The Egyptian Army: Question Marks

Posted on Feb 4, 2011

AP / Tara Todras-Whitehill
An Egyptian Muslim cleric cries in front of a
tank in Tahrir Square in Cairo.
By Barry Lando

In attempting to persuade Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to leave the scene, Washington
desperately wants to avoid further radicalization on the streets of Egypt and, above all, to ensure
that the Egyptian army remains unscathed. That interest, of course, coincides with the aim of
Egypt’s top brass.

The generals are intent on continuing to exercise power behind the scenes—as they have for
decades.

The announcement that the army would refuse to take up arms against the people was part of
Washington’s game plan. It undercut Mubarak and prevented him from attempting a bloody
showdown that could have been disastrous—for the people and the army. In fact, the Egyptian
military made that same announcement in 1977, when it was called in to quell riots after
President Anwar Sadat announced cuts in basic food subsidies. The army refused to intervene
unless the subsidies were re-established. Sadat restored the subsidies.

That doesn’t mean that the army would be willing to step aside for whatever the will of the
people turns out to be. Perhaps the military could be assured that it could remain the nation’s
guardian, as in Turkey. What are the political limits the army would accept?

Of course, the army is not monolithic. Its ranks are filled with hundreds of thousands of
conscripts, drawn from the most humble levels of society. It has traditionally been the most
important means of socializing the lower classes, inculcating them with a sense of pride and
patriotism. Indeed, the 1971 constitution says that the Egyptian army shall “belong to the
people.” This sentiment was made dramatically clear by the iconic images of soldiers shaking
hands and embracing the demonstrators, even allowing them to paint slogans on their battle
tanks.

How then to explain the fact that on Wednesday in Cairo organized bands of armed thugs were
reportedly allowed to pass through military checkpoints to attack the anti-Mubarak crowds,
while the military stood aside and watched.

That tactic makes eminent sense from the point of view of generals determined to keep
themselves from the abyss. Now that Mubarak has said he won’t run for another term, the
generals would like the people to return obediently to their homes. The military will oversee
things now, thanks. Only the people won’t go. They don’t trust Mubarak. But, since the army
doesn’t at this point want to endanger its own future by using bloody force, others are being
allowed to do the dirty work. The military will keep its hands clean, and pretend it has no
responsibility for the bloodshed.

So far, the tactic hasn’t worked: The people have refused to back down.

The top military ranks have concerns other than just protecting their own institution. They’re also
worried about their own skins. They can never forget the lurid spectacle of Iranian generals being
executed in the aftermath of Khomeini’s revolution in Iran. Iran also demonstrated that a radical
revolution means a radically transformed military, with the traditional army shunted aside.
(Egypt’s generals have a constant reminder of that lesson nearby: The Shah of Iran is buried in a
Cairo mosque.)

Under Mubarak, the top military ranks have also enjoyed a pampered existence in rambling
developments such as Cairo’s Nasr City, where officers are housed in spacious, subsidized
condominiums. They enjoy other amenities the average Egyptian can only dream of, such as
nurseries, schools and military consumer cooperatives featuring domestic and imported products
at discount prices.

One of the most indulged divisions is the Egyptian Republican Guard, responsible for defending
Cairo and key government institutions. They are under the control of the minister of defense. It is
apparently the only significant military unit allowed in central Cairo, apart from the intelligence
service’s military branch. Its ranks are filled primarily by highly trained, highly motivated
volunteers rather than conscripts. They are rewarded with bonuses, new cars and subsidized
housing.

The Guard was created in 1952 as a kind of Praetorian Guard by Gamal Nasser to protect the
presidency. Do its members still view that as their main mission today?
We’re not just talking about official perks. Many of Egypt’s military brass are notoriously
corrupt. It was military land, for instance, that was sold by the generals to finance some major
urban developments near Cairo—with little if any accounting.

The military also presides over 16 sprawling factories that turn out not just weapons, but an array
of domestic products from dishwashers to computers to medical diagnostic equipment. The
military’s farms produce enough food to feed its ranks with plenty left over to sell to civilians.

The justification for all this nonmilitary activity is that the army is just more efficient than
civilians. But that’s hard to prove since the military’s operations are off the books. Many civilian
businessmen complain that competing with the military is like trying to compete with the Mafia.

The U.S. also has a $1.3 billion carrot dangling in front of the Egyptian army. That annual
American military aid to Egypt has allowed the Egyptian officers to get their hands on lots of
nifty weapons—as we’ve seen over the past few days in and over downtown Cairo.

The generals realize there is no way the U.S. will continue paying for those playthings if a new
regime opposed by the U.S. and Israel takes power in Cairo.

Will the generals be willing to forgo that aid?

There has also reportedly been a recent surge of religious feeling among military members—and
their wives. Will they be willing to reconsider their traditional antipathy to the Muslim
Brotherhood and more radical Islamic movements?

Tune in tomorrow.