British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

The World of Imagination in Ibn 'Arabi's Ontology

Author(s): Samer Akkach
Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (May, 1997), pp. 97-113
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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1997), 24(1), 97-113

The World of
Imagination in Ibn
'Arabi's Ontology
SAMER AKKACH*

ABSTRACT In Ibn 'ArabF'sontology imaginationplays an essential role: it is

seen as the creative source of manifestation,the very cause of our existence, and
the powerful intermediarythat enables us to remain in constant contact with the
Infinite and the Absolute. Through the concept of imagination Ibn 'ArabT
managed to differentiatebetween the humanand Divine mechanismof creativity,
a differentiation which he then used to resolve the paradox of the eternity
(qidam) and newness (huduth)of the world. This study aims to examine these
aspects of Ibn 'ArabT'scomplex concept of imagination and to illustrate its
transcendentaland ontological dimensions. The study adopts a hermeneutical
approach to the original texts, by placing more emphasis on the interpretive
conditions-which is influencedby a preoccupation with artistic creativity and
a desire to understandthe creative mechanismof imagination,both at the human
and Divine level in the wider ontological framework-than the historical and
contextual contingencies.

Introduction
Abu Bakr Muhammadb. 'All b. MuhammadIbn al-'Arabl al-Hatiml al-Ta'T,
known as MuhyiddinIbn al-'Arabi (abridgedas Ibn 'Arabi), is probablyone of
the most prolific and influentialfigures in the history of Islam.1Born in Murcia,
Spain, in 560/1165, Ibn 'Arabyis also known among Sufis as al-shaykhal-akbar
(the 'Greatest Master'). Like most Sufi masters, Ibn 'Arabi spent his life
travelling throughout the Islamic world and making contacts with the most
prominentspiritualauthoritiesof the time. He finally settled in Damascus where
he died at the age of 78 in 638/1240, and was buried on Mount Qasiyun in the
suburbof ShaykhMu.hyial-DTnwhich carries his name to this day. Ibn 'Arabi
left us a large body of knowledge which, according to Ibn 'Arabl himself,
comprised 289 books and treatises, and accordingto others 400 or 500.2 Given
* Lecturer,Departmentof Architecture,The Universityof Adelaide, Australia.I am gratefulto Mr William C.
Chittickfor directingmy attentionto his book, The Sufi Path of Knowledge,and for his commentswhich led to
many valuable
1 For a full improvements.
biographyof Ibn 'Arabisee ClaudeAddas, Ibn 'Arablou La quete du SoufreRouge (Paris:Editions
Gallimond, 1989); for an introductionto his life, work and thought, see S. H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1964); R. W. J. Austin's introductionto Ibn Al-'ArabT.The Bezels of
Wisdom(New York: Paulist Press, 1980); and A. Afifi's introductionto his commentaryon Fusus al-Hikam
(Beirut:Dar al-Kitabal-'Arabi, 1980).
2
Afifi, ibid., p. 5.

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SAMER AKKACH

the complex natureof the topics he dealt with, and the many voluminous works
he produced,such as al-Futuhat,the lost 95-volume interpretationof the Qur'an3
and the lost 300-chapter book Mandhij al-Irtiqd',4 it is clear that his overall
contributionto Islam was enormous.In addition,one can also look to the many
commentaries on his works to appreciatethe significance of his thought and
teachings both for Islam in general, and Sufism in particular.
In an introductionto his translationof Fusus al-Hikam, Austin regards Ibn
'Arabi as representing'a culminationnot only of Sufi exposition but also, in a
very significant way, of Islamic intellectual expression'.5 Throughhis writings
and teachings, Ibn 'Arab!presents an elaborateand cohesive view of the world
based on a very intricate ontological structure.His ontology brings together
harmoniouslya wealth of philosophical, theological, scientific, linguistic, meta-
physical and mystical knowledge, developing it into a cohesive and intrinsic
multi-dimensionalwhole. Interest in Ibn 'Arabi's writings and teachings has
increased in the last few decades, particularlyin the West. The difficult and
complex nature of his texts, however, has kept many of his works, and
particularlyal-Futuhat, largely inaccessible to the non-Arabic reader.6Some
profound studies of Ibn 'Arabl's philosophy and mystical experiences are
available, however, in Europeanlanguages, among which H. Corbin's Creative
Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabf, and W. Chittick's The Sufi Path of
Knowledge, are the most pertinentto this study.7
Imaginationplays an essential role in Ibn 'Arabi's ontology. It is seen as the
creative source of manifestation, the very cause of our existence, and the
powerful intermediarythat enables us to remain in constant contact with the
Infinite and the Absolute. For Ibn 'Arabi, imagination is such an essential
cognitive instrumentthat 'he who does not know the status of imagination is
totally devoid of knowledge'.8Corbin's study of imaginationfocuses mainly on
its multi-dimensional role in the fulfilment of the mystical experience: its
theogonic and cosmogonic function;its cognitive and creativerole as theophany;
and its mediationin the dialogue between God and man, the Worshippedand the

3
Fawat al-Wafaydtcited in Afifi, ibid., p. 6.
4
In this particularwork, each chaptercontainsten sub-chapters;it was mentionedby Ibn 'Arabyin Al-TadbTrdt
al-Ilahiyya (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1339 AH), p. 112.
5
Austin, op. cit., p. 14.
6 Thereis an anthologyof translatedtexts fromal-Futuhatin both English andFrenchentitledLes Illuminations
de la Mecque/TheMeccan Illuminations, Michel Chodkiewicz (ed.) (Paris: Sindbad, 1988), in addition to
fragmentedcommentariesthat can be found in various studies.
7 See the translationof Corbin
by RalphManheim(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1969) and Chittick's
work (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989). Recently, The MuhyiddinIbn 'Arabi Society of
Oxford has published a collection of studies: S. Hirtenstein and M. Tieman (eds), MuhyiddinIbn 'ArabT:
CommemorativeVolume(London:ElementBooks, 1993). Among otherstudiessee T. Izutsu,Sufismand Taoism.
A ComparativeStudy of Key Philosophical Concepts (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983); T. Burckhardt,An
Introductionto Sufi Doctrine, D. M. Matheson (trans.) (Wellinborough:Thorsons Publishers Ltd, 1976); A.
Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 3rd edn (The University of North CarolinaPress, 1978); N. H. Anu
Zaid, Falsafat al-Ta'wTl(Beirut:Dar al-Tanwir,1983); A. A. Afifi, TheMysticalPhilosophyof MuhyidDin Ibnul
Arabi (Cambridge,1939); S. A. Q. Husaini, The Pantheistic Monism of Ibn al-'ArabT(Lahor, 1970).
8 Ibn 'Arabi,al-Futuihat
al-Makkiyya(Beirut:Dar Sadir,n.d.) II, p. 313. Translationsare by the author,unless
otherwise stated.

