SECTION 13 – RIGHT TO BAIL
respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial
PEOPLE V. FOTES
GR NO. 90643
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of
Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of
the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused.
Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was
granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to
RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails
denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section
3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is
either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent
the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on
the part of the court.
COMENDADOR V. DE VILLA
GR NO. 93177
"military members exempted from the right to bail”
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with
violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of
the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court
which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional
liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking
that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the
Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of
petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of
proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee
on the right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military
as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and
national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that
mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to
continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the
lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
BAYLON V. JUDGE SISON
“application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua/life imprisonment
requires a hearing to give prosecution the chance to present evidence on the guilt of
the accused”
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused
charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days
before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules
of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from
the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they were not
given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous
notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant
of bail to the accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in
granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a
Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving
the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule
embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law
that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged
with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of
petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not
a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
MANOTOC V. CA
FACTS : There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities
Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints
against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged
with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each
trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US
relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the
prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with
CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying
his leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail
as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
right to travel
ISSUE : WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of discretion
HELD : A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts As
petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's
motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the
appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
US V JUDGE PURUGANAN
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court
allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he
left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under
its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG V. HON OLALIA
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or
if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and
that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007,
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to
the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from
the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement
in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that
before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it
is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail;
that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong;
and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its
Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he
is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or
the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless
of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?
HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian
grounds.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.
N.B.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on
October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to
"sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known
that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months
after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending
the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on
June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group,
a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered
for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on
three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the
calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad
had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D.
No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other
hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A
delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the
light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case
involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority
reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the
assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to
the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the
Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the
intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos
however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as
planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan
and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert
genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence
and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the
charges against them.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due
process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the
authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and
closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary.
The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void
and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack
of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set
aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order
for a re-trial was granted.
ALONTE V. SAVELLANO
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A
petition for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party.
During the pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of
desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge
Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and
Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie
and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires
that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and
the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without
a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.”
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
PEOPLE V. DRAMAYO
Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not
testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and
Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to
station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for
murder. Hence the appeal
Issue: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence.
So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both
appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants
were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is
forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is
moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise,
but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral
certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
regular to constitute the offense."
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of
the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt
had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not
come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was
offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable.
It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had
been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being
acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the
party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral
certainty having arisen as to their capability.
DUMLAO V. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal
official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered
by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment
of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing
of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution
and thus, should be declared null and void
(2) Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
Held: No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there
is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) There must be an
actual case or controversy; 2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; 3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and 4) The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the
provision. His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a
detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with
acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective
positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan
have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, but the institution of a taxpayer’s suit per
se is no assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this
particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is
absent.
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another
class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger
employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the
workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null
and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
MARQUEZ V COMELEC
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the
province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a
quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate
because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local
Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was
still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued
for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the
Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from
justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who
drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen
that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from
justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means
somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art.
73 of the IRR.
Issue:
What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?
Held:
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to
a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials
in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent
to it.
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made
a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to
Comelec.

CORPUS V PEOPLE
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
PEOPLE V HOLGADO
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a
counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was
presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without
attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being
arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the
opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused.
The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real
and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the
plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence
of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case.
Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above
all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially
because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found
to be capital by the court.
PEOPLE V AGBAYANI
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found
guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the
new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his
right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day
preparation for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse
the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such
a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus
it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will
be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty,
the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good
cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly
demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error
and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial,
hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel
who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he
was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is
incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision
of the lower court.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
PECHO V PEOPLE
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex
crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was
assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of
the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of
RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In
the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted
estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since
his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime
of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that
the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the
information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime
to which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:
- To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense;
- To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause;
- To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions
of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and
cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a
crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has
been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two
offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be
convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that
would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
SORIANO V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner, an Assistant City Fiscal, was assigned to investigate a complaint for
qualified theft. In the course of said investigation, petitioner demanded money from a
party litigant to the case in consideration for a favorable resolution thereof. Said
litigant reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation and petitioner
was arrested in an entrapment operation. An information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan which found petitioner guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
HELD:
NO. While the Court agreed that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of
violating R.A. No. 3019, a reading of the information clearly makes out a case of
bribery. Hence, petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
Judgment of Sandiganbayan is MODIFIED, convicting petitioner with direct bribery.
