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Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security

Marianne Hanson
International Relations 2002 16: 361
DOI: 10.1177/0047117802016003004

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Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security
Marianne Hanson, University of Queensland, Australia

Abstract

This article argues that nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in military
calculations; moreover, their continued retention invites the dangers of further
proliferation and of accidental use. They are thus defined here as obstacles to, rather
than as facilitators of, international security. Seven reasons are presented to support this
contention, including an assessment of the moral implications and the strategic
limitations of nuclear weapons. Despite these limitations, and the recent commitments
made by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, nuclear weapons remain
central to the strategic doctrines of these states. Several reasons are put forward to
explain why this retention continues, including the unchanging nature of strategic
mindsets, the presence of vested interests, and now, in the case of the USA at least, a
renewed reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of how appropriate and effective such
a strategy might be against emerging terrorist or ‘rogue state’ threats.

Keywords: disarmament, international security, non-proliferation, nuclear weapons

One of the paradoxes of international security in the post-1945 era is that the
security of a number of key states has been predicated on maintaining arsenals of
weapons which, for a number of reasons, have been effectively unusable. Nuclear
deterrence has been, and continues to be, the cornerstone of security policies for
the USA, Russia, China, Britain, and France. These states, together with their
allies – despite some ambivalence on their part and even calls for nuclear
elimination – essentially concur in the privileging of nuclear weapons as supreme
guarantors of security. India and Pakistan joined these ranks in 1998, although
they are not recognized by the international community formally as nuclear
weapon states under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiated
in 1968.
Yet adoptions of nuclear capability and the maintenance of nuclear deterrence
have proceeded without a realistic acknowledgment of the limited utility of
nuclear weapons in warfare. This article will argue that not only do nuclear
weapons have minimal utility as instruments of war, but that the continued
possession of nuclear weapons also has a deleterious effect on the maintenance of
the broader security order. They are thus perceived here as obstacles to, rather than
as facilitators of, international security. This argument is by no means novel; nor is
it an isolated one.1 A notable development in international relations in recent years
is the extent to which a broad range of states and non-state actors has examined
the utility of nuclear weapons and subsequently called for their elimination.
Particularly in the last decade, the usefulness of nuclear weapon-based security
policies has come under challenge from a variety of voices heard in a number of

International Relations Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications

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362 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

different arenas, ranging from individual foreign ministries to independent

security research centres. What this article will reiterate – within the broad theme
of war canvassed in this issue – is the lack of suitability of nuclear weapons in
military conflict situations. It will proceed, moreover, to suggest a number of ways
in which maintaining nuclear weapons represents a substantial threat to regional
and global security. Its primary claim is that a continuation of the status quo not
only confers no real benefits to states possessing nuclear weapons, but that it also
represents a threat to a global order which seeks to provide an equitable set of
security relations and to minimize the chance of an accidental or inadvertent
nuclear strike. A first point to note, then, is that this article broadly endorses the
main arguments of the push for the elimination of nuclear weapons, namely that
retention of these weapons by a select group of states cannot be sustained in
perpetuity without both the risk of proliferation and the danger of accidental use
growing.
Against this, a critic might argue that significant advances in arms control have
taken place over the last decade and that nuclear stocks are now at levels well
below those at the height of the Cold War. There have indeed been substantial
advances made in arms control in the 1990s and recent pledges by the two states
with the largest stocks, the USA and Russia, promise to take these levels
significantly further. Such advances should not go unacknowledged. But problems
persist; many arms control initiatives remain stalled in diplomatic forums and
there is no indication that the nuclear weapon states, notwithstanding significant
reductions made recently, are moving towards elimination as a ‘firm and serious
goal’.2 This remains the case, despite their commitment at the 2000 Review
Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) where they publicly
and explicitly committed themselves ‘unequivocally’ to the elimination of their
nuclear arsenals, in accordance with that treaty’s obligations. A brief examination
of recent developments in arms control can help to clarify the picture.

Assessing recent nuclear arms control agreements

Most promising in the array of bilateral and multilateral initiatives are the moves
towards implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
agreements and plans to push beyond the levels stipulated by START II. The
latter, which aimed to reduce US and Russian strategic warheads to around 3500
each by 2007, was ratified by Russia in 2000; its provisions had been held hostage
to Russian concerns about US abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty3 and plans to proceed with a ballistic missile defence shield.
Notwithstanding these differences, both states agreed, at the Crawford, Texas
Summit in November 2001 to move beyond these levels, with Presidents Bush
and Putin calling for numbers to be reduced to between 2200 and 1700 warheads
each. These announcements have been welcomed by advocates of elimination,
although some disquiet remains over whether these targets can be achieved in

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 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 363

light of simmering disagreements between the two states on strategic issues.

Whatever the case, it is likely that Russia will be in no position to sustain
financially its present levels of nuclear weapons, and that it will have little choice
but to proceed with substantial reductions.
One of the earliest agreements on nuclear arms control, the 1987 INF
(Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty stands as a striking example of successful
negotiations, inspections and verifications resulting in the elimination of an entire
class of ground-launched intermediate and shorter-range weapons. The treaty’s
full implementation period ended successfully in May 2001, and represented, in
the words of the US representative involved, ‘a new standard of openness . . .
[and] . . . an on-site verification regime of unparalleled intrusiveness’.4 Against
this success, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself remains in a fragile state.
On the one hand, it reflects the near-universal appeal of the non-proliferation
regime, and has had a laudable effect in limiting the horizontal spread of nuclear
weapons. On the other, it is the focus of dissent for a number of non-nuclear states
whose leaders argue increasingly for the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to fulfil
their commitments to disarmament as embodied in Article VI of the treaty.
Although it was extended indefinitely in 1995 and survived a controversial review
process at the 2000 Review Conference,5 the inherent inequality of the NPT treaty
continues to embody the grievances of numerous states opposed to the indefinite
retention of nuclear weapons by a select group of powers. There had been much
concern that the 2000 Conference might see an unravelling of the treaty, with
aggrieved states defecting from its provisions. In the end, this was averted, largely
by a pledge made by the NWS to move ‘unequivocally’ towards the elimination of
nuclear weapons, and the inclusion of a forward-work programme on nuclear
disarmament.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated in 1996 after a period
of self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing by the NWS, has been one of the
chief areas of concern in arms control and disarmament negotiations. Despite initial
US enthusiasm for the project, the CTBT’s future was cast into doubt when the US
Senate refused to ratify it in October 1999. Without this ratification, and ratification
also by key states India and Pakistan – which show little signs of doing so –
the CTBT cannot enter into force and remains at best an informal restraint.
Additionally, the UN-sponsored Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD)
remains the most hopelessly mired of vehicles for advancing arms control. Unable
to agree even on a work programme, debate has not been able to advance a Fissile
Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), negotiations for the prevention of an arms race
in outer space (PAROS), no-first-use commitments from the nuclear weapon states
or a range of other issues long under consideration by the CD. Nor has any
significant progress been made on de-alerting nuclear weapons, one of a number of
measures seen as essential for preventing the accidental use of nuclear weapons.
While a strength of the CD lies in its broad membership, its consensus-based
structure and the perennial differences between the nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states have hampered efforts to move forward on most of its programmes.6

