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[A model of it ind. 1 cons i ives he relevant fats, and it hat 90 ‘ollie thesia see. The book tan vababe ad oan understanding tthe weld of today — The Timer “A very excellent book... A masterpiece of balanced exposition’ — Sir Huscid Neston, Daily Telegraph ‘May well come tobe repmded atthe standard short history of wor ‘Stars Toe sry ctl blanced, adequate, and po ore eustwrthy Sido a understanding of present foreign pics cold be nized The Times Literary Supplement ‘An understanding of lterational affairs between the te word war it ecesy forever hiking man and woman. EH. Car's best sein bok Provides a concise and readable secout of the couse of international Felatlons fom th peace of 1919 tothe Second World War of 1939. "The bok Is divided ino four part: the period the Verses Tre fy enforcement, ending athe asco of Reparations andthe Rehr i {he period of pace and opts following the Loarao Treaty, dng ‘shichthe League of Nation sine the summit ofits presage: the ood ‘ssi belong with the economic reakdowa and clesnaig inthe Sapanese adventure in Manchuria and the flue of the Disarmament Conference the eid ofthe open ropa ote Verses Treaty and the Covenant, ening up tothe renewal wa. E.H.Car, who died in 1982 ot he age of ninety, was hora i 1892 and Scvested ae Merchant Taylor’ School, Londot, and Tent” College amide Ater several years atthe Foreign ices fiat academe fostion mas a1 Wilson Profesor of Inematonal Poti, Univer Cilege of Wales, Atersveyth and atthe same time, fom 194111986, be ‘vas Assistant ator of The Tima. Prom 1983 to 1958 he wae Toto Pos at Batol Colege, Oxford nd in 1955 he moved o Cambie on WM olraussstsaysss INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS, Al by EH. Care INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS 1919-1939 E. H, CARR MACMILLAN Alea ened. No edo. copy oan JsBV 0-38-4410 fananer) CONTENTS ‘Tom Price Serrumier “The European Setemen. ‘The Near bart and Af, ‘vei tnd the Fat PART INTHE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT: ‘THE ALLIANCES (1930-24) Puayee 000 em Asses “The System of Guscantees. ‘The Sytem of Alco. ‘The Lite Boone, ‘CHAPTER 2 Graver re Derr Wor Gui and War Crna Dissent and Demueacason, Reparation. CHAPTER 5 (Omen SromeCevens 5 Eunoes "The Danabian Stats Italy ‘The Soviet Union. ® PART I—THE PERIOD OF PACIFICATION. ‘THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (192-9) (CHAPTER “Tam Fouvoariows oF Pence aan Tnvercalied Debs ‘The Geneva Drool CHAPTER 5 “Tow Lenoun ae es Zou * ‘The League a Fl Sreagth ‘The League os Pescemacer Other Activites ofthe Lesue cuapren 6 “Toe Carson acamer Wan ss Leneve Coneniont PART IIL~THE PERIOD OF CRISIS: THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS (1930-35) CHAPTER 7 “Tas Econoute Bnaneoo¥n cs ‘The Your of Dwr ‘The End of Repaston ‘The Wort Eeoneme Conference, ‘The Law Phase cuarrer & The Cisse ee Fan ast . 5 China afer the Washington Conference, Japan Conquers Manchu The Consequence othe Lense CHAPTER 6 “Toe Desnsuene Cosrenncr sos ‘The Diurmament Prete ‘The Diurmament Conferne, ‘The PourPower Pact PART IV—THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GERMANY ‘THE END OF THE TREATIES (1933-39) CHAPTER 10 ‘Tue Nats Revouwnion on Poland and the Soviet Union. France, Tal wd the Lite Een ‘The taikan Bene CHAPTER 15 “Toe Reroonriow op Treats sats ‘The German Repudition, ‘The Bed of Lacy CHAPTER 12 ‘Twe NowEomoreay Wond .. ‘The Mile Ear ‘The Brian Commons of Nations, contents (CHAPTER 13 Reuret nme Wan. "The Spanish Cie Wer, ‘Revel Grouping ofthe Pome. Germany bein Maression Arrow 1: The Montoe Doctrine» Arroeoie 2: Wile’s Fourteen Points Arrmson 3+ tests frm the Covenant of the ‘Lene of Nations CCumonovocte Tuas oF roxas LIST OF MAPS The Toeey ofVeriles P Be Beeps ATMO) The BR oe eee The Middle at pect a 86 2 » INTRODUCTION ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ‘PRODUCTION: THE PEACE SETTLEMENT “Twe duration of the fist world war was rather more than four years and three months-—from July 2th, gta, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, to November 11h, 1918, when the Allee granted Germany an armistice, After the armistice, fire more years were required to complete the general peace Rclement. In 1919 the Allied and Associated Powers Concluded the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (une 28th), the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (Geptember soth) and. the Treaty of Neuilly with Balgeria (November 27th), and in 1920 the Treaty of ‘Trianon with Hungary (June ath). Te was not Casi July 23rd, 1923, Ut the final treaty of peace tvth ‘Turkey sta signed at Lausanne; aad with the Coming into fore ofthis treaty on August 6th, 1924, peace was at last formally re-established throughout fhe world. In the meanvtile the Posters interested in the Poific had assembled at Washington inthe winter fof 1gat-23 and concladed a series of treaties designed to estalish on 2 frm basis the status qu in the Fat East, All these tcatis, together witha host of minor treaties and agreements artng out of them, may be Suid to constitute the peace setlement. Almost every important plitial event ofan international character in the peiod between the frst and second world wars 3 tas the direct of inditeet product of this settlement and it is therefore necesaty to begin ovr study with 1 brit aurvey of te most outstanding features, ‘Tue Eenorean Serrumcest ‘The Treaty of Versilles had certain special charac- teristics which determined much of its subsequent istry Tn the fst place it was, na phrase made frie bby German propaganda, dictated peace”. It was imposed by the victors on the vanquished, not negoti- sted by 2 process of giveand-take between them, [early every tweaty which brings a war to an end i, in fone sense, a dictated peace; for a defeated Power Seldom accept willingly the consequences ofits defeat. Dut in the Treaty of Versailles the element of dictation, ‘was more apparent than in any previous peice tety of imodeen times. The German’ Delegation at Versilles ‘were alloved to submit one set of written comments on the draft treaty presented to them. Some of thoee comments were faken into account ; and the revised text was then handed to them withthe treat that war ‘would be resumed if were not signed within fve days [No member ofthe German Delegation met the Allied elegates face to face except on the to formal occa tions ofthe presentation of the draft and the signature of the treaty. Even on these ocesions the ordinary ‘courtesies of social intercourne ere not observed AE the ceremony of signature, the two German signstores vere not allowed to it with the Allied delegates atthe table, but were escorted in and out of the hal in the ‘ ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ‘manner of erminals conducted to and from the