Religion and Political Theory

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Religion and Political Theory

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from the Winter 2017 Edition of the First published Thu Oct 2, 2008; substantive revision Thu Jan 15, 2015
Stanford Encyclopedia When the well-known political theorist Leo Strauss introduced the topic of
politics and religion in his reflections, he presented it as a problem—the
of Philosophy “theologico-political problem” he called it (Strauss 1997).[1] The problem,
says Strauss, is primarily one about authority: Is political authority to be
grounded in the claims of revelation or reason, Jerusalem or Athens? In so
characterizing the problem, Strauss was tapping into currents of thought
deep in the history of political reflection in the west, ones about the nature,
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson extent, and justification of political authority. Do monarchies owe their
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor authority to divine right? Has God delegated to secular rulers such as
Editorial Board kings and emperors the authority to wage war in order to achieve religious
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aims: the conversion of the infidel or the repulsion of unjust attacks on the
Library of Congress Catalog Data true faith? Do secular rulers have the authority to suppress heretics? What
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authority does the state retain when its principles conflict with God's? Is
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- the authority of the natural law ultimately grounded in divine law? These
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP and other questions animated much of the discussion among medieval and
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SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, With the emergence of liberal democracy in the modern west, however,
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . the types of questions that philosophers asked about the interrelation
between religion and political authority began to shift, in large measure
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
because the following three-fold dynamic was at work. In the first place,
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The Metaphysics Research Lab divine-authorization accounts of political authority had lost the day to
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prominent defenders of liberal democracy claimed, is grounded in the
Religion and Political Theory
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Copyright consent of the people to be ruled rather than in God's act of authorization.
Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo Second, the effects of the Protestant Reformation had made themselves
All rights reserved. felt acutely, as the broadly homogeneous religious character of Western
Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/ Europe disintegrated into competing religious communities. The
1
Religion and Political Theory Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo
population of Western Europe and the United States were now not only This article considers the most important answers to these questions
considerably more religiously diverse, but also deeply wary of the sort of offered by recent philosophers, political theorists, and theologians. We
bloodshed occasioned by the so-called religious wars. And, finally, present these answers as part of a lively three-way discussion between
secularization had begun to take hold. Both the effects of religious advocates of what we call the standard view, their liberal critics, and
diversity and prominent attacks on the legitimacy of religious belief proponents of the so-called New Traditionalism. Briefly stated, advocates
ensured that one could no longer assume in political discussion that one's of the standard view argue that in contemporary liberal democracies,
fellow citizens were religious, let alone members of one's own religious significant restraints must be put on the political role of religious reasons.
tradition. Their liberal critics deny this, or at least deny that good reasons have been
given to believe this. New Traditionalists, by contrast, turn their back on
For citizens of contemporary liberal democracies, this three-fold dynamic both the standard view and its liberal critics, arguing that religious
has yielded a curious situation. On the one hand, most take it for granted orthodoxy and liberal democracy are fundamentally incompatible. To have
that the authority of the state is located in the people, that the people are a grip on this three-way debate, we suggest, is to understand that
religiously diverse, and that important segments of people doubt the dimension of the theologico-political problem that most animates
rationality of religious belief and practice of any sort. On the other hand, philosophical reflection in liberal democracies on the relation between
contrary to the predictions of many advocates of secularization theory, religion and politics.
such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and (at one time) Peter Berger, this mix of
democracy, religious diversity, and religious criticism has not resulted in 1. The Standard View
the disappearance or privatization of religion. Religion, especially in 2. The Doctrine of Religious Restraint
liberal democracies such as the United States, is alive and well, shaping 2.1 Core Components of the Doctrine of Religious Restraint
political culture in numerous ways. Consequently, there very much 3. Three Arguments for the Doctrine of Religious Restraint
remains a theologico-political problem. The problem, moreover, still 3.1 The Argument from Religious Warfare
concerns political authority, though now reframed by the transition to 3.2 The Argument from Divisiveness
liberal democracy. If recent reflection on the issue is any guide, the most 3.3 The Argument from Respect
pressing problem to address is this: Given that state-authorized coercion 4. Liberal Critics of the Doctrine of Religious Restraint
needs to be justified, and that the justification of state coercion requires the 5. The Primary Concern Regarding the Doctrine of Religious
consent of the people, what role may religious reasons play in justifying Restraint
state coercion? More specifically, in a religiously pluralistic context such 6. Rawls
as one finds in contemporary liberal democracies, are religious reasons 7. A Convergence Alternative
sufficient to justify a coercive law for which reasonable agents cannot find 8. The New Traditionalism
an adequate secular rationale? 8.1 The Declinist Narrative of the New Traditionalism
8.2 Two concerns about the narrative
9. Summary
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2017 Edition 3

Bibliography evaluates the relevant considerations, he concludes that the only

Academic Tools persuasive rationale for that measure includes as a crucial premise the
Other Internet Resources claim that homosexual relations are contrary to a God-established natural
Related Entries order. Although he finds that rationale compelling, he realizes that many
others do not. But because he takes himself to have a general moral
obligation to make those political decisions that, as best he can tell, are
1. The Standard View both just and good, he decides to vote in favor of criminalization.
Moreover, he tries to persuade his compatriots to vote with him. In so
The standard view among political theorists, such as Robert Audi, Jürgen
doing, he offers relevantly different arguments to different audiences. He
Habermas, Charles Larmore, Steven Macedo, Martha Nussbaum, and John
tries to convince like-minded citizens by appealing to the theistic natural
Rawls is that religious reasons can play only a limited role in justifying
law argument that he finds persuasive. But he realizes that many of his
coercive laws, as coercive laws that require a religious rationale lack
fellow citizens are unpersuaded by the natural law argument that
moral legitimacy.[2] If the standard view is correct, there is an important
convinces him. So he articulates a variety of other arguments—some
asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect:
secular, some religious—that he hopes will leverage those who don't share
some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious
his natural law theism into supporting his position. He does so even
reason can. This asymmetry between the justificatory potential of religious
though he doubts that any of those leveraging arguments are cogent,
and secular reasons, it is further claimed, should shape the political
realizes that many of those to whom he addresses them will have
practice of religious believers. According to advocates of the standard
comparable doubts about their cogency, and so believes that many coerced
view, citizens should not support coercive laws for which they believe
by the law he supports have no good reason, from their perspective, to
there is no plausible secular rationale, although they may support coercive
affirm that law.
laws for which they believe there is only a secular rationale. (Note that not
just any secular rationale counts.) We can refer to this injunction to Advocates of the standard view will be troubled by Rick's behavior. The
exercise restraint as The Doctrine of Religious Restraint (or the DRR, for relevantly troubling feature of Rick's behavior is not primarily his decision
short).[3] This abstract characterization of the DRR will require some to support this particular policy. Rather, it is his decision to support a
refinements, which we'll provide in sections 2 and 3. For the time being, policy that he believes others have no good reason, from their perspective,
however, we can get a better feel for the character of the DRR by to endorse. After all, Rick votes to enact a law that authorizes state
considering the following case. coercion even though he believes that the only plausible rationale for that
decision includes religious claims that many of his compatriots find utterly
2. The Doctrine of Religious Restraint unpersuasive. In so doing, Rick violates a normative constraint at the heart
of the standard view, viz., that citizens in a pluralistic liberal democracy
Rick is a politically engaged citizen who intends to vote in a referendum ought to refrain from using their political influence to authorize coercive
on a measure that would criminalize homosexual relations. As he laws that, to the best of their knowledge, can be justified only on religious