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364 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

This brief survey of arms control agreements indicates that while there might
have been high hopes for arms control and disarmament negotiations in the late
1980s and early-to-mid-1990s, this sense of optimism about what can realistically
be achieved has been subsequently dampened. There is a sense that we have
reached an impasse in arms control which is unlikely to be broken in the near
future; the past few years have seen a decline in expectations that arms control and
disarmament can go any further. The prevailing view now, in contrast to a decade
ago, is that the international community cannot move towards any new non-
proliferation initiatives and may not even be able to implement those agreements
reached in the years after the ending of the Cold War. In sum, any optimism that
policy-makers might move towards a nuclear elimination track – a possibility
considered in the early 1990s, even within the US Administration – has been
considerably altered, notwithstanding the continued efforts of proponents of
elimination.
Such a view is reinforced by the prevailing strategic doctrines of the nuclear
weapons states: the United States, for instance, has insisted on retaining nuclear
weapons as the ‘supreme guarantee’ of NATO security and has reasserted the
‘central role’ of these weapons,7 despite calls from various NATO allies for a
revision of the alliance’s nuclear policy. Most recently, the USA’s January 2002
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), although it placed less weight than was the case
previously on offensive nuclear capabilities, showed no indication that the
centrality of nuclear weapons in US strategic doctrine had been lessened. US
proposals have hinted at the development of new nuclear weapons, and the
possibility of a resumption of testing.8 Russia, for its part, although it has ratified
the CTBT and START II, has also reaffirmed the central role of nuclear weapons
in its military strategy. This was particularly evident in Russia’s 2000 strategic
doctrine, The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation. Although
this position was softened in subsequent months, the doctrine reaffirmed Russia’s
previous commitments to nuclear deterrence and included the possible first-use of
nuclear weapons.9 Some observers have interpreted the Russian concept as a
broadening of the circumstances under which Russia would consider using
nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold for such use.10 With a rapidly
declining strategic nuclear force and the prospect of further reductions in its
arsenal, as well as in conventional forces, Russia is likely to advocate a broader,
rather than diminished role for its nuclear forces. In sum, substantial impediments
to disarmament operate at the domestic level.11 China for its part continues to
modernize its nuclear weapons capability, fuelled by the calculation that its forces
are susceptible to US ballistic defence missile plans, while Britain and France –
although both have engaged in reductions – remain committed to the maintenance
of a minimum nuclear deterrent.

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 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 365

The push for elimination

As noted, these reaffirmations of the salience of nuclear weapons in strategic

doctrines have taken place at a time when many non-nuclear states and non-state
actors have been calling for the delegitimisation and downgrading of these
weapons. A striking development in international diplomacy in the past decade is
the extent to which a broad range of states is seeking to influence the role of
nuclear weapons and the pace of arms control, strategic issues once considered to
be the domain of the Great Powers only. An unprecedented degree of pressure is
currently being applied to the NWS to proceed with further reductions and to
move towards elimination. Much of the pressure has been aimed at the United
States, which is perceived as having an important leadership role to play in
advancing arms control and disarmament, and where it is expected that any
positive US initiatives will be followed by Russia and subsequently the other
nuclear weapon states also. This current pressure against the NWS is evident in
multilateral diplomacy at a global level, where like-minded states form coalitions
of interest, as well as in the reports and analyses sponsored by some of these
states. Unlike calls for disarmament in previous decades which came largely from
the Non-Aligned Movement and from strident critics of Western policy, there has
now evolved a significant diplomatic push from Western allies, political
practitioners and policy analysts advocating rapid reductions, a devaluing of the
role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, and the ultimate elimination of
nuclear weapons. This has occurred independently of US policy preferences and
indeed often runs counter to these preferences.
The nature of this challenge to the nuclear weapon states, and the forms that it
has taken must be noted here. Importantly, the growing call for disarmament has
come from a broad range of actors in the international system, in some cases from
states and groupings of states (such as the NAC – the New Agenda Coalition12); in
others, from individuals often associated with policy and/or from non-governmental
organizations. In other cases, reports have emanated from analysts within respect-
able institutions. Overwhelmingly, these calls are not for unilateral disarmament, but
rather for phased, balanced and verifiable moves towards the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons, based on calculations of the utility of such weapons. They
invariably call for the salience of nuclear weapons to be reduced as a first step
towards delegitimation, and accept that the security concerns of the NWS must be
effectively addressed during any moves to zero. In general, there is agreement that
although these weapons cannot be disinvented, their possession and use – and their
eventual elimination – can nevertheless be managed by strong norms and institutions.
The composition of this broad movement is surprising. Where once the calls
for disarmament signified a divide between a radical left-wing and ‘establishment’
officials, this is no longer the case.13 As Lawrence Freedman has observed, the
present campaign for elimination ‘feels less like a popular crusade and more like
an extended discussion of policy detail’.14 The argument for elimination today is
not being made by fringe organizations or radical groupings, but rather by