dock, ‘These unnecessary humiliations, which could only be exphined by the intense bitterness of feeling stil let lover from the war, had far-reaching psychological con= Sequences, both in Germany and eliwhere. They fixed in the consciousness of the German people the conception of a “dictated peace"; and they helped to ‘reate the belie, which became universal in Germany sand was tacily accepted by a large body of opinion in ‘other counties, that the signature extorted from Ger- ‘manyin thes conditions was not morllybinding oa her Secondly, the Treaty of Versilles, unlie any previous treaty of peace, was professedly based on & fhumber of gencral principles enunciated during the war, the most famous of these, President Wilon's Fourteen Points, having been formally accepted by Germany before the armtion athe base ofthe settee sent. ‘Thanks mainly to Wilkons insistence on these Principles, the treaty was founded on a substructure of ‘Fenuine idealism. It provided for the ereation of = League of Nations, whose primary purpose was to censure the maintenance of peace of an International Labour Orpanisation for the regulation of labour con- ditions; and of a mandatory ystem of government for the colznis to be ceded by Germany. These init tions became after 1919 a regular and easential part of the mew world order.” Other results of the attempt of the treaty-makers to blend idealism with the ek igencies of the victorious Powers were, however, less fortunate. Te was not dificult for erties to discredit certain parts of the treaty by comparing them with the text of the Fourteen Point. It was perhaps 5 erropucrion ‘open to question whether the territories ceded by Ger- many to Poland included only those " inhabited. by indisputably Polish populations”, or whether the taling {ray of all Germany's overseas pontessions was" re ‘open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment ofall, clonal claims"; and the prohibition of a union between Germany and Austia was indefensible once the Allie had announced the self-determination of sete peoples asthe guiding principe of the eit rent. ‘These and other diserepancies between principle tnd practice gave an exey handle to those who wished to argue thatthe Versilles Treaty was a tinted docu- ‘ment and that the Als had violated the conditions on ‘which the armistice was concluded "The servitudes imposed on Germany inthe Treaty cf Verses were eventually, with few exceptions, sbrogated either by agreement, o by lapse of time, oF ion on the part of Germany. ‘The most of them (penltes, reparation, demilitarised in ater chaptes Here itis only nesesstry to summarise the European territorial provisions. In the west, Germany restored Aluce and Loraine to France, ceded two tiny frag- ‘nents of territory a Eopen and Malmédy to Belgium, land renounced her former eustoms union with Luxem= burg. The ensl-smining area of the Saar was placed ‘under the administration of a Leagve of Nations Com- Ission for fifteen yeas, atthe end of which time ite fate wes to be decided by a plebiscite. The mines were transferred to French ownership by way of com= pensation for French cosl-felds devastated during the War In the south, Germany ceded a small sinp of ‘ La | Stovaxia | a at ans The Treaty of VERSAILLES INTRODUCTION territory to the new sate of Czechoslovakia, nd was ebarced from uniting with Austria except with the ‘unanimous consent ofthe Council ofthe League. In the north, part ofthe former Grand-Duchy of Schles- wig, which had been seized by Prussia from Denmark in 1864, was made the subject of a plebiscite. The plebiscite was held in February and March 1920 and {ested in a satisfactorily clear-cut decision. In the northern sector, 75 per cent ofthe votes were cast for Denmark; the southern sector voted by an even larget majority for Germany. ‘In the east, Germany ceded tothe Principal Allied and Associated Powers, for eventual transfer to Lith ‘nia, the port of Memel and its hinterland, To Poland the ceded the province of Posen and the greater part of the province of West Prusia with a serboard of some forty miles—the sowalled "corridor ” which divides East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Danzig, German town, but the natural port of Poland (which had been promise, inthe Fourteen Points,“ free and secure access to the sea"), became a Fre City in eeaty relations with Poland, entering the Polish customs area and entrusting the conduct of its foreign relations 9 Poland. In addition, plebsctes were to take place in the Marenwerder district of West Pras, inthe Allen- stein distit of Eat Praia and in the whole of Upper Silesia. ‘The Marieawerder and Allenateinplebisctes vere held in July 1920, and resulted in overwhelming German majorities, «few villages only in each cave showing a Polish majority and being transferred to Poland. ‘The plebiscite in Upper Silesia was postponed ‘unt the foloming year, and provoked intense feeling ’ ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT nd serious outbreaks of violence on both sides, Un- like the other plebiscite dntricts, Upper Silesia was rich ineoal and iron and contained a large, densely populated industrial area, ‘The vote proved inconclusive. About Go percent of the votes were cast for Germany, about 49 percent for Poland, But apart from certain clearly ‘edned rural areas the result was a patchwork which fendered a decision extremely dificult. The British tnd Talian Commissioners on one side, and the French Commissioner on the other, submitted widely divergent recommendations. The Supreme Council of the Allied Powers failed to agree and, by an unhappy inspiration, referred the matter to the Council of the League. ‘The Council, ater another threatened dead- lock made an approximately equal compromise between the line proposed bythe French Commisioner and tht proposed by the British and Italian Commissioner, Since the Brtsh-Ialian line had been a carefl attempt ta reproduce a closely as was practicable the results of the vote, whereas the French line showed a marked partiality for Polish claims, the destin ofthe Council ‘was not defensible on grounds of strict equity. Te wan received with indignation in Germany, and did much to prejudice German opinion agsingt the League dosing Ss early years The territorial clauses of the Versailles ‘Treaty involved the loss by Germany in Burope of more than asjo00aquare miles of terstory and nearly seven rillion inhabitant, "The other European peace testes can be more brety deal with “The eallape ofthe Avsto-Hungsrian Monarchy ia November 1918 left German Austria an isolated and ill ° 7 proportioned remnant. Of its 7,000,009 inhabitants fore than 2,000(00 were congregated in. Vienaa Hotemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia had broken say to form the nucleus of Casshoslovakia. Slovenia had joined Serbia and Croatia to form the