grounds and so lack a plausible secular rationale.[4] Or, otherwise put, Second, the DRR does not require a thorough-going privatization of
Rick violates the DRR. For the DRR tells us that, if a citizen is trying to religious commitment. Indeed, the DRR permits religious considerations
determine whether or not she should support some coercive law, and if she to play a rather prominent role in a citizen's political practice: citizens are
believes that there is no plausible secular rationale for that law, then she permitted to vote for their favored coercive policies on exclusively
may not support it. religious grounds as well as to advocate publicly for those policies on
religious grounds. What the DRR does require of citizens is that they
The DRR is a negative constraint; it identifies a kind of reason that cannot reasonably believe that they have some plausible secular rationale for each
itself justify a coercive law and so a kind of reason on which citizens may of the coercive laws that they support, which they are prepared to offer in
not exclusively rely when supporting a coercive law. But this negative political discussion. In this respect, the present construal of the DRR is
constraint is typically conjoined with a permission: although citizens may weaker than comparable proposals, such as that developed by Robert
not support coercive laws for which they believe themselves to have only Audi, which requires that each citizen have and be motivated by some
a religious rationale, they may support coercive laws for which they evidentially adequate secular rationale for each of the coercive laws he or
believe there is only a plausible secular rationale. As we'll see in a she supports (see Audi 1997, 138 and Rawls 1997, 784ff).
moment, advocates of the DRR furnish reasons to believe that religious
and secular reasons have this asymmetrical justificatory role. Third, the DRR places few restrictions on the content of the secular
reasons to which citizens can appeal when supporting coercive laws.
2.1 Core Components of the Doctrine of Religious Restraint Although the required secular reasons must be “plausible” (more on this in
a moment), they may make essential reference to what Rawls calls
The standard view has often been misunderstood, typically by associating
“comprehensive conceptions of the good,” such as Platonism, Kantianism,
the DRR with claims its advocates are free to deny. It will therefore be
or utilitarianism.[7] Accordingly, the standard view does not commit itself
helpful to dissociate the DRR from various common misunderstandings.
to a position according to which secular reasons must be included or
First, the DRR is a moral constraint, one that applies to people in virtue of otherwise grounded in a neutral source—a set of principles regarding
the fact that they are citizens of a liberal democracy. As such, it need not justice and the common good such that everybody has good reason, apart
be encoded into law, enforced by state coercion or social stigma, promoted from his own or any other religious or philosophical perspective, to find
in state educational institutions, or in any other way policed by the powers acceptable. Somewhat more specifically, advocates of the standard view
that be. Of course, advocates of restraint are free to argue that the state needn't claim that secular reasons must be found in what Rawls calls
should police violations of the DRR (see Habermas 2006, 10).[5] Perhaps “public reason,” which (roughly speaking) is a fund of shared principles
some liberal democracies do police something like the DRR. But about justice and the common good constructed from the shared political
advocates of the standard view needn't endorse restrictions of this sort.[6] culture of a liberal democracy. That having been said, it is worth stressing
that some prominent advocates of the standard view adopt a broadly
Rawlsian account of the DRR, according to which coercive laws must be
justified by appeal to public reason (see Gutmann and Thompson 1996,

Larmore 1987, Macedo 1990, and Nussbaum 2008). We shall have more Suppose, then, we have an adequate working conception of the DRR. The
to say about this view in section 6. question naturally arises: Why do advocates of the standard view maintain
that we should conform to the DRR? For several reasons, most prominent
Fourth, the DRR itself has no determinate policy implications; it is a of which are the following three arguments. Of course, there are many
constraint not on legislation itself, but on the configuration of reasons to more arguments for the DRR than we can address here. See, for example,
which agents may appeal when supporting coercive legislation. So, for Andrew Lister's appeal to the value of political community (2013).
example, it forbids Rick to support the criminalization of homosexuality
when he believes that there are no plausible secular reasons to criminalize 3. Three Arguments for the Doctrine of Religious
it. As such, the moral propriety of the DRR has nothing directly to do with
Restraint
its usefulness in furthering, or discouraging, particular policy aims.
3.1 The Argument from Religious Warfare
The DRR, then, is a norm that is supposed to provide guidance for how
citizens of a liberal democracy should conduct themselves when Advocates of the standard view sometimes commend the DRR on the
deliberating about or deciding on the implementation of coercive laws. For grounds that conforming to it will help prevent religious warfare and civil
our purposes, it will be helpful to work with a canonical formulation of it. strife. According to Robert Audi, for example, “if religious considerations
Let us, then, formulate the DRR as follows: are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of coercion,
there is a special problem: a clash of Gods vying for social control. Such
The DRR: a citizen of a liberal democracy may support the
uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death” (Audi
implementation of a coercive law L just in case he reasonably
2000, 103). The concern expressed here, presumably, is this: for all we
believes himself to have a plausible secular justification for L,
reasonably believe, citizens who are willing to coerce their compatriots for
which he is prepared to offer in political discussion.
religious reasons will use their political power to advance their sectarian
About this formulation of the DRR, let us make two points. First, in what agenda—using the power of the state to persecute heretics, impose
follows, we will remain largely noncommittal about what the qualifier orthodoxy, and enact stringent morals laws. In so doing, these citizens will
“plausible” means, as advocates of the standard view understand it in thereby provoke determined resistance and civil conflict. Such a state of
different ways. For present purposes, we will simply assume that a affairs, however, threatens the very viability of a liberal democracy and,
plausible rationale is one that epistemically and morally competent peers so, should be avoided at nearly all costs. Accordingly, religious believers
will take seriously as a basis for supporting a coercive law. Second, should exercise restraint when deliberating about the implementation of
according to this formulation of the DRR, a citizen can comply with the coercive laws. Exercising restraint, however, is best accomplished by
DRR even if he himself is not persuaded to support a coercive law for any adhering to the DRR.
secular reason. What matters is that he believes that he has and can offer a
According to the liberal critics of the standard view, there are several
secular rationale that his secular cohorts can take seriously.
problems with this argument. First, the liberal critics contend, while there

may have been a genuine threat of confessional warfare in 17th century considerations. As historian Michael Burleigh has argued, secularists have
Western Europe, there is little reason to believe that there is any such a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and,
threat in stable liberal democracies such as the United States. Why not? presumably, that hostility isn't at all grounded in religious considerations
Because confessional conflict, the liberal critics continue, is typically (Burleigh 2007, 135 and, more generally, Burleigh 2005).
rooted in egregious violations of the right to religious freedom, when, for
Third, the liberal critics maintain, when religious believers have employed
example, people are jailed, tortured, or otherwise abused because of their
coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves
religious commitments. John Locke puts the point thus:
rarely have done so in a way that violates the DRR. Typically, when such
it is not the diversity of Opinions (which cannot be avoided) but rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious
the refusal of Toleration to those that are of different Opinions believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need
(which might have been granted) that has produced all the Bustles for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological
and Wars, that have been in the Christian World, upon account of apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: “The king
Religion. (Locke 1983, 155) punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger
the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity
If Locke is correct, then what we need to prevent confessional conflict is of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain” (quoted in Rivera, 1992,
not compliance with a norm such as the DRR, but firm commitment to the 50). Ordinarily, the kind of religious persecution that engenders religious
right to religious freedom. A stable liberal democracy such as the United conflict is legitimated by appeal to secular reasons of the sort mandated by
States is, however, fully committed to protecting the right to religious the DRR. (This is the case even when religious actors are the ones who
freedom—and will be for the foreseeable future. True enough, there are appeal to those secular reasons.)
passionately felt disagreements about how to interpret the right to religious
freedom: witness recent conflicts as to whether or not the right to religious Finally, liberal critics point out that some religious believers affirm the
freedom should be understood to include the right of religious objectors to right to religious freedom on religious grounds; they take themselves to
be exempted from generally justified state policies (See Koppelman 2013; have powerful religious reason to affirm the right of each person to
Leiter 2012). But it is difficult to see, the liberal critics claim, that there is worship as she freely chooses, absent state coercion. So, for example, the
a realistic prospect of these disagreements devolving into violent civil 4th century Nestorian Mar Aba: “I am a Christian. I preach my faith and
conflict. want every man to join it. But I want him to join it of his own free will. I
use force on no man” (quoted in Moffett 1986, 216). [8] A believer such as
Second, even if there were a realistic prospect of religious conflict, liberal Mar Aba might be willing to violate the DRR; however, his violation
critics claim that it is unclear that adhering to the DRR would lower the would, according to the liberal critics, help not to cause religious war but
probability that such a conflict would occur. After all, the trigger for to impede it. For Mar Aba's 'sectarian rationale' supports not the violation
religious war—typically, the violation of the right to religious freedom—is of religious freedom but its protection.
not always, or even typically, justified by exclusively religious