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366 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

respected and acknowledged specialists on the military and political issues

attendant on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Certainly the debate
today is more informed and less driven by idealism than in the days of the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, and
includes academics, policy analysts in respectable research institutions, senior
military and defence officials and politicians more associated with traditional
nuclear strategy. What is remarkable is the extent to which the debate is a serious
mainstream issue in international diplomacy today. At the declaratory level, there
is full acceptance of the norm against nuclear testing and possession of nuclear
weapons and a widespread acceptance – again at the declaratory level at least15 –
of the need to move to a position of zero, something that would have been
unthinkable even at the declaratory level in previous decades.
Notable reports issued in the 1990s by independent bodies included the
Stimson Center Steering Committee Reports, especially its final report, An
American Legacy: Building a Nuclear Free World (March 1997) and the report of
the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the US National
Academy of Sciences, The Future of Nuclear Weapons Policy. Also notable was
the Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals in
1996 and a similar Statement by International Civilian Leaders.16 Perhaps most
substantial are the reports sponsored by individual states. The Australian
government-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons17 in 1996 and the Japanese government-sponsored Tokyo Forum
Report18 released in 1999 have been adopted as useful analyses of the feasibility
of nuclear elimination.19 These initiatives sought to avoid the sometimes
belaboured progression of bilateral and multilateral talks and formal negotiations,
and to produce assessments which might have a more timely and pronounced
impact than did traditional security negotiations. Relevant here also is the 1998
Canadian Parliamentary Report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge, the
recommendations of which were aimed at reducing the political value of nuclear
weapons and advancing non-proliferation and disarmament.20

The case for elimination

Given this context, this article will proceed to its main argument, that nuclear
weapons serve no useful purpose in military calculations, and that their retention
impedes security because of the danger of proliferation and accidental, un-
authorized or inadvertent use. Seven reasons are presented to support this
contention.

1. The moral case against nuclear weapons

The first and arguably most important of these arguments revolves around
humanitarian factors. Ethical considerations against the use of nuclear weapons

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 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 367

are not by any means new21 but they have been strengthened considerably in the
past decade. Because nuclear weapons are targeted at civilian populations and rely
overwhelmingly for their impact on the threat of a massive loss of civilian life, the
use – and by implication, the threat of use – of these weapons violates inter-
national humanitarian law which seeks to regulate the conduct of warfare.22 The
two core principles of humanitarian law governing the actual conduct of armed
conflict (ius in bello) specify, first, that parties to a conflict must distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants and, second, that it is prohibited to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Both of these principles would be
violated by resorting to nuclear warfare. (Indeed, injuries would continue in sub-
sequent generations also, as the deformities and illnesses in post-war Hiroshima
and Nagasaki demonstrated, thereby raising questions of intergenerational
justice.) The question is essentially this: Can the deliberate killing of vast numbers
of civilians as retaliation for the actions of their state (or sub-state) representatives
ever be justified?
Despite these concerns, the very basis of nuclear deterrence, the foundation of
security policy for nuclear weapon states and their allies, remained (and remains)
implicitly tied to the threat of widespread destruction of civilian areas and high
loss of civilian life. What was notable about the Cold War doctrine of nuclear
deterrence was the scant attention paid to the humanitarian implications of such a
policy. Plans for deterrence and retaliation went ahead at the same time that it was
clear that actually using nuclear weapons would force the crossing of a serious
ethical line. As Nina Tannenwald has outlined,23 the existence of this taboo
against nuclear weapons was important in restricting their use since 1945; by
extension, these moral concerns can also be said to have limited their strategic
utility (relevant to the point below). This was always the case, but realistic
assessments of the utility of nuclear weapons were detached from the momentum
that propelled strategic postures and the arms race, and moral considerations
appeared to have had little impact on planning for nuclear warfare. As Andrew
Butfoy noted when outlining the paradox of a security policy dominated by a
concept of deterrence that involved the theoretical use of what are essentially –
because of their humanitarian implications – unusable weapons, Cold War nuclear
policy represented a ‘parallel, abstract world divorced from day-to-day
diplomacy’.24 The point here is that these moral and logistical constraints,
inseparable even from early calculations of nuclear strategy, are becoming
increasingly highlighted in current debates and reports on arms control and
disarmament. Important here is the growth of a widespread sentiment that modern
warfare – if it is deemed to be legitimate at all – must avoid or minimize civilian
casualties. The controversies surrounding NATO bombings in Yugoslavia and the
US campaign in Afghanistan – using conventional weapons – highlighted this
point. Nuclear warfare, unlike the examples just noted which resulted in
accidental civilian deaths, relies instead on the promise of widespread civilian
deaths, a strategy hardly likely to be acceptable in present international society.

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368 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

2. The strategic case against nuclear weapons

As practical instruments of warfare, nuclear weapons would appear to have no
utility. The Canberra Commission was most explicit in noting that they cannot be
used in war, that they have ‘long been understood to be too destructive and non-
discriminatory to secure discrete objectives on the battlefield’. Their very non-use
in conflicts since 1945 indicates that political and military leaders have conceded
the unsuitability of such weapons to achieve their strategic goals. This is hardly
surprising: as weapons of mass destruction, likely to kill friendly as well as enemy
forces, kill large numbers of civilians and devastate huge areas of the
environment, their launch would negate whatever perceived military or political
benefit prompted their use. And with the advent of precision-guided and ‘smart’
conventional weapons able to give discrete and accurate strategic targeting
(notwithstanding numerous cases of human error and misunderstanding) the more
indiscriminate and unpredictable nature of a nuclear strike is unlikely to be chosen
as a preferred alternative. Restricting damage to specific areas and delineating
between civilians and military personnel is simply not possible with weaponry
that is diffuse, rather than discrete in its impact, a point made repeatedly in the
Canberra Commission and its Background Papers. Even the suggested deploy-
ment by the USA of the so-called ‘mini-nukes’ or bunker-busters does not change
the picture greatly. These are unlikely to give the ‘clean’ result accorded to them
by their proponents; a recent report published by the American Federation of
Scientists concludes that any use of such a weapon would result in a ‘massive loss
of human life’.25 In sum, it is difficult to sustain an argument that nuclear weapons
retain any strategic utility when examining the consequences attendant on the use
of these weapons in war-fighting scenarios. It is especially important to note that it
is the humanitarian implications against the use of these weapons that reinforce
their lack of utility in the battlefield.

