blessing yet. But even in this
case, the ministry should not be dragging out the purchases of
the services, to slow down their agenda. Instead, as Manoj Joshi
concludes, “the political leadership [should] closely work with the
armed forces to evolve a strategy to deal with Pakistan ... to work
with them on all aspects of a strategy that will deter Islamabad.”
A viable strategy for the nuclear era is clearly needed.
The earlier promise that nuclearisation would result in a peace
dividend was rudely contradicted by the Kargil War. The military
has come up with its own answers to the strategic problem posed
by Pakistan. The political leadership is obliged to consider the
military’s ‘solution’. In case there are qualms over the proposals,
or other ideas that have come up elsewhere, the government needs
to bring these out as well. Hiding behind procedural rigmarole as
it appears to be currently doing is to disregard its authority to over
rule the military. So why is the government not taking a stand?
First, do no harm
Firstly, at the heart of the government is in an accommodationist
solution to India’s Pakistan problem. Therefore, it follows a
carrot-and-stick policy requiring a mix of containment through
intelligence operations, military coercion, diplomatic pressure and
political incentives. This way it prefers to keep the lid on the India-
Pakistan relationship, to prevent it from boiling over and scalding
India’s growth trajectory, on which the national grand strategy
depends. Pakistan, cognisant only to the pressure applied on it,
is unresponsive to carrots, knowing it can compensate for Indian
pressure through external balancing, such as leaning on China and
the US.
Secondly, the government has lost the initiative to hardliners.
The government, once bitten by the reaction to Sharm-el-Sheikh
joint statement, is now twice shy in appearing accommodationist.
It is forever watching its back against allegations of a ‘sell out’,
using which the opposition right wing that is currently down
and out might claw its way back into the political reckoning.
 234

The strategic community, dominated by vocal and telegenic

hardliners, keeps the government on the defensive. Their latest
salvo has been on India’s marginalisation in the Af-Pak arena at
the London Conference, despite the significant financial and other
contributions the country has made.
Lastly, the government is possibly persuaded by the logic
ranged against military options in the nuclear age. Since escalation
cannot be ruled out, the risk of military action is unwarranted. It
is easy for strategists to talk endlessly on escalation control and
the viability of deterrence. It is a much graver matter for political
leadership to take decisions on the issue. For decision makers, life
and death issues cannot be replicated in academic exercises, war
games and intellectual constructs.
To work its way out of the conundrum the government needs to
do three things. One is to make Pakistan an offer it cannot refuse.
This has already been done through the back channels, both
during the Vajpayee era and during Manmohan Singh’s first term.
However, since the government has never officially acknowledged
this exchange, it has not built the political ballast necessary for
seeing the initiative through. Secondly, it needs to build the
conditions necessary to get Pakistan - and more importantly,
its Army - to bite. And lastly, it needs to proceed with a public
information campaign to bring the public round to accepting the
unavoidable necessity of a political solution. This would require
political investment on the part of the party.
Taking the bull of strategic doctrine by the horns is important
lest the government continue to be in the cross hairs of critics,
some of whom may well be in the pay roll of arms companies
waiting for the windfall. Flush with funds from continuing growth,
India is presently comfortable with spending on arms. This also
achieves the political objective of not appearing ‘soft’. The
irony is that when these weapons are used tomorrow, they will
endanger the very prosperity that enables their purchase today.
The government needs to take a call on whether it is persuaded
by the logic of the purchases it is set to make. Antony has enough
ammunition to outlast his critics!

______________________________________

Rethinking Civilian Control

2847, April 17, 2009
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/rethinking-civiliancontrol-
2847.html

Pavan Nair writing a commemorative article in the reputed Economic

and Political Weekly on the silver jubilee of India’s militarization of
Siachen, deplores the manner in which the Army was permitted to go
ahead with its plans in the first place and secondly to insist on remaining
on the high battle ground despite civilian led attempts to negotiate a
disengagement with Pakistan.
The Army has given itself a Cold Start doctrine of uncertain
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governmental imprimatur. The military’s engagement with the US is

a driver in the deepening of the ‘strategic partnership’. Karnad’s latest
book India’s Nuclear Policy tells of the military’s institutional position
favouring ‘credible’ as against ‘minimum’ in India’s ‘credible minimum
deterrence’. This could over time prove Basrur’s thesis, in his Minimum
Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security, that the strategic-militaryscientific
lobby’s interest in intricate weaponization could lead up
through ‘creeping growth’ to Limited Deterrence.
On the internal security front, the weight of the Army’s opinion for
continuation of both deployment and the cover of the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act for the same is not contested despite public opinion in
the affected areas ranging from J&K to Manipur. Its reluctance to deploy
in Central India has forced a questionable policy on the Ministry of
Home Affairs of relying on new raisings of central police organisations.
With regard to its self-conception of institutional good health too
the government has accepted its position. Phased implementation of
recommendations of the Army’s Bagga Committee on upgradation in
the officer rank structure, that were in turn taken on board by the AV
Singh Committee, testify to the organisational weight available with
the forces. Sensitivity of response to the manner the high powered
ministerial committee of the government revisited the issue of pay scales
is indication not only of the valued position of the military but also of the
relative power it has begun to command, backed by the ex servicemen
lobby.
A circumstance of increased military salience appears inevitable in
light of the increasing militarization of polity, best evidenced by the
post 26/11 perceived necessity of the ruling party to increase the defence
budget by 36 per cent against a post Kargil hike of only 23 per cent.
Manifestos of political parties echo security concerns with strengthening
the military being central to each prescription. The trend in the
military’s institutional weight is also reflective of the militarization of
the neighbourhood with the Global War On Terror. That this would
continue into the future is certain with India’s ascent of the great power
trajectory and the military’s indispensability to preferably deterring,
and, if necessary, meeting China’s eventual challenge.
What are the implications for India’s much vaunted civil-military
relations? So far India’s politicians have countered this by interpositioning
the bureaucracy against the military. The bureaucracy in turn
uses inter-service cleavages effectively with the Defence Secretary being
a virtual Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The media, where required, is an
effective tool, as demonstrated in the pay commission related episode
involving the office and person of the current Chairman of the Chief of
Staff Committee (COSC). However, it is apparent that the military, now
a political player, would require more sophisticated management in the
future.
Firstly, the Arun Singh Committee recommendations would require
to be taken to their logical conclusion with a Goldwater-Nichols
equivalent Act in India. Secondly, the power of a generalist bureaucracy
requires curbing through a merging of the service headquarters with the
ministry. Thirdly, to bring about parliamentary control over this powerful
Indian avatar of the Pentagon, greater attention and involvement of the
 236

politicians through bipartisan parliamentary committees would be

necessary. Procedures bringing in greater scrutiny into defence processes
need to be in place.
Keeping the military at bay in the belief that its professional position
would queer an integrated approach to over-arching security questions
is no longer warranted. India has a developing strategic culture in
a variegated strategic community; organisational experience in the
National Security Council (NSC); and competing power centres in
the security field, such as the ‘strategic enclave’, to lend balance. It is
poised at a generational change in political leadership. Its democracy
and federal structure are healthy enough for cooptation of the military.
Thus, it would be appropriate to accord the military ‘insider’ status on
Raisina Hill.
The advantage that would accrue is that the military would be party
to collegiate decisions. Currently, its position, if at odds with that of
the government, appears jarring. This either leads to the impression of
over-reaching by the military or weakness in the government; neither of
which is entirely accurate nor, paradoxically, without substance. Such a
move would effectively iron out the military’s edges averred to earlier in
the article. For an emerging power to persist with control structures of a
developing state would be anachronistic. Where public money, and more
importantly questions of freedom and security are involved, the index of
civilian control is domestication of the military.
The incoming dispensation could rethink civil-military relations
along these lines; even if the aspect has not found mention in any
manifesto under the mistaken belief that all is traditionally well.
__________________________________________

How deep is the rot?

20 November 2008
indiatogether.org

Three equally serious issues regarding the Indian armed forces

demand our attention at this juncture. The first was sparked off
by Shekhar Gupta’s opinion piece on the non-compliance with
the cabinet approval of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay
Commission, and the implications for civil-military relations. Since
Gupta has been following military developments ever since India’s
peacekeeping foray into Sri Lanka and has even spent a productive
year at the reputed International Institute of Strategic Studies, his
perspective cannot be easily discounted.
The second development, a more muted step, is the development
of ‘second strike capability’ by India. India has tested the silo
launched version of the K 15 missile called Shaurya, that had
earlier been tested from an underwater launch platform.
Each of these two developments require greater public
attention, but it is the third that has caught the eye of the media
and the public. Daily revelations in the case of Lt. Col. Purohit’s
association with terrorist activities have grabbed the headlines.
Virtually every news item on this topic begins with the preface
that Purohit is the ‘first ever serving officer to have been arrested
 237

for such a crime. It has prompted the legitimate question as to

whether his case is an aberration, as the Army has put it, or if it
is the proverbial tip of the iceberg.
The worry is that if Purohit’s activities are only one instance of
something wider, then the Army has a real problem - namely, the
penetration of majoritarian religious ideology into the defence
forces. It is not an issue that can be wished away by a default
reliance on the professionalism of the armed forces. It can be
hazarded that since this issue has not been examined very much
earlier, even the services would not know enough to judge
whether such a threat has developed within their ranks. There
is no information on this aspect available in the public domain,
either, with the dominant view being that the services are - and
have always been - apolitical and secular.
Nonetheless, we must contend with the evidence of the
Lieutenant Colonel. If there is one Purohit, despite the army’s
professionalism and secularism, why not more? To answer this
question, it behoves the military leadership to make an objective
assessment, and if necessary institute corrective procedures right
away.
It would be logical to expect that the armed forces would also
be a focus of any ideological project, since these forces would
need to be diluted or outflanked before the new ideology could
take full power.
The majoritarian ‘Hindutva’ project has never made any secret
of its ambition to take over political power and thereby direct
the nation towards its destined greatness. An example of success
of the project is evident from a proportion of some state police
forces, such as in Gujarat and Orissa, having been injected with
the majoritarian world view. One symptom is in the anti-minority
bias that these elements exhibit, particularly in the manner their
professionalism is compromised in restricting the violence against
minorities.
As a political effort this may be unexceptionable, but the
manner in which this political power is attained, and the ends it is
then put to, internally and externally, are certainly questionable.
This is a global phenomenon, not limited to Hindu majoritarianism
in India. The corresponding tendencies elsewhere are the Jihadi
enterprises in Muslim countries out to convert these states into
fundamentalist powers.
It would be logical to expect that the armed forces would
also be a focus of these forces. Being the ‘last bastion’, it would
eventually be the armed forces that would require to check their
accession to power, particularly if it is unconstitutional at any
future juncture. The armed forces are also where the majoritarian
ideology would need to mount its greatest effort, since the culture
of the forces has historically been apolitical, professional and
secular. Therefore, this culture would need to be diluted over time,
without which the eventual success of the project could not be
achieved. Therefore, it is unwise to believe that the armed forces
would have escaped the radar screen of the nebulous leaders and
 238

planners of the project.

The armed forces are also unlikely to be able to detect the subtle
nature of the effort. Historically, they have never seen themselves
as being under threat of subversion. Secondly, their professional
training and limitations of political understanding makes them
less able to detect the myriad forms of penetration. Thirdly, the
penetration itself may appear altogether a good thing, for it would
appear, to begin with, in the guise of nationalism and moraleenhancing
stress-relieving religion. Lastly, but no less important,
is the increase in acceptance of the hindutva philosophy over the
last two decades among the middle classes that contribute most
of the officer corps. This would likely make the social space in the
military tend towards that of the wider society, even while not
mirroring it.
Contending with militants and mercenaries claiming to be
engaged in a jihadist enterprise can only serve to heighten this
tendency, as was the case with Lt Col Purohit, during his tenure
in Kashmir. As to the extent of this possibility, the military would
require to check and satisfy itself.
It is a well known theoretical insight from the field of military
sociology that the conservative tendency of the military as an
institution, and of military men as individuals, gives it a bias
towards conservative-realist political persuasions. In the Indian
context, this has been brought out in a book by Lt Gen Mahajan -
A Career in India’s Armed Forces (New Delhi: Ocean Books, 2000),
thus: “Military ethic is conservative and therefore is naturally
attracted to rightist political ideology which may appear ‘good
for the defence forces’. Both the rightist politicians and higher
military commanders must be made wary of this affinity which
paves the way for the politicization of the armed forces (p. 131).”
The political program of the conservative right can be expected
to have a greater acceptability and following in the military.
Whether the military would be able to differentiate the extreme
right agenda is moot. Spotting this as a possible threat would
require the military to first be sensitive to the possibility of the
threat. This has now been unmistakably been revealed by the
Purohit episode.
The onus on the military is thus to institute internal checks and
procedures. The Army would be remiss were it to confine these to
the instant lessons from this case, such as checking that the war
material recovered in counter insurgency operations is deposited
and that secret military intelligence funds are not misappropriated.
Instead the most efficacious measures that need to be taken lie in
its cultural domain.
The threat of the Hindu Talibanisation of India is real. Some of
the blasts that were earlier attributed to terrorist groups originating
in the minority are now appearing to have been perpetrated by
elements of the saffron combine. Remember that these attacks
were not claimed by the groups, such as Abhinav Bharat, and were
instead designed to further implicate the minority as a potential
fifth column. Therefore, the attacks should be seen as a prelude
 239

to a takeover of the state itself. There is therefore greater urgency

to understand the phenomenon accurately.
One important difference between these states and India is in
the manner of the state’s response. Arab and North African states,
and of late even Pakistan and Bangladesh have been relatively
harsh in checking the Jihadist challenge. India on the other hand
is more alert to minority-perpetrated terrorist challenges, as
against the more dangerous one that aims at eventually changing
the constitutional complexion of the state itself. Instances of
the Purohit variety instead tend to be regarded as vengeful in
motivation, and also as aberrations.
But such attitudes gravely underestimate the risks, and also
overlook the evidence. These terrorist activities cannot be wished
away as instances of revenge, for it they were mere revenge
attacks they would have been claimed as such. Nor can they be
wished away as aberrations. Even if references to ‘aberrations’
are made for public consumption, the military would do well to
quietly use the opportunity to conduct a thorough spring cleaning.
This would deter future ‘aberrations’, while reassuring the country
that the Army remains capable of fulfilling its ultimate role as the
‘last bastion’.

________________________________________
The Indian Army: crisis within
03 January 2007
indiatogether.org

The Indian Army has been surprisingly candid in releasing figures

of the suicides and fratricides that have wracked the force in the
recent past. A report out of Kashmir in the Himal of December
2006 carries the revealing statistics that in October this year there
were ten fratricide cases as against only three deaths in combat
operations. All told, in the first ten months of the year, the army
lost 55 soldiers to terrorism in Kashmir, while one third more took
their own lives. It is not a figure that any army would release of
its own, since morale related security reasons would have stymied
such openness.
That 500 defense personnel have reportedly either committed
suicide or were killed by colleagues in the past four years indicates
that the problem has crossed the threshold in which it could be
treated as internal to the army. The Ministry of Defense has had
to write to the Army to act more liberally in the grant of leave to
its soldiers as a stress relieving measure. This is the first issue that
the newly appointed Minister of Defence, A K Antony, has involved
himself with, indicating the concern in South Block.
Among the many measures being taken on a war footing include
recruitment of 400 psychiatrists by the Army, liberal grant of
leave, a missive from the Defence Minister to state governments
to act purposefully on complaints from servicemen on problems
faced back home etc. Clearly, with the ministry involving itself,
the problem, of which suicides and fraggings are but a symptom,
 240

has received the attention it deserves, but only along predictable

problem solving lines.
Much of the problem owes to its most challenging engagement
in Kashmir lasting over the last decade and half. That it has
succeeded considerably can be seen from contrasting statistics on
annual fatalities of the past two years. These are down on every
indicator by about 30-50%. While in 2005 the figures, taken from
the website satp.org of a leading think tank, were 1000 and 218 for
terrorists and security personnel killed respectively, the figures
are 512 and 186 for this year.
The army has apparently delivered on its mandate of ensuring
the return of an environment infinitely more conducive to law
and order than what it started out with in the early nineties. The
symptoms of stress on display are evidence of the strains on its
rank and file in this effort. One incentive for its exertion is that
the political process would take over after a point and thereby
release it from further strain. If the political end game does not
get energized now there is the danger of a slide.
For the political leadership to rely only on the army would be
an abdication of its responsibility.
The army has repeatedly retrieved the situation after terrorism
has got a fresh lease of life due to our own misstep such as the
Charar e Sharif episode (the loss of the sufi shrine to fire in an
army operation resulted in the assembly elections being put off
by a year), or later through Pakistani incitement through its Kargil
venture. The army’s capacity for such endeavour afresh may be
under stress, in light of the strains that beset it at the moment.
This should be a consideration informing the political leadership
and its bureaucratic advisers in their charting the course of the
future.
Though there are no palpable similarities between the situation
of the Indian army and of the US army in Vietnam, lessons from the
latter experience may be worth recall at this juncture since the
term ‘fragging’ made its first appearance in that war. A landmark
study on the Vietnam quagmire was that of Gabriel and Savage
‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army’ (Journal of
Armed Forces and Society, 1976) that culminated in the wellknown
book ‘Crisis in Command’ (1978). They make three points.
The first was that senior officers did not supervise the junior
level to the extent required in countering insurgency since in such
operations, tactical actions have political implications. Second,
that officer quality was poor in relation to the complexity of the
task on hand. Lastly, that the system of rotation through a tenure
of 13 months in Vietnam did not permit the required levels of
cohesion to develop in the teams.
The Indian army also has potential for such problems. It
expanded its officer intake after the Kargil war in which problems
resulting from shortage of officers surfaced. However, whether it
has managed to maintain quality in light of the pulls on otherwise
competent candidates from other sectors of an expanding
economy is debatable. One of the American problems in Vietnam
 241

was that the low quality of majority of its junior officers resulted
in infamous incidents as at My Lai in which Lt Calley, the officer in
charge, was found to have been of a remarkably poor caliber.
Another aspect is rotation. The Indian army’s unique counterpart
to the American rotation system has been the paramilitary force
Rashtriya Rifles. This measure has however not resolved the
problem of lack of cohesion. This is because its ranks are drawn
from disparate divisions and services and are rotated through
tenures that are not coextensive in the primary group, which the
major avenue of horizontal bonding for army members. Notable
studies in military sociology have highlighted that the primary
group is where the primary psycho-social needs of members are
best catered to. If this is weak or disrupted, there is a heightened
demand on the officer corps. To this, added an expanded intake
of lower quality junior officers. This further accentuates the levels
of supervision of junior officers being exercised by the senior
leadership. Whether the seniors have been mindful of this problem
is not known.
That the army has read its military history adequately is evident
from the army preventing Kashmir from being India’s Vietnam.
Formidable armies have fared worse in such circumstance earlier,
be it the French in Algeria, the Pakistanis in East Pakistan and the
Soviets in Afghanistan. However, for the political leadership to
rely only on the army would be an abdication of its responsibility
of bringing strategy – the utilization of instruments of state power
- back into the reckoning.
An additional consideration is that other areas requiring the
military attention are on the security horizon. Presently the
cease-fire in Nagaland is happily extended every year. By their
very nature, cease-fires are taken as breathers in which both sides
firm in their military flanks. The Sri Lankan experience with the
LTTE is a case to point. This is one reason why a cease-fire has not
found favour in Kashmir since it was last attempted over five years
ago. Taking cue, from this it would be strategic prudence for India
to address one front at a time. Whether the next call on the army
is in the North East or in Maoist Central India, there would be a
need to extricate it partially at least from Kashmir.
It is encouraging that the pace and direction of the peace
process is promising poised as it is at the offer of President Pervez
Musharraf on making the LOC irrelevant being welcomed by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. This is the moment for the political
leadership to seize and take the peace process further along the
several lines aired by the two sides: self governance - maximum
autonomy, joint management - institutional arrangements etc.
Waiting indefinitely for the ‘right moment’, defined as one in
which negotiations are from a position of strength, may not be
appropriate in the circumstance of a military under strain. In light
of the problem diagnosed here from a reading of the symptoms,
it is not as capable or ready an instrument it has been in fixing
problems that politics has given rise to and thereafter been unable
or unwilling to resolve.
 242

______________________________________
Politicisation and the Indian military
17 April 2006
indiatogether.org

In his latest book, A General Speaks, General ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan

has put down his views that on many issues he describes as being
“quite different from those of the Government of India.” The
General’s views in the matter of politicisation and the Indian
military are of interest on account of their likely influence within
the Army he once led. His book is a distillation of his experience,
though his memoirs are still due. His candour is credible in light
of his earlier work The Writing on the Wall: India Checkmates
America 2017 in which his scenario of India prevailing over the U.S.
runs in the face of current India-U.S. bonhomie.
In one of the book’s key chapters, the General examines “the
matter of political control of the services in greater depth, the
aberrations that have crept in and what we must do to see that the
armed forces are not politicized.” The General is right in assessing
that the Indian record is one calling for self-congratulations,
particularly in light of the situation to the contrary elsewhere in
our neighbourhood.
Manas Publications, F, 2005, 234p.
The General’s view is that politicisation of the Army has as its
starting point unauthorized approaches by politicians on behalf
of kinfolk. This gives rise to the ‘politically infected’ officer and
the onset of politicisation at the grassroots level. The ‘senior
league’ corruption is when symbiotic ties develop between such
upwardly mobile officers and their political mentors. Another
class of ‘politically sensitised’ servicemen comprises those hailing
from political backgrounds such as scions of erstwhile princely
families. The General praises such officers for having “conducted
themselves with dignity.” These are also thinly veiled references
to former defense ministers.
But the General betrays an unsophisticated understanding of
politicisation. Politicisation is a much more complex phenomenon
than a politician seeking undue favour for his constituents and a
pliant uniformed kinsman serving up the same. Politicisation is a
departure from the professional ethic of neutrality by flirting with
a political plank and is known to have sorry outcomes. In its more
pernicious form it is about the military subscribing to an ideology.
We need look no further than Pakistan to see the consequences.
During the Zia years, there was an attempt at Islamisation of
Pakistan so as to build up an Islamic identity for the state. This
led up to an increased influence of the Jamaat I Islami and the
Tablighi Jamaat within the officer corps. Strategic leverage of
the Islamic card was also sought through Pakistan’s training and
arming of both the Taliban and Kashmiri militants. The outcome
has been a dysfunctional democracy and growth of terrorism at
home and abroad.
 243

In India, politicisation of state agencies has also been

attempted with like consequence. During the Emergency years,
the depredations of a ‘committed’ bureaucracy were paid for at
the polls of 1977. Politicisation of the police in Mumbai and Gujarat
has been evident in the manner of their response to communal
flare-ups. The growth of minority extremism can be partially
attributed to these violent episodes.
The General’s analysis is also missing a related predisposition
of the military. Sociologically, armed services are known to be
conservative entities. They favour political realism in which power
is taken as an arbiter. Their corporate interest lies in higher
defense spending. In the bureaucratic politics that characterizes
the policy and budget formulation process, the armed services
also require allies. Therefore it can be hazarded that armed forces
are not politically innocent. They would instead incline towards
the conservative end of the political spectrum.
A convergence of interests of between the military and the
civil state could result in politicisation that in theory passes for
‘subjective’ political control of the military. It is this linkage that
requires one to be alert against.
In the Indian case, the rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
endorses majoritarian nationalism, favors political ‘realism’ and
higher defense budgets. Its tenure as the ruling dispensation at Delhi
witnessed India going nuclear, one limited war and one prolonged
crisis. The period witnessed the demonisation of India’s largest
minority, a hard line towards Kashmir and Pakistan, an abnegation
of critical faculties in relations with the U.S., and restructuring
of the higher defense system in line with the military’s wishes,
though not to their complete satisfaction. Criticism from seasoned
military watchers such as Praveen Swami and AG Noorani has been
useful in keeping its ideological inroads into the military under
scrutiny. Nevertheless, the fag end of 1998 saw a close call for the
military in the unprecedented sacking of the Naval Chief Admiral
Vishnu Bhagwat, by the BJP led government.
That the military does not require ‘detoxification’ can be
attributed to the resilience of liberalism in India that resulted in
the timely change in government at Delhi in 2004 owing to issues
as ‘pani, bijli, sadak’ (water, electricity, roads), and perhaps
electoral revulsion over the Gujarat episode.
Still, sensitisation to the threat of politicisation, for it remains
even today a threat-in-being, is required and towards this end a
more rigorous understanding of the phenomenon is necessary.
The recent outcry that led to the defense minister retracting
the government’s position on the muslim headcount in the Army
indicates that the right wing of polity continues to hold sway in
issues such as national security. Even liberal governments are
compelled to be defensively hard-nosed, so as not to be accused
of reneging on national security. In times of crisis, this tendency
is further accentuated.
The General, in another passage informs us, that “armies are
maintained to safeguard core values and national interests.” He
 244

elaborates this line also in his latest writing ‘Indian Army: 2020’ in
the Indian Defence Review of October-December 2005.
It is true that formation and articulation of values and interests,
while being a political exercise, does witness the participation of
institutions charged with national security. But participation may
not be value-driven alone. For instance, the nuclear establishment
lent its weight to India’s nuclearisation arguing in terms of
national security. That this was also in its corporate interest was
not projected and it was merely taken as being incidental to its
position. Likewise, the military is a participant in defining these
values and interests, for its strategic projections are premised on
such a definition.
There is therefore a case to be made for a more sophisticated
review than the rather bland offering of the General. For too long
has the fixation with coups and the relative political supremacy
of the military vs. civil formed the subject matter of military
sociology. For India, the conclusion has invariably been that civil
supremacy is sacrosanct. (Apurba Kundu’s excellent Militarism in
India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus is a typical example
of such an assessment.)
The lesson is that the military is not quite a neutral agency
engaged purely in an apolitical, professional and non-judgmental
provision of security for its ‘client’, the state. Instead its position
on what constitutes these values and interests has utility for
political forces. A convergence could result in politicisation that
in theory passes for ‘subjective’ political control of the military. It
is this linkage that requires one to be alert against in India that is
otherwise treated as a model developing state in so far as political
control of the military goes. Further, it is this linkage that usually
results in the tilting of the balance towards issues of national
security and away from the social sector or a developmental
agenda.
In sum, while agreeing with General Padmanabhan that
“politicisation of the military is a self defeating exercise in a
democracy,” it is difficult to concede that “greed for fish and
loaves of office” is how the politician would corrupt the military
establishment and wrench it from its apolitical moorings. The
threat is instead in a tacit, if not covert, ideological affinity that a
conservative military may share, albeit unwittingly, with nationalist
parties. It is this relationship that bears future watch particularly
if the political right reemerges at the helm.
_____________________________________________
_________________________
Hail to the new chief
01 December 2004
indiatogether.org