BORJA V MENDOZA
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he
was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with
the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a
violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to
petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision
should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to
be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with
full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process
that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first
time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against
him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed
him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the
absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard
by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General
agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being
null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the
requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded
to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical
injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court,
starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
PEOPLE V TEE
Facts
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was
convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense
assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana
seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further
contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the
prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates
thereby slowing down the trial procedure.
Issue
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced
during the hearing of the case.
Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial
was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial
period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining
the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a
warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily
relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the
reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice
and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days
of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the
constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court
trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the
absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State
must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
FLORES V PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari
where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over
a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the
dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its
affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the
People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial
functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there
are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA
took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the
original trial.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was
violated.
Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights
of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more
significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines
that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities
should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a
valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded
with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case
against the petitioners.
CONDE V RIVERA
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been
forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than
on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required
to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from
a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial
trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde,
like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay
down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
GARCIA V DOMINGO
FACTS:
In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there
were commenced, all dated January 16, 1968 eight criminal actions respondents
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Lorenzana. The trial for the
cases was jointly held on 14 trial dates. All the fourteen trial dates fell on a Saturday.
This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents
Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible as, Saturday as agreed upon as
the invariable trial day for said 8 criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question
was held with the conformity of the accused and their counsel in the chambers of
Judge Garcia. It is worthy to note that said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not
objected to any supposed irregularity of the proceedings thus far; Then Carbonnel
thru their counsel, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
alleging jurisdictional defects. The respondent judge acting on such petition
forthwith issued a restraining order causing the deferment of the promulgation of
judgment. There was
an order from him declaring that ‘the constitutional and statutory rights of the
accused had been
violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the
trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not
in the court room open to the public. What did occasion difficulty in this suit was
that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court
Judge, it was in the latter’s air
-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the
proceedings as violative of this right? ISSUE: Whether or not the trial conducted in
the chambers of the Judge suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of the right
to Public trial. HELD: No. The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing
that the public was thereby excluded. It is to admit that the size of the room allotted
the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact
though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of
uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice
Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a
trial being public if the accused could “have his friends, relatives
and counsel present,
not matter with what offense he may be charged.”
Then too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the
part of respondent policemen should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded.
Thus, in one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The
Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused
offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held his right is
deemed waived
IN RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO AND TV COVERAGE .. PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST FORMER PRES JOSEPH ESTRADA
PEOPLE V MAPALAO
FACTS:
Appellants and two others were charged with the crime of highway robbery with
homicide. After the arraignment and uring the trial, appellant Rex Magumnang
escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then. As to him trial
in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated
against the defendants. He remains at large while his appeal is pending.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an accused who is at large during and after his trial may appeal his
conviction.
HELD:
NO. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.
PEOPLE V VALERIANO ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt, and their immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds exist for their
Facts: In two separate informations dated 28 February 1981 and filed with the then further detention.
Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Negros Oriental, Engracio
Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal, Abundio Nahid and several John
Does were charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder and did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to
leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below
the knee; left leg hacked behind the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,'
and did then and there set the house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina
Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to
be burned inside said house
On 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the
records of these two cases were burned. The records were subsequently reconstituted
upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were
retaken, however, before it could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped
bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 November 1987 was returned
unserved because he could not be found. An alias warrant for his arrest was issued on
26 June 1989, but he remains at large up to the present.
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision, counsel for the accused
manifested in open court their intention to appeal the decision. The ruling that
conclusions and findings of the lower court are entitled to great weight is not
applicable in this case because the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses
in its entirety was not the same judge who penned the decision. They further stressed
the delay incurred by Antonio in reporting the crime to the authorities. The crime
was committed on 28 January 1980 but he reported it to the Office of the Governor
of Negros Oriental in Dumaguete City only on 18 February 1980 or some 21 days
after its commission.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Constitutional Rights of the accused to a Speedy,
Impartial and Public Trial was violated when the Judge who heard the case was not
the same Judge who rendered the judgment for the case.
Ruling: Although it is a settled rule that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses should be given the highest respect because it had the
advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and can discern if such
witnesses are telling the truth or lying through their teeth, we cannot rely on that rule
in this appeal because the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not
the same judge who penned the decision. Judge Temistocles Diez of Branch 37
received and heard the testimonies of the witnesses but it was Judge Pacifico S.
Bulado who rendered the decision. The latter had no opportunity to observe the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, which are important considerations
in assessing credibility.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants
must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Accused-appellants
MACARIO ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are