Reserva/Reversion Adoptiva A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise in barrio Lutucan, Sariaya,

Quezon, from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire several
G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980 parcels of land. 
DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while still living with
ABRENICA, petitioners,  the spouses. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely
vs. Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano,
PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO who are the children of a deceased brother, Martin Mirano. 
MIRANO, respondents. The parties do not dispute the Identity of the two parcels of land in controversy, which are described
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.  in paragraph 3 of the complaint as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Recto Law Office for respondents.  1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 44,200 square
meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by Ravine; on the East, by the property of Leodovico
FERNANDEZ, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 Garcia; on the South by the property of Gregorio Amponin; and on the West, by the property of
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo Banawa). Under Tax Declaration No. 25994 in the name
April 12, 1965 1 in CA G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled "Primitive Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,210.00. 
versus, Doroteo Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is: têñ. 2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 54,093
£îhqw⣠square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley; on the
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendants- East, by an Alley; on the South, by the properties of Filomeno Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and
appellants.  Andres Moratilla; and on the West, by the property of Agapito Aro. Under Tax Declaration No.
The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: têñ.£îhqw⣠19786 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,760.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective assertions and evidences
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels of land are in sharp divergence, we shall refer to the
complaint;  first parcel as the Iba Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche property and, moreover, we
(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to the plaintiffs;  shall treat and discuss the two separately. 
(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Maria Carmen Parcel 1, or the Iba Property. 
Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced by The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido Punzalan from whom it was
Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and void;  acquired on May 5, 1921. Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends to show that the acquisition of the
(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956, evidenced by Exhibit 'D' said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a public instrument acknowledged
executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano before Notary Public Ramon A. Cabrera on the date aforesaid, a photostatic copy of which was
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations No. 26818 in the names of the spouses introduced in evidence as Exhibit 'A', the same having been secured from an original copy on file
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano Amponin with the Division of Archives, Bureau of Libraries. The deed of sale in question states that the Iba
and Gliceria Abrenica, and the registration of the said deed of donation in the registry of deeds of property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and that they were sold for the amount of
Batangas; and  P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant Doroteo Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of
(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of P 4,500 and this notarial document when he declared that in the execution of the document concerning the
attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00, and the costs of this action. purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00
SO ORDERED. 2 for stamps in the name of Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A-7'). 
The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of this case in the By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is predicated upon their assertion
Court of Appeals. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Gliceria Abrenica, legally adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the Mendoza. Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed money from defendant
Carsuche property. 3 spouses on three different occasions for the sums of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00,
The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of respectively, each of which was evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon the failure of
Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965. 4 Placido Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land aforementioned to
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are: têñ.£îhqw⣠the spouses for P 3,700.00, but as the total value of the three loans was P4,080.00, Punzalan had to
It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano a niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza, and who was reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00. The document of sale stated the price to be only
then about nine years old, was taken in by the appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana P2,000.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa had only P25.00 with him when the deed was
Mendoza, in the latter's house in Mahabang Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants spouses being prepared by the notary public, and the latter was charging P10.00 for every one thousand pesos
childless, treated and reared her up like their own child. They hired a private tutor to teach her the mentioned as the consideration of the contract, Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made
rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. They supported her, gave her money, clothes and even to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being already old, they want to leave
jewelry. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the household chores.  something to Maria Mirano for her to lean upon when they would have been gone. They, however,
1
made Maria understand that although the property was placed under her name, they would continue THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
to be the owners thereof, to administer and enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL CODE IS TOO
she would become the owner of the land only after their death. Maria supposedly expressed her LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL PROVISION. 
conformity to and appreciation for the said arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when the III
deed of sale was executed.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property.  THE 'EXCEPTIVE' CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN
There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was acquired by way of purchase THE PRESENT CASE. 
from its original owners, to wit: Roman Biscocho, his sister Paula Biscocho, and sister-in-law IV 
Carmen Mendoza. The sale took place sometime in December, 1935. There is, however, a sharp THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
conflict of evidence between the parties concerning the form of the document evidencing the same SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY IN THE
and in whose favor the sale was made at that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was evidenced by INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY ADOPTED. 
a public instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of Taal, Batangas, V
and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was Maria Mirano. The defendants, on the other THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING WITH
hand, assert that the sale was evidenced by a private writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED OF SALE
Biscocho and that it was in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Neither the EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO BANAWA AND HIS
public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. Ilagan nor the private writing supposedly prepared by WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE
Roman Biscocho was presented before the lower court.  PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO. 6
After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary evidence, the plaintiffs presented The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property, parcel 1, while the fifth
Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho to testify upon the execution of the aforesaid public error assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot 2. 7
instrument in December, 1935. These two declared that sometime in December, 1935, the spouses As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the ownership of the two
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, Maria Mirano, Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Carmen parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees, respondents herein, assert title to the lands as
Mendoza, accompanied by Atty. Regino Aro, went to the office of Atty. Ilagan in Taal, Batangas; heirs of Maria Mirano. Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, claim ownership over them by
that Atty. Aro, who was a classmate of Atty. Ilagan in the law school, asked the latter's permission to virtue of purchase from the original owners.
