Supreme Court: Singson, Ledesma and Lim For Appellants. D.R. Williams For Appellee

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court
decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had
not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory
to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured
the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep.,
49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and
there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity
of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under
the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate
of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all
the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open,
and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons
must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page
823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R.,
152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can
be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that
the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his
"Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of
the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If
then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by
including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not
believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and
RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999
PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON
WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO
FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the
subject of the present
1
dispute. The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.
To prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on September 22, 1966, filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. The trial
court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis
pendens over the disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays'
certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to
proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB
which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the
same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in
the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
T-16272, 2 was entered in the bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in
the certificate of title issued in the name TRB.
Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the
property with damages and attorney's fees. Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3,
1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI
ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB and the issuance
of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses.
TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on
March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No.
33774, 3 was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in turn divided
the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who
became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his co-owners developed the property and thereafter sold the
six (6) lots to seperate buyers who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens. 5
On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial court as to
the award of damages but affirming the same in all other respects.
For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this
Court 6 was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied in a Resolution dated October 12, 1983. The Court's September 12, 1983 Resolution
having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court issued a writ of execution
directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to cancel TCT No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue
a new one in the name of the Capay spouses.
Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers of the
subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of
possession ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against
TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents in G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter,
"the non-bank respondents"). Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo 7 who
succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil
Case No. Q-10453 who become co-owner of the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorney's
fees (collectively, "the Capays"). On March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the

defendants and ordering the Register of Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-
36177, Books 198, Page 177 in the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D.
Santos and Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page
107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and Josefina L. Pe; to cancel
TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron Wescombe,
married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT No. 36147,
Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II and Liza R.
Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the names of
Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to cancel
TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of Remedios Oca, and issue
new ones free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all the
improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows:
35% to Ramon A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with
postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City 37.92% to Patria B.
Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann Capay, of legal
age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita Capay, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay of legal age, Filipino,
married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Raul Flores; Linda Joy Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all
with postal address at 37 Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City,
ordering said defendants to vacate the premises in question and restoring
plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal Bank to pay each of the
plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in exemplary
damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees, all with legal interest from the filing
of the complaint, with costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED. 8
TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on
February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in
toto. 9 It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be considered as purchasers for value and in good
faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and that while
the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent
transferees' titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to
all persons of such adverse claim, citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon, 10 Levin vs. Bass 11 and Director
of Lands vs. Reyes. 12
As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the property knowing
that it was under the litigation and without informing the buyer of that fact.
On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision, docketed
herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND THEREBY
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS

COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT.
a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically,

arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of
jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
x x x x x x x x x
b) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of
petitioner when the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to its new
title.
x x x x x x x x x
c) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had
legally caused the invalidation of the Capay's property and the
subsequent validation of TRB's title over the same property was effective
even as against the Capays. 13
Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision.
Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10,
1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint as against them. The
dispositive portion of the resolution states:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for
reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court,
promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed
against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and
the certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby
ordered restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862 to set aside the
resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48
PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE.
II

HOLDING THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA
34, ARE NOT APPLICABLE.
III
HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404
AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE
HEREOF.
IV

HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.

HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF
VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.
VI

HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS
AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED FROM
THE EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH

REGARDS TO TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS
APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:
B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-10453.
Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G.R No. 114299, pursuant to this Court's
Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15
The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the non-bank
respondents, has a better right to the disputed property, and (2) whether or not TRB is liable to the
Capays for damages.
On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.
First, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the Capays
caused to be annotated on their certificate of title was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither
did the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property from TRB, contain any such
notice. When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued,
none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and
his co-owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents,
therefore, could not have been aware that the property in question was the subject of litigation when they
acquired their respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title or
respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents
had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest,
and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects
of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to
real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in
the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title
has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If
a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto
is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than
they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be
the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied. 16
Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected
the properties and inquired from the register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of
the property they were purchasing — an exercise of diligence above that required by law.
Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean, testified:
Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particulary in Kim. 2.5 San
Luis, Baguio City?
A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve
(12) years now, I got interested in buying a property here.
Q How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you
now reside?
A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.
Q When this particular property was bought by you, when was that?
A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir.
Q At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside,
how did it look?
A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1) room
structure, it is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom structure.
Q What kind of structure with regards to material?
A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.
Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the
surrounding area look like at the time you visited?
A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in
front of the property and beside the property.
Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your
sister Ruth Ann Valdez did you come to know the owner?
A We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there
supervising the workers.
Q And who?
A Amado Cruz sir.
Q After you saw this property, what else did you do?
A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.
Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this

concern of yours?
A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.
Q What was his answer?
A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the
mother title and it is a clean title.
Q Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you
do anything to answer your question?
A Yes, sit.
Q What did you do?
A Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office.
Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?
A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.
Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?
A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.
Q When you say we, who was your companion?
A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.
Q The three (3) of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What title did you see there?
A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.
Q And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of
Amado Cruz?
A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty.

Diomampo who heads the office. We showed him a copy of that title and
we were also reassured by him that anything that was signed by him was
as good as it is.
Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?
A He did.
Q After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do?
A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from
RCBC Binondo, Manila this is Atty. Nelson Waje.
Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?
A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case

we think of buying the property.
Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?
A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.

Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds,
looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend, what decision did you
finally make regarding the property?
A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as

advised by that same lawyer, there is another office of the Bureau of
Lands. I cannot recall the office but it has something to do with
registration of the old.
Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?
A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.
Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?
A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it
was a clean title and we saw the mother title under the Hilario family.
Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this
Banaue?
A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.
Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what
was the result of your investigation, the investigation that you made?
A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a

genuine title.
Q When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or
genuine title, what did you do?
A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17
Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine:
Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are
presently residing?
A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch
Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife that there is a property for
sale at Asin Road, and she was the one who introduced to us Mr.
Alcantara, sir.
Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr.
Alcantara, did you see the property that was being offered for sale?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall?
A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.

Q When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you
saw at that time?
A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara.
As a matter of fact the road leading to the property is still not passable
considering that during that time it was rainy season and it was muddy,
we fell on our way going to the property and walked to have an ocular
inspection and physical check on the area, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you
are going to purchase?
A During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-
half of the riprap sir.
Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you
went there?
A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.
Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of deciding
to purchase this property, what else did you do?
A First, I have to consider that the property is clean.
Q How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is
clean?
A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his

office and checked the documents he has regarding the property.
Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the
property is clean?
A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.
Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property,
what else did you do?
A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the

Bureau of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir.
Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to?
A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.
Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you
would like to know?
A Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area
that it was clean, sir.
Q What Certification are you referring to?
A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of

Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir.
Q Do you have a copy of that Certification?
A Yes, I have, sir. 18
The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and Josefina Pe 20 were to the same effect.
The non-bank respondent predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was less thorough:
Q And will you give a brief description of what you do?
A I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into
smaller lots and sold it to some interested parties.
Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what
place in Baguio have you acquired and subdivided and sold lots?
A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir.
Q You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you
referring?
A That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.
Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come
to know that Emelita Santiago is disposing of the property?
A Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir,
Armando Gabriel.
Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?
A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad sir,
Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a
property in Asin?
A He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the

Traders Royal Bank.
Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation
with Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at Asin Road?
A Later part of March, 1983, sir.

Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his
property to be sold, what did you do?
A I went to the place with the agent, sir.
Q When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place?
A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir.
Q And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to
see the place?
A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.
Q Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there

were no roads?
A None, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week
of March, 1983, will you please briefly describe how this place looked like
at that time?
A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of
the roads were eroding already, so we cannot possibly enter the
property, sir.
Q At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim
by anyone?
A None, sir.
Q In terms of fence in the area?
A There is no such, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to
this property prior to your purchase?
A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir.
Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds?
A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances, sir.
Q To whom did you talk?

A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.
Q And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check,
did you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?
A The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the
road right of way, sir.
Q After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking
with Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired?
A We bought the property, sir.
Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please
tell the Honorable Court what you did with that deed of sale?
A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title

because at that time when we bought the property, Emelita Santiago had
it subdivided into six (6) lots, sir.
Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was

subdivided into six (6) parcels?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers
in the subdivision of this property prior to your purchase?
A Yes, I have.
Q This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for

action?
A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided
by the owner, could you please inform the Court if there was any claim
by any other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the property?
A None, sir.
Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented
it to the Register of Deeds and after the subdivision already, what action
did the Register of Deeds have regarding the matter?
A They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir.
Q In whose names?
A One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.
Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this
entire area of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square
Meters. Now, you are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado
Cruz and one Dr. Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles. Could you
explain how these titles came into their possession?
A Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir.
Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita

Santiago is in favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez?
A Yes, sir. 21
Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be
the one to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17,
1967 but the same was not TRB's title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in
1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the
bank's name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the next fifteen (15) years or
so, they did not bother to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the original
certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the
meantime, the subject property had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It
was not until after the land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building their houses on the
other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the
Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that
the party entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 23
Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations such as the
case at bar, where there have been a series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value.
To set aside these transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept on his rights
is anathema to good order.
Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners, the

doctrine of laches may further be counted against them, which latter tenet finds
application even to imprescriptible
actions. . . . 24
In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held:
While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of
conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under
the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171
SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot invoke said dictum because their action to
recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the
whole world of the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253).
But the petitioners' complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed
only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of the sale to Rosendo. The
petitioners failed and neglected for an unreasonably long time to assert their right, if any,
to the property in Rosendo's possession.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon Levin Bass and Director
of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry
book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim.
Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after sleeping on their rights for fifteen years to assert
ownership over the property that has undergone several transfers made in good faith and for value and
already subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their owners.
In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2) assignment of errors, do not help
them any, as the transferees in said cases were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
In Tuazon vs. Reyes and
Siochi, 27 where the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente Tuazon, it was with a
deed containing the recital that the land was in dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon,
who was merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the dispute and, furthermore, David
did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs. Moran, 28 Rivera acquired interest in the land before the
final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending
litigation and, consequently, could not have been considered a purchaser in good faith. Similarly,
in Atun, et al. vs. Nuñez, et al. 29 and Laroza vs. Guia, 30 the buyers of the property at the time of their
acquisition knew of the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank
respondents in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean title from their
predecessors-in-interest.
II
We come now to TRB's liability towards the Capays.
The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to shift the
blame on the Capays, thus:
x x x x x x x x x
23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen
(14) years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said property, Central Bank
regulations require that real properties of banks should not he held for more than five (5)
years:
24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis Pendens to
the new title of the petitioner Bank should not be absorbed by the latter considering that
in all good faith, it was not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the time
that said title was in its possession for almost fourteen (14) years before the property was
sold to Emelita G. Santiago. . . . 31
TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents allowing ownership to pass for
almost 15 years constitute prescription of action and/or laches." 32
Sec. 25 of the General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the possession of any real estate
under mortgage or trust, deed, or the title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debt
due to it, for a longer period than five years." TRB, however, admits hoding on to the foreclosed property
for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name. The bank is, therefore, estopped from involving
banking laws and regulations to justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide
behind the law which it itself violated.
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was
foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the
name of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued in
place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens.
We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled that
upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for prohibition on
September 22, 1966 against the TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt,
the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the property. The case reached this Court.
Prescription or laches could not have worked against the Capays because they had persistently pursued
their suit against TRB to recover their property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after holding on to the property for more
than ten (10) years, it suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General Bank Act. What is
apparent is that TRB took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their
certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This notwithstanding the adverse decision
of the trial court and the pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus
transferred caused the property without the lis pendens annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays'
reach. Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and should
be held liable for damages. 34
Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void for want of
consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays
would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not now
available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the hands of third parties who
acquired the same in good faith and for value. Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays
the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago, the transferee of TRB.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920,
as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal
Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita
Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register
of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the
former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
RENATO L. MATEO, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be accorded to the Torrens title that the seller holds
at the time of the sale.
In its decision promulgated on August 31, 2006, 1 the Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the
respondent and his three brothers were the rightful owners of the land in litis, and directed the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City to cancel the transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered
under the name of petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its place
another TCT in favor of the respondent and his three brothers. Thereby, the CA reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered on May 9, 2000 (dismissing the respondent’s
complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance upon a finding that CDC had been a buyer in good
faith of the land in litis and that the respondent’s suit had already been time-barred).
Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land (property) with an area of 6,693 square meters,
more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City, that was originally owned by Isaias
Lara,2 the respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property
passed on to his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a grandson, Rosauro (son
of Perfecta who had predeceased Isaias in 1920). In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of the
full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad (whose married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an
agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and
Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property
was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land registration. After the application was
granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.
In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a
succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay
the loan to Bacoor Bank and secure the release of the mortgage, Laura borrowed funds from
Parmenas Perez (Perez), who, however, required that the title be meanwhile transferred to his
name. Thus, OCT No. 6386 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438959 was
issued in the name of Perez. Subsequently, Laura recovered the property by repaying the obligation
with the proceeds of another loan obtained from Rodolfo Pe (Pe), resulting in the cancellation of TCT
No. 438595, and in the issuance of TCT No. S-91595 in Laura’s name. She later executed a deed of
sale in favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of TCT No. S-91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn
constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as
security for a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership
of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in
the name of China Bank.
In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the
property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. On March 4, 1993,
CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29,
1993, CDC was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its own name.
In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad died intestate.
On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
in Las Piñas City against the respondent’s siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and
the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have
jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction
belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in
continuous and open possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed
themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and that CDC’s title was invalid, considering
that the land had been registered before its being declared alienable. 3
On October 19, 1992, the MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, viz:
The Court, after careful consideration of the facts and the laws applicable to this case[,] hereby
resolves:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction.
The defendants alleged that the land in question is an agricultural land by presenting a Tax
Declaration Certificate classifying the land as "FISHPOND." The classification of the land in a
tax declaration certificate as a "fishpond" merely refers to the use of the land in question for
the purpose of real property taxation. This alone would not be sufficient to bring the land in
question under the operation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
2. On the issue of open and adverse possession by the defendants.
It should be noted that the subject land is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the
name of plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest China Banking Corporation. Certificates of Title
under the Torrens System is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As between two persons
claiming possession, one having a [T]orrens title and the other has none, the former has a
better right.
3. On the issue of the nullity of the Certificate of Title.
The defense of the defendants that the subject property was a forest land when the same
was originally registered in 1967 and hence, the registration is void[,] is not for this Court to
decide[,] for lack of jurisdiction. The certificate of title over the property must be respected by
this Court until it has been nullified by a competent Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering
the defendants
1. [sic] and all persons claiming right[s] under it to vacate the subject premises located at
Pulang Lupa I, Las Piñas, Metro Manila and surrender the possession of the same to herein
plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject
premises hereby fixed at (₱100.00) one hundred pesos a month starting November 22, 1990
(the time when the demand letter to vacate was given) until defendants actually vacate the
property;
No pronouncement as to costs and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the RTC via petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
RTC resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had acted without jurisdiction because the land,
being a fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988). 5
CDC appealed to the CA, which, on January 25, 1996, found in favor of CDC, declaring that the
MeTC had jurisdiction. As a result, the CA reinstated the decision of the MeTC. 6
On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the Court affirmed the CA’s decision in favor of CDC, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34039, dated January 25, 1996 and February 21, 1997 respectively, are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The decision in G.R. No. 128392 became final.
Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance
of four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and Laura in the RTC in Las Piñas City entitled
Renato L. Mateo v. Casimiro Development Corporation and Laura Mateo de Castro. In paragraph 4
of his complaint, he stated that he was "bringing this action to quiet title on behalf of himself and of
his three (3) brothers – Cesar, Leonardo, and Candido, Jr., all surnamed MATEO – in his capacity
as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las Piñas,
Metro Manila."
On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC, disposing:
WHEREFORE, and by strong preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the defendant Casimiro Development Corporation and against the plaintiff Renato L. Mateo by (1)
Dismissing the complaint, and upholding the validity and indefeasibility of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation; (2) Ordering the plaintiff Renato
Mateo to pay defendant Casimiro Development Corporation the sum of [a] ₱200,000.00 as
compensatory damages; [b] ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and [c] to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696), the CA promulgated its decision on August 31, 2006,
reversing the RTC and declaring CDC to be not a buyer in good faith due to its being charged with
notice of the defects and flaws of the title at the time it acquired the property from China Bank, and
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 9, 2001 of Branch 225, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City
in Civil Case No. 94-2045 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered:
(1) Declaring appellant Renato Mateo and his brothers and co-owners Cesar, Candido, Jr.,
and Leonardo, all surnamed Mateo as well as his sister, Laura Mateo de Castro as the
rightful owners of the parcel of land, subject of this case; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City, Metro-Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-34640 under the name of appellee Casimiro Development
Corporation, and that a new one be issued in favor of the appellant and his co-heirs and
siblings, mentioned above as co-owners pro indiviso of the said parcel.
(3) No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA denied CDC’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal, in which CDC urges that the CA committed serious errors of law, 10 as follows:
(A) xxx in failing to rule that the decree of registration over the Subject Property is
incontrovertible and no longer open to review or attack after the lapse of one (1) year from
entry of such decree of registration in favor of Laura Mateo de Castro.
(B) xxx in failing to rule that the present action is likewise barred by res judicata.
(C) xxx in failing to rule that the instant action for quieting of title and reconveyance under PD
No. 1529 cannot prosper because the Subject Property had already been conveyed and
transferred to third parties who claimed adverse title for themselves.
(D) xxx in failing to rule that the action of respondent for "quieting of title, reconveyance and
damages" is barred by laches.
(E) xxx in ruling that the Subject Property must be reconveyed to respondent because
petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation is not a "purchaser in good faith."
CDC argues that it was a buyer in good faith; and that the CA did not rule on matters that fortified its
title in the property, namely: (a) the incontrovertibility of the title of Laura; (b) the action being barred
by laches and res judicata; and (c) the property having been conveyed to third parties who had then
claimed adverse title.
The respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith, because it
had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings; that CDC
did not actually accept delivery of the possession of the property from China Bank; and that CDC
ignored the failure of China Bank to warrant its title.
Ruling
We grant the petition.
1.
Indefeasibility of title in the name of Laura
As basis for recovering the possession of the property, the respondent has assailed the title of
Laura.
We cannot sustain the respondent.
There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already
been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the
Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. 11 The objective is to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate
and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the
registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long
as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. 12
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s
title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in
the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts
can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the
conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 13
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not
create or vest title.14 The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described therein. 15 In that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a
particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be
co-owners of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the
registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person. 16
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible.17
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from
China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions
causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of
the land in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the
entire Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive
registration in her sister Laura’s name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his
claim of ownership for the first time through this case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he
did so only after CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo, and Cesar’s defense in the ejectment case
brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of their ownership of the property, but
on their being agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC. Even that defense was ultimately rejected by
this Court by observing in G.R. No. 128392 as follows:
With regard to the first element, the petitioners have tried to prove that they are tenants or
agricultural lessees of the respondent corporation, CDC, by showing that the land was originally
owned by their grandfather, Isaias Lara, who gave them permission to work the land, and that CDC
is merely a successor-in-interest of their grandfather. It must be noted that the petitioners failed to
adequately prove their grandfather’s ownership of the land. They merely showed six tax
declarations. It has been held by this Court that, as against a transfer certificate of title, tax
declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of ownership. Granting arguendo that the land was
really owned by the petitioners’ grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt to show how the land
went from the patrimony of their grandfather to that of CDC. Furthermore, petitioners did not prove,
but relied on mere allegation, that they indeed had an agreement with their grandfather to use the
land.
As for the third element, there is apparently no consent between the parties. Petitioners were unable
to show any proof of consent from CDC to work the land. For the sake of argument, if petitioners
were able to prove that their grandfather owned the land, they nonetheless failed to show any proof
of consent from their grandfather to work the land. Since the third element was not proven, the fourth
element cannot be present since there can be no purpose to a relationship to which the parties have
not consented.18
The respondent’s attack against the title of CDC is likewise anchored on his assertion that the only
purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in the sole name of Laura was for Laura to hold the title in
trust for their mother. This assertion cannot stand, however, inasmuch as Laura’s title had long ago
become indefeasible.
Moreover, the respondent’s suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the
name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens
System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period
allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.19 A collateral attack occurs
when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack
is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a
direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to
annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek
recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. 20
2.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value
The CA found that CDC acquired the property in bad faith because CDC had knowledge of defects
in the title of China Bank, including the adverse possession of the respondent’s siblings and the
supposed failure of China Bank to warrant its title by inserting an as-is, where-is clause in its
contract of sale with CDC.
The CA plainly erred in so finding against CDC.
To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond
the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. 21 He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. 22 The pertinent law on the matter of burdens
and claims is Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree, 23 which provides:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. — Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the
right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer
alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
In short, considering that China Bank’s TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any
lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face
of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. 24
The CA’s ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its knowledge of the adverse possession of the
respondent’s siblings at the time it acquired the property from China Bank was absolutely unfounded
and unwarranted. That possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that should
have put CDC on actual notice of a defect or flaw in the China Bank’s title, for the respondent’s
siblings themselves, far from asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized their
possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on
tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the owner. Consequently,
due to his own admission in his complaint that the respondent’s own possession was not any
different from that of his siblings, there was really nothing – factually or legally speaking – that ought
to have alerted CDC or, for that matter, China Bank and its predecessors-in-interest, about any
defect or flaw in the title.
The vendee’s notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith,
should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make
further inquiry into the vendor’s title,25 or facts and circumstances that would induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. 26 In other words, the
presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate.27
And, secondly, the CA grossly erred in construing the as-is, where-is clause contained in the deed of
sale between CDC (as vendee) and China Bank (as vendor) as proof or manifestation of any bad
faith on the part of CDC. On the contrary, the as-is, where-is clause did not affect the title of China
Bank because it related only to the physical condition of the property upon its purchase by CDC. The
clause only placed on CDC the burden of having the occupants removed from the property. In a sale
made on an as-is, where-is basis, the buyer agrees to take possession of the things sold "in the
condition where they are found and from the place where they are located," because the phrase as-
is, where-is pertains solely "to the physical condition of the thing sold, not to its legal situation" and is
"merely descriptive of the state of the thing sold" without altering the seller’s responsibility to deliver
the property sold to the buyer.28
What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably indicate is that CDC, having paid the full and fair price
of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value, for, according to Sandoval v. Court of Appeals: 29
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was
the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and
subsisting.
The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact,

MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a
registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if
it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of
title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus 1 under Rule
65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372,
located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court,
rendered its decision disposing thus: 3
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants,
Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land
described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of
their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the
name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with
residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order 4 dated
March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the
LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G.
Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal
to issue the said decree: 6
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated

August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are
respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the
Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic]
Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was
found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration
(CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex "A" hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued
Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26,
1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro
Manila, a copy is Annex "B" hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was
received by this Authority, a copy is Annex "C" hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "D" hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the
parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another
letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
"E" hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a
certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the
parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been
received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it
was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block
No. 159, Plan S.W.O. — 7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in
the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex "F" hereof. Said
TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title
issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No.
6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would
result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R.
No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . . . .
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for
being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4,
1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution,
dated October 23, 1995, which ordered: 8
. . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995
filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor
General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution,
what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993
(the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC
Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-
1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in
Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to
which was attached a letter, dated November 27, 1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA
Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states: 9
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our
letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that
Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda.
de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per
verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued
for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT
#6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and
order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel
of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio
Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over
the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10

Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the
corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
LXVIII (68).
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA "unlawfully neglect[ed] the
performance of an act which the laws specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office . . . ."
They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear
legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform" because, as
land registration is an in rem proceeding, the "jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication
should be complied with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this
proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA
to "take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic]
TCT No. 6595." Rather, it is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute
in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of
petitioners' application for registration." Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in
the issuance of their title, because of "the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to
furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595" notwithstanding the
lack of opposition from the holders of said titles. 12 Fourth, the State "consented to its being sued" in
this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case "as
final and make provision for its satisfaction." 13
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the
trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree
again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second
decree for the same land is null and void." 14 On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled
to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings
below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is
especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a
situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land
which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title
of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT
No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive
presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, "(t)he very purpose of the Torrens
system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would,
under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not
allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three
reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet
executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear
legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not
become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals: 17
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory.
Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be
reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final
and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners
contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must
issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge
set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order
of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in
a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1)
year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and
the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of
negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such
issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the
Torrens system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any
doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this
respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is
the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings."
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding
upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of
whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an
answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which
provides:
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as
stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation
and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet
title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to
the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or
certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is
any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full
force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided,
however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal
shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and
Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29,
1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records
submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register —
Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over
which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot
3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's refusal to issue a decree of
registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same
land would be null and void, 19 since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once. 20 Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has
already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will
run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act
becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction
to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the
certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case
of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959,
in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good
faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate
ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the
case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the
registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed
and registered in favor of the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of