3.2 The Argument from Divisiveness will likely be frustrated by the requirement that the DRR places on
religious citizens. According to these secular citizens, all citizens have the
If the liberal critics are correct, one of the problems with the argument right to make political decisions as their conscience dictates. And, on
from warfare is that there is no realistic prospect of religious warfare some occasions, these secular citizens hold that exercising that right will
breaking out in a stable liberal democracy such as the United States. Still, lead religious citizens to violate the DRR.[9]
there may be other evils that are more likely to occur under current
conditions, which compliance with the DRR might help to prevent. For If this is correct, for the argument from divisiveness to succeed, it would
example, it is plausible to suppose that the enactment of a coercive law have to provide reason to believe that the level of frustration and anger
that cannot be justified except on religious grounds would engender much that would be produced by violating the DRR would be greater than that
anger and frustration on the part of those coerced: “when legislation is of conforming to the DRR. But, the liberal critics claim, it is doubtful that
expressly based on religious arguments, the legislation takes on a religious we have any such reason: in a very religious society such as the United
character, to the frustration of those who don't share the relevant faith and States, it might be the case that restrictions on the political practice of
who therefore lack access to the normative predicate behind the law” religious believers engenders at least as much frustration as the alternative.
(Greene 1993, 1060). This in turn breeds division between citizens—anger
and distrust between citizens who have to find some amicable way to Second, the liberal critics argue, there is reason to believe that
make collective decisions about common matters. This counts in favor of conformance to the DRR would only marginally alleviate the frustration
the DRR precisely because compliance with the DRR diminishes the that some citizens feel when confronted with religious reasons in public
likelihood of our suffering from such bad consequences. political debate. The DRR, after all, does not forbid citizens from
supporting coercive laws on religious grounds, nor does it forbid citizens
To this argument, liberal critics offer a three-part reply. First, suppose it is to articulate religious arguments in public. Furthermore, complying with
true that the implementation of coercive laws that can be justified only on the DRR does not prevent religious citizens from advocating their favored
religious grounds often causes frustration and anger among both secular laws in bigoted, inflammatory, or obnoxious manners; it has nothing to say
and religious citizens. The liberal critics maintain that there is reason to about political decorum. So, for example, because the DRR doesn't forbid
believe that compliance with the DRR would also engender frustration and citizens from helping themselves to inflammatory or demeaning rhetoric in
anger among other religious and secular citizens. To this end, they point to political argument, the anger and resentment engendered by such rhetoric
the fact that many religious believers believe that conforming to the DRR does not constitute evidence for (or against) the DRR.
would compromise their loyalty to God: if they were prohibited from
supporting coercive laws for which they take there to be strong but Third, the liberal critics contend that because most of the laws that have a
exclusively religious reasons to support, they would naturally take chance of enactment in a society as pluralistic as the United States will
themselves to be prohibited from obeying God. But for many religious have both religious and secular grounds, it will almost never be the case
believers this is distressing; they take themselves to have overriding moral that any of the actual frustration caused by the public presence of religion
and religious obligations to obey God. Similarly, some secular citizens supports the DRR. Given that the DRR requires not a complete but only a

limited privatization of religious belief, very little of the frustration and 2009.)
anger apparently engendered by the public presence of religion counts in 3. So, there is a powerful prima facie presumption against the
favor of the DRR. To which it is worth adding the following point: permissibility of state coercion.
advocates of the standard view could, with Rorty (1995), adopt a more 4. If the presumption against state coercion is to be overcome (as it
demanding conception of the DRR that requires the complete privatization sometimes must be), then state coercion must be justified to those
of religious belief. But, as many advocates of the standard view itself who are coerced.
maintain, it is doubtful that this move improves the argument's prospects. 5. If state coercion must be justified to those who are coerced, then any
The complete privatization of religion is much more objectionable to coercive law that lacks a plausible secular rationale is morally
religious citizens and, thus, more likely to create social foment. (Rorty, it illegitimate (as there will be many to whom such coercion cannot be
should be noted, softened his approach on this issue. See Rorty 2003). justified).
6. If any coercive law that lacks a plausible secular rationale is morally
There are no doubt other factors that need to be taken into consideration in illegitimate, then a citizen ought not to support any law that he
the calculation required to formulate the argument from divisiveness. But, believes to have only a religious rationale.
the liberal critics maintain, it is unclear how those disparate factors would
add up. In particular, if the liberal critics are correct, it is not clear whether However, on the assumption that the antecedent to premise (4) is true—
requiring citizens to obey the DRR would result in less overall frustration, that there are cases in which the state must coerce—it follows (given a few
anger, and division than would not requiring them to do so. The issues at other assumptions) that:
stake are empirical in character and the relevant empirical facts are not
known. 7. The DRR is true.
3.3 The Argument from Respect That is, the DRR follows from a constraint on what makes for the moral
legitimacy of state coercion—viz., that a morally legitimate law cannot be
The third and most prominent argument for the DRR is the argument from such that there are those to whom it cannot be justified—and from the
respect. Here we focus on only one formulation of the argument, which claim that citizens should not support any law that they realize lacks moral
has affinities with a version of the argument offered by Charles Larmore legitimacy.
(see Larmore 1987).[10]
The argument from respect has received its fair share of criticism from
The argument from respect runs as such: liberal critics. Perhaps the most troubling of these criticisms is that the
argument undermines the legitimacy of basic liberal commitments. To
1. Each citizen deserves to be respected as a person. appreciate the thrust of this objection, focus for a moment on the notion
2. If each citizen deserves to be respected as a person, then there is a being a coercive law that is justified to an agent, to which the argument
powerful prima facie presumption against the permissibility of state
coercion. (On this basic claim, See Gaus, 2010, Gaus and Vallier,

appeals. How should we understand this concept? One natural suggestion moral achievement, the liberal critics maintain that the moral legitimacy of
is this: a law is not a function of whether it can be justified to all citizens—not
even to all reasonable citizens. Some citizens are simply not in a strong
A coercive law is justified to an agent only if he is reasonable and epistemic position to recognize that certain coercive laws are morally
has sufficient reasons from his own perspective to support it. legitimate. In such cases, liberal critics claim that we should do what we
can to try to convince these citizens that they have been misled. And we
Now consider a coercive law that protects fundamental liberal
should certainly do what we can to accommodate their concerns in ways
commitments, such as the right to exercise religious freedom. Is this law
that are consistent with basic liberal commitments (see Swaine 2006). At
justified to each citizen of a liberal democracy? Liberal critics answer: no.
the end of the day, though, we may have no moral option but to coerce
For there appear to be reasonable citizens who have no good reason from
reasonable and epistemically competent peers whom we recognize have
their own perspective to affirm it. Consider, for example, a figure such as
no reason from their perspective to recognize the legitimacy of the laws to
the Islamic intellectual Sayyid Qutb. While in prison, Qutb wrote an
which they are subject. However, if a coercive law can be morally
intelligent, informed, and morally serious commentary on the Koran in
legitimate even though some citizens are not in a strong position to
which he laid the ills of modern society at the feet of Christianity and
recognize that it is, then (in principle) a coercive law can be justified even
liberal democracy.[11] The only way to extricate ourselves from the
if it requires a religious rationale. After all, if religious reasons can be
problems spawned by liberal democracy, Qutb argued, is to implement
adequate (a possibility that advocates of the standard view do not typically
shariah or Islamic legal code, which implies that the state should not
deny), then they are just the sort of reason that can be adequate without
protect a robust right to religious freedom. In short, Qutb articulates what
being recognized as such even by our morally serious and epistemically
is, from his point of view, a compelling theological rationale against any
competent peers.
law that authorizes the state to protect a robust right to religious freedom.
If respect for persons requires that each coercive law be justified to those It should be conceded, however, that this objection to the argument from
reasonable persons subject to that law, and if a person such as Qutb were a respect relies on a particular understanding of what it is for a coercive law
citizen of a liberal democracy, then the argument from respect implies that to be justified to an agent. Is there another account of this concept that
laws that protect the right to religious freedom are morally illegitimate, as would aid the advocates of the standard view? Perhaps. Nearly all theorists
they lack moral justification—at least for agents such as Qutb.[12] And for have argued that a coercive law's being justified to an agent does not
a defender of the standard view, this is certainly an unwelcome result. require that that agent actually have what he regards as an adequate reason
to support it (see Gaus 1996, Audi 1997, and Vallier 2014). “The question
This kind of case leads liberal critics of the standard view to deny the
is not what people do endorse but what people have reason to endorse”
fourth premise of the argument from respect. If they are correct, it is not
(Gaus 2010, 23). Better to understand the concept being a coercive law
the case that coercive laws must be justified to those who must obey them
that is justified to an agent along the following lines:
(in the sense of justified to introduced earlier). Although having a
persuasive justification would certainly be desirable and a significant A coercive law is justified to an agent only if, were he reasonable