Lt. Gen. Joginder Jaswant Singh has no doubt survived some

anxious moments over the past year, during which he has been in a
close race for the post of the next army chief against his regimental
officer and course mate, Lt. Gen. Hari Prasad. In the event, Hari
 245

Prasad lost out despite a whisper campaign on his behalf that did
the rounds preceding the announcement of the replacement for
the outgoing chief - that Hari Prasad, with more stints in Kashmir
than JJ Singh, would be the more deserving candidate. The rumour
mongers apparently forgot that that Gen. Vij, the present chief,
has no background of command in Kashmir.
If the last government had not demitted office with a resounding
loss at the hustings, the chief could well have been the nowretired
Lt Gen ‘Shammi’ Mehta - who roused the ire of Mr. Deve
Gowda for recommending the T 90 tank over the T 72 and Arjun
as India’s mainstay battle tank into the first two decades of the
new century. What he should be remembered for, however, is his
war record as the young commander of one of the cavalry pincers
headed for the liberation of Dhaka in 1971.
There was also the small matter of a jinx against a Sikh rising
to the highest rank in the service, despite the considerable
representation of the community in the higher ranks, as also
the capabilities of those who in the past reached within a hair’s
breadth of the top, such as Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh and Lt. Gen.
Bhagat, VC.
That the government chose to stand by the principle of
seniority and appoint JJ Singh does not in any way detract from
his credentials for the top job. He earned a purple heart while
in command of a brigade in Kashmir. He thereafter did the
mandatory stints at South Block in the operations directorate,
and during the Kargil War, became a well-received face at press
briefings. He exercised his strike corps in maneuvers in a nuclear
backdrop during Exercise Purna Vijay, again in full media glare.
He is reportedly the brain behind the new war doctrine adopted
by the army during the first ever conclave of former army chiefs.
He also served a three-year stint as military attaché in Algeria,
gaining international experience.
Thus there is much to recommend him; that he outlasted other
equally worthy claimants, and that a Sikh officer has made it
finally to the top of the reputedly greasy military hierarchy, are
irrelevant.
What can we expect from the new chief? There is his ‘soft’
side chanced upon by the media during a get-acquainted session
with him. JJ Singh was seen on national television in an emotional
moment recounting an episode from his tenure in the Valley, in
which he had let off a newly-wed militant on his promise of reform.
This facet of the General has likely fuelled press reports full of
the ‘hearts and minds’ approach in the new army doctrine drawn
up while the General was presiding over the army’s light-weight
training command, the ARTRAC located at Shimla. Hopefully, for
the people of Kashmir, he will be able to implement his agenda
dictated as much from the heart as from compulsions on the
ground.
Those compulsions can be quite tricky. Some pointed questioning
by Ajay Shukla, a former colonel and present day star correspondent
on Prannoy Roy’s team, over the army’s downsizing in Kashmir has
 246

opened up skepticism about the army’s implementation of the

Prime Minister’s intention to draw down the number of soldiers in
Kashmir. Clearly, the hardliners within the armed forces will have
to be won over, and as some of JJ Singh’s predecessors discovered,
that’s quite a difficult battle to engage.
Gen V N Sharma was army chief during the early phases of the
Kashmiri revolt. His fortuitous contribution preceding the event
was in sending in a Muslim general, Zaki, to head the Srinagar
corps. Jagmohan recounts how Zaki’s reputation was the target of
a disinformation campaign directed against his policy of distributing
food and milk to people caught up in the army’s numerous
crackdowns - testifying to the existence of both enlightened and
negative forces within the military.
From Gen Rodrigues writings subsequent to retirement, his
head and heart too also appear to have been in the right places,
with respect to the manner of dealing with the Kashmiri people.
However he was debilitated by the sharp cut on his knuckles
administered by the Defense Minister Pawar for his off-the-cuff
characterization of Pakistan as ‘bandicoot’, and ventilating that
the army too has a legitimate interest in ‘good governance’! Gen.
Joshi’s command coincided with the rise of the Ikhwan and the
body-count syndrome. He was also instrumental in raising the
Rashtriya Rifles that gained initial notoriety before finally settling
down to its task a decade after its induction. Gen. Roy Chaudhary
was handicapped from the very beginning in having pipped at the
post the Northern Army commander Lt. Gen. Surinder Singh, who
in normal course would have succeeded Joshi.
The General will have to rely on his negotiation skills to sell
the idea that making a distinction between people and the armed
insurgents - local and foreign - is the sine-qua-non to successful
counter insurgency.
Gen Malik was waylaid by Kargil, while his successor ‘Paddy’
Padmanabhan was too deeply implicated in the policy in Kashmir
having been on the scene for the longest tenure of any of the brass.
It is no wonder then that the General tried to bail himself out of a
strategic cul-de-sac by generating the option of conventional war
in response to the suicide attack on parliament. It is for history
to ascertain and judge if the military deliberately misunderstood
Vajpayee, or if the political head was toying with the military. In
the event, the logic of deterrence prevailed.
Which brings us to Gen Vij; his signal contribution has been
the fence along the Line of Control that has sealed off Kashmir.
In this the international configuration of forces post 9/11, and
Gen Musharraf’s own internal political agenda, have both had an
influence.
JJ Singh thus inherits a promising configuration of forces.
Declining infiltration, talk of force reduction, ongoing talks with
Pakistan on both nuclear and conventional CBMs at official levels,
talks at the Foreign Minister level on security CBMs and J&K
slated for the month-end and a fresh counter terrorism doctrine
predicated on a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, are few of the
 247

heartening factors. The General will have to rely on his negotiation

skills to sell the idea that making a distinction between people and
the armed insurgents is the sine-qua-non to successful counter
insurgency.
Kashmiri insurgents or militants - or ‘terrorists’ as Gen JJ Singh
would have us refer to them - remain Kashmiri and as such are
very much fellow Indians; this distinction is lost on the Americans
and the Israelis - on whom India has of late been drawing on for
ideas on how to tackle terrorism who see their antagonists only
as external forces, whereas for India they are partly internal as
well. The chances of a people-centered campaign as envisaged
by the new army doctrine will be dependent on the outcome of
the intellectual tension and power struggle between the two sides
within the military - those persuaded by ‘hearts and minds’ versus
the hardliners. For once, the army chief has both the inclination
and capability to be on the side of the enlightened. JJ Singh’s
predecessors arguably could not take this route; to do so would
have been premature given the earlier levels of Pakistani proxy
war. At the same time, he would do well to remember that he will
not have this defense to speak for his record three years down the
line.
The Sikh combine - the first turbaned PM and army chief -
are likely to succeed where their forebears have failed, not only
because the constellation of forces is promising, but also because
of the kind of men they are - or appear to be, in their media
avatars.

______________________________________
Security agenda: 2006 and beyond
30 December 2005
indiatogether.org

General J J Singh (‘JJ’), India’s Army chief, wrote recently that

the inspiration for his humane doctrine on counter insurgency has
been the ailing Field Marshal Manekshaw - affectionately known
as Sam Bahadur. When JJ was a live wire subaltern, he served
the inevitable tenure in the Eastern Command, which looks after
India’s troubled North East and was then under the tutelage of
Manekshaw from Calcutta.
There is enough evidence that humane-ness isn’t exactly a
new policy for the Indian Army, only it has never had the decided
imprimatur of the Chief. With JJ being so closely identified with
it, he would do well to push it through in the forthcoming year
to ensure his place in history. The hard-line school is presently
claiming to have done its bit in pushing back the militancy to low
levels. It is therefore time for the ‘healing touch’ to make itself
more evident on the ground. With the right alignment of attitudes
and stars, such a change in the manner of interface between the
security forces and the citizens in Kashmir could even hold the
potential to wrap up the militancy in the near term.
The main impact of the softer approach would be to remove
 248

the rationale for jihadis to make their presence felt in the Valley
under the guise of fighting to protect an oppressed Muslim minority.
If the acts labeled ‘oppression’ were to noticeably diminish, the
host Kashmiri society would cease to be as welcoming as it has
hitherto been to jihadis, since the disaffection with the Indian
State too would parallely diminish. With Pakistan playing ball to
a considerable extent in keeping Kashmir from boiling over, and
due to the positive fallout from the unfortunate earthquake in the
region, the changes in the militancy both warrant and reinforce
the Indian Army’s full hearted make over to the publicly aired
policy of its Chief. Since security forces comprise the BSF and the
CRPF also, the effort should permeate these as well.
While political alienation has been redressed to some extent by
the democratic changeovers up to Mufti Sayeed on to now Ghulam
Nabi Azad, the presence of the Army can be reduced more boldly
now. So far the Army has played a cautious hand, worried about
a dramatic change of gears for the worse. However, as the ground
situation improves, we must not lose the opportune moment. To
push things further, the proximity of Mr. Azad to the power center
in Delhi must be taken advantage of. The resulting improvement
can prove to be political capital later.
The changes so far have been restricted to indulging in less of
the same. It is time now for more of the new.
Information coming out of Kashmir has always carried with it
the underside of manipulation by interested forces. Reliance on
credible sources is therefore warranted in gauging the ground
situation. One such is the doughty Praveen Swami, who has
consistently and courageously reported on Kashmir. His latest
insight, carried in Frontline is on changed terrorist modus operandi.
Tactically, the terrorists have emulated the Al Qaeda in their
cellular structure, with a higher social and technical profile of
recruits and resort to an Iraq-style stand-off bombing campaign.
It is apparent that militancy has withered from the public sphere
with people’s participation having receded.
In the words of the new commander of India’s Northern Army,
Lt. Gen. Deepak Kapoor, terrorists were ‘frightened by the
alienation’ of the civilian population and that ‘they have been
have been carrying out attacks in desperation, using grenades and
IEDs (improvised explosive devices) to show their presence’. This
has echoes of the declining Punjab militancy in which spectacular
strikes punctuated the return to normalcy. Therefore, there is a
case for meaningful change in security operations in Kashmir.
The changes so far have been restricted to indulging in ‘less
of the same’. It is time now for ‘more of the new’. A humane
approach coupled with downsizing is the key. While the former
is already, hopefully, a primary component of India’s security
strategy, the latter has not been broached so far. There are
two aspects to the latter – one short term and Kashmir-centric,
and the second of long term import for India’s national aims.
In the near term, downsizing the Army’s presence in Kashmir
would help Musharraf, since demilitarisation has been one of his
 249

publicly stated objectives of late. It would buttress the composite

dialogue process that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has made
the keystone of his Pakistan strategy. The term ‘demilitarisation’
has also been bandied by Kathwari’s Kashmir Study Group, a USbased
lobby led by a non-resident Kashmiri, thinking up pragmatic
solutions to the problem and having access to power centers both
in New Delhi and Islamabad, more so the former.
In case India ignores Musharraf on Kashmir in the comforting
belief that its present day upper hand in Kashmir enables it to do
so, it could face regressive consequences in the fore-grounding
once again of the military option. On the other hand, with the
Army selectively and partially back in barracks, the effect would
be to serve public perception of serious Indian intent, undercut the
jihadis, and appear a concession to Pakistan while still choosing the
terms ourselves. The characterisation of talks as ‘constructive and
fruitful’ may be adequate on marginal issues such as the recently
concluded one between the two nations’ respective Surveyors
over Sir Creek, but on the substantial, if not ‘core’ issue, there
has to be more to show, including some ‘give and take’.
What transpires in 2006 may prove historic on this score, for the
importance of the year lies in it being the run up to 2007. In that
year, we will witness the next hustings in J&K, Musharraf’s bid for
the Presidency out of uniform, and parliamentary and provincial
elections in Pakistan. The situation in J&K would be crucial to
the several interests at stake in all these polls. Therefore there
is much to be gained by moving towards a solution in Kashmir.
In case the various stakes are not taken on board, such as, say,
that of Musharraf and Pakistan, then their adverse reaction will
have to be needlessly contended with. Being seen as making a
positive difference in Kashmir makes sense for all players. Mutual
accommodation therefore makes practical and strategic sense.
With the provincial elections in India’s own pivotal state of
Uttar Pradesh slated for February 2007 additionally, the Congress’
showing could well hold the future to rebuilding its independent
strength nationally, and emerging from the UPA coalition’s shadow.
Also, if the BJP - currently in the midst of a change of guard - begins
to set its house in order under new leadership, then 2007 may be
as late as the Congress can wait for such a positive development.
Treating winter as a traditional waiting period for operations
in the summer may prove too late. The incentive for Pakistan to
play its usual summer game on the Line of Control requires to
be diminished while the passes remain snow-shut. A revival of
the Hurriyat-Centre talks, a rethink on the density of the security
forces deployment, a few workshops for the forces on ‘firm but
friendly’ behaviour, are all fresh ideas for the new year. With the
PM - known for privileging the economy as a means to engaging
with India’s intertwined problems of development and security
- acting as his own foreign minister presently, the momentum of
interfacing with Pakistan should not be allowed to lag by default
in the absence of a full time foreign minister. Also even though
the present Governor, Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd), once led the India
 250

delegation to Italy in 1972 for the Conference on Application of

Human Rights During Warfare, it may be timely to bring in a fresh
dynamism by a change of guard at Raj Bhawan; its occupant since
mid 2003 will turn an octogenarian in Year 2006.
A word now on the as-yet-unarticulated long term implication
of the advocated downsizing for India’s army. Merely holding the
surplus military manpower in reserve within the forces would not
help the prospects of resolution in Kashmir. Similarly, retrenching
this manpower in, for instance India’s North East or the Red
Crescent apparently forming from Nepal to Telangana may only
serve to militarise these areas. Thus, what is needed is a partial
and phased demobilisation of India’s surplus military force strength
in tandem with the draw-down in Kashmiri militancy that led up to
its expansion in first place.
The New Year has significance beyond the apparent. One hopes,
as often in the past, that it will mark the beginning of the end
of the Kashmir problem. After a long time, the possibility seems
imaginable, and this may still be an end-game that both India and
Pakistan can win.

_______________________________________
Menu for the New Chief
#1595, December 22, 2004
http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/menu-for-the-newchief-
1595.html

Lt Gen JJ Singh, who has been designated to succeed Gen Vij as the new
army chief from 1 February 2005, will have a tenure of about three years.
Three years is a long enough time for a chief to make a lasting impact on
the force. In their introductory and inaugural press conferences most
chiefs spell out their priorities. These are generally about keeping the
army well honed and in high morale. Since these yardsticks are difficult
to measure, the success or otherwise of a chief in office is an exercise in
subjective judgment on the outcome of some or other major initiative of
his tenure.
Gen Vij for instance will be known to history as one who got the LoC
fence through. Gen ‘Paddy’ has already expressed his preference for the
proactive option in his post retirement book (India Checkmates America),
an option he was denied while he kept the army ready on its starting
blocks during Operation Parakram. Gen VP Malik barely retrieved his
reputation by beating back the Kargil intrusion. Shankar Roychowdhury
would not be known for much, since the Arjun tank does not amount to
much, even though the army in his tenure was only ‘Officially at Peace’.
Gen Joshi paid the price for a hard-driving life in saddle for getting
major initiatives as the Rashtriya Rifles through; though the jury is
still out if that was a wise decision. Gen Rodrigues tenure saw Indian
Army grappling with over-stretch, to ease which he was constrained
to highlight that ‘good governance’ was also the army’s business. Gen
VN Sharma did well to pull the IPKF out, even if he would prefer to be
remembered for his role as Eastern Army Commander in challenging the
Chinese in 1987 at Sumdorong Chu. Of his predecessor, Gen K Sundarji,
 251

there is no denying that his main contribution to national security was in

propounding a nuclear doctrine and preparing the army for the nuclear
era. Against such line up of illustrious predecessors at 5, Rajaji Marg,
there is little doubt that JJ Singh would want to be known to history for
more than being the first Sikh to head India’s army.
Sam Bahadur in his inimitable style let it be known at the recent
conclave of former chiefs that a chief has his own mind and could do
without gratuitous advice. However, there is no escaping that JJ Singh
will have to contend with Kashmir. In the cases with earlier chiefs the
situation was never as bright. Therefore, with due apologies to Sam
Bahadur, Gen JJ Singh would be well advised to set as target a drawdown
in India’s military engagement in Kashmir during his tenure,
albeit one predicated on an improvement in the Indo-Pak relationship
and the internal political environment in J&K.
That JJ Singh has it in him to bring this about is evident from the
unintended revelatory encounter with the press on being appointed chief
designate. The General was caught on camera in an unguarded emotional
moment on his stint in Kashmir when he had let off a newly-wed militant
on the promise of reform. This is the human face that could turn round
the situation in Kashmir since the army is the ubiquitous presence of the
Indian state in Kashmir.
An army press release on the adoption of a new counter terrorism
doctrine has it that it would prioritize ‘winning hearts and minds’ in
such situations. Institutionalization of such an approach, rather than
leaving it to the level of liberality and enlightenment of officers, is the
answer, rather than the army’s efforts at media management to brush up
its image. If Gen JJ Singh manages to sell the doctrine to the hardliners
within the force, it could, with an admixture of a Mizoram-style political
opening, bring about the end game in Kashmir. In doing so it could
provide a telling counter to the KPS Gill doctrine of ‘exhaustion’, seen as
India’s only ‘successful’ military answer to insurgency so far.
Gen JJ Singh, with a background in mechanized warfare having
commanded a strike corps and the western army, would like to propel the
army into being one of the RMA generation. This can only be brought
about by Kashmir being off its agenda and the finances so released being
directed into a down-sized, tech-savvy force subsequently.
The first-ever Indo-Pak talks at official level on conventional forces
and CBMs recently concluded in Islamabad provide an interesting
opening. With Pakistan having access to arms as a major non-NATO ally
of the US and with it arriving at a modus-vivendi on the conventional
imbalance with India, its need to keep India tied down in Kashmir will
recede.
With infiltration levels down, talks on with both Pakistan and with
dissidents in Kashmir, no chief ever had it so good. Thus, Gen Singh will
have a lot to answer for in case, as he hangs up his spurs, the situation is
back to square one in keeping with the unfortunate pattern in Kashmir.

_______________________________________
 252

Chief of Defense : Implications

01 January 2004
indiatogether.org

The latest controversy to hit the headlines in the defense field

is the letter fired off by Mr. Tarlochan Singh, Chairman of the
Minorities Commission, pumping for a particular candidate as the
next Army Chief. While the incumbent is not due to retire any time
soon, Mr. Tarlochan Singh’s haste stemmed from rumors abroad
that the Army Chief is to be kicked upstairs as the first Chief of
Defense Staff (CDS). In that case Mr. Tarlochan Singh’s candidate
would have fallen by the wayside since seniority would be on the
side of another General at the present juncture.
While the issue raises several points of concern, not least
of which is the politicization of the Army through attempts at
manipulation of its leadership, the point is that appointment of the
first CDS may be in the offing. This is probably the only stone left
unturned in India’s march towards nuclearisation since Pokhran II.
The implications of this development demand scrutiny. There is
every likelihood that this measure is taken as yet another feather
in the cap of the reigning BJP led NDA government in its striving to
make India strong and secure. Perhaps the announcement is being
withheld for a suitable occasion, with January offering two such
occasions – the Army Day and the Republic Day. Clubbed with the
reported flight of the 3000 km Agni III in the pipeline, India would
proclaim acquisition of a deployed nuclear deterrent.
India has over the recent past declared its nuclear doctrine,
given itself a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) comprising
Political and Executive Councils, prepared two or more Nuclear
Command Posts, created a Strategic Forces Command, geared
up its nuclear delivery capability comprising Su 30 aircrafts and
Prithvi and Agni Missile Regiments and is in an advanced stage
of purchase of missile defense missiles and radar systems and
Airborne Warning and Control aircrafts. The only gap left in this
nuclear edifice has been the absence of the CDS. The role of
the CDS as espoused by its votaries is to act as a single point
of advice on military matters to the political head. He is to also
control the Strategic Forces Command, which presently has an
uncertain chain of command running from the Political Council
of the NCA through its Executive Council to the Chief’s of Staff
Committee. The latter is a body of equals comprising the three
service Chiefs and is headed by the longest serving Chief, deemed
an unsatisfactory arrangement for a nuclear and regional power,
if not a Great Power itself. Therefore there is an impetus for the
government to wrap up nuclear related initiatives and go into the
national elections with not just the economy to boast about, but
security too.
The major argument towards reorganization of the national
security apparatus has been that it is archaic and lends itself
to inter-service rivalry that is exploited by the bureaucratic
intermediary -- the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the argument goes,
 253

the political head is not able to access the service perspective and
therefore national security suffers in the bargain. The Arun Singh
Committee (set up by Mr. Jaswant Singh) took on board these
arguments and had apparently recommended the creation of a
CDS. However, the bureaucrats who would stand to lose power in
the turf wars in South Block have stymied this. Instead of a bona
fide CDS, India has a Chief of Integrated Defense Staff answering
to the revolving Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The problem with the CDS is not merely that this will be
yet another functionary participating in the bureaucratic wars
on Raisina Hill. There is the additional weight that the security
complex will acquire in deliberations regarding allocation and
distribution of the national resource cake. Presently, the system
is so geared that even if the Navy wishes to acquire a new aircraft
carrier, it takes about a decade or more to materialize it in the
form of the Gorshkov. While security analysts fault this system,
the truth is that it has prevented an overt and overly militarisation
of India.
The recently retired first Chief of Integrated Defense Staff
(CIDS), Lt Gen Pankaj Joshi, has given vent to his discontent with
the present system. Writing in the USI Journal, a periodical widely
subscribed to in strategic circles, he pushes for systematization
for ‘long term budgetary support commitment to structure force
levels to effectively counter forecast threats’. The General’s time
horizon is two decades hence. This is a call repeatedly heard in
seminars on the circuit.
‘Forecast threats’ are most likely to be expansive. The
corresponding ‘budgetary support commitment’ would certainly
serve the institutional interests of the security establishment at
the expense of other sectors. The point oft missed is that the
‘forecast threats’ are most likely to be expansive. To combat these
‘structure’ and ‘force levels’ would likely be not as extensive. The
corresponding ‘budgetary support commitment’ would certainly
serve the institutional interests of the security establishment at
the expense of sectors already reeling under the onslaught of
liberalization. A CDS for in-house credibility would be required to
forward the military case. A lesson from a century ago in which
the Commander in Chief Kitchener saw off the Viceroy of no less a
stature than Curzon, the CDS could acquire a say that could upset
the singular politician-military equation in India.
It is testimony to the democratic system in which several
interest groups make demands on the state and no particular
one commandeers the agenda. It helps ward off the future of an
overbearing military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower
warned against in his farewell address to the people of the
United States. This is a message not only for Americans of today,
but also for India as it readies to imitate the American Joint
Chiefs of Staff system to make its nuclear weapons employable,
even if its declaratory doctrinal principle is in favor of nuclear
disarmament.
The technocratic argument for building in efficiency in the
 254

system appears to have some substance, but future generations

cannot be deprived of agency. The ‘military mind’ is wont to
define ‘threats’ and their counter is obvious from the course of
the Vietnam War and the Cold War elsewhere. There is also the
element of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ to be considered. Therefore
to expect that India would be able to manage the future of its
security any better is to be oblivious of the body of literature
encompassed in military sociology. With a right wing government
positioning itself for another term, it can be hazarded that its
military largesse is set to continue.
The oncoming election should be the occasion to retrieve
India’s future for future India to determine.

