2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW

LAST MINUTE TIPS Handout No. 7

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is a government instrumentality vested

with corporate powers. As such, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees.

At the crux of the present petition is the issue of whether or not BCDA is a government
instrumentality or a government-owned and – controlled corporation (GOCC). [fit is an
instrumentality, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees. lf it is a GOCC, it is not exempt and
as such non-payment thereof would mean that the tax court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case and properly dismissed it for BCDA's failure to settle the fees on time.

BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. As such, it is exempt from
the payment of docket fees required under Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules or Court, to wit:

RULE 141

LEGAL FEES

SEC. 1. Payment of fees. – Upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. x x x

SEC. 21. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local governments
and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not
exempt from paying such fees. (Emphasis Ours)

Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides
for the definition of a government "instrumentality" and a "GOCC", to wit:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government. not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. x x x.

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or

non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x. (Emphasis Ours)

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The grant of these corporate powers is likewise stated in Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7227; also known as The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which provides for
BCDA's manner of creation, to wit:

Sec. 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. - There is hereby created a
body corporate to be known as the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, which shall
have the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a corporation.
(Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, it is clear that a government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate
powers and at the same time retain its classification as a government "instrumentality" for all
other purposes. Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 205925, June 20, 2018

In the filing of a permissive counterclaim, failure to pay the required docket fees, even on the
reliance that the same is a compulsory counterclaim as declared by the lower courts, should
not necessarily lead to the dismissal of the counterclaim provided that: (a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government.

In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the
courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the
fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the
claimant to defraud the government.

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their
counterclaim, primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC had already found such
counterclaim to be compulsory in nature. Such finding was then upheld in the July 2, 2007 RTC
Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did
not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement
thereto. Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous,
exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud
the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non¬payment of docket
fees. Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos, G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016, J. Perlas- Bernabe

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An action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action and jurisdiction over which
is determined by the assessed value of the property.

The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that
the loan obtained by respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay
such loan which was secured by a mortgage on the property of the respondents spouses; and
prayed that in case of default of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to the court, the
property be ordered sold to answer for the obligation under the mortgage contract and the
accumulated interest. It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage
indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of
the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to
answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness.

In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has
the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of
applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real
action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and
an order for the sale of the res.

As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which
determines the court's jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged
property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction
of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended.

Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We are not
persuaded. In the Russell case, we held:

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

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Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and
for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS
AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."

Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for
recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the
property involved. Alona G. Roldan vs. Spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios,
Rommel Matorres, And Hon. Jemena Abellar Arbis, In Her Capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
6, Regional Trial Court, Aldan, G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018

However, a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage is an action where the subject
matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be ascertained.
If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of
sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money or real property results as a
consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In this case, the Court finds that the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money
or real property. The petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed
during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them. Rather, it
assailed only the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered into with
respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan
agreement. Such subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction and is incorrect in dismissing the Complaint. First Sarmiento
Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of Communications G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

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The proper venue in actions for the revival of judgments depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action.

Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. x x x

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival
of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is
located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action
that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Infante vs.
Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007

If the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to a

Petition for Certiorari before the CA did not state whether the Petitioner presented competent
evidence of their identities, or that he was personally known to the notary public, the Petition
has to be dismissed.

Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by an official agency, the photocopies of
the IDs of private respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui from La Vista Association, Inc.,
R.O. Barra Builders & Electrical Services, and St. Charbel Executive Village, respectively, do not
constitute competent evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. In the same vein, their Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring the
CA that he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12
(b), Rule II of the same rules, considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui)
themselves are privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, in which Andales's participation is sought to be proven. To note, it cannot be presumed
that an affiant is personally known to the notary public; the jurat must contain a statement to
that effect. Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to private respondents' petition before the CA did not state whether they

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presented competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the
notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification and certification against
forum shopping under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, of the Rules of Court.

Case law states that verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On
the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that
a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The
important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially
called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private
respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission
of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. Go Que Construction vs. CA,
G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe

A verification whereby the counsel is the affiant is not a substantial compliance with the rules.