use his typewriter on which he prepared a document in English and which he asked Atty. Ilagan to Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not contrary to
ratify; that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog the contents of the said document to the parties and. those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not necessary. In Tolentino
the witnesses, after which they all signed the same; that the document involved the sale of the vs. de Jesus, et al., 8 this Court held: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Carsuche property in favor of Maria Mirano: that after paying him P20.00 for his services which The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on this
Atty. Ilagan would not accept at first, Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog whether the Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L- 25563, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 27; Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo, et al., L-
document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay) to safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano, to 23096 & L-23376, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 43 1; Villacrucis vs. CA, L-29831, March 29, 1972, 44
which Atty. Ilagan answered in the affirmative.  SCRA 176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA, L-24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga Dev. Corp. vs. CA,
Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the Carsuche property by the owners L-28175, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda, et al., L-28523, July 16,
thereof, they agreed on the purchase price of P3,700.00 of which a down payment of P1,200.00 was 1971, 40 SCRA 35; Quiñ;ano, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 227; Reyes, et
made and, later, an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho, both payments being al. vs. CA, et al., L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142; Gotamco Hermanas vs. Shotwell, et
evidenced by a receipt dated December 15, 1936 (Exh. '9'). A few days later, Roman Biscocho al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 112-117; Limjoco vs. CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37
prepared in his own handwriting a private document selling the Carsuche property in favor of the SCRA 663-669; De Garcia, et al. vs. CA, L-20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 130, 136-137; Simeon
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00, the vendors having asked vs. Peñ;a, L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
for a P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa, thereafter brought said private document to the entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
municipal treasurer of Taal, Batangas, to whom he expressed the desire to have the land declared in there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
the name of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to the payment of taxes over the land Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of
whenever he was away. This wish of Doroteo Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit, both appellant and appellees [Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the
thus accounting for the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the tax declarations findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of
covering the same from 1934 to 1956. 5 facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set
The petitioners assign the following errors: têñ.£îhqw⣠forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
I  respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622] ; and (9) when the finding of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA MIRANO WAS IN on record [Salazar vs. Gutierrez, L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243]. 
THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS.  The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. 
II However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually. 
2
The first error assigned reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba Properly in
the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos.  owner of the said parcels of land was clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of
The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of First
Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of Maria
Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a
donation mortis causa was executed, the Court of Appeals said that, under the facts and
circumstances narrated by the petitioners, the placing of the Iba property in the name of Maria
Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all - was not in the nature of a donation  mortis causa, but
rather it would be in the nature of a donation inter-vivos, giving its reasons and citing the applicable
law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical
conclusion. 10
The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court of Appeals is
that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano was
the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. Aro, a nephew of the deceased
Doroteo Banawa, that the money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche
properties was given to her by, Doroteo Banawa. 11
If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of them, then the money had belonged to her.
Maria Mirano purchased and paid for the said properties with her money. As a matter or fact, the
deed of sale, Exhibit "A", 12 recites as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina (P2,000.00) que me ha pagado
Maria Mirano ... .  under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of the land in
favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a
sale in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands by the
spouses in favor of Maria Mirano. 13
There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely simulated contract and the
relatively simulated one. In both instances, however, their nullity is based on the want of true consent
of the parties. There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed. Such contracts
are even generally regarded as fraudulent with intent of injuring third persons. The purpose,
therefore, of a simulated contract which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent, or to
deceive or defraud third persons.
From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of concealment of intent of the parties
as to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The transactions which
transpired were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to money by the
spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and accepted verbally; and (2) purchase of
lands by Maria Mirano with the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the
spouses) as consideration thereof.
The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract of sale
between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. The
petitioners were present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They were the ones who caused
the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano because they wished "that after
our death Maria Mirano could have something for her maintenance. 14Moreover, the testimony of
Vicente Ilagan, the notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed, to the effect that he
was asked by Doroteo Banawa in Tagalog "Kung matibay ang documenting ito para kay
Maria" 15 and to which query he answered, "Yes, Sir", 16 supports this conclusion. The conduct of the
3
spouses at the time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the petitioners,
the late spouses and their successors-in interest, now assert. Their intention to make Maria Mirano the
the deeds of sale which influenced the vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in
their agreement. The petitioners had full knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the
document of sale. They are equitably estopped 17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in question in
favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent of the parties as embodied in the documents of
sale of the Iba and Carsuche properties. The documents are what they purport to be — contracts of
sale from the vendors to the vendee, Maria Mirano. 
The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano
when the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was
created. The present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party
but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property. The
former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if the person to whom the title is
conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is
implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. 