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 IBN 'ARABI'S ONTOLOGY

worshipper, the Beloved and the lover. In his exposition, Corbin appropriately
emphasizes the difference between imagination and fantasy. Whereas the cre-
ative power of imagination derives from its ontological privileges, fantasy '... is
an exercise of thought without foundation in nature, it is the "madman's
cornerstone".'9 Chittick's study, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship
between metaphysics and imagination, explaining the metaphysical and ontolog-
ical nature of imagination and its role in understanding Ibn 'ArabT'smetaphysics
and ontology. Driven by his concern to 'preserve the overall context of Ibn
al-'Arabi's teachings as he himself presents them',?0 Chittick covers far more
ground of the original text of al-Futuhat, in which the concept of imagination is
discussed, than Corbin. Corbin's hermeneutical flights, however, stretch the
concept of imagination beyond the conservative bounds of Chittick's contextual
interpretations. But both of these valuable studies have left two aspects of
lbn'ArabT's concept of imagination in need of further clarification: first, the
difference between the creative mechanism of human and Divine imagination;
and second, the way in which Ibn 'Arabi's concept of imagination resolves the
paradox of the eternity (qidam) and newness (huduth) of the world. These two
aspects are inextricably linked, because it is through the essential difference
which Ibn 'Arab! establishes between human and Divine creativity that he
manages to resolve the problematic notion of creatio ex nihilo. By focusing on
the creative function of imagination, this study aims to examine these two
aspects, and to illustrate the transcendental and ontological dimensions which
Ibn 'Arab! attributes to imagination, taking it far beyond the bounds of human
psychology. The study adopts a hermeneutical approach to the original texts, by
placing more emphasis on the interpretive conditions than the historical and
contextual contingencies. In this case, the interpretive condition is influenced by
a preoccupation with artistic creativity and a desire to understand the creative
mechanism of imagination, both at the human and Divine level in the wider
ontological framework within which it operates.11

Creative Imagination as an 'Isthmus' (barzakh)

Ibn 'Arab! begins his elaborate ontological hierarchy by categorically differenti-
ating three existents as being the first knowable things (ma'lumdt) of universal
existence. These are: Absolute Being (al-wujud al-mutlaq), that is, the unrestric-
ted existence of God, the necessary Self-Existent (wdjib al-wujud li-nafsihi);
Absolute non-Being (al-'adam al-mutlaq) which is non-Self-Existent ('adam
li-nafsihi); and a Mediator or Separator whereby these two are distinguished one
from the other.12Ibn 'Arabi calls this Mediator barzakh, which may be translated
literally as "isthmus", and describes it as the intermediary domain of Archetypes
9 Corbin
10 citing Paracelsus,CreativeImagination,p. 179.
Chittick, op. cit., p. xx.
1 The hermeneutical
approachas developedby H. G. Gadamerin his book Truthand Method,2nd edn (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1976), pp. 345-67.
12 Ibn
'Arabl, op. cit., III, pp. 46-7.

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SAMER AKKACH

Figure 1. The first level of differentiation in Ibn 'Arabi's ontology.

containing the Principles of all possible existents (al-mumkinat).13 The concept

of the isthmus as an intermediaryworld is derived from the Qur'an, which
makes more than one allusion to its nature: 'He bringeth forth the two seas,
which meet; between them is an isthmus (= barzakh), which they do not go
beyond'. (LV, 19-20);14 'He it is who bringethforth the two seas; one is fresh
and drinkable,the other is salt and bitter;and He hath made between the two an
isthmus (= barzakh)and a closed barrier.'(XXV, 53)15 These verses portrayan
image of two integraldomains, symbolized by the 'two seas' that are related,yet
at the same time separated, by the third intermediarydomain, the isthmus
(al-barzakh).The unitive-separativenatureof the isthmus brings together these
two domains, but does not allow them to become mixed. Likewise, the
intermediaryworld of the barzakhforms the borderlinebetween Absolute Being
and Absolute non-Being. As one might perceive the borderlinebetween light and
shadow, the barzakhdelimits the extent of the two neighbouringdomains, and
preventseach of them from being qualifiedwith the qualities of the other, acting
as a common horizon which reflects the realities of both bordering worlds.16
Ibn 'Arabi emphasizes that although the 'isthmus' faces two independent
domains, it is not a two-sided mediator,which would mean that the aspect by
which it encounters one domain is other than that by which it encounters the
other.17On the contrary,the aspect-which is none other than the essence of the
isthmus-which encounters one domain is exactly the same as that which
encounters the other. Were it otherwise, there would be an isthmus within an
isthmus:the isthmusitself would be divided into three domains,two independent
aspects and a mediatorthat brings them together,since the isthmus is one entity.
13
Ibn 'Arabi,op. cit., III, p. 518; on the concept of al-barzakh,see Chittickop. cit., pp. 14-16; 117-18; 125-6;
Burckhardt,'Concerningthe Barzakh',Studies in ComparativeReligion, 13 (1979), pp. 24-30; Abu Zayd, op.
cit., pp. 51-7.
14
Translationby Burckhardt,'Concerningthe Barzakh', p. 24.
15
Ibid, p. 24.
16
Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., III, pp. 46-7; see also I, p. 304, translatedin Chittick, op. cit., pp. 117-18.
17 Ibn
'Arab!,op. cit., III, p. 518.