______________________________________________

Elevate Human Rights As the Core Organising

Principle in Counter Insurgency
Issue Brief IDSA
IDSA Policy Brief

‘You must remember that all the people of the area in which you
are operating are fellow Indians. They may have different religions,
pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians and the very
fact, that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of
India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have
taken up arms against their own people and are disrupting peace
f this area. You are to protect the mass of the people in the area
from these disruptive elements. You are not to fight the people in
the area but to protect them.’
- COAS Special Order of the Day 195521
Introduction
The Indian Army’s Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations
(DSCO)22 comes up for review next month, five years after its
publication. When it was written, it had the section on Low Intensity
21. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and
Counter Insurgency, New Delhi: Routledge, 2007, p. 147. The Order was in
wake of the army being called upon for counter insurgency operations in
Nagaland.
22. HQ ARTRAC, Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, Shimla: ARTRAC,
2007.
Conflict in the Indian Army Doctrine as guide and half century of
counter insurgency experience to inform it.23 The iteration this time has
the Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations24 (JDSCO) to inform
the reappraisal along with the past half decade in putting the doctrine,
dubbed ‘iron fist in velvet glove’, into practice.25 The reappraisal will
no doubt benefit from the introspective input provided by the internal
environment, as mandated by the procedure for doctrine revision. The
forthcoming publication may also find useful the sometimes critical
commentary from outside the military.26 This Brief is to constructively
help inform the doctrinal revision underway [rephrase sentence].27
The Brief advocates centering of the doctrine around the human
 255

rights imperative. This is largely the case since ‘Upholding Human

Rights’ is acknowledged in the JDSCO among the ‘Principles of SCO (Sub
Conventional operations)’ [rephrase sentence].28 Arriving at a ‘reasonable
and pragmatic balance between the demands of military necessity and
humanity’29 is admittedly a difficult proposition. This is borne out in the
tension reflected in the doctrine between the necessity of kinetic force
23. Section 14 of Chapter 5 in HQ ARTRAC, Indian Army Doctrine, Shimla:
ATRAC, 2004.
24. HQ Integrated Defence Staff, Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations,
New Delhi: HQ IDS, 2010.
25. Foreword by General JJ Singh, Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations
(DSCO), p. i. He states: ‘I have emphasised the concept of ‘Iron Fist with
Velvet Glove’, which implies a humane approach towards the populace at
large in the combat zone.’
26. Gautam Naulakha, ‘Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations: A
Critique’, EPW, 7 April 2007 and Ali Ahmed, ‘Revision of the DSCO:
Human Rights to the Fore’, IDSA Policy Brief, March 2011.
27. Also see Vivek Chadha,‘Heart as a Weapon - A Fresh Approach to the
Concept of Hearts and Minds’,IDSA Policy Brief, November 2011.
28. Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (JDSCO), p. 22.
29. ‘Statement by the ICRC on the Status of the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts,
2008’, October 24, 2008.
and the equally compelling need for its restriction. The Brief highlights
doctrinal tenets that could potentially cause dissonance. Ironing these out
in the process of doctrinal revision will lead to an internally consistent
output. The proposal here is to elevate human rights from one among
several principles to being the core principle.30
This Brief first discusses the competing perspectives on human
rights to substantiate that protection of human rights is more than just
a strategic necessity or a force multiplier. Thereafter it brings out the
dissonance in the doctrine that owes to viewing human rights protection
instrumentally, or as a means to an end. The recommendation that
emerges is to take human rights protection as an end in itself, or the
‘categorical imperative’. Additionally, since military force application
inevitably has consequences for human rights, the political prong of
strategy must be equally in evidence.
Placing human rights at core
The nature of violence and the nature of the military instrument are
critical to understanding its place in a counter insurgency campaign. Its
inescapable limitations are such that Clausewitz once observed, ‘War
in general…is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy
shall not be inconsistent with these means.’31 Extension of politics by the
means of violence must respect the nature of the means. The nature of
violence is such that the impossible cannot be demanded of it. Equally,
militaries qua organizations are blunt instruments. Given this, there is
no escaping tension between application of violence and human rights.
This obviously means that the tension needs reconciling. Clearly, this
cannot be at the expense of human rights. Therefore restriction can only
be, firstly, in the resort to force, and, secondly, in the manner of the use
of force. The former places an onus on the political prong of strategy and
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the latter is more narrowly the domain of the military.

Existence of laws such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act
30. The JDSCO has it as one among 11 principles. Even though these are not
ranked by priority, it bears noting that it figures seventh in the list.
31. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret
and edited by Beatrice Heuser, OUP, 2007, pp. 28-29.
(AFSPA) suggests that force application entails imposing on soft and hard
core rights of citizens. The doctrinal understanding is that, within their
ambit, the endeavour must be to have as light a footprint as possible.
Alongside a strict human rights protection regime must be in place,
termed ‘zero tolerance’.32 The strategic fallout is in gaining support of
the people, deemed the ‘center of gravity’.33 Valuing human rights of
citizens is thus consequential, but is a means to an end.
The perspective, reflected in doctrine, is that respecting the human
rights factor is a strategic necessity. The problem with the perspective is
that the converse is equally implicit, which is that in case strategy requires
a departure then human rights can be neglected. The JDSCO says that,
‘It is our constitutional obligation to honour the HR of our people and
any disregard to this obligation will only enable the terrorist/insurgents
to discredit the state’s legitimacy and influence (italics added).’34 Further,
it states, ‘Upholding of HR is a constitutional obligation and is also
necessary to establish the credibility of the government in the eyes of
the people (Italics added).’35 The qualifications, italicised here, makes
it apparent that the constitutional obligation is not enough on its own
merits. Instead, the strategic fallout makes it necessary to honour human
rights.
This understanding is compounded by a perspective that takes
human rights protection as a ‘force multiplier’. A force multiplier is
defined as, ‘a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat
force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and
thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.’36
This is jargon that does not find mention in the DSCO in respect of
human rights. The JDSCO alludes to it, stating, ‘Popular support is the
Force Multiplier in SCW for either side and hence the centrality of the
32. DSCO, p. 55.
33. Ibid., p. 15.
34. JDSCO, p. 25.
35. Ibid., p. 44.
36. ‘Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, Joint Publication 1-02, US
Department of Defense, 2005.
population (italics added).’ The understanding is that popular support is
the ‘force multiplier’ that makes for centrality of the demographic terrain.
Such support is gained through respecting human rights [rephrase]. It
thus makes instrumental use of human rights as a means to an end. The
population is not central for its own sake; gaining its support is instead
placed at core [rephrase].
This understanding owes to other significant imperatives that the
state and the military are required to consider. These are territorial
integrity and state monopoly of force [rephrase]. The warrior ethos of the
service that privileges prevailing in a military contest, both externally
and internally also impels taking human rights as a means to an end.
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Lastly, it is not always that grievance impels insurgency; greed does so

too.37 For righteousness to prevail there has to be a reluctant resort to
force that leads to a regrettable impact on human rights.
These interpretations – human rights as a strategic necessity and
a force multiplier - bring to fore a need to privilege human rights
unambiguously. This can best be done by moving to an understanding
that human rights are instead a categorical imperative. A categorical
imperative denotes an ‘absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts
its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end
in itself’.38 The term itself is Kantian, the philosophy behind which is
not covered here. Elevating human rights protection conceptually to a
categorical imperative ensures that it becomes the organizing principle
for both doctrine and strategy.
This intuitively appeals to soldierly sensibilities because it is in keeping
with India’s warrior and civilisational ethic. This is acknowledged as such
with the DSCO viewing human rights as, ‘the very essence of human
behaviour and interaction.’39 Institutionally, the military places the
‘country’ first ‘always and every time’.40 By definition, the term country
37. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance’, Oxford Economic
Papers 56(4): 563–595, 200.
38. http://www.categoricalimperative.org/
39. DSCO, p. 53.
40. This is the Chetwodian motto adopted for the officer corps by the
IndianMilitaryAcademy.
is beyond mere territory; it’s essentially about people. Lastly, loyalty of
the soldiers is first to the Indian Constitution, rightly brought out in
the DSCO as: ‘Indian Constitution, Indian Army, regiment, unit and
colleagues.’41 Therefore, doctrinal acknowledgement of human rights as
a ‘categorical imperative’ will negate instrumental interpretation of the
HR factor.
Significantly, that it is a constitutional obligation makes it an overriding
imperative. There need be no other reason, period.42The DSCO
acknowledges as much noting that the ‘Indian Army…holds these
Fundamental Rights as one of its most cherished values’ and wishes to
‘keep the environment sensitised about this constitutional obligation.’43
The way forward
It bears reiteration that application of force against those resorting to
violence is legitimate and often inescapable. The level of force application
is a professional military decision. However, organisational theory and
social psychology informs that such decisions are influenced, sometimes
negatively, by institutional and personal level factors. Better known are
corrupting factors at personal level such as overweening desire for awards,
‘Rambo’ sub-culture etc. But institutional interests, such as need to of the
military project a certain image and the self-image of itself by the military,
also sometimes influence military action. For instance, application of
force can sometimes be influenced by the demonstration effect intended,
over and above the due demands of the operation underway. Therefore,
the military decision must have limiting parameters in keeping with one
of the oldest questions in political science: ‘Who guards the guardians?’44
The well regarded parameters are discrimination, proportionality,
41. DSCO, p. 55.
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42. This is reminiscent of the proposition in Tennyson’s ‘Charge of the Light

Brigade’, specifically, ‘Theirs’ not to reason why’.
43. Ibid., p. 54.
44. The phrase ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ is attributed to the Roman
poet Juvenal, Satires (Satire VI, lines 347–8), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Quis_custodiet_ipsos_custodes%3F
military necessity and increasingly, legality.45
This is fairly well appreciated. The Indian Army Doctrine demands
the COAS Commandments be respected ‘notwithstanding the tense,
stressful and turbulent situations at the grass roots level.’46 Incidentally,
it advocates, ‘low profile and people-friendly operations rather than
high intensity operations related only to body and weapon counts.’47
Consequently, it maintains that, ‘Violation of Human Rights, therefore,
must be avoided under all circumstances, even at the cost of operational
success (italics added).’48
A tendency towards permissiveness is brought about by the competing,
instrumental, perspective on human rights. The 2006 DSCO talks of
a need for kinetic operations dominant attrition warfare leading to
‘elimination’ of terrorists in the early phase of deployment.49 A shift to
non-kinetic maneuver warfare in which terrorists are neutralized is in
the later stage.50 The understanding seems to be that the Army will be
called out only when the situation is bad enough to warrant it. Upgrading
of the central armed police forces for tackling lower order insurgency,
as witnessed in Central India, is being done. Once the situation escapes
their control, military deployment could take place. The military would
require appropriate force application to wrest the initiative and stabilize
the situation. Thereafter, the shift is to be made to a maneurverist
45. There are a separate set of considerations that could be dwelt on in
doctrine too on the very deployment of the military. These would include
legitimacy, constitutional provisions etc. In effect, a distinction can be
made domestically on the parameters attending military deployment and
employment, in the tradition of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in international
law of armed conflict.
46. Indian Army Doctrine, pp. 23, 30.
47. Ibid., p. 23.
48. Ibid., p. 26.
49. The heuristic (DSCO, p. 22) uses the term ‘elimination’. The Foreword
uses the term ‘neutralization’, p. ii. The reconciliation is in favour of
‘neutralization’ (p. 33).
50. Ibid., p. 21.
approach.51
The problem is that kinetic force application makes the army seem
an alien imposition, since in the early stages the likelihood of peoples’
support for the insurgent is higher.52 This is further complicated by
external support and proxy war. The compulsion to gain military
ascendance increases, making it difficult to identify when to shift from
one approach to the other.53
The intensity of the insurgency instead should dictate levels of
military force application with professional innovation in tactics
preventing compromise of effectiveness. There is therefore no need for
the timeline positing the kinetic-non-kinetic distinction. The wait for
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reaching a position of strength for enabling political initiatives can be

undercut by proactive peacemaking and peacebuilding subsumed in the
political prong of strategy. This often awaits the non-kinetic, later phase,
resulting in prolonging of insurgency, with avoidable consequences for
human rights of citizens.
Next, consistency can be built in to eliminate expansive
interpretations. For instance, the DSCO highlights ‘minimum force’.54
But an element of dissonance is brought in by the JDSCO. It rules in
favour of ‘optimal rather than minimal or maximal’.55 This shift calls
for explanation especially since the Supreme Court has used the term
‘minimal’ in its 1997 judgment in the Nagaland case.56 The Supreme
Court judgment does not say ‘minimum’, leaving the military to judge in
51. DSCO, p. 22.
52. JDSCO, p. 39.
53. Ali Ahmed, ‘Revision of the DSCO: Human Rights to the Fore’, IDSA
Policy Brief, March 2011.
54. DSCO, p. 33.
55. JDSCO, p. 27.
56. The Supreme Court bench comprising Chief Justice, M.M. Punchhi and
Justices, S.C. Agarwal, A.S. Anand and S.P. Bharucha considered the Naga
People’s Movement, Of Human Rights Vs. Union Of India case on 27
November 1997.
the context of the situation.57 The principal criterion of level of force to
be used is effectiveness in the particular action force is being applied in.
There is no cause for the military to endanger either its own soldiers or
innocent people in preserving the life of terrorists unwilling to lay down
their arms. [rephrase]. Therefore, doctrinal rhetoric such as ‘punitive’,
‘overwhelming’ etc provides avoidable loopholes leading to expansive
interpretation of the tenet of minimal force.
Another example of dissonance in the JDSCO is in its simultaneous
enumeration of human rights as a ‘principle’ along with the principle of
‘balance between people friendliness and punitive actions.’58The term
‘punitive action’ of the JDSCO suggests that people friendly operations
may indicate ‘lack of strength or resolve for dealing with culprits’. It seeks
to compensate by calling for ‘punitive action’ using ‘optimal as against
minimal’ force. This is untenable since punishment is beyond the scope of
military authority and can be seen as evidence of institutional interest.
Silence is as much a give away of thinking as words. A conspicuous
area of silence is absence of reference to international obligations. This
ignores the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) definition
of human rights that ‘“human rights” means the rights relating to
life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable
by courts in India (italics added).’59India’s international obligations are
specifically the four Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).60 While the first has
57. The judgment stated: ‘The laying down of these conditions gives an
indication that while exercising the powers the officer shall use minimal
force required for effective action against the person/persons acting in
contravention of the prohibitory order (italics added).’
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58. JDSCO, p. 27.

59. The Protection Of Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 10 of 1994, (8th January,
1994), p. 1, http://www.nhrc.nic.in/
60. For text see UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.
been enacted into law,61 the latter are incorporated into the Constitution.
At a minimum, a discussion on Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions is mandatory. Since torture is ruled out by this provision,
the slovenly passage of the right against torture through the parliament
is not of consequence. The DSCO has merely one paragraph on legal
matters.62 The JDSCO does not have any mention of human rights related
law in its coverage of international law in its Chapter 3.63 In effect, the
meager discussion of the legal dimension amounts to a doctrinal blindspot.
The much-in-the-news AFSPA finds mention in a reference to
respecting Do’s and Don’ts.64 At a minimum, a guide to how to ascertain
ripeness of an area for disturbed areas status and how to ascertain when
to revoke such status needs to be discussed. This would be useful in
the arriving at the military’s input into the decision.65 This would be in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s requirement that the disturbed areas
status needs to be under constant review, along with every extension of
the Act. The Supreme Court had mandated:
It is, therefore, necessary that the authority exercising the power
under Section 3 to make a declaration so exercises the said power that
the extent of the disturbed area is confined to the area in which the
situation is such that it cannot be handled without seeking the aid of the
armed forces and by making a periodic assessment of the situation after
61. For full text see http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1954823/
62. DSCO, p. 15.
63. The focus is on terrorism related agreements at the international and
regional level (JDSCO, pp. 17-20)
64. DSCO, p. 68. The DSCO incorporates the Supreme Court judgment in
this regard: ‘The instructions in the form of “Do’s and Don’ts” to which
reference has been made by the learned Attorney General have to be
treated as binding instructions which are required to be followed by the
members of the armed forces exercising powers under the Central Act
and a serious note should be taken of violation of the instructions and
the persons found responsible for such violation should be suitably
punished under the Army Act, 1950.’
65. This is the case currently in J&K.
the deployment of the armed forces the said authority should decide
whether the declaration should be continued and, in case the declaration
is required to be continues, whether the extent of the disturbed area
should be reduced.66
Policy recommendations
India’s counter insurgency policy is people-friendly in keeping with
its credentials as a liberal democracy. The tone and tenor of doctrine
reflects this. Doctrine bravely deals with the tension between application
of force and the impact on human terrain. Evidence from the ground
lately suggests that this is a largely successful exercise. Yet, some policy
recommendations to help improve doctrine are as under:
The ministry of home in consultation with the • ministry of defence,
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the National Security Council Secretariat and the NHRC needs to

spell out an overarching national approach. This would help in
formulating strategy at the next lower level in each of the areas
where the AFSPA is applicable.67 This will bring in accountability
and a ‘whole of government’ approach. It would ensure that
the counter insurgency strategy orchestrates the twin prongs,
political and military, at the two levels, centre and province, in
sync. This could be part of the national security doctrine or done
independently. These foundational documents must make clear
the place of human rights as sacrosanct.
• Institutionally, at the level of the military, the nation-institution
distinction must be maintained. There is potential for the ‘fair
name’ of the institution being mistaken for the ‘good’ of the
nation. This leads to departures from the straight and narrow
on human rights. Even as the military leadership is sensitive to
this, political level oversight of the military in such situations
66. Supreme Court ruling in the Nagaland case, 1997.
67. For instance it would help the Central Armed Police Forces, on the
frontline ever since the earlier default resort to military deployment has
been considerably curtailed after the Group of Ministers report of the early
2000s, to arrive at respective doctrine documents.
needs to be intimate. Currently, the problem is in the military
answering to the ministry of defence, but the problem in the areas
in question being under the domain of the home ministry. There
is an additional political authority by way of elected democratic
provincial governments in place. But the horizontal relationship
of the military with the provincial government is to be one of
‘cooperation’, as per the Supreme Court judgment. The Unified
Headquarters is useful, but is subject to structural limitations. In
effect, the military is answerable not so much to the provincial
government, but to the Union government through the ministry of
defence. This increases the onus of coordination and oversight on
the two central ministries, home and defence, and, in particular,
the political appointments within these
• Internalisation of human rights through revision of doctrine by
placing human rights at core is recommended. Areas of dissonance
pointed out need reconsideration. A strict adherence to guidelines
of the Supreme Court, specifically its order on ‘minimal’ force, is
a must. The current human rights record has been arrived at in a
situation of relative military ascendancy in J&K and culmination
of political processes in Nagaland and Assam in the North East.
The test of the army’s sensitivity could arise in more challenging
circumstances in future. This necessarily means going beyond
training and pedagogy68 to internalization through socialisation
into reinforced norms.
• In matching strategy with the legal domain, the next iteration
of doctrine must extend to dwelling on conditions that entail
declaration of an area as ‘disturbed’ under section 3; the exit
indicators for such status in first place and, secondly, repeal of the
Act; parameters for governmental permission under section 6/7 of
the relevant AFSPA for prosecutions; and clear endorsement that
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Do’s and Don’ts amount to law. The government could consider

amending the Army Act 1950 for making violations punishable
under law as was desired by the Supreme Court.
68. DSCO, p. 49
Conclusion
The nature of violence and of military force is such that acceptance
of impositions on human rights in counter insurgency is only realistic.
Limiting its affects on hapless citizenry therefore acquires urgency. The
first step is in ensuring against doctrinal justification or rationale for
imposition beyond that warranted by the very nature of force. Building
in internal consistency in the doctrine is necessary. Towards this end,
elevating human rights as the central pillar of doctrine to the status of
‘categorical imperative’ is for consideration. Since, insurgency and its
counter is less about the visible military contest and more about the
competition in ideas, this will ensure that ‘idea of India’ prevails over
insurgent alternatives on offer.

__________________________________________________
Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle

CHAPTER 6:
THE ORGANISATIONAL FACTOR

Inside the box

The traditional understanding is that utility of conventional force has declined in the nuclear
age. Where deterrence is the norm, war-fighting is passé. However, the only cognisance military
doctrine takes of the nuclear dimension is the proviso that military objectives would be trimmed
to political aims to be achieved. This ignores a salient feature of war, that the enemy has agency.
The intent of limitation is difficult to deliver on in practice. A perceived need to persevere in case
of reverses; to press home an advantage; or the very pursuit of ‘victory’, leads up to a non-trivial
possibility of breach of the nuclear threshold. Behind such impulses is institutional interest, making
scrutiny of the impact of the organisational level on doctrine necessary. To its credit, the problem
has not escaped the military:

The fundamental problem of prosecuting a limited war is rooted in the clash between two
definable paradigms of military security: one in which the organizing construct rests on
preparing to fight and win the war (conventional paradigm), another in which war
avoidance is the underlying goal of military preparations (nuclear paradigm)… Military
planners are therefore confounded as most military plans tend to carry within them the
seeds of mutual suicide. These challenges manifest itself in the form of disconnect
between military force application and political objectives (Menon 2005: 153).

Organisational theory lens has proven resilient to such purpose. For instance, Rajesh
Rajagopalan (2007) in his study of Indian Army’s counter insurgency doctrine has used it suitably.
Itty Abraham’s study of the ‘strategic enclave’ (1992) has also used this approach. It can be
expected to help understand changes in its conventional war doctrine too. The chapter fills the
gap by looking ‘into the box’. Organisation theory has it that the military seeks autonomy, reduction
of uncertainty and innovates when confronted with failure. The ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, taken as a
Limited War doctrine, substantiates theory, in that it is an attempt to impose order on a crisis by
seizing the initiative. Firstly, it favours autonomy for the military by enabling the offensive as a
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preferred choice presented to the political head for decision; and, secondly, it innovates to redress
perceived shortcomings, such as occurred during coping with the earlier two crises, the Kargil
War and Operation Parakram. It is also an assertion of autonomy from civilian control in an area
in which the military considers it can exercise a professional prerogative.

This chapter assesses the wellspring of doctrine at the organisational level. The
suggestion here is that change in India’s military doctrine has been to preserve the military’s
institutional interest. The chapter draws on organisational process and bureaucratic politics
models. The organisational level is the level at which bureaucracies charged with generating
doctrine function are located. Three models are available for use: Rational Actor Model,
Organisational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. The first has been dealt with in Chapter 4 on
the structural factor in its examination of doctrinal change as the rational response to the security
dilemma. The latter two are dealt with in this chapter. It attempts to discern the influence of
organisational processes and bureaucratic politics on doctrine formulation.

There are two aspects to the Indian experience. The first is the civil-military relations,
involving the ministry and the military respectively. The second is that of inter-Service rivalry. The
former is uniquely Indian in that the ‘disintegration’ (Posen) between the civilian and the military
is seldom so stark. The distance between the bureaucrat-dominated ministry and the military, best
evidenced by absence of a strategic doctrine, has resulted in the military carving out a
professional space for itself in the realm of military doctrine. The latter is universal. The impetus
to doctrine making has also come from the competition between the three Services for resources,
budgets, political attention and professional pride. The former can be explained in terms of
organisation process model while the latter is domain of bureaucratic politics.

The relevance of organisation theory is covered in Part I of this chapter. The doctrinal
responsibility of the military is discharged by it as yet another organisation/bureaucracy and
therefore insights of organisational theory in terms of bureaucratic politics, institutional interests
etc. are applicable. This is to establish validity of this direction of investigation. Part II begins with
a look at the organisational structures. Thereafter, the organisational process and the
bureaucratic politics models are examined in its subsequent sections. The ‘pulls and shoves’ with
regard to the CDS issue and jointness are elaborated on, since these are critical to doctrine and
the ‘pulls’ themselves are consequence of doctrinal divergence within the Services. The absence
of both makes doctrine a Service-specific function. The ministry is not in a position to act as
adjudicator, due to absence of expertise. The situation is not one that Services find averse,
despite its implications for synergy and effectiveness, since it gives them autonomy of spheres of
combat space – land, air and maritime – that they have respectively arrogated to themselves. In
Part III, inter-Service ‘fights’ and doctrinal friction, driven by ‘tribalism’ - the sociological hallmark
of cohesive organisations – is taken as evidence of bureaucratic politics.

PART I

The ‘lower’ order levels

In theory, levels of analysis have been taken as ‘holistic/systemic’ with focus on the
structure and ‘reductionist/unit’ focusing on the state (Buzan 1995: 202). In accessing the
explanation for doctrinal development and movement thus far, a look has been taken at both
these levels – regional/sub-systemic in terms of ‘balance of power’; and at the state/unit level in
its focus on strategic culture and organisational culture. However, since doctrines are a functional
output of the military, there is a need to seek explanation at a lower level. This is at the lower two
levels - bureaucratic level and the individual level (Buzan 1995: 212). The latter, individual level
 264

is consequential in doctrine making since doctrine is the product of the intellect. In a hierarchical
organisation as the military, it is usually the call of the appointment charged with it and then
endorsed by the apex military leadership. Such appointments are usually reserved for those with
a flair and talent for doctrinal thinking.

Military history is replete with figures of importance in doctrinal development. Some

examples are Alfred Schlieffen famous for the plan executed at the start of World War I that bears
his name; Percy Hobart, J.F.C. Fuller, Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian connected with the
development of tank warfare; Generals William de Puy and Don Starry of the US associated with
the Air-Land battle concept; K. Sundarji who has contributed to two Indian doctrines mechanised
warfare and nuclear doctrine; and General David Petraeus famous for rethinking the American
approach to counter insurgency. Likewise India’s nuclear doctrine has had the input of K Sundarji,
K Subrahmanyam, Jasjit Singh, Raja Menon and Bharat Karnad among others. The Draft Nuclear
Doctrine of 1999 was the collective work of members of the National Security Advisory Board
headed by K. Subrahmanyam (Pant 2007: 246).

Organisations rely on identifying and posting those with an aptitude for doctrinal thinking
to jobs in the specialised doctrine formulating bureaucracies. Alongside, those with such talent
and interest bid for consideration for such jobs. Their individual stamp would be possible to discern
only in retrospect when their memoirs are available. For instance, the role of V.P. Malik, in his
own words, given below, indicates that individuals are consequential for the development and
dissemination of doctrine:

In a meeting of the National Security Advisory Board with the Prime Minister on the day
Op Prakaram was called off, I had recommended ‘strategic relocation’ of ground forces
and the need to prepare joint contingency plans which can be implemented at a short
notice or during the course of mobilisation…. We need not wait for mobilisation of the
entire theatre or border to be completed. This important aspect and its military application
on the ground have led to what is now euphemistically called the ‘cold start’ doctrine (Malik
2010).

Unlike decisions, for which a look at the mind and psychological profile of a decision maker
is necessary, doctrine development is largely a bureaucratic exercise. Individuals may make
choices between alternatives and may champion certain aspects of the whole. The consequential
influence of General Sundarji in the development of manoeuvre warfare doctrine is example.
Since his memoirs (Sundarji 2000) cover only his years as a junior and the second volume on his
years in higher office is not complete, it is not possible to trace his well-known intellectual influence
definitively. Yet, doctrine is not a product of one mind, but an outcome of the bureaucratic
procedures and processes within the ministry of defence, the national security apparatus and the
military. Individuals participate as ‘cogs’ in bureaucratic ‘wheels’. The making of a doctrine is the
work of organisations and specific bureaucracies within them.