and adequately informed, then he would have a sufficient reason right if they were adequately informed about the divine authorship of the
from his own perspective to support it. Quran and the proper rules of its interpretation. While Qutb's say-so
doesn't settle the issue of who would believe what in improved conditions,
Given this weaker, counterfactual construal of what makes for morally liberal critics maintain that his response indicates just how complicated the
permissible coercion, the argument from respect needn't undermine the issue under consideration is. Among other things, to establish that Qutb is
legitimacy of the state's using coercion to protect basic liberal wrong it seems that one would have to deny the truth of various
commitments. For we can always construe those counterfactual conditions theological claims on which Qutb relies when he determines that he would
in such a way that those who in fact reject basic liberal commitments reject the right to religious freedom were he adequately informed and
would affirm them if they were more reasonable and better informed. In reasonable. That would require advocates of the standard view to take a
that case, using coercion to ensure that they comply with basic liberal stand on contested religious issues. However, liberal critics point out that
commitments would not be to disrespect them. If this is correct, the defenders of the standard view have been wary of explicitly denying the
prospect of there being figures such as Qutb, who reject the right to truth of religious claims, especially those found within the major theistic
religious freedom, need not undermine the legitimacy of the state's religions.
coercive enforcement of that basic liberal commitment.
Turn now to the second claim. Some liberal critics of the standard view,
Liberal critics find this response unsatisfactory. After all, if this alternative such as Nicholas Wolterstorff, maintain that at the heart of liberal
construal of the argument is to succeed, it must be the case not only that: democracy is the claim that some coercive laws function to protect
inherent human rights. Wolterstorff further argues that attempts to ground
Were an agent such as Qutb reasonable and adequately informed,
these rights in merely secular considerations fail. Only by appeal to
he would have sufficient reason from his own perspective to
explicitly theistic assumptions, Wolterstorff argues, can we locate an
support coercive laws that protect the right to religious liberty;
adequate justification for the ascription of these rights (see Wolterstorff
but also: 2008, Pt. III as well as Perry 2003). What would a reasonable and
adequately informed secular citizen make of Wolterstorff's arguments?
Every coercive law that protects basic liberal commitments is such Would he endorse them?
that adequately informed and reasonable secular citizens would
have a sufficient secular reason to support it. It's difficult to say. Liberal critics maintain that we are simply not in good
epistemic position to judge the reasons an agent would have to support
These two claims, however, are highly controversial. Let us consider the laws that protect basic liberal commitments were he better informed and
first. Were we to ask Qutb whether he would have reasons to support laws more reasonable. More exactly, liberal critics maintain that we are not in a
that protect a robust right to religious freedom if he were adequately good epistemic position to determine whether a secular agent who is
informed and reasonable, surely he would say: no. Moreover, he would reasonable and better informed would endorse or reject the type of theistic
claim that his compatriots would reject the liberal protection of such a commitments that philosophers such as Wolterstorff claim justify the

ascription of natural human rights. The problem is that we don't really First, liberal critics of the standard view assume that citizens should
have any idea how radically a person would change his views were he to support basic liberal commitments such as the rights to religious freedom,
occupy these conditions. The main, and still unresolved, question for this equality before the law, and private property. Michael Perry argues, for
version of the standard view, then, is whether there is some coherent and example, “that the foundational moral commitment of liberal democracy is
non-arbitrary construal of the relevant counterfactual conditions that is to the true and full humanity of every person—and therefore, to the
strong enough to prohibit exclusive reliance on religious reasons but weak inviolability of every person—without regard to race, sex, religion… .”
enough to allow for the justification of basic liberal commitments. (See This commitment, Perry continues, is “the principal ground of liberal
Vallier 2014 for the most recent and sophisticated attempt to specify those democracy's further commitment to certain basic human freedoms” that
counterfactual conditions.) are protected by law (Perry 2003, 36).[13] More generally, liberal critics
maintain that citizens should support only those coercive laws that they
4. Liberal Critics of the Doctrine of Religious reasonably believe further the common good and are consistent with the
Restraint demands of justice. These commitments, they add, are not in tension with
the claim that citizens may support coercive laws that they believe to lack
In the last section, we considered three arguments for the DRR and a plausible secular rationale. So long as a citizen is firmly committed to
responses to them offered by the liberal critics. In the course of our basic liberal rights, she may coherently and without impropriety do so
discussion, we began to see elements of the view that liberal critics of the even though she regards these laws as having no plausible secular
standard view—critics such as Christopher Eberle, Philip Quinn, Jeffrey justification. More generally, liberal critics of the DRR maintain that a
Stout, and Nicholas Wolterstorff—endorse. To get a better feel for why citizen may rely on her religious convictions to determine which policies
these theorists reject the DRR, it will be helpful to step back for a moment further the cause of justice and the common good and may support
to consider some important features of their view. coercive laws even if she regards them as having no plausible secular
rationale.
Earlier we indicated that liberal critics of the standard view offer detailed
replies to both the Argument from Religious Warfare and the Argument Second, liberal critics of the standard view lay down constraints on the
from Divisiveness. Still, friends of the standard view may worry that there manner in which citizens arrive at their political commitments (see Eberle
is something deeply problematic about these replies. For by allowing 2002, Weithman 2002, and Wolterstorff 1997, 2012a). So, for example,
citizens to support coercive laws on purely religious grounds, they permit each citizen should abide by certain epistemic requirements: precisely
majorities to impose their religious views on others and restrict the because they ought not to support coercive laws that violate the
liberties of their fellow citizens. But it is important to see that no liberal requirements of justice and the common good, citizens should take
critic of the standard position adopts an “anything goes” policy toward the feasible measures to determine whether the laws they support are actually
justification of state coercion. Citizens, according to these thinkers, should just and good. In order to achieve that aim, citizens should search for
adhere to several constraints on the manner in which they support coercive considerations relevant to the normative propriety of their favored laws,
laws, including the following. weigh those considerations judiciously, listen carefully to the criticisms of

those who reject their normative commitments, and be willing to change more, and no less, a responsibility to aspire to persuade their secular
their political commitments should the balance of relevant considerations compatriots by appeal to secular reasons than secularists have an
require them to do so. Again, liberal critics deny that even the most obligation to aspire to persuade their religious compatriots by appeal to
conscientious and assiduous adherence to such constraints precludes religious reasons. Otherwise put, according to the liberal critics, if we
citizens from supporting coercive laws that require a religious rationale. accept the claim that:
No doubt, those who support coercive laws that require a religious
rationale might do so in an insular, intransigent, irrational, or otherwise If a religious citizen finds herself in a position in which she has
defective manner. But they need not do so and, thus, their religiously- excellent reason to believe that she cannot convince a fellow
grounded support for coercive laws need not be defective. secular citizen to support a coercive law that she deems just by
appeal to religious reasons, then she should do her best to appeal to
Third, critics of the standard view need have no aversion to secular secular reasons—reasons that her cohort may find persuasive;
justification and so need not object to a state of affairs in which each
person, secular or religious, has what he or she regards as a compelling we should also accept:
reason to endorse coercive laws of various sorts. (Indeed, they claim that
If a secular citizen finds herself in a position in which she has
such a state of affairs would arguably be a significant moral achievement
excellent reason to believe that she cannot convince a fellow
—a good for all concerned.) According to the liberal critics, however,
religious citizen to support a coercive law that she deems just by
what is most important is that parity reigns: any normative constraint that
appeal to secular reasons, then she should do her best to appeal to
applies to the reasons on the basis of which citizens make political
religious reasons—reasons that her cohort may find persuasive.
decisions must apply impartially to both religious and secular reasons.
Many secular reasons employed to justify coercion—ones that appeal to Recognizing parity of this sort, according to the liberal critics, lies at the
comprehensive perspectives such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, for heart of what it is to be a good citizen of a liberal democracy. For being a
example—are highly controversial; in this sense, they are very similar to good citizen involves respecting one's fellow citizens, even when one
religious reasons. For this reason, some advocate for a cousin —more or disagrees with them. In a wide range of cases, however, an agent exercises
less distant, depending on the formulation—of the DRR, namely, one that respect not by treating her interlocutor as a generic human being or a
lays down restrictions on all religious reasons and on some particularly generic citizen of a liberal democracy, but by treating her as a person who
controversial secular reasons. (See section 6 below.) Moreover, the has a particular narrative identity and life history, say, as an African
normative issues implicated by certain coercive laws are so complex and American, a Russian immigrant, or a Muslim citizen. But doing this often
contentious that any rationale for or against these laws will include claims requires pursuing and appealing to considerations that it is likely that one's
that can be reasonably rejected—secular or religious as the case might be. interlocutors with their own particular narrative identity will find
persuasive. And depending on the case, these reasons may be exclusively
If this is right, according to the liberal critics, equal treatment of religious
religious.
and secular reasons is the order of the day: religious believers have no

