G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979 4.
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R.
No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of
Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is
likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces
of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior
an- d up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on
the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including
the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause,
which is found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan
at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa
amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang
dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan
na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin,
at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and
Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway
54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the
left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page
One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the
rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies
in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews
and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline,
Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago,
who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad
ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal
already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of
the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity
due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the
summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was
procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other
person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of
the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the
deceased was not executed and attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the
purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three
attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal
was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration
of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed
and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as
required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by
petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973,
respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and
testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on
several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses
did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the
evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason
to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The
Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require
the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the
petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings
of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration  10 which private
respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply
followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by
law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit
"F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan"
and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
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V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated
the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when
the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the win
was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses
(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said
testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last
will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at
the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and
reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs.
CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA  (L32192, July
30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83,
88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the
jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking
through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in
disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on
appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its
premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct.
Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because
only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of
the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a
minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We
have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit
"F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an
absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and
that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he
is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness
are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not
synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be
credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should
receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation
with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness
to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this
Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good
standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the
Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it
must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the
same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be
supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that
being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the
Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or
testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in
the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental
witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to
any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of
unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible  witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another,
While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the  competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the
attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just
being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent  under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible
witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a
competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental
witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by
profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and
his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But
the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a
competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of
Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil
Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may
be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible"
insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of  Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the
Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked
before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.
" emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same
Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf,
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or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New
Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does
not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications
as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical
Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases,
Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of
Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one
competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283.  Moos vs.
First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible
witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to
testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined
as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate,  Smith vs. Goodell 101
N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, such
persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity,
interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering
them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title
& Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art.
820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of  Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing,
and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to
testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe
his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to
be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that
the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have
attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent
proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of
the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that
Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type
such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same
occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in
holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel
and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture
takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate
court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss
hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on
record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the
witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty.
Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit
of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with
him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested
him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he
was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel
told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by
her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the
lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence
certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at
Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal
on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing
of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from
showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of
Isabel Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the
deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas
residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house
in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place
where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty.
Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April
15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted
to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that
he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and
disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of
Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law
office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and
their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was
corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel
Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the
occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given
the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior
occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear
in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961
following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a
notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document
executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear,
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such
evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten
words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the
same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate
court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the
only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal
appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said
certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty.
Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as
3
executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the
numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a special
proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it
was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso,
considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a
brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F".
While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to
be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was
particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying
the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor
of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win
was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent
Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting
witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the
respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the
testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very
clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was
signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's
conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and
that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that
— day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday
and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that
day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving
piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of
April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas,
Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961
and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the
documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and
convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by
signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause
which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all
the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the
purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132;
Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance
to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that:
"Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and
Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to
lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia
mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the
will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde
Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue
importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence
however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this
occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso
was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of
Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel
Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless.
What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree
with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one of the
legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies
before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso
which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which
was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde
Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed unimportant details which could have
been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative
value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected
that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and that
witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur
in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a
demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural
that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez
vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate
court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a
general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review,
alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been
misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on
conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the
province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the
record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel
dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not
have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign
the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial
court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed
and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a
mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then
it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive
as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as
required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at
the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from
one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her
will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney
wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to
her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document,
he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the
presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each
and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will
by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the
4
presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will,
the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute
Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand
Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and
On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis,
Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of
the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring the respondent Court of Appeals.
with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the
of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's petitioner.
claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates G.R. No. L-8774. November 26, 1956.]
any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, In the matter of the testate estate of the deceased JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO. EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and
Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL., oppositors-
ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing appellants.
in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty.
Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso Delgado, Flores & Macapagal for appellees.
and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the
evidence — which the trial court itself believed was unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she Eulalio Garcia, Miguel R. Cornejo and Jose A. Garcia for appellants.
executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish SYLLABUS
to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for 1. SUCCESSION; WILLS; WHEN PRETERITION OF BLOOD RELATIVES ALLOWED. — The testator who has no forced
P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it, to the exclusion of his
listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was blood relatives. (Article 763, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of
properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but 2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTING WITNESSES’ , QUALIFICATION OF; RELATIVES AND EMPLOYEES NOT BARRED FROM
prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension BECOMING WITNESS. — The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L- age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled
22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. credence.
No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above.
We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The DECISION
conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of
facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court
of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be
applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize MONTEMAYOR, J.:
the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have
disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly Mariano Molo and Juana Juan was a couple possessed of much worldly wealth, but unfortunately, not blessed with children. To
and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the fill the void in their marital life, they took into their home and custody two baby girls, raising them from infancy, treating them
power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the as their own daughters, sending them to school, and later to the best and exclusive centers of higher learning, until they both
trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. graduated, one in pharmacy, and the other in law. These two fortunate girls, now grown up women and married, are Emiliana
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable Perez-Molo-Peckson, a niece of Juana, and Pilar Perez-Nable a half sister of Emiliana.
that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the
presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to his wife. Juana, his widow, died on May 28, 1950,
Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then leaving no forced heirs but only collateral, — children and grandchildren of her sisters. She left considerable property worth
delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the around a million pesos or more, and to dispose of the same, she was supposed to have executed on May 11, 1948, about two
signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the years before her death, a document purporting to be her last will and testament, wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her property
lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot to her two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar. These two foster daughters, as petitioners, presented the document for probate in
be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The other relatives, such as Enrique Tanchuco, only son of Juana’s deceased sister Modesta,
performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present. and his two children, Ester, and Gloria, both surnamed Tanchuco, and Faustino Gomez and Fortunata Gomez, the only

5
surviving grandchildren of another deceased sister, named Francisca, filed opposition to the probate of the will on the ground
that the instrument in question was not the last will and testament of Juana; that the same was not executed and attested in
accordance with law; that the said supposed will was secured through undue pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries therein; that the signature of the testatrix was secured by fraud and that she did not intend the instrument to be her
last will; and that at the time the instrument was executed, the testatrix Juana was not of sound and disposing mind.
Because of the value of the property involved, as well as the fact that the bulk of said property was being left to Emiliana and
Pilar, ignoring and practically disinheriting the other relatives whose blood ties with the testatrix were just as close, if not closer,
the will, marked Exhibit A at the hearing, was hotly contested and considerable evidence, oral and documentary, was introduced
by both parties. After hearing, Judge Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding over the trial court, in a well considered decision declared
the document Exhibit A to be the last will and testament of Juana Juan, and admitted the same for probate; and following the
provisions of the will, he appointed Emiliana and Pilar executrices without bond. Failing to obtain a reconsideration of this
decision, the oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals about the beginning of the year 1951.
Ordinarily, because of the value of the property involved in the will, which was many times more than P50,000, the appeal
should have been brought directly to this Tribunal. However, shortly, after the execution of the instrument admitted to probate
as a will, the testatrix executed a document purporting to be a deed of donation inter vivos, donating the great bulk of her entire
property, with the exception of about P16,000 worth, to the same beneficiaries in the will, namely, Emiliana and Pilar. If this
deed of donation is valid, then the will disposes of property valued only at about P16,000; hence, the appeal to the Court of
Appeals instead of the Supreme Court. In justice to the oppositors, it should be stated that, at the same time that they opposed
the probate of the will in the probate court, they also expressed their intention to contest the validity of the allege donation inter
vivos, either in the administration proceedings or in a proper separate case. The appeal, for one reason or another, remained in
the Court of Appeals for sometime, and only by its resolution of July 7, 1954, was the case certified to us on the ground that,
inasmuch as the validity of the supposed donation inter vivos was being impugned and repudiated by the oppositors of the will,
and inasmuch as the will itself covered property valued well in excess of P50,000, the appeal should be determined by the
Supreme Court.
We have carefully gone over the evidence of the record, and we are convinced that the great preponderance thereof is in favor of
the probate of the will. Not only this, but we realize that the credibility of witnesses is very much involved in the determination
of this case, the testimony of those for the petitioners being diametrically opposed to and utterly conflicting with that of the
witnesses for the oppositors. His Honor, the trial judge had the opportunity and was in a position to gauge said credibility and he
evidently found the witnesses for the petitioners more entitled to credence, and their testimony more reasonable. We find no
reason for disturbing said finding of the probate court. We quote with approval a portion of the decision of Judge Tan, reading
as follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"From the evidence presented in this case, both oral and documentary, it was proved to the full satisfaction of this Court that the
deceased freely and voluntarily executed Exhibit "A", her last will and testament, in the presence of her three attesting witnesses
that at the time of the execution of the said will, the deceased was of sound mind and in good health and was fully conscious of
all her acts as may be seen in Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2", "D-3", and "D-4", and also as was proven by the testimony of the two
attesting witnesses, Petrona P. Navarro and Dr. Cleofas Canicosa; that said will was signed in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses, who, likewise, signed in the presence of the testatrix and in the presence of each other; that after the execution of said
will or after the signing of the same, the deceased Juana Juan Vda. de Molo took it with her and kept it in her possession and
after her death, the said will was presented in court for probate.