The military is further internally differentiated into the three Services. Even the Services
are not monolithic, but comprise of ‘lobbies’. The doctrinal movement is partially a product of the
internal motivations and thrusts of the Services and involves intellectual ‘push and shove’ and
bureaucratic ‘thrust and parry’. On this account, a look within for locating the drivers and
explanation of doctrine formulation, development and change is warranted.

Nevertheless, no explicit line needs be drawn between the levels. Instead the concept of
‘dyad’ (Buzan, 1995: 204) is useful in that system-unit dyads can be system-state, state-
bureaucracy and bureaucracy-individual. In this scheme, in each pair the first comprises the
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system and the second serves as unit. Explanation therefore can be top-down or bottom-up. By
looking at the bureaucratic level, the plausibility of a bottom-up explanation to doctrinal movement
in a state-bureaucracy dyad can be ascertained. As seen earlier in the study of organisational
culture in the last chapter, an overlap of the bureaucratic level with the unit level exists.

The three models

Doctrine development is an exercise in bureaucratic rationality, in that bureaucracies are

involved and attempt to arrive at a doctrine rationally. The three models, brought out by Graham
Allison (1969) are the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process model and the
Bureaucratic Politics model (Jackson and Sorensen 2010: 229). His argument is that analysts
think in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that in turn influence the content of their
thought. The rational actor model (Model I) attempts to explicate government action as a rational
output of a unitary and rational state actor. The alternatives are Model II (Organisational Process)
and Model III (Bureaucratic Politics) models. The latter two models supplement, if not supplant,
Model I. This owes to the seemingly monolithic state actor being firstly a conglomeration of highly
differentiated decision-making structures and, secondly, state action is consequence of
innumerable smaller interactions of individuals reacting to different stimuli (Allison 1969: 63).

Bureaucracies, in the Weberian understanding, are to increase efficiencies and

effectiveness by assigning responsibilities and defining rules and procedures (Kegley and
Wittkopf, 1997: 55). These organisations and agencies exist to execute the state’s security and
foreign policies. It is assumed that central to policy and decision-making is ‘rationality’ (Sagan,
1994: 71). Rationality is the conscious balancing of ends and means and engagement in value
maximizing behaviour. The state is taken as a unitary actor that formulates the ‘vital, essential,
and desirable’; conceives alternative courses of action; evaluates courses for consequences;
exercises the power of choice; caters for contingencies; apportions resources; and, thereafter,
directs and controls its instruments. The process involves an extensive search for relevant
information; a thorough canvassing of a wide spectrum of views; conscious inclusion of expert
opinion to the contrary of the conventional view point; re-examination of assumptions for their
validity; and detailed provisions for execution of chosen course to enable judgment of practicability
(Janis 1972: 142). This is the traditional manner of explaining state behaviour subsumed under
the conceptual model Rational Actor/Rational Policy Model.

The Organisational Process model has it that the state, far from being unitary, completely
informed, rational and centrally controlled, is actually a conglomerate of loosely allied
organisations with substantial autonomy. Thus, governmental action is less an exercise of
deliberate choice and more as ‘outputs’ of agencies enacting routines and standard patterns of
behaviour. The specific proposition of this model is that organisational actions conform to a set
of programmes dealing with standard situations. Consequently, particularity of situations is
inadequately addressed; flexibility is constrained; and innovation is resisted. To Scott Sagan
(1994: 71), ‘large organisations function within a severely “bounded” form of rationality: they have
inherent limits on calculation and coordination and use simplifying mechanisms to understand
and respond to uncertainty in the external environment.’ Organisations develop routines to
simplify reality; are often myopic; suffer from ‘goal displacement’ by being fixated on operational
details and missing the larger picture; and are limited by their repertoire of concepts and
vocabulary (Sagan 1994: 72). Their output reflects the interests of some self-interested subunits
looking for ‘relatively rational ways to maximise its interests – protecting its power, size, autonomy
or organisational essence.’ This is not necessarily in accord with the interest of the military as a
whole, leave alone that of the nation (Sagan 1994: 73).
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The Bureaucratic Politics model has two characteristics: ‘organisational process’ reflecting
the routine and constraints of the organisation; and ‘bureaucratic politics’, involving the pressures
and counter pressures of the decision process (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 55). The former relates
to operating procedures to cope with policy problems. The latter involves policy choices of
bureaucracies reflecting preferences dependent on organisational roles, interests and affiliations.
This explains the aphorism: ‘Where you stand depends on where you sit.’ Since each organisation
has a mandate and an obligation to further its position professionally and rationally arrived at, it
is ‘obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right’ (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 55). This
accounts for the ‘pushing and hauling’ that characterises policy-making and making the exercise
intensely political (Sagan 1994: 72). The state is thus only seemingly a unitary actor, comprising
as it does actors and players in games involving coalitions, compromises and bargains.

Decisions, positions taken and exercise of choice is effected by organisations having

parochial interests. They seek to promote their power, influence, prestige and purposes and are
protective of their ‘turf’. Organisational needs can sometimes obscure state needs or national
interest, particularly if an organisation develops a narcissistic self-perception. This could be
illusory or a self-serving rationale. It usually has some basis in the power arrangements in polity.
For instance, the Pakistani Army’s self-image is that it stands between the state and state failure.
Such perceptions intensify competition since interests are relative to those of other competing
organisations equally relevant to the national purpose. To protect respective interests,
organisations prefer autonomy. Interference, inter-penetration and exercise of accountability by
political masters are usually reluctantly acceded to. Another characteristic of organisations is
‘group think’ or tendency of predominant beliefs prevailing in the organisation to determine outlook
and behaviour. This tendency reduces dissent, creativity and independent mindedness and
increases reliance on procedures and precedent (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997: 58-59).

At the organisational level, civil-military relations theory provides for military provisioning
of decision and policy options for the political leadership (Huntington 1957: 72). Since the onset
of nuclearisation has rendered ‘Total War’ unthinkable, ‘Limited War’ must of necessity be central
to the military input into decision making (Sethi 2009: 293-4). There could be two factors impelling
the military. The first is professional, in that doctrine-making is to cope with the changed nuclear
reality. The second is parochial, dealing with protecting its institutional interest through increasing
its relevance into the nuclear age. Arguments extant have it that conventional capability
contributes to security by thrusting the nuclear threshold upwards. The second argument is that
deterrence implies that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons, not war. Conventional capability
is therefore relevant. The third is that the need to restrict the sub-conventional space requires
holding out the promise of Limited War as conventional retribution. Doctrine is also subject to
bureaucratic politics. Thus, both the organisational process and the bureaucratic politics model
are pertinent in examining doctrinal drivers at this level. While doctrine generation would lend
itself in the organisational process model, the selling of the doctrine externally through interaction
between the three Services and the ministry can be best explained in the Bureaucratic Politics
model. It is logical to expect that these characteristics manifest in the doctrine relevant
organisations in India.

The military organisation

Military doctrine comprises guidelines on approaches to military force: offensive or

defensive, decisive or limited, attrition or manoeuvre (Sagan, 2000: 17). These choices are the
prerogative of military bureaucracies, and the doctrine-making exercise can be expected to reflect
processes and politics as theorised. Sagan believes that, ‘military organisations, like all other
organisations, have parochial interests. Their leaders and members are not only concerned with
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the security of the state they are employed to protect but also with protecting their own
organisational strength, autonomy and prestige. These parochial interests do not always conflict
with the state’s national security interests, but there is no reason to believe the two are always
consistent (Sagan 2000: 18).’ This contests the rational actor model, indicating that dressing up
of parochial interests can take place rationalising action in terms of the national interest.

Militaries prefer offensive doctrines. These are necessary to reduce uncertainty as they
enable seizing of the initiative and thereby imposing one’s own plan and will on the enemy.
Offensive biases serve other interests also such as larger forces, which in turn affect budgets and
organisational structures (Sagan 2000: 18). He identifies three pathways through which the
military brings its parochial interests to bear on state policy. First is that it directly determines
doctrine in case of weak civilian oversight. Second is that even where civilian oversight is
forthcoming, the complexity and technical nature of the subject prevents intimate acquaintance of
civilians with the subject; and, third, military officers are not above exerting subtle pressures to
maintain their doctrinal preferences (Sagan 2000: 22). Consequently, the influence can be quite
significant, for instance in Sagan’s view, ‘In order for us to understand the evolution of nuclear
doctrines in South Asia, it is necessary to focus on the organisational interests and biases
common among professional military officers (Sagan 2009: 220).’

Jeffrey Legro adds the additional dimension of organisational culture linking the two levels
in a dyad: unit/organisation. Legro writes, ‘Military cultures – beliefs and norms about the optimal
means to fight wars – are important because they have a pervasive impact on the preferences
and actions of both armies and states (Legro 1994: 109).’ Defining organisational culture as, ‘the
pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external
environment and manage its internal structure (Legro 1994: 115), his finding is that, ‘at the pattern
of assumptions, ideas and beliefs that prescribe how a military bureaucracy should conduct battle
will influence state preferences and actions on the use of that means (Legro 1994: 117).’ This is
a bottom-up view of the dyad, organisation/unit. The inter se manner organisations place
themselves to influence policy in favour of their positions comprises bureaucratic politics.

Organisational culture flows out of the military ethic in combination with particularities of
the national strategic culture. As William Kaufman wrote, ‘attitudes toward war are… heavily
mortgaged to tradition’ (Canon 1992: 71). Elizabeth Kier (1997: 5) says that the choice between
offensive and defensive doctrines is a product of the interaction between constraints in the
domestic political arena and the military’s organisational culture. She deems as inaccurate the
view that doctrine is responsive to the security environment and instead favours a cultural
approach. Organisational culture in the military reflects chiefly the military ethic. Samuel
Huntington described the military ethic in his doctoral thesis, later published as the influential book
The Soldier and the State (1957). To him, the military ethic emphasises,

permanence, irrationality, weakness and evil in human nature… It accepts the nation state
as the highest form of political organisation and recognizes the continuing likelihood of
wars among nation states. It emphasizes the importance of power in international relations
and warns of the dangers to state security. It holds that the security of the state depends
upon the creation and maintenance of strong military forces… It holds that war is an
instrument of politics… The military ethic is thus pessimistic, nationalistic, militaristic,
pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and
conservative (Huntington 1957: 79).

In short, doctrine is additionally impacted by elements that are universal to military

organisations qua military organisations, in particular the ‘military ethic’. Organisational culture,
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specific to a military and differentiating it from other militaries in general, is yet another factor that
has a considerable bottom-up influence. The former universal ingredient of military organisational
cultures needs noting. The overlap owes to operation of the dyad, unit/organisation.

The military’s doctrinal responsibility

The military, headed by a modern officer corps, is a ‘professional body’ (Huntington 1957:
7). It has expertise in terms of specialised knowledge and skills, acquired through professional
endeavour and education. The military is expert in ‘management of violence’, a phrase of Harold
Lasswell (Huntington 1957: 11, 15) and working in a social context, implies that the military
provides a ‘service’. The service is of security to the client, state and its constituent society. It has
a social responsibility. Another distinguishing characteristic of a profession, of interest in this
thesis, is ‘corporateness’. The military has a ‘sense of organic unity and consciousness of a group
apart (Huntington 1957: 10).’ On this count, Huntington categorises the military as a bureaucratic
profession, one that tends ‘to develop a more general sense of collective responsibility and proper
role of the profession in society (Huntington 1957: 10).’

To Huntington, the duties of a military officer include: ‘(1) the organising, equipping, and
training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and
out of combat (1957: 11).’ The latter two are directly related to doctrine; and the former is
determined by doctrine. This places the doctrinal function at the core of military professionalism.
The responsibility towards the State in monopoly control of the military is of an ‘expert adviser’
(Huntington 1957: 16). Since doctrine is taken as being in the military domain, the influence of
the military’s advisory role is higher. Nevertheless, given that nuclear weapons have
unquestionably bridged the conventional and political domains, there can be no solely military
domain any more. In effect, a military doctrine even in the conventional sphere would require
benefit of checks and balances afforded by civilian scrutiny and imprimatur.

In the Huntington formulation, the military is concerned with only one segment of the
activities of the government - military security - to the exclusion of all others. Therefore, it cannot
impose decisions on the client that have implications beyond the military’s field of special
competence. It can only explain to the client the military’s needs in an area; advise on how these
may be met and once a decision is taken, implement it. Doctrine formulation, and its marketing
with the client, the government, is how this responsibility is met. The corporate character of the
military as a bureaucratised profession and insights from organisational behaviour, indicate that
the rational ‘ideal’ that Huntington lays out can only be aspired to and approximated. In practice,
militaries may exert an influence beyond the ‘ideal’ of tendering advice to the extent of virtual
exercise of veto, especially in case of inadequate civilian control.

Huntington’s seminal theorising was intended for democratic liberal states, in general and
the US military, in particular. The Services derived the importance of doctrine from their self-
perception as merely instruments of higher national policy. This accounts for their need for a
‘formal, self-conscious and explicit’ and written doctrine. Huntington associates doctrine with
‘bureau philosophy’ or ‘ideology’ (Huntington 1961: 468). To him, inter-Service conflict resembles
inter-political party differences over fundamentals of national policy or between ‘English regiments
on a grand scale’ (Huntington 1961: 474, 475). A significant aspect liable to be missed, in seeing
organisations as monolithic, is prevalence of intra-Service rivalry alongside inter-Service rivalry.
In the American case, intra-Service rivalries were less significant than inter-Service rivalries.
According to Huntington, ‘services are like nation-states: loyalties to them tended to override
sectional or class affiliations and also to be stronger than transnational loyalties (1961: 473).’ By
analogy, the case cannot be very different in India.
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PART II

Organisation process model

This section looks at the structures responsible for conventional doctrinal thinking and the
output. These serve as sites for organisational processes and are actors participating in
bureaucratic politics, but are not the sole or the most significant players. They comprise only a
part of the silos constituted by respective Service. They only originate the doctrinal output. The
chief feature of doctrine generation is captured below:

each service principally develops is own doctrines without coordination or relation to the
other two. Therefore, the Army articulates a doctrine that puts the Air Force in a
subordinate role providing close air support to ground troops, while the Air Force’s own
doctrine and acquisition pattern emphasises strategic bombing and air-to-air combat.
Meanwhile, both services largely ignored the Navy, which is pushing to develop a broader
reach… (Kapoor 2010: 7).

The second feature is that, while all the three services now have written doctrines, there
is a tendency to keep doctrines under wrap. In a democracy the manner the military intends
discharging its role should be in the open domain. Only, strategies, due to the distinction
discussed in a preceding section and for reasons of secrecy, need be classified. It is interesting
to note that the HQ IDS (HQ IDS website) provides links to over fifty doctrines of the US, France
and the UK on the same webpage on which it provides links to only two Army doctrines, Indian
Army Doctrine (hereafter Doctrine) (2004) and the Doctrine for Subconventional Operations
(2006). This is of a piece with the overall approach to security of information followed (Mukherjee
2009). Given that doctrine promulgation has implications for placing all on the same page,
including civilian agencies responsible for acquisitions, budgets and technology, there is a push
within the Services for doctrines being open source documents (Kapoor 2010: 5).

The Army

The Army Training Command (ARTRAC) came into being at Mhow, Madhya Pradesh, on
01 October 1991. It was tasked with doctrinal development and dissemination through training.
It shifted to Shimla on 31 March 1993 (Oberoi 2000: 329). Its role is formulation and dissemination
of concepts and doctrines of warfare in the fields of strategy, operational art, tactics, logistics,
training, and human resource development. Its charter of duties include, to act as the nodal
agency for all institutional training in the Army; to evolve joint doctrines in conjunction with other
Services; develop and disseminate of standardized doctrines for war at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels; develop supplementary concepts for operational functioning of all Arms and
Services, with particular reference to the fields of intelligence, psychological operations, electronic
warfare, motivation and training; and specified aspects of NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical)
warfare (ARTRAC website, n.d.). The doctrinal aspects of the role of the ARTRAC include
evaluation of concepts and doctrines; evaluation of organisations, tactical and technical
developments; organisation of macro level training exercises and seminars; doctrinal aspects of
NBC warfare; and planning and conduct of joint and combined operations (Oberoi 2000: 332).
The aims envisaged for Army training include creation of a well-trained, proud, highly disciplined
and motivated force for conventional operations, to deter war and when deterrence fails, to
conduct swift conventional operations for a decisive victory. The Service is to be trained to fight a
conventional war against the backdrop of a nuclear threat (ARTRAC website, n.d.).
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HQ ARTRAC does doctrinal work in conjunction with the Faculty of Studies (FOS) at the
Army War College (AWC), the Military Operations (MO) and the Perspective Planning (PP)
Directorates at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Army) (IHQ of MoD). The Category ‘A’ training
establishments under command of ARTRAC function as sounding boards in its concept
development function, act as a testing ground and provide feedback (Oberoi 2000: 331). Doctrine
development earlier involved preparation of a draft, soliciting comments, and then circulating the
final product once again before final approval. The formal procedure can be fast tracked by
holding seminars and brain storming sessions. Ultimately the product is in written form and is
distributed to training institutions and the field force. The product is a supplement to General Staff
pamphlets in the form of Army Training Notes, ARTRAC Papers, Concept and Approach Papers,
Liaison letters etc.

The ‘capstone’ document in the public realm for generating a discussion earlier was the
document, Fundamentals, Doctrine and Concepts (Oberoi 2000: 333). It has now been replaced
by the Indian Army Doctrine (2004). The manner this doctrine has developed involved deep
rumination over the lessons of the extended deployment during Operation Parakram. The
extensive process involved is brought out in a report in the run up to the release: ‘Draft of the
doctrine was discussed at the Army Commanders’ conference in July 2004 after which the
document was circulated to senior officials for comment. The feedback received was then used
to fine tune the document at Shimla where top commanders met to incorporate suggestions.
Feedback will also be taken from former Army Chiefs who for the first time are to meet in a
conclave prior to the Army commanders’ conference (Dutt 2004: 2).’

The Air Force

The Air Force was first to set out its doctrine in 1995 (Sawhney 2004: 7). It had a
Directorate of Concept Studies in the Operations Branch, later re-christened as AWSC (Air War
Strategy Cell) and placed under the ACAS Ops (Space) at the Integrated HQ (IHQ) of the MoD
(Air) that undertakes doctrinal studies. It has recently upgraded the position of the Deputy Chief
of Air Staff dealing with operations and space to Director General (Operations Space) (IAF 2009).
The doctrine put out, and later revised in 2007, is in two parts. The first, generic in nature, deals
with air power, and, the second is on how the IAF intends fulfilling its roles. Though a classified
document, Bashyam Kasturi (2008) indicates that the Air Force prioritises gaining of air
superiority. No specific concern of the Air Force with Limited War is mentioned. The chief
characteristic of an Air Force being flexibility, it is possible to regulate air operations with greater
precision and ease (Sethi 2009: 310). This eases the possibility of limitation to the extent desired.
However, explicit acknowledgement of the requirement and manner of operationalisation would
make for greater compatibility with the nuclear dimension for the doctrine.

Air Force doctrinal thinking was advantaged by the position of an air power theorist and
former practitioner, Jasjit Singh, as head of IDSA in the nineties. His writings (1999), among other
factors such as the manner of entry of air power into the Kargil conflict, have helped the force
acquire a strong corporate position on issues that affect it, the doctrinal one being the most salient.
Among other votaries of air power are Kapil Kak, who served as Jasjit Singh’s deputy at IDSA for
a period, and Air Marshal Patney, who was the much-decorated air commander overseeing the
Kargil theatre.

The Navy
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The Navy first published its doctrine in the same year as the Army, in October 2004. The
Indian Navy has a Directorate of Strategic Concepts and Transformation under the Vice Chief of
Naval Staff (VCNS) that is responsible, with the assistance of the Maritime Doctrine Development
and Concepts Centre (MDDCC) in Mumbai under the Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts, and
the Directorate of Naval Plans at the IHQ of MoD (Navy), for doctrinal thinking. There is a Director
Naval Plans to look after infrastructure development, force levels, perspective planning and naval
budget. The VCNS oversees the directorate through the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy and
Plans).

The Navy has a Vision document that has informed its maritime doctrine and is in the
public domain. Its intent is to develop a capability for full spectrum operations to include
conventional operations and the naval role in nuclear operations. The latter is essentially to do
with acquisition of a ‘triad’-based second strike capability. The nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, to
assure this capability, was launched in July 2009 (Menon 2009). The Navy published the revised
doctrine in 2009, naming it expansively, Indian Maritime Doctrine. It defines maritime power as
the ‘ability of a nation to use the seas to safeguard and progress its national interests (IHQ of
MoD (Navy) 2009: 10).’ According to the document, ‘Maritime doctrine, therefore, focuses on that
dimension of maritime power, which enables use of the seas by all stake holders (2009: 10).’ It
deals with ‘concepts and principles of employment of India’s Naval Power (2009: 11).’ By
addressing the military-strategic level and covering the operational level, it is intended to serve
as a ‘‘capstone’ doctrinal publication’ and ‘‘guiding light’ for the Service in all its endeavours (2009:
11).’

Joint structures

A joint warfare doctrine has been arrived at by the HQ IDS. Doctrinal output continues with
specific doctrines covering other facets of warfare, such as sub-conventional warfare, Special
Forces and Information Warfare, being generated (HQ IDS website, n.d.). Two joint doctrines
were released on 16 June 2010, Joint Air-Land Doctrine and Joint Psychological Operations
Doctrine (PTI 2010). The organisation dealing with this was originally the multi-disciplinary inter-
service organisation, the Defence Planning Staff (DPS). This body was part of the Cabinet
Secretariat and provided input to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The Cabinet Committee
on Political Affairs (CCPA) had approved the functions for the body to include threat analysis;
force level planning; jointness; perspective planning; and, interaction with R&D (Research and
Development) and production. To fulfil these it was divided into the International Security division,
Policy Planning division, Military Plans division, and Weapons and Equipment division (MoD
1998-99: 98-99).

Presently, the Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Division of the Doctrines, Operations and
Training (DOT) Branch is responsible for joint doctrine formulation. The name echoes the Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of the US, the model of ARTRAC. It has the assistance of
joint institutions as the College of Defence Management (CDM) and the Defence Services Staff
College (DSSC), controlled by the HQ IDS, along with the expertise and experience of the two
joint commands, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command
(SFC) (HQ IDS website, n.d.). Work on preparation of joint doctrine for all the three Services
involved interaction with the IDSA, the United Services Institution of India (USI), HQ ARTRAC
and the three Service HQs. A draft joint doctrine was prepared and circulated to various Category
‘A’ training establishments and the Service HQs to elicit their views. Only thereafter was it
presented to the COSC. The joint doctrine was approved and promulgated at a Combined
Commanders Conference in May 2006.
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Organisation process in operation

The civil-military interface

There is little political and bureaucratic engagement with military doctrine due to policy
incapacity (Ladwig 2008: 11). Ladwig writes, ‘The impact of this disconnect between politicians
and the military is apparent when evaluating Operation Parakram, which lacked clear objectives
and terminated with inconclusive results. This raises questions about the ability of India’s civilian
leaders to set the kind of concrete objectives and associated military tasks that would be
necessary to successfully engage in limited warfare between two nuclear powers (2008: 12).’ This
lack of direction is evident from absence of a strategic doctrine that logically should precede
military doctrine. Strategic doctrine remains amorphous, under-developed and little articulated. If
this is the case with strategic doctrine that is essentially a civilian responsibility, inadequacies can
only spill over to civilian engagement with military doctrine. The apex defence structure
contributes to this firewall between the civilian and military. The ministry does not have either the
‘hardware’ or ‘software’ to think through linkages between the strategic and military doctrines. The
ministry is not the site for nuclear doctrinal thinking. That is the preserve of the National Security
Council (NSC) system. The NSC system while involved with nuclear doctrine is less cognisant
with its implications for conventional doctrine or vice versa, the implications of conventional
doctrine for nuclear doctrine. The lack of integration has structural reasons, the military being
under the MoD, while nuclear assets are not under the MoD. This is of a piece with the
longstanding military reservation on the higher policy and decision-making system. A former Chief
of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Arun Prakash, opines, ‘It is common knowledge that despite their
being on par with the cabinet secretary, the service chiefs are kept well outside the inner circle
(2007: 10).’

Arun Singh identifies the interest of the bureaucratic level in perpetuating its power over
the Services through ‘a growing tendency for checks to overwhelm the balances (Singh, A. 1989:
267).’ Among the reasons for greater autonomy of the military sphere is ignorance on part of
generalist civil servants on what the doctrinal process requires and of the demands an interactive
doctrinal process makes on civil servants. The deficiencies in the system extend downwards into
the relationship with the Services. The GOM Report (2001) acknowledges as much stating, ‘There
is a marked difference in the perception of civil and military officials regarding their respective
roles and functions. There has also been, on occasions, a visible lack of synchronisation among
and between the three departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of Defence
Finance (Lok Sabha 2007: 12).’ The situation has one advantage for the Services in permitting
them autonomy in doctrinal formulation. Doctrines are to be horizontally and vertically integrated.
Horizontal integration implies an overlap between land, air and naval doctrine as necessary. The
nuclear backdrop makes vertical integration between the conventional and nuclear levels also a
necessity. This is to be reflected in both conventional and nuclear doctrines.

The political level

In the nuclear era, Limited War is the only kind of ‘war of choice’ that India can possibly
embark on. However, the preceding discussion indicates that there has to be political direction to
the military on this score. The military can then reflect on doctrine accordingly. This first step not
having been taken, the military has proceeded doctrinally without explicitly engaging with the
requirement of Limited War. While the Raksha Mantri’s (Defence Minister’s) Directive exists, that
it has left the doctrinal space to the military is self-evident. It is also not known if the doctrine the
Services formulate receives political imprimatur since the Ministry’s annual reports do not carry a
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mention of doctrine. This deficit can be attributed to organisational deficiencies in the national
security system.