Yugoslav state. Italy had occupied Triste and its immediate hinterland.” The Treaty of St Germain id litle Dut register these accomplished fact. It only wo provisions which conspicuously contadiced the principle of self-dctermination were the probibition, epested fromthe Treaty of Versilles,on union between ‘Atsvia and Germany, and the cession t Italy of the purely. German-speaking South Tyrol, hich sa ‘esigned to ive Ttaly the strategic frontier of the renner, But Austria’ economic plight was eo dite (Gor many months Vienna was literally starving) that the political humiliations of the peace were scarcely fel. "The Allies, fearing that the movement for union with Germany ‘would assume uncontrollable dimensions, ‘made no serious tempt to apply the non-territoral provisions of the weaty; and the Austrian Reparation ‘Commission transformed itself into a rele organisation. “The ancient kingdom of Hungary, of whose 1700,000 inhabitants litle more than half were Hane futlan, bad also disolved into is ethnic components. ‘The Treaty of Trianon confirmed the transer of Slo- vakia to Caechosloraia, of Croatia to Yugoslaia and ‘of ‘Transylvania to. Roumania. In the main these Gecisions were just, But the frontiers of Hungary, ven more markedly than the eastern frontier of Get= ‘many, Dear witness to a certain eagerness onthe part of the taty-makers to stretch their principles wherever ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ibe to the advantage ofthe Aled andthe dei Itent ofthe enemy cy. The cumulative eet of thin clay wm amide ad fall eae ha Been trade by Hungarian propagandists of thee mine the losses of Bulgaria were almost as severe as those of Hungry. Dut tet of them date, nt Tem he Pesce stent of 191, bot from that of 1919 which fide the second Bala War ne fit Blan Wat af sor, Dolgria had combined with Seti, Gree Sd ‘Reumanis to enpelTerkey from the Ballany ted {tive her Back to line some iy ne from Con Staminple” But the victor fell ot over the dvon of the apo. In the scond Balan War, Daria wa Siatanouty tached by ber hc fore Ales and bp Turkey, ann the ein tet wan complied ede terry to lle of them. "The Testy of Nevill in 919 confirmed Dulgwin's Ines. Ie modi fd tl fash to her dadvatage the nts with Serbs an Grese, antl oched the ppp nj op fener wih Roumanin, "The mon hen {Gof all Bugerin’sqcvances war the ow of Mace dein whith ed bee the prc promised to befor her fartcpaton in the fiat Balan Wart and here we {ouch on # trtral problem dierent in cheacer from any hitherto dicted. Te might be dia to xan equiuble fronts between Germany and Puan, tr becween Hungry and Resin; bu here wr a ieee no dsbe about the rac curcter of the pola tions uelved. In Macedon the prema) pin trav te nbject of biter contovery. The Macedon: iit eves people of Sav sock, whose naa cone neraopUcTioN sciousness was weak ot nonexistent and whose dinlect Shaded off into Serbian on one side and into Bulgarian ‘onthe other. In time they could be made inditferently into good Serbs or good Bulgarians. ‘The tetlement of 1913, confirmed in 1919, had given the greater part ‘of Macedonia to Serbia, and most ofthe remainder to Greece. But the Macedonian were a primitive people among whom brigandage was held in honour.” The ftalwart among them fed to Dulgara and formed there | Macedonian Revolationary Organisation, which con- ‘acted periodical rads in Vagoaay or Grech territory, terrorised the population on both sides ofthe frontier, and embittered el neighbours for more than ten years after the ws During this period, lif and property were probably lst secure in Macedonia than in any other part of Europe ‘The only other provision of the Treaty of Neullly which requires mention here is the clause by which the Allies undertook "to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria tothe Aegean Sea". ‘The Bulgarians inter- preted this to mean, a8 in the cate of Poland, a terri- fori corridoe.” ‘The Alli offered a free tone for Bulgaria in one of the Greek ports. ‘The Bulgarians preferred no bread to half loaf; and nothing was ever done to carry thie dispated clase into eet. “Lat, shouldbe mentioned thatthe newly created stater—Poland and Czechoslovakia—as well as other tats which had received large necessions of territory— Yopeslavia, Roumania and Greece —were required to conclude with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers treaties under which they guaranteed to the “racial, religious and linguistic minorities” residing their testis political right, religious freedom, the provision of schools, and the use of ther language before the court and in their dealings with the authorities, Similar provisions were inched in the testes f peace with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Ger- masy wat not asked to avberibe to any minority ‘obligations. "Tronically enough, thie wae almost the ‘only respect in which the peace-makers of Verales recognised Germany's equality of status with the other Grest Powers, ‘Thon Nean Ease ano Arnica “The Treaty of Lausanne, conchided with Trey in July 1923 isthe only one ofthe peace treaties which, Tor thirteen years, was accepted as valid and applicable byallits signatorien and which ven in 1936 ep 24), ‘vas modified ony by voluntary agreement and in one particular. Historically i owed thi advantage to several factors which distinguished # from the other peace tweatien.” Tt came into being nearly five years after the fend of hostilities when bitter panions had had time to tate; it was not imposed, But negotiated by a long proces of barpaining between the parties; and it w ‘Signed, notin an Allied capital, but on neutral territory. Tmay be wel to recapitulate ere the long and com plicated series of events by which tis happy conclsion ‘eas reached "Tn May 1919, while the Peace Conference, in the intervals ofits more pressing preoccupation with Ger= ‘many, was discussing the future of Turkey, Venizelos, ‘the Greek Prime Minister, persuaded the Allis tallow ey Greek troops to oosupy Smyrna in Asis Minor, The ‘Turks bitterly eesented thie violation oftheir territory, long after the armistie, by the most implacable and most despised of ther enemies. From this resentment 2 widespread movement of national revolt wa born, ‘nd found a capable and powerfl leader in Mestapa Kemal. Within a year the Kemalists had sept the whole county, and only the presence of an Allied {rison kept a puppet Turkish Government in being St Constantinople. Undetrred by this wiring, the ‘Allied Powers signed at Sivres in August 1930 4 treaty of peace with the Constantinople Government. Te wat constructed onthe Versailles model, and provided inter ‘aa that Smyena should remain in Greck cccuption for five years, is fate thereafter being determined by & plebiscie. ‘Any faint chance which remained of the enforce- sent ofthe Treaty of Sevres was, however, destroyed by events