"While the written opposition to the probate of said will consists of a litany of supposed abuses, force and undue influence
exercised on the testatrix, yet the evidence shows that these supposed abuses, force and undue influence consist only of failure
on the part of the deceased to invite the oppositors in all the parties held in her house through the alleged influence of Mrs.
Nable, of paying more attention, care, and extending more kindness to the petitioners than to the oppositors in spite of the close
blood relationship existing between the testatrix and the oppositors. The oppositors also tried to prove the existence of another
will which, according to them, was read to the oppositor Enrique Tanchuco three days before the departure of the testatrix for
the United States, though no evidence whatsoever was presented as to what happened to the supposed will, where it is now, in
whose hands it is, or in whose possession it could be found. The oppositors also tried to prove that during the illness of the
testatrix in 1948 they were unable to visit her because of the influence of Emiliana Molo-Peckson, who told them that they
could not visit the testatrix because of the advice of the doctor. This testimony of the oppositors was satisfactorily contradicted
by the testimony of Mrs. Emiliana Molo-Peckson who denied that the testatrix was sick in the year 1948 and by means of
photographs which show that during the said period of time, which the oppositors alleged to be the date when Mrs. Juana Juan
Vda. de Molo was sick, the latter attended several affairs, such as sponsoring the reconstruction of the Antipolo Church,
attending a party given in the house of Gen. Aguinaldo in Kawit, Cavite, and other social gatherings."chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Neither do we find anything unusual or extraordinary in the testatrix giving practically all her property to her foster daughters,
to the exclusion of her other relatives. The two beneficiaries, as already stated, were taken in and raised by her and her husband,
Mariano, when they were mere babies. Naturally, they became very much attached to and came to love said two children,
specially since they had none of their own. They sent them to good, even expensive schools like the Santa Teresa, Santa
Escolastica, and the University of the Philippines, and otherwise lavished their affection and their wealth on their two protegees.
Little wonder then that Juana in making her will made Emiliana and Pilar practically her exclusive beneficiaries, specially since,
So we understand, when these two girls had grown up to womanhood, and been highly educated, they helped their foster parents
in the administration of their extensive properties, and later took good, kind, and tender care of them in their old age. We repeat
that it was neither unusual nor extraordinary that the testatrix, with no forced heirs, should have made her two foster daughters,
the beneficiaries in her will, to the exclusion of her blood relatives. Said this Court in a similar case — Pecson v. Coronel, 45
Phil. 220:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of relatives from
one’s estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that
cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no
forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraph of
article 763 in the following terms:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"’Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire it.’
"Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the Code embodying it has been in force in the Philippines for more than a
quarter of a century, and for this reason it is not tenable to say that the exercise of the liberty thereby granted is necessarily
exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants of this country whose customs must have been taken into consideration
by the legislator in adopting this legal precept, are averse to such a liberty."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Oppositors-appellants in their printed memorandum contend that under Section 618 of Act 190, the Old Code of Civil
Procedure, which requires that a will should be attested or subscribed by three or more credible witnesses, two of the attesting
witnesses to the will in question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss Canicosa, who were employed as pharmacist and salesgirl,
respectively, in the drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of beneficiaries in the will, may not be considered credible witnesses for
the reason that as such employees, they would naturally testify in favor of their employer. We find the contention untenable.
Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or
more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision
is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the
beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of
wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to
say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may
cite:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"A ‘credible witness’ is one who is not disqualified to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc. of
Dauphin County v. Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226 Pa. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010." (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
"As construed by the common law, a ‘credible witness’ to a will means a ‘competent witness’. Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114
Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837." (Ibid. p. 341). "Expression ‘credible witness’ in relation to attestation of wills
means’competent witness’; that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St.
art. 8283. Moos v. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App. 60 S. W. 2d 888, 889." (Ibid. p. 842)
6
 Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the
"The term ‘credible’ , used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible witnesses, means court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement.
competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June
attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the time 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.
it is offered for probate. Smith v. Goodell, 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 Ill. 145. (Ibid.) Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:
I
"’Credible witnesses’, as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, such persons as are not THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE
legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and
other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter II
or in the particular suit. Hill v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 152 N. E. 545, 546, 322 III. 42." (Ibid. p. 343) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DIRECTING
THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE
This Tribunal itself held in the case of Vda. de Roxas v. Roxas, 48 Off. Gaz., 2177, that the law does not bar relatives, either of WAS ERRONEOUS.
the testator or of the heirs or legatees, from acting as attesting witnesses to a will. The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE
In view of the foregoing, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from the same is hereby affirmed. No costs. LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I — First Page
G.R. Nos. 83843-44               April 5, 1990 This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the partition in favor of
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or less one hectare, and the boundary
LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants, at the South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their sister, and the boundary in the
vs. West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-appellees. CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is now the time for me being now
Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners. ninety three (93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me to partition the fishponds which were and had been
Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents. bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two mothers, hence there shall be no differences among themselves,
those among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to
each and everyone of them the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or
differences among the brothers and sisters.
PARAS, J.: II — Second Page
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is  dated, as provided for in And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of
Article 8102 of the New Civil Code. the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO
of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of LABRADOR, their father.
Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should be followed and complied with
Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. in order that any differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen along these troubles among my
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed children, and that they will be in good relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;
in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut trees and all others like the other
Melecio Labrador. kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that there shall be nothing that
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador anyone of them shall complain against the other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.
filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging III — THIRD PAGE
therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located, the same being the fruits of our
testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share among themselves, and or to be
Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier benefitted with all those property, which property we have been able to acquire.
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37) That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature below hereof, and that this is
Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio what should be complied with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers — JULIANA
Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who made this writing (WILL), and
being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious. he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is
1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court  a quo had impressed with merit.
also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. 1âwphi1 It is worthy of note
representing the redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.
7
 And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of
the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO
LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the
date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement
among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date
of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof
to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which
defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of
the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio
Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of
the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption price as erroneous, respondent
court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for
P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale
null and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the
property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The
holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to
REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS,
SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.
Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the
brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of Administration had been granted
to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July
21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased
Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my
win which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus
who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus.
Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their
deceased mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was
the date when said Will was executed by their mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will
of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation
and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend,
nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he
found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that
the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic
Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of
the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby
disallowed for not having been executed as required by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is hereby set
aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the
testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase
Año mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction
of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will is void for non-compliance with Article
810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that
Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code
whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is
wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of
Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills
are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding
the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy —
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this Project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of
wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will and testament on the
ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that which the law can make. For this
reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the
decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but
without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
8
 xxx xxx xxx
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of
any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt and the instrument
appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination
should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to
probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient
if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40
Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the
same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is
no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there
any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother
and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-
respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be
entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as
in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order
allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
G.R. No. L-7856 December 26, 1913
In re estate of MARIA CRISTINA G. CALDERON. BASILISA SALTERAS, POTENCIANA DE LA CRUZ, in their
own behalf, and BENIGNO CALDERON, as the natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, ET
AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
LUCAS EUGENIO, as administrator of the said estate, and PETRONILA EUGENIO, respondents-appellees.
Fermin Mariano and R. M.a Calvo, for appellants.
Buencamino and Lontok, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
The appeals in this case were made by the attorneys for Basilisa Salteras, Potenciana de la Cruz and Benigno Calderon, the
latter as the natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, and also by counsel for Mauro Sulat, Encarnacion
Gutierrez Calderon, Benigno Calderon, and Calixto Salteras, from the order of December 6, 1911, which directed that the
administrator be authorized to make a conveyance of the property, classed as urban, consisting of a house and lot situated on
Calle Anloague, Binondo, and designated, under the old numeration, as No. 29, and under the new, as No. 173, to Petronila
Eugenio, in accordance with the petition of Ramon Fabie, who is made a party by the order.
The question involved in these proceedings are those as to how and in what manner the provisions made by the testator, the
deceased Miguel Fabie, in clause 12 of his will, should be complied with, and as to who are the legatees that should receive  pro
rata the legacy specified in the said clause, a literal copy of which is as follows:
Clause 12. I declare it to be my will that my property on Calle Anloague, No. 173, mentioned under the letters C and
H in the third clause of this my testament, in order that as a legacy of mine to my wife, under the condition that, with
its net revenue, she shall care for, educate and assist, during her widowhood, the children of our servants and the two
children of D. Lucas y Eugenio who are also in this house in the character of proteges, named Filomena and Joaquin,
minors and orphans by loss of their mother; and I authorize and charge my wife to provide in her will that she may
make after my death, that her testamentary executors shall deliver this aforesaid property on Calle Anloague, an as
inheritance from her, to the person or persons who may have assisted and cared for her during her widowhood until
her death. If the persons who may have served he should be from different families, I charge her testamentary
executors, in order to avoid disagreements among such persons, publicly or privately to sell the said property on Calle
Anloague immediately after her death and to divide in equal shares the net proceeds derived thereby. If through
involuntary negligence my wife and legatee should be unable to make a will after my death, or if for any other cause
she should not fulfill the charge I impose upon her in this twelfth clause, it is my will that it be complied with and
fulfilled by my brother, Ramon Fabie, or, in his default, by his heirs, his sons named Serafin and Jose surnamed
Fabie.