To this we should add a clarification: strictly speaking, the liberal critics' that from the fact that religious citizens are morally required to pursue
insistence on parity between the pursuit of secular and religious reasons is secular reasons for their favored coercive laws (when that is necessary for
consistent with the DRR. For, as we have construed it, the DRR allows persuasion), it does not follow that they should refrain from supporting
that religious citizens may support coercive laws for religious reasons (so coercive laws if their pursuit of secular reasons fails. Because our having
long as they have and are prepared to provide a plausible secular an obligation to try to bring about some state of affairs tells us nothing
justification for these laws). And while its advocates do not typically about what we ought to do if we cannot bring it about, nothing like the
emphasize the point, the DRR permits secular citizens to articulate DRR follows from the claim that citizens should pursue secular reasons
religious reasons that will persuade religious believers to accept the for their favored coercive laws. According to the liberal critics, a parallel
secular citizens' favored coercive laws (for reservations about this practice, position applies to non-religious citizens: from the fact that non-religious
see Audi 1997, 135-37 on “leveraging reasons”. See also Schwartzman citizens are morally required to pursue religious reasons for their favored
2014). Still, the DRR implies that there is an important asymmetry laws (when that is necessary for persuasion), it doesn't follow that they
between the justificatory role played by religious and secular reasons. To should refrain from supporting coercive laws if their pursuit of religious
this issue we now turn. reasons fails. For the liberal critics, parity between the religious and the
secular obtains both with respect to the obligation to pursue justifying
5. The Primary Concern Regarding the Doctrine of reasons and with respect to the permission not to exercise restraint when
Religious Restraint that pursuit fails.
Assume that, in religiously pluralistic conditions, religious citizens have Have we identified a genuine point of disagreement between the liberal
good moral reason—perhaps even a moral obligation—to pursue secular critics and advocates of the standard view? It seems so. If the liberal critics
reasons for their favored coercive laws. Assume as well that secular are correct, all that can be reasonably asked of religious citizens is that, in
citizens have good reason to pursue religious reasons for their favored a pluralistic liberal democracy, they competently pursue secular reasons
coercive policies (if only because, with respect to some coercive laws, for the coercive laws they support. If the pursuit fails, then they may
some of their fellow citizens find only religious reasons to support them). support these laws for exclusively religious reasons. Proponents of the
What should citizens do, religious or secular, when they cannot identify standard view disagree, maintaining that if the pursuit fails, these citizens
these reasons? must exercise restraint. This disagreement is rooted in differing
convictions about the justificatory role that religious reasons can play.
According to advocates of the standard view, if a religious citizen fails in Once again, advocates of the standard view maintain that religious reasons
his pursuit of secular reasons that support a given coercive law, then he is can play only a limited justificatory role: citizens must have and be
morally required to exercise restraint. After all, if his pursuit of these prepared to offer (at least certain kinds of) secular reasons for any coercive
reasons fails, then he does not have any secular reason to offer in favor of law that they support, as religious reasons are not enough. The liberal
that law. Liberal critics of the standard view, by contrast, deny that citizens critics deny this, maintaining that no persuasive arguments have been
so circumstanced are morally required to exercise restraint. They claim offered to believe this. The DRR highlights this disagreement, as it

incorporates an assumption that religious and secular reasons play critics claim, for a morally sensitive and epistemically competent citizen
asymmetrical roles in justifying coercive laws.[14] to regard only certain religious considerations as providing decisive
support for a given coercive law. Nicholas Wolterstorff, to return to an
As we have explicated the view of the liberal critics, religious citizens are earlier example, maintains that only theistic considerations can ground the
(in a wide range of cases) morally required to pursue secular reasons for ascription of inherent human rights, some of which are protected by
their favored coercive laws, but they needn't exercise restraint if they fail coercive law. Arguably, were a citizen to find a position such as
in their pursuit. But this position raises a question: What's so bad about Wolterstorff's persuasive, then he should appeal to those considerations
requiring citizens to exercise restraint? Why should liberal critics object to that he actually believes to further the cause of justice and the common
this? good. And this should lead us to want him to support that law, even though
he does so solely on religious grounds, even if he regards that law as
According to the liberal critics, one of the core commitments of a liberal
having no plausible secular justification. Good citizenship in a pluralistic
democracy is a commitment to religious freedom and its natural extension,
liberal democracy unavoidably requires citizens to make political
the right to freedom of conscience. When citizens use the modicum of
commitments that they know their moral and epistemic peers reject but
political influence at their disposal, liberal critics claim that we should
that they nevertheless believe, with due humility, to be morally required.
want them to do so in a way that furthers the cause of justice and the
This ideal of good citizenship, so the liberal critics claim, applies to
common good. So, for example, when a citizen deliberates about whether
religious and secular citizens alike.
he should, say, support the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States
and its NATO allies, we want him to determine, as best he can, whether
the invasion of Afghanistan is actually morally appropriate. In order to
6. Rawls
determine that, he should be as conscientious as he can in his collection
The portrait that we have offered of the standard view (and that of its
and evaluation of the relevant evidence, reach whatever conclusions seem
liberal critics) is a composite, one which blends together various claims
reasonable to him on the available evidence, and act accordingly. If he
that its advocates make about the relation between coercive law and
concludes that invading Afghanistan would be unjust, then he should
religious reasons. Because of this approach we have made relatively little
oppose it. That he does so is not only his right but also morally excellent,
explicit mention of particular advocates of the standard view, such as that
as acting in accord with responsibly held normative commitments is an
towering figure of contemporary political philosophy, John Rawls. Of all
important moral and civic good.
the contemporary figures who have shaped the debate we are considering,
This, the liberal critics maintain, suggests a general claim. Whatever the however, none has exercised more influence than Rawls. It is natural to
policy and whatever the reasons—whether religious or secular—we have wonder, then, whether we've presented the standard view in its most
powerful reason to want citizens to support the coercive policies that they powerful form and, thus, whether we've omitted a crucial dimension of the
believe, in good conscience, to be morally appropriate. But that general debate between the standard view and its liberal critics. We believe not.
claim has direct application to the issue at hand. It is possible, the liberal The version of the standard view that we have considered is one that