For verification to be valid, the affiant must have ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition. Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would be
insufficient for counsel to swear to the truth of the allegations in a pleading. Otherwise, counsel
would be able to disclaim liability for any misrepresentation by the simple expediency of stating
that he or she was merely relaying facts with which he or she had no competency to attest to.
For this reason, the Rules of Court require no less than personal knowledge of the facts to
sufficiently verify a pleading.

In this case, respondents' counsel, not having sufficient personal knowledge to attest to the
allegations of the pleading, was not able to validly verify the facts as stated. Respondents'
Petition for Certiorari before the CA should have been considered as an unsigned pleading.
Therefore, the petition of respondents before the CA should have been dismissed. Charlie
Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018

A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the action. For, only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does
the adjective or remedial law become operative.

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That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the time
the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001 proved that the
respondent’s legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise. Thus,
the CA did not err in holding that the petitioners had no cause of action, and in ruling that the
RTC did not validly render the partial summary judgment.

Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the
complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners’ right of action
could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has
not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action. For, only when there is an
invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative.
Verily, a premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without a cause
of action and dismissible on such ground. In short, Civil Case No. 01-086, being a groundless suit,
should be dismissed.

Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than
sufficient to cover the petitioners’ claims on June 26, 2002 (when they filed their motion for
partial summary judgment) did not rectify the absence of the cause of action at the time of the
commencement of Civil Case No. 01-086. The motion for partial summary judgment, being a
mere application for relief other than by a pleading, was not the same as the complaint in Civil
Case No. 01-086. Thereby, the petitioners did not meet the requirement of the Rules of Court
that a cause of action must exist at the commencement of an action, which is "commenced by
the filing of the original complaint in court. Philip Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping , G.R. No. 157479,
November 24, 2010

The "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply
if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.

In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers
motions to dismiss. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice
except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal (“two-dismissal rule”).
Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to
the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present: 1) There was a previous
case that was dismissed by a competent court; 2) Both cases were based on or include the same
claim; 3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and 4) When the motion to dismiss
filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former. Accordingly, the purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is to

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avoid vexatious litigation. Clearly, when a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is
now barred from seeking relief on the same claim. Powing Properties, Inc vs. Cheng and Santos,
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by
motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.

An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment

which could no longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse
of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes
final.

Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment sought to be
revived. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the
merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of
judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory. Anama vs. Citibank, GR No. 192048,
December 13, 2017

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an incorrect remedy in assailing the decision of the
Ombudsman in an Administrative Case. The petitioner should have appealed by filing a Rule 43
petition.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals via Rule 43.

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In this case, the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents of the
administrative charge possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal. Though
final and unappealable in the administrative level, the decisions of administrative agencies are
still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion. Specifically, the
correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the Ombudsman's
decision of dismissal of the administrative charge.

In this case, Joson failed to do the same. Hence, the decision of the Ombudsman exonerating the
private respondents from the charge of grave misconduct had already become final. In any event,
the subject petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any reversible error on the
part of the Ombudsman to compel this Court to overturn its assailed administrative ruling.

Therefore, petitioner's failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the administrative
case renders the Office of the Ombudsman's decision final. Edward Thomas Joson vs. Office of
Ombudsman G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control
of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After
all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual,
peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.

While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not be
interfered with, the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI issued by the RTC in this case to be
proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not observed. As aptly pointed out by
the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of the subject properties, they
nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual physical possession of the same at the
time the incidents transpired. In fact, a cursory perusal of the complaint readily shows that
petitioners never alleged that they were in prior possession of the subject properties. Hence, for
these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein. Spouses
Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, G.R. No. 208343, February 03, 2016 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

While the Court may pass upon the issue of ownership in an Action for Recovery with Writ of
Replevin, the same is limited to the determination of who between the parties has a better

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right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding
determination on the issue of ownership. Since the determination of ownership is merely
provisional, the same is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.