in Greece. In October 1920 King Alexander died of the bite oa pet monkey. In the ensuing general election Venizelos was swept from power ; and ex-King Constantine, who had been expelled ffom Greece during the war for his pro-German leasing, aa re= talled othe throne. This sep alienated the sympathy Of the Allie—a sympathy ligely due to Venizelos? magnetic personality. In the folowing year, rt the French, and then the Italians, made private agree: rents with the Kemalit Government which had now tetablished itself in Angora. In Great Britain Lloyd George's Greck policy came in for severe criticism | and though the Greck srmy had boldly advanced from Smyrna int the interior of Asia Minor it became lear that it could no longer count onthe effective support of the Alles. In these conditions, a dele was invit- tle The Grecks were slowly driven back; and in September 19a, after aome particularly savage Siting, Kemal drove the last Greek troops fom the sol of Asi Floshed with victory, the Kemalist now tured their attention to Constantinople. "The French and Taian Governments hurriedly withdrew their contingent ‘The situation wae critical.” resumption of hostilities between Great Britin and ‘Turkey seemed for a ‘moment inevitable. But Mustapha Kemal stopped in time, An armistice was concluded, andthe way paved for the peace congress of Lausanne, where the treaty ‘wat signed inthe fllowing summer. "The armistice of 1918 had found the Oxtoman Empire, like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in a state of disolution, is vast Arab dominions being in the occupation of British and French forces. Fortune ately, however, the Kemalist movement had from the tutet rejected the ancien Islamic bai of the Ortoman Empire, and proclaimed the modern seelar principle of rational self-determination, ‘The new Turkish sate fxplicitly renounced all claim to territories containing ‘Arab majorities; and the conclusion of peace therefore presented no insuperable difcutes.. The frontier of ‘Turkey in Europe was pushed forward beyond Adrian- pleat the expense of Greece; and no more was heard of a plebiscite at Smyrna. The clauses ofthe Sévres ‘Treaty regarding penalties, reparation and disarmament disppeared. But the ‘Tushish Government rather furprsingly accepted the establishment on Turkish territory of two demilitarized zones, in Thrace and 5 eTRODUCTION the area of the Suits. The National Asembly at Angora, well pleased with what it had secured, pro= elnimed Turkey a republic with Kemal ats president, embarked on a vigorous programme of secilarsation and, in the spring of 1924, abolished the office ofthe Ouaman Caliph, the religions head of Islam, who for four and half centuries had had his sent at Con= stantinople. "The fate of the Arab provinces ofthe old Ottoman Empire may serve as an introduction tothe mandatory system, ‘The Covenant of the League provided that those territories, ceded bythe defeated Powers," which sre inhabited by peoples not yet abl to standby them= felves under the strenuous conditions of the modern ‘world, should be placed under the ttelage of ade anced nations", and that" this tutelage should be ‘exercised by them as Mandstories on behalf of the League of Nations". The extent to mhich the Man- datory Powerscouldbesud tacton behalfaftheL-eague vs, indeed, doubtful. ‘The testrisin question were Cedod by Germany and Turkey tothe Principal Allied tnd Associated Power, who were responsible for the telecon of the Mandatory Powers, The. League spproved the terms ofthe mandstesandreccivedannval ‘reports from the Mandstoris on the territories under ‘ther tutelage. Butite function was limited to fendly citcsm. “Sinceit did not grant the mandate, teary ould not revoke them. Where the averegnty ove the mandated teritorie resided was an iaolale legal conundrum ‘The Covenant proved for three clases of mandates (commonly known a2" A","" Band" C” mandate) % araded according to the stage of development of the ‘opultins to which they are applied Tn "A" mandates, under which the ex-Turkish province were placed, the role of the Mandatory was fefined an” the rendering of administrative advice tnd assistance... until such time as they are able to snd alone"; and it was explicitly laid down that "dhe wishes ofthese communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory "It ‘annotbe eid that the lat condition was fly complied bith. The destination ofthe Arab territories had been teiled during the war by a secret agreement beewees Great Brin and France; and though, after the Wat, there wat much haggling over the application of this agreement, the argument did not tum on the wishes of the inhabitants The mandate for Syria wa assigned to France, the mandates for Ing and for Palestine and ‘Transjordania to Great Britain, the mandate for Paes- tine being conditioned by an undertaking given by the British Government in 1917 to establish in Palestine tational home forthe Jewish people". ‘The maining ‘Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire eecured thet independence. ‘The coastal strip of Arabia bordering fon the Red Sea—an important territory in the eyes of ail Moslems, since it contains the holy place of Mecea ‘and Medina became the independent kingdom ofthe Hedjas, Inthe rest of Arabia Turkish sovereignty had never been more than nominal; and in so fara these regions wer inhabited by setled populations, authority was exercised by a number of autonomous Sultans, ‘Sheik and Imam. Tn" B” mandates, which were applied othe grealar a nernopucrion part of Germanys African possessions the population twas recognised tobe uni for any form of administra: tive autonomy. But the Mandatory Power was under sn obligation, not only to prohibit the slave trade and fms trafic and to retain from recrting natives "for ther than police purpoes or the defence af terstory™ (a-somewhat equivocal phate), but to give equal rights to the trade and commerce of other members of the League. In East Africa the whole of the former Ger- rman colony of Tanganyika was mandated to. Great Briain, except forthe two western provinces which, adjoining the Belgian Congo, were mandated to Belgium, and the port of Kionga in the south, which was ceded outright to Portugal. In West Ain the Cameroons and Togoland were both divided between Brith and French mandates, "The category of "C" mandates was crested for German South-West Africa, which was mandated tothe ‘Union of South Africa, and the German Pacific lands, Which were mandated to Australi, New Zealand and Jnpan, Terstories under " C™ mandates wee ad- ‘ministered under the laws ofthe mandatory " and the ‘isential practical dilerence between "and" C” ‘mandates was that holders of the latter were under no ‘bligaton to grant equal rights inthe mandated terre tory tothe trade and commerce of other states. Avonen avo ip Fan East In ta atiude to the