3. The need to create a climate for dissuading proliferation

Given that nuclear non-proliferation remains a fundamental goal of the vast
majority of members of the international community,26 there is a strong case to be
made for the elimination of nuclear weapons as vital to strengthening this goal.
Central to this issue is the inequality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which – at
least until Article VI is fulfilled – allows a select grouping of states to retain these
weapons, while denying them to all other states. Reinforcing a strong taboo
against the possession of nuclear weapons – demonstrated by the NWS moving to
elimination of their own arsenals – may be the best means of dissuading
proliferation. As the Canberra Commission has noted:

Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these
weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to
themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and

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 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 369

thus unstable; in cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by

any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.

It would, of course, be naive to claim that a move to elimination by the existing

NWS would guarantee that no state would henceforth acquire such weapons. The
point, however, is that the present situation, in which there is no clear global
prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons, does little to encourage global
restraint. Moreover, if a climate of zero is achieved, then any episode of pro-
liferation, or ‘break-out’ as it is known, would be of far greater significance than it
is at present. (There is, in any case, a range of viable options available to the
international community to respond to break-out, should it occur.) The shadow of
international condemnation is likely to carry far more weight in a climate of zero
than in one where some states continue to possess even a few weapons.
Essentially, the violation of a norm becomes a much more serious affair if all
states have forsworn the nuclear option. Any attempt to contain or reverse
proliferation, therefore, must be accompanied by a recognition that would-be
proliferators will not curb their nuclear ambitions unless existing nuclear powers
also take steps towards nuclear prohibition.

4. Nuclear forces are not necessary to respond to ‘break-out’

Those who argue against elimination generally voice the fear that it will be
impossible to force compliance with a regime of zero. Central to this view is the
fear of break-out, in which a state or sub-state grouping may choose, despite any
ethical or legal prohibitionary regimes, to build or reactivate a nuclear weapons
programme, thus scoring an advantage against those states that have chosen to
abide by their disarmament pledges.27 As a result, one of the implicit reasons
given for the retention of nuclear weapons is that they are seen as necessary for
deterring, or responding to, any such episode of break-out. But this ignores the
key factor that conventional forces are adequate, and indeed far more appropriate,
to counter any such development. States, and especially the United States, have
recourse to a wide range of military options other than the threat of nuclear
retaliation to deter proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons, or to respond to
any specific episode of break-out once it has occurred. A conventional weapon
response to break-out, if it occurs – and, as noted above, a climate of zero is in any
case likely to be more conducive to non-proliferation than is the existing unequal
structure – would be a logical and pragmatic response able to achieve the
elimination of such a capability at least as well as a nuclear strike.

5. Nuclear forces are not necessary for responding to biological or chemical weapon
threats and attacks
As with the case made immediately above, there is no logical reason for thinking
that nuclear weapons must be retained in order to counter threats or attacks of a

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370 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

chemical or biological weapon nature. Regardless of the problematic humanitarian

implications and the lack of military suitability of nuclear weapons, and despite
the fact that no NWS has declared as a matter of firm policy that it would respond
to biological or chemical weapons with nuclear retaliation, an implicit strategic
linkage appears to have been made which assumes that a weapons of mass
destruction attack requires a weapons of mass destruction (that is, a nuclear)
response. As noted above, conventional weapons will be more appropriate as an
effective response to this issue. Massive (or even limited) nuclear arsenals will not
be helpful for either deterrence or retaliation. A nuclear strike cannot be effective
against a group of terrorists whose whereabouts may be unknown, and whose
numerous cells may in any case be scattered across different parts of the globe.
And even if such a group’s whereabouts could be located, a nuclear launch which
destroys large parts of the environment and kills thousands if not millions of
civilians as punishment for the actions of their leaders or sub-national groups is
simply untenable and could not be seriously contemplated or condoned by the
international community. The US campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan
illustrates this graphically: were there any circumstances in which the USA could
have employed nuclear weapons to eliminate successfully the Al-Qaeda network?
The answer is surely a resounding ‘no’. Not only would such a strike have
inflicted unacceptable civilian losses, but there would also have been no guarantee
that the terrorist network was effectively destroyed. The presence of a large US
nuclear arsenal did nothing to deter the terrorist assault on that country; similarly,
this arsenal has no part to play in responding to that attack.
Rather, the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (by state or sub-state
groups) while it is a growing possibility, is better addressed by focusing on a
series of specific prohibitionary measures. Nuclear attack can best be averted by
eliminating nuclear weapons, establishing tight control over fissile materials,
developing rigorous verification and monitoring mechanisms and strengthening
the legal and moral taboos against their possession or use. None of this is beyond
the international community’s reach. The same is true of chemical and biological
weapons. Multilateral efforts to strengthen and implement universal adherence to
both the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, together with strong
monitoring and verification facilities (including a commitment to the latter’s
Protocol, rejected by the USA in December 2001) represents a far more realistic
approach to addressing this threat than does a reliance on the threat of nuclear
retaliation.28

6. The need to adopt inclusive processes and practices in international security

Despite the ending of the Cold War and some successful arms control agreements
in the early to mid-1990s, a pervading view now is that the large powers in the
international system have not fulfilled their responsibility to create a security
environment which reflects the interests of smaller and middle-sized states in that
system. Although many states have become more involved in international

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 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 371

security debates than ever before, the grievance is that multilateral structures
continue to be dominated by Great Power preferences, specifically, preferences to
retain for themselves a nuclear monopoly. A consequence of this is that the
existing order, which has been largely shaped and upheld by the five established
nuclear powers, may be at risk of unravelling as other states seek to acquire their
own nuclear capability. It becomes harder to deny would-be proliferators the right
to possess nuclear weapons when the nuclear weapon states – constituting an
exclusive nuclear club – themselves continue to affirm the centrality of these
weapons in their security doctrines. In the medium to long term, this may well
have implications for the continuation of an international order acceptable to all
systemic actors, especially non-aligned and non-Western states. Compliance with
the non-proliferation norm might depend on how legitimate the upholders of the
prevailing norm are perceived to be. For the moment, we continue to see an
inherently unequal structure operating in the field of nuclear arms, a structure that
if it persists could be highly destabilizing to the international security order,
particularly if it continues to privilege the interests of the nuclear weapon states as
prior to that of international society as a whole.29