The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective on
August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable. 18
Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust for the
petitioners.
The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive prescription
Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by possession in good faith
and under a just title for ten years as between persons present and for twenty years as between
absentees. 
The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten (10) years as
between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a just title.
As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or otherwise, to
support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must
be proven; it never can be presumed."
Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners cannot
invoke prescription with respect to the Iba property.
The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property under Section
41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads têñ.£îhqwâ£
Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land
or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every
actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under
disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or
adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims
must have been actual open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and
adverse to all other claimants ...
It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as the owner
thereof Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive
prescription under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property
became adverse and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date of The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the Carsuche property
the filing in 1957 of the present action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed.  (Lot No. 2) is meritorious. 
The second error assigned is: têñ.£îhqw⣠Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real estate — An
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that petitioners' interpretation of action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal and ignores the rationale of the legal provision.  brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues." 
Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the New Civil
in writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this Code which provides that "prescriptions already running before the effectivity of the New Civil
requisite the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same form." Code, shall be governed by the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run
It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires simultaneous since 1940, the date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of
delivery of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given by Maria Mirano for the Batangas. Hence the Code of Civil Procedure governs. 
purchase of the said property from Placido Punzalan was the pre- existing debts of the latter to the The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.  in 1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the same was
The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria filed only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later. 
Mirano is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive. The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership in 1950, ten
Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for example, (10) years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public
in manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee.  and continuous, under a claims of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claim
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring commenced. (Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in
physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real 1940 with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-
delivery, as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the house spouses was continued by their present successors. 
from the vendor to the vendee.  The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously sold to Maria
In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of the vendor, Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there is
Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced." As held in one case "... guilty
Mirano when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever way
of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido possession may have been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the
Punzalan, of his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. land openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten years." 19
Consequently, there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a little less than
over the property in question to Maria Mirano. ten (10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P 500.00. A total amount of P 4,500.00 as actual
It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that Article 1448 of damages was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years when the
the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case.  decision of the trial court was rendered. An adjustment should be made in view of the finding of this
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor spouses are entitled to the land in Court that the Carsuche property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners. 
question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question. Forty-five
reads: têñ.£îhqw⣠percent (45 %) of the annual net income of P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00. Maria Mirano has been
... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be dead for about thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period, the petitioners have been in
his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his possession of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. They should pay as actual damages
parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who the total amount of P6,975.00 representing the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on
shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.  the basis of P225.00 a year. 
The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00. 
of this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the case of the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot
judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is No. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was acquired by the spouses
clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.  Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano
The fifth error assigned is: têñ.£îhqw⣠Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are ordered to pay the private respondents the total
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to the Carsuche property amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the
(Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the petitioner Doroteo Banawa and his amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.
wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the pretended sale to Maria Mirano.  SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria
Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land was G.R. No. L-18753             March 26, 1965
sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The petitioners immediately entered into the
possession of the land as owners. 
4
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,  reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence
at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the
left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and
Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will
was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full
use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the
beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she
could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico,
married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct
of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her
grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of
in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of
First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite
publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed
under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because
the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November
10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the
testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by
the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor
filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the
will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for
5
favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor
appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and
the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and
oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the
following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the
will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing
on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion
to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other
hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an "interested person." An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction
that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be
a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and,
in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected
by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner
thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of
the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any
comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy
behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it,
the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to
inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based
upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of
sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa,
3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not
extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be
considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of
the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not
extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of
the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid
scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol.
1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in
this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly
attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this
respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for
she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the
attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and
the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself
who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the
will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of
the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the
will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the
witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and
the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
6
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly
executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public
in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no
proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence.
Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their
supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to
exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those
fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the
weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from
subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary
dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the
Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different
occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the
opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years
prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what
the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a
kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and
make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is
on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a
matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved
by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may
be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of
the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does
not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law
recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine
that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually
complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14
Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass
upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid
the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in
excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to
intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby
set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to
the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds
that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
7
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of
her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence
of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in
case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name
the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper
name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle
name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the
following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because
under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to
prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of
words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or  surname of the mother.
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or  Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use . Article 365 of the
Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and
that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which
reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to,
the child may also use the surname of the mother.
8
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his
name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s
correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile.
Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they
all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall
be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames,
they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof.
Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of
the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. 20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21 of the Family Code and Section 17 22 Article V of
RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed.
In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3)
of the Family Code and Section 18 24, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs.
Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of  However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor
of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the
courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Disinheritance
9
G.R. No. 198994
IRIS MORALES, Petitioner, 
vs.
ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO
OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ and FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA
OLONDRIZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from the May 27, 2011 decision and
October 12, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.1 The CA
denied Morales' petition for certiorarifrom the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 12, 2007 and
October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No. 03-0060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-0069.2
Antecedents
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow,
Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O.