Article 675 of the Civil Code prescribes as follows with regard to the interpretation of wills:
Every testamentary provision shall be understood in the literal meaning of its word, unless it clearly appears that the
will of the testator was different. In case of doubt, that which appears most in accordance with the intention of the
testator, according to the tenor of the same will, shall be observed.lawphil.net
A testator cannot prohibit the contest of his will in the cases in which there exists nullity specified by law.
A uniform rule has been set down by the supreme court of Spain, with respect to the construction and application of the said
article of the Civil Code, also in force in that kingdom, in several of it decisions, among them that of May 24, 1882, where it
says: That the will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and when it is clearly and precisely
expressed the decision of the questions argued at trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be in accord with it as
construed from the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was
different from that literally expressed. This same rule was reaffirmed in the decisions of May 8, 1901, October 8, 1902, and
January 14, 1903.
In the preinserted clause of the said will of the deceased Fabie it appears explicitly ordered by the testator that, after the death of
his wife Maria Cristina Calderon, the legatee of the usufruct of the property situated at No. 173 Calle Anloague, now Juan Luna,
the said property should be delivered to the person or persons who may have served and cared for his aforementioned wife
during her widowhood until her death; and it is also provided therein by the testator that, in case the said legatee of the revenues
of the property referred to should not in her will direct the delivery of such property to the legatee or legatees indicated, as in
fact she did not do, then the testator's will, relative to the delivery of the said property to the person or persons who may have
served and cared for his widow until her death, should be fulfilled by his brother Ramon Fabie, or, in the event of his failure or
default, by this brother's sons, Serafin and Jose, surnamed Fabie.1awphi1.net
The testator's will, as recorded in the above clause 12, is so clear and definite that, in order duly to comply therewith, it needs
but be determined who are the persons that must be considered as the legatees on account of their having served and cared for
the testator's widow until her death.
From a due examination of the evidence, taken at trial on the petition of the appellants, who appeared and claimed a share in the
aforementioned estate and legacy, it is concluded that those entitled thereto are Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Filomena
Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria and Josefa Calderon, and Petronila
Eugenio, and so the trial judge also held in his order of September 23, 1911, except with respect to the little girls Maria and
Josefa Calderon, whom he considered to be too young to have been able to serve the widow Maria Cristina Calderon as
domestics; but the record shows that these children, as the widow's protegees, lived in her house until her death and, sometimes
the one and sometimes the other, used to accompany her, even when she went to church, and that, although they were minors,
they could have rendered the widow assistance and services sufficient and proportionate to their respective ages; and we are of
the opinion that, from the testator's intention as expressed in his will, it is undeniable that the assistance and services rendered to
the widow, required as a condition for meriting the legacy in question, were sufficient to the needs and conveniences of the
testator's widow in respect many chores in the house, and enough to fill the requirements of a woman sickly and infirm in her
already advanced age. The company of obliging and obedient little girls is usually more agreeable and useful to elderly and sick
persons than that of adults.
With the report of the testator's brother, Ramon Fabie, the testator's will is not legally fulfilled, and it is not just that the other
persons, besides Petronila Eugenio, who rendered services to and assisted the widow Maria Cristina Calderon should be
deprived of the proportionate share of the legacy to which they are entitled.
9
Petronila Eugenio was already in the house serving the wife of the testator while the latter was still living, and had he seen that
Petronila alone could serve and attend her during the widowhood of his wife and that the latter would not need other servants,
he would have bequeathed the whole of the said house to Petronila; and if the deceased Miguel Fabie provided in his will that
the property should be delivered to the person or persons who should render useful services to and assist his widow until her
death, it was because he knew and was aware that there were other servants in the house, and evidently imposed this condition
in order that those who were servants there might continue as such until his wife's death. Since some of them did do so, as
proven by the record, the law must be fulfilled in accordance with the tenor of the last will of the testator.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that Petronila Eugenio, Filomena Calderon,
Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and
Josefa Calderon are entitled to receive pro rata  the sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29, Calle
Anloague, now Juan Luna. No special finding is made as to costs.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO
K. KALAW, respondents.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister,
Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the rights of said
Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate
my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10,
1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of
the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole
heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made
by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K.
Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate although the
alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of
the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors are
estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to
submit the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor
was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C".
Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full
signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix,
the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was
denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it)
requires no necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration,
ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not the  original unaltered text after
subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been
noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in
the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the
seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it
in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is,
with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new
Civil Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un
testamento olografo que contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por el
testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad,  tal omision solo
puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa
disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas
no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y
ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con
el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y
tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el documento
que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas
no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del pensamiento del testador , o constituyan meros
accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo,   es preciso que las
tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien
de modo substancial la express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento . Asi lo advierte la
sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar salvada por el
testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en que fue extendido 3 (Emphasis ours).
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby
affirmed in toto. No costs.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
10
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the
instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente
Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged
that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and
was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero.
He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will,
its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for
the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written
in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the
question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the
will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for
probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed
by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question
was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who
have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the
requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of
the testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself
has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her
birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the
testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of
her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The
objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a
nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than
sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic
will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance
where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has
testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will,  i.e., at or around the time of
her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and
has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which
has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly
pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in
question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein
which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate
succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were
presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will
submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals
found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with
Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated,
and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever
be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that
the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.  5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to
probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
11
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent
had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its
signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code,  ante, were not complied with, hence, it
disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919),  that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic
or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in
the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions  cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242  (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an
identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in
provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the
present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites
required in Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his
signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil
Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass
upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the
Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole
property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840,
dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire
house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
G.R. No. 123486           August 12, 1999
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 and its resolution denying
reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the
authenticity of testators holographic will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S)
are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will
in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant
files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown
no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right
to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for
appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the probate of the holographic
will of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when
she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the
testator, and will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her
death.4
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to the petition for probate, alleging that
the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an
interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the
deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after
the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting
of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud
and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence,
filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having being well taken, same is
granted, and the petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits. 7
12
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again
reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal
Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special proceedings for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear
the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the
handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the
decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of
Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven
(11) years of close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her (deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial
buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in
posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will
dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the
dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga  testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and
handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a
result of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will
was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region 10. She testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature
of the deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact
adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that
the signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:
Instruction
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must
continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
Mama
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the
case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of
Appeals held:
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our
present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at
the execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that
the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For
it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness acquainted
with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the
reason why the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that —
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to.
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same
thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to
expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only
one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45
PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered
mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no
witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely
permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the court deem it necessary",
which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where
the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine,
it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or
none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty
of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that
the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the
civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the
execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive.
What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable
inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no
uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of
Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to
probate.
Hence, this petition.
13
The petitioners raise the following issues: Q.   In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of sale which you said what
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
Appeals, was applicable to the case. A.   Posting records.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been able to present credible Q.   Aside from that?
evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix. A.   Carrying letters.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seño Q.   Letters of whom?
Vda. de Ramonal. A.   Matilde.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The Q.   To whom?
article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare A.   To her creditors.15
that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt xxx     xxx     xxx
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a Q.   You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its title "tugon" is this
mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the the document you are referring to?
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. 11 A.   Yes, sir.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the Q.   Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?
goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous A.   My Aunt.
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. Q.   Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An A.   Because I am familiar with her signature.16
exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator. What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal
identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased. Q.   Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the will you said, yes?
voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer available. A.   Yes, sir.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that: Q.   Who was in possession of that will?
Q.   And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de A.   I.
Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy Q.   Since when did you have the possession of the will?
that time? A.   It was in my mother's possession.
A.   Collecting rentals. Q.   So, it was not in your possession?
Q.   From where? A.   Sorry, yes.
A.   From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets. 12 Q.   And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the possession of your mother?
xxx     xxx     xxx A.   1985.17
Q.   Who sometime accompany her? xxx     xxx     xxx
A.   I sometimes accompany her. Q.   Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and therefore you have
Q.   In collecting rentals does she issue receipts? that in your possession?
A.   Yes, sir.13 A.   It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.
xxx     xxx     xxx Q.   After taking that document you kept it with you?
Q.   Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts A.   I presented it to the fiscal.
which she issued to them? Q.   For what purpose?
A.   Yes, sir. A.   Just to seek advice.
Q.   Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs. Binanay? Q.   Advice of what?
A.   Matilde vda. De Ramonal. A.   About the will.18
Q.   Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal? In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children
A.   I am familiar with her signature. of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the
Q.   Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts death of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
of her tenants? In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
A.   Yes, sir. Q.   Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?
Q.   Why do you say so? A.   Yes, sir.
A.   Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal. Q.   She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go to her building to
Q.   How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected? collect rentals, is that correct?
A.   In handwritten.14 A.   Yes, sir.19
xxx     xxx     xxx xxx     xxx     xxx

14
 Q.   Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word A.   Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I am related to the
Vda.? husband by consanguinity.
A.   Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous. Q.   Can you tell the name of the husband?
Q.   And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D? A.   The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
A.   Yes, sir. xxx     xxx     xxx
Q.   Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued towards letter D. Q.   Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have legitimate children?
A.   Yes, sir. A.   As far as I know they have no legitimate children. 25
Q.   And there is a retracing in the word Vda.? xxx     xxx     xxx
A.   Yes, sir.20 Q.   You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
xxx     xxx     xxx A.   Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q.   Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a document Q.   Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you A.   I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible? Q.   When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?