To Clausewitz, there were three principal institutions involved in war – the ‘Trinity’
comprising government, military and people (Clausewitz 2008: 30). They ‘make up war and
determine its main tendencies’ (Echevarria 2007: 97). The political responsibility is explicit in
Clausewitz’s writings:

First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous
but always as an instrument of policy… Second, this way of looking at it will show us how
wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations that give rise to them.
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its
nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive (Clausewitz
2008: 30).

This political function can benefit with additional attention. Antulio Echevarria writes that
‘in democracies civilian authorities have the right to be wrong: they should get the wars they ask
for, even if they are not the ones that they really want; in other words, military practitioners should
not take creative liberties with the guidance they receive from their civilian heads (Echevarria
2007: 103).’ This pre-supposes political involvement and guidance, suggesting civilian control of
the military. This deficit is noted, in Chapter V, ‘Management of Defence’, in the Group of Ministers
(GOM) Report on National Security, as, ‘There is a marked difference in perception of civil and
military officials regarding their respective roles and functions.’

National and political interest lies in war avoidance. Knowledge of potential escalation
leading to ‘overturning the boat’ is expected to induce caution in states that rock it. The process
of rocking the ‘boat’ is however open-ended. Rocking is also a strategy, under the concept of
leaving ‘something to chance’. In this, Limited War is taken as a ‘psychological bargaining process
between belligerents’ dependent on the escalatory prospects of the degree of violence being held
in reserve (Clark 1988: 61, Canon 1992: 84). The fear is that the ‘boat’ could well capsize (Clark
1988: 140). This is accentuated in case of rising prosperity of a state as it raises the stakes in
preserving the gains. Therefore, strategic prudence is in not entering dangerous terrain. This
explains the bias towards deterrence as strategic doctrine. This is how the needs of conflict
avoidance are met, since there is a mutual interest in the ‘boat’ staying afloat. Only a Limited War
can ensure minimum regression from prosperity. Limited War thinking permits the matching of
military means to political ends (Clark 1988: 61). This aim at the political level needs to be
articulated through an appropriate strategic doctrine for the military’s translation into a workable
Limited War doctrine.

Currently, India’s strategic doctrine is in a half-way house between compellence and

deterrence. With military-led Pakistan self-servingly only seeing compellence at work, even India’s
deterrence related measures are liable to be wilfully misread. It would be difficult even for a
‘normal’ neighbouring state to take India’s conventional doctrine of proactive offence under a
nuclear cover of expansive retaliation differently. Jasjit Singh’s advice can yet be taken: ‘the
importance of the strategic (politico-military) doctrine is much higher in the case of limited wars
than those of full scale, leave alone total wars (2000: 1212).’

The strategic level

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Logically, the doctrinal result has to be worked on by both, civilians and the military, to
earn political acceptability. The GOM Report acknowledges as much stating, ‘Ideally the
Government’s national security objectives should lead to a formulation of defence objectives,
which in turn, define defence policy and directives of the Defence Minister. This is not the case at
present. The preparation and subsequent implementation of defence objectives and missions
should result from an interactive process, in which, the desired military capability, required
technologies and industrial skills and capacities, and fiscal resources, are identified (GOM Report
2001: 98)’ The GOM Report goes on to note: ‘The defence planning process is greatly
handicapped by the absence of a national security doctrine (2001: 98).’ The Ministry of Defence
website indicates the current status as a ‘work in progress’, stating, ‘As a first step, Draft National
Security Strategy has been prepared and forwarded to National Security Adviser (MoD website
n.d.).’ Though written prior to creation of the NSC, this situation continues as true a decade into
the NSC’s existence, even though it is well-known that successive NSABs have been tasked and
provided the relevant input.

The military retains its doctrinal autonomy, even though doctrine is one area that civilian
masters must use for exercising democratic political control. That this is not done suggests a
relationship in which the military is seemingly permitted autonomy, even as they are kept out of
policy and decision making. This inattention or lack of integration and cohesion at the strategic
level in the political-bureaucratic-military security complex could result in unfathomed nuclear
dangers.

The Indian Army Doctrine has no discussion of Limited War. It is not known how the Air
Force doctrine, being classified, addresses the issue. While air power permits flexibility, not
having Limited War concept inform doctrine would result in greater scope for expansive targeting
in the tradition of application of air power set by the US-led West. Insights gained of targeting of
infrastructure, command and control assets, military objectives, counter force targets etc., need
to be adapted to conditions that obtain here. Flexibility that is inherent in air power enables this to
an extent, but it needs to be buttressed by intellectual argumentation restricting air power. A
picture may emerge with the latest five-yearly review of the doctrine being released into the public
domain for the first time in 2012. The Navy doctrine is also ambiguous. It takes General or Total
War as ‘involving nearly all resources of the nation, with few, if any, restriction on the use of force,
short of nuclear strike/retaliation (Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009: 19).’ This formulation appears
to suggest that Total War aiming for ‘annihilation or total subjugation of the opponent’ can yet
occur below the nuclear threshold. Also, there is no category in the ‘Spectrum of Conflict’ in the
doctrine which accommodates nuclear use, since the definition of Total War recounted here
seems to place nuclear war outside into a separate category.

The overall impression is that the military is undecided to weigh in on the side of Limited
War unambiguously. This is surprising given that it needs to do so to raise the nuclear threshold
for conventional force application. If it does not reassure the enemy of a limited war being waged,
then the enemy may be stampeded into premature nuclear use. This would undercut the military’s
own initial intent. It is perhaps possible but unclear that this lack of discussion on Limited War
precepts is part of an information war strategy of coercing Pakistan.

Organisational process model has some answers. In the case of the US, Michael Cannon
writes, ‘the question of what military end states were required to secure political objectives rarely
saw light in print. The services demonstrated a myopic concern with means (tools available) over
ways (manner of employment) and ends (Cannon 1992: 94).’ His understanding is that military is
concerned with war-fighting. For clarity, the military conceptualises a ‘spectrum of conflict’ – ‘a
continuum defined primarily by the magnitude of the declared objectives’ - and plans to be capable
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of victory across the spectrum. ‘Escalation dominance’ defined as ‘the idea that superiority at the
highest level of force in use along the scale is the most important aspect of the conflict’, becomes
consequential. Capabilities and plans attempt to gain asymmetry at best, and, symmetry or parity,
at a minimum (Cannon 1992: 94, 95). Enemy capabilities become the defining yardstick rather
than intentions or, indeed, even the aims of own government in case of deficiencies in political
control. The military would come up with a war-fighting doctrine in accord with its interests
postulated by organisational process model as against a war-deterring one required by political
masters. Arun Singh’s warning is apt: ‘There is plenty of evidence from both within and outside to
suggest that individual Service interests sometimes take priority over the ‘common good’ in
Operational Planning (1989: 265).’

Implications for military doctrine

Land warfare doctrine

At the political level, Cold Start permitted only a limited time window for crisis management
and war avoidance efforts (Cohen and Das 2010: 63). This revealed that it was not entirely aligned
to the national interest, given the extant ‘strategy of restraint’ protective of the national economic
trajectory. The national interest is in conflict avoidance, meaning time for crisis management to
explore if war, and its effects on the economy, can be avoided. There may have been an element
of artfulness in this denial of the window diplomats need to get their act together in a crisis. Any
decision to attack Pakistan would be dependent on a certain amount of political will being
available. The Army felt it necessary to undercut the time available for this decision lest second
thoughts prevail and erode the ‘will’. Assuming ‘pusillanimity’ among politicians, the idea is to
make them strike when the iron is hot, particularly in case of grave provocation. Political will would
be forthcoming earlier in the crisis since public support would be there for energetic response. In
the words of a former Vice Chief, ‘now we can mobilise before world opinion comes down on
political leaders and prevents them from acting (Kapur 2008: 90).’ Such thinking owes to the
military’s scepticism of the strategic sense and resolve of the political and bureaucratic class. The
understanding is that India being a ‘soft state’ requires greater ‘push’ to work up the ‘will to power’.

The military does not want a replay of Operation Parakram in which it rushed to the border
but was checked at it. It is unable to reconcile with the reaction then of coercive diplomacy, seeing
it not as strategy but as absence of strategy. The government, for its part, wished to manipulate
the threat of war for gaining Pakistani concessions. For this the military was to demonstrate a
capacity for war. In the event, the military felt it was cheated out of an opportunity to punish
Pakistan. ‘Cold Start’ makes the politician commit himself prior to launch of the military instrument.
The makes sense to the extent that resort to the military instrument must be after due
contemplation. However, the readiness to escalate may be without the benefit of prior
contemplation. War must be launched with due deliberateness. This is negated by the doctrine of
proactive operations at short notice. Even if operations are not from a ‘Cold Start’, there is little
articulation of how limited operations will be employed for political effect. Cohen and Dasgupta
see strategic commentary as driven by the military through its surrogates in the retired officer
community and hawkish civilians (2010: 63). The differences are brought out by Cohen and
Dasgupta (2010: 61), ‘a strategy of compellence seems so high risk that the political leadership
is unlikely to embrace it. There is little reason to expect the Indian government to abandon
strategic restraint for a more assertive policy, but the army’s plans continue regardless.’

On the horizontal level, the doctrine drew considerable criticism from the Air Force (Ladwig
2008: 11). It did not give the Air Force the time window it required for execution of air dominance
operations. Threatened with relegation to a supportive role and with the Army setting the doctrinal
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agenda, the Air Force counter attack was swift and sharp including with its own set of partisans,
with one critic articulating, ‘It is essential therefore, that air power is seen as an instrument of
national power and not merely an adjunct to the army (Phadke 2001: 1801).’

Within the Army, the implication of the proactive offensive doctrine is in terms of force size.
Not only are the offensive capabilities of the three strike corps required to be overhauled, but also
additional offensive content is required in the pivot corps to execute the limited offensives from a
standing start. Secondly, the internal advantage is in favour of the Armoured Corps-Infantry
balance within the Service. This was threatened by a tilt towards the latter with the massive
counter insurgency involvement and expansion through the nineties in favour of the Infantry. The
innovation of integrated battle groups has helped breath life back into the mechanised lobby
(discussed in a subsequent section in this chapter). Strike corps are threatened with
obsolescence. The Sundarji doctrine of expansive employment of strike corps would drive military
contest across the nuclear threshold, besides furnishing nuclear targets for the enemy. With the
IBGs being smaller, mobile and less provocative in their reach, this disadvantage stands
overcome. Lastly, there are relative proportions of the capital budget at stake, of which the Army,
being less capital intensive, has to exert overtime to retain its share. With a self-image as the
leading and senior Service, it has to demonstrate its centrality to deterrence and war making. Its
doctrinal agenda and output an attempt at retaining it primacy.

Air war doctrine

As noted earlier, the Air Force was first off the block with a doctrine in 1995 (Cohen and
Dasgupta 2010: 88), brought on by witnessing the era transcending air campaign in Iraq War I.
Also straitened budgetary circumstances in the nineties required each Service to lobby for its
budget slice. A doctrine is a useful instrument in budgetary fights. It serves the purpose of the
case for ‘more’ in face of compelling arguments of the other Services. This facet makes it difficult
to make out the extent strategic reasoning is an after the fact rationalisation and the extent
institutional interests drive organisations. A former Air Marshal writes,

as reflected in its performance in internal budget battles and the wider political debate, it
does not seem to have developed an air doctrine that articulates the importance of air
power to the defence of India… nor has the IAF developed and publicised a concept for
greater employment of air power in the defence of India, which would seem to be a
prerequisite to gaining a larger voice in the allocation of resources (Jayal 2000: 18).

An air power theorist and practitioner, Arjun Subramaniam, informs on the influence of
‘global strategic culture’ (Scott Sagan) on air power thinking, ‘The application of air power to
further a nation’s strategic objectives has gained momentum over the last few years, ever since
it was used with telling effect in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, and
Enduring Freedom (Subramaniam 2008).’ In carving for itself a strategic role as the ‘arm of
decision’, the IAF believes that it has advantages in possessing a capability for deterrence by
denial and by punishment over the other two Services (Singh, J. 2000a: 1219). Subramaniam
(2008) articulates the force’s intent: ‘The IAF's mind-set is also shifting from that of a tactically
oriented and proficient force to one that has the confidence to influence strategy and doctrinal
changes.’

The consequence is in the Service operating along multiple thrust lines. The IAF’s
emphasis of its advantages in punishing the enemy across the conflict spectrum, from surgical
strikes to nuclear strikes, enabled the initial thrust to gain a ‘Strategic Air Command’ (Jayal 2000:
21). Arjun Subramaniam (2008) advocates ‘It is time to embrace a doctrinal shift towards building
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up a Strategic Forces Command.’ The advocacy is for ‘parallel warfare’, the unfolding of both the
strategic and tactical campaigns simultaneously. The thrust is also for becoming an ‘aerospace
power’. The idea is that ‘Aerospace power capability is likely to become the arbiter of national
military power and has to be given due emphasis and funding (Patney 2009: 182).’ The thrust for
role expansion is also evident in the move towards acquiring counter insurgency relevance.
Subramaniam’s insight (2008) indicates an interest along this direction: ‘The emergence of
invisible enemies, such as terrorists, and unconventional targets involving material and human
resources will increase the difficulty of classifying the roles performed by strategic air assets over
the next few decades.’

The case for ‘air-centric doctrines’ of Limited War is now a salient one (Bakshi 2010: 53-
61). Implications of Limited War have not been factored in. The belief is that by identifying and
targeting the centre of gravity of the enemy with a strategic air campaign would enable deterrence
by punishment and coercion (Kak 2001: 2119). The counter that this would have implications for
conflict escalation is dismissed by recourse to the Kargil example. Subramaniam believes, ‘In fact,
the introduction of airpower proved decisive in de-escalation and conflict resolution (at Kargil).
With that as a template, nothing prevents the formulation of a cohesive interdiction campaign,
even in subconventional scenarios, provided that surface forces realise the tremendous payoffs
of a well-planned strategic-interdiction campaign (Subramaniam 2008).’ Operations for air
dominance, the strategic air campaign and the thrust to target Pakistan’s premier nuclear delivery
system, the F 16 (Sidhu and Smith 2000: 56), between them, make the environment of future
conflict markedly different from Kargil. The escalatory potential of air doctrine needs to be factored
in.

The argument that air power can do the work of attrition is right, but neglects the likelihood
that such application of punishment would provoke the Pakistani Army into expansion and
escalation along the land war dimension. Thus, the more successful the air component of military
power the less secure a nation may get from point of view of the other side escalating to keep up.
The refrain is that escalation dominance in terms of being stronger at all levels will deter escalation
is persuasive, but may wilt as an argument against the emotionally charged nature of war. This is
particularly so if the nuclear assets of the enemy also figure on air targeting lists. Whether they
do or not is not known, but lack of knowledge does not imply that in fact they do not. The
advantage of explicitly and overtly weighing-in in favour of the Limited War concept is obvious. In
terms of air power such limitations would include avoidance of targeting essential infrastructure,
infrastructure that release dangerous forces such as dams and nuclear installations etc. This is
not to be left to the targeting function during war. It needs to be placed on the target list requiring
prior political approval in the planning stage itself. An overt doctrine would leave no apprehensions
on this score. Currently in the absence of the doctrine in open sources keeps the enemy guessing
and does not incentivise like restraint on its part.

Naval war doctrine

The Navy’s strategy document (2007) draws on recent strategic play in the maritime
dimension to assert its role and make its case for expansion and continuing relevance. It builds
on the earlier strategy titled, ‘A Maritime Military Strategy for India 1989-2014’ (2007: 101; Cohen
and Dasgupta 2010: 94). This document was prepared in the hey-days of ‘blue water’ Navy
thinking in the eighties. Expanding defence budgets of late and India’s greater influence as a
rising power make its current strategy document more credible. The Navy’s logic is below:

Both Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram were undertaken with a nuclear backdrop.
The Indian Navy shortlisted three goals: namely, to ensure safety and security of our
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maritime interests against a surprise attack, to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict
into a full-scale war and to win the war convincingly at sea. … The lesson that emerges
for Indian Navy is on two counts. Firstly, there will be space and scope to conduct
conventional maritime operations below the nuclear threshold. Secondly, a window of
opportunity would exist to influence the land battle (IHQ of MoD (Navy) 2007: 22-23).

As is the refrain within the military, the Navy believes that political direction may not be
forthcoming. It would require operating its own rudder. The document makes this point stating, ‘It
was clear that, as in all previous wars and operations, no End States had been visualized. While
there is merit in pressing for political directives or End States to conflicts, the reality is that they
may not be forthcoming. Hence, the End State definition may be hazy and strategies must be
prepared for that contingency (2007: 16).’ The Navy is better positioned since it has the
characteristic to be responsive to political demands. In its thinking, ‘The flexibility available in
employing naval forces provides escalation control in any crisis (2007: 74).’ What emerges is a
professed strategy clearly premised on deterrence with offensive undertones (2007: 131).

The joint amphibious doctrine enables the Navy to stay relevant in a land warfare context
as well. Exercise Tropex 2009 that was conducted at the Madhavpur coast of Gujarat tested the
amphibious task force. The amphibious task force including the new acquisition, INS Jalashwa,
sailed from Karwar along with 91 Infantry Brigade of Sudarshan Chakra corps. The exercise
witnessed a para-drop and air operations by Mig 29s (Mishra 2009). Clearly, the Navy is
determined not to ‘sit out’ the next war. The former Naval Chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, has said
as much, stating that ‘maintenance of a war-fighting ability’ remains the ‘top most priority’ and that
‘we need to maintain an organisational ability to deploy warships, submarines and aircraft at
immediate notice (Pandit 2011b).’ A Pakistani observer’s assessment has it that the Navy’s
contribution to Limited War when so deployed would likely be along the lines:

The Indian Navy’s stated role in Cold Start seemingly remains limited; ostensibly, the navy
will provide aviation assets to IBGs in the southern sector only. But to complement the
effort on land, and posing a multidimensional problem for Pakistani military planners, the
Indian Navy will inevitably take a forward posture, possibly impose a distant blockade of
Pakistani ports, and/or move into sea lines emanating from the Red Sea or Far East. The
Indian Navy could deploy submarines—which soon will be armed with land-attack
supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles—close to the Makran coast to clog Pakistan’s sea
traffic (Khan 2011).

At the nuclear level, the Navy holds the trump card, given its indispensability to an
invulnerable second strike capability. In its view, ‘the most ‘credible’ of all arsenals in a second
strike is the nuclear-armed missile submarine. On both counts (crisis stability and arms control
stability) therefore, the nuclear submarine option is the preferred arsenal for small nuclear forces
(2007: 76).’ Nuclear doctrine needs factoring in the problem of communications and the
implications for nuclear warhead numbers. This means timely fleshing out of both the maritime
and nuclear doctrines in step with India’s growing capability, which by decade end would see the
deployment of nuclear armed nuclear submarines on patrol stations.

PART III

Bureaucratic politics model

Limitations of the HQ IDS suggest that organisational interest in role and budget
expansion will continue. Since no Service argues that a changed doctrine is for increasing
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resources coming its way, the motive is difficult to prove. To argue that absence of proof implies
proof of absence is to miss a major institutional dimension of organisational life: institutional
interest. Institutional interest informs organisational output and organisational pursue it through
strategies designed for the bureaucratic contest over competing interests.

The rapid release of doctrines, even if welcome, points to an element of doctrinal

competition. The joint doctrine that logically should have preceded Service doctrines was the last
to be articulated in 2006. General Deepak Kapoor has acknowledged as much stating, “The
necessity for a tri-service approach in such operations has been well established and must be
duly ensured (Kapoor, D. 2012).”While land and air co-ordination has been done in the latest
doctrinal release of mid-2010, similar co-ordination between air and maritime power is in the
pipeline. This doctrinal contestation is illustrative of bureaucratic politics surrounding doctrine.
Each Service understandably wishes to justify its continuing relevance in the changed security
setting brought on by nuclearisation. Doctrines serve to explain internally and to justify externally
the legitimacy, immediacy and inevitability of Service requirements. This helps each Service in
the battle for budgets, gaining bureaucratic and political attention, fighting off critiques and
influencing public opinion. This is therefore a logical area for seeking the motivation for doctrinal
development.

The succinct proposition is ‘where you stand depends on where you sit.’ The corollary is
‘what is good for General Motors is good for America.’ At core of bureaucratic politics is the
personality of the organisational head in terms of ability ‘to stand the heat in the kitchen.’ Solutions
do not emerge from a detached review of problems (argument-reflection-choice), but by the ‘push
and shove’ of agencies, represented by their leaderships, partially selected for expertise in
manipulating the environment to deliver institutional ends. Parochial agendas, pre-existing action-
channels, bargaining games, and power play as the mechanism of choice, characterize this
model. Decision-makers can thus be viewed as following rather than leading in an environment
of constraints, like ‘canoeists midstream’ (Graham Allison). Incidence of bureaucratic politics is
an endemic characteristic of the Indian scene. The institutional interest is central to the
organisational process model. Also, competitive matching of institutional interest constitutes the
bureaucratic politics in defining the national interest.

Doctrinal contest over CDS

That the CDS is needed is widely acknowledged (Lok Sabha 1996: 25, Kanwal 2004: 10).
That it does not yet exist is popularly attributed to ‘turf wars’. Here the understanding advanced
is that it owes to a seemingly insuperable and sometimes invective laden, doctrinal contest,
primarily between the Army and Air Force. Despite the level of necessity and acceptability of the
office of CDS (Lok Sabha 2010: 26) being widely acknowledged, there has been little progress.
The Standing Committee on Defence expressed its frustration, stating, ‘The committee fails to
understand the lack of political consensus on such an important issue concerning the nation’s
security. Merely writing letters, even from the level of the defence minister is not sufficient (Lok
Sabha 2010: 6, Pandit 2009: 19).’ A report, quotes a ‘top official’ commenting on lack of political
will as, ‘Some politicians even feel, albeit wrongly, that a CDS could become all powerful.
Bureaucrats, of course, do not want a uniformed person to rival the stature of cabinet secretary’
(Pandit 2006: 9).’ Nevertheless, on at least one occasion, the government was close to
implementing this long standing recommendation of the GOM (Mustafa 2004: 1), but did not follow
through.

Jasjit Singh notes the doctrinal stand-off at heart of the hold-up, writing, ‘It is apparent that
the basis on which the Group of Ministers took their decision (in February 2001) to create a CDS
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was doctrinally flawed… The central point is whether we should manage our higher military
organisation on the principle of corporate/collegiate decision making or on the basis of a unitary
hierarchical system… every large modern organisation has to be managed on the collegiate
principle (Singh, J. 2004: 8).’ He prefers to first arrive at conceptual clarity. To him, ‘Higher
defence organisation has two distinct functions: one is creation of capabilities for the future and
second of fighting a war or employment of military power. The former involves perspective
planning, procurement of weapons and equipment, recruitment training, and employment policies
of military manpower. The latter involves operations within existing resources… India has not
been able to separate the two distinct functions…So the first issue is would the CDS be the
commander in chief or chief of staff… (Singh, J. 2004b: 8).’

The implication of the appointment for doctrine is stark. A professional body is required to
undertake the adjudication between the competing Services. The ministry does not have the
software for this. Therefore it requires the office of the CDS. The absence of a CDS is also a
cause of such inter-Service face-off. However, the more important aspect has been missed out in
literature. It is that the appointment of the CDS is critical to limitation.

Limited War, by definition is one that is non-nuclear and one not liable to go nuclear. This
involves keeping it below the perceived nuclear thresholds. This requires monitoring at a level
higher than that of the three Services. It requires the office to have a macro view of the war, taking
in both the strategic and the grand strategic perspective. The strategic view is that of the Services
and the grand strategic view is at the higher level of the government or state. While the Service
Chiefs can function adequately on the former, it is the latter that suffers in case of a ‘double-
hatted’ Chairman COSC as India has at present. Since each Service would be playing out its war-
time role under a wider inter-Service plan, such a plan requires ownership and monitoring. It
cannot emerge out of the trade-offs that constitute consensus among equals. Also, in case of
Limited War, there is a great premium on reining in, restraining force application. This would
require an oversight mechanism to monitor the military pressures that the Services are individually
applying. Since collectively their impact could result in breach of thresholds, it is for limitation that
the CDS is required. Since the Nuclear Command Post (NCP) will have to manage the
conventional conflict, orchestrate deterrence and oversee the transition to nuclear conflict, the
agenda requires full-time monitoring by an empowered military authority in the form of a CDS.

This doctrinal angle to the controversy makes the ‘turf’ aspect of the CDS debate recede
in significance. The IAF is unwilling to be subordinated to the Army since in its self-perception it
has a strategic role. Even the theatre commands concept cannot be worked through due to this
reservation as it would entail allocation of air resources that the IAF prefers are centrally
controlled, albeit for decentralised application. The Army for its part would wish to privilege force
objectives that are terrain and attrition related. There is a debate on the type of CDS model as
well. As seen above, there is the ‘staff model’ in which the appointment is akin to a Joint Chiefs
of Staff system and charged with the creation and delivery of the forces. The other is the
‘command model’, for an empowered authority to oversee the limitation required in Limited War.
Also the CDS would be in charge of nuclear retaliation. The clinching decision would require to
be based on which of the two are better for national security in the nuclear context; a debate
outside the scope here.

Jointness

The levels of jointness in the Services are preliminary as assessed from experience and
from the structure. The former relies on the reminiscences. The controversy over the recall of the
Kargil War by the former Air Chief, A.Y. Tipnis, is an illustration (Singh, R. 2008b: 6). Tipnis,
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critical of the Army, stated, ‘I observed the ground situation was grave. The army needed IAF help
to evict the intruders. But it was not amenable to the air headquarters position to seek government
approval for use of air power offensively as the army was reluctant to reveal the gravity of the
situation to the MoD (Singh, R. 2006a).’ In the event, Tipnis reports V.P. Malik storming out of a
meeting between the three chiefs saying ‘If that is the way you want it, I will go it alone (Singh, R.
2006a).’ Controversies such as the one on the Laungewala battle in 1971 appear to have the
instrumental purpose also of keeping jointness at bay.