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 IBN 'ARABI'S ONTOLOGY

If this is the case, then this unifying mediatoris to be consideredthe real isthmus
(barzakh).18Ibn 'Arabi also views the intermediaryworld of the 'Isthmus' as
being the means by which the creation and productionof the world is effected.
He considers the unitive-separative nature of the isthmian mediator (wasTt
barzakhi)as being responsiblefor bringing the initial duality of Absolute Being
and Absolute non-Being into a productive mode. That is to say, it is only by
means of the 'isthmus' (barzakh)that the delivery of the world from potentiality
to act is effected, and the world becomes, as it were, the child born from the
fruitful marriageof Absolute Being and Absolute non-Being.
In this generative relationship Ibn 'Arabi perceives a pattern which he
considers as a constant principle underlying all existence. This pattern is
revealed through the intrinsic relationship between triplicity and quadrature.
Triplicity is explicit in the three domains, already defined: Absolute Being,
Absolute non-Being and the Isthmus; and quadratureis implicit in the dual
participation of the Isthmus in the other two domains. Thus quadratureis
implicitly inherentin the system that rendersthese three domains generativeand
productive.Ibn 'Arabi shows how this generativepatternis directly reflected in
the categorical syllogism, determining the productive process of syllogistic
reasoning. To arrive at a syllogistic conclusion there must be two premises: for
example, every animal has a body (major premise), man is an animal (minor
premise), therefore,man has a body (conclusion). This mental operationconsti-
tutes three explicit elements: two premises, representingAbsolute Being and
Absolute non-Being, and a conclusion, representingthe world. The conclusion is
the product,as it were, of the marriagebetween these two premises, in the same
way that the world is the productof the marriagebetween Absolute Being and
Absolute non-Being. But, there is a hidden fourth element without which this
marriagewould not be productive.This element is the concept of 'animality':it
is the 'isthmus' that mediates between the two premises, and is revealed in the
repetitionof the word 'animal' in both premises. The dual manifestationof the
word 'animal' in the two generative premises reveals, outwardly,the principal
relationship between explicit triplicity and implicit quadraturein an inverse
manner.Triplicitybecomes implicit in the distinctive elements-'man', 'animal'
and 'body'-and quadraturebecomes explicit in that the word 'animal' is
actually stated twice.
Premise (1) Every ANIMAL has a BODY
Premise (2) MAN is an ANIMAL
Conclusion Therefore man has a body

Based on the above hierarchy, Ibn 'Arab! views the manifested world to be
three-fold:higher, lower and intermediary.The higher world is the world of the
'unseen' ('alam al-ghayb), of spiritual being, of angelic forms, the world of
abstractmeanings; whereas the lower world is the world of the 'seen' ('alam
18 Ibid. See also Abu
Zayd, op. cit., pp. 51-2.

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SAMER AKKACH

al-shahada), of corporealbeing, of the senses and sensible forms, the world of

bodies. In the latter, things are perceived by sight, whereas in the former they
are conceived by insight. As is the case with Absolute Being and Absolute
non-Being, these two worlds are at once separatedand linked by a mediator,a
third world, which Ibn 'Arab! calls the 'world of imagination' ('alam al-
khaydl).19The world of imagination,says Ibn 'Arab!,combines the characteris-
tics of its two bordering domains: it is the place where the spiritualityof the
'unseen' is integratedinto the corporealityof the 'seen' to create the subtlety of
imagination. It is the ontological level at which spirits manifest in sensible
matrices, and abstract meanings take on their bodily forms.20The world of
imaginationis the world of dreamswhere everythingis real yet, like a phantom,
untouchable and unreachable.Imaginable forms, like dreams, have an appari-
tional or phantasmalquality:they are perceivable,meaningfulforms yet without
physical presence. They are neither purely sensible nor purely abstract.Like an
image in a mirror,it is visible, yet not there;it is visible but without a body; and
like an illusive mirage, it exists but can never be reached.21These are the
qualities of the isthmian world of imagination.The illusive natureof imaginary
forms derives from its intermediaryfunction between the pure and the gross, the
spiritual and the physical, the meaningful and the sensible. The world of
imagination is the level of existence where this duality is resolved: where the
pure is embodied and the body is purified. Imagination is the world where
meaning and form are wedded, generatinga new world that at once unites and
separates its parental domains, just like the twilight zone which unites and
separateslight and darkness.

'Absolute', 'Detached' and 'Attached' Imagination

Ibn 'Arab!says: 'If you say: what is the world of the isthmus? we say: it is the
world of imagination.'22According to the above hierarchy,however, there are
two isthmuses:one mediatingbetween Absolute Being and Absolute non-Being,
the other between the spiritual and corporeal levels of existence. Ibn 'Arab!
differentiatesbetween these two isthmuses by considering the one mediating
between Absolute Being and Absolute non-Being to be of a higher order:it is,
as Ibn 'Arabi defines it, 'the isthmus of all isthmuses' (barzakh al-bardzikh).
Therefore, if the world of the isthmus is none other than the world of
imagination, are there corresponding worlds or levels of imagination of a
differentexistential order?The answer to this question is not simple. Ibn 'Arab!
distinguishes three ontologically different levels of imagination: a transcen-
dental, unrestrictedimagination which he calls khaydl mutlaq (lit., 'Absolute
Imagination'),an all-encompassingimaginationwhich he calls khaydl munfasil
(lit., 'detached imagination'), and an encompassed imagination which he calls
19 Ibn
'Arabi, op. cit., III, p. 42. See Chittick, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
20 Ibn
'Arabi, op. cit., II, p. 129; III, p. 42.
21
Ibid., I, p. 304.
22
Ibid., p. 129.

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 IBN 'ARABI'S ONTOLOGY

khayalmuttasil(lit., 'attachedimagination').23The first correspondsto the higher

isthmus, the second to the lower, whereas the third designates the human level
of imaginationin its psychological framework(being an isthmusbetween human
corporealityand spirituality).In The Sufi Path of Knowledge, Chittick explains
this correspondencefurtherby categoricallydistinguishingthree differentloci in
which imagination becomes manifest: in the cosmos (khayal mutlaq), 'where
existence is identical with imagination'; in the macrocosm (khayal munfasil),
'where the intermediate world between the spiritual and the corporeal is
imaginal', and in the microcosm (khayal muttasil), 'where the human soul
considered as a reality distinct from spirit and body pertains to imagination'.24
Chittick further considers the soul's faculty of imagination to be yet another
designation,but in a narrowersense. The relationshipbetween the three worlds
of imaginationor levels of the isthmus is not that of independenceor opposition,
but ratherof containment:one is contained within the other.
Know that you yourself are an imagination. And everything that you perceive and say
to yourself, 'this is not me', is also an imagination. So that the whole world of existence
is imagination within imagination.25