A.   Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted. A.   It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court before. 26
Q.   You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not sickly and she was agile. xxx     xxx     xxx
Now, you said she was exhausted? Q.   Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of
A.   In writing. Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is
Q.   How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain yourself out this?
because of the apparent inconsistencies? A.   That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
A.   That was I think. (sic). Q.   Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
Q.   Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, A.   This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. 27
you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . xxx     xxx     xxx
And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners? Q.   Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other assistance wherein
A.   Yes, sir. you were rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
Q.   You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature appearing in the alleged A.   I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to show that I have assisted
holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and then I can recall.28
tremors, do you notice that? xxx     xxx     xxx
A.   Yes, sir.21 Q.   Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?
testified that: A.   I am not familiar with the handwriting.
Q.   You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Q.   This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
Could you tell the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal? A.   I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.
A.   During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her transactions. Q.   Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose
Q.   What else? What services that you rendered? signature is this?
A.   After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer. A.   Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q.   What was your purpose of going to her lawyer? Q.   Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is that?
A.   I used to be her personal driver. A.   As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q.   In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Q.   Why do you say that?
Ramonal? A.   Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
A.   Yes, sir. Q.   How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
Q.   How come that you acquired familiarity? A.   The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar. 29
A.   Because I lived with her since birth.22 xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx Q.   Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S
Q.   Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?
below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is this? A.   Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
A.   Yes, sir, that is her signature. Q.   So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it
Q.   Why do you say that is her signature? seems to be her signature because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?
A.   I am familiar with her signature.23 A.   That is true.30
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three
lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document. witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs.  Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that: directory and not mandatory.
Q.   Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal? In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
15
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on
the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five
years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents
signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms.
Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents
written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978, 35 the strokes are different. In
the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with
instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.
Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera,
claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son
of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills. 1
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of
the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the
sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed special administrator. After
joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera
who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he
had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The
holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its decision is now the subject
of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.
In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show that the said person was
married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the
couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented
Domingo Santos, who testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several
times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they
met. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, who
were legally married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he could not present his parents' marriage certificate
because the record of marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as certified by
Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were each
described therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of
age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the
Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons
by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were
Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that
the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also denied kissing Jose's hand
or recognizing him as a brother. 12
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it, the marriage records for
1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage,
since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven
children in all during that time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.  — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described therein as the son of Florencio
Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno
Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue
here) it may nonetheless be considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one and the
same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is
no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more persons may
live at the same time and bear the same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at
bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, Jose did
not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported himself — and presumably also
his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same
town — and obviously prospering — and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another woman and
raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status.
If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and
instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life.
Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered — assuming the claims to be true — that
Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate wife — if indeed she was —
she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and founded another family by another woman, and in the same
town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored
and neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate father. It is
unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her
son's interests from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if
errant husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged
partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.
16
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to support her son's allegations
that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done because she was already old and bedridden then. But there
was no impediment to the taking of her deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her
testimony was vital to the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does not
agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the burden of proving that
serious allegation.
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio Rivera who married
Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a
humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more
prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two
families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.
Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been written, dated
and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in
SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic
wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by
Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied
Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera
whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto
did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who
authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-12190             August 30, 1958
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate
of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan
ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. ............................................. 5 Bahagi
Fausto E. Gan ......................................................... 2 Bahagi
Rosario E. Gan ......................................................... 2 Bahagi
Filomena Alto .......................................................... 1 Bahagi
Beatriz Alto .............................................................. 1 Bahagi
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking ipinamamana sa aking asawang si
Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At
kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, 1 refused to probate the alleged
will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of
Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to
make a will. She confided however that it would be useless if her husband discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with
Fausto E. Gan, nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter replied it could be done
without any witness, provided the document was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no
time in transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan
Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the
presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad
was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who
again read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will,
again in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will,
which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the
purse: and being afraid of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day,
Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina
handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time. 2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from heart disease for several years before her
death; that she had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950
husband and wife journeyed to the United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease; that thereafter she
felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred,
she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the early morning of the first Monday of November 1951
(Nov. 5). The whole household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower
floors and of by the Yap spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found
the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her husband. Injections and oxygen were administered.
Following the doctor's advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her husband and her personal attendant,
Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side. These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could have
made no will on that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if
according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she
executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a
showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and
read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez
and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also
improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her
purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse
from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without destroying the will,
the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not
have executed such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous
effort to discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but
they failed to induce the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand, aptly answers the criticisms.
17
We deem it unnecessary to go over the same matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the weakness of
the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act
190) approved August 7, 1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from
1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in  each and every page; such
witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills,
to guarantee their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed
the testator would succeed him and be benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However,
formal imperfections may be brushed aside when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off. Gaz.
1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec.
5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57
Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no
witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at
any time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will"
says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such
witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic will. They may be mistaken in their
opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may
present other witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with
other writings or letters of the deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the
deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may use its own visual sense, and
decide in the face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence  are not available. And
then the only guaranty of authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses  who have allegedly
seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such document was not
in the testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify,
because there is no way to compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's
hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form
thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful;
but they may have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof have taken no pains to
examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury,
because no one could prove that they have not "been shown" a document which they believed was in the handwriting of the
deceased. Of course, the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to
them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what witness or lawyer would not foresee such a
move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his
statement: he has seen and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the
oppositor would practically be at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as to  the
contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary — evidence
the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
which could not then be validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen 4 — an
implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it
and require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will  was
written by the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been proven he shall order that it be
filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It
requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any
statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is universally admitted that the
holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its
contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the
will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will
itself  is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either complying with the will if they think it
authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. 5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for their
examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their
opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege  to comply with the will, if genuine, a right
which they  should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
June 5, 1925, which denied  protocolization or probate to a document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of
the deceased, but apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations
and testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal
declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que
para que sea valido el testamento olografo debera estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del año,
mes y dia en que se otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos, no basta la
demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la
expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el verbo se emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que
el documento se encuentre  en dichas condiciones en el momento de ser presentado a la Autoridad competente, para
au adveracion y protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es affirmar que el de autos carece
de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de firma, y sin
perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados, bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la
persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto
insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code
provisions on the matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E depues que los herederos e sus fijos
ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez
tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si
semjara la letra de la manda, sea confirmada la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el juez,
o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--
Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will,
unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y
Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. 8
18
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the
allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with
its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented
by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be
proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only
guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and
of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their
lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by
the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to
end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of
the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible 9 only one man could engineer the fraud this way:
after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest
and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would
in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it
in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And
considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one  of them need be signed, the substitution of
the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature — feasibility of forgery — would be
added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known
Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law. 10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying  to a fact which
they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses
would testify as to their opinion  of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor
directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the
dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will
precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into
amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to
another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries?
Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the
will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted
by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct"
proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased,
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by
law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275).
Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February
23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and
settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition
for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic
wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity
of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic
Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the
dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve question of
fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT
BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED
BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its
due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is
required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because
the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic
will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap,
104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
19
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it
says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August
9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby
SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-2538             September 21, 1951
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
Claro M. Recto and Serafin C. Dizon for appellants.
Delgado & Flores for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to probate the last will and testament of the
deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed on August 17, 1918. The oppositors-appellants brought the case on appeal to this
Court for the reason that the value of the properties involved exceeds P50,000.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced
heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the
legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939. (Exhibit I). The later will executed in 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, which was docketed as
special proceeding No. 8022 seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no
opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court
rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for
the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 56, in the
same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now
estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law
and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came
and the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be
impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its reconstitution. As a result,
petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition
based on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition. Then, the case was set for trial, and on May 28, 1948,
the court issued an order admitting the will to probate already stated in the early part of this decision. From this order the
oppositors appealed assigning six errors, to wit.
I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate
of the will dated June 20, 1939, in special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of another
alleged will of Molo dated 191.
II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of Molo's alleged
will of 1918.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come to court with "unclean hands" and as such is
not entitled to relief.
IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo's alleged will of August 17, 1918 was not executed in the
manner required by law.
V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was deliberately revoked by Molo himself.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was subsequently revoked by the decedent's will of
1939.
In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the probate court erred in not holding that the petitioner
voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of
the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and circumstances with their opinion indicate
that petitioner connived with the witness Canuto Perez in an effort to defeat and frustrate the probate of the 1939 will because of
her knowledge that said will intrinsically defective in that "the one and only testamentory disposition thereof was a "disposicion
captatoria". These circumstances, counsel for the appellants contend, constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by petitioner
with a view to insuring the realization of her plan of securing the probate of the 1918 will which she believed would better
safeguard her right to inherit from the decease.
These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection with special proceedings No. 8022, now closed and
terminated, are vigorously met by counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise them in these proceedings which are entirely
new and distinct and completely independent from the other is improper and unfair as they find no support whatsoever in any
evidence submitted by the parties in this case. They are merely based on the presumptions and conjectures not supported by any
proof. For this reason, counsel, contends, the lower court was justified in disregarding them and in passing them sub silentio in
its decision.