The second piece of evidence on levels of jointness is from the structure. On jointness
efforts, considerable progress has been made such as Integrated Defence Staff, tri-Service
bodies like the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Strategic Forces Command and the
Andaman & Nicobar Theatre Command. However, while structures exist, their performance needs
to be gauged against expectations. Premvir Das (2007), writes, ‘The HQ IDS is a massive
bureaucratic monolith, under a Vice Chief level officer but including another four lieutenant
generals, ten major generals and about 45 officers of the rank of Brigadier/Colonel. It is not
surprising that instead of becoming a facilitator, this new entity has become yet another hurdle to
be crossed in a course full of obstacles.’

In part, the structural problems owe to the lack of jointness in thinking – a function of
doctrine. Admiral Mehta underlines one perspective on jointness, defining it as, ‘At the staff and
planning levels, jointness is sought to be achieved through joint capability development, joint
planning, joint targeting, joint training, joint logistics and other functions that lend themselves to
jointness’. During a Unified Commanders’ Conference, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) opined
that “Jointness does not necessarily imply equal partnership” and that there was a need to “adopt
correct combinations, whilst respecting the core expertise of individual Services” (Mehta 2009).’

The Army-Air Force face-off on the more relevant instrument of force is at root of the
shortcomings in jointness. The doctrinal disconnect is in the Army believing in a unified command,
while the Air Force, on the other hand, believes that the different Services should coordinate their
plans but fight the war separately in order to achieve integrated political and military objectives
(Kasturi 2008: 12). Sawhney notes that the ‘Air Force feels its maximum effort should be to destroy
enemy’s strategic and air force assets and not so much the support of the land battle (2004: 7).

To reconcile the divergence, there was a joint conference under the aegis of the Army
Training Command (ARTRAC) on the issue in 2008. The follow-up has been in release of a joint
air-land doctrine by HQ IDS in May 2010. It is the cornerstone document to synergise air power,
technology, procedures and organisations in an air-land battle (PTI 2010). The joint doctrine
reconciles the positions of the two Services; but it is uncertain as to the level of integration of war-
fighting concepts, doctrines, systems and procedures.

An illustration of this uncertainty in the level of integration is on the problem posed by fire
power. The Army prefers a higher quantum of fire power support. This is a lesson from the Kargil
War, in which the Bofors gun earned its spurs. In a speedy attack as envisaged in the new
doctrine, the centrality of fire power increases. This requires Army resources being supplemented
by Air Force resources. The logic is explicated by Kanwal (2010), thus: ‘The logic behind the
generation of massive asymmetries of fire power is simple: since it would be difficult to bring to
battle and destroy Pakistan’s strategic reserves, Army Reserve North (ARN) and Army Reserve
South (ARS), through deep manoeuvre in a short, limited war, their combat potential can be
substantially degraded only through the sustained application of ground-based and aerially
delivered firepower.’ The Air Force is amenable only to the extent that it can release fire power
from what it sees as its initial primary role of gaining air dominance. This requires concentrating
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on the air war. A doctrinal adjudication on this is required and has the potential to help other
elements fall into place.

The Army’s concept for war needs to be contrasted with that of the Air Force. The Air
Force prefers being identified as the Service of ‘decision’ and with a ‘strategic’ role. This is so
because of air-enabled strategic strikes are possible simultaneously on key elements of the
military, political and economic power-base through ‘parallel war’ (Subramaniam 2008), even
while the air force attempts ‘air dominance’ (Singh, J. 2010: 23).

The joint doctrine would require to contend with the sequencing raised by air strategist,
Kapil Kak, who argues in his survey, A Century of Air Power, that the ‘counter air campaign would
need to precede a major offensive operation on land or at sea and not run concurrently. This is
the lesson of history (Kak 2001: 2126).’ Jasjit Singh appears to concur, writing, ‘Ultimate success
may require control of the land, but is not necessarily the first order of business (Singh, J. 2000b:
1666).’ The strong stand of the Air Force on the doctrinal question is revealed best by a leading
votary of air power, V. Patney, who was the Air Force commander in-theatre in the Kargil War.
He opines that doctrine is a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposition believing that, ‘a doctrine for the
Service is not a government formulated or approved set of precepts. The doctrine is produced by
the Service itself and for itself (Patney 2009: 184).’

These inter-Service ‘tension’ (Singh, J. 2010: 24) has had one positive outcome: that of
development of a joint doctrine. Since its contours are not known, it is not impossible that it is a
mere pastiche of Service doctrines, reflecting continuing disagreement rather than reconciliation.
The foremost reason an efficacious joint doctrine needs to exist is that it would unify the action at
the conventional level. Doing so is a necessary prelude to knitting together the conventional-
nuclear interface. While nuclearisation has brought about an altered situation in South Asia,
persistence of modes and mores indicates a lack of appreciation of the changes necessary.

Friction ‘within’

The vertical stove-piping of the Services is replicated within the Army. Each arm has a
stake in the doctrinal direction, since its fate and relative salience would depend on the resources
made available. For instance, despite the advent of the tank in World War I, the cavalry maintained
a visible presence on the battle field till its last action in Germany’s invasion of Poland at the
beginning of World War II. Doctrine guides spending, size and importance of the armed forces.
Therefore, there is an internal tussle within the Services to influence it. The ‘Cold Start’ concept
set-off the debate on the continuing utility of strike corps in the context of nuclearisation.

The concept had advantages for the Army in that it enabled it to expand its size in terms
of re-organising to operationalise it effectively. The South Western Command was raised and
adjustment was made in the boundaries of Western and Northern Commands. Northern
Command’s Nagrota based 16 Corps was split and 9 Corps was raised as part of Western
Command (Thapar 2006: 15). This was to rationalise the frontages, since according to the new
doctrine the pivot corps would also have an offensive role. They would be expected to provide
launch pads for strike corps. Thus, each Command was geographically affiliated with one of the
three strike corps that used to be earlier taken as strategic reserves held with the Army HQ. Thus
while the Kargil War enabled the Army to enlarge its size by creating 14 Corps for Kargil and
Ladhak, the fallout of Operation Parakram was larger, in the creation of a command and a corps.

The role and employment of strike corps however, have come in for closer scrutiny.
General V.P. Malik writes, ‘In the new military conflicts environment, I believe that some of our
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large size combat organisations can be reduced in size and made more versatile and agile…
Having several large, unwieldy and expensive Strike Corps for conventional deterrence that tend
to sit out of the war when it actually happens is not a cost-effective military strategy (Malik 2010:
144).’

Such thinking faces a spirited fight back from the ‘cavalier lobby’ that stands to lose. P.J.S.
Sandhu (2004: 9) makes a case for retention of strike corps in light of the multiple roles they fulfil.
He traces the origin of the idea of IBGs to the Germans during the concluding stages of the
Second World War on the Russian front and in Europe. At the outset, the Germans had organised
their war machine into Panzer Armies, corps and divisions. However, after 1943, these German
formations were untenable in light of attrition suffered, and therefore ‘battle groups’ substituted
for formations. The actions of battle groups resulted in a quicker reaction time required to organise
a new line of resistance and secondly gave a psychological boost to the Germans.

Sandhu deems advantages of the strike corps to include: ‘These impose a decision
dilemma on the enemy, especially for the position of the reserves. It is the commitment of reserves
that decides the outcome of a battle. These strike corps have not only the capability of penetrating
the defences but more importantly to bring to battle the enemy’s theatre/strategic reserves and
then degrade them in a mobile battle…’ Since Strike Corps have an independent armoured
brigade integral to them, it can with an infantry division operate by itself or in concert with the
corps. This provides unlimited operational and strategic flexibility in planning and execution of
offensive operations.

In comparison, battle groups proposed are no substitute. These can at best ‘dent’ enemy
defences and cannot achieve a breakthrough in the developed terrain. In desert terrain they
cannot carry out a ‘turning movement’. This is essentially a movement that imbalances enemy
forces by gaining an advantageous position from an unexpected flank or the rear. The
psychological advantage such power has over the enemy is squandered. Sandhu also proposes
that in case the enemy is to retain his strike corps, India will be disadvantaged. To him, battle
group commanders would only think at tactical level up to 10-15 km from the border. As a result,
strategic vision in planning would be lacking. These are telling arguments, but it is interesting that
Sandhu does not touch the nuclear issue. Such silences are equally revealing.

General Sundarji perceived the changes nuclearisation entailed way back in 1986, stating:
‘we in the armed forces are gearing our organisation, training and equipment in such a manner
that in the unlikely event of use of nuclear weapons by the adversary in the combat zone, we will
limit the damage, both psychological and physical. This is an important change in Indian military
thinking, although there still is no discernible conceptual development of an official nuclear
doctrine (Sidhu and Smith 2000: 32).’

Yet, there is little conceptual understanding of the era transcending nature of nuclear
weapons acquisition. S. Paul Kapur suggests, ‘Indian strategists dismiss the possibility of a
Pakistani nuclear response against India proper, however (Kapur 2008: 90).’ He concludes that
‘organisational and other pathologies will result in suboptimal policy formulation’ with a ‘significant
risk of catastrophic escalation (Kapur 2008: 93).’ Such risks compel renewed effort at doctrinal
integration.

Military tribalism as answer

Two lenses – organisational process and bureaucratic politics – have been used. The
doctrinal tussle between the Services has provided grist. The Services have used doctrine
generation and dissemination to influence the environment – internal and external – towards ends
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of expanding roles and missions, increasing size, staking claim for a larger proportion of the
budget, seeking primacy in terms of roles, maintaining autonomy from rival claims and warding
off the overarching bureaucratic-political level. This is in keeping with the predictions of theory
that has it that ‘most organisational leaders value autonomy and ‘turf’ as much as, if not more
than, having extra resources at their disposal (Sagan 1994: 37).’ Autonomy is an important factor
at the organisational level. It enables a Service to determine its agenda, priorities and trade-offs.
As seen, in light of the existing fault-line between the Services and the bureaucrats in the ministry,
autonomy has been available by default. Lack of expertise in the ministry and that it is
overburdened, enables this autonomy. There are no political directives and a strategic doctrine
that could serve the Services in determining their own doctrinal thrust. The downside is that there
is no adjudication on Service positions in their inter-Service dimension.

Doctrine being the foundational document for downstream aspects as force structure, size,
salience, etc, each Service uses the document for explaining, legitimising, advocating and
influencing. Therefore, doctrine is not generated solely as routine organisational output, but has
a significant utility in bureaucratic politics. The joint doctrine, a useful document meant to further
jointness, can be expected to come into its own only in subsequent iterations. A former Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee has admitted as much stating, ‘Conceptualisation and promulgation of
joint doctrines, including the visualisation of Limited War against a Nuclear Backdrop, forms an
important facet of our integrated approach (Bakshi 2011).’ Doctrine, so far a key battlefield in the
inter-Service and in the ‘bureaucrat vs. brass’ competition, can thereafter cease to be such.

______________________________________________
Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle

Service sub-cultures
The sociology of the military informs that ‘tribalism’ is a characteristic, essential as a tool for
combat effectiveness. War is the realm of uncertainty and friction. These cohesive groups
functioning as a team are better to overcome war. The organisation is hierarchical and has a
layered structure. This is to enable the materialisation of the contents of mind of the
commander. Militaries see themselves as institutions performing a service for society. There is
an increasing evidence of occupational and management ethic due to technological changes
(Moskos 1977). The trends elsewhere in modern militaries are manifest in the Indian military as
part of mimesis, isomorphism or what Scott Sagan characterises as ‘global strategic culture’
(Sagan 2009: 225). However, the dominant thrust is to retain the ‘institutional’ ethic, which deals
better with the problems of narrow parochialism. Though organisational loyalty is useful, it has
the drawback of distancing an organisation from its counterparts. Doctrine performs the function
of knitting myriad sub-sections of the military, vertically and horizontally, by provisioning the
aims and providing guidance on the manner of achieving these aims. Doctrine is itself subject to
influence of prevailing sub-cultures. It is the site of pulls and pressures of the sub-groups,
unwittingly in competition for control of organisational purpose and resources (covered in the
next chapter). The military organisation can be deceptively calm on the surface projecting order
and discipline without, but like the ocean has currents within it.
Increasing muscularity in India’s political culture, as pointed out in the preceding part, can be
expected to have an influence on the military. This aspect is understudied in India. In the
context of ascendance of conservatism, there appears a functional convergence between
realists and nationalists in the political spectrum. This cannot be seen as penetration of political
ideology into the military, but a convergence in thinking on security between the conservative-
realist military and the conservative side of the political spectrum. The theoretical possibility has
been pointed to by Huntington in his understanding of the military mind as informed by
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‘conservative realism’ (Huntington 1957: 80-97). He discerns the linkage between conservative
forces and the military by characterising the former as a ‘pro-military’ ideology and its antithesis,
liberalism, as an ‘anti-military’ ideology. This is easier formed due to conservative political party
speaking in a ‘straightforward’ language similar to the language of the military according to
Manvendra Singh, a conservative politician and Territorial Army member (Datta et al. 2008).
Vijay Oberoi notes the affinity, stating, ‘The language of those on the right of centre has always
had greater appeal for men in uniform in most democracies. I have done a course in the United
States and I saw 90 per cent of the officers were Republican (Datta et al 2008).’ The affinity is
brought out because the Indian conservative party’s ethos has an explicit commitment to a
nationalistic ideology, which to Huntington is in keeping with a characteristic of the ‘military
mind’. The military man sees the military as a profession charged with national security.
Therefore, the military mind privileges the collective and reifies the national (Huntington 1957:
63).
This observation on the organisation is not evidence of a shared world view. At best, it indicates
that the military is not an island, but is part of society, even if isolated to an extent by its
geographical location in cantonments and on borders, by tradition and extant civil-military
relations. The levels of conservative ideology prevalent in the social strata having majority
representation in the officer class, determine scope for higher levels of a conservative milieu.
This tendency in organisational culture and its implications for organisation output such as of
doctrine requires investigation once military sociology acquires depth as a discipline in India and
once society and the military as an institution acquire the maturity for dispassionate self-
analysis.
The conservative view has fallout in scepticism of the political class. Among reasons for
deficiency in India’s will to power is seen as political prudence amounting to over caution. The
tendency is to push against this in providing offensive options. For instance, the rapidity
required for Cold Start to unfold successfully deprives the political head of freedom of choice.
The military would prefer the political head compensate with will and resolve for any perceived
shortfalls in strategic rationality of resort to Cold Start. The military places a premium on political
resolve and will. This is to transfer Clausewitz’s emphasis on this quality in military commanders
to the political level. This is at the expense of rationality.
In other words, there is a push for a pro-active tackling of ‘threats’. The military is not agreeable
to the diplomatic argument that the Charter-era world order has placed restrictions on a nation’s
sovereign right to wage war. It believes that India has the right of self-defence that it can
exercise aggressively and in any case, the diplomatic game needs to be played. Given that the
military once characterised Pakistan as ‘bandicoot’ (General S. Rodrigues) and recently as
‘irritant’ (General V.K. Singh), they prefer a power tryst. Since India has been more circumspect
than adventurous, the military knows its limitations as ‘solution’. Therefore, it uses the doctrinal
domain for impressing Pakistan of its vulnerability to Indian military action. Arjun Subramaniam,
writing in respect of air power, brings out a representative opinion within the Services noting
that,
Prosecution of strategic air campaigns requires strong political will, clarity of intent, ability to
gather domestic public support/approval, and ability to absorb international criticism. The only
way to gather public support in a democracy like India is to encourage widespread debates to
make our strategic interests widely known and accepted so that when these interests are
threatened, we can easily make the decision to use force. This is a weak area in our country
that we need to address at the earliest… India has very few politicians with military
backgrounds. For this reason, airpower proponents must educate the political leadership on
airpower's strategic capabilities (Subramaniam 2008).
The dominant Service being the Army, the preceding discussion on organisational culture has
largely encapsulated its culture, though there are elements it shares with the other Services.
The following two sub-sections dwell on the unique characteristics of the other two Services.
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The ‘aerospace warrior’ ethos

The IAF’s self-image is of a Service that can bring about strategic decision. It can be employed
in all scenarios ranging from selective strikes to delivering nuclear weapons. A particular
impress on Service ethos has been the employment of US air power in recent wars. Several air
power votaries such as Jasjit Singh, Kapil Kak, Vinod Patney and Arjun Subramaniam, have
contributed to expressing, and in the process framing, the force’s operational ethos. Several
veteran ‘air warriors’ as part of the strategic community present and defend the Service case
independently and vigorously. The bureaucratic politics around this is covered in the next
chapter. Of consequence here is the resolve of the Service to remain outside the shadow of its
larger sister Service, the Army. This involves building and articulating an organisational culture
unique to the Air Force. The major element of this is in the concentration on the strategic role of
the Service. This is in keeping with the trends earlier manifested in the US and UK.
In case of the Air Force, technological ramifications of the RMA are a major consideration. Arjun
Subrabmaniam reflects that, ‘The advent of sensors that provide accurate target intelligence,
coupled with precision-guided munitions (PGM), has led to ‘effects-based operations’ gaining
predominance in speedy conflict resolution, with minimum attrition and collateral damage.’ This
he says has led to the ‘The Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the midst of a radical change in mind-set
and re-orientation of its force structure that will enable it to conduct parallel warfare and
simultaneously influence operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
(Subramaniam 2008).’ Theories of air power theorists, John Boyd and John Warden, have been
influential in identifying the centre of gravity and the utility of air power in directly and indirectly
addressing it. This is to be administered by a strategic air campaign to first blind and then
destroy the enemy by use of technology, targeting his communications, infrastructure and
military assets. To Subramaniam,
That does not mean that air power and strategic air campaigns alone can win wars, but
by applying the principles of asymmetry and paralysis, we can hasten the capitulation of
an enemy by incapacitating him and reducing his military potential, as mentioned earlier,
rather than destroying him. Air power can do all this - and simultaneously support the
surface campaign by conducting parallel warfare at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels. Building such an ability calls for a change in mind-set… (Subramaniam
2008)
This change implies moving from a predominantly tactical air force one with a limited deterrent
capability to one that needs to ‘think big’ and ‘think far’. This requires looking at power
projection, strategic intervention over limited distances and duration, proactive strikes,
humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/enforcement missions, protection of energy and
economic resources and island territories, antiterrorist and anti-hijacking operations, protection
and evacuation of human resources, and enforcement of no-fly zones (Subramaniam 2008).
Another area of emulation of the US is to wrap the air campaign around the land and maritime
campaigns in real time, giving synergy and joint operations its due.

Maritime ethos
India has a continental mindset, though its southern kingdoms have been known to have had
sea-faring traditions. The zenith of India’s maritime engagement was in the spread of Indian
culture to South East Asia. Its nadir has been the advent of colonialism from the sea. It is for this
reason that the Navy, known as the ‘silent service’, has formally engaged in articulating its
organisational ethos. This owes to its perception that there is a greater effort needed since the
maritime dimension is lost on India, given its heritage as a continental power. The Navy’s
doctrinal writings have included two editions of doctrine (2004, 2009), the ‘Vision’ and the
‘Strategy’ (2007) documents and are partially geared towards an educative end. The Navy has
drawn inspiration from the Prime Minister’s address at the Commander’s Conference in which
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he stated, ‘India’s growing international stature give it strategic relevance in the area ranging
from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca… (IHQ of MoD (Navy) 2007: iii).’ The Naval Chief
has articulated the role of the Navy in the Strategic Document as:
… within this overall national and defence framework, our primary maritime military interest is to
ensure national security, provide insulation from external interference, so that vital tasks of
fostering economic growth and undertaking developmental activities, can take place in a secure
environment. Consequently, India’s maritime military strategy is underpinned on ‘freedom to use
the seas for our national purposes, under all circumstances (IHQ of MoD (Navy) 2007: iii).’ 145

The Navy sees its role as also going beyond the strictly military domain. It sees itself as
furthering economic power as well in protecting trade routes and transit, infrastructure and
coastal security. This wider aspiration is articulated thus, ‘The Indian Navy, by virtue of its
capability, strategic positioning and robust presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) can be
the catalyst for peace, tranquillity and stability in the IOR.’ Consequently, its aims are
‘Deterrence, including strategic deterrence, conduct armed conflict if need be… project power;
catalyse partnerships; build trust and create interoperability; and when required use convincing
power to achieve national aims (IHQ of MoD (Navy) 2007: iv).’ In nutshell, it deems, ‘Ensuring
good order at sea is therefore a legitimate duty of the Indian Navy (IHQ of MoD (Navy) 2007:
iv).’ Its engagement in anti-piracy operations is testimony.

______________________________________________
Extract from article: ‘Borders and other such lines’, Journal of Peace Studies, Vol 20,
Issue 3 & 4, July-December 2013

Institutional Level
While the primary role of defending borders keeps the military
professional and outward looking, it also keeps it large in size, attritionist,
static and defensive in orientation. Though the Cold Start - ‘proactive
and offensive’ – mindset has been in the works for over a decade,
territorial imperative still commands a centrality. The offensive is still
geared to territorial objectives. This time it is not to seize territory: the
US predicament post Iraq War II decisively dispels that. It is to threaten
decisive objectives so as to draw out the enemy reserves and decimate
them by maneuver and fire from land assets and air power. This implies
‘more of everything’ – maneuver elements, firepower resources, infantry
to hold the line, Rashtriya Rifles for countering irregular warfare. This
is good from the perspective of arm specific ‘lobbies’ internal to the
military. The disquiet between the arms most closely identified with mass,
specifically infantry and artillery, and the mechanized and technical
arms is an underestimated undertow within the military. The overall
loss is the army continuing as a ‘mass’ army. Military ‘transformation’, in
the works for half-a-decade, is rendered even more remote.
Not usually finding mention in strategic commentary is an outcome
in relation to internal politics, specifically civil-military equations. The
routine refrain that civil-military relations are on even keel in India
serves to obfuscate the reality that is considerably more nuanced, if not
quite vexed. The security sector can acquire vested interest in unsettled
borders. Continued national munificence and institutional salience
can be expected to ensue. This can have internal dividend for the
army. Further, the army’s position on Siachen, AFSPA, ‘two front’ war
etc. has a constituency, whipped up by the veteran community. In case
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a convergence is contrived with forces in polity this could have grave

implications. Settling borders makes such unanticipated possibilities
recede. Not doing so is a current vulnerability that can constitute an
opportunity for nefarious political end in an indeterminate future.
Lastly, expansion appears as the characteristic reaction of the army to
all manner of threats, ranging from conventional threat across borders
to unconventional threats of proxy war and insurgency. This knee-jerk
response can only have diminishing marginal utility. While the eighties
witnessed mechanization and the nineties onwards the raising of the
Rashtriya Rifles, the latest wave of expansion has been on the China
front. In the ‘two and half front’ formulation, addressing the ‘half
front’ – internal conflict - the army has reportedly asked for expansion
of six divisions! This is not impossible if soaking up India’s vast armies
of unemployed was all that is involved. The problem is that training
and socialization are also intrinsic. The quality of this is already under
question. More importantly, the narrowing of the recruitment base,
particularly of the officer cadre, to the Hindi speaking ‘cow dust’ belt
is underway. A decline in the all-India sociological complexion of the
military could be discernible if the statistics were made available. In the
absence of authentic data this can only be apprehended. Doing so here
may prove timely.
The civil-military relations problem that can emerge, and arguably is
emerging already, is along two dimensions. The first is on the cultural
gap between the army and its area of deployment in marginal border
areas or in internal security such as in Central India in future. Second
is in the possibility of the army’s secular credentials coming under siege,
for instance, in case of extremist variants of cultural nationalism find
anchor in the recruit catchment areas. Unanticipated outcomes also need
guarding against. Since unsettled borders impel expansion, tackling root
causes - in this case, borders – entails meaningful border negotiations.