settlement made after the war the people of the United States awajed, in s manner ‘which appeared. to be characteristic at this time of ‘THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ity attitude towards foreign athirs, between extreme idealism and extreme cavtion. At fist, theough the ‘mouth of ts President insted on the insertion ofthe Covenant of the League in the Teeaty of Verses and then, through the mouth of Congress, it rejected the treaty on account ofthe cligaion impated by the Covenant. "The ultimate consequences of this with- drawal of American -eperation were incalculable and far-reaching. But it had no immediate effect on the European settlement. Separate treaties, mainly of a formal character, were conched by the United States sith Germany, Astra and Hungary (the United States had not been at war with Bulgaria or Turkey): and peace was thus reetored without involving Americ in tinvelcome European obizations Tn the Far Fast the United States could not afford to preserve the same attitude of serene detachment. ‘The close ofthe warhad eft Japan, whose own itary ‘exertions had heen litle more than nominal, the dom fant Power in the Pacific. By the Treaty of Veruiles ‘head acquired from Germany the leased territory” ‘of Kisochow in the Shantung province of Chinas ‘ecision which caused China to refs her signature to the tent, She had atthe stme time obtained the mandate for Germany's former ialand posession: in the Northern Pacific, By the eclipse of Rusia, she had become the only Great Power on the borders of China and by the simultaneous destruction of the Russian and German navies, se had been lef, not only the greatest naval Power in the Far East, but the third naval Power in the world. ‘The Japanese threat t9 ‘China andthe Japanese bid for naval supremacy in the 9 meTRoDUCTION Pacific were highly daguiting to American observe tnd in the later par of 1921 the United States Governe tment invited the other Great Powers (the Bitish Em ite, Japan, France and Isly), together with the three father Powers having teritaral interest ia the Pace (China, the Netheriands and Portugal) and Belgium (hos claim to inclusion wax purely sentimental," #2 participate in conference on the limitation of arma ‘ments in connexion with which Pacific and Far Eastern ‘questions would also he discussed". The Conference assembled at Washington in November 1924 The Washington Conference resulted inthe signa- ture of theee treaties, The frst, known asthe Foure Power Treaty, was concluded between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, who agreed to respect each other's rights in relation to chit insular possessions in the Paci and to consult to- tether in the event of any controversy between them Feqarding these rights, or any threat to them through the aggressive action of anyother Power. ‘The import= ance ofthis simple document was twofold, Ie drew the United States forthe fist time (since their rejection of the Covenant of the League) into a limited system of consultation with other Great Powers on maters of ‘common concen ; and it provided a decent pretext for bringing to an end the now superiuous Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had become highly unpopular in the United Sates, in the Dominions, and among a large section of publicopinion in Great Britain. ‘The second, ‘or Five-Power, ‘Treaty provided for an extensive measure of naval disarmament, its essential features being the establishment of naval party beoween the ‘TUE PEACE SETTLEMENT: [rtsh Empire and the United States and the fixing of the strength of Japan in capital ships at 60 per cent of the Britah and American figures.” The French and Taalian quotas were 35 per cent. No limitation was placed on light cruisers, destroyer, submatines or other Suxilary cra. ‘The sigastaree further agreed maintain the sfatar quo, in respect of foreations and aval bees, in aepecified area ofthe Pacific. By the third, o Nine-Power, Treaty all the Powers presented at the Coaference pledged themselves to respect the Independence and integrity of China, and "to refain from taking advantage of conditians in China to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the Fight of subjects and citizen of friendly tates. In ‘Adiion to these treties, yet another document wat Signed at Washington ; and though it formed no part ofthe oficial proceedings ofthe conference, agreement twas certainly not reached without strong pressure fom the British and American Delegations. Under this agreement, conchided between Japan and China alone, Japan undertook to return to China the Kiaochow teei= tory which had been ceded to her by Germany in the Veruales Treaty. "The Washington Coaference was hailed, not without reason, as an outstanding success. Ithad toallappear~ ances restored the preswar balance in the Pacific. Tntimidated by a fem Anglo-American font and by the moral pressure of world opinion, Japan had accepted, ifrnot am open defeat at any rate a serious check to her ambitions. She had been persuaded to abandon her sole war gain on the mainland of China. She had not ‘entured to cai naval party with the Bish Empire nyrropuction and the United States; and her demand for 70 percent {of British and American naval tonnage had been eut down to Go per cent. The Japanese menace to the integrity of China and to Angio-American naval supre- ‘macy in the Pacific had been removed. Yet the star tion created by the Washington tratice was insecure to far a it depended on the unwilling renunciation by Japan of her forward poicy on the Asiatic mainland, Sooner or ater, Japan, conscious of her strength, would resent the loss of prestige involved inthe Washington ‘settlement. The fundamental question whether the dominant iflueae in the Far Bact was to be Anglo: Saxon or Japanese wa sll undecided. But shanks to the Washington Conference it remained in abeyance for almost exactly ten years PART ‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT: ‘THE ALLIANCES (1930-1934) CHAPTER 4: FRANCE AND HER ALLIES ‘Tw most important and persistent single factor in European affairs in the yeas following 1919 was the French demand for security. In the sevententh and jghteenth centuries France rightly regarded here at thestrongest military Powerin Europe; andthis tradition survived the Napoleonic wars, when she succumbed nly to# general European coalition agningt her. In 1870 the ilsion of her strength was abruptly shattered by the Franco-Prussian war. A new Power had arisen in Cental Europe whore national feeling wat a8 strong and united as thet of France herself and whose naturel resources were far greatet. The mineral wealth of Germany gave her an industrial development and a capacity for the production of war material which France could not hope to rival. The population of France was almost stationary at something under forty