In the Futuhat, Ibn 'Arabi charges the 'presence of imagination' (hadrat

al-khaydl)with many functions and gives it more than one meaning,thus making
the correspondencebetween the hierarchywithin the world of isthmus and that
within the world of imaginationmore complex and ambiguous than the simple
one given above. Whereas the isthmian world derives its main characteristic
from its mediatoryrole, imaginationhas creative power, and hence the world it
generateshas, in additionto its mediatoryfunction, an attachmentto a creative
faculty or attribute.Accordingly, the correspondencein the hierarchy already
explained makes sense only when one considers the world of imaginationfrom
the standpoint of its mediatory function, that is, as a barzakh and not as a
product of the creative power of a faculty or attribute.26By detaching imagin-
ation from its creative source, one is left with an ontological hierarchy that
involves two creative faculties-human and Divine imagination-and three (or
four according to Chittick's interpretation)worlds of imagination.The relative
ontological autonomy possessed by the faculty of imagination (whether human
or Divine), by virtue of its creative capacity, forces one to question the
ontological position of the levels that do not seem to relate directly to the
creative source. In other words, the ontological status of 'detachedimagination'
(al-khaydl al-munfasil) in relation to the 'Absolute Imagination' (al-khaydl
al-mutlaq) or to 'attachedimagination' (al-khayal al-muttasil) raises questions
not only about who is imagining at that level, but also about the creative
23
Ibn 'Arabl, op. cit., II, pp. 309-13. Cf. Corbin,op. cit., 219-20.
24
Chittick, op. cit., pp. 116-17.
25
Afifi, op. cit., 104; trans. Izutsu, op. cit., p. 7.
26
Chittick's hierarchymay be explained from the Platonic point of view of the Body, Spirit and Mind of the
world, which leads to consider the creative power of the macrocosmicworld of imaginationin a metaphorical
sense. This, however, introducesdifferentinterpretiveconditions that have other implications.

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SAMER AKKACH

mechanismof its world.27The text of al-Futuhatis by no means unequivocalon

this matter. Ibn 'Arabi discusses briefly al-khayal al-muttasil and al-munfasil,
explains in greaterdetail al-khaydl al-mutlaq and relates al-khayal al-mutlaq to
al-khayal al-muttasil,28but he does not discuss categorically the relationsliips
between al-khayal al-mutlaq and al-khayal al-munfasil.It is ratherinterestingto
observe that when Ibn 'Arab! is clearly discriminative about the concept of
imagination,in the heading of the chapterin which he discusses the three worlds
of imagination,he refers to it by its two worlds al-muttasiland al-munfasilonly.
In this context, by considering the world of imaginationfrom the standpointof
its creative source, one is inclined to view the 'attached'and 'detached' worlds
of imagination as being associated with the human and Divine creativity:
'attached imagination' is associated with the human soul while 'detached
imagination' is associated with the Divine Essence (dhat). Viewed in this way,
'Absolute' and 'detachedimagination'can be consideredto belong to the Divine
creative source, while human soul and its imaginative faculty belong to the
human. The former is designated as 'detached' and the latter as 'attached'.
Ibn 'Arab!explains that our power of imagining things, that is, our ability to
conceive of their forms abstracted from their sensible bodies, belongs to
'attached imagination' (khayal muttasil). It is the imagining faculty operating
within a human psychological framework.It is referredto as 'attached'because
it is, as Corbinexplains, 'an imaginationconjoined to the imagining subject and
inseparablefrom him'.29Corbin refers to it as 'dependentimagination'because
it depends in its existence on 'detached imagination' which he calls 'auton-
omous'. 'Detached' or 'autonomousimagination' refers to a higher ontological
state of being which causes all imaginable forms first to exist. The forms
conceived by 'attached' or 'dependentimagination' are extractedby the senses
from naturalforms which are part of the cosmic forms. Cosmic forms embody
cosmic realities and belong to a self-subsisting presence dissociable from the
imagining subject and entirely independent of him.30 It is what Ibn 'Arab!
defines as 'detached imagination' (khayal munfasil), simply because it is an
independentpresence detached from its lower reflection, the 'attachedimagin-
ation'. 'Detached imagination' is Divine Imagination,God imagining the world
and is the presence of the world in the Divine Mind; whereas 'attached
imagination' is human imagination, man imagining the forms of existents
brought into existence by the creative power of Divine Imagination;it is the
presence of things in the human mind. 'Attached imagination' depends upon
'detached imagination', and the human act of imagining is no more than a
27
Taking Ibn 'Arabl's common example of Gabrielappearingin the form of Dihya, one wonders whetherthis
creativetransformationis an autonomousprocesstakingplace at the macrocosmiclevel independentof the creative
powerof Divine Imagination.If not, thenGodeitherhas two differentmodes of imagining,andthis is not explained
by Ibn 'Arabi,or only one mode, which means that al-khaydlal-mutlaqand al-khaydlal-munfasilare identical
so far as creativityis concerned.
28 Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., II, p. 310.
29
Corbin,op. cit., p. 219.
30
Cf. ibid., p. 219. Chittick,refersto al-khayalal-mutlaqas 'NondelimitedImagination',to al-khaydal
al-munfasil
as 'discontiguousimagination', and to al-khaydlal-muttasal as 'contiguousimagination' (op. cit., p. 117).