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas
RTC for the partition of the decedent’s estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July
4, 2003. The case was raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.
On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for her
appointment as special administratrix. Her petition was also raffled to Branch 254 and docketed
as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.
The pertinent portions of the decedent’s will reads:
1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and administrator of
my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith. x x x
2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and between (1)
IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3)
ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother
(6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.3
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the
decedent.
On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and moved
to suspend the intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate proceedings in  Sp. Proc.
Case No. SP-03-0069. The respondent heirs opposed Morales’ motion for suspension and her
petition for allowance of the will.
On November 27, 2003, the RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 with Sp. Proc. Case
No. SP-03-0069.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because
Francisco was preterited from the will.
On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of
preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate
the existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.
After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the evidentiary
hearing was scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her
right to present evidence on the issue of preterition.
On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended the intestate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned that
probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the
motion on September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration
previously issued to Alfonso Jr.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of
Administration. They also moved for the inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.
On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition. The case was transferred
to Branch 253 presided by Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.
On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs’ motion for reconsideration of the
revocation of the Letters of Administration and (2) Morales’ motion to be appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate. The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will
not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become an
idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that
based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso
Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.
On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales
alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence
of the will. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales’ petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while
probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir
in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into
intestate succession.4 Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and
impractical because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the
present petition for review on certiorari on December 5, 2011.
The Petition
Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the case to
proceed intestate because: (1) the probate of a decedent’s will is mandatory; (2) the RTC Branch 254
already ordered the case to proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate already
attained finality; (3) the probate court cannot touch on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (4) there
was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his
legitime.
The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC’s jurisdiction to reverse or modify an
interlocutory order setting the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention that she did
not appear in any of the evidentiary hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the
RTC and the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the will; and (4) that Francisco’s
preterition annulled the institution of heirs and opened the case into intestacy. They conclude that the
RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated Alfonso
Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed intestate.
Our Ruling
We join the ruling of the CA.
10
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named
or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part
of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any
legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. 6
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s
inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation. (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not
impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. 7
In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless
Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his
preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco
received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did
not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue.
We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
We will not entertain the petitioner’s factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited because this
Court is not a trier of facts.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC’s conclusion. We
see no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.
The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to questions
on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s formal validity
and due execution.8However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. 9 It is not beyond the probate
court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional
circumstances.10 When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue. 11
The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s preterition annulled
the institution of heirs.1avvphi1 The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will,
resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. 12 The decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity
of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error – much less
grave abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the previous order setting the case for
probate barred the RTC from ordering the case to proceed intestate. The disputed order is merely
interlocutory and can never become final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment
does.13 An interlocutory order does not result in res judicata.14 It remains under the control of the
court and can be modified or rescinded at any time before final judgment. 15
Certiorari is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is
one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 16 As discussed, it is well within the jurisdiction
of the probate court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will if probate proceedings might
become an idle ceremony due to the nullity of the will.
On the other hand, grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the
law.17 It is present when power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion
and hostility. Morales failed to show that the R TC acted in such a capricious and despotic manner
that would have warranted the CA's grant of her petition for certiorari. On the contrary, the RTC
acted appropriately in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,  at stockholders ng China Banking.
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and
October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo
C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a
certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
11
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio
labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit
daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta
siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at
hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396
were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily
on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the
court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into
the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the
face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he
other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir
in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100
(1987)] has made its position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility .
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS
IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL,
I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY
LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON
EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID;
AND,
III
12
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b)
cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate
case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did
not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention
of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that
the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919
of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his
or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect. 14
With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath
his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir.
Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose
of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed
to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of
the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, 
vs.
13
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents. 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta". 
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts: 
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She
left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: 
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang
with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her
husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even during
the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my
nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I
know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son.
He has made me do things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent
with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred
to as the Testate Case). 
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole
heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for brevity). 
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI,
presided by respondent Judge. 
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited
the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs.
Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a
case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution
on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent. 2
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise: 
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court
finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L. Maninang and which was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same
Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is
not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the
duties of the trust. " 
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse
that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case concepts. 
(September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).  ... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause
lower Court committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law", 1956
reviewable only by appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.  ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand,
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate is presumed to be "involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o
Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.  p. 1131). 10
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different. 
the Rules of Court. 4 ... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Pretention
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This annulment is in toto,
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.
by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5 In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.  the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last
... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. 11
(sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not
authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion
even after the will has been authenticated .... 6 was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable. 
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso  12
accordance with the requirements of the law. 7 ... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid  8, reading:  dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, foundation, ...
and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. (Emphasis in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where
supplied)  appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. 
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez  9 had a similar thrust:  WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First Instance-
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special Proceeding
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings. 
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. No pronouncement as to costs. 
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of SO ORDERED. 
the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or
not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the
Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. 
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely
preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited,

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