rillions. The population of Germany wat incresing by five millions a decade, and by 1905 had exceeded sixty millions, Moreover, the Germans displayed a feniusformiltary organisation, "The German miliary ‘machine was aot only better equipped and better ‘manned, bu beter run than the French. In 1914 the French, ae they were well avare, would once more have been beaten ation in ix weeks bu for prompe British intervention ; and that intervention had hung on « 35 © thread, The jubilation of 1919 was short-lived. ‘neath the eejocings a deep note of anxiety soon made itself heard, "Since 1870-and stil more since 1934— France had been morbily conscious of her weaknea i face of Germany. ‘She had turned the tables on the vitor of 187, What could be contrived to prevent Gi ‘many one day turing the tables onthe victor of 1918? France's fist answer to this question was clear and cmphatc. She wanted hat se called a physical fuarantee "—the possenson in perpetuity of the Rhine nd ite bridges, across which any invader of France from the east mist pass." The danger comes", ran a Frenchmemorandutm presented tothe Peace Conference in February 1919, "from the possesion by Germany of the Left bank and of the Rhine bridges... The fafey ofthe Westera and Overseas Democracies makes it iesperative, in present circumstances, for them to fuard the bridges of the Rhine.” To her keen die Appointment, her Allie refused to give France the fccurity of the Rhine frontier, on the ground that this arrangement would have involved. the separation from Germany of more than five milion Germans Tiving oa the left bank of the Rhine. After a bitter struggle, France was obliged to abandon her claim, ‘She secre in exchange— (2) the inclusion in the Verses Treaty of clases providing forthe occupation of the left bank of the Khine for Bilton years by Allied fores, and for its permanent demilitarisation (Ze proibition to maintain troops or construct fortesses West of the Rhine) and {2) the conclusion, simultaneously with the Ver= sales Treaty, of trates with the Brith Empire tnd the United State, under which these Powers Undertook to come immesatly to the assistance of France "inthe event of any unprovoked moveret of agaresion against er being male by Germany" ‘The flue ofthe United States to rat the treaties signed at Versilles rendered both the Drtsh and the ‘American undertakings void. race felt herself cheated. She had abandoned he claim onthe strength fof a promise which was not honoured; and this gree nee wat an underlying factor throughout the subse- ‘quent dscusions between France and Great Britain on the question of security ‘Having thus been compelled to abandon ber hope ‘of 2 physical guarantee, France worked feverishly ding the next four years t ind compensation for her natural inferiority to Germany, and t allay he Fae of German vengeance. She falowed two separate and parallel methods a system of weaty guarantees, and 3 system of alliances. "The Svstest oF Guananrens ‘When i became clear, about the beginning of 1920, thatthe Anglo-American guarantee aguinst unprovoked tggresion would never come int fore, France was left Without any treaty protection against Germany other than that contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. France had decided from the fist that this vs insufcent, Ie was true that, under Article 20 of 7 the Covenant, members of the Leagve undertook 0 tespect and preserve as gains external aggression the teritoral integrity and exiting politcal independence ofall memisers of the League", and that Articles 15 and 17 provided for sanctions’ or penales agunst fny state which resorted to war in disegurd of ite obligations. But Article to had been acepted by Grest Britain the Power which counted for most) with reluc- tance; and the French proposal to eeate an intr rational army, which alone eould make sanctions elect- ive, had been emphatically nepatived by Great Britain tnd the United States, Under Article +6 members of the League were bound to break off financial and economic telations with an agyresoe. But military {tion and nothing lees would stop Germany) depended fon a" recommendition ” of the Councl, which ro- (uited 2 unanimous vote, and which, when Voted, could bbe accepted or rejected by individual states a8 they pleted; and the American defection cart serie outta on the eficacy, oF even the posibilty, of a financial and economic blockade. ‘French scepticism about the eficacy ofthe Cove- nant wat enhanced when the League actully came into being. When the frst Assembly met in Geneva in December 1930, Articles 19 and 16 were the subject ‘of an immediate stack Canada wanted to supprest [Anil 1 altogether; and the Scandinavian deleations desired to provide for exceptions to the automatic ‘pplication of economie sanctions under Article 16, oth these proposals gave rset long deliberations. I the following Year, the Assembly voted a resolution which prescribed inter alia that the Council would, 8 when need arose, recommend the date on which the enforcement of ceonomie presure under Article 16 is to be begun the efec being to give the Counc lavude to postpone and modify the application of eonomic sanctions. In 1g23 a resolution was poe posed dechiring tat the decision what measures were hecesuty to curry ou the obligations of Article 10 must rest with "the constitutional authorities ofeach mem= ber”. ‘The effect of this resolution was to leave the rater of military atstance tothe discretion of ‘and its adoption was Blocked only by the adverse vote of ene minor state Although neither Ante 10 nor Article 16 had been focally Amended, i wae clear from these discussions that theit practical application in time of crisis would lag cone Siderably behind the strict lewe of the Covenant. The Imachinery of Geneva was evidently not likly to set in ‘mation that prompt military action which alone eould save France from tavasin, Tn these circumstances it is not surprising that France continued to press Great Britain for some ditional guarantee of asntance aginst Getman Sggresion. The conclusion ofthese efforts wis, how fever,paradoxical. Tn January 192, the British Govern- rent at length plucked up courage to offer France 4 ‘guarantee in approximately the same terms at thore of the abortive treaty of 1919. It so happened that the [French Prime Minster ofthe day waste obtinate and shortsighted Poincaré, who belived ia policy ofall fr nothing. Poincaré demanded that the guarantee ‘hould be tupplemented by a military convention de- Sing the precie nature of the asintance tobe rendered 9 boy the Brish aemy, and declared that, ling this, a sere guarantee Weaty was worthless t9 France. ‘The British Government was not prepared to commit itself to far. Ted dacharged its debt of honour and it ‘now abandoned for some time to come the apparently hopeless tak of satisfying the French appetite for