First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already
a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The
court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and
within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another
person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first
registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world
that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already
covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To
declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens
system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility.
It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of
the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and
Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain
many things to be done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of
amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a
subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another
party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa,
48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated
in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must
contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained
technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of
land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of
such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In
such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly
be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of
the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be
considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration
Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance
of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De
Villa, supra). . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because
it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be
awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought
to be compelled is clear and complete. 24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is
a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and
the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But
where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this
case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for
decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a
judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its
own judgment and understanding of the law. 28
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.
However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to
direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the
property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty
(60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed
according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin
in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the
court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in
TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration
court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether
the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112905 February 3, 2000
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON,
ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA
LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON,
MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA
LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO
LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE
LEON, petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA,
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and their
successors-in- interest, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this case, the two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed twelve years
apart in different branches of the same Court of First Instance, but a certificate of title was issued in
one case while the other is still pending appeal.
The applicants in the earlier case are now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
They assert that the decision ordering the issuance of a decree of registration in their favor, while
promulgated subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title in the names of the second
applicants, should be "executed" and that the certificate of title issued to the latter should be
nullified.
1âwphi1.nêt
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al. filed an application for the registration of a 69-hectare parcel of
land in Tagaytay City with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch III under Land Registration
Case No. 299 and LRC Record No. 11617. On January 29, 1957, the court issued an order of
general default, excepting only the Director of Lands.
On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang, Cavite,
filed a motion to lift the order of general default and submitted an opposition on behalf of the
municipality. The opposition was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging that a portion of the
land applied for which the municipality had leased to private persons had been its patrimonial
property since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged that in a registration case entitled
"Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R), the Court of Appeals found
that the applicants had never been in possession of the land sought to be registered.
In its answer to the amended opposition, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land
they sought to register was their inheritance, which includes Lot No. 2 of plan PSU-51901 with an
area of 119 hectares. However, it had to be excluded in the application for registration of the 69-
hectare land in Cavite upon the recommendation of the Chief Surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office because it is located in the province of Laguna. Similarly, Lot No. 1 of PSU-
51901 that lies within Tagaytay City had been excluded from the registration proceedings under
G.L.RO. Rec. No. 53498 or Land Registration Case No. 2201 in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.1
Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to dismiss the application for original registration of Lot
No. 1 on the ground of res judicata. The applicants, on the other hand, contended that the principle
of res jucidata is not applicable because the subject matter of CA-G.R. No. 8161-R (Mariano Lopez
de Leon v. Municipality of Silang) was Lot No. 2 or the portion of the land in Laguna.
On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit
on the ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene considering that Lot No.
1 was outside of its territorial limits. The lower court held:
. . . . Even if said land was communal property of the Municipality of Silang, by virtue of its
incorporation into (the) city of Tagaytay it became the property of the latter. Hence, the
Municipality of Silang has no personality to appear in this (sic) proceedings. If any right of
action exists, it accrues in favor of the City of Tagaytay and the same should be pursued by
the said city.2
The oppositor municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. On July 23, 1970, the
court issued an order stating that "in order not to impede whatever action the movant" might take
against the order of February 7, 1969, said motion should be denied. On January 12, 1971, the
applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive evidence for
them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executory "by virtue of which
the Municipality of Silang no longer ha(d) any personality to appear in these proceedings." 3 The court
granted said motion and directed the clerk of court to submit a report on the matter.
In his report dated April 15, 1971, Clerk of Court Rolando D. Diaz stated that since time immemorial,
Micaela, Fernando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all surnamed De los Reyes, owned and possessed the
parcel of land in question. On November 3, 1870, they sold the land to Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad
and Francisco Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property passed in ownership to Pedro
Lopez de Leon, Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the daughter and sole heir of Ambrocio Carrillo
Trinidad. Pedro and Maxima remained in possession of the property until their death when their
children, applicants Pedro Lopez, Mariano Lopez de Leon, Pastor Lopez de Leon, Eulogio Lopez,
Clara Lopez, Ricarda Lopez and Rosario Lopez took over ownership and possession thereof. Upon
their death, their respective heirs succeeded over the property and, on February 25, 1971, they
partitioned it. The agricultural property was under the supervision of Domingo Opeña who planted
portions thereof to rice and other agricultural products.
The clerk of court thus recommended that the court confirm its order of general default, approve his
report, and register the property in the names of the applicants in accordance with the extrajudicial
partition of the property.4
On April 19, 1971, the court5 accordingly rendered a decision approving the report of the clerk of
court and ordering that once the decision becomes final, the corresponding decree of registration of
title be issued in favor of the applicants.6
The oppositor Municipality of Silang interposed an appeal from the said decision of the land
registration court to the Court of Appeals. On May 2, 1979, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision7 dismissing the appeal "for lack of personality of the oppositor-appellant Municipality of
Silang to interfere in the registration proceedings below." 8 Undaunted, the oppositor municipality filed
with this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 51054 (Municipality of Silang
v. Court of Appeals) which was denied on September 19, 1979. The municipality's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied with finality for lack of merit on October 24, 1979. 9 On
November 9, 1979, judgment was entered in the said case.10
Meanwhile, in the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the decree of
registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission discovered that Lot
No. 1, plan Psu-51901 had been decreed in favor of private respondents Honesto de Castro, et al.11
Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967, 12 Honesto de Castro, et al. filed before the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in Tagaytay City, an application for the registration of the
same parcel of land under Land Registration Case No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No. N-33292. The case
was called for hearing on March 18, 1968. Eight (8) days later or on March 26, 1968, the
court13 promulgated a decision adjudicating the land located at Barrio Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more
particularly described as Plan Psu-51901-Amd., in favor of said applicants and directing that upon
the finality of the decision, the corresponding decree of registration be issued. 14 The ruling of the
court was based on its finding that one Hermogenes Orte, who originally owned the land sought to
be registered, sold it in 1932 to Marciano de Castro. The deed evidencing said sale was destroyed
during the Japanese occupation. De Castro continued possession of the land until his death on April
26, 1940. His wife Epifania and their children named Maria Socorro, Francisco, Honesto, Romualdo,
Felicitacion, Faustino and Felixberto continued possession of the property who declared the land for
assessment and taxation purposes in Cabuyao, Laguna. However, upon learning that the property
lies in Tagaytay City, the applicants declared it in their names in said city.
The cause of the conflicting claims over the same land was never explained because the head of the
geodetic engineers of the Land Registration Commission did not appear in court in Land Registration
Case No. 299. Hence, on August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III 15 issued an order declaring
that the court had lost jurisdiction to hear the case, without, however, dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, or on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez, et al. filed a complaint "for
execution of judgment and cancellation of land titles of the defendants and their successors-in-
interest" before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, at Tagaytay City. Docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-1028, the complaint named as defendants Honesto C. de Castro, Maria Socorro de
Castro married to Antonio Perigrina, Francisco de Castro "widow", Faustino de Castro, Felixberto de
Castro, Epifania C. Vda. de Castro and their successors-in-interest.
The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce the judgment of April 19, 1971. The plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, alleged further that, upon the filing of their application for registration with the CFI
of Cavite, Branch III at Cavite City, said court acquired jurisdiction over the res because land
registration proceedings are in rem and therefore, the CFI of Cavite, Branch IV at Tagaytay City
could not have acquired jurisdiction over the same res by virtue of De Castros' application for
registration. They claimed that no less than this Court had recognized the jurisdiction of Branch III in
Cavite City when it passed upon the correctness of the lower court's ruling in favor of Pedro
Lopez, et al. Contending that the decision of Branch III on April 19, 1971 declaring that title to the
land belonged to Pedro Lopez, et al. had become final and executory on June 18, 1980, they
asserted that they were the lawful owners of the land. However, they had been unduly deprived
ownership and possession thereof on account of its "wrongful registration" in the name of the
defendants "by means of fraud and misrepresentation." As a result of their undue deprivation of
ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property notwithstanding that the question of ownership
had been settled in their favor, plaintiffs claimed that they suffered actual and moral damages.
Claiming that the judgment sought to be executed had not been barred by the statute of limitations,
they prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to effect:
1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
Branch III, Cavite, dated April 19, 1971 by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico which
became final on June 18, 1980;
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and the
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the titles of the land in question under
the names of the defendants and their successors in interest and that new title to the
same parcel of land be issued to plaintiffs;
3. Ordering all the occupants of the questioned land to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in interest to pay plaintiffs or its
(sic) heirs and/or successors in interest actual damages (in) the amount of
P200,000.00 or the amount that may be proven during the hearing and trial of this
case;
5. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in interest to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P200,000.00 for and as attorney's fees;
6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 or the sum