borrows liberally from Rawls' thought, albeit softened and modified in secular reasons that have their home in one or another comprehensive
certain ways. Still, before moving forward, it will be helpful to say conception of the good. This might render the DRR vulnerable to the
something more about Rawls' view. We limit ourselves to the following criticism that it invidiously and arbitrarily discriminates against religion.
three observations. But the Rawlsian 'public reason' alternative is also vulnerable to criticism.
It is not clear, for one thing, that the content of public reason will be rich
First, Rawls' own position about the relation between coercive law and enough to provide compelling reasons to support genuinely informative
religious reasons has shifted. In Political Liberalism, Rawls admits that at positions on matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials. Perhaps,
one point he inclined toward accepting an ambitious version of the DRR for example, the claims that belong to public reason are only fairly
according to which each citizen of a liberal democracy ought not to appeal sweeping ones that ascribe basic rights of various sorts but offer no
to religious reasons when deliberating about matters of basic justice and guidance about how they should be weighed (see Quinn 1997, 149-52).
constitutional essentials (see Rawls 1993, 247 n.36). In the face of Furthermore, it is unclear that appealing to public reason is the best way to
criticism, Rawls modified his position, arriving at a close relative of the respect one's fellow citizens. Perhaps, as Wolterstorff and Stout have
DRR, viz., that while an agent may appeal to religious reasons to justify argued, respect is better served both by explicitly disclosing to one's
coercive law, he may not appeal solely to these reasons. Secular reasons interlocutors the reasons one finds most persuasive (whatever they may
must be forthcoming (see Rawls 1997).[15] be) and appealing to reasons that they might most find most persuasive,
given their own commitments to one or another comprehensive
Second, Rawls places significant restrictions on the content of the secular
perspective (see Wolterstorff 1997 and Stout 2004, Chs. 2-4).
reasons to which an agent may appeal. To advert to a point made earlier,
Rawls argues that when deliberating about matters of basic justice and In fact, Wolterstorff has argued that, ironically, Rawls' methodology has
constitutional essentials, citizens should appeal to “public reason,” which the implication that appealing to public reason would be to treat others
(roughly speaking) is a fund of shared principles about justice and the with profound disrespect. For note that when Rawls formulates his version
common good that is constructed from the shared political culture of a of public reason, he claims that it will incorporate the idea that liberal
liberal democracy—principles that concern, for example, the equality of democracy is a society with a system of fair cooperation over time. How
citizens before the law and their right to a fair system of cooperation. In do we identify such a system? Rawls maintains that doing so requires that
Rawls' view, when deliberating about these matters, appealing solely to we set off to the side those who are “unreasonable” – these being those
secular comprehensive accounts of the good such as Aristotelianism or who are “unwilling to honor, or even to propose … fair terms of
utilitarianism is no more legitimate than appealing solely to religious cooperation” (Rawls 1993, 51). But, as Wolterstorff contends, there are
reasons. For all of these comprehensive doctrines will be alien to some of many who do not satisfy Rawls' account of reasonability, including those
one's reasonable compatriots. who think of politics not in terms of distributive justice but other
categories such as preserving individual liberty, protecting small
As will have been evident, in our presentation of the DRR, we have
government, maximizing their own wealth, and so on. The implication of
relaxed Rawls' stipulation, allowing for the legitimacy of appealing to only
setting these people off to the side is that, when engaging in public

political deliberation about some issue of basic justice, the “reasonable” attempting to settle fundamental political questions. Once again, the
citizens are free to ignore the views of their “unreasonable” compatriots. content of public reason may be too thin to settle anything of importance.
This, however, raises the concern that far from advocating a system in Moreover, it is unclear that reasonable and autonomous agents would
which all other citizens are respected as free and equal, Rawls' view has regard as inappropriate a democratic system in which agents bring to the
the paradoxical implication that “to follow the duty of civility is perforce table whatever reasons that seem best to them and vote solely on their
to perpetrate injustice” by Rawls' own lights (Wolterstorff 2012, 121). basis.
Third, as Paul Weithman points out (in Weithman 2007), there are really Imagine, for example, a scenario in which citizens of a liberal democracy
two types of argument that Rawls provides in favor of his position. The such as ours must deliberate on an issue of basic justice such as health care
first is a variant of the argument from respect. More specifically, it is a reform. One approach these citizens might take is Rawls': they appeal
relative to the first version of the argument from respect that we primarily to public reason. Another approach is that they try to forge a
considered earlier, which maintains that coercive laws are morally consensus about the issue that incorporates features that belong to rather
legitimate only if they can be justified to citizens of a liberal democracy different comprehensive perspectives. According to this latter approach,
with their actual commitments and beliefs. This argument, if the liberal Jews, Christians, Kantians, Buddhists, and Aristotelians all offer each
critics are correct, is subject to some fairly powerful replies, among which other the reasons from their own comprehensive perspectives that seem to
is that, given the fact that there is widespread pluralism about God and the support health care reform, pointing out to each other the degree to which
good among the citizens of liberal democracies, it is impossible for their reasons overlap. No public reasons are offered, only a plethora of
coercive laws that protect basic liberal commitments to be justified to particularistic reasons each of which is reasonably rejected by some
them. The second type of argument that Rawls provides in favor of his citizens. Then the matter is put to a vote. Would an agent who is
favored restrictions on religious reasons, however, appeals not to the claim reasonable and autonomous reject this procedure in favor of appealing to
that justifying coercion on the basis of alien reasons disrespects our public reason? According to the liberal critics, it is difficult to see why we
compatriots, but to the idea that the reasons on which we rely must be should believe he would. If so, the connection that Rawls attempts to forge
ones that others can endorse as autonomous agents. In Kantian categories, between the exercise of autonomy and public reason is too tight. (In the
this second line of argument singles out not the evil of heteronomous next section, we discuss a version of ‘public reason liberalism’ that
considerations, but the goodness of considerations that autonomous and incorporates the basic idea that respect for persons is compatible with each
reasonable agents could accept as an appropriate basis for settling citizen’s offering to one non-shared, non-public reasons for state
fundamental political questions. coercion.)
It is difficult to see, however, that this latter argument genuinely moves A final concern is worth airing. Figures such as Philip Quinn, Jeffrey
beyond the argument from respect. The problem is that it is not evident Stout, and Nicholas Wolterstorff interpret Rawls as addressing the issue of
that the content of what Rawls terms public reason is that to which how citizens in actual liberal democracies ought to conduct themselves
reasonable and autonomous agents would primarily appeal when when debating matters of justice and the common good. But there is

evidence that Rawls' texts ought not to be read in this way. For, as Rawls At the heart of the liberal critics’ conception of religion and public life is a
indicates at various places, he takes himself to be discussing well-ordered commitment to parity between the religious and the secular: because there
societies. A well-ordered society is such that it contains no egoists, are no morally, sociologically, or epistemically relevant differences
everyone complies with the principles of justice, everyone wants to between religious and secular reasons, religious and secular reasons may
participate in forms of social life that call forth their own and others' play exactly the same role in a citizen’s deliberations or decision-making
natural talents, treachery and betrayal are absent, and its members want to regarding state coercion. This parity claim seems flatly inconsistent with
cooperate with others on terms that are mutually justifiable and affirm only the DRR – which singles out religious reasons for special, discriminatory
reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Weithman 2012, 65, 162, 169, 310). treatment. But some theorists have argued that the parity claim, which is
In short, a well-ordered society is nothing like the actual world but is so important to the liberal critics, is in fact consistent with a version of the
something approximating a political Utopia. DRR. An argument of this sort has been articulated by Gerald Gaus and
Kevin Vallier (Gaus 2012, Gaus and Vallier, 2009, Vallier, 2014).
Suppose Rawls were to establish that in a well-ordered society agents
would conform to his favored version of the restrictions on religious Gaus and Vallier's argument rests on two central claims. First, state
reasons. This would not imply that, in those circumstances in which we coercion is presumptively wrong; each and every coercive state enactment
actually find ourselves, citizens should appeal to his version, thinking of it must be justified by each and every citizen subject to it. By contrast, the
as a regulatory ideal in their political thinking. Not all ideals, after all, are lack of any state policy is not presumptively wrong, and so need not be
worth pursuing. It might be, for example, that pursuing the Rawlsian ideal justified – even to citizens whose well-being is affected by the lack of state
would make it much more difficult for citizens to employ other approaches activity. Second, the reasons by which state coercion is justified need not
to political deliberation that would result in a liberal democracy being be shared by (or be accessible to) the citizens who are subject to a given
sufficiently stable for the right reasons, which, says Rawls, should be a coercive measure. What matters for purposes of the justification of
primary objective of any liberal democracy. If this were correct, then coercion is that each citizen has sufficient reason, as judged from his or
Rawls's project would have very modest implications for how to think her particular perspective, to endorse state coercion. Since this view places
about the relation between religion and public reason, since it would no restrictions on the reasons to which an agent might appeal, religious
provide little or no guidance for how citizens ought to conduct their and secular reasons can play exactly the same justificatory role, namely, to
behavior (see Cuneo 2013). defeat what would, in the absence of contrary reasons, be permissible acts
of state coercion.
7. A Convergent Alternative
Gaus and Vallier, then, have defended a convergence rather than a
Liberal critics of the standard view have not been free of their own critics. consensus account of the standard view. If this account is correct, state
We conclude this part of our discussion by articulating one important coercion must be justifiable to religious citizens as religious believers and
response. when it is not, then state coercion lacks moral legitimacy. The same holds
true for non-religious citizens. Although the convergent conception of the

