Biden’s Domestic Priorities Should Guide His Foreign Policy

By Robert B. Zoellick, September 8, 2020

If Joe Biden wins the presidency in November, his foreign policy team will present him
with a staggering to-do list. Given his significant international experience, the former
vice president will be tempted to dive in. But he should pause to consider his priorities.

Biden will face vast demands at home. COVID-19 will continue to endanger American
lives and livelihoods and spotlight inequities in the nation’s health-care system. The
new president will need to direct an inclusive economic recovery. He will face
frustrations over racism and criminal justice. Democratic constituencies will demand
action on climate change, the environment, energy, and immigration.

Biden’s staff will want to rely on his skills as a dealmaking legislator—no president
since Lyndon Johnson has had his experience working in and with Congress—even as
he faces a diverse and impatient caucus. Biden will understand that he needs to
demonstrate effectiveness, not just stand for causes, because many Americans will have
voted against President Donald Trump, not necessarily for Biden’s program. He and his
inner circle know the experience of newly elected Democratic presidents who have
taken power along with a Democratic-controlled Congress after an era of Republican
rule: Presidents Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and Jimmy Carter all faced high
expectations and then suffered midterm defeats after two years. A wise White House
will set priorities and pursue specific accomplishments.

Given the constraints on the new president’s time and political capital, a Biden
administration should leverage its domestic agenda in crafting its foreign policy. The
president can signal U.S. leadership with an international agenda that rests squarely on
his domestic priorities. A combined program offers an incumbent President Biden a
cohesive strategy, rather than a long roster of individual items.

The natural components of such a policy include public health and biological safety,
environmental and energy security, inclusive economic growth, cyber-protection and
technological innovation, and immigration. These topics should appeal to U.S. allies,
too, creating the basis for a reinvigorated transatlantic and transpacific partnership.
From this new base of cooperation, the United States and its partners will be better
positioned to address two overarching challenges: the future of free societies and
competition with China.

The pandemic offers the clearest, and most urgent, link between policy at home and
abroad. The United States needs vaccines, better treatments, and effective precautionary
systems to counter the virus. But recovery in the United States requires global progress.
Scientists and doctors will need to share knowledge and treatments across borders. In
contrast to current policy, the United States will need to work with other nations to
strengthen the World Health Organization and supplement it when necessary. In doing
so, a potential Biden administration should look to President George W. Bush’s
successful campaign against HIV/AIDS, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR). That program combined resources, knowledge, and compassion to
address a common threat. PEPFAR and a similar effort against malaria and tuberculosis
have been among the United States’ greatest contributions to Africa. A Biden
administration should initiate a similar initiative for COVID-19.

The world faces dangerous viral outbreaks every year. The United States and other
countries, including China, need to learn lessons—without issuing indictments—about
prevention, precautions, and treatments. To complement this work, the United States
should promote collective action against wildlife trafficking that spreads hazardous
viruses.

Similarly, a Biden administration should build upon its domestic carbon policies to
generate support for international climate change action. In addition to rejoining the
Paris agreement, Biden would regain momentum and broaden support, including among
developing nations, by rolling out coordinated international policies across a range of
topics. For example, the United States could help integrate climate change and
development policies: a soil carbon initiative could assist African agriculture, and
reforestation incentives would boost biological diversity worldwide. Alternative energy
technologies could be scaled to match capacities and needs in developing countries as
well. All countries will need adaptation policies, and carbon taxes and trading markets
would direct investments to projects with the greatest potential benefits.

Biden also needs to link his economic policies to a global post-COVID-19 recovery.
U.S. workers will not make gains in a stagnant world economy. Though domestic
politics will likely limit big trade initiatives, Biden could boost confidence and assist
farmers and other U.S. exporters by putting a stop to Trump’s economic warfare. He
should start by rolling back perverse “national security” barriers with allies and
offsetting some tax increases at home by cutting tariffs and import costs. His
administration should also free the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement
system to get back to work and coordinate with the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, and
others to address the WTO’s weaknesses.

If Biden wants a trade initiative, he should propose that the three North American
economies negotiate a North Atlantic accord with the United Kingdom. That accord
would underscore the strength of an integrated North American economy and announce
that the “Three Amigos” intend to shape global rules. U.S. unions cannot reasonably
complain about British labor standards.

A future global economic recovery will go hand in hand with U.S. research and
technological innovation. In the past, the United States’ “triple helix” of government
funding for basic research, universities, and private enterprise proved superior to state-
directed systems. To succeed today, the United States must remain open to people,
ideas, capital, and competition from outside its borders. U.S. universities must be
magnets for the world’s talent. A potential Biden administration should work closely
with other countries to strengthen common standards and safeguards for commercial
security and intellectual property.

The United States needs a revitalized immigration policy to maintain this economic and
intellectual edge. The country needs safe gateways, not dumb walls. Early action on
“Dreamers” and visas would set the stage. In 1979, Ronald Reagan launched his
presidential campaign with a message that fits our present moment: “The key to our
own future security may lie in both Mexico and Canada becoming much stronger
countries than they are today,” he said. “It is time we stopped thinking of our nearest
neighbors as foreigners.” The North America of NAFTA withstood Trump’s efforts to
rip the three partners apart. But Biden will need to make the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), NAFTA’s successor, work.

The new NAFTA should support North American supply and production chains that
offer attractive alternatives to Chinese exports. Biden’s “Buy America” should become
“Buy North America.” Although the region’s demographic future shines brighter than
that of China, Europe, and Japan, violence and organized crime shadow Mexico’s
prospects. To improve Mexico’s working conditions and union safety, the United States
and Canada can help build institutions and the rule of law. The USMCA’s
Competitiveness Committee should invest in human capital through education and skills
to build a continental workforce, while respecting citizenship requirements and
sovereignty. A fresh approach to North America could also offer Biden electoral
dividends with Hispanics. That backing could help shift southwestern states into his
column.

My recommendations for a new domestic-foreign policy combine novelty with

continuity. During difficult days in the Cold War, Presidents Harry Truman, John F.
Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush recognized the need to draw allies
closer together. They prioritized building and strengthening partnerships before
negotiating with their Soviet adversary.

The same must be true today. This plan leads with topics of common interest among
allies in Europe and the Pacific. Free societies need to be able to meet twenty-first-
century demands for citizen security and opportunity. Acting in concert, the United
States and its partners can become more attractive to others and compete effectively
with rising authoritarian states. At the same time, this agenda, if promoted by a
coalition, could offer common ground with China and Russia. Competition, and even
rivalries, can be tempered by mutual interests.

This agenda can also help the United States build international support for its traditional
security responsibilities. Alongside its partners, Washington will need cutting-edge
technological capabilities to deter would-be aggressors and counter nuclear and terrorist
threats. Yet U.S. military leadership has traditionally enjoyed greater support among
allies when it begins with mutual political and economic interests.

A foreign policy agenda for 2021 should start at home—but then look beyond. A Biden
administration can succeed if it makes domestic and foreign policies two sides of the
same coin.