that may be proven during the trial;
7. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs just and proper under the premises. 16
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the defendants interposed the defenses of
prescription, laches and/or estoppel and failure to state a cause of action. They averred that they
were no longer the owners of the property as it had been sold "absolutely and unconditionally to
innocent third parties for valuable consideration and in good faith." They contended that in view of
the indefeasibility of their title to the property, even the title of their successors-in-interest can not be
subject to collateral attack. They claimed that Branch III of the CFI in Cavite should have "remanded"
the records of LRC Case No. 299 or LRC Record No. 11617 to the same CFI branch in Tagaytay
City to which the "legal and proper jurisdiction to hear and decide that particular case belonged."
They asserted that the complaint should have been directed by the plaintiffs against the Assurance
Fund under the provisions of P.D. No. 1529. Alleging that the "very precipitate and wrongful suit"
caused them mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation and similar injury, they claimed
moral damages of P500,000.00, nominal damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P300,000.00.
On May 21, 1990, the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay City 17 rendered the decision in Civil
Case No. TG-1028 dismissing the complaint for being "improper and premature". The court likewise
dismissed the defendants' counterclaims for "their dearth of sufficient legal, factual and evidentiary
support."18
The lower court held that the decision of Branch III that became final on June 18, 1980, could not be
enforced against defendants considering that they were not parties in LRC Record No. 11617.
Neither could it order the cancellation of the titles issued to defendants because the LRC and/or the
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City had not been impleaded as parties to the case and therefore the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
The lower court held further that because the case was covered by Act No. 496 and/or P.D. No.
1529 which are special laws, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on execution of judgment by
independent action cannot be invoked. The court also ruled that:
Treating the second issue raised by plaintiffs, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch IV, or this Court, validly acquired jurisdiction over the case filed by defendants
Honesto de Castro, et al., in LRC Case No. TG — 95. The records show that herein
defendants as petitioner(s) in that case, complied with all the jurisdictional requirements of
law, conferring jurisdiction upon this Court to try that case and lent validly (sic) upon its
proceedings. As admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, this Court was not aware of the
existence of LRC Record No. 11617, pending before the other Branch of this Court, in the
same manner that they, or the plaintiffs themselves, did not also know the existence of LRC
Case No. TG — 95 before this Court. This Court is assured that good faith pervaded among
the parties concerned, in the conduct of its proceedings, all procedural requirements having
been punctiliously complied with and no irregularity or breach of law having been committed.
So that the decision rendered by this Court in that case is valid and subsisting, for all intents
and purposes and can be nullified only under circumstances and through procedures
mandated by law. Hence, the corresponding decree of registration issued in TG-95 and the
original certificates of titles issued to defendants in consequence thereof, are all valid and
binding until declared otherwise, in a case directly assailing their validity, and of course, by a
competent court. And by express provision of law, the same are insulated from any collateral
attack.19
The court concluded that the complaint was in the nature of a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificate of title issued in favor of the defendants and their successors-in-interest because, "(b)y its
caption and averments, the validity of the title in question, is not directly assailed."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, which was denied on May 29, 1991. It
reiterated that the plaintiffs' failure to implead the Administrator of the NLRDRA, the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City and the possessors of the property in question was a fatal procedural error
because they were indispensable parties over which the court should acquire jurisdiction. Their
inclusion as defendants in the case was necessary in order that their title to the property could be
directly attacked. Petitioners should have availed of the remedy provided by Section 32 of P.D. No.
1529 and their failure to observe that law was a "colossal error" because once issued, a certificate of
title becomes indefeasible, "completely insulated from any form of collateral attack assailing its
validity."20
Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on November 29,
1993.21 Stressing the indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System of land registration, the Court of
Appeals echoed the lower court's ruling that the decree of registration in favor of respondents cannot
be reopened or set aside in a "collateral proceeding such as the one in the case at bar which has for
its objective the execution of a judgment which apparently has become dormant, thus appellants'
insistence that it be revived." Citing Article 1544 of the Civil Code on sale of property to different
vendees which it opined had a "persuasive influence" in the resolution of the appeal, it held that "in
case land has been registered in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date (of
registration) shall prevail." Nonetheless, emphasizing that the land in question has been transferred
to a third person, the Court of Appeals ruled that the title issued in favor of respondents should be
"maintained in their status quo, until the proper court shall have determined their priorities, and the
equities resulting therefrom."22
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, raising the following assignment of errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE VITAL AND PIVOTAL ISSUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT (CFI
TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH IV), HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBSEQUENT LAND
REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HEREIN, AND IN DECREEING THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE SAID LOTS WHICH
WERE ALREADY PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS BY
ANOTHER COURT (CFI CAVITE, BRANCH III) IN A PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION CASE IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH WAS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND EVEN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE INSTANT
ACTION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF CFI BRANCH III,
WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A REVIVAL OF THE JUDGMENT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
MERELY RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE, COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE RESPONDENTS' TITLES, AND PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF
THE TITLES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS, WHICH RELIANCE ARE MISPLACED AND
UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND TO ISSUE THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PETITIONERS CANNOT DIVEST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED LOTS BY
FILING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS' TITLES.
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY AND LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly compiled with, or the proceedings will be utterly
void.23
When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot No. 1 before the CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the
governing law then as regards the matter of jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic
Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law providing for the permanent stations of district judges or judges
of Courts of First Instance stated that for the Seventh Judicial District that included the province of
Cavite, there would be two judges in Cavite City.24 The law did not create other branches of the CFI
in the province of Cavite outside of the City of Cavite.
It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749 took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City
was set up.25 That amendment to Republic Act No. 296 provided that four judges would preside "over
the Courts of First Instance of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece
Martires" who would be "judges of the first, second, third and fourth branches" of that court. Because
the rule has always been that court having territorial jurisdiction over the property should take
cognizance of its registration,26 upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch, petitioners' application
for registration should have been transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is
located in that city.
It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the venue of petitioners' application for
registration, apparently on account of the following provision of Rep. Act No. 3749:
Sec. 6. Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court of First Instance is or are
established in this Act in the same place where there is an existing court or courts of first
instance, all cases already filed in the latter court or courts shall be heard, tried and decided
by such latter court or courts.
Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase "in the same place" refers to the judicial
district/province or the place where a branch of the court is stationed. Hence, considering the
general rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case it remains with that court until its full
termination,27 the phrase "in the same place" should be interpreted as referring to the province of
Cavite. The Cavite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over the
application for registration because there was no jurisdictional question involved in the proceedings
in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was in question was whether the Cavite City branch of the
Cavite CFI was the proper venue for said case upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch. As
this Court said:
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county
may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the
court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration. 28
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience
to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. 29 Thus,
the last paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land registration cases, the
Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked with the administration and supervision of all courts, may
transfer land registration courts "to any other place more convenient to the parties." This implied that
Land Registration Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite City branch of the CFI if it would be
convenient to the applicants who had been used to transacting business with that branch; the case
did not have to be transferred to be transferred to Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46
dated July 3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag addressed to all CFI judges and
clerks of court in line with the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947, merely quotes Section 6 thereof.
Said circular does not elucidate on whether cases should be transferred to the branches that had
territorial jurisdiction over them.
Petitioners' claim that this Court had "sustained" the jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of the CFI
over Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue
raised in the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality of the Municipality
of Silang to file an opposition to the application for land registration. While this Court upheld the
lower court's ruling on that issue, such affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was
likewise resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to light for resolution.
As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch over the land registration proceedings
instituted by private respondents, the order of general default issued in Land Registration Case No.
299 is of relevance. When the Cavite City branch of the CFI issued an order of default, it is
presumed to have regularly performed its task in accordance with law especially with regard to
notice requirements. Act No. 496 provided that after the court shall have set the application for initial
hearing the following procedure should be observed:
Sec. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing of the
application from the clerk of the Court of First Instance, the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office shall cause a notice thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, in the English language. The notice shall be issued by order of the court,
attested by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, and shall be in form
substantially as follows: . . . .30
The general order of default of January 29, 1957 stated as follows:
It appearing from the certificate of the Chief of the General Land Registration Office and the
return of the Sheriff, attached to the record of this case, that the time notice relative to the
application in said case was duly published, posted, and served in accordance with law; and
that the time allowed for entering appearance and filing answers expired at 9:30 A.M. on the
29th day of January, 1957, for which date said case was duly set for hearing by the Court;
And it further appearing from said record that no person has appeared as respondent in the
case filed an answer within the time for that purpose allowed, with the exception of the
Director of Lands represented by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi;
All persons, except those herein above named, are hereby declared to be in default in the
above-entitled case, and it is ordered that a general default be recorded in said case, and
that the application therein be taken as confessed by all the world, except the persons
hereinabove named.
It is so ordered.31
On January 24, 1957, the Municipality of Silang filed a motion to lift said general order of default and
to admit its opposition to the registration. 32 This fact supports the presumption that the officials
concerned performed their duties regularly because it implies notice, whether actual or constructive,
on the part of said municipality that a land registration proceedings had been filed with respect to Lot
No. 1.
Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication had the effect of notifying all persons
interested in the proceedings including the herein private respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar
v. Caoagdan:
. . . it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the pendency of the present
registration case even if they were actually occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but
such procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because registration
proceedings have the nature of actions in rem. . . . .33
A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land
as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property.34 Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the
application for registration and service of notice to affected parties. 35 Consequently, when private
respondents filed their own application for registration of the same parcel of land, strictly speaking,
the Tagaytay City branch could no longer entertain the application for registration as
the res involved had been constructively seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court. In
hindsight, this complication of two applications for registration having been filed for one and the
same tract of land could have been avoided had Land Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to
the Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it rightfully belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep.
Act No. 3947.
Be that as it may, the Court is not persuaded that the registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents should be nullified by reason of the fact that the Cavite City branch of the same court
was already proceeding with another registration case for the same piece of land.
In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and
to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires
title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is issued
over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate. 36 It should be stressed that said rule refers to the date of the
certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even
though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have priority of right to register
title. As such, while his application is being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe
vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land registration. In
the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to have rendered
private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of notice in the land
registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of notice upon
petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of the land registration
proceedings filed by private respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite CFI thereby
providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.
The fact that an interlocutory matter in Land Registration Case No. 299 had to be resolved by both
the Court of Appeals and this Court did not in any way mean that petitioners should no longer
exercise due diligence to protect their right or interest in the said proceedings. On the contrary, they
were bound to exercise such diligence with vigor especially because as early as April 19, 1971, they
already had a judgment in their favor. The record does not show why petitioners did not have actual
knowledge of the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents. However, the lack of
such knowledge in fact raises a doubt as to the veracity of their claim that they were in possession of
the land. If indeed they possessed the property, even if through an administrator, as diligent owners,
the threat to their ownership could not have escaped them considering that the property is in a rural
community where news travels fast.
Even granting that petitioners did not really have actual knowledge of private respondents'
application for registration, yet after discovering that the land was already registered in the name of
private respondents, petitioners should have immediately sought recourse in law to protect their
rights. As it turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass from such discovery before they
acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment. Hence, they filed the separate action "for
execution of judgment and cancellation of titles" of private respondents because more than five (5)
years had elapsed since the promulgation of the decision directing the issuance of a decree of
registration.37 Under these circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that petitioners neglected for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they
could or should have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert it. 38 In short,
they were guilty of laches.
The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 39 Land registration proceedings
entails a race against time and non-observance of time constraints imposed by law exposes an
applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious effects of the application of the
doctrine of laches. An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the
certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has lapsed, the title to
the land becomes indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved applicant certain remedial
measures, these are designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the property and not
necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he had allowed by inaction to be vested in another
person. In Javier v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court set out these remedies as follows:
. . . . The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer
open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not
mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet
passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The
decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the
date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court
for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages. . . . .
In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court also said:
. . . it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property who was
prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages
against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action
against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.
In filing the action for execution of judgment and cancellation of titles, petitioners must have realized
that only the remedy of filing an action for damages was available to them. Otherwise, they could
have filed an action for reconveyance of the property. Of course, petitioners cleverly clothed their
complaint as one for execution of judgment under the provisions of the Rules of Court. Clearly, such
procedural strategy was a bid to revive the decision of the lower court ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration in their names. In other words, petitioners availed of procedural remedies
provided for by the Rules of Court as it appeared that because of the lapse of time, they would not
benefit from remedies prescribed by land registration laws.
The wrong appellation of petitioners' complaint shall not mislead this Court as, in the determination
of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather than its title, are the proper gauges. 42 A reading of
the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028 betrays petitioners' true intention in filing
the case. In paragraph 15 of the complaint, petitioners alleged that they were '"unduly deprived of
their ownership and lawful possession of the land . . . due to the wrongful registration of the subject
land in the name of the defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentations." Except for this
general statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged with particularity in the
complaint.43 This is unfortunate because, if filed within the time set by law, a complaint with the
proper allegation of fraud coupled with proof thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of
private respondents' title to the property. It is established that if fraud attended the acquisition of title
under the Torrens System, such title cannot be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property. 44
We take note of petitioners' allegation in their reply memorandum that in the registration proceedings
filed by private respondents, "what was published in the Official Gazette was the description of a
bigger tract of land that includes the smaller lot actually applied for by respondents." 45 That factual
allegation could have had its impact before the trial court in an action for reconveyance on the
ground of fraud in the acquisition of title but not before this Court where factual issues may no longer
be raised.
The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners were cognizant all the while of the futility of
their attempt to cancel the title of private respondents under the law. Hence, they indirectly and
collaterally attacked the land title duly issued to private respondents on the theory that the revival of
the dormant judgment in their favor could result in the realization of their objective of nullifying such
title, However, aggrieved applicants for land registration cannot seek protection under the provisions
of the Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration
proceedings.
The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which
officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the lower court's order to explain the
conflicting claims of ownership over the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an
explanation why they caused the publication of the notice of hearing in private respondents'
application for registration notwithstanding that the same office had already published the notice of
hearing as regards petitioners' application for registration of the same parcel of land. It is within the
power of these officials to determine whether or not the same parcel of land is the subject of two
applications for registration. The indefeasibility of private respondents' title over the property should
not get in the way of an administrative investigation of possible omission or neglect of official duty.
This Court cannot let such malfeasance or misfeasance in office pass unnoticed lest the integrity of
the Torrens System of land registration be undermined.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED, and the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-
1028 is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice so that an
investigation against officials who were responsible for the publication of two notices of hearing of an
application for registration of the same parcel of land may be conducted and the guilty officials duly
sanctioned. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006
FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP. No. 50952. The first decision dated 27 November 2000 1 upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) affirming the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) order for ejectment, while the Resolution
dated 5 July 20012 denied the motion for reconsideration.
First, the factual background of the case.
Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P. Candelaria
(Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995, a partition agreement 3 was entered into by petitioners and
Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or
less, was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160
square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-10870 was cancelled and TCT No.
288500 was issued in the name of petitioners.
On 30 May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including the improvements thereon, to Spouses
Santiago and Fortunata Batuyong (respondents). TCT No. 294743 was issued in their names over
the said parcel of land.4
On 21 May 1996, petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building that
allegedly intruded into the lot of Respondents. At the instance of respondents, petitioners were
summoned by barangay officials to a meeting on the matter. It was then agreed upon that petitioners
would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be conducted by a
government surveyor.
A verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia. She submitted a
report dated 12 November 1996 which yielded the findings that Lot 6-A (Candelaria’s) and Lot 6-B
(petitioners’) were not correctly positioned geographically on the ground with respect to TCT No.
294743. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of way of
Lot 6-B (petitioners’ lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-
A (respondents’ lot) presently occupied by petitioners. 5
Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled construction,
allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot, including the portion being
used as right of way for petitioners’ tenants.
After respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City Building Official to
fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate the encroached portion but to no avail.
Respondents brought the matter to the barangay but no amicable settlement was reached. A
Certificate to File Action was issued to them by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A final demand
was made through a letter dated 20 May 1997 upon petitioners to vacate the encroached premises.
Petitioners, however, vehemently refused to vacate and surrender the premises.
On 14 April 1997, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan
Trial Court6 (MeTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 23359. In a Decision 7 dated 2 July
1998, the MeTC ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender possession of a portion of respondents’
lot and to pay ₱500.00 per month as fair rental value from May 1996 until the premises is finally
vacated, plus ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. 8
On appeal, the RTC9 affirmed the judgment of the MeTC.10 In doing so, the RTC debunked the three
(3) arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the RTC ruled that the
MeTC had jurisdiction over the instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue of jurisdiction was
never raised in the court a quo while on the other hand, petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently, petitioners raised the
question of jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so only after he obtained an adverse
judgment. Second, the allegations of the complaint sufficiently averred a case for ejectment which
the RTC found to be within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third, the trial court ruled that
petitioners categorically recognized the validity of the verification survey done by Engineer Valencia,
as shown by the presence of petitioner Flaviana Cajayon during the verification survey and setting of
monuments per survey report.11
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in an Order 12 dated 12
January 1999 of the RTC. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On 27 November 2000, the appellate court rendered a
Decision13 dismissing the petition. Holding that the exclusive jurisdiction to try unlawful detainer
cases is vested with the MeTC, the appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
The complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain the action for
unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to obtain possession of the controverted lot from
Respondents. Specifically, it alleges that sometime on May 21, 1996, petitioners started construction
works in the area which intruded into a portion of respondents’ property; that the parties eventually
agreed to stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be conducted thereon; that a
survey was conducted in the presence of the parties and a report was submitted by Engr. Valencia
on November 12, 1996, showing an encroachment of about 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot
including that portion being used as a right of way for petitioners’ tenants; that even after the
boundaries had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the area; that despite verbal
and written demands, the last of which was made on March 20, 1999, petitioners refused to vacate
and surrender the encroached area. Surely, respondents’ resort to unlawful detainer when
petitioners failed to leave the controverted premises upon demand is in order. 14
The appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners’ houses already stood on the controverted
lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents failed to negate the case for ejectment. 15 The
appellate court emphasized that prior physical possession is not a condition sine qua non in unlawful
detainer cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings on the validity of the verification
survey conducted by Engineer Valencia that petitioners have encroached on a 20.61 square meter
portion of respondents’ lot.
On 5 July 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 16 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question of jurisdiction
and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results. 17
Petitioners anchor their petition on the court a quo’s lack of jurisdiction over the instant suit. The
averments in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment, they claim, as their entry into the
disputed lot was not made by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Neither was their
possession of the disputed property by virtue of the tolerance of respondents or the latter’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Respondents counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an action for unlawful
detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the parties agreed to the conduct of a
survey by a government surveyor and after the survey, it was determined that the structures
introduced by herein petitioners have encroached a portion of herein respondents’ lot; (b) notices to
vacate and surrender of possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the last
being on March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was instituted on April 11, 1997 or within one (1) year from
date of last demand.18
Respondents also stress that possession of the premises by petitioners took place more than one
year before the filing of the complaint and the absence of an allegation in the complaint that such
possession of the disputed portion was merely by virtue of respondents’ tolerance does not deprive
the lower court of its original and exclusive jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents’ action for
unlawful detainer.19
It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. 20
The Complaint21 filed by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material facts: 1avvphil.net
2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the former co-owners of a certain piece
of land located in Maypajo, Caloocan City containing an area of 260 square meters, more or
less, under TCT No. C-10870 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City;
3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by virtue of a
Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square
meters, more or less, was given to Isagani P. Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294,
containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to defendants. A copy of
said Partition Agreement is hereto attached as Annex "A";
xxx xxx xxx
5. That on May 30, 1995, Isagani P. Candelaria sold his share to the herein plaintiffs,
including the improvements thereon, in the sum of ₱100,000.00, under a Deed of Absolute
Sale x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
7. That sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the area and
intruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest and report the matter
to the barangay authorities;
8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to appear before the Barangay
Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the construction works, and in a subsequent
conference on June 7, 1996, they agreed to defer the matter pending the result of a survey
to be conducted by a government surveyor;
xxx xxx xxx
11. That the following day, September 5, 1996, Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia
conducted a survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete monuments thereon in
the presence of plaintiffs and defendants;
12. That on November 12, 1996, a verification survey report was submitted by Geodetic
Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification plan xxx;
13. That despite defendants’ knowledge of the property boundary, and despite repeated
serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a seven-door
bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18 square meters and another
10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus encroaching upon at least 20.61 square
meters of plaintiffs’ lot, and further demolishing plaintiff’s wall.
xxx xxx xxx
20. That despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon defendants,
both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants in manifest bad faith,
wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive manner and in utter disregard of the
property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate the
same up to the present time x x x.22
From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as
opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in
forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until
he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have
been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the
defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively
lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property
under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous
demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first
make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature. 23
Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the concept of owner prior to
petitioners’ intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached upon respondents’ lot and
started construction works thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various
demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners’
entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an action for unlawful detainer.
On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. 24 It is not essential, however, that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. 25
The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had
prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned
provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he
use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property,
and this is all that is necessary.26 In the case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment into respondents’
property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises
despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of respondents’ serious objections,
indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning of the law.
Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents’ property, the
action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the occurrence of
the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a
plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one
(1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In forcible entry,
the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land. 27
Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’ actual entry into
the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well
within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.
As a collateral issue, petitioners claim that they are at least entitled to the rights of a builder in good
faith on the premise that they are not the owners of the property encroached upon.
This contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. 28 In the instant case, when the
verification survey report came to petitioners’ knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report
is a professional’s field confirmation of petitioners’ encroachment of respondents’ titled property. It is
doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is
necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot
despite knowledge of respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.
Now, the second issue. Petitioners question the evidentiary weight of the verification survey report.
They point out that since the survey was a unilateral act of respondents, done as it was without their
consent, they should not be bound by its findings. 29
In raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the factual findings of the
courts below, a task which is beyond this Court’s domain. Factual matters cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower courts.30 We find no ample reason to depart from this rule, more
so in this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the
MeTC.
Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed, 31 i.e., government officials
who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity, 32 as the courts below pointed
out.33 In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary.
Even prescinding from the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification
survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their presence. That was the finding
made by the courts below and affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle. 34
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. 1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 172611 July 9, 2010
SPS. FEDERICO VALENZUELA and LUZ BUENA-VALENZUELA Petitioners,