security, ‘Tue Srorent of Atasavens Poincar": high-handed attude was explained in part by the success which France had meanwhile Achieved in the other aspect of her quest for security the building up of system of alances. A policy of rilitay allnces was more congenial to French tem= perament and Prench tradition than the more abstract curity of guaraneceapuint aggression. Te was this policy which had gained for France her supremacy in Europe inthe eighteenth century, when she contained Austria by alliances with Austria's smaller neighbours, Te was ths policy by which she now sought to encizcle Germany. Tn the west, the postion was made secure in September roao bya military alliance with Belgium, heethere fresh ground had tobe broken. Russia had ‘ceased to exist as 2 military power. But in her pace the new republic of Pland had appeared on Germany's tastern frontier. To the south there had arisen, thanks to the victory of the Allies, the thee new or much enlarged states of Coechowovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, who were France's natural friends and clients, Out of this material France Bult up, ia the thre years after the war, an effective and closely knit sjsten of alliances. » [FRANCE AND HER ALLIES Poisso ‘The Polish republic which came into being at the tend ofthe war vas not anew site, but the revival of an ‘ld one, From the tenth t the eighteenth century, Poland bad teen a large and powerful Kingdom. In the Inter half of the eighteenth century, she incurred the joine enmity of Rusia, Prossia and Avsria and aftr three" partitions", i Which Lager and larger tlices of territory were taken from her she lout her independence in 791. The simoltancos eclipse in 1918 of the Russian, German and Austrian Empires seas stroke of lock which made hr re-buth certain, But the frst years were a period of prest dificult. ‘The Russian, German and Austrian Poles, who now united to form a single state, ad for a century and a quarter lived under uiterent ie and iferent systems ff admiistration, had served in difrent armies and fought on oppusite sides, and had acquired diferent traditions and different lvates, It rquiced no small stock of common patrstiem to ovecrde these diver- {gence of outlook, "Moreover Poland, set in the midst fof the great European plain, had no clearly marked ‘geographical frontiers except on the touth, where the (Carpathian Mountains divided her from Slovakia, Het ‘western and northern frontiers with Germany were feted, inthe manner already described, by the Verses Treaty. Everywhere ele, the limits of the new Poland were the subject of acrimonious debate vith her neighbours In the southewest the litle district of Austrian ” g § 2 5 a z & a 5 lia, an important coalfield inhabited by « mixed CCzzch-Polsh population, provided an apple of discord between Poland and the new state of Czechoslovaki, Enrly in 1919 Polish and Caech forces came to blows in the disputed area: anda pitched battle was ony averted by the mediation of French and Dritsh officers. Temas decided to settle the dispute bya plebiscite. Duta the time for the wote drew near, passions ran 80 high that the plan was dropped and under strong French pres ‘ure, both sides agreed toa settlement. By this stl. ment, Ceechoslovakia obtsined the coal mines and Poland the principal town of Teschen (though not is nilway station which remained in Czechoslovakia) Te ‘was compromise which had no vrtue except that of being a compromise ; and beth sides continued to regard themselves as deeply injured parte. Tn Asstrian Poland a diferent problem arose. Of the two provinces of West and East Galicia into which Austrian Poland was divided, the former was purely Polish in character. In East Gali the landed gentry and myst of the intellectuals (ther than the Jews, who ‘were eve particularly aurserous) were Poles. But the peasantry belonged to the same stock which peopled the whole of southwestern Rusia — being variously escrbed as Litde Russians, Ukrainians or Ruthenes. Teis probable thatthe landless Ruthene peasant of East Galicia hated the Polish landowner rather because he was a landowner than because he wat a Pole. Dut of the depth of the hatred there was no doubt. Ia the carly months of 1919 East Galicia was the scene of Stubloon civil war between the ruling Polish minority And the subject Ruthene majority, Polish reinforce Fy ‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT ‘ments were soon broughtin ; and in May the resistance of the Ruthenes, supported by nothing more effective than mild protests fem the Allis Pare guinst Polish high-handedness, ame oan end. ‘The Allie, helpless to alter the accomplished fact, oered Poland 2 mandate over East Galicia fr twenty-fve years after which time the fate ofthe eritory was tobe decided hy the League of Nations. ‘The Poles rejected the propos and re- ‘mained in posession. In 1925 the Allies at ast formally ‘recognised Polish sovereignty over East Gali inretuen for & promise (which was never earried out) to st up an rutonomous régime thee, ‘On the easter frontier of Poland the same problem presented itself on fr larger scale. Inthe days of ta sreatness the kingdom of Poland had not been confined to lands where the indigenous population was Polish Thad embraced the whole of Lithoania, most of White Russia, and the whole of the Ukraine as far asthe Black Sea, In these territories, wae rats of county were in the posession of Polish andowners—s sate of affairs ‘which continued right down to the Russian revolution of 1917. After the revolution, these landowners took refuge ia Poland. They not unnaturally pot strong pressure on the Pash Government to recanguer thelr ands for them and perfervid patriots dreamed of a restored Plish empire stretching from the Dalit the Black Sea. A proposal fom the Allis in Paris that the exstern frontier of Poland shouldbe so drawn a8 to include only teritores where the Polish population was ina majority was received a a biter inaule Te was in such 2 mood that Marshal Pilsudsk, the bead ofthe Polish state and the commandersin-chie of ” the aemy, set out in the sping of 1920 to conquer the Urraine for Poland. The Sovict army, diseased by the civil war, made fecble resistance; and Polish {woop quickly reached Kiev. In June, however, the Sovkt force were able to launch a mass countere offensive, which not only drove the Pols helter-skeler fut of the Usine, but brought Soviet toops within a fev miles of Ware. Here the fortunes of war under went another sudden reveral.. The Soviet offensive, like the Polish efensive before it, was exhausted. The Polish army advanced once more.This time, avoiding the Ukraine, they marched due est nto White Rassia fand when the armistice was at last sounded, the ine ‘wat some 150 miles east ofthe so-called "Curzon ine” proposed by the Allis. But the Soviet Goverament ‘wat prodigal of