While the case filed by respondent before the RTC was only for recovery of possession of the
compressor, the parties however raised the issue of ownership during the trial in the RTC. Thus,
when they raised the issue of ownership, while this Court may pass upon the issue of ownersip,
the same is limited to the determination of who between the parties has a better right to possess
the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination on the issue of
ownership. Since the determination of ownership is merely provisional, the same is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

To determine who has the better right to possession of the compressor, examination of the
contract between respondent and Davao Diamond is in order. The CA is of the opinion that the
contract between respondent and Davao Diamond is merely a contract to sell, as such, mere
delivery of the thing sold does not result to the transfer of ownership to the buyer.

In a contract to sell, the seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the buyer until the
fulfillment of a condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price. Title to the property is
retained by the seller until the buyer fully paid the price of the thing sold.

As found by the CA and undisputed by the respondent, the Sales Invoice No. 82911 covering the
disputed compressor contained the following stipulation:

Note: It is hereby agreed that the goods listed to this invoice shall remain the property of the
seller until fully paid by the buyer. Failure of the buyer to pay the goods as agreed upon, the seller
may extra-judicially take possession of the goods and dispose them accordingly.

While the sales invoice is not a formal contract to sell, the sales invoice is nevertheless the best
evidence of the transaction between the respondent and Davao Diamond. Sales invoices are
commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at
the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact
transpired. Thus, the moment respondent affixed his signature thereon, he is bound by all the
terms stipulated therein.

The sales invoice contains the earmarks of a contract to sell since the seller reserved the
ownership of the thing sold until the buyer fully paid the purchase price. We therefore agree with
the CA that the agreement between respondent and Davao Diamond is a contract to sell. As such,
the mere delivery of the compressor to respondent does not make him the owner of the same.
Demosthenes Arbilon vs. Sofronio Manlangit G.R. No. 197920, January 22, 2018

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Certiorari lies even if the respondent does not exercise quasi-judicial power.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph
of Section 1, Article 8 of the Constitution.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby
entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has
become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising
our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on
the Chief Executive’s spending power. Araullo vs. Aquino G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

A person is guilty of indirect contempt of court when he employs harsh and disrespectful
language in the Motion for Reconsideration that accused the Court and its members of
ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication.

The Court felt impelled to require the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt of court for the offensive and disrespectful statements
contained in their Motion for Reconsideration dated October 1, 2014, to wit: x x x

24. Second, with regard to the PROOF OF SERVICE required under Section 2(c), Rule 56 in relation
to Section 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedures, as amended, even a perfunctory scrutiny of the

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present PETITION and its annexes would have yielded the observation that the last document
attached to the PETITION is the AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE dated August 12, 2014, by Marcelino T.
Pascua, Jr., xxx in compliance with Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, & 13, RULE 13 of the 1997 REVISED
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. A copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE is attached hereto as ANNEX
"B", and made an integral part hereof;

25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes up
to its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there were non-submission of the proof of
service;

26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this Honorable Court who
took the observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in
truth and in fact, it is not;

27. There is therefore need for this Honorable Court to rectify its foregoing finding;( Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The statements of the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza unquestionably tended to attribute gross
inefficiency and negligence to the Court and its staff. It is worse because the statements were
uncalled for and unfounded. As such, the statements should be quickly deterred and gravely
sanctioned for actually harming and degrading the administration of justice by the Court itself.
The wrong the statements wrought on the reputation and prestige of the Court and its operating
staff must by all means be vindicated, and even undone if that was at all possible.

The Court finds and declares the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza guilty of indirect contempt of
court. Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit Proper et al. G.R. No.
213525, November 21, 2017

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

The mere uttering by a private individual in a TV Program of threats to retaliate against a

certain person does not make a case for a Petition for the issuance of Writ of Amparo. The court
has the discretion to determine whether or not it has authority to grant the relief in a Petition
for the issuance of Writ of Amparo in the first place.