vs.
SPS. JOSE MANO, JR. and ROSANNA REYES-MANO Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The rule that a Torrens Certificate of Title is conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described
therein1 does not apply when such land, or a portion thereof, was illegally or erroneously included in
said title.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the Decision3 dated January 16, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83577, which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated March
10, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 1065-M-
99. Also assailed is the Resolution 5 dated May 3, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela (Andres) who was the
owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 938 square meters, more or less, located at
Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The property was declared in the name of Andres under Declaration of
Real Property No. 71876 which described the property as follows:
Location: Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan

Boundaries:
North: Camino Provincial
East: Felisa Calderon
South: Aurea Caleon
West: Benita Bailon
Kind of Land: Residential Lot
Area: 938 square meters
Andres died on October 10, 1959, and the possession of said property was transferred to Federico.
On August 5, 1980, a document denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at
Pagpaparaya o Pagkakaloob7 was executed by the heirs of Andres who waived all their rights to the
property in favor of Federico.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 1991, a Deed of Conditional Sale8 was executed between Feliciano

Geronimo (Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose Mano, Jr. (Jose), wherein the former agreed to
sell to the latter a 2,056-square meter parcel of land located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The
corresponding Deed of Sale9 was subsequently executed in March 1991.
On March 4, 1992,10 Jose applied for a Free Patent and on April 10, 1992, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-35111 was issued in his name. This time, the property was indicated as covering an
area of 2,739 square meters.
Sometime in 1997, Federico declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 97-19005-01105 12 the
property covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 7187 in the name of Andres.
Subsequently, Jose sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-351 to Roberto S.
Balingcongan (Balingcongan). On January 8, 1998, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
11286513 was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2,292 square meters. On the same date,
TCT No. T-11286414 was also issued in the name of Jose covering 447 square meters.
Federico transferred his residence to Malabon and so he left the care of the property to his nephew,
Vicente Joson (Vicente). Sometime in 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter
fence on his property but he was prevented by Jose, claiming that the 447 square meters was his
property as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864. On the other hand, Federico is claiming it as part of
the property he inherited from his father, Andres.
When the matter could not be settled amicably, the petitioners lodged a Complaint 15 for Annulment of
Title and/or Reconveyance, Damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The case was set for pre-
trial conference16 on March 27, 2000. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found that even before Jose purchased the 2,056 square meters lot from Feliciano on
February 7, 1991, he had already caused the survey of a 2,739-square meter lot on January 30,
1991. The document of sale expressly stated that the area sold was 2,056 square meters and that
the same is located in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. However, in March, 1991, Jose filed his
application for free patent using the survey on the 2,739 square meters. He also indicated therein
that the property is located in Dampol II, Pulilan, Bulacan and that the land described and applied for
is not claimed or occupied by any person. He further claimed that the property was public land which
was first occupied and cultivated by Feliciano.
Thus, the trial court found that the preponderance of evidence showed that the disputed area of 447
square meters rightfully belongs to Federico. This was a part of Lot No. 1306 originally owned and
possessed by Andres as identified and described in the Declaration of Real Property No. 7187.
On March 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as
follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiffs the disputed portion consisting of 447
square meters and now covered by TCT No. T-112864 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,
in the name of Jose Mano, Jr. married to Rosanna Reyes;
2. Ordering defendants to immediately demolish and/or remove the concrete fence erected
on the premises;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 for moral damages;
₱30,000.00 for exemplary damages and ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel said TCT No. T-112864 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan;
5. Defendants to pay costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents went to the CA on appeal. In a Decision18 dated January 16, 2006, the CA reversed
and set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the complaint. According to the CA, respondents
satisfactorily proved their ownership over the disputed property. The Free Patent No. 031418-92-463
and the TCT No. T-112864, as well as the tax declaration offered in evidence by respondents are
more convincing than the evidence presented by the petitioners. Also, petitioners failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the fact of fraud allegedly committed by Jose in obtaining title to the
disputed property.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the CA through its
Resolution19 dated May 3, 2006.
Issues
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it declared that petitioners were unable to prove
ownership of the disputed portion notwithstanding evidence introduced and admitted.
II.
Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it reversed the
decision of the lower court finding fraud committed by the respondent in obtaining title to the property
in question.
Simply put, the issues raised are: (1) Did the CA err in holding that the respondents are the owners
of the disputed 447 square meter property? and (2) Did the CA err in finding that no fraud was
committed by the respondents in obtaining title to the disputed property?
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in not holding that they are the rightful owners as Federico
inherited the property from his father Andres, who died on October 10, 1959. Jose purchased a
parcel of land from Feliciano measuring only 2,056 square meters but his application for free patent
indicated a lot with a total area of 2,739 square meters. Moreover, he indicated the same to be
located at Dampol II, Pulilan, Bulacan; however, it is actually located at Dampol 1st. He also
declared that the said property is not claimed or occupied by any person but the truth is that the 447
square meters is owned and possessed by Federico.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that they have a better title to the property. The certificate
of title issued in their name is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property. It
is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. There was also no proof or evidence presented to
support the alleged fraud on the part of Jose, nor was there any allegation of specific acts committed
by him which constitute fraud.
Our Ruling
After serious consideration, we find petitioners’ arguments to be meritorious.
There is preponderance of evidence that Federico is the owner of the disputed property.
We rule that Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. The Deed of Conditional
Sale described the property purchased by Jose as follows:
A part of parcel of land (T.D. No. 14312) situated at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. Bounded on the
North- Lot 6225; East- Lot 1306 & 1311; South- Lot 1307 and 1308 and West- Lot 1304 &
1299. Containing an area of Two Thousand Fifty Six (2,056) square meters, more or less.
(Bulacan)."
Feliciano sold a portion of Lot 1305 to Jose. After the sale was made, a Sketch/Special Plan 20 was
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Fortunato E. Chavez. It is clear from such document that Lot 1305-A
representing the upper portion with an area of 1,112 square meters was retained by Feliciano and
what was sold was the lower portion thereof which became Lot No. 1305-B with a total area of 2,292
square meters. This exceeds the area of 2,056 square meters indicated in the above sale
transaction.
In another Sketch/Special Plan21 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Norberto C. Chavez, it is shown

that Lot No. 10176-B with an area of 2,292 square meters with a right of way going to Camino
Provincial Highway was the one sold to Jose and which was also sold by him to the Balingcongan
spouses. This is also known as Lot No. 1305-B. TCT No. T-112865 was issued in the name of the
spouses Balingcongan. Lot No. 10175 which represents the upper portion of Lot No. 1305 was
retained by Feliciano. This is also known as Lot No. 1305-A. However, what is surprising is that the
said plan showed that Lot No. 10176-A with an area of 447 square meters had been made to appear
as part of the lot sold by Feliciano to Jose. TCT No. T-112864 was issued in the name of Jose. If
indeed this disputed area is part of Lot No. 1305 then it should have been part of Lot No. 1305-A
which was retained by Feliciano as it is at the East side of the said property.
Moreover, during the ocular inspection, 22 it was observed that all the neighboring lots are either
square or rectangle. There is an old fence, measuring about 40 meters long (abutting the newly
constructed fence), which bounds the true and actual area purchased by Jose. Thus, if the old fence
is followed, the land purchased would either be square or rectangular like the adjoining lots.
However, if the disputed 447 square meters would be included in the land purchased by Jose, the
same would slant remarkably to the right, to the extent of covering the entire area fronting the
provincial road, which as per tax declaration of Federico, is the boundary of his land on the north.
Furthermore, Feliciano, the owner of Lot No. 1305 from whom Jose acquired the property through
sale, testified that his lot is only about 2,000 square meters and that Andres owns the adjoining lot
which is enclosed by a fence. Part of his testimony is copied verbatim to wit:
ATTY. NATIVIDAD:
Q. But before they caused the measuring of the lot in question, do you have any idea how
much is the area of the lot?
A. About 2,000 plus, sir.
Q. This property measuring about 2,000 plus, as you mentioned a while ago before it was
surveyed by them, who is the present owner of this property?
A. Jose Mano, sir.
Q. How did Jose Mano become the owner of the property?
A. I sold it to him in 1991, sir.
xxxx
Q. Mr. Geronimo, I withdraw the manifestation.
May we further request that the description of the land indicated in the first page thereof
particularly the boundary and the area be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit D-3, your
Honor.
Do you know your boundary owners of this lot located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan?
A. Teresa and Andres Valenzuela, sir.
Q. Who else if you know?
A. It is all that I could remember of, sir.
Q. At the time that the property was acquired from you by Jose Mano or by the defendants,
do you have any fence erected on your property?
A. None, sir. The adjacent lot has, sir.
COURT:
On all sides?
A. On Teresa and Andres Valenzuela’s side, sir.
Q. They were fenced?
A. Yes, there is, sir. 23
The testimony of Feliciano from whom Jose purchased the property coincides with the observation
made during the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC that there is an old fence, measuring about
40 meters which encloses the true and actual area purchased by Jose. Feliciano retained the upper
portion of Lot No. 1305 which eventually became Lot No. 1305-A because it is along the national
highway. The disputed 447 square meters property is located at the eastern side of Lot No. 1305-A.
He gave Jose a right of way at the western side24 of the lot he retained for himself. This supports the
theory that Feliciano was fully aware that the property at the eastern part of his property belonged to
Andres from whom Federico inherited the said lot. This is the reason why a right of way going to the
national highway was given to Jose between Lot No. 1305-A and Lot No. 1304. If the disputed
property is part of the sale as claimed by Jose then Feliciano would not have given the said right of
way but would rather keep it to himself.
"Settled is the rule that a person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or oversight the land
owned by another, does not become the owner of such land by virtue of the certificate alone. The
Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration but is not intended to perpetrate fraud against the real owner of the land. The certificate
of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner." 25
Jose committed fraud in obtaining the title to the disputed property.
Anent the second issue, we rule that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property.
The chain of events leading to the issuance of title in his name shows beyond cavil the bad faith or a
fraudulent pattern on his part. The evidence on record disclosed that even before Jose purchased
the 2,056 square meters from Feliciano, he had already caused on January 30, 1991 the survey of a
2,739 square meters lot. Although the document of sale expressly stated that the area sold was
2,056 square meters and is located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan, however, when he filed his
application for free patent in March 1991, he used the survey on the 2,739 square meters and
indicated the same to be located at Dampol II, Pulilan, Bulacan. Also, in his application, he stated
that the land described and applied for is not claimed or occupied by any person when in reality the
same is owned and possessed by Federico.
Petitioners are entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
Article 221726 of the Civil Code defines what are included in moral damages while Article 2219
enumerates the cases where they may be recovered. Moral damages are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer.27 "The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear
and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other
party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive."28 In the same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must
be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party
acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. 29 As regards attorney’s fees, the law is
clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory
damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 30 of the Civil Code.
Having ruled that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property then he should be
liable for both moral and exemplary damages. Likewise, since petitioners were compelled to litigate
to protect their rights and having proved that Jose acted in bad faith, attorney’s fees should likewise
be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83577 dated January 16, 2006 and its May 3, 2006
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch 14 in Civil Case No. 1065-M-99 dated March 10, 2004 is reinstated and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