_____________________________________________

Review: Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A

Perspective on Human Rights, Occasional Paper 2, IDSA, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 40
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=49951

In the IDSA monograph under review, Chadha brings out the current status of army‘s approach
to human rights. The army‘s record has been chequered, but the limitations of space in a
monograph length work have led to Chadha‘s looking at only the positives. The good news is
that the current day army appears suitably impressed by the need to keep human rights to fore
in subconventional operations.
Since the army is not particularly challenged today in any theater of subconventional operations,
be it J&K or North East, it is easier for the army to maintain a credible record on human rights.
That it is has used the letting up in operations for taking a closer look at human rights is
altogether heartening. The test of whether it has suitably internalized this can only come up with
the next test.
Such test does not appear on the horizon. The situation in J&K while being delicate politically
and simmering in terms of popular disaffection is unlikely to escalate militarily owing to the
massive deployment of the army continuing along the borders and within the ‗hinterland‘. The
Udhampur, Gurdaspur and Pathankot incidents suggest the difficulties terrorists are having in
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using Kashmir as site for their action. In the North East, a series of suspension of operations
agreements are in place, the most significant of which in Nagaland has recently be
strengthened by a framework agreement. The Central Indian theater of operations has been
consigned to the paramilitary since the levels of violence are relatively low and access to
sanctuary abroad the missing element.
As for the possibility of being faced with subconventional operations outside of the borders, this
can only be in wake of conventional operations against Pakistan. The likelihood of this has
thankfully been appreciably set back by the upward trajectory, albeit a hesitant one, in Indo-Pak
relations of late. Stabilisation operations in which human rights would have a place appear
remote. Another farfetched site for subconventional operations could be if India joins a
multinational force in wrapping up the ISIS in an indeterminate future.
The upshot of this survey is that after a long while the army is not faced with subconventional
operations of any notable intensity. Does Chadha‘s work lend confidence that the army will pass
when tested?
It would be as easy as unfair to dismiss Chadha‘s word as coming out of a ‗sarkari‘ think tank,
the IDSA, and being from a former military man cannot but be biased. However, it best to give
him a hearing for as once an infantry colonel he would know where the shoe pinches. His first
hand knowledge is from participation in subconventional operations in Sri Lanka, J&K and North
East. He is also author of the heavy tome Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis in which
he laid out a brief history of India‘s showing in countering insurgency in various theaters.
Chadha believes that the army‘s human rights approach has not received due attention in the
human rights discourse otherwise crowded with the works critical of the state and its agencies.
His claim is that the army has at least over the last decade spruced up its understanding of and
record on human rights. He uses its work in J&K as a case study.
In J&K, the statistics are clear. The human rights record of the army has improved to an extent
that incidents such as at Machil stand out as aberrations. Further, the positives are in the army‘s
own attempt at house cleaning such as in its punishing perpetrators for the Machil and follow up
in the mistaken opening up of fire at a road block in Chhatargam in which two youth died.
There are two explanations for this. One is that Pakistan has indeed turned off the tap to a large
extent in terms of infiltration, leading to an improved security situation. Consequently, the army
has rightly tuned down its operational tempo, leading to an improved human rights record. The
second is that it has also had an enlightened leadership in Kashmir, appointing figures with a
credible spoken reputation. It needs noting that the current theater commander General Hooda
has embellished his credentials by his actions on this front.
In the bargain, Chadha‘s work appears to have profited with Northern Command furnishing
some figures to help his case. Even if these are critiqued - as they should be - by human rights
defenders in J&K, the gainer would be the human rights discourse having something more that
a straw man to grapple with and reflexive military bashing.
Chadha‘s vantage point does not allow him to engage with the items at the forefront of the
human rights agenda in J&K. The issue of justice is critical. The figure of disappeared at close
to five figure mark; the resurfacing of the Kunan Poshpora incident in the judicial agenda; and
the attempted closure by the army to the Pathribal case are prominent cases.
Chadha, for his part, attempts to bring out that judicial and human rights activism can result in
miscarriages in terms of making soldiers acting in good faith victims. The reminder is that
intensive operations also have a psychological war angle, which human rights defenders must
also for their part be objective about. Chadha also reveals the processes by way of which the
ministry approaches its role in respect of Article 6 (in case of J&K, Article 7) of the Armed
Forces Special Power‘s Act. But, he takes the safe way out in being descriptive, rather than self-
critical.
In a reference to the infirmities in the western record in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chadha brings
home an inescapable fact: that collateral damage and human rights infringement is intrinsic to
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military operations. There is no ‗zero casualty‘ war. The human environment of combat
severely tests pious intentions: both at the strategic and tactical levels. The ‗zero tolerance‘ to
human rights abuse policy inevitably acquires caveat.
The seeming logic is that this is for the eventual larger good. This explains India‘s parameter:
human rights infringement is tolerable only if it is operationally justifiable. The problem is that the
military sits in judgment on its own action, in that verdict on operational justification cannot, of
necessity, have civilian imprimatur.
Though outside the scope of Chadha‘s reflection, if and since subconventional operations have
human rights consequences, the state (and civil society) must not only look at mitigation. The
state must be preventive and political.
For instance, in the case in J&K, it is not enough for the army to be working on its human rights
record. Firstly, howsoever well intentioned, this would always leave much to be desired when,
for example, the ‗Do‘s and Dont‘s injunction against torture implies that it is excusable short of
maiming and causing death! Secondly, kinetic subconventional operations outsourced these
days the army‘s engagement with human rights becomes academic, if not diversionary. The
case in Imphal of ex PLA fighter Sangit Meitei‘s killing by Herojit Singh on orders of the police
Additional SP and the manner of paramilitary‘s sway in Central India make their human rights
approaches more significant.
Wishfully speaking, the state must work more diligently in taking forward the promise of Modi‘s
Lahore stop over externally, and, internally, creating the political conditions speedily for removal
of troops. If the misplaced sloganeering in Delhi‘s Press Club and JNU on 9 February is to have
any value, it is to wake India up to this finally. If two tenures of a UPA government could not
bring this about, it cannot happen any time soon.
Consequently, the verdict is that whatever the human rights spin/situation - such as currently - it
cannot but be impacted when push comes to shove. This inevitability opens the human rights
space to instrumental use as part of policy and strategy, by both sides. Chadha‘s is a tragic
insight: this is at best subject to mitigation, never to elimination. In J&K, the resulting satisficing
leads to the circular argument: since the situation is tolerable now, the army can be removed,
but since the army is tolerable now, it can remain indefinitely.
_____________________________

K.S. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict, Centre for Land
Warfare Studies, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010, pp. 88, ISBN 978-93-80502-24-3, Rs 225.
Strategic Analysis, 35:3 May 2011

The book is the result of the author's sabbatical with the National Human Rights Commission
and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies to research 'all aspects of human rights in the context
of the employment of the armed forces for internal security duties'. Only the first chapter of two
and half pages carries any content on human rights. The remainder is a distillation of the army's
Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) (Shimla, HQ ARTRAC, 2006). There are four
attached appendices that are human rights related, but are again from the DSCO. In fact
Appendix A reproduces Chapter 7 of the DSCO, 'Human Rights', verbatim. A chapter entitled
'Media Dynamics and Human Rights' again disappoints by focusing on the military-media
relationship rather than human rights.
The issue of human rights should have been left out of the title because the book otherwise
quite ably covers the subject of 'Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflicts'. But even here the
book does not venture beyond the DSCO. This gives rise to the question, 'What purpose has
been served?' And a wider question as to what the sabbatical was about. It is a pity that the
opportunity for informed comment on the issue and a much debated subject like the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), has been passed up. The author's first-hand engagement
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with the subject as a military professional, his access to its nuances at the National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC) and research possibilities at Center for Land Warfare Studies
(CLAWS) have been sub-optimally utilised in this monograph. The author could compensate by
taking up the issue once again in a subsequent edition by incorporating his experience at his
present posting on the general staff in charge of human rights at the Corps HQ in Srinagar.
The author, in his take, makes a contestable equation between human rights and fundamental
rights. While there is an understandable correspondence between the two, fundamental rights
are a contract between the state and its citizens. Human rights instead are intrinsic to people on
account of their being human, which means that there are also some 'hard core rights' that are
not liable to abridgement by national laws or constitutions. Fundamental rights as we know can
be held in abeyance in periods of national emergency or amended by appropriate legislation.
The concept of human rights instead made the individual the referent and sought to preserve,
protect and advance human rights of the individual and the collective, taking the issue beyond
the scope of nation and state. The experience of the twentieth century dictated this. While in
India's case, fundamental rights guarantee basic freedoms and human rights, it is important to
maintain this distinction.
Getting this distinction right is crucial since its absence gives rise to the flawed logic that 'Where
there is terrorism, there cannot be human rights' (p. 4). 'Hard core' human rights, specifically
against arbitrary killing and torture, exist at all times for all, including foreign terrorists on Indian
soil. The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention covers these, and they are valid even in
internal security situations and have been incorporated into national legislation. This is true for
low intensity conflicts, deemed different from insurgencies in terms of the levels of external
interference. The case is made that the external factor legitimises not only army deployment but
a tougher line. This risks overlooking the human terrain comprising Indian citizens and the fact
that a majority of the fighters are Indian citizens even under maximum levels of proxy war.
A permissive environment for egregious measures, referred to in the foreword by the director of
CLAWS, is created by focusing on the external factor for distinguishing a low intensity conflict
from an insurgency. The author takes a 'clash' between the two as being inevitable. He writes,
'This is the basic point of clash between the goals of achieving internal security and the
observance of human rights' (p. 4). He urges the state to 'remain fully aware of its obligations to
prevent occurrence of such instances and take prompt measures to check them' (p. 4). The
contention here is that this conceptual understanding of the army contributes to its predicament
in such situations.
What the author describes as 'insolence', or disaffection and alienation from the state, then
develops. This is the response of the citizenry not only to violations of the hard core rights of
local fighters but also to the infringements of its soft core rights. It makes strategic sense in
countering insurgency or proxy war to privilege human rights, lest the situation get worse before
it gets any better. This trajectory of violence has been true in most of India's counter-insurgency
engagements, whether externally inspired or not, ranging from Mizoram, referred to as a
successful case, to Kashmir. Whereas in the former the policy of grouping infringed on soft core
rights, in Kashmir the existence and work of the non-governmental organisation 'Association of
Parents of Disappeared People' indicates the levels of departure from doctrinal tenets by
security forces. For the army to forever prefix 'allegations of' when referring to violations is to be
more conscious of self-image than the possibility that the image may not match the reality. The
author in not having answered the question, 'But, are these violations a reality and are the
armed forces really at fault?' does not help to resolve this debate in any way.
Given that the book is a research effort, it could have benefited from a bibliography. Its scant
footnotes otherwise suggest that the sabbatical programme of the army could do with some
improvement, particularly in terms of the officers being permitted to speak their minds. This
would not only benefit them and the institution, but also the attentive public keenly interested in
the army's viewpoint and ever ready to be persuaded by its case.
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_________________________________________
Countering Insurgency In J&K: Debates In The Indian Army
Book chapter in Maroof Raza (ed.): Confronting Terrorism

The doctrine for sub conventional warfare of the Indian Army was released in December
2006.i It encapsulates the experience and wisdom gained by the Army over half century
of being engaged in such operations since Independence. The Army has evolved this
doctrine in light of the philosophy of ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ that ‘emphasizes a humane
and people centric approach, underscores the need for scrupulous respect for human
rights and minimum use of kinetic means, in order to create a security environment,
without causing any collateral damage.’ii The philosophy has been constantly been in the
focus in the Indian Army’s approach to counter insurgency, even if it has on occasion
been neglected due to pressures of circumstance. That the Army has not always
delivered on its stringent standards is even acknowledged in the doctrine as the Army
having left ‘footprints of both success and failure’. This story of the Army’s engagement
in counter insurgency can be narrated through the tension between the stringent yardstick
it has given itself and the operational reality. The degree of convergence has been
dependent on the debates within the Indian Army on how to approach the issues and
problems encountered. This paper attempts to trace the Indian Army’s counter insurgency
story in J&K through retelling these debates.

It is counter-intuitive to refer to ‘debates’ within armies that are otherwise universally taken
as disciplined, hierarchical, traditional and conservative institutions. However, this would
be to miss the amazing intellectual versatility and distinctiveness of India’s Army. It has
an internal environment reflective of its host society. Springing from a societal tradition
valuing argumentiii and defending a democratic state it cannot but have an open internal
environment. This constitutes its strength and to this strength can be attributed its
professionalism, unique among armies in the developing world. The approach to
countering insurgency - a product of the uniquely Indian brand of professionalism - can
be held up to the world, and the US led West in particular, as an example.

It can be argued that though the military position in these debates often tended in favour
of its institutional interests, the contending perspective was never suppressed. To the
resulting balance can be attributed the Army’s preservation of its image and conduct as
a people-friendly counter insurgency force. However, this self-image met its gravest
challenge in J&K. The Army’s position on the various aspects of its J&K engagement
depended on the relative strength of the two sides of the debate. The direction of the
debate and the extent the leadership was persuaded by either side at various junctures
determined the Army’s approach and accounted for change. As has been credibly
documented elsewhere its conduct has not been entirely above reproach. Pointing to
mitigating circumstance or rationalizing the Army’s position in such instances as being
forced on it by the adverse circumstances brought on by ‘proxy war’ can be attempted.
This essay however refrains from doing so but it would be only pragmatic to place the
perspective offered here in the context of the times.

Peter Paret, a renowned authority on Clausewitz, accurately identified a key characteristic

of insurgency in the relationship between military and political dimensions of the conflict:
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“Military power plays essentially a secondary role; the decisive factor is the population,
which is both the strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary object.”iv While the
military dimension is the domain in which ‘creative ability is free to roam’, sensitivity to the
other dimensions of the conflict, namely, socio-economic, cultural-ideological,
psychological and international is evident in these debates.v These matters - influenced
by the military position, though not determined by it - form the ‘context’ of the internal
debates. It is a complex story, but, as the recent elections in J&K demonstrated, one with
a potentially happy ending. The salient debates - determining the layout of this paper -
were over understanding of the internal conflict; the role of the Army vacillating between
the ‘hard-line’ and ‘soft-line’; and on operational issues as leadership style, human rights,
relationship with the media and the controlled use of force.

Understanding the Conflict

The better known debates that occurred in the wider public domain naturally found
resonance in the thinking in the Army. These revolved round whether the Kashmir
problem was a secular one as an inter-state territorial dispute or one with ideological and
existential portents for the two states. Among the earliest debates was the extent the
conflict was externally inspired against one created by Indian neglect and Pakistani
opportunism. Disputed also were aims and objectives of Pakistan and its Army, of
whether these were Kashmir specific or more expansionist in envisaging the unraveling
of India. Since 9/11 the argument has been over the extent Kashmir is on the radar screen
of Islamists challenging the GWOT in the vicinity. The outcome of these debates
determined the prescription operational in J&K at various turns in the Kashmir story.

Approaches ‘for’ and ‘against’ the motion in a debate are determined largely by the ‘belief
system’. It is a set of orienting lens for ordering preferences. Psychology has it that that
‘action’ is based on the ‘image’ of situation, rather than ‘objective’ reality. This ‘image’ is
a function of the belief-system. Thus a conservative belief system is more than likely to
view the world in realist terms, while a liberal orientation lends itself to rationalism. This
leads to identification of individuals and institutions on the conservative-realist and liberal-
rationalist continuum.vi

The dominant philosophy in security establishments globally is realism owing to their

being generally conservative, tradition minded, power oriented and concerned with high
politics.vii Realist theory has it that national security stems from the optimization of power
in the defense and furtherance of national interest. Such simplistic elevation of the
geographic state and of the inter-state system, leads to an external orientation - whereby
internal security is seen as subversion from without. The downside to realism is that
‘safeguard of one’s national interests may result in compulsions which necessitate the
departure from absolute principles of morality’,viii given the amoral nature of realism-based
inter-state relations. Such paradigm dominance forecloses other legitimate and valid
approaches to security. The contention between realism and rationalism played out at the
national level and found expression also in the debates internal to the Army.
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In the realist perspective, aid and abatement by Pakistan as per a supposed plan named
Op Topac,ix led to the onset of the ‘terror’ in J&K. The Op Topac mythology is so ingrained
that even the Kargil intrusion that occurred about ten years later has been mistaken as
its end-game, with an aim of having multiple options of addressing the Valley.x In this
view, Pakistan has sought to undercut India by tying down Indian conventional superiority
in a low cost ‘proxy war’. Violence being the language that Pakistanis have chosen, the
Indian response has to be appropriate in a language ‘they’ understand. It is believed that
Kashmiri participation has consistently been declining as Islamists from Pakistan and
elsewhere hijacked the issue. Politico-strategic ends of the Pakistani state are only part
of the problem – the more pertinent issue is now of radical Islam. As the post 26/11
aftermath has demonstrated, Pakistan is unlikely to restrain the ‘jehadis’. It fears they
would turn against their mentor, and in so doing deal a deathblow to the quasi-modernist
order in Pakistan. The answer, in this perspective is, therefore, to ensure defeat of these
forces not only in Kashmir but also across the border with India weighing in
unambiguously alongside the US-NATO combine in the GWOT.

To the contrary, the rationalist viewpoint focuses more on domestic politics. It gives
weightage to the issue of mismanagement of the sensitive border state. Once militancy
erupted in an initial, if short lived, bout of active people’s participation, it was seized on
by Pakistan for its own strategic ends. Kashmiri involvement is given greater credence
and is attributed in part to the heavy-handed response of the state. It favours a moderate
approach privileging politics over a military dominant approach. Military operations require
to be progressed in a people-friendly fashion. This may entail difficulty in operational
translation, but it is not beyond the tested professionalism of the redoubtable Indian
military. Kashmiri participation - to the extent of two thirds of the militant cadres being of
the indigenous Hizb ul Mujahedeen - is what gives the problem the dimensions of an
insurgency, as against it being characterized arbitrarily as ‘terrorist’ and ‘proxy war’.
Terrorism is tactics in a wider insurgency. Incident in demographic terrain, it requires that
the counter be mindful of the human environment. Therefore, the space, created by the
security forces in their containment of violence so far, needs to be exploited for initiation
of a purposeful dialogue within the ‘four corners’ of the Constitution.
The divergent approaches in national discourse are evident through another example.
Realists Ajay Sahni and KPS Gill have been trenchant critics of ‘peace processes’ in
general and of the ongoing one in J&K in particular.xi The broader reservation of the
authors is that the search for peaceful political solutions is akin to appeasement. With
respect to J&K, the contention is that the initiative is flawed in that it is neglectful of the
context of the problem – the context being taken as the increasing presence of radical
Islam in the subcontinent through the instrumentality of a Pakistani state held hostage by
its military and its intelligence agencies. The alternative picture is presented by Wajahat
Habibullah, a former civil servant of the J&K cadre. He diagnoses the ‘revolt’ of the people
as one brought about, inter-alia, by the India's insular policy in Kashmir of keeping the
state on dole and under corrupt regimes. In his paper while on sabbatical, xii he redefines
the conflict from being perceived as an inter-state one by focusing on people and the
effect of the conflict on them. His advocacy in favour of the 'human security' paradigm is
a refreshing contrast to the majority realist tracts on the Kashmir issue.
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Realist formulation of security has been the dominant one in the national security
discourse, ever since the onset of the ‘1962 syndrome’. The 1962 syndrome has been
brought about by the defeat by China being attributed to a neglect of power generally and
military power in particular. The ‘Panipat syndrome’ is the second argument used by
realists to degrade liberal approaches to security. It involves identifying emerging threats,
such as the irredentist and subversive threat posed by Pakistan, and meeting it ‘pro-
actively’. The realist approach commands majority adherence of the strategic community
and is in line with the institutional bias of security agencies. Nevertheless it has not carried
the argument entirely and the liberal-rationalist school has succeeded in keeping it on the
defensive.

Consequently, the Indian state has a dual track approach, mindful of the strengths of both
perspectives. Inevitably, its bifocal perspective has pleased neither completely. In
keeping with the principal point of counter-insurgency theory, it is mindful that each
insurgency is different, requiring a case-specific approach. For security forces this implies
operations in keeping with the trusted WHAM principles; for the government it implies
persisting with the political prong of the counter-insurgency effort.

The dominant perspective did manage to queer the ‘image’ of the threat in Kashmir in
security analysis. In the popular understanding, the problem in Kashmir has been
unleashed by Pakistan. To most `it is a well planned and meticulously executed
operation by the ISI and master-minded by the then Pakistan President Gen Zia-ul-
Haq.... codenamed Op Topac'.xiii The doyen of Indian strategic thinkers Mr.
K. Subramanyam, apologised in print for mistaking Op Topac for reality.xiv
Following from the assumption of Pakistani complicity in initiation and sustenance
are prescriptions indelicately put thus: `If terrorists and their kind are accepted as enemy
soldiers, then what is (sic) this humbug efforts to bring
`misguided' people into the national mainstream?'xv The writer goes on to write
that, ‘The lords of the jungle must be given a taste of their own medicine. The cure lies in
this. The morality bug and human considerations are opium for inaction.’xvi The phrasing
indicates the irritation with fighting with ‘one hand tied behind the back’. The alternative
view in the rationalist tradition finding echo in the Army highlights the debate within: ‘the
soldier has to respect human dignity…Arrogance of power is the assured guarantor of
people’s alienation. The military must learn to go to the people if need be.’ xvii
A major influence over the period of disturbed conditions in Kashmir has been
ascendance of the doctrine of cultural nationalism, Hindutva, in the rest of India and in
the Jammu region in J&K. Hindutva has impacted politics, society and the public
discourse.xviii This debate in wider Indian society and its inevitable incidence within the
Army owes to the attraction of the philosophy among the middle classes, particularly in
areas of majority recruitment into the officer corps.xix Where militants and mercenaries
claim to be engaged in a jehadi enterprise, viewing it with saffron tinged lens does not
make for an explosive ‘image’. This is a pertinent exercise given that religion is used as
a motivator in the Army in some ethnic based regiments.xx In this regard, noted political
scientist Harish Khare, who has a doctorate from Yale on the role of perception in decision
making, makes the point: ‘Once the DSP, or the RR Major, come to imbibe this even if
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unconsciously, there will only be disproportionate use of force and lasting alienation with
intractable consequences for maintenance of internal order.’xxi
There are instances of accepting, if not adopting, a revised symbolic format in its make
over from the British legacy within the military. An example is the installation of the statue
of the Goddess of Learning at the Valmiki Library at the Defence Services Staff College.
An indicator of the possible extent of impact of Hindutva philosophy on the Army in
Kashmir is visible in the surfacing of a Lieutenant Colonel, who once worked in the
intelligence set up in Kashmir, as the mastermind in the Malegaon blasts case under
investigation. While the case is doubtless an aberration as conceded by the Army, there
is subscription to cultural nationalism in the service. This is unexceptionable since soldiers
as individuals cannot be without political beliefs. It is the influence these belief’s have on
judgment that is of consequence. A General, who commanded a division in Kashmir, was
of this opinion: ‘We have not maintained our racial purity and though successive invaders
have been assimilated our customs language and even our religion has been gradually
affected. Consequently although we have retained our basic character and our racial
pride, we have also absorbed the traits of the invader as racial and religious
intolerance.’xxii It would require supreme professionalism in the individual and a highly
vigilant organizational climate to ensure such beliefs do not unduly contaminate military
conduct. A possible influence of such thinking has been traced by a noted authority on
Kashmir, Wirsing, in his observation: ‘The real source of the problem in Kashmir, a senior
civil servant in Srinagar said, lay in India’s domestic political situation. Hindu
fundamentalism was gaining ground. Both the army and the bureaucracy were affected
by it.’xxiii
The existence of two streams of thought in the wider discourse accounted for lack of clear
political direction from the Center. Coalition dynamics of the Nineties and alternation in
power between the principal political formations since then has led to political
inconsistency in Kashmir. Along with the direction of the internal debates, shortfalls in
political direction account for dissonance, to the extent it has occurred, in the Army’s
approach to Kashmir. The major lesson here is that there has to be closer political control
in such situations, given that the Army, as organization theory informs, is programmed to
focus on the immediate, leaving the problematic aftermath to political management;
favoring offensive over defensive doctrines; is unimpressed with non-military alternatives;
and defines ‘victory’ narrowly.xxiv
Role of the Army
The usual tenor of professional journals faithfully reproducing internal debates, on the
political context of insurgency is that, ‘the goal is to resolve a political problem with political
means, with minimum necessary use of military force.’xxv Political initiatives, intermittently
taken and haltingly pursued, have however placed the military instrumentality of the state
center stage to the extent that at least two Chiefs, Generals VP Malik and Padmanabhan,
on demitting office have said that there is no military ‘solution’ to political problems
constituted by insurgencies. Their reflection was probably to attract attention of political
decision makers and their bureaucratic advisors to the somnolence of the Indian state in
tackling insurgencies. Relying on the Army to contain these indefinitely carries the risk of
overstretching the Army and makes the Army a convenient scapegoat should the situation
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deteriorate. It impacts internal management of the Army, a matter of concern to Chiefs

