G.R. Nos.

168992-93 May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated
15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo
Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children 2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is
1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools.
They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act No.
85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael
also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered
as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June
2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section
7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of
parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority
because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura
lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already
18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the
age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen
(16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in
the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
 (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated
having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent
shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents
and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in
keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights
of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii)
the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. 18 Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support
from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such
as support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow
childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v.
Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The
law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied) 1 avvphi1.zw +

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with
her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon
Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private
respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18,
1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.

The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States
of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that
the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision on
June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this
effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.

The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental
authority to the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603
as amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed. In
 accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in the
corresponding government agency, particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida,
Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to
issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners.

Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND
EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.

We rule for petitioner.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen
but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his
relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses
Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.3

The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code),
provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986
amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an
alien.5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule
by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 8

In a distinctly similar case, we held:

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity
for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find
governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. 9

Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for
application.10

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote that objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest
of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA
MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a
Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all
surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing
of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. a petition for Review
on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent court, thus —

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES
JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines," is explicit.

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon
the termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in
paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in
her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209, expressing as follows:
 Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition
that must be read along together with Article 184.

The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), exactly adopted that
found in then Article 336 of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter I, Title II, of the said decree provided :

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if
the child were their own by nature.

Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under which regime, a joint adoption by the spouses was
apparently not made obligatory. The provision was later amended, however by Executive Order No. 91, dated 17
December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed, thus —

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if
the child were their own by nature.

If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption
shall not be allowed.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find
governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James Anthony
should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the appellate court cannot
be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the
exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not so much
for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of
this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for
whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice
is given,1 we must obey its full mandate.
Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having to call the attention of the appropriate agencies
concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption, a matter that evidently is likewise
espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph, Family Code).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.