7. The danger of relying on deterrence

A final argument presented here in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons
concerns the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence
involved the strong perception that the possession of nuclear weapons deterred
their use by others. It is conceded here that this might represent a utility for
nuclear weapons, but as the Canberra Commission also concludes, such a utility
implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons; any such utility would
disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated. Moreover, the risks and dangers
inherent in relying on rational deterrence have long been evident.30 This is not a
new reason for arguing against nuclear policies, but it is one worth re-stating here.
With its assumption of the rationality of actors, deterrence cannot be seen as a
reliable instrument for preventing a nuclear strike. Unexamined assertions that
nuclear weapons must be retained to deter attack, either from another nuclear
weapon state or because of a vague and undefined necessity – what Michael
MccGwire describes as a wish for an ‘all-purpose security blanket’31 – not only
gloss over the huge problems associated with nuclear weapons’ use but also risk
perpetuating a nuclear weapons culture in which the very existence of nuclear
arsenals increases the risk of accidental or ‘irrational’ use.
Moreover, it is by no means accepted universally that it was nuclear weapons
and their deterrent qualities that kept the peace between the Great Powers after
1945. The avoidance of war between those states can be attributed to a number of
factors other than deterrence.32 It is salutary also to remember that there are
numerous documented instances during the Cold War period which record a
perilously close descent into a nuclear exchange because of miscalculation or
misperception. There is no guarantee that we will be as lucky in preventing

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accidental war in the future. To use the Cold War experience to argue a usefulness
of nuclear weapons at once attributes too much to their deterrent qualities and
pays not enough attention to the dangers attendant on their very existence.
As the above points have argued, nuclear weapons would appear to have no
real utility in the maintenance of international security. When considered against
the range of threats facing national, regional and global actors today, it is hard to
find a compelling reason for their continued retention that outweighs the moral
costs, strategic limitations, the danger of accidental use or the growth of nuclear
proliferation. As the Canberra Commission has pointed out, nuclear weapons have
no relevance in a world where threats to security increasingly come in the form of
ethnic conflict, weak or failed states, humanitarian disasters, economic crises,
environmental degradation or, as we saw in 2001, terrorism. Given this,
international security can best be served by their elimination.

Why the resistance to reform?

Why then, in light of the lack of utility of nuclear weapons, the dangers associated
with their continued existence and the many pressures being placed on the nuclear
weapon states, has the idea of elimination not gone any further? What are the
factors that make this issue captive to a persistent lack of reform and new thinking
among the nuclear weapon states’ leaders? Six suggestions are offered here. They
apply primarily to the US context, although have application also to the other
nuclear states and the broader international community. But the USA, as the pre-
eminent nuclear weapon state, sets the tone for much of the debate and has an
important leadership role to play, so much so that most of the reports and studies
arguing for elimination explicitly call on the USA to be at the forefront of
commitment to this goal.

Strategic mindsets have not changed

Despite US policy-makers giving this issue consideration in the early 1990s,
nuclear elimination appears to be inconceivable within the USA today. (It is
probably almost as inconceivable in Russia, although, as noted earlier in this
article, there is good reason to believe that if the USA took the initiative on
elimination, Russia and subsequently the other NWS also would fall into line.)
The essential problem is that Cold War strategic mindsets reiterate the (often
unexamined) mantra of the utility of nuclear weapons. A recent example
illustrates this well: the US Nuclear Posture Review, concluded in January 2002,
while it did downplay to some extent US offensive nuclear capabilities and
accorded importance to conventional weapons, nevertheless reiterated the high
salience of nuclear weapons in US security policy. The controversy following the
leak of the classified version of the report, in which the USA was shown to have
been considering planning for nuclear war against China, Russia, North Korea,

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Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya was not really the point (and in any case was dampened
swiftly by Secretary of State Colin Powell). What was most notable about the
Posture Review was that the threshold for nuclear use appears to have been
lowered and that it reaffirmed the reliance on, and centrality of, nuclear weapons
in the USA. The report was criticized by the Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee and several of his Democratic colleagues as perpetuating
outdated Cold War policies.33 Essentially, the Bush administration has been
charged with wanting to maintain a force structure almost identical to the one
recommended by the previous posture review, regardless of US commitments
made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and regardless of changed strategic
circumstances. As General Lee Butler, former Commander in Chief of the US
Strategic Air Command, had already observed, ‘this abiding faith in nuclear
weapons was inspired and is sustained by a catechism instilled over many decades
by a priesthood who speak with great assurance and authority’.34 This ‘catechism’
is unlikely to change in the near future.

Vested interests within the military-industrial-Congressional complex prevail

The maintenance of a modern nuclear arsenal, the attention paid recently to
possible development of ‘mini-nukes’ and the development of a missile defence
system all have important economic ramifications within the USA, with state and
federal legislators reluctant to deprive constituents of the many lucrative defence
contracts associated with the arms industry. Conservative US politicians – both
Democrat and Republican – pushed along by defence industry contractors, appear
at times to be locked into a momentum favouring expensive weapons systems
regardless of the political and diplomatic costs associated with developing these,
and often without any guarantee of their effectiveness. A recent Federation of
American Scientists Public Interest Report has observed that the most vocal
proponents of new weapons come from the nation’s nuclear weapon laboratories.
It concludes that a ‘cynical interpretation of these statements is that the laboratory
staff and leadership simply feel threatened by the current restrictions on their
activities [such as the moratorium on testing] and want to generate a new mission
and associated funding’.35

The nuclear issue has little visibility

One of the most serious structural impediments to nuclear elimination is that this
issue has little visibility at the broader public level. There are two chief reasons for
this. The first is that there is a perception among the wider public that, with the
ending of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear warfare, so evident during the 1960s,
1970s and early 1980s, has diminished substantially or even vanished altogether.
There is little awareness that thousands of nuclear weapons still remain on
dangerously high levels of alert or that episodes of mistaken calculation persist in

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the post-Cold War era also. Second, this is not a topic that has its grim reminders
on a daily basis. The merciful fact that these weapons have not been used since
August 1945 nevertheless removes the danger to an abstract level for most people.
Unlike the case of the successful anti-landmines campaign, for instance, where
victims were represented in a graphic way in the media on a daily basis, and where
statistics showed that these particular weapons were being used in their hundreds
and thousands every day with devastating human consequences, no such stimulus
for action is evident in the case of nuclear weapons.
There is, nevertheless, considerable evidence to show support for a phased and
verifiable move to a nuclear weapons-free world.36 Where public opinion has been
canvassed (and the vigorous reactions to Chinese and French nuclear testing in
1995–6 would tend to bear this out), there is a widespread abhorrence for the idea
of nuclear weapons use. Yet until such time as this abhorrence can be translated
into policy – probably unlikely until we witness a nuclear strike (deliberate or
accidental) and massive loss of life – it will remain inchoate and largely unhelpful
to the elimination campaign.