standard view accords religious reasons a potentially decisive role in implications for religion but for liberalism. Consider in this regard the case
defeating state coercion, and so accords religious reasons a much more of Qtub treated earlier. Qtub seems to have articulated compelling
prominent role in the justification of state coercion than religious reasons theological objections to the right to religious freedom, and thus
have on most alternative formulations of the standard view, it is also articulated compelling theological reasons to deny that the state may
consistent with the DRR. How so? coercively enforce that right. In this case, the state's enforcement of the
right to religious freedom seems, according to the convergent conception,
In any liberal polity, there will inevitably be some secular citizens. If there to lack legitimacy.
is nothing to be said from any secular perspective that decisively justifies
some coercive measure, and if the only plausible rationale for that 8. The New Traditionalism
coercive measure is a religious rationale, then there will inevitably be
some citizens to whom that coercive measure cannot be justified. To this point, we have been primarily concerned to articulate the standard
According to the view under consideration, such a coercive measure view and lay out the response offered to it by its liberal critics. We have
would be disrespectful and so illegitimate. So the convergent variation on emphasized that there are important differences between these two views.
the standard view maintains the core conviction that religious While not trivial, these differences should not be exaggerated, however.
considerations cannot decisively justify state coercion in pluralistic liberal Both views are deeply committed to the core components of liberal
politics. The implications for the duties of religious citizens seem direct: democracy, including the protection of basic freedoms such as the freedom
they ought to restrain themselves from supporting any act of state coercion to practice religion as one sees fit. Furthermore, both views recognize the
that they know cannot be justified other than by religious reasons. That is, legitimacy of religious reasons in political deliberation, noting the role of
they must comply with the DRR. If Gaus and Vallier are correct, then, such reasons in important social movements such as the civil rights
commitment to equal treatment of religion is entirely consistent with a movement. The main difference between advocates of the standard view
version of the DRR. (Gaus and Vallier, it is worth noting, reject the DRR and their liberal critics, we've contended, is how they view the justificatory
as an account of the duties of citizens, accepting only a milder version that role of these reasons. That said, the liberal critics are not the only or even
applies to certain public officials in certain circumstances.) the most influential critics of the standard view. Indeed, if the central
argument of Jeffrey Stout's book Democracy and Tradition is correct, the
Although the convergent variation of the standard view will likely be more
standard view has generated a worrisome backlash among prominent
attractive to liberal critics than familiar alternatives, they still have reason
Christian theologians and political theorists. These theologians and
to be skeptical. The convergent conception of the standard view is, after
political theorists, who Stout labels the New Traditionalists, reject not only
all, demanding: state coercion must pass muster before the bar of religious
the standard view, but also liberal democracy as such—their assumption
and secular reasons. However, many citizens will have compelling reasons
being that the standard view is a more or less inevitable outgrowth of
to reject core liberal commitments. It follows that, according to the
liberal democracy. In spite of their fairly radical position, Stout contends
convergence view, those liberal commitments will lack justification. If so,
that these thinkers need to be taken seriously by the friends of democracy,
liberal critics have reason to reject the convergent view, not because of its

as they exercise considerable influence in certain sectors of the academy MacIntyrean narrative is broadly declinist in character, depicting the
and the culture at large. degeneration of Western moral and political thought in the following four
stages.
Suppose Stout is right to say that New Traditionalists such as John
Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Stanley Hauerwas are widely In the first stage, the New Traditionalists maintain that the late ancient and
influential in the academy and elsewhere. Should they be taken seriously the high medieval thinkers of the west embraced a unified philosophical
by political philosophers? That depends on what one understands the role vision that includes three fundamental components. The first component is
of political philosophers to be. Suppose, however, we assume that political a commitment to a “thick” teleological account of the human good,
philosophers should be multidisciplinary in orientation, engaging with according to which human beings have rational natures that can be
what sociologists, psychologists, and theologians write and say. If we perfected. The second component is a commitment to the claim that virtue
assume this, then taking a multidisciplinary approach in this case seems to consists in the perfection of our rational nature in both its practical and
make sense. The topic under consideration, after all, is the relation theoretical dimensions. Practical reason, according to the vision, can
between religion and politics, and theologians have had much to say about ascertain not merely the means to achieve one's ends, but also the very
their interrelations. Furthermore, while the approach that the New telos or end for human beings. And theoretical reason, so the vision has it,
Traditionalists take to our topic is different from that taken by the can gain genuine insight into the world by viewing the entire created order
advocates of the standard view—the New Traditionalists tell a historical as participating in or resembling the divine nature. The third component of
narrative about the ills of liberal democracy—the narrative that they tell is the vision is that moral thought and discourse should be framed primarily
a philosophical one. Indeed, it is a narrative whose main lines will be in terms of the virtues—the virtues providing the dominant conceptuality
familiar to most philosophers working in ethics and political philosophy. It in terms of which we conduct moral reasoning. To which it is worth
is natural to want to know whether this historical-philosophical narrative adding the following point: advocates of the MacIntyrean narrative do not
survives philosophical scrutiny. We shall close, then, by considering the deny that pre-modern societies had their share of moral, religious, and
narrative that the New Traditionalists tell about the emergence of modern political problems. Their claim is merely that these societies enjoyed (at
liberal democracies, highlighting the response offered to it by the liberal least in principle) the shared conceptual resources with which they could
critics. coherently address and remedy them.
8.1 The Declinist Narrative of the New Traditionalism In the second stage of the narrative, there is a fall into our current
fragmented moral and religious condition. Although the New
Those familiar with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre will immediately Traditionalists regard different movements and figures as responsible for
recognize the New Traditionalists' narrative. For in its broad structure, it the fall, they agree on this much: the philosophical vision that unified the
bears a close resemblance to the one that MacIntyre tells in his three books societies of pre-modernity fell apart. The teleological worldview was
After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions replaced by a nominalist and mechanistic one. Practical reason became
of Moral Inquiry (MacIntyre 1984, 1988, and 1990, respectively).[16] The instrumentalized—viewed as merely a “slave of the passions,” to use

Hume's phrase. And theoretical reason was conceived of as working in a are correct, the DRR is both crucial to liberal democracy and an important
perfectly adequate fashion apart from any commitment to there being a reason for traditional believers to reject it.
divinely-ordered reality. Furthermore, the language of justice and
individual rights supplanted that of virtue. As a result, the state that we 8.2 Two concerns about the narrative
now occupy is one in which we no longer enjoy a shared conception of the
The MacIntyrean narrative is intriguing but highly controversial. Liberal
good, and politics has become—to use MacIntyre's memorable phrase
critics have raised the following two objections to it.
—“civil war by other means.” Without such a conception of the good, we
now face all manner of moral, religious, and political problems that we The first feature of the narrative to which liberal critics have drawn
lack the conceptual resources to resolve or even properly understand. attention is its highly intellectualized character. If John Milbank and
MacIntyre are correct, for example, the fall into secularist liberalism is
In the third stage of the narrative, New Traditionalists maintain that liberal
driven by the influence of some fairly abstract philosophical claims about
democracy emerges as the more or less natural political consequence of
the nature of reason and existence, which were defended by the medieval
the fall from the pre-modern state. Liberal democracy, according to the
philosopher Duns Scotus. By rejecting the broadly Augustinian/Thomistic
New Traditionalists, is not only a political structure that protects putative
picture of reason and existence, the New Traditionalists claim, Scotus
individual rights (such as to religious freedom), but is also committed to a
paved the way for the rise of secularism, which is endemic to
broad thesis of neutrality with respect to notions of God and the good.
contemporary liberal democracies (see Milbank 1990 and MacIntyre 1990,
According to this understanding of liberal democracy, the state should not
Ch. 7).
enact laws that require a religious rationale and citizens should therefore
comply with the DRR. Given its commitment to neutrality and the DRR, Liberal critics maintain that, as a matter of intellectual history, this is not
the New Traditionalists claim that liberal democracy is a mode of correct. Proponents of broadly Scotistic or anti-theistic views, according to
governance that is fundamentally at odds with the type of traditional thinkers such as Stout, never had the numbers or clout to change the world
religious way of life that informed society during its pre-modern state. as dramatically as New Traditionalists claim. In fact, if Stout is correct,
there is a counter-narrative to tell that is at least as plausible as the one that
In the final stage of the narrative, New Traditionalists offer proposals of
New Traditionalists champion. According to this counter-narrative, we
various sorts for how traditionally religious believers should cope with
should distinguish two types of secularism: on the one hand, there is
being citizens of a political system whose fundamental commitments are
secularism as understood by the standard view, which tells us that appeal
at odds with their own. The proposals are generally not injunctions to
to religious reasons in public political discourse is insufficient to justify
transform the liberal state. Rather, they are broadly separatist in nature,
coercive laws. On the other, there is broadly pluralistic secularism, which
exhorting traditional believers to distance themselves from the liberal
tells us merely that participants in public political discourse are not in a
state, say, by living in small religious communities, which owe their
position to assume that their interlocutors are making the same religious
ultimate allegiance to the church or some larger religious tradition. If they
assumptions that they are. Stout maintains that liberal democracy is