vs.
FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

vs.
DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner.
Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I,
dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070
entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without merit. 1
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents
Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos.
P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations
furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan,
respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey
plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds
of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant.
The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. 2
The defendants filed their respective answers. 3
The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated
February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases which were granted.
4 5
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within the
intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on
June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 6
The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the
complaint in intervention. The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated
7
September 10, 1972. 8
Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3)
criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359
and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan,
private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free
patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended
pending the outcome of the criminal cases.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense
filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and
that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.
In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and
dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9
Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos.
1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the
extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the
crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to
order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in
question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the
subject matter in litigation. 10
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:
After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil
cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO
DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said
Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of
the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122
of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private
properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands
vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that
OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible
and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone
cancel the same.
The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of
Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain
Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based
on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely under Sec. 3
of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11
They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order
dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. Both motion for reconsideration were denied by
12
the trial court. Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant
13
petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE

OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY
BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE
FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE
FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14
Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public
Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act
provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration
and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being
privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at
present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and
certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving
evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the
free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the
private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens
title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now
indefeasible.
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said,
On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose of
the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act No.
3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its
second paragraph states:
A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously

occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable
or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he
files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public
Land Law.
The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent issued
to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has the
jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of law,
certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could
very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads:
'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian

brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited
by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an
exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from their
ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the
wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of
agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest
zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural
minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the
more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who
have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been
harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and
imprisonment.
The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the
Public Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance
to acquire lands of the public domain' ...
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were
driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain — that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy on
liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more
consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities,
which our courts of justice must uphold. 15
The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the
benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth

Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows:
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or
prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through
his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has,
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this
chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to
exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts
of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files
his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or
disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.
There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities;
that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of
any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor,
petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private
respondents applied for free patents thereon.
It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded
to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void
when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title
issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. In Director of lands vs. Abanzado this Court said:
16 17
4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly
opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, a 1968 decision. After a
review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a
Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land,
is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests
have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the public domain
shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the basic state
objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes
of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse
or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and
lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results.
With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
— crops, livestock, houses and highways — not to mention precious human lives, ...'
The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil
cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there
was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the acts of
falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are
timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of
Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case.
There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or
not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents
belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents
on said lands.
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172102 July 2, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HANOVER WORLWIDE TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70077, which affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281. Petitioner also assails the CA
Resolution2 dated March 30, 2006, denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an application for Registration of
Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New) under Vs-072219-000396, situated in
Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of One Hundred Three Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters, more or less, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application stated that Hanover is
the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 4488, its title thereto having been obtained through purchase
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the approved Technical
Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Hanover’s President and General
Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the President and General Manager of Hanover in favor
of the latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting that the property was surveyed; 6) a Tax
Declaration; 7) a tax clearance; 8) a Municipal Assessor's Certification stating, among others, the
assessed value and market value of the property; and 9) a CENRO Certification on the alienability
and disposability of the property.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application. The Republic contended,
among others, that neither Hanover nor its predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax payments attached to or
alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the lands applied for; Hanover is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels of land applied for are portions
of the public domain belonging to the Republic and are not subject to private appropriation.
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the presentation of its evidence.
The Republic was represented in the proceedings by officers from the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision3 approving Hanover’s application for registration
of the subject lot. It held that from the documentary and oral evidence presented by Hanover, the
trial court was convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public,
continuous, notorious and peaceful possession, in the concept of an owner, of the land applied for
registration of title, and that it had registrable title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D.
1529.
On appeal by the State, the judgment of the RTC was affirmed by the CA via the presently assailed
Decision and Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL HEARING OF
THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE THEREOF.
II
DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE

"WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE" EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE TITLE THROUGH
ADVERSE OCCUPATION.4
Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. It avers that the RTC set
the initial hearing of the case on September 25, 1995 in an Order dated June 13, 1995. Petitioner
contends, however, that, pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the case must be
not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the Order
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995,
the initial hearing should have been set not earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days from June 13, 1995)
and not later than September 11, 1995 (90 days from June 13, 1995). Unfortunately, the initial
hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14) days later
than the prescribed period.
Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence in the form of
specific facts indicating the nature and duration of the occupation of its predecessor-in-interest to
prove that the latter has been in possession of the subject lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The petition is meritorious.
As to the first assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It is true that in land registration cases, the applicant
must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In the instant case, though, there is no
dispute that respondent complied with the requirements of the law for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case.
With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23
of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of
the land registration court and not the applicant. Citing Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., 5 this
Court held in Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation 6 that:
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant
has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date.
The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge
and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This
involves a process to which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x
xxxx
x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land
court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish
an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more important than the date on which
the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via
publication. x x x
In the instant case, there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via
publication was duly made. 1avvphi1
Moreover, petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely faulted if the initial hearing
that was conducted on September 25, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section
23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent substantially complied with the
requirement relating to the registration of the subject land.
Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any error in giving
due course to respondent’s application for registration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the more important issue that
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it or its predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject property for the period required by law.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 7
Likewise, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073, states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.8
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, it must now be shown
that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.9
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites involve delving into
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the
court a quo are generally binding on this Court, except for certain recognized exceptions, 10 to wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 11
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that there is neither finding nor
discussion by both the trial and appellate courts which would support their conclusion that
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the disputed parcel of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had
been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanover’s
President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he was the former owner
of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan;
that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in
favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands; and that his and Hanover’s possession of the property started in 1990. 12
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that its predecessor’s
possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period or duration required by law. The
earliest date of the Tax Declarations presented in evidence by respondent is 1965, the others being
1973, 1980, 1992 and 1993. Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why the realty
taxes due on the subject property were only paid starting in 1965. While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. 13 In the present case,
the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to the presumption that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or possession of the subject lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must
show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the
land is of the nature and duration required by law. 14 Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the pieces
of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" proof
necessary in cases of this nature.
Lastly, the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot had been declared
alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably
belong to the State.15 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 16
In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property, Hanover
submitted a Certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(CENRO) attesting that "lot 4488, CAD-545-D, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THREE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square meters, more or less, situated at Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu" was found to be within "Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification
project no. 28, per map 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu." However, this certification is not sufficient.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.17 this Court held that it is not enough for the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable, thus:
x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable x x x.18
In the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO Certification was not
confirmed as only the President and General Manager of respondent corporation identified said
Certification submitted by the latter. It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. 19 In the present case,
Hanover’s President and General Manager, who identified the CENRO Certification, is a private
individual. He was not the one who prepared the Certification. The government official who issued
the Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could have testified regarding its
contents. Hence, the RTC should not have accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the
facts stated therein. The contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanover’s President and
General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of such Certification. Even if
the subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. 20
Moreover, the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands. 21 Thus, the CENRO Certification
should have been accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Respondent, however, failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2005 Decision and March 30, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077 and the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Land Registration Case No. N-281 are SET ASIDE.
Respondent Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation’s application for registration of Lot No. 4488 of
Consolacion Cad-545-D (New), under Vs-072219-000396, Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court: Singson, Ledesma and Lim For Appellants. D.R. Williams For Appellee

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Supreme Court: Singson, Ledesma and Lim For Appellants. D.R. Williams For Appellee

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

From the record the following facts appear:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner,

G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS

a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically,

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-

B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.

A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.

A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir.

Q What kind of structure with regards to material?

A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.

A Amado Cruz sir.

A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.

Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this

A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.

Q What was his answer?

Q What did you do?

Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?

A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.

Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?

A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.

Q When you say we, who was your companion?

A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.

Q The three (3) of you?

Q What title did you see there?

A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty.

Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?

A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case

Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?

A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.

A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as

Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?

A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.

Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?

A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.

A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a

A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17

A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.

A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.

A First, I have to consider that the property is clean.

A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his

A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.

A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the

Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to?

A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.

Q What Certification are you referring to?

A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of