Perennial fears of the ‘rogue state’ dictate US policy

While undoubtedly the USA and other states have some legitimate cause for
concern about the intentions of what have been labelled ‘rogue states’, this fear
propels the unreasonable maintenance of a nuclear arsenal. Even though, as
argued above, a nuclear response is not appropriate for addressing any such threat
because of its ethical and strategic limitations, the very existence of these states
helps to perpetuate a mindset in which nuclear weapons are perceived as a
necessary all-purpose insurance policy. These states have served to provide a
timely and useful justification for the retention of nuclear weapons, regardless of
the accuracy of threat assessments made against them.37 The recent speech by
President Bush in his State of the Union address – in which he outlined an ‘axis of
evil’ – is but one example of this preoccupation with rogue states. It has set back
efforts by the West to engage in talks with at least two of these states (Iran and
North Korea) and importantly, will have given a green light to those US policy-
makers eager to proceed with missile defence and the zealous maintenance of a
nuclear capability.

A preference for counter-proliferation?

In recent years, the debate in the USA seems to have shifted away somewhat from
the goals of non-proliferation (with nuclear elimination being an integral part of
this) and more towards a position of counter-proliferation. Missile defence, for
example, while it may have some virtue as a defensive system, has not been
pursued in tandem with a rigorous emphasis on elimination or even less
controversial aspects of non-proliferation. Moreover, the damage it might do to

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the processes of arms control or perceptions of maintaining strategic stability –

this applies especially to Chinese calculations of deterrence38 – runs contrary to
the rhetoric of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. It should be
remembered that all the nuclear states affirmed their commitment to non-
proliferation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, but none has so far advanced
this issue significantly. Even the opprobrium attached to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 has more or less vanished, especially in
the light of the current war against terrorism. (Within the context of a less than
vigorous non-proliferation effort, mention must be made here of the repeated
actions of China, at fault for facilitating the proliferation of nuclear materials and
the means of their delivery, in steady violation of non-proliferation goals.39)
Essentially, it would seem that for some NWS at least, there is a resigned
acceptance of the fact that we might see more nuclear weapon states arising in the
future. But it is the failure to pursue non-proliferation measures adequately that
will help to bring this about. Emphasis on defences such as missile shields may
serve to protect the states below them, but will do nothing to increase overall
global security in an unstable world of numerous, nuclear-armed states. Missile
defence, it must be said, can be an important and valid part of an overall US
security policy, but unless it is embedded within a broader commitment to pursue
non-proliferation (requiring substantial reductions and, ultimately, nuclear
elimination) it will serve to inflame, rather than abate, the grievances of certain
other states.

Retention has been fuelled, not lessened, since 11 September

A notable aspect of the terrorist attack against the USA in 2001 was that a
determined group of zealots relied not on sophisticated technology (or even on the
use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)) to inflict massive damage, but
rather on the simple mechanisms of box-cutters and plane hijackings to achieve
their purposes. This has done nothing, however, to deflect the USA away from its
policy of deploying a missile defence shield, notwithstanding the fact that any
such shield could easily be circumvented by the smuggling in of the proverbial
‘suitcase bomb’ by state-sponsored or sub-state groups. Indeed the 11 September
attack may have served generally to strengthen US resolve to reserve for itself any
military means it deems useful and necessary for its defence. In the aftermath of
the attack, there were hopes that US reliance on global support for its war against
terrorism might see a lessening of US unilateralism in security issues, but this has
not been the case. The lesson the USA appears to have taken from 11 September is
not that it should increase substantially its non-proliferation efforts and persist
with prohibitionary and verification measures, but rather that it must rely on self-
help, whatever forms this might take, with or without the support of its friends.40
The continuing rejection of multilateral security agreements such as the CTBT
and the Biological Weapons Convention protocol are cases in point, as is the
abrogation of the bilateral ABM Treaty (a controversy which preceded 11

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376 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

September but which will have been given a new impetus by those events). The
justified sense of outrage and loss felt by many in the USA may only encourage
Washington to review its commitments to security treaties in general, and it may
be unwilling now to rule out any particular option, despite the views of its allies or
of non-nuclear states. Missile defence, regardless of its relevance or efficacy will
continue, ‘mini-nukes’ will be considered, and nuclear postures will continue to
favour nuclear use. In this light, the elimination of nuclear weapons will continue
to be resisted.

Conclusion

The prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons are decidedly dim. Despite
the recent reductions announced by Bush and Putin, there is no indication that
elimination is seriously being considered. What seems more likely is that limited
arsenals will continue, with strategic partnerships refined between certain nuclear
powers, perpetuating and protecting the possession of these weapons by a select
group of states. Rebecca Johnson has noted that far from inspiring optimism, the
announced reductions are simply a means for the largest nuclear powers to
‘rationalise their arsenals at levels still well above world overkill . . . and mainly
intended to clear away enough of the oversized, obsolete junk to make room for
new weapons for modern requirements’.41 With this evident fondness for retaining
nuclear weapons in the United States, it seems unlikely that any of the other
nuclear weapon states will take any bold initiatives towards reducing the salience
of nuclear weapons in their own strategic doctrines. And without convincing
moves towards elimination on the part of the existing nuclear weapon states, the
two dangers noted at the outset of this article, namely the risk of acquisition of
such weapons by other states, and the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear
strikes, will continue. Nuclear proliferation, whether it be in India, Pakistan, North
Korea, Iraq or any other disaffected state, cannot be anything but a serious
disruption to the stability of the entire international system; it will inevitably make
the existing security order more confrontational and unstable. This is clearly not in
the interests of the existing nuclear powers (regardless of counter-proliferation
measures they may pursue) any more than it is in the interests of smaller and non-
nuclear states. Similarly with the risk of accidental or inadvertent use; any such
event would be catastrophic and would have serious consequences at a regional
and global level.
It is difficult to see how the humanitarian and strategic impediments to the use
of nuclear weapons outlined in this article can be overcome. By their very nature,
these are unusable weapons, or at the least, weapons which cannot be used
effectively, without devastating consequences. In terms of future conflicts, war,
where it is deemed by the international community to be legitimate, will never-
theless be restricted and the means of waging it are sure to be closely delimited.
This is likely to entail a strengthening, not a weakening, of the norm against

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civilian deaths. What is more, there will clearly be a refinement of conventional

weapons appropriate for responding to a broad range of emerging state or sub-
state threats. Within this context, there is little point, and much attendant danger,
in retaining nuclear weapons.