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this contention. There is indeed no evidence which
may justify the insinuation that petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of the deceased to
enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere conjecture drawn from the apparently unexpected testimony of
Canuto Perez that he went out of the room to answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio Reyes was signing the will and the
failure of petitioner later to impeach the character of said witness in spite of the opportunity given her by the court to do so.
Apart from this insufficiency of evidence, the record discloses that this failure has been explained by petitioner when she
informed the court that she was unable to impeach the character of her witness Canuto Perez because of her inability to find
witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation stands uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, it
is not now, for us to determine. It is an incident that comes within the province of the former case. The failure of petitioner to
present the testimony of Artemio Reyes at the hearing has also been explained, and it appears that petitioner has filed because
his whereabouts could not be found. Whether this is true or not is also for this Court to determine. It is likewise within the
province and function of the court in the former case. And the unfairness of this imputation becomes more glaring when we
stock of the developments that had taken place in these proceedings which show in bold relief the true nature of the conduct,
behavior and character of the petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in disrepute by the oppositors.
It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will executed on June 20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941,
by the petitioner. There being no opposition, the will was probated. Subsequently, however, upon petition of the herein
oppositors, the order of the court admitting said will to probate was set aside, over the vigorous opposition of the herein
petitioner, and the case was reopened. The reopening was ordered because of the strong opposition of the oppositors who
contended that he will had not been executed as required by law. After the evidence of both parties had been presented, the
oppositors filed an extensive memorandum wherein they reiterated their view that the will should be denied probate. And on the
strenght of this opposition, the court disallowed the will.
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the testamentary disposition in her favor
invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through consultation
with a lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of filing the petition for the probate of the will. She could
accomplish her desire by merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to the probate of the
will executed in 1918. But for her conscience was clear and bade her to take the only proper step possible under the
circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for the probate of the 1939 will. This she did and the will was
admitted to probate. But then the unexpected happened. Over her vigorous opposition, the herein appellants filed a petition for
reopening, and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted and the case was reopened. Her motion for reconsideration
was denied. Is it her fault that the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order admitting the will to probate was set aside?
That was a contingency which petitioner never expected. Had appellants not filed their opposition to the probate of the will and
had they limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of said will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the
deceased would have perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their strategy. If said will was denied probate it is due to
their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad faith petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to protect her own
interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased to happen.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did not commit the second and third errors imputed to it
by the counsel for appellants. Indeed, petitioner cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent her from seeking
20
the probate of the 1918 will simply because of her effort to obtain the allowance of the 1939 will has failed considering that in
both the 1918 and 1939 wills she was in by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged with bad faith far having
done so because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of her husband. She cannot be blamed being zealous in protecting her
interest.
The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased which was denied
probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect
of nullifying the prior of 1918.
Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid down in the case of  Samson vs. Naval, (41 Phil., 838).
He contends that the facts involved in that case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence, the doctrine is that case is here
controlling.
There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved in the Samson case we are indeed impressed by their
striking similarity with the facts of this case. We do not need to recite here what those facts are; it is enough to point out that
they contain many points and circumstances in common. No reason, therefore, is seen by the doctrine laid down in that case
(which we quote hereunder) should not apply and control the present case.
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that, while they do not disagree with the soundness of the
ruling laid down in the Samson case, there is reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated and runs counter
to the modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence. They maintain that said ruling is no longer controlling but merely
represents the point of view of the minority and should, therefore, be abandoned, more so if we consider the fact that section
623 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the revocation of wills, is of American origin and as such should follow the
prevailing trend of the majority view in the United States. A long line of authorities is cited in support of this contention. And
these authorities hold the view, that "an express revocation is immediately effective upon the execution of the subsequent will,
and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a probate proceeding". (p. 63, appellants' brief .
While they are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for oppositors, and that view appears to be in
controlling the states where the decisions had been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in line with the assertion that
is now the prevailing view in the United States. In the search we have made of American authorities on the subject, we found
ourselves in a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each
State in the subject of revocation of wills. But the impression we gathered from a review and the study of the pertinent
authorities is that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law. On page 328 of the American Jurisprudence
Vol. 57, which is a revision Published in 1948, we found the following passages which in our opinion truly reflect the present
trend of American jurisprudence on this matter affecting the revocation of wills:
SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument. — Ordinarily, statutes which permit the revocation
of a will by another writing provide that to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be executed with the same
formalities which are required to be observed in the execution of a will. Accordingly, where, under the statutes,
attestation is necessary to the making of a valid will, an unattested non testamentary writing is not effective to revoke
a prior will. It has been held that a writing fails as a revoking instrument where it is not executed with the formalities
requisite for the execution of a will, even though it is inscribed on the will itself, although it may effect a revocation
by cancellation or obliteration of the words of the will. A testator cannot reserve to himself the power to modify a
will by a written instrument subsequently prepared but not executed in the manner required for a will.
SEC, 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil. — A will which is invalid because of the
incapacity of the testator, or of undue influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. Moreover, a will is
not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. Nor is a will revoked by a defectively executed will or codicil,
even though the latter contains a clause expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where it is provided by a
controlling statute that no writing other than a testamentary instrument is sufficient to revoke a will, for the simple
reason that there is no revoking will. Similarly where the statute provides that a will may be revoked by a subsequent
will or other writing executed with the same formalities as are required in the execution of wills, a defectively
executed will does not revoke a prior will, since it cannot be said that there is a writing which complies with the
statute. Moreover, a will or codicil which, on account of the manner in which it is executed, is sufficient to pass only
personally does not affect dispositions of real estate made by a former will, even though it may expressly purport to
do so. The intent of the testator to revoke is immaterial, if he has not complied with the statute. (57 Am. Jur., 328,
329.)
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in 1939. On page 1400, Volume 123, there appear
many authorities on the "application of rules where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is the following:
It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not being executed in accordance with the
provisions of the statute, or where the testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is
procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not
revoke the first will or affect it in any manner. Mort vs. Baker University (193-5) 229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S.W. (2d),
498.
These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in the Samson case is predicated. They reflect the
opinion that this ruling is sound and good and for this reason, we see no justification for abondoning it as now suggested by
counsel for the oppositors.
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides that a will may be some will, codicil, or other
writing executed as proved in case of wills" but it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within the
meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply because it was denied probate.
And even if it be regarded as any other writing  within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said
writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation. (See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
But counsel for oppositors contemned that, regardless of said revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect
because of the presumption that it was deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause contained said will, himself deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is
only a duplicate of said original.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of
his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the
first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and
apparently they remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy
(Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of
the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical step for the
testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the
fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one
(21) years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a
copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may
be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of
voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second
will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in
the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we
not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory
clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion
that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for
same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where
a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799).
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition;
and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the
original will remains in full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents
the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will
21
 not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a
new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from
the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918
because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given
due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is
clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can
therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the due execution of the will.
The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel
Cuenca. The first two witnesses died before the commencement of the present proceedings. So the only instrumental witness
available was Angel Cuenca and under our law and precedents, his testimony is sufficient to prove the due execution of the will.
However, petitioner presented not only the testimony of Cuenca but placed on the witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public
who prepared and notarized the will upon the express desire and instruction of the testator, The testimony of these witnesses
shows that the will had been executed in the manner required by law. We have read their testimony and we were impressed by
their readiness and sincerity. We are convinced that they told the truth.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.1âwphïl.nêt
G.R. No. L-11823            February 11, 1918
CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION EUGENIO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL, objectors-appellants.
Guillermo Lualhati for appellants.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellees.
ARAULLO, J.:
On September 20, 1915, attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance as
the will of Simeona F. Naval, who died in said city two days previously, a document executed by her of February 13, 1915, and
in which he was appointed executor. The case was recorded as No. 13386 and, after hearing the petition for allowance filed by
said executor, it was denied on the ground that said document was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and
testament, inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not sign it in the presence
of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased filed in the same court for allowance as her will, another
document executed by her on October 31, 1914, and, consequently, the case was registered under another number, which was
No. 13579. The petition for allowance was opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval on the ground that the
will, the allowance of which is asked, could not be allowed, because of the existence of another will of subsequent date,
executed during her lifetime by the same Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed
subsequently by her during her lifetime, and further, because sail will has not been executed with the formalities required by
existing laws. Trial having taken place, at which evidence was adduced, the court on February 8, 1916, issued an order,
admitting said second document and ordering its allowance as the last will and testament o said deceased. From said order the
opponents appealed to this court and transmitted to us the corresponding declarations. Tow of the opponents, that is, Rosa and
Cristina Naval, assigned, as errors committed by the court, the following:
1. The finding of the court that the will of October 31, 1914, has not been revoked by that of February 13, 1915;
2. The act of the court in permitting the petitioner to institute and proceed with the proceedings relative to the last case for the
allowance of the will, No. 13579, notwithstanding that proceedings had already been had in the other case No. 13386 and final
judgment rendered therein; and
3. The act of the court in denying the motion for continuance of the trial on the allowance of the will of October 31, 1914, which
motion was presented for the sole purpose of introducing evidence to show the falsity of the signature appearing in said will and
submitting said signature to the Bureau of Science for analysis.