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 IBN 'ARABI'S ONTOLOGY

participationin the latter. Ibn 'Arabi says: 'From this detached imagination
attachedimagination derives.'31
Although they both have creative power, 'detached' and 'attached imagin-
ation' are essentially different. The realm of 'detached imagination' is a
permanentpresence whereas the realm of 'attachedimagination' is a transitory
one. The former derives its permanencefrom the Divine Eternity, being none
other than the presence of the world in the Divine Imagination;whereas the
transience of the latter is a reflection of the ephemeralnature of man.
The distinctionbetweenattachedanddetachedimaginationis thatthe attachedvanishes
when the one who is imaginingvanishes;the detachedis an EssentialPresence(.hadra
dhatiyya)permanentlyreceivingIdeas (ma'dnT,lit., 'meanings')and Spiritsso that it
embodiesthem by its special capacity.32
As a transientpresence, Ibn 'Arabi divides human imaginationinto two kinds:
dreamingand imagining. The former is an involuntaryact while the latter is a
voluntaryone.33The voluntaryact of imagining involves the retainingof images
perceived through the senses by memory (al-quwwa al-hdfi;a), as well as the
composing of new images by a form-giving faculty (al-quwwa al-musawwira).
Ibn 'Arabi's concept of 'attached imagination' is similar in structure and
function to the notion of imagination formulatedby many traditionalMuslim
philosophers.Generally,imaginationwas perceived as a human faculty capable
of receiving the forms of all sensible objects, of imagining them when they are
no longer in contact with the senses, and of imagining or fancying-after
recognizing the elementary components by the senses-things which have
correspondingrealities and things which do not. In accordance with the tra-
ditional notion of form and matter,the nature of imaginationwas analogically
comparedto a very rarefiedor subtle substancesupportingthe imaginableforms
detached by the senses from their sensible matter.34In the subtle matter of
imagination,forms were free from the restrainingforces of sensible matter;thus
they could easily become merged and fused. The creative natureof imagination
gave it the power to deal with, and manipulate,the abstractedforms in whatever
way it wished. This is how, for example, 'one can imagine a camel standing on
the top of a palm tree or a palm tree on the back of a camel, a bird with four
legs, a horse with two wings, a donkey with a human head ...35 Hence the
creative power of humanimaginationwas perceived as the ability to deconstruct
available forms and to reconstruct new unfamiliar forms that embody new
meanings. The power of composing new meaningful images is, of course, the
essential foundation of every artistic creation. Ibn 'Arab! asserts that although
the senses might not have discerned the new images composed by the human
imagination in their composed form, their elementary components must have
31
Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., II, p. 311.
32
Ibid., p. 311; Cf. Corbin, op. cit., pp. 219-20.
33 Ibid.,
pp. 311, 375. See Chittick, op. cit., pp. 115-21.
34 Ibn 'Arabl,
op. cit., II, p. 691. On the traditionalIslamic concept of form and matter,see S. Akkach, 'Aspects
of the TraditionalIslamic Philosophy of Art', The Islamic Quarterly,37 (1993), pp. 44-62.
35 Ikhwan Al-Safa', Rasd'il IkhwanAl-Safd' (Beirut:Dar Sadir, n.d.), III, p. 416.

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been sensibly perceived.Humanimaginationcannot deal with anythingthat does

not have, in part or whole, sensible form.36This means that our individual
imaginationis inextricablybound to the sensible world. All the elementarydata
that fill our imaginaryreservoirare extractedby our senses throughcontact with
the phenomenalworld, so that our imaginationhas no power of creatio ex nihilo.
We are, nevertheless, able to synthesize things creatively in our imagination
accordingto new, unfamiliarpatterns,as when, for example, we form an image
of a creaturewhich is half man and half horse, even though there is no existing
model for such an image. Neither the image of the man nor that of the horse,
however, are pure products of our imagination, but are both no more than
imaginaryreflections of sensible prototypes.
Since human imagination has the power of participatingin the world of
'detachedimagination',that is, the world of potential existence, it is capable of
composing an infinite number of different kinds of images; but owing to its
confinementto the sensible domain, its elementary data are limited. It follows
that out of the limited data that human imaginationhas at its disposal, man has
the power to synthesize as many forms as there are possibilities latent in the
world of 'detachedimagination'.In this connection, human imaginative power,
in comparison with the imaginative power of the Divine to which the entire
domain of 'detachedimagination'belongs, fades into insignificance;and despite
the infinite possibilities available to God,37the forms composed in the Divine
Imagination, which are revealed to us through the process of manifestation,
follow certain, specific and well-defined patterns.38The question may then be
asked: if the human imagination is capable of composing an indefinitude of
forms, which includes, as the Ikhwan put it, 'images which have corresponding
realities and otherswhich do not',39what is the value of the composed forms that
have no correspondingrealities or archetypalpatterns?What is the value of the
imaginaryform composed of, say, half a man and half a horse, if it is a mere
possibility?40An assessment of this and other related questions could shed new
light on the value and meaning of traditionalIslamic art and architecture.
AlthoughIbn 'Arab!does not addressthis question,some cues can be foundin his
teachings. Imagination,he teaches, is corruptwhen it does not conform to the
realities.Wherean imaginedformcorrespondsto its realityin the realmof 'detached
imagination',then, and only then,does it fall into the categoryof 'mentalexistence'
(al-wujadal-dhihni),which is one of the four distinctivedegrees of existence:41
36 Ibn
'Arabi, op. cit., I, pp. 163, 125-6.
37 For the distinctionbetween
'infinity' and 'indefinity',and their relationto 'possibility', see R. Gu6non,The
Multiple States of Being, J. Godwin (trans.)(New York: Larson, 1984), pp. 27-34.
38 The natural
patternsthat govern the created world.
39 Ikhwan
Al-Safa', op. cit., III, p. 416.
40 The concept of imaginationplays a significantrole in the formationof traditionalIslamic art. See S. H. Nasr,
'The World of Imagination'and the 'Conceptof Space in the PersianMiniature',in Islamic Art and Spirituality
(Ipswich: Golgonooza Press, 1987), pp. 177-84.
41 The four degrees of existence are:(1) al-wujadal- 'aynf(the existence of a thing itself, i.e., in a sensible form);
(2) al-wujudal-dhihnr(the existence of the thing in the mind, i.e., in an imaginableform); (3) al-wujad al-lafj
(the existence of the thing in utterance,i.e., in an oral form);and (4) al-wujudal-raqmT(the existence of the thing
in writing, i.e., in a written form). Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., II, pp. 309-10.

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Mental existence is the known (al-ma'lum) being imagined in the soul according to what
it is in its reality; but if the conceived image does not conform to reality, that would not
be an existence of the known in the mind.42
As an all-encompassing, permanentpresence, the world of 'detached imagin-
ation' can then be seen as governingthe human 'attachedimagination'by setting
an immutablecode for it. Such a code, whose content is made up of the cosmic
realities, is considerednecessary to preventthe human imaginationfrom degen-
erating into a kind of fantasy. Participatingin this realm of realities, human
imaginationcan become either a valuable source of knowledge when it complies
with the realities of that code, or can become corruptfantasy when it does not.
Furthermore,Ibn 'Arab!teaches that the ignorantperson is one who speaks of,
or believes in, what he forms in his soul, while that which he has formed has
no corresponding form other than itself. Any imaginary form that has no
'existential presence' (hadra wujudiyya)governing its existence is producedby
ignorance and the produceris ignorant. 'And anythingthat has no form except
in the soul of its speaker,' he adds, 'vanishes from existence with the vanishing
of his saying or the vanishing of his memorisingwhat he may have fancied from
his speech, for there is no existentialpresence (hadra wujudiyya)that governs its
existence'.43With regard to its elementary components, however, whatever is
composed in man's imagination necessarily has correspondingarchetypes, for
human imagination cannot escape the world of archetypes, which Ibn 'Arab!
says contains the essences of all possible things. But with regardto a composed
form, if it has no existing archetypeit would be insignificant,for it would point
to non-existence (al-'adam). The sensible form produced according to an
insignificantimaginaryform has, accordingto Ibn 'ArabY,no 'fatherly'principle
determiningits existence but only a 'motherly' principle, that is, the producer
himself.44