Notes

1 The arguments in this article have drawn extensively from the wide range of studies which have
emerged in the last decade investigating the feasibility of nuclear elimination. Many of the points
used to refute the utility of nuclear weapons can be found in the following (by no means
exhaustive) list of publications: Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (eds) (2000) A Nuclear-Weapon-
Free World: Steps along the Way; The Tokyo Forum Report (1999) Facing Nuclear Dangers: An
Action Plan for the 21st Century, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/
forum/tokyo9907/index.html. Joseph Rotblat (ed.) (1998) Nuclear Weapons: the Road to Zero.
Basingstoke: Macmillan. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
(1996) available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html; The Canberra Commission on the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Background Papers (1996) Commonwealth of Australia;
Joseph Rotblat, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar and Jack Steinberger (eds) (1993) A Nuclear-Weapon-
Free World: Desirable? Feasible? Basingstoke: Macmillan; and The Stimson Center Reports
available at http://www.stimson.org.legacy
2 This term, used to signify more than simply a rhetorical commitment to elimination, was used by
Michael Quinlan and continues to be the preferred term for those advocating a move to zero.
Michael Quinlan (1993) ‘The future of nuclear weapons policy for Western possessors’,
International Affairs, 69(3), pp485–596.
3 The USA made its much-anticipated announcement that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty
on 13 December 2001.
4 News Review (2001) ‘INF Treaty inspection regime successfully concluded’, in Disarmament
Diplomacy, 58. Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd58/58news4.htm
5 Rebecca Johnson (2000) ‘The 2000 NPT Review Conference: a delicate hard-won compromise’
Disarmament Diplomacy, 46, pp2-20; Tariq Rauf (2000) ‘An unequivocal success? Implications
of the NPT Review Conference’, Arms Control Today, 30: 4, pp9–16; Carl Ungerer and Marianne
Hanson (2001) ‘The NPT Review Conference: a normative advance’, in Carl Ungerer and Marianne
Hanson (eds) The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation, pp72–84. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
6 For a recent analysis of the CD’s deliberations, see Vladimir Petrovsky and Rebecca Johnson
(2001) ‘Breaking the CD impasse’, Disarmament Diplomacy, 53, pp16–23. For a view that
proposes alternatives to the CD, see Yuri Nazarkin (2000) ‘Getting negotiations started:
alternatives to the CD’, in Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (eds).
7 This was made clear in paragraph 62 of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in April 1999. ‘NATO’s
1999 Strategic Concept’, NAC-S (99)65, April 24. Although NATO’s 1991 New Strategic
Concept had made some effort to de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons, this was seen by
proponents of elimination as insufficient and it was hoped that the 1999 review would take this
further. For commentary, see Karel Koster (2000) ‘An uneasy alliance: NATO nuclear doctrine
and the NPT’, Disarmament Diplomacy, 49, pp8–13.
8 For an analysis of the US Nuclear Posture Review, see Phillip Bleeck (2002) ‘Nuclear Posture
Review released, stresses flexible force, planning’, Arms Control Today, available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/nprjanfeb02.asp. For reports on the proposal for
‘bunker busters’ or ‘mini-nukes’, see News Review (2002) ‘Speculation over possible return to
US nuclear testing; US keeps options open on low-yield nuclear weapons’, Disarmament
Diplomacy 62, pp51–2.
9 Nikolai Sokov (2000) ‘Russia’s new National Security Concept: the nuclear angle’, CNS reports,
available at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sokov2.htm; Daniel Sumner (2000) ‘Russian
perceptions of nuclear weapons’, Disarmament Diplomacy 44, pp16–21.
10 Sokov, op.cit.; Sumner, op.cit.
11 Alexander Nikitin (2000) ‘Russia: impediments to nuclear disarmament’, in Frank Blackaby and
Tom Milne (eds), pp181–7.

