G.R. No.

162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH SERRANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: Reyes, RT, J

FACTS: Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres.
Estrada as student regent of UP. Petitioner together with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). One
of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and
Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. However, the
renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and system-wide
alliances of students consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds
and Property with the Ombudsman charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP
student regent. She contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer
since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and
over Serana

HELD: Yes, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the
twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is
committed in relation to their office.

A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. It is well-established that compensation is not

an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public makes one a public officer. A public office is the right, authority, and
duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring
at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion of sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also

has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

G.R. No. 165835  June 22, 2005

GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: Tinga, J

FACTS: The OMB filed with the SB 2 petitions for the forfeiture of those properties that
was allegedly amassed and unlawfully acquired by the Gen. Garcia. The Garcias’ filed
motion to dismiss on the ground of SB’s lack of jurisdiction for lack of proper and valid
service of summons: (1) Forfeiture I – the corresponding summons on the case were all
issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention; (2) Forfeiture II – the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP
Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia.

The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other
respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following
qualifying note: I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but
these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction on the person of Clarita

Garcia and her three sons, considering that summons were improperly served.

HELD: On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted
service of summons. There is merit in petitioner’s contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a

reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to
be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever
mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a
court acquires jurisdiction over a person.

In the instant case, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective since summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on
Gen. Garcia who is detained at the PNP Detention Center and receipt was
acknowledged.
In the case of Manotoc v CA the following requirements as laid down:

1. Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on

substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2)
different dates.

2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return
of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service.

3. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion

residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in
charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004
ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J

FACTS: Petitioner 2Lt. Arnel Escobal is a member of the Intellegence Group of the
PNP. On March 1990, while he was conducting a surveillance operation on drug
trafficking he somehow got involved in a shooting incident resulting to the death of
Rodney Nueca.  Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and tried in the RTC of Naga City
Branch 21. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case reiterating that since he committed the
crime in the performance of his duty, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction
over his case. Thus, the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan.  However,
respondent Justice Garchitorena which is the presiding justice of the case ordered the
return of the records and that the case be remanded back to its court of origin, RTC 21.
ISSUE/S: Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC

HELD: The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….
Court jurisdiction over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
Information and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the
action. For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law
over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential
that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and
the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information and it is not
enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed
by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.

The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the
discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged
when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to
include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to
office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606
was already in effect.
The Law provides that even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE VS HENRY GO
Ponente: Peralta, J

FACTS: An information was filed against Secretary Arturo Enrile and Henry T. Go
before the Sandiganbayan alleging that the two conspired in acts involving violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249.

Go filed a motion to quash alleging that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show
cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who
is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

ISSUE/S: Whether the SB lost its jurisdiction over the person of the accused since he
was not a public officer.

HELD: Allegation of conspiracy between them can still be proven or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged by reason of Secretary Enrile's death since there are no
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. This
however means that the only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer.

The law does not require that such person must be indicted together with the public
officer as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private
person may still be indicted alone.
G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
RAMISCAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J

FACTS: Ramiscal was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) and during his incumbency,
the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of a land for development as housing
projects. Ramiscal and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed
and signed the first bilateral Deed of Sale over the subject property at the agreed price
and after payment, Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral second Deed of Sale over
the same property. The second Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which
became the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property.

Ramiscal filed his first Motion for Reconsideration with a supplemental motion regarding
the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to review
the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal, indeed participated in and affixed
his signature on the contracts and found probable cause. The Ombudsman acted
positively on the findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal
Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on the ground that there
is a pending resolution of his second Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his
arraignment.
2. Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification of public documents.

HELD: No, the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed.

Further, the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling
of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause
in the resolution subject of the motion.

Arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court on the
grounds of unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review
of the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed
60 days. Here, Ramiscal failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid
ground for suspension of arraignment.

On the issue of finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case.
Here, Ramiscal also failed to establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, thus, there is probable cause in the filing of the case.
G.R. No. 154473  April 24, 2009
PEOPLE VS BENIPAYO
Ponente: Nachura, J

FACTS: Benipayo, then was the Chairman of the Commission of elections, was charged
with libel before the Office of the City Prosecutor by Photokina Marketing Corporation,
which felt alluded to in a speech made by Alfredo before the Bahay Kalinaw, University
of the Philippines, and in an television interview. The Office of the City Prosecutor, in
both instances, filed Informations for libel before the RTC. Benipayo moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that at the time he made the alleged utterances, he
was an impeachable officer and the same was made in relation to his duties, therefore,
even assuming that he can be charged with libel, the same should be lodged with the
Sandiganbayan. In both instances, the RTC ruled in his favor, thus Photokina elevated
the case to the Supreme Court on question of law on whether the utterances were
made in relation to his office; and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the libel case.

HELD: The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on
the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to
his office. Generally, jurisdiction in libel cases belong to the RTC to the exclusion of all
other courts. However, the Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606
as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers is shared by the RTC
with the Sandiganbayan.

As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is
explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus, the
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with RTC or MTC where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999
LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Ponente: Martinez, J

FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an

organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in
the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command on a

media expose said that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, the
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. The panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.

However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged
as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited to cases where one or more of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase
“principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7

which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the alleged multiple murder of hee Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial
Court’s jurisdiction.

HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICTION. Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what
determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender.
Here, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office
if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was
in the performance of his official functions.

Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in

determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.

The Sandiganbayan directed the transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for
multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIO
Ponente: Cruz, J

FACTS: Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7)
counts of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer
the penalty of seven reclusion perpetua. The prosecutions version of the events was
based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio
Malabanan - coconspirators turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in
the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, but denied any personal
involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed. In this appeal, the
pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of
witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations served as
principal basis for the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to
quash on the grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the
death of only two persons.

HELD: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape,
the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as
a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will
be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the
presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the
highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses
its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions
like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to
constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with
a specific penalty which is in the highest degree.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by
him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only
one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped
seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the
assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to
kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged
separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting
the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against
each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the
subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her
seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe
the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record. The trial courts impressions of the star witnesses for the State
bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied on the defense of
denial/alibi but positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime, demolishes the alibi.
716 SCRA February 11, 2014
DISINI JR VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Ponente: Abad, J

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities is violative of certain constitutional rights. The
government asserts that the law merely ensures that cyberspace activities are
reasonable and in order to punish any wrongdoings and prevent inappropriate attacks
on the system.

ISSUE/S: Which court has jurisdiction over cases violative of RA 10175?

HELD: Sec. 21 provides that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the
provisions of RA 10175 including any violation committed by a Filipino national
regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was
committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system
wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage is
caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was
in the Philippines. There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by
specially trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.

Further, it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial
function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
Ponente: Brion, J

FACTS: Jimenez, the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
Antzoulatos, et al. listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc., for syndicated
and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging that Antzoulatos, et al. falsely represented
their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a
recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.

An Information was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Mandaluyong.
Subsequently, the City Prosecutor reconsidered resolution and filed a motion with the
RTC to withdraw the information. The RTC denied the motion to withdraw information
as it found the existence of probable cause to hold Antzoulatos, et al. for trial. The RTC
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against Antzoulatos, et al. Antzoulatos and
Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for delayed serving of the
warrants of arrest, which was denied.

Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer
enforcement of the warrants of arrest, which was denied for being moot and academic.
The RTC granted Alamil’s motion for reconsideration, and treated the motion for judicial
determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.

Jimenez moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to

prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any
relief from the RTC, which was denied.

The RTC denied Jimenez's notice of appeal it was filed without the conformity of the
Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal
actions appealed to the CA.

Jimenez brought his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, which was
dismissed by the CA for Jimenez’s lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf
of the People of the Philippines.The CA denied the motion for reconsideration that
followed.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Jimenez, the private complainant, has legal personality in
assailing the RTC Orders.

HELD: NO. It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.

Procedural law basically mandates that "criminal actions commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code.

It must be noted that the controlling doctrine is that the People is the real party in
interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
G.R. No. 175602 January 18 2012
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
Ponente: Bersamin, J

FACTS: The celebration of the family of Estrella Sayson was interrupted by the arrival of
Eduardo and Edwin, agitated, asking the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out.
Moises Sayson approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. He
advised them not to force Jonathan to go out. Estrella then heard one of the accused-
appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?” Moises replied
“Huwag” and successive gunshots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his
brother. He was however, was also shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell.
Joselito, ran away but was also hit at the back while running.

The RTC convicted the 2 accused of 3 counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer
Resclusion Perpetua for each count of murder.

PO2 Valdez contended in his appeal that the state failed to establish the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The CA however affirmed the convictions.

ISSUE/S: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance

of treachery.

HELD: Complaint or information is deemed sufficient if it stated the name of the

accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.

Here, what is controlling is not the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or the violation that was alledged because such are mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form that is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information including facts and
circumstances necessary to determine the elements of the crime.

It is must be presumed that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the victims causing their immediate
deaths did not sufficiently set the facts and circumstances exhibits treachery. The
requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense in
accordance with the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused.
G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: Brion, J

FACTS: The local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging petitioner Fernando Miguel for
violating R.A. 3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed
Koronadal Public Market. The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-
affidavit. The Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some other
private individuals for violation of RA 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Documents.

The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan to which
the latter court ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner 10 days to file his counter-
affidavit with the OSP. However, instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner
asked for another 3-day extension and another 20-day extension thereafter.

Despite the given extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter-affidavit
prompting prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare the petitioner to have waived his right
to submit countervailing evidence. Ombudsman approved the resolution After several
extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him however, the Sandiganbayan denied
the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation.

The Sandiganbayan denied motion of petitioner to suspend Pendente Lite based on the
obvious and fatal defect in the information prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
challenge the validity of the suspension order.

ISSUE/S: Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.

HELD: No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the
accused (Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to
actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.

Here, though no pre-suspension hearing was held to determine the validity of the
information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against them
achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral
arguments but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.

A pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement given to the accused

providing adequate opportunity to exhibit his defenses against a mandatory suspension
under RA 3019.
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged.
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
PEOPLE VS SORIA
Ponente: Del Castillo, J

FACTS:
The victim is the daughter of the accused who allegedly raped her. The whole incident
was witnessed by her brother. She informed her aunt about the rape and her mother
was also immediately informed of her ordeal. The victim was taken into the custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development thereafter.