territory and needed peace. Tn 193t the Treaty of Riza confirmed the armistice line a the permanent frontier between Poland and Soviet Rus Poland abandoned ber claim othe Ukraine, but received large, though sparsely populated tract of White Rusia ‘Next came the turn of Lithuania, Here the chief bone of contention wat the city and datct of Vilna Vilna had been the capital of the mediaeval empire of Litheania («hich in the stceath century bid been ‘united with Poland by a convenient royal marriage): and when in 1918 an independent Lithuania was re- ‘ived, it promptly precaimed Vilna as its capital. ‘Une happily, Vilna had an equally strong sentimental ateac- tion for Poland. Tt wan the seat of famous Polish ‘university andan ancient homect Polish earning. Feim the ednographical standpoint, neither the Lithuanian ‘or the Polish claim was strong. ‘The population of s ‘THE PERIOD OF ENFORCEMENT the city was Jewish the Jews bad an absolute majority), Polish and White Russian; of the surrounding dee, Whice Russian and Lithuanian, But where so many passions were excited, the wishes of the popelations Concerned (if indeed they had any) were vaikcly to be decisive, Tn July 1920, during the Soviet advance towards ‘Warsa, Lithuania had signed a treaty with the Soviet Government by which the litter recognised her claim to Vilna. But the subsequent Polish advance cut off Lithuania altogether from her Soviet finds, and she vas left to face the Poles alone. Fighting scon began inthe neighbourhood of Suvalk. It went less well for the Poles than might have been expected ; and in ‘October an armistice was signed which lft Vilna and district in Lithuanian hands, ‘Three days later, an independent Polish general named Zeligowski collected fome toops and, taking the Lithuanians completly by ‘surprise, ccupied Vil, Oficial, the Polish Governe ‘ment deplored thi fgrant breach of faith. But i “unbluchingy atuck tothe prize; and Plsudsi admitted, ‘some years later, tht the coup had been carried ut with is knowledge and approval. Long negotiations conducted by the League of Nations filed to dislodge the Pole; and in’ 1923, when the Lithuanians had ‘put themselves out of court by their seizure of Meme! (brhich had been occupied by the Allies since the Ver. sles ‘Treaty, the Allie formally recognised Vilna part of Pland, ‘The Polish state, thus constituted, had! a population of over thiry millons—a figure which almost entitled ito the rank ofa Gres Power. Tt was rich in natural 6 FRANCE AND HER ALLIES resources, posesing an abundance of coal and ion in the south-west, olin East Galicia, extensive frets in the east, and good agricultural land almost every- ‘where. But it aio had conepicuous weaknesses, Not less than 25 percent ofits population was non- Polish, inctodng four million Jews | and most ofthe minorities ‘were actually or potentially hore. Furthermore, Poland was, in these early dayn, on bad terms with al hher neighbours without exception. “There wat con- stant friction with Germany over the tretment ofthe German minovty and over Danzig; and it seemed oubsfl whether any German ‘Government would ‘stomach indefinitely the separation of Fast Prussia fom the rest of Germany by the Polish corridor. Soviet Rossa might some day regret er generosity. Cvecho- vakin was sullenly resentful, Lithuania noisily in- Gignant; and there might be' trouble again in East Galicia.’ Poland was the strongest Power in eastern Europe. But she could scarcely face the world alone, In these circumstances, the Freneh policy of alliance with the neighbours of Germany coincided perfectly With Poland's own needs. ‘The Franco-Polth treaty Of alliance of February 1921 wat an inateument of clase political co-operation. Tea accompanied by a secret military convention, and wat followed by the supply from France on easy terms of large supplies of wat material for the equipment of the Polish army. Some cautious Frenchmen complained that so quarrel. tome anally was more of a iblty than an asset, and that no French soldier would be willing to div for Poland. Some Poles grumbled at the. patronising attitude of their French associates, and atthe number v and cvcliness ofthe French Military Mission ia War- fh, But the alliance was founded on ato slid basis of common interest to be shaken by any tevial diet contents. In every important ine of international politics, France and Poland eanged themselves side by fide. “At Geneva, the French and Polish delegates were hand-in-slove in every private negtation, and spoke and voted together in every public debate "Tae Lirrur Eeresre ‘The Little Bntente was the unoficial name forthe alliance between the thre sates which profited moxt by the break up of the Austro-Hlungarian monarchy Caachoslovakia, Roumania and Yugosavia, Czechoslovakia, as the name (a recent coinage) indiates, was formed bythe union of two neighbouring peoples." The Czechs and Slovaks are to branches of the same Slav stock, speaking closely related dialects of the same language. "The history ofthe tr peoples is however quite diferent. The Ctechs, who formed in the Middle Ages the nucleus ofan independent King- dom of Bohemia, passed from 1620 onwards under the Germanie influence of the Austrian Empire, ‘The ‘old Coch aristocracy was completely Germansed and the modem Czech ae thrifty, hard-working, well ‘educated middle-class and working-class people. Slo ‘aki, onthe other land, had for a thousand years prior to 1918 been par of Hungary. ‘The Slovaks were an illterate peaant race; and Slovak eulture was repre sented by a handful of intellectuals living abroad, ‘mainly inthe United Suites. These conditions madeit ¥ inevitable that the army officers, the civil servants and the teachers of the new Czechoslovak state shoud be ‘raw principally from the Czech. But this inequality ‘wae resented in Slovaecrcles; and the most representa tive Slovak party persistently demanded” national asto- omy ” for Slovshis, “The greater part of the sil of Czechoslovakia was agricultural; and the new state strengthened itself by an extensive agrarian reform, involving the exproprae tion of the lezer landowners, mainly German or Hugaren, andthe distibtion of ther land to Caech for Slovak small farmers and peasanta. But Ceecho- slovakia was also a highly developed industrial state, and 4 large manufacturer of war materia. Her former ‘Avstran provinces contained some So per cent of the production of co and iron and the heavy industy of the prewar Austrian Empire. These advantages were in part set off by the weahness of her geographical postion and the mised character of her population. Of her population of more than fourteen millions the Czechs, who formed the ruling cls, accounted for six snd a Tall millions and the Slovaks for two millions ‘more. ‘The balance was made up ofa compact and ine

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