who are the ultimate ‘stop’ for the proverbial ‘buck’.
In such a situation, the Army understandably sees itself as the ‘last bastion’. The disturbed
situation in Kashmir has on occasion been of the order that inspired such a reading of its
role, particularly during the early period and in the immediate aftermath of the Kargil War.
The problem posed by Pakistani machinations has however been compounded by the
Army tending towards the Moltkean definition of military autonomy and role. The Prussian
military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, inclined towards the position that political
considerations permeate military matters and are paramount even during the conflict
stage. General Moltke, credited with the rise of German military power in the nineteenth
century, redefined or misread Clausewitz in believing that the military sphere is
autonomous on outbreak of hostilities. The military role in such a circumstance is
destruction of enemy military capacity as means to defeat enemy ‘will’. This tendency
reached its zenith in Marshal Ludendorff’s retrospective writings on the First World
War.xxvi On this conceptual point, Paret interprets Clausewitz as under:
‘Clausewitz’s recognition of the political character of war reinforces the dual nature
of war that war is not an isolated act. The defeat of the enemy’s armed power is
not an end in itself but a means to achieve political goals. Violence should express
the political purpose and express it in a rational, utilitarian manner; it should not
take the place of the political purpose nor obliterate it. Consequently the political
leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war…Instead the
chiefs of staff and commanders of the Prusso-German general staff thought that
once war has broken out it was essentially an autonomous activity and did
everything in their power to protect the army its strategy and its operations from
political interference…In a culture shaped by specialists and technocrats, with an
assertive military unchecked by the political leadership, the universalist outlook of
Clausewitz expressed in On War dimmed and was lost.’xxvii
Translated into the counter insurgency context this implies that the political should
continue to determine military domain. While terrorist ranks have to be kept pruned
through military action, such action should not lead to a rise in terrorist numbers by
alienated recruits signing up to the cause. However absent credible political direction, the
Army set about defining its role. Since the political plank of negotiations was not pursued
with any sense of direction or commitment either with Pakistan or with Kashmiris, the
Army had to continue in a severely tested counter insurgency grid. Koithara, a retired
Admiral and keen observer of the Army in Kashmir since, has observed that, ‘the political
failure of the state on the one hand and the increase in the repressive capability of the
state on the other, have led to notably more militarized approach to internal security.’xxviii
India’s exercise in coercive diplomacy in wake of the Parliament attack in the form of
Operation Parakram forced Pakistan, among other reasons as outbreak of the GWOT to
its west, to change tack. The return of elected government in Kashmir and stabilization of
the coalition era in Indian politics has also ameliorated the Army’s quandary. Thus with
improving contextual and ground circumstance, the Army’s position has considerably
eased.
The structures necessary for political control were absent initially in J&K. In the period
when generals were appointed as Advisers Home to the Governor to coordinate internal
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security, according to an Indian Defence Review Study Team, ‘the Army perceived the
concept as undermining its chain of command. The Army therefore asserted its legislated
autonomy.’xxix Dilution in political control in this manner had an operational fallout. A
content of a message from the Army to the UHQ, in reference to the famous controversy
over the handing over of food to trapped militants in Hazratbal in 1993, demonstrates this:
‘The Army Commander is unhappy over this incident. In future, if the food has to be
served inside, orders of the Adviser (Home) in writing should be there, otherwise no body
will be allowed to enter the shrine. If it happens again, the Army will be forced to lift the
siege and the civil administration will have to make its own arrangement.’xxx It would
appear the Mutt and Jeff game of the Army and the civil administration was not as per a
plan, as has been interpreted by Manoj Joshi,xxxi but is more a power game.xxxii
Once a situation has been ‘handed over’ to the Army with the declaration of an area as
‘disturbed’ under Article 3 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, it is the Army’s
responsibility to bring the situation back to a state in which the administration can function
effectively. The fact that even in such a circumstance it remains in ‘aid to civil power’
receded to the background in Kashmir. The logic against this was that the Army’s
credibility could not be chanced by handing over decision making to an uncertain
administration with indistinct lines of authority.
Later when elected Chief Ministers were in the chair of the Unified Headquarters, Corps
Commanders acted as Security Advisers. The absence of the Army Commander,
Northern Command, from the setup was an anomaly in the chain of accountability to the
state administration – ‘law and order’ being a state subject. This has led in part to
aggravating latter day issues as implementation of the ‘human touch’ policy and proposals
for demilitarization. Over time, the effort to hand over the improving situation to the central
police forces has enabled the Army to disengage progressively to a situation now in which
it is a subdued presence in rural areas. The control is being handed over in turn to the
police testifying to improved conditions. Clearly, the return of normalcy owes to the Army
staying steady in crisis. However, a ‘lesson learnt’ should be on the higher level
management, legal instruments and structures in higher order internal security situations.
The issue of autonomy of a self-regarding military is central to civil military relations. It
was most dramatically brought to fore in the sacking of General MacArthur from his
command in Japan in his challenging of Truman’s perspective and that of the Joint Chiefs
on the Korean War. MacArthur believed he, and the military, owed allegiance to the
people and not to elected incumbents. In Kashmir, the issue can be traced through the
understanding brought out in Arjun Ray’s book, written as a Brigadier in the Badami Bagh
headquarters. He opines that the ‘army belongs to the people, never to the government,
accordingly, the army is answerable only to the people.’xxxiii Given that the ‘commitment
of the nation has to be kept alive’,xxxiv the information war requires to also turn inwards
through the media. This responsibility, along with ‘management of the environment’, is
taken as the sphere of operational responsibility of the commanding general.
The contrary view, that the army is an instrument of state run by the government and
accountable to the government of the day, has nevertheless been the traditionally
dominant view in the military. The commanding general is required to input the
government on policy and implement it. This has been largely the case even in Kashmir,
though institutional pushing and shoving does obscure this facet at times. Also there is
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considerable heartburn, and rightly so, within the brass of their distance from the political
head due to an intervening layer unaccountable bureaucracy.
A sympathetic understanding the army’s position would lie in first coming to grips with its
internal compulsions. In the early nineties, the army was over extended, with
commitments in J&K and Punjab following close on the heels of de-induction from Sri
Lanka. Budgets had been cut and the army had declined in public prestige as against a
liberalizing civil sector. Its deliberate effort at a low profile in areas as Punjab resulted in
higher esteem for the efforts of the KPS Gill led Punjab Police.xxxv The fallout was in the
form of an appreciation deficit. The cumulative impact in Kashmir was in a determination
of the hard-line, image projection and institutional expansion to cope with the additional
demands.
Taking Kashmir as a ‘proxy war’ alone has legitimized a militarized strategy of dealing
with it. A major implication was in its treatment as a long-term affair, requiring institutional
innovation. At a cost of US $25 million the Army initially raised a 36 battalion para-military
force, the Rashtriya Rifles.xxxvi This force has now about three score units, courtesy the
experience of the Kargil War in which a loosening in the counter insurgency grid led to
resurgence of fidayeen led terrorism. With its creation institutionalisation of Army
involvement in internal security was complete. However, its evolution was in the midst of
a ‘proxy war’ challenge leading to a worsening of the situation before the situation finally
got better with the stabilization of the RR on a stable counter insurgency grid.

Operational Issues

There are several candidate operational for discussion. These include the two distinct
campaigns underway – counter infiltration along the Line of Control and counter
insurgency in the hinterland. There are several facets of the latter. These include tactical
level direct action, leadership styles, special forces operations, morale, training, logistics,
population control measures, intelligence operations, fraternization, Operation
Sadhbhavna and information operations. Tackling these would amount to a book length
work. Instead only key issues need detain our attention.
The conduct of the Army was determined by the operational level leadership exercised
by commanders at the Corps and Command level. The strategy comprised ‘zero
infiltration’ based on a series of interception lines starting with the ‘Vij line’ on the Line of
Control, incessant intelligence based operations in the hinterland and civic action through
Operation Sadhbhavna. This was a departure from its earlier Strategy of Exhaustion in
which the people were inconvenienced in massive operations so as to punish and deter
popular support to the militants.
The internal debate on revolved around the extent of autonomy is to be permitted the
tactical level in a circumstance in which tactical actions had strategic repercussions.
Identification of the key level was also discussed, whether it is that of the General in
theatre, the commanding officer or the junior leader.xxxvii The theoretical backdrop to this
debate was provided by a landmark study, The Soldier and the State, by late Samuel
Huntington, better known for his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. It deals with officership as
a profession and defines the military’s role as ‘management of the means of violence’. In
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this definition lies the controversy over the primary identification of the officer corps - as
Warrior-Leaders or Managers. Succeeding studies in the same genre by Morris Janowitz,
The Professional Soldier, and Charles Moskos, The Institution-Occupation Debate,
indicate of the universal search for identity by the military professional. An ARTRAC
publication on Leadership has summed up the institutional position thus:
“…even the Armed Forces in USA replaced leadership with management…The
Americans lost that war (Vietnam War), the only war they have lost in their history.
One of the major reasons that contributed to this set back was that they had
discarded leadership in favor of management.”xxxviii

One opinion was that ‘the Army wins or loses at these two crucial levels of command –
the platoon commander and the general.’ In this perspective ‘while battalions kill militants,
the generals must get on with the mission of winning the information war…this is what
generalship is about… to lean back and take a wide angled view of the ground and
political situation. He must continually keep sharing his intent with subordinate
commanders, fighting the info war and managing the environment…’. xxxix This bespeaks
of a managerial style at the operational level. An opposed view is that more hands-on
leadership is required at the operational level since ‘CI is long drawn, laborious, sapping,
tricky, taxing, uncertain and flexible and to a much higher degree than conventional war.
Without an equally high level of camaraderie, concern for and involvement with men and
sincere and effective exercise of heroic pattern of leadership, there can be no inspirational
leadership’. Though appreciative of the junior leader for ‘enthusiasm, keenness, guts and
promptness’, in this view if ‘the formation commander did not inspire his command that
body of troops would be at half its efficiency.’xl

Critical to pronouncing on the debate are the influential findings of Gabriel and Savage
in, relation to the American performance in Vietnam:

‘The War in Vietnam was tied intimately with politics. Accordingly by the terms and
conditions of the war, ALL operations should have been subject to intense high
command supervision in order to ensure that violence employed is moderated
commensurate with political warfare…all low level commanders should have
ideally demonstrated high competence in counter guerilla tactics while at the same
time being controlled by strict overall counter guerilla policy.’xli

It is known that counter insurgency operations are largely undertaken at the tactical level.
Though at tactical level, all actions have a propensity of fallout at strategic level. In case
of convergence in operations with doctrinal precepts, the strategic fallout is in terms of a
populace won over. In case of divergence, there is the strategic after affects of the
negative spiral to be contended with. The junior leader is therefore crucial to the outcome.
Supervision of this level reduces pressures for seeking success in the name of ‘unit ki
izzat’ and ‘results by any means’. Quantification of indicators of unit performance compels
resort to avoidable means. The formation commander, not encumbered by morale-related
attachment to regimental symbols and more aware of the propaganda link between
military actions and political fallout, is better positioned to exercise the requisite influence.
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A formation commander with experience in Kashmir has written that ‘the formation
commander should concentrate more on creating the ethos and discipline conducive to
CI operations’.

Since the RR was the primary instrument of the Army in Kashmir, it warrants a closer
look. The RR was honed in the face of battle and against long standing theories of military
sociology. Military history has most extensively documented the phenomenon of
integration in studying it in the German soldiers of the retreating Wehrmacht and in the
American experience in Vietnam. The conclusions of cohesion related theory on the
human element in battle has at its core the ‘primary group’. Horizontal bonding creates
the cohesion so necessary for physiological and psychological ministering to group
member needs. Personnel turbulence is to be kept to a minimum to foster such team
spirit. Vertical integration in the form of inspiring leadership is a pre-requisite. This is the
mainstay of the Indian regimental system. It could be interpreted as ‘quam ki izzat’ since
troops are in ethnically homogenous groups. In short, the concept of RR in theory and
practice was neglectful of the core insights of military sociology.xlii That the Army managed
the change, albeit at a human cost, without losing balance is less to its managerial credit
and more to the junior officers who served in the RR in its trying times.

Owing to divergence from theoretical yardsticks in certain periods of the campaign,

symptoms of ‘brutalization’ and the ‘fatal attraction of the ‘bean count’ and ‘numbers
game’’ surfaced.xliii Comparing 40000 casualties in Kashmir in six years (a figure from
Arjun Ray’s book) against a toll of 25000 in Punjab in ten years of militancy is an indication
of higher levels of violence. Given that 60 per cent of Kashmiri militants were not
aggressive;xliv the kind of arsenal provided by Pakistan; and Pakistani care in keeping the
pot boiling without spill over, it would appear that the levels of armed opposition do not
justify these high casualty figures. In contrast to the IPKF sojourn in Sri Lanka, in eight
years of the problem in Kashmir versus three of the IPKF, 7200 militants have died in
Kashmir versus 6000 LTTE cadre; 840 Army men were killed versus 1400 of the IPKF;
2548 personnel were wounded versus 3500 IPKF personnel; 40000 civilians killed as
mentioned by the Home Minister, J&K versus 13000 Tamils. The level of potential
violence preempted in Kashmir is evident from levels of recoveries numbering 20000
weapons.

The comparison with Punjab and IPKF stint indicates that higher levels of force have been
applied in Kashmir. Does this imply permissive rules of engagement? This appears
justifiable in relation to the gross provocations, violations of human rights and levels of
violence capable of foreign terrorists. But fallout in terms of alienation sustaining the
insurgency was a factor that the Army apparently postponed reckoning with in its quest
to quell foreign terrorists. In the event it is not certain as to the exact cause of the decline
in terrorism. Does it owe to Pakistan temporarily diverting its attention to its western
borders? Nevertheless, it needs be acknowledged these figures when contrasted with the
manner other countries have approached insurgency are extremely favourable and
indicate that Indian methods are not only effective but comparatively efficient. Despite this
that the Army has drawn flak. While media and human rights activism does rile tempers
within the Army,xlv there is also satisfaction that such criticism is an index of the good
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health of Indian democracy, free press and civil society. These constitute checks and
balances in an Indian system that otherwise appears anarchic. It is the ultimate symbol
of supremacy of politics over the military domain and of the people.

The related attitude to the human rights question can be seen from the dichotomy
between doctrine and its practice. The WHAM strategy is central to the former, while
institutional compulsions have a tendency to render askew the actuality.xlvi Organisational
measures to sensitise soldiery to human rights issues have borne fruit. That these efforts
were extensive is evident from the remark they have prompted: ‘Having discussed the
steps being taken by the Army to educate its troops on HR and its concern for discipline,
is it justified to get unduly perturbed about violations?... This over concern by the Army
and senior officers is unduly harassing the junior leadership.’xlvii
India is constitutionally bound by Article 51 of its Constitution to uphold its international
treaty obligations. More importantly, protection of the right to life and liberty (Art. 21), right
against detention and arrest (Art. 22) and to right to constitutional remedies (Art. 32, 226)
exist. In so far as humanitarian law is concerned India has enacted ‘The Geneva
Conventions Act, 1960’. It has however refrained from acceding to the Additional
Protocols of 1977. It set up the NHRC in 1993. It has set up HR Cells in Command HQs
and has HR staff representatives in headquarters down to divisions. The Army has
propagated a set of ‘Do’s and Don’ts’ and a separate supplementary set exists
promulgated by the Army Chief. A list of ‘10 Commandments of the COAS’ was also
drawn up in 1993 and updated in 2005.

The instrumental value in violating the rules and norms covered above is in the
intelligence imperative. Thus, rough and ready measures are accepted as practical
responses. This translates as alienation for the civil population resulting in a further freeze
in information, and a certain gallingly sullenness of disposition. The latter invites
gratuitous violence having origin in frustration, arrogance, sadism, and displacement.
Another aspect impacting human rights is the punitive one, justified as retribution in the
name of the state carried out by the forces filling in for the dysfunctional judicial system.
These pathologies obtain in varying degrees in all armies countering insurgency. This is
true also of Western forces engaged in ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. Getting
the counter insurgent into this quagmire is the insurgent aim and terror is his strategy. By
this yardstick winding down of insurgency in Kashmir is proof of the Indian Army being
well along in its learning curve. This is best summed up by a respected General:

“In Counter Insurgency operations, commanders at company and battalion levels

often find themselves in a quandary…Should they liquidate him (abettor) in an
‘encounter’..?...Indian Army has shown admirable restraint and maturity in all such
cases…It is no coincidence that ours is the only Army in the world, which has
successfully eradicated or tackled insurgency…”xlviii

The Indian ‘military way’ is unique in limitations in the use of force. For instance, although
there exists a lobby for the use of air power in countering insurgency, this capability has
not been resorted to. Advocacy that ‘air power has the potential to play a significant role
in containing and eliminating the insurgency in J&K’xlix does not find much traction in
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Indian thinking. This has lessons for other armies to only a limited extent since they tend
to compensate for lack of manpower with firepower delivered from stand off distances in
a post heroic age. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a leading critic of both the Taliban and the methods
being used to tackle them, observes that ‘heavy use of airpower has led to large numbers
of non-combatant casualties…This approach swells the Taliban's ranks. If there is to be
any chance of containing the Taliban menace, the coalition forces must set zero innocent
civilian casualties as their goal.’l

India has by comparison been most restrained. This owes partially to an expanded
definition of Area Of Responsibility into which the Army’s manpower-heavy counter
insurgency grid is imprinted on the map, on the ground and indeed on the consciousness
of the people. This privileges the population over terrain. Terrain is substituted by
demographic terrain. The accent has changed from ‘Area’ to ‘Responsibility’ implying
responsibility is less of the area but of its inhabitants. Equating the lives of the people
placed on the charge through the medium of the AOR with that of the troops under
command makes for strategic sense in CI operations. The Army’s studied approach along
these lines is irritating for votaries of a hard line. Bharat Karnad’s remark, apparently after
interaction with serving officers, reflects the impatience:

‘Despite every evidence to suggest that SOF are far better to wipe out
insurgencies, the Indian Army persists in its folly of using regular troops for this
purpose and on insisting they fight according to some Marquess of Queensberry
rules…And it dissuades them from doing things like eliminating those identified as
jehadi commanders in the field and their main supporters in the society. Indeed,
RR commanding officers have been reprimanded for ‘fighting dirty’ even if these
tactics garnered success!’li

A detached and covert manner of utilizing the ‘dirty tricks’ option is in the raising and
abatement of pseudo-gangs of ‘friendlies.’ This has been the strategy used by General
Petraeus in Iraq in bringing the Sunni Triangle to heel through the Awakening movement
reliant on Sunni irregulars against the Al Qaeda. In Kashmir, the contribution of these
groups has been equally telling. However, as Pankaj Mishra writes, ‘the most dreaded
people in the valley…are renegade militants…the most hated symbol of Indian rule.’lii But
contrary to his prediction that it would not be possible to ‘tame’ them, these groups have
been considerably reined in politically and members have largely been regularized by
absorption into the Police. This has had the effect of increasing the Police’s capacity of
response, thereby enabling the Army to disengage and reduce its visibility in Kashmir.
The rise of the Police in J&K, due in particular to its command over intelligence resources
and reaction capability based on autonomous small teams, is also an interesting story. It
is unlikely this story would ever be told in full due to its many sub plots and actors needing
to remain unspoken and invisible.
The last aspect is Information War. The linkage progressively sought to be established
between Kashmiris, Muslim Indians and foreign manipulation is part of the campaign.
Contrived linkages increasingly obtain in strategic literature and are quite naturally
reflected in the Army’s internal debates on the question of subversion of India’s minority
by Pakistan’s ISI. The implication for the wider Army and the Army in Kashmir is in the
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unwarranted stereotyping of the minorityliii as anti-national and on that count liable.

Imbibing extant commentary leads to faulty assumptions in policy making, inaccurate
policy input and as a corollary inadequate policy output. The Kashmiri question gets held
hostage to the good behavior of minority elsewhere and vice versa and to the broader
question of global Islamist agenda and Western counter. This cumulatively leads to
nowhere in terms of conflict resolution or questionable approaches as the trifurcation of
J&K along religious lines.liv
Conclusion
The Indian Army is well known for a hoary martial tradition, for its apolitical ethos, for its
valourous response to calamities, riots and crisis, and for its stoic soldiery and heroic
junior leadership. Less well known is the culture of discussion within. Though the
commander takes the final call, its officers are entitled to their perspectives and express
their opinions. This has enabled contesting perspectives on all issues to have votaries in
the ranks. This makes for a wider menu of options, policy choices and approaches. The
balance that results keeps the Army reflective of the continent sized country it represents.
This innate strength of the Army bears nurturing. It is not one that can be taken for granted
for the forces buffeting it are of historical dimensions. The outcome of history could well
depend on the Army retaining this strength into the century.

Its consequences for Kashmir have been mixed. Blame must unambiguously be attributed
to Islamabad and in particular to the General Headquarters there for the trajectory of
violence in Kashmir. The Indian Army has been in a reactive mode in a complex setting
and cannot solely be faulted be for the effects of violence and restrictions on lives. In so
far as it has over reached its mandate, blame must be placed on faulting commanders
and those who have failed to maintain an internal climate that deterred such
transgressions. In case of a hypothetical Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
institution has no obligation to defend those who failed to uphold its core values. Crisis is
not a mitigating circumstance since it is in crisis is metal tested and for which training is
meant to prepare soldiers and leaders. This could eventually form part of the resolution
to Kashmir issue and to the Army closing a chapter in which it faced down the gravest
challenge yet to the nation.

The essay cannot but close on the views of a young counter insurgent, Captain A Shinde,
writing in the Army’s flagship publication on counter insurgency and anti terrorism,
Pratividrohi, published by its renowned Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School:

‘CI ops is not conventional warfare, it is an art, it is a new experience each time
you set out for a patrol or an ambush. It is indeed a game that tests you both
physically and psychologically. But most important of all, it makes you test yourself.
Do you have it in you?’lv

i
Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (2006), Shimla: HQ ARTRAC.
ii
Ibid. p.3.
 305

iii
See Sen, A. (1998), The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity, New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giraux.
iv
Peter Paret, “The French Army and la Guerre Revolutionaire”, RUSI Journal, Feb 1959, p. 59.
v
Baylis, J., “Revolutionary Warfare”, in Baylis, J. et. al. (ed.) (1987), Contemporary Strategy, Vol 1, New York:
Holmes and Meier, p. 212-215.
vi
Holsti, O (1962), ‘Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, pp.
244-52.
vii
The Realist tradition has been built by the likes of Chanakya, Thucydides, Tsun Tsu, and Machiavelli. Modern
Realism is attributed to EH Carr. Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz. For a critique in the Indian setting, see Achin
Vanaik’s writings: India in a Changing World, Tracts for the Times; in Raghavan, V., National Security Management,
New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group; ‘India’s Place in the World’ in Chatterjee, P. (1998), ed. Wages of Freedom, Delhi:
OUP, pp. 62-85.
viii
Dixit, J.N. (1996), Assignment Colombo, New Delhi: Konark, p. 349
ix
IDR Study Team, IDR, Jul 89.
x
Combat Journal, Mar 2000, pp 11-13.
xi
‘J&K ‘Peace Process’: Chasing a Chimera’, Faultlines, Vol 8, pp. 1-40.
xii
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr121.html
xiii
`Proxy War', USI Journal, Jul-Sep 1998.
xiv
Strategic Analysis, Apr 1990.
xv
Combat Journal, Dec 1992, p.83.
xvi
‘Defusing Violence and Militancy – An Increasing Role for Armed Forces’, Combat Journal, Dec 91.
xvii
Lt Gen S Sardeshpande, Combat Journal, Dec 1992.
xviii
Ray, A., Kashmir Diary: The Psychology of Militancy, p. 136.
xix
Kundu, A., ‘Over dependence on Martial Race Officers’, IDR, Jul 91, p. 80.
xx
‘Fighting for Nam, Namak, Nishan’, Infantry Plus, Oct 2000, p. 41. The author states: ‘Dominance of one religion
to extinct (sic) the other became common… To save themselves communities formed their own armies…these armies
fought religiously and fervently...This tradition is still alive and was glorified in Op Vijay’.
xxi
The Hindu, 21 Sep 2000.
xxii
Shah, S., ‘An Approach to Motivation’, Infantry Journal, 1997.
xxiii
Wirsing (1994), India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, London: MacMillan, p. 172.
xxiv
Also see Ahmed, A., ‘Institutional Interest in National Security Policy and Decision Making’, unpublished USI
Project, 1999-2000.
xxv
‘Relearning Lessons Learnt in LICO’, Pratividrohi, p.23, Spring 97.
xxvi
Ludendorff, E., The Nation at War, London: Hutchinson, 1936.
xxvii
Paret, P., Makers of Modern Strategy; Oxford, Clarandon Press, 1986, pp. 200, 212.
xxviii
Koithara, V. (2000), Society, State and Security, New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 104.
xxix
IDR Research Team (1994), ‘Army in Kashmir’, IDR, p. 31.
xxx
Papers of Lt Gen (Retd) MA Zaki, then Advisor (Home). The army’s position, expressed by Lt Gen
Padmanabhan on TV was that the food had gone in against the army’s wishes as given in Joshi, M. (1999), The Lost
Rebellion, Penguin, New Delhi, p. 264).
xxxi
Ibid. p. 65.
xxxii
Also see, Habibullah, W. (2008), My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospects of Enduring Peace; Washington:
United States Institute of Peace Press.
xxxiii
Ray, A., Kashmir Diary, p. 197.
xxxiv
Ibid, p. xix.
xxxv
Saklani, D.D. (1999), Kashmir Saga, New Delhi: Lancers, p. 113.
xxxvi
Newberg, P., Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p.
27.
xxxvii
Maj Ali Ahmed, ‘On Military Leadership in Counter Insurgency Operations’, Pratividrohi, Spring 1998, p. 16-
19.
xxxviii
Fundamentals, Doctrines, Concepts – The Indian Army, Shimla: ARTRAC, 1998, p. 9.
xxxix
Ray, A., Kashmir Diary, pp. 178-185.
xl
Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna, p. 151.
xli
‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternate Perspective’, Armed Forces and Society, May
1976, p. 364.
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xlii
The concept of the RR was General Hazari’s brainchild as VCOAS in 1986. In its original form it was for the
raising of such a force as a means of employment of ex-servicemen as an aid in countering militancy in Punjab. It was
transplanted into Kashmir when the Gen. Joshi became COAS. However Gen. Joshi too claims ownership of the idea,
its gestation, and credit for its implementation (COAS Address to the RR Commanders, Harjeet Singh, Insurgency in
Doda, New Delhi, Lancer, 1999, Appendix B).
xliii
Ray, A., Kashmir Diary, pp. 171-179.
xliv
Ibid, p. 60.
xlv
See remark, ‘Till we change our functioning and system we shall continue to be a soft defenceless punching bag
incapable of fighting back for what is right!’ in ‘Media: Friends Turned Foes’, Pratividrohi, Mar 2008. Also see,
Ahmed, A., ‘Rethinking Human Rights’, Sep 2000, p. 49-51.
xlvi
The List of Do’s and Dont’s’ found favorable mention in the Supreme Court’s ruling on the validity of the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (Noorani, A.G., ‘Supreme Court on the Armed Forces Act’, EPW, Jul 4, 1998, p. 1683.
For the list, see Harjeet Singh, Insurgency in Doda, Appendix C.
xlvii
Col RC Patial, ‘Army’s Over Concern - Human Rights’, Pratividrohi, Sep 2006, p.19.
xlviii
Kala, H.B. (2003), Demystifying Military Leadership, New Delhi: Manas, p. 222.
xlix
Group Captain SS Deshpande, ‘Employment of Offensive Air Power against Insurgencies’, Trishul, Autumn
2004, pp. 19-27.
l
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/barack-obama-s-triple-test
li
Karnad, B., ‘Firming up the Critical Capability Triad’, Army 2020, New Delhi: CLAWS, p. 247.
lii
Mishra, P., Sunday Edition, The Hindu, Sep 2000.
liii
Take for instance the absurdity detected on pages of Defence Management (p. 154) written by a Brigadier, ‘British
were closer to the Muslim community, since bulk of their retainers were Muslims who had less social inhibitions than
Hindus…Muslims, unlike other religious denominations, are more inward looking, cohesive and more subservient to
the dictates of the mullah.’ Such instances obtain as a result of editorial oversight rather than editorial complicity since
otherwise vigilant editors are already conditioned by the repeated commentary in the wider media discourse over the
past decade.
liv
Swami, P., Kargil War, New Delhi: Leftword Books, 1999. AG Noorani is another significant analyst unsparing of
right wing politics and its influence on the Kashmir question.
lv
Shinde, A., Pratividrohi, Sep 2004, p. 31.