It is undisputed that petitioner’s Amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition is
merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported violation of their right to life
and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect

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government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the
purview of A.M. No. 07- 9-12-SC and must fail.

Hence, the RTC, properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this
principal determination. The court has the discretion to determine whether or not it has
authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition
falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice
any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation. Spouses Santiago Vs. Tulfo, G.R. No.
205039, 21 October 2015, First Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The RTC has jurisdiction over the offense of psychological violence under R.A. No. 9262 even if
the marital infidelity was committed outside the Philippines.

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed
out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the means
employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein
any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try
the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the
other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

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Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even
be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if
the alleged extra¬ marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts. AAA vs. BBB G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

Information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) of Makati City is void if there was no
prior written authority from the City Prosecutor, even if the information contained a
certification that the ACP had prior written authority from the CP.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz
was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are
bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so
by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor
of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the
approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office
Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz
was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to
have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the OCP-
Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the
Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly
showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek
the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before
the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the
Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the
same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. Quisay v People, 13 January
2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

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A denial by the Sandiganbayan of a motion for bail is proper even if based only on a “great
presumption of guilt”.

The Court has previously discussed in our Decision dated November 7, 2017 that the trial court
is required to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail whenever the accused is charged with a
capital offense. While mandatory, the hearing may be summary and the trial court may deny the
bail application on the basis of evidence less than that necessary to establish the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is limited to whether
there is evident proof that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. This standard of proof is
clearly different from that applied in a demurrer to evidence, which measures the prosecution's
entire evidence against the required moral certainty for the conviction of the accused.

The distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the application of Macapagal-
Arroyo to the present case. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to evidence in
Macapagal-Arroyo was annulled based on the paucity of the evidence of the prosecution, which
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that former President GMA was the mastermind of the
conspiracy to commit plunder. In other words, there was a final determination of former
President GMA's innocence of the crime charged.

This is not the case for Napoles. The issue that the Court resolved in its Decision dated November
7, 2017 was whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Napoles'
application for bail. This involved a preliminary determination of her eligibility to provisional
liberty. The resolution of this issue does not involve an inquiry as to whether there was proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles, or her co-accused as the case may be, was the main
plunderer for whose benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed or accumulated. These are
matters of defense best left to the discretion of the Sandiganbayan in the resolution of the
criminal case. It was sufficient that the denial of her bail application was based on evidence
establishing a great presumption of guilt on the part of Napoles.

Lastly, the other issues raised in Napoles' Motion for Reconsideration merely reiterated the
earlier arguments that this Court has already resolved. For this reason, the reconsideration of the
Court's earlier Decision is unwarranted under the circumstances. Janet Lim Napoles vs.
Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 224162, February 6, 2018

A search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the
one-specific-offense rule.

At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied
for in connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section

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4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation to
one offense.

Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, there is only one special complex crime for which the last paragraph of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e., death
There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection with
the crime of kidnapping with murder. Asked by Judge Ong during the hearing as to what particular
offense was committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified that Dimal "allegedly
committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one
Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010."19 It is not amiss to add that a search warrant that covers
several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.20

Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to ask searching questions,
and to consider that the testimonies of the applicant and his witnesses were based entirely on
hearsay, as they have no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to the supposed
disappearance or murder of the 3 victims. Jaylord Dimal vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018

EVIDENCE

A barangay blotter is not a sufficient substitute for the inventory requirement under Sec. 21,
R.A. No. 9165. It constitutes only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is not an
adequate substitute for the physical inventory requirement under the chain of custody rule.

The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of
photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, fails to
approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165.

Needless to state, the barangay blotter, which is merely a recording of the incident, is not
equivalent to or a substitute for a physical inventory that accounts and lists down in detail the
items confiscated from the accused. Besides, "[e]ntries in official records, as in the case of a police
blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated" and are "[n]ot necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial
suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries." Neither can the Court excuse the alleged
absence of a camera as a justifiable reason for non-compliance with the photography rule, since
the cause of such absence was never explained. Nor does the plain allegation that the
"commotion had already happened" - without explaining its compelling nature - dispense with
the necessity for the seized items to be properly inventoried. It is well-settled that the procedure

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in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality.

Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were exerted by the police officers involved to
comply with the mandated procedure so as to convince the Court that the failure to comply was
reasonable under the given circumstances. Since this was not the case here, the Court is impelled
to conclude that there has been an unjustified breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, Manansala's
acquittal is in order. People of the Philippines vs. Raul Manansala y Maninang G.R. No. 229092,
February 21, 2018 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

A dying declaration is admissible in evidence if the following circumstances are present: (1) it
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (3) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (4)
the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of the inquiry involves the
declarant's death.

In order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death
must be entered into by the declarant. It is the declarant's belief of his impending death and not
the rapid succession of his death in point of fact that renders his declaration admissible as a dying
declaration. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looks on
death as certainly impending.

While Jonathan was under the impression that his brother was in the throes of death, it does not
appear that the declarant himself was conscious of his impending death. The fact that Alex was
ripping his shirt while he uttered the name of his assailant is not sufficient to qualify such as a
dying declaration.

Nevertheless, while Alex's statement does not qualify as a dying declaration, the same may still
be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae.

For a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.40 All the foregoing elements are present
in this case.

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First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, there was no sufficient
time for Alex to contrive or devise a falsehood when he uttered the name of his assailant to
Jonathan. Between the infliction of the mortal wound upon Alex and his statement surrounding
this incident, at most two hours had elapsed. This interval of time is hardly sufficient to conjure
up a story or concoct and contrive a falsehood given that even an interval of four hours is still
considered as nearly contemporaneous to the startling occurrence. Lastly, the statement
concerned the circumstances surrounding the stabbing of Alex. People of the Philippines Vs.
Badillos, G.R. No. 215732 June 6, 2018

The sole credible testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime
charged.

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Here,
the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible as it was made in a "candid and
straightforward manner," "coupled with her occasional crying while relaying her story." Notably,
the CA agreed with the RTC on this point and saw no reason to overturn the same. After
approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the records, the
Court likewise finds no justification to disturb the findings of the RTC. Despite his vigorous
protestations, the Court agrees with the findings of the courts a quo that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Villalobos raped AAA on that fateful night of June 7,
2008.

The trial court's reliance on the victim's testimony is apt, considering that it was credible in itself
and buttressed by the testimony of the medico-legal officer. AAA narrated in the painstaking and
well-nigh degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful ordeal in a logical manner. Without
hesitation, AAA pointed an accusing finger against Villalobos as the person who ravished and
sexually molested her on the night of June 7, 2008. She credibly recounted how Villalobos, at
gunpoint, ordered her to leave her room, where her two minor children, ages two and four, were
then sleeping, and brought her to a nipa hut which is 50 meters from her house; that Villalobos
ordered her to remove her dress but she refused; that Villalobos undressed her, sucked her
breast and inserted his penis into her vagina; that still unsatisfied, Villalobos made her suck his
penis for almost half an hour, then inserted his penis into her anus and made a push-and-pull
movement for another half an hour; that she begged Villalobos to stop the sexual assault because
it was already painful, but the latter simply ignored her pleas; that thereafter, Villalobos made
her suck his penis again for half an hour; and that when Villalobos was distracted by the light that
passed through the nipa hut coming from a vehicle, she immediately fled from the hut.

AAA was not able to shout because Villalobos' handgun was pointed at her which, later on, was
placed close by him. Villalobos threatened to shoot her if she would make a sound while he

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consummated his carnal knowledge of her. She just cried silently. Thus, we are convinced that
Villalobos had employed intimidation to subjugate AAA's will and break her resistance down.
AAA's statements pertaining to the identity of Villalobos as her violator and the perverse acts he
visited upon her were straightforward and categorical. Hailed to the witness stand, AAA never
wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. People of the
Philippines vs. Junrel R. Villalobos G.R. No. 228960, June 11, 2018

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