Creation Through the Divine Breath

Although both 'attached' and 'detached imagination' have creative power, the
mechanism through which each one creates differs widely. Imaginative pro-
duction is not quite the same at both the Divine and human levels of existence,
and the notion of 'detached imagination' is not simply a projection of an
anthropomorphiccharacteristicinto the Divine realm. In orderto understandthe
creative mechanismof 'detachedimagination'one needs to be familiarwith Ibn
'Arabi's view of creation. With reference to the tradition which says: 'God
created the world through the Breath of the Compassionate' and the Quranic
verse: 'WheneverWe will the existence of something,We only say to it, "Be!",
and it comes into existence.' (Sura XVI, vs. 40), Ibn 'ArabTformed an elaborate
view of creation. He says that the world is created throughthe utteranceof the
42
Ibid., 309.
43 Ibn p.
'Arabi, op. cit., IV, p. 203.
44 Ibid., p. 203.

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PrimordialWord 'Be!', which coincides with both the exhalation of the 'Divine
Breath' (al-nafas al-ildhi) or the 'Breath of the Compassionate' (al-nafas
al-rahmdn0)45and the manifestationof the world.46Ibn 'Arab!also considersthat
the creationof the world and the Self-manifestationof the Absolute (tajalli) are
equivalent expressions.47 Self-manifestation, Ibn 'Arabi explains, has two dis-
tinct phases: first, the 'Essential Self-manifestation' (al-tajalll al l-dhdti),
wherein the Absolute manifests as 'ImmutableEssences' (al-a'ydn al-thabita);
and second, the 'Sensuous Self-manifestation'(al-tajallTal l-shuhaudi,wherein
the Absolute manifests as 'ExternalEssences'.48Being an inwardact that occurs
within the Divine Self or Consciousness, the 'Essential Self-manifestation'does
not project outwardlyin an 'otherness'differentiatedfrom the 'sameness' of the
Essence. The 'ImmutableEssences' which are manifested by this determining
act are none other than the Names and Attributes of the Essence. Otherness
occurs in the 'Sensuous Self-manifestation'when God breathes, exhaling 'the
first dense, transparent,luminous Mass',49a 'CompassionateVapour' (bukhar
rahmdnO,50that is, the Divine Breath.51The Divine Breath is the medium
through which the Divine Names were externalized, bursting out from the
inwardrealm of formless Being into the outwardrealm of formal existence, from
the state of potentiality into the state of actuality. It is the 'substance of the
world' (jawharal-'alam), in which are found all the latent possibilities of formal
manifestation.52Ibn 'Arab!says: 'All is containedin the Divine Breath, like the
day in the morning's dawn.'53 The world actualizes the forms potentially
disseminated in the Breath, in the same way that the day brings about all the
ordainedevents that are revealed in its dawn. 'He who wants to know the Divine
Breath (nafas),' Ibn 'Arab!furtherexplains, 'let him consider the world'.54The
Breath equates the Prime Matter (al-Jawhar al-Hayladni), which encompasses
all the forms of the world,55and which is the transcendentSubstancefor all the
Divine Artefacts. The Breath in relation to the world can be analogically
compared to the ink in relation to all written texts, and to the whiteness of a

45 Or 'the
Sigh of existentiatingCompassion', as Corbinputs it in his Creative Imagination,p. 185. See also
Chittick,op. cit., pp. 127-30; L. Bakhtiar,SufiExpressionsof the Mystical Quest (London:Thames and Hudson,
1976, repeated 1979), p. 16.
46 The formsreceive the spiritfromthe Breathof the Compassionatein the same way thatlettersreceive meanings
when they are exteriorizedin orderto denote the meaning for whose sake they are exteriorized.Ibn 'Arabi,op.
cit., II, p. 434.
47 See
Izutsu, op. cit., pp 152-58; Chittick, op. cit., pp. 91-4.
48 Al-Qashanf,Sharh.Al-QdshdnT'ald Fusus al-.Hikam(Egypt, n.d.), pp. 10-11; see Izutsu, op. cit., pp. 155-6.
49 Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., III, p. 420.
50 Ibid., II, p. 310.
51 See Corbin,
op. cit., pp. 184-5. In so far as the Divine Breathsignifies the PrimordialSubstance,the materia
prima of the world, it is the root of 'otherness'.See Burckhardt,Alchemy,W. Stoddart(trans.)(London:Element
Books, 1986), p. 63.
52 Ibn
'Arabi, op. cit., II, p. 331; III, p. 452.
53 Afifi,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 145; T. Burckhardt,The Wisdom of the Prophets, A. Culme-Seymour (trans.)
(Aldsworth:BesharaPublications, 1975), p. 77.
54
Afifi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 145; trans. Burckhardt,op. cit., pp. 76-7.
55 Afifi,
op. cit., vol. I, p. 144; cf. Burckhardt,op. cit., p. 75.

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blank sheet in relation to all drawnforms. The Breath is the source in which all
possibilities are fused together as a non-differentiatedtotality.

The Breath, the 'Cloud' and Absolute Imagination

If creation was effected throughthe PrimordialUtteranceand the exhalation of
the Divine Breath,what was the role of imaginationin the creative process? Ibn
'Arab! identifies the act of Breathing with that of Imagining (because through
BreathingGod manifestedthe forms of all existents), and the world of 'Absolute
Imagination'(al-khayal al-mutlaq), with the PrimordialBreath. Ibn 'Arab! also
identifies the Primordial Breati with the 'Primordial Cloud' ('ama'). The
ProphetMuhammadwas once asked, 'Where was our Lord before creating His
creatures?'He replied, 'In a "Cloud"('ama'); there was no space [hawd', lit.,
"air"] either above or below.'56 Ibn 'Arabi says that the 'Cloud' ('amd')
mentioned in this traditionis the first form the Divine Breath took, and within
which God then differentiatedthe forms (suwar) of all things in the world.57The
PrimordialCloud is the first affirmativelyqualifiedform of universal manifesta-
tion within which the Realities of the world are delivered from potency into
actuality, from the formless state into formal existence:
Then know ... that the reality of the 'Absolute Imagination' is the so-called 'Cloud',
which is the first condition (zarf) support God's outward being (kaynunat al-haqq).58