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12 For a history of the origin and activities of the NAC, see Carl Ungerer (2001) ‘The Force of
ideas: middle power diplomacy and the new agenda for nuclear disarmament’, in Carl Ungerer
and Marianne Hanson (eds) The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation, pp187–204. Sydney:
Allen and Unwin. For an evaluation of the NAC’s success at the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
see Rauf op. cit. and Johnson op. cit.
13 John Baylis and Robert O’Neill (2000) ‘The contemporary debate about nuclear weapons’, in
Baylis and O’Neill (eds) Alternative Nuclear Futures: the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-
Cold War World, p2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14 Lawrence Freedman (2000) ‘Eliminators, marginalists and the politics of disarmament’, in John
Baylis and Robert O’Neill (eds), p63.
15 Note the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences by the nuclear
weapon states.
16 The Stimson Center Report (and its two earlier reports) can be viewed at
http://www.stimson.org.legacy. The National Academy of Sciences Report can be found at
http://www.nas.edu/readingroom/books/fun Both the Statement on Nuclear Weapons by
International Generals and Admirals and the Statement by International Civilian Leaders are part
of the Nuclear Elimination Project at the State of the World Forum. For the full text of these
statements, see http://www.worldforum.org/initiatives
17 The Canberra Commission Report can be accessed at http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html
18 The Tokyo Forum Report can be accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/
forum/tokyo9907/index.html
19 Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer (1999) ‘The Canberra Commission: paths followed, paths
ahead’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53:1 pp5–17; Marianne Hanson and Carl
Ungerer (1998) ‘Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons’ elimination: the Canberra
Commission and dilemmas of disarmament’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44:4,
pp533–51; Marianne Hanson (2000) ‘Seeking human security from nuclear weapons: recent non-
traditional initiatives’, in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (eds) Asia’s
Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security. Tokyo: United Nations
University Press.
20 The full Canadian report can be accessed at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nucchallenge/menu-e.htm
21 For an overview of the evolution of the taboo against nuclear weapons, see Richard and Nina
Tannenwald (1996) ‘Norms and deterrence: the nuclear and chemical weapons taboos’, in Peter
Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics. New
York: Columbia University Press. Nina Tannenwald (1999) ‘The nuclear taboo: the United States
and the normative basis of nuclear non-use’, International Organization 53:3, pp433–468. See
also Hanson (2000).
22 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear
weapons’ use, while not categorical, was important in reinforcing the non-nuclear norm. The
Court concluded that the use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law and reiterated the need for the NWS to fulfil their commitments to disarm, as
required by Article VI of the NPT.
23 Tannenwald (1999).
24 Andrew Butfoy (1999) ‘The future of nuclear strategy’, in Craig Snyder (ed.) Contemporary
security and strategy, p166. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
25 Federation of American Scientists (2001) News Release ‘FAS welcomes report on bunker
busters’, December 19. Available at: http://www.fas.org/press/011219-mininuke.htm
26 There is little overt sympathy with the ‘more is better’ thesis advocated by, for example, Kenneth
Waltz (1981) arguing that selective proliferation will be beneficial for international security.
Kenneth N. Waltz (1981) The spread of nuclear weapons: more may be better, Adelphi Paper
171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Further proliferation, whether it be by
so-called ‘rogue states’ or even by Western allies such as Japan, South Korea or Germany would
be viewed overwhelmingly as destabilising to the international system. The vigorous affirmation
of the NPT by both nuclear and non-nuclear states in 1995 and 2000, the international responses
to the nuclear developments in India and Pakistan in 1998 and the widespread public rejection of
French and Chinese nuclear weapons testing in the mid-1990s would all indicate a strong
aversion to the idea of further proliferation.
27 And indeed there has been growing concern over the nuclear intentions of certain states within
the international system, together with the fear, particularly since the 2001 terrorist attacks
against the USA, that terrorist groups may acquire nuclear weapons.

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28 Nonetheless, such a reliance continues. The US 2002 Nuclear Posture Review linked nuclear
weapon targeting with deterring the use of other WMD. As Nolan concludes, this is only just
short of a declaratory policy to use nuclear weapons for all kinds of contingencies. Janne E.
Nolan (2002) ‘Parsing the Nuclear Posture Review: an ACA panel discussion’, Arms Control
Today, available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/ panelmarch02.asp
29 Hedley Bull (1987) ‘Arms control and world order’, reprinted in Robert O’Neill and David
Schwartz (eds) Hedley Bull on arms control. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Nicholas J. Rengger
(1992) ‘Arms control, international society and the end of the Cold War’, Arms Control, 13:1,
pp32–57. Paul Keal (1993) ‘Nuclear weapons and the new world order’, in Richard Leaver and
James L. Richardson (eds) The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses. London: Allen
and Unwin.
30 Michael MccGwire (1985-6) ‘Deterrence: the problem – not the solution’, International Affairs,
62:1, pp55–70, Richard Ned Lebow (1987) Nuclear Crisis Management, Cornell University
Press, and Robert Powell (1990) Nuclear Deterrence Theory: the Search for Credibility,
Cambridge University Press.
31 Michael MccGwire (1994) ‘Is there a future for nuclear weapons?’, International Affairs, 70(2),
p213.
32 Raymond L. Garthoff (2000) ‘Nuclear weapons and the Cold War: did nuclear weapons prevent
war or increase its risks?’ in Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (eds) A Nuclear-Weapon-Free
World: Steps Along the Way, pp229–46. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
33 Philip C. Bleeck (2002) ‘Democrats criticize Nuclear Posture Review’, Arms Control Today,
March. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_3/nucposmarch02.asp
34 Lee Butler (2000) ‘At the end of a journey: the risks of Cold War thinking in a new era’, in Baylis
and O’Neill (eds), p183. There is a further point to be made here: a number of analysts have
noted that an effectively monitored nuclear weapon-free world will be a nett gain for the USA,
positioning it as an unrivalled conventional power if its adversaries could possess no nuclear
weapons. See for example Michael Brown (1996) Phased Nuclear Disarmament and US Defense
Policy. Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. This point appears to have been lost on those
whose focus has been to sustain nuclear weapons possession at all costs.
35 Robert W. Nelson (2001) ‘Low yield Earth penetrating nuclear weapons’, Federation of
American Scientists, Public Interest Report, 54:1, available at: http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/
v54n1/weapons.htm
36 For an assessment of various surveys, see Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (2000) ‘Public opinion
on nuclear weapons’, in Blackaby and Milne (eds), pp247–78.
37 See, for example, Joseph Cirincione (2000) ‘Assessing the assessment: the 1999 national
intelligence estimate of the ballistic missile threat’, Nonproliferation Review, 7:10, pp125–37.
38 Charles Ferguson (2000) ‘Sparking a buildup: US missile defence and China’s nuclear arsenal’,
Arms Control Today, 30:2, pp13–18.
39 Mohan Malik (2001) ‘Chinese perspectives on nuclear non-proliferation and Asian security’, in
Carl Ungerer and Marianne Hanson (eds) The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, pp132–57.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
40 This stands in contrast to the stance advocated by Jayantha Dhanapala who calls for good US
leadership on the issue of multilateral arms control measures. Jayantha Dhanapala (2002) ‘The
impact of September 11 on multilateral arms control’, Arms Control Today, available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/dhanapalamarch02.asp
41 Rebecca Johnson (2000) ‘Summits that cheat security’, Disarmament Diplomacy, 61, p2.
Rose Gottemoeller (2002) has also acknowledged the present ‘enthusiasm’ in the USA for
developing new weapons and reopening the climate for nuclear weapon testing. ‘Parsing the
Nuclear Posture Review: an ACA panel discussion’, Arms Control Today, available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/panelmarch02.asp

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