The other opponent, Monica Naval, assigned, besides the first two errors already mentioned, the finding of the court that the
disallowance of the will of said deceased, dated February 13, 1915, on the ground that is was not executed in such form that it
could transmit real and personal property, according to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also had the effect of
annulling the revocatory clause in said will.
From the evidence it appears, as we have already stated, that the trial court declared that the first document presented by the
executor of the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13, 1915, and which was the subject-matter
of case No. 13386 of said court, could not be allowed, on the ground that it was not executed with the requisites and formalities
prescribed by law. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is by operation of law revoked by another valid
subsequent will, if the testator does not state in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or partly. In
harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no will
shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in
case of wills.
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first document presented as
the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, could have the effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by the
petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31, 1914, that is, on a date previous to the execution of the first, it was
necessary and indispensable that the later will, that is, that first presented for allowance, should be perfect or valid, that it,
executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves maintained that said later will, that is, that of February 13, 1915,
was not perfect, or executed as provided by law in case of wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila has so held in
disallowing said documents as the will of the deceased. So that it very evident that the second will presented, that is, that of
October 31, 1914, was not and could not have been revoked by the first, and the court was not in error in so holding in the order
appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add a single word mere or cite well-known doctrines and opinions of jurists in
support of what has already been stated.
As to the second error assigned by the opponents, we believe it sufficient to refer to what the court below stated in the judgment
appealed from. It is as follows:
The court finds no incongruency in the presentation of a prior will when another will of subsequent date has been
disallowed. Disregarding the fact that the petitioners in this case were not those who presented the will in No. 13386,
in which the petition was presented by the same D. Perfecto Gabriel as executor, it is proper to take into account that
the object of a petition for allowance is to ask for an order declaring that a will has been executed in accordance with
the requisites and formalities required by law. This is a question for the court to decide and is out of the control of the
party who presents the will. The allowance or disallowance of a will by a competent court depends upon whether the
evidence adduced at the trial shows or does not show that the formalities required by law have been complied with,
and this cannot be determined in advance, as a general rule, by the person who presents the testament. for he has not
always concurred in or seen the execution of the will.
If, therefore, the personal who presents a will and asks that if be allowed does not secure its allowance, and he has in
his possession another will, or has information that another exists, he does not contradict himself by asking for the
allowance of the will of earlier date merely because the later will was declared invalid by the proper court. If in this
case there is any who adopts a contradictory position, it is the respondent himself, inasmuch as in case No. 13386 he
alleged, as a ground for the disallowance of the will then presented, that it was not executed in accordance with the
law, and now he maintains the contrary, for he claims that said will revoked that which is now presented.
With respect to the third error, it is beyond doubt that the court did not commit it, for it appears that when the examination of the
witness, Cristina Samson, was finished and the court told Attorney Lualhati, counsel for the respondents, to continue adducing
his evidence, he said he had no more proof, although he added that he would ask the court to grant him permission to send the
will of 1914 to the Bureau of Science, which petition was objected to by the attorney for the proponents and denied by the court.
Immediately thereafter the attorney for the opponents asked for the continuance of the trial, which was also denied by the court,
after objection was made by the proponents. The attorney for the opponents excepted to said ruling.
Therefore, the petition of said attorney for the remission of said will to the Bureau of Science, in the terms in which it was made
to the court, after ha had stated that he had no more evidence to present, signified that he left it to the discretion of the court to
grant it or not. Furthermore, no exception was taken to the order to the order denying this motion, and although the attorney for
the opponents excepted to the order denying the motion for continuance of the trial, such exception was completely useless and
ineffective for the purpose of alleging before this court that the trial court erred in that respect, for said resolution, being one of
those left to the discretion of the court in the exercise of it functions, according to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it
could not be the subject of an exception, unless the court, in denying said motion, abused its discretional power and thereby
prejudiced the essential rights of the respondents, which is not the case here.
The error which, in addition to the first two already mentioned, has been assigned by the opponent and appellant, Monica Naval,
and refers, according to her, to the court's action in declaring that the disallowance of the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval,
dated February 13, 1915, for the reason that it was not executed in such manner and from that it could transmit real and personal
property, according to the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also had the effect of annulling the
revocatory clause of said will.
22
First of all, it is not true that the court made such statement in the terms given in said assignment of error, that is, it is not true
that the court declared that, because said will was not executed in the form required by law in order that it may transmit real and
personal property, according to the provisions of section 618, the disallowance of said will also had the effect of annulling the
revocatory clause therein contained. In the order appealed from there is no declaration or conclusion made in these terms. The
court did not say that the annulment of the revocatory clause in said will was the effect or consequence of the fact that it was not
allowed on the ground that it was not executed in the form required by law in order that it may transmit real and personal
property. Referring to the construction, given by the respondent to sections 618 and 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the
effect that a subsequent will may revoke a previous will, although the later will has not been allowed by the competent court, it
being sufficient that the intention of the testator to revoke the previous will should be clearly expressed, and that, while the
requisite of allowance is necessary in order that it may transmit property from one person to another, it is not necessary in order
that it might procedure other effects, for example, the effect of a revocatory clause, or a clause of aknowledgment of a child, —
what the court declared, we repeat, was that although the revocation of a will should have been effected, not by means of
another will or codicil, but by mans of a document, as authorized by said section 623, which document should have the
requisites and conditions fixed in section 618, the presentation of the document to the court was necessary in order that the latter
might allow it, by declaring that it was executed with the formalities required by law for the execution of a will, and finally
concluding that, just as to, is to be proved that the requisites of section 618 have been complied with in order that a will may be
of value through its allowance, so without such allowance the revocatory clause like the other provisions of the will, has no
value or effect except to show extraneous matters, as, for example, the acknowledgment of natural children, of some debt or
obligation. In such case, the document could produce effect, but not as will, but simply as a written admission made by the
person executing it. And It is beyond doubt that the revocatory clause contained in a document, like the present, which contains
provisions proper of a will, as those relating to legacies and distribution of the properties of the testator after his death as well as
the appointment of executors, is not matter extraneous to the will, but merely a part thereof, intimately connected with it as well
as with the will or wills, the revocation of which is declared in said clause; in short, the desire of the testator declared in the
revocatory clause is related to the desire of the same testator expressed in the provisions of the testament in which said clause is
found and to that which he might have expressed in the testaments which he may have previously executed. There is such
relation between the revocatory clause and the will which contains it, that if the will does not produce legal effects, because it
has not been executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, neither would the revocatory clause therein produce legal
effects. And if, in the present case, the so-called will of the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, was not duly
executed by her as her last will and testament, ad declared by the court in its decision of November 19, 1915, in case No. 13386,
for which reason its allowance was denied, neither may it be maintained that the revocatory clause contained in said will is the
expression of the last will of said deceased. The disallowance of the ill, therefore, produced the effect of annulling the
revocatory clause, not exactly because said will was not executed in such from that it could transmit real and personal property,
as inaccurately alleged by the appellant, Monica Naval, to be the court's finding, upon which said assignment of error is based,
but because it was proved that said will was not executed or signed with the formalities and requisites required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, a cause which also produces the nullity of the same will, according to section 634 of said law; and
of course what is invalid in law can produce no effect whatever.
If the instrument propounded as a revocation be in form a will, it must be perfect as such, and be subscribed and
attested as is required by the statute. An instrument intended to be a will, but filing of its effect as such on account of
some imperfection in its structure or for want of due execution, cannot be set up for the purpose of revoking a former
will. (40 Cyc., p. 1177, and cases cited therein.)
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a general rule, be admitted to probate before
the clause of revocation can have any effect, and the same kind, quality, and method of proof is required for the
establishment of the subsequent will as was required for the establishment of the former will. (40 Cyc., p. 1178, and
cases cited therein.)
But admitting that the will said to have been executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval on February 13, 1915, notwithstanding
its inefficacy to transmit property for the reason that it has not been executed, according to the provisions of said section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, should be considered as executed by her in order to express her desire, appearing in one of its
clauses, to revoke and annul any previous will of hers, as stated in clause 13, this being the argument adduced by the appellant,
Monica naval, in support of said assignment of error — neither could it be maintained that, the allowance of said will having
been denied by the court on November 11, 1915, said revocatory clause subsists and the intention expressed by the testratrix
therein is valid and legally effective, for the simple reason that, in order that a will may be revoked by a document, it is
necessary, according to the conclusive provisions of section 623 of said procedural law, that such documents be executed
according to the provisions relating to will in section 618, and the will in question, or, according to the respondent, the so-called
document, was not executed according to the provisions of said section, according to the express finding of the trial court in its
order of November 11, 1915, acquiesced in by the opponent herself, and which is now final and executory. Therefore, the
disallowance of said will and the declaration that it was not executed according to the provisions of law as to wills, produced the
effect of annulling said revocatory clause.
In support of the argument advanced in her brief said appellant, Monica Naval, cites the declaration made by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in Wallis vs. Wallis (114 Mass., 510, 512)m which, according to the appellant herself, was in the following
terms:
If it be shown that a later will was duly executed and attested, containing a clause expressly revoking former will
nothing else appearing as to its contents, it is nevertheless good as a revocation, but it can only be made available by
setting it up in opposition to the probate of the earlier will.
In the decision of said case the finding referred to be by the appellant appears not to have been made by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts.