On the other hand, the appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of
the alleged rape but denied committing the crime.He claimed that the filing of the rape
case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair
with a man residing in their community. According to him, he could not have molested
his daughter, in fact, he was the only one sending his children to school since his wife
already neglected them and seldom comes home.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which
would warrant his acquittal?
2. Whether the information is sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused?

HELD:
RPC provides that rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or by
sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through
sexual intercourse or consummation of carnal knowledge which is the central element
and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It
is evident from the testimony of the victim was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s
penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. She stated that she only knew
that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by
her brother. Clearly, she has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which
touched her labia and inserted into her vagina but it would be erroneous to conclude
that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of the victim’s brother
which declaration was hearsay due to his failure to testify.

The prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual
assault through his moral ascendancy and influence which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault.

It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have encourage their daughter to file the
charges publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed
committed.
The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed
the rape through sexual intercourse, at the same time, the Information alleged that
appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. Though these
allegations are ambiguous, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape
was committed and the same do not assail the Information filed. The allegation in the
information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a
description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on
the ground of multifariousness.

In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty, it is must be established beyond

reasonable doubt. There must be clear proof of the commission of the crime to ensure
his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.

Based on the victim’s testimony, there was nothing that would show that she was raped
through sexual intercourse, thus her testimony is sorely lacking in important details that
would convince the court with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was
placed into her vagina. As adduced, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of rape by sexual assault.
G.R. No. 192565, Feb. 28, 2012
UNION BANK VS PEOPLE
Ponente: Corona, CJ

FACTS: Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping.  It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that
the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with
prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.

Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City
does not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Makati City, where the Certificate Against Forum Shopping
was notarized, is the proper venue for the case of perjury.

HELD: YES. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases because it

determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the
court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-
fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a
trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity
and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses
and other facilities for his defense are available.

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can

be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
Ponente: Bersamin, J.

FACTS: Gerld Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end
of the large intestine out through the abdominal walls, enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald was admitted
at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed
the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucerio, Dr.Donatella Valeria and
Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella, Razon and Solidum. During
the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia and went into a coma. His coma lasted
for two weeks , but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer
see, hear, or move. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries were filed by Gerald’s parents against the team of doctors alleging that there
was failure in monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Dr. Solidum, through his acquittal, is exempt from civil liability.
2. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with
the accused.

HELD:
1. YES.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him
from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal
bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt.
There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been
caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum
was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced
by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on
the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on
speculation but on competent evidence.
2. NO
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr.
Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered
their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA
should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced
by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such
a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. 191240 JULY 30 2014
CASTILLO VS SALVADOR
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS: Salvador and his brother was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code by petitioner Castillo, a businesswoman engaged in
real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was
then enticed by Phillip and Ramon to engage in freight and remittance business.

She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would
be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion
and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations of
business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business. However, the
proposed business never operated. When she asked respondent about the money and
the since Salvador confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations.
Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Upon their arraignment, Salvador and Ramon pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding Phillip guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
ordered him to pay Castillo, US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.

Ramon was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Phillip appealed his conviction to the
CA, which overturned the RTC decision. Castillo filed a petition for review on certiorari
on the civil aspect of the case, arguing that the Court should have at least retained the
amount of damages to her.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the acquitted accused are still liable for damages.

HELD: YES. an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused is not
exempt from civil liability, which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. The
law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated
in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability,
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for
the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Since the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, He is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.

In discrediting Castillo's allegation that she gave Phillip US$100,000.00 in May 2002,
the CA found that Castillo failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same. She
also failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried
to Hong Kong; her claim of trust as reason for not requiring Phillip to sign a receipt was
inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and her
behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.
679 SCRA 114 August 23, 2012
LIM VS. KOU CO PING
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. and PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: FR Cement Corporation, a cement manufacturing plant, issued several

withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, FilCement Center
and Tigerbilt. The said withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the
dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority
contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless
revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

FilCement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal authorities and consequently, Co
sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew
the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis.

FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities. However, the plant implemented a price increase and would only release
the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity
of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were
not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to
resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co.
The private complainant, Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her
damages. The RTC of Pasay acquitted Co for insufficiency of evidence.

After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved
Co of civil liability to Lim. Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that
she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her. The
trial court denied the motion. Lim filed her notice of appeal.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Lim commited forum shopping in filing the civil case for
specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil
aspect of the criminal case for estafa

HELD: NO. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto,
that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based
on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless,
treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the
Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions
that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the
criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the
final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished
when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.”

The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state
that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.
G. .R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario
Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino
Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of
Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion
for Reconsideration, Casupanan andCapitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of
Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final orderwhich disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have
been an appeal. Hence,Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulo’s contended that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counter claim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a
separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil
case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that
Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
Laroya’s contention was that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to
question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal.
Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is
already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/S: Whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal
case.

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides that the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the
offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The accused can file a civil action for quasidelict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of
Rule 111 which provides that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a
separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons.
1. the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that
is deemed instituted in the criminal case. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasidelict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
2. the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasidelict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim
in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and
equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasidelict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is tenable.