The Cloud equates with the Divine Imaginationbecause it not only passively
receives all the forms, but also actively gives beings their forms.59It is thus the
means whereby God projectedforth the Essences of potential beings as cosmic,
imaginableforms, and the instrumentwhose function is to actualizethe transcen-
dental patternsof Divine Realities in the form of the cosmos. By identifying the
realm of Absolute Imaginationwith the Cloud and the Divine act of Imagining
with that of Breathing, Ibn 'Arab! considers that the Divine act of Imagining,
unlike the human, occurs from without and not from within the Essence. This is
to say that God produced the world the moment He imagined it, and not
according to an eternally imagined 'Form' or 'Model' (mithdl). And prior to
their existence in the Cloud, the forms (suwar) of the world did not exist as
forms in the Divine Self, nor has God imagined them in His Mind prior to their
production.This view is somewhat different from Corbin's interpretation:'...
we must think ratherof a process of increasing illumination, graduallyraising
the possibilities eternally latent in the original Divine Being to a state of
luminescence.'60'Increasingillumination' implies veiled presence of the Forms

56
Ibn 'Arab!,op. cit., II, p. 310; cf. Corbin, op. cit., p. 185; Chittick, op. cit., pp. 125-7.
57 Ibid., III, p. 430.
58 Ibid., II, p. 310. With referenceto Qur'anicverses, Ibn 'Arab!describesfive conditionswhere God's outward
being is supported:in the 'Cloud', upon the Throne,in heavens, on earthand with all creatures.Cf. Chittick,op.
cit., p. 125.
59 Cf.
Corbin,op. cit., p. 185.
60
Ibid., p. 216.

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in the Divine Self, whereas Ibn 'Arabi stresses that the possibilities eternally
latent in the originalDivine Being as 'ImmutableEssences', were known by God
as they were, and as they would be when formally produced, but were not
imagined. Hence the eternal model of the world is God's Knowledge, which, in
Ibn 'Arabi's view, differs from His Imagination.61The Divine act of Imagining
the forms of the world coincides with producingthem throughHis Breath, and
that is why Ibn 'Arabi identifies the Breath with the realm of Absolute
Imagination.62Here Ibn 'Arab!makes a sharpdistinctionbetween knowing and
imagining:
The conceiver and that which is conceived-each one is of two kinds: a conceiver that
knows and has imaginative power, and a conceiver that knows and has no imaginative
power; and a conceived thing that has form-according to which it can be known but
not imagined by the one who has no imaginative power, and known and imagined by
the one who has imaginative power-and a conceived thing that has no form and can
be known only. Knowledge is not conceiving the form of the known, nor is it the
meaning of the known being formalized, because not every known admits form nor is
every knower able to conceive of form. Form-conception is related to the knower
through the latter's ability to imagine, and form is related to the known through the state
in which the latter is accessible to imagination. And since there are knowable matters
that are originally inaccessible to imagination, it is certain that they have no form.63

In keeping with the distinction he makes between the act of knowing and that
of imagining, Ibn 'Arab! differentiates clearly between 'form' (sura) and
'meaning' (ma'and). Forms embody formless meanings and as such they are
accessible to human imagination. 'The forms, in so far as they are forms,' he
says, referring to the cosmic forms, 'are the imaginable, and the Cloud, in which
they are manifested, is the Imagination.'64 Thus viewed, Ibn 'Arabi's forms are
not permanent and principal models in whose likeness things are made, but are
rather the things themselves. So just as there are pure, spiritual forms, there are
also sensible, gross forms and intelligible, subtle forms. Together they constitute
the cosmic forms that embody the formless 'Immutable Essences', and hence, in
Ibn 'Arabi's schema of creation, 'cosmic' and 'formal' are synonymous terms.
Meaning, on the other hand, is accessible to the intellect and can be known
without necessarily being imagined. The principal 'Meanings' are nothing but
the 'Immutable Essences'.65 So the imaginable forms that Ibn 'Arabi speaks of
as existing in the Cloud or the Absolute Imagination are different from the
knowable 'Immutable Essences', which 'have not smelt the fragrance of exist-
ence', residing as they are in the Divine Self. This distinction between form and
meaning is consistent with Ibn 'Arabi's conviction that knowledge is not the
form of the known imprinted in the knower's soul, that is to say, not the knower
imagining the form of the known. He finds support for this conviction in the
61
Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., I, p. 119.
62
On the simultaneityof the breathingand the manifestationof the forms, ibid., I, p. 305.
63 Ibid., I, p. 42.
64 311.
Ibid., III, p.
65
BurckhardtcomparesIbn 'Arabi's 'ImmutableEssences' to Platonic 'Ideas', see, An Introduction...,pp. 62-4.

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Divine Name badT', 'Originator' or 'Innovator', mentioned in the Qur'anic