The syllabus of said decision says:
When a will revoking a former will is in existence, it must be established in the Probate Court; but when it has been
lost or destroyed, and its contents cannot be sufficiently proved to admit it to probate, it may nevertheless be availed
of as a revocation in opposition to the probate of the will revoked by it.:
And in the body of the decision there is a declaration, to which the appellant must have desired to refer in her brief, which
declaration says:
If it can be proved that a later will was duly executed, attested and subscribed, and that it contained a clause expressly
revoking all former wills, but evidence of the rest of its contents cannot be obtained, it is nevertheless a good
revocation; and it can be made available only by allowing it to be set up in opposition to the probate of the earlier
will,. . .
The facts of the case in which this decision was rendered are different from the facts of the case at bar. That was a case
concerning a will filed by one of the children of the testatrix, Mary Wallis, as her last will, to the allowance of which another
son objected, alleging that said will had been revoked by another executed by the same deceased subsequent to the will that was
filed, and that it had been fraudulently destroyed or taken by his brother, the proponent and his wife, or by one of them, in order
to deprive him of the rights conferred upon him by said will. Therefore, the will said to have been subsequently executed by the
testatrix and in which, according to the oppositor, the clause revocatory of the former will appeared, was not presented by said
oppositor, while the previous will was, in the contrary, filed for allowance by the son of the testratrix, who appeared to be
favored therein, said oppositor having alleged that the subsequent will, that is, that containing the revocatory clause, had been
drawn, subscribed and executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, a fact which he was ready to prove just as he was
ready to prove that it had been destroyed or suppressed by the proponent, his brother and his wife, or one of them. In the case at
bar, the subsequent will containing the revocatory clause of the previous will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval was
presented to the court for allowance and it was disallowed — a fact which gave opportunity to the legatees of said deceased to
present a previous will executed by her on October 31, 1914, and said two wills having been successively presented, evidence
as to them was also successively adduced for their allowance by the court.
Therefore, the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Wallis vs. Wallis (supra), to the effect that a
subsequent will containing a revocatory clause of previous wills, constitutes a valid revocation and may be used in objecting to
the allowance of the previous will, even when it is not possible to obtain proof of the remainder of the contents of said
subsequent will, refers to the case in which the latter had been taken away, destroyed or suppressed, and it was impossible to
present it for allowance, but requires for that purpose that it be proved that said subsequent will has been executed, attested, and
subscribed in due form and that it contained, furthermore, that revocatory clause. This is what said declaration and, in relation
thereto, also what the syllabus of the decision thereof clearly says. The court, through Chief Justice Gray, in giving its opinion,
thus began by saying:
By our law, no will can be revoked by any subsequent instrument, other than a "will, codicil or writing, signed,
attested and subscribed in the manner provided for making a will." And when an instrument of revocation is in
existence and capable of being propounded for probate, its validity should be tried by a direct proceeding instituted
for the purpose in the Probate Court. (Loughton vs. Atkins, 1 Pick., 535.)
It results, therefore, that while perfect parity does not exist between the case decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, to
which the appellant Monica Naval refers, and that which is not before us, it is wholly unquestionable that, whether the case
deals with a subsequent will revocatory of a previous will, which may possibly be presented to a probate court for allowance, or
of a subsequent will, also revocatory of a previous will, which could not be presented for allowance, because it has been taken
or hidding, or mislaid — in order that such will may constitute a valid revocation and be utilized in the second case, although
23
the remaining provisions may not be proven, in opposition to the allowance of the previous will, it is necessary to prove that it
was executed, attested, and subscribed in due form, and, of course, also that it contained a clause expressly revoking the
previous will, or, what is the same thing, that said subsequent will has been executed according to the provisions relating to
wills, as expressed in section 623 of the procedural law in force. There can be no doubt whatever that this applies when the
revocation had been made to appear in a writing or document susceptible of presentation for allowance, like the so-called will of
the deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, and considered by said respondent and appellant as a mere document
of revocation, for, as already seen in said decision invoked by her, the requisite as to signing, attesting, and subscribing in the
form, required by law for the execution of wills in order that it may revoke a previous will, is also required in a will as well as in
a codicil, or in a writing, and in referring to a document of revocation, it is also expressed that its validity should be proved in a
direct proceeding, instituted for the purpose in a probate court. In the case at bar, the document, executed by the deceased,
Simeona F. Naval, as her last will and testament, dated February 13, 1915, has been presented for allowance; it validity has been
proved by means of said procedure in the Court of Probate of Manila, and that court denied its allowance, on the ground that the
document in question had not been duly executed by the deceased, as her last will and testament, because she did not sign in the
presence of three witnesses, and two of these witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other, or what is the same thing, that
said document has not be attested and subscribed in the manner established by law for the execution of will, or, in other words,
as provided by law in case of wills, as stated by section 623 of said procedural law, and this resolution was acquiesced in, as
already stated, by the respondents in this case, and is, therefore, final and executory.
In conclusions, the doctrine laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, invoked by the appellant, Monica
Naval, is in conformity with the provision of said section 623 of our procedural law and article 739 of the Civil Code, and the
will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval on October 31, 1914, not having been revoked, according to these provisions,
by the will presented and alleged as executed by the same deceased subsequently on February 13, 1915, the allowance of which
was denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the court below was not in error in ordering the allowance of said will, that
is, of that of October 31, 1914, as the last will and testament of said deceased.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-26317             January 29, 1927
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for appellant.
Jose Rivera for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day
of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th
day of July, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of January, 1922, the
said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will.
The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac
(civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union). After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was
denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2d day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th
day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said will
of the 16th day of April, 1919 (Exhibit 1). To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed
by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c)
that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the respective parties, denied the
probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge
Teodoro, after examining the evidence adduced, found that the following facts had been satisfactorily proved:
That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased testator Miguel
Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator
on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920, the original Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually
cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and
the land where the house was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919), executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa
Gago in a way corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel
Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully
established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa Gago, the
sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when cross-examined by attorney for the opponents,
testified that the original Exhibit A could not be found. For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that the
original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of
Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had
been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his
death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower
court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation
of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that
such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found
after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being
weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view
of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court
are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent
clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of
revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the
testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony
that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the
duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or
destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo, G.R. No. L-26063.)1
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate had been cancelled by
the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.
G.R. No. 17857             June 12, 1922
In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased.
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Crispin Oben for appellants.
Pedro Guevarra and Carlos Ledesma for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the municipality of Pagsanjan,
Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in
the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on the 6th of January,
1921, and, as the record shows, the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance of Laguna on
the 19th of January of the same year an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of
administration in his favor.
24
To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito,
alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch
as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the
witnesses in the presence of each other.
Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants, and ordered the probate of the will, Exhibit
A, and the inventory, Exhibit A-1, holding that both documents contained the true and last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea.
From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed, and in their brief they assign three errors, which, in their
opinion, justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.
The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court below is its finding to the effect that Exhibit A, said to be
the will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities required by the law.
The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first assignment of error tend to impeach the credibility of the
witnesses for the proponent, specially that of Eugenio Zalamea. We have made a careful examination of the evidence, but have
not found anything that would justify us in disturbing the finding of the court a quo. The attesting witnesses, Eugenio Zalamea
and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify that together with the other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and every
page of the will and of the inventory in the presence of each other and of the testatrix, as the latter did likewise sign all the pages
of the will and of the inventory in their presence.
In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not signed by the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the
day of the execution of the will, that is, on the 19th of July, 1918, basing their contention on the testimony of Aurelio Palileo,
who says that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one of the pages of the will had not been signed by the witnesses,
nor by the testatrix on the day of its execution. Palileo's testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya not only in the
direct, but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. To our mind, Palileo's testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting witnesses,
Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea. The appellants impeach the credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a sworn
declaration before the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before the trial of this case, to the effect that he was really one
of the witnesses to the will in question, which fact was corroborated by himself at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's
testimony in connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a nephew of his, in whose success he was interested, and
infer from this fact the partiality of his testimony. We deem this allegation of little importance to impeach the credibility of the
witness Zalamea, especially because his testimony is corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo Abaya, and by
attorney Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament at the instance of the testatrix. The foregoing is sufficient for us to
conclude that the first assignment of error made by the appellants is groundless.
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate notwithstanding the omission of the proponent
to produce one of the attesting witnesses.
At the trial of this case the attorneys for the proponent stated to the court that they had necessarily to omit the testimony of
Pedro de Jesus, one of the persons who appear to have witnessed the execution of the will, for there were reasonable grounds to
believe that said witness was openly hostile to the proponent, inasmuch as since the announcement of the trial of the petition for
the probate of the will, said witness has been in frequent communication with the contestants and their attorney, and has refused
to hold any conference with the attorneys for the proponent. In reply to this, the attorney for the contestants, said to the court,
"without discussing for the present whether or not in view of those facts (the facts mentioned by the attorneys for the petitioner),
in the hypothesis that the same are proven, they are relieved from producing that witness, for while it is a matter not decided, it
is a recognized rule that the fact that a witness is hostile does not justify a party to omit his testimony; without discussing this, I
say, I move that said statement be stricken out, and if the proponent wants these facts to stand to stand in the record, let him
prove them." The court a quo  ruled, saying, "there is no need."