verse: 'The Originator[badi'] of the heavens and the earth.' Sura (II, vs. 117)66
This Name derives from ibda' which means 'to create somethingoriginal, novel,
unprecedented',and of which the term bid'a means 'originality'and 'novelty'.67
Commenting on the above verse, he says that the creation of the heavens and
earthis associatedwith the Name badl' because they are createdaccordingto no
preceding 'model', 'likeness' or 'form' (mithdl). Had the form of the cosmos
been identical with the 'ImmutableEssences' in non-existence, God would not
have been badT', for He would have been creating according to the Form
(mithdl) already present in His Knowledge, and there would be no creatio ex
nihilo:
God says: 'The Originatorof the heavens and the earth' because they were created
accordingto no precedingmodel. The firstthing God createdwas the Intellect,thatis,
the 'SupernalPen' (al-qalam):it is the first 'originatedcreature'(maf'ul ibda'ua)
manifestedfrom God-mosttranscendent. And every creaturecreatedwithoutpreceding
model (mithal)is 'original'(mubda'),and its creatoris its 'originator'(mubdi').So if
knowledge is conceiving the form of the known, as some people maintainin the
'definition' (hadd) of knowledge, that creaturewould not be 'original' (mubda'),
because it has in the soul of one who originatedit a model, accordingto which he
broughtit into existence.To maintainthis definitionof knowledgewouldmeanthatthat
which is in God's Self has neverceased to be 'necessarybeing' (wdjibal-wujad),and
that God did not originate(ibtada'a)it in Himself, as does the innovator(al-muhdith)
when he originates,nor has anythingbeen broughtinto existencebut accordingto the
form (suira),which exists in the Self of the Form-giver(al-musawwir)for [the sake of
thingsto be in] its likeness,not for its own sake,for [God'sSelf] is not the place of what
He creates.It follows thatGod is not badT'(accordingto the people who maintainthat
knowledgeis the formof the knownimprintedin the soul of the knower);but He is. So
He has in Himself no form of what he originates,nor has He conceived of its form
[before originatingit]. This is a problematicmatter.Among the knowable matters
(ma'lumdt)thereare thingsthatcan be formalizedand othersthatcannot,thoughthey
are knowable;hence, the definitionof knowledgeis not conceiving the form of the
known.And so likewiseis the one who knows:he couldbe amongstthose who areable
to conceive of forms,being endowedwith imaginingfaculty,or he could be amongst
those who know withoutbeing able of formalize,being incapableof giving form.Thus,
[for God] form-givingis an act thatoccursfromwithout(minkhdrij),and He does not
receive withinHis Self whatHe forms(sawwara)from without,but He knows it. And
know first that origination(ibdd') is not possible except with forms (suwar) in
particular,because they can be created and can, therefore,be originated.As for
meanings(ma'dni),none of them are originated(mubtada'),because they cannotbe
createdand,therefore,cannotbe originated,thoughthey can be intellectualizedas being
essentially immutable ...68

Ibn 'Arabi elaborates this view further through his interpretations of the Qur'anic
verse: 'Everything perisheth but His Face', alluding at the same time to the
66
Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., IV, pp. 315-16, II, p. 421.
67
Bid'a also means 'heresy'.
68
Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., II, p. 421; (1, pp. 90-1).

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nature of the cosmic forms contained in the Cloud ('ama'). In this verse, the
expression 'His Face' is an interpretationof the Arabic word wajhihi, in which
the last syllable hi is the pronominalsuffix ha' that may also be taken to refer
to the 'thing' in 'Everything'.This means that this verse may also be translated
as: 'Everythingperisheth but its face (i.e. the face of the thing).' Similarly, in
the Prophetic tradition: 'God created man in His Image (suratihi)', the same
pronominalsuffix ha' may also refer to 'man', in which case the saying would
read as: 'God created man in his image (i.e. the image of man).' Ibn 'Arab!
explains the meaning of the above verse, understood in the alternative sense,
with referenceto the forms manifest in the PrimordialCloud. In accordancewith
his differentiationbetween the Meaning (i.e. Essence or Reality) and the form
of a thing, he considers the form of a thing to be its perishableaspect; whereas
its Face is its imperishableaspect, that is, its Reality:
Then He caused to exist in the Cloud all the forms of the world, about which He says
it (i.e., the world) 'perisheth'-that is, in respect of its forms-'but its face', that is to
say, 'but in respect of its reality it does not perish', for the [pronoun] ha' in wajhihi
refers to the 'thing'. So in relation to the forms of the world, 'everything perisheth', but
in relation to its Realities, the world is not perishable, nor is it possible to be so. For if
the form of man perishes, for example, and there remains no trace of it in existence, its
reality, which is identified by, and is identical with, man's 'definition' (hadd), would not
perish. We say that man is a 'rational animal' (hayawdn natiq) and we do not refer to
his being existent or non-existent, because this reality has never ceased to be his even
if there were for him no form in existence.69
In spite of the apparenteccentric nature of this, Ibn 'Arabl's conviction is
quite fundamentalto his doctrine, for through it he was able to resolve the
paradox of creation: the eternity (qidam) and newness (huduth) of the world.
According to the notion of creatio ex nihilo (creationfrom nothingness), which
is one of the dogmatic issues in Islam, the world must have had a beginning and
will therefore have an end. Philosophically, this presents a problem. The
existence of the world introduces a circumstantialchange to the Divine whose
eternal Presence necessitates, from the philosophical point of view, transcen-
dence above all changes and transformations.The same applies to the termin-
ation of world's existence. This had led many traditionalMuslim philosophers
to consider or talk about the eternity of the world, that the world coexisted with
God, which in turn led to the issue of the end of the world becoming
questionable. Thus the paradox was: how could the world be eternal, so that
God's transcendenceis not contradicted,and at the same time be created from
nothingness, so that the Muslims' dogmatic beliefs are not compromised?For a
long time this paradox occupied the minds of many traditionalMuslim theolo-
gians, philosophers and mystics. This was an issue of the utmost importance
both at the religious and social levels, because being directly related to the
creation and terminationof the world, it was concerned with the reality of the
Divine Judgmentin the hereafter.Nothing testifies to the great significance of
69
Ibid., III, p. 420.

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this issue betterthan the debate documentedin Al-Ghazall's Tahafutal-Falasifa

(The Incoherenceof the Philosophers)70and Averroes' Tahafutal-Tahdfut(The
Incoherenceof the Incoherence).71While both authorsput forwardvalid points,
they were totally consumed in their attemptsto undermineeach others' position
on the issue. Their argumentshave, however, left one with a sense of uncer-
tainty, and with a desire for a more reconciliatoryapproach.It was throughIbn
'Arabi's concept of imagination that this highly contentious and paradoxical
issue reached a state of affirmative reconciliation.72Through his ontological
structureof the world of imagination,he was able to maintainboth the eternal
presence of the world in the Divine Knowledge as ImmutableEssences, as well
as the Islamic dogma of creatio ex nihilo.73 The opening statement of al-Futuhdt
summarizesIbn 'Arabi's view of the creationeloquently: 'Praisebe to God who
brought the world into existence from non-existence and the non-existence of
non-existence.' The first negation (non-existence) affirms the newness of the
world, creatio ex nihilo, while the following double negation (the non-existence
of non-existence= existence) affirms its eternity.

70
71
Tahafutal-Faldsifah, 4th edn (Beirut, Dar al-Mashriq,1990).
M.
Tahafutal-Tahafut, Bouyges (ed.) (Beirut, ImprimerieCatholique, 1930).
72
'Affirmative' in the context of Ibn 'Arabi's comprehensiveand influential ontological schema. Given the
incompatibilitybetween the Divine and humancreative mechanism,however, one is never fully at ease with it.
73 Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., I, p. 41.

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