To this ruling of the court, the attorney for the appellants did not take any exception.
In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), recently decided by this court, in deciding the question whether a
will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or
accounting for the absence of the other two, it was said; "while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by
the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in  Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court
declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the
attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had been
pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was
entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the  proponent, believing in
good faith that probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at
hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a
postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any
basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned,
this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been
proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of
the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly
it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for t he first time in this court. We believe this
point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must be declared not to be well taken. This exact question has
been decided by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we see no reason
why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
There are at least two reasons why the appellate tribunals are disinclined to permit certain questions to be raised for
the first time in the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion of the Court of First Instance
upon the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a court of first instance with reference to that
point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the second place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to
trifle with the administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and from their opponent the actual point
upon which reliance is placed, while they are engaged in other discussions more simulated than real. These
considerations are, we think, decisive.
In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be understood as laying down any hard and fast rule that
would prove an embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in the future. In one way or another we
are constantly here considering aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have escaped the attention of all
persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is necessary if this court is to contribute the part due from it in the
correct decision of the cases brought before it. What we mean to declare is that when we believe that substantial
justice has been done in the Court of First Instance, and the point relied on for reversal in this court appears to be one
which ought properly to have been presented in that court, we will in the exercise of a sound discretion ignore such
question upon appeal; and this is the more proper when the question relates to a defect which might have been cured
in the Court of First Instance if attention had been called to it there. In the present case, if the appellant had raised this
question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a motion for a new trial, that court would have had the
power, and it would have been its duty, considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in
order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of thus calling the error to the attention
of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late.
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains nothing inconsistent with the ruling we now
make, for it appears from the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had obtained an order for a
republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of presenting the two additional attesting witnesses who had not
been previously examined, but nevertheless subsequently failed without any apparent reason to take their testimony.
Both parties in that case were therefore fully apprised that the question of the number of witnesses necessar to prove
the will was in issue in the lower court.
In the case at bar, we do not think this question properly to have been raised at the trial, but in the memorandum submitted by
the attorney for the appellants to the trial court, he contended that the will could not be admitted to probate because one of the
witnesses to the will was not produced, and that the voluntary non-production of this witness raises a presumption against the
pretension of the proponent. The trial court found that the evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of
the two attesting witnesses and the other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of the preparation of the will
and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1, was sufficient. As announced in  Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, the general rule is that,
where opposition is made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are exceptions to this rule,
for instance, when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for truth has been
questioned or he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. In such cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the
testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly
executed. Wherefore, we find that the non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for by the attorney
for the proponent at the trial, does not render void the decree of the court a quo, allowing the probate.
But supposing that said witness, when cited, had testified adversely to the application, this would not by itself have change the
result reached by the court a quo, for section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a will can be admitted to probate,
25
notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence
adduced that the will has been executed and signed in the manner prescribed by the law.
The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of the inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this
exhibit has no attestation clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters.
In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, Exhibit A-1, and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix
Josefa Zalamea says:
In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page containing the signatures and the
attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the
presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918.
And the attestation clause is as follows:
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the
inventory of the properties of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the
latter affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our
presence; and she declared this to be her last will and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our
respective signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory this
19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I.
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA,
EUGENIO ZALAMEA,
PEDRO DE JESUS.
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, we find that the foregoing attestation
clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes
unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the inventory.
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere to the doctrine announced in the case of  Aldaba
vs. Roque (p. 378, ante), recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of the will was assailed on the ground that its
folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. It was held that this way of
numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the
correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be
said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should
be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of
forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of
the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And as in the present case there exists the
guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and the paging
thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might as well be
repeated:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded."
In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on another. Neither one of these pages was
numbered in any way, and it was held: "In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, and the second contains only the attestation clause
and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by
the testator and the witnesses, or be paged."
This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of paging does not necessarily render the testament invalid.
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging
should be placed in the lower part, would the testament be void for this sole reason? We believe not. The law also provides that
the testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right
margin, would this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in  Avera vs. Garcia and
Rodriguez (42 Phi., 145):
"It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin
of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as
to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same execution for wills must be fully complied with. The
same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court."
"Still some details at time creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial that it would be absurd to suppose
that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the effect that the
signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page — rather than on the margin
— seems to be of this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can
make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or
the other. In Craig vs. Tatlonghari (G. R. No. 12558, decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will
void which was totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the case of Re
Estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875) a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessary signatures on the
margin of each leaf (folio), but not in the margin of each page containing written matter."
We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no importance. But since its principal object is to give
the correlation of the pages, we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three, etc., as well as by writing A, B,
C, etc.
We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the
inventory in question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed
in Aldava vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will, we find that the judgement appealed from
should be, as is hereby, affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-3378             August 22, 1951
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DAMASA CRISOSTOMO. NAZARIO TRILLANA, administrator-appellee,
vs.
CONSORCIA P. CRISOSTOMO, ET ALS, petitioners-appellants.
Francisco R. Capistrano and Jesus T. Quiambao for petitioners and appellants.
Jose G. Generoso and Jose B. Bautista for administrator and appellee.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan denying the appellants' petition for relief from the
judgment of the said court allowing the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the deceased Damasa Crisostomo.
The appellants, in support of their sole assignment that the lower court erred in denying their petition for relief from the
judgment of January 5, 1949, admitting to probate the will of October 19, 1948, submits to this Court three propositions, to wit:
(a) "The judgment of January 5 was obtained through fraud," (b) "The lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set date for
proving the will of August 16, 1948;" and (c) "The failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 with the will of
October 19 was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence."
In support of their proposition (a), attorneys for the appellant allege that the fraud in obtaining the judgment of January 5
consisted in that the proponents of the will of October 19 did not cause personal notice of the hearing to be made upon the legal
heirs of the decedent, contrary to the requirement of Rule 77, sec. 4 of the Rules of Court. We can not consider now for the first
time in this appeal the question whether the lower court (not the proponents) complied with the requirement of said sec. 4 of
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, for that question has not been raised by the appellants in the court below, either in their original
petition for relief of May 12, 1949 (pp. 2-8, Record on Appeal), or in their motion for reconsideration dated August 27, 1949, of
the order denying their petition for relief (pp. 67-71). And there being no evidence to the contrary, the legal presumption is that
the court which probated the will of October, 19, 1948., complied with its duty and acted in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction in
probating said will (Sec. 69 (m) (n), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court). Besides, appellee's attorney, in the statement of facts in to
the appellants' petition for relief, stated that "This Honorable Court set its hearing [of the petition for allowance of the will of
October 19, 1948] on December 2, 1948. Copy of this order was published in "The Star Reporter", newspaper of general
circulation in Bulacan on November 5, 12 and 19 respectively, and the corresponding notices served by the office of the Clerk
of Court, in accordance with law" (pp. 25 26, Record on Appeal). And the attorneys for the petitioners-appellant had not denied
said statement.
The petitioners-appellants having failed to show that the judgment of the lower court of January 5, 1948, probating the will of
testatrix of October 19, was obtained through fraud, the lower court did not commit any error in denying the appellant's petition
for relief under sec. 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for us to discuss and pass upon the other
propositions of the appellant.
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 Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting
the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against an persons. The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so
far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for the, probate of the will does
not render the order of probate void for lack of due process. (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156)
Besides, even assuming without deciding, that under sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court shall set aside a date for proving a will even
without petition when it is delivered to the, court having jurisdiction, as contended by the appellants, the lower court was right
in not setting a date for proving the will of August 16, 1948, because this will was expressly and absolutely revoked by the will
of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix or deceased, which was filed for allowance on November 1, 1948, with the
same Court of First Instance of Bulacan. According to the attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16, 1948, was sent
together with a writing called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948, from Manila to the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, by Attorney Mr. Tomas V. Barnes, and said will must have been received by the Clerk of Said Court on or
after November 1, 1948, the date when the subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate. It stands to reason that if two
wills are presented for allowance but one of them revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will,
because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may
be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed. (11. McAra  vs .MacCay, L. R. 23 Ir., 138;
Pepper vs. Pepper, Ir. R. 5 Eq., 85; Matter of Palmer, 58 L.J. P.D. and Adm., 44; Matter of Stephens, 22 L.T. Rep., N.S. 727.)
[68 C.J. 886]
Besides, the appellants in the present case, who merely allege in their petition for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and
therefore legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without specifying the degree of relationship they had the latter, do
not pretend that it if the will October 19, 1949, be disallowed, they will inherit the estate left by the testatrix. They contend that
said will should be probated jointly or together with the will of August 16, 1948, and the latter be allowed instead of the former.
As in her will of October 19, 1949, as well in that of August 16, 1948, the testatrix is leaving all her properties as legacies to
other persons, the appellants have no interest in the probate of said wills, and they can not appeal from the judgment which
allowed one of them instead of the other.
Appellants argue that they are in interested parties and therefore may appeal in the present case, because in the event the will of
October 19 is disallowed and in its that of August 16 is allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees
incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to appellants. This argument has no merit. In civil actions and special proceedings,
unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so
that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or
contingent (Espinosa vs. Barrios, 40 Off. Gaz., [8 Supp. No. 12]. p. 145). The interest claimed by the appellants is purely
contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948
(2)The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.
In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

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