committed only to secularism of the second sort. Indeed, even critics of which Stout adds that secularization (in the second, pluralistic sense
the standard view who affirm liberal democracy on religious grounds, such specified earlier) thus understood doesn't morally or pragmatically
as Wolterstorff, grant that liberal democracy is secular in Stout's second, preclude citizens from voicing their religious convictions in the public
pluralistic sense. Certainly, the liberal critics maintain, there is nothing square. Martin Luther King Jr.'s appeals to religious considerations, for
about liberalism that commits it to a version of secularism in which the example, were highly politically effective.
liberal state is an anti-Christian ecclesia or an alternate vehicle for
salvation, as some New Traditionalists have claimed (see, for example, The first worry regarding the New Traditionalists' declinist narrative, then,
Milbank, et al. 1999, 192). is that it is overly intellectualized, portraying the rise of secularism as
owing primarily to the influence of philosophical ideas and not to more
Suppose that the liberal critics are correct in their contention that liberal mundane sociological facts, such as the need to cope with increasing
democracy is committed only to pluralistic secularism. Is this commitment religious pluralism. The second worry about the narrative is that the New
the upshot of a broadly Scotistic view about reason and existence having Traditionalists misdiagnose the character of liberal democracy, attributing
taken root in modernity? If thinkers such as Stout and Wolterstorff are to its advocates commitments that they needn't accept. To better
correct, the answer to this question is also: no. Rather, both Stout and understand this worry, recall the pattern of argument that the New
Wolterstorff suggest that liberal democracy's commitment to secularism is Traditionalists employ, which is roughly the following:
the result of Christians themselves recognizing that post-Reformation
Christianity itself had become so fragmented that Christians could no Liberalism is committed to various philosophical claims and
longer appeal to scripture and tradition in public discourse under the practices that are incompatible with orthodox theism (or at least
assumption that their interlocutors would share their views regarding orthodox theism in its best forms, such as Thomism).
scripture and tradition (see Zagorin 2003).
So, orthodox theists should reject liberalism.
In support of this contention, Stout appeals to the historian Christopher
What are some of the claims and practices that fit poorly with orthodox
Hill who maintains that in 17th century English parliamentary politics, one
theism and to which liberalism is committed? If the New Traditionalists
increasingly finds members of parliament appealing rather less to scripture
are correct, at least these two: first, liberalism tells us that political systems
when engaging in public political discourse and rather more to
should be neutral regarding various notions of God and the good; they
considerations upon which they and their interlocutors could agree.
should not operate with an account of an overriding good for human
According to this counter-narrative, “secularization was not primarily
beings in whose light subsidiary goods can be ordered. Second, liberalism
brought about by the triumph of a secularist ideology….What drove the
is committed to the claim that moral and political discourse should be
secularization of political discourse forward was the increasing need to
couched not primarily in terms of the virtues, but individual rights. This,
cope with religious plurality discursively on a daily basis under
say the New Traditionalists has rendered liberal democracies a breeding
circumstances where improved transportation and communication were
ground for citizens who are individualistic, self-focused, and whose views
changing the political and economic landscape” (Stout 2004, 102). To

and behavior are destructive of community. According to the New respect are especially called for. And, particularly important for our
Traditionalists, these two claims are connected. It is because liberal discussion is Stout's further claim that pragmatism of this variety needn't
democracies do not operate with a thick notion of the good that the lend any support to the standard view. Expressing the virtues of civility
language of rights has supplanted that of virtue. For in order for the and respect is perfectly compatible with appealing only to religious
language of the virtues to be intelligible, it must be grounded in a thick considerations when making and supporting political decisions.
account of the good.
So, if the liberal critics are correct, one place to press the New
When properly qualified, liberal critics such as Stout are willing to grant Traditionalists' narrative is its claim that only within a thick, overarching
the first of these claims: liberalism does not in fact operate with a thick account of the human good are the virtues intelligible. There is, however, a
notion of the good. But they reject the further claim that this has rendered second place to press the narrative, which is its skepticism about rights. As
appeal to the virtues in a liberal democracy irrelevant or somehow deeply intimated earlier, MacIntyre and the New Traditionalists portray individual
conceptually confused. For consider, Stout argues, champions of rights claims as both false and dangerous, indeed, as the upshot of an
liberalism within the broadly pragmatist tradition, such as Walt Whitman Enlightenment conception of morality that is inimical to a properly
and John Dewey. These thinkers do not fit well into the MacIntyrean religious way of life (see MacIntyre 1984 and 1983). MacIntyre, for
paradigm. At their best, Stout maintains, Whitman and Dewey consciously example, writes that not only are rights claims on par with belief in
theorize from the perspective of a broadly pragmatic tradition that is “witches and unicorns,” but also that:
committed to the centrality of the virtues, albeit within a society
characterized by competing and rival conceptions of God and the good. there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language
correctly translated by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close
More specifically, Stout maintains that according to pragmatist liberals of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in
such as Dewey, good citizens of a liberal democracy aspire to express not Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or Arabic, classical or medieval, before
only civility and respect in public political discourse, but also to accept about 1400, let alone in Old English or Japanese even as late as the
some measure of responsibility for the conditions of society and the mid-nineteenth century. (MacIntyre 1984, 69)
political arrangements it makes for itself. And to do this, citizens must
reason with one another about the ethical issues that divide them and hold In reply, the liberal critics make two points. First, as a matter of historical
each other responsible, in ways that are decent and fair, for what is done fact, it is simply false that rights claims have their conceptual roots in the
and said. If the pragmatist liberals are right, reasoning of this sort requires soil of late medieval nominalism and Enlightenment morality, as
that citizens of liberal democracies display virtues of various sorts, such as MacIntyre claims. Rather, as Wolterstorff argues, appeals to rights are
openness to the views of others, proper respect for their positions, and so ubiquitous throughout history. One can find them, for example, in the
forth. In an inversion of the MacIntyrean position, Stout contends that it is ancient Romans juridical documents such as Justinian's Digest, the
at least in part because liberal democracies do not espouse some writings of the church fathers, and the work of the medieval canon
overarching, thick conception of the good that virtues such as civility and lawyers.[17] Indeed, according to Wolterstorff, appeals to what we call

inherent or natural human rights can be traced back to the Hebrew and to be obeyed, and God demands that we respect the worth of each human
Christian scriptures (see Wolterstorff 2008, Pts. I-II). If Wolterstorff is being. If the liberal critics are correct, then, any individualism that attends
correct, the scriptural tradition not only birthed our conception of inherent liberal democracy is a corruption. Perhaps it is a corruption to which
human rights, but also provides the conceptual soil most conducive to its liberal democracies are prone; but individualism is neither a liberal
survival, for it offers the most cogent account of the worth of human commitment nor, if thinkers such as Stout and Wolterstorff are correct, an
beings. If this is true, according to Wolterstorff, there is no incompatibility inevitable manifestation of liberal commitments.
between the liberal tradition's reliance on rights and a commitment to
orthodox theism. To reject liberalism because it is committed to and relies The liberal critics, then, are highly suspicious of the New Traditionalists'
heavily on the notion of rights would be a mistake. narrative and the philosophical lessons they glean from it. But suppose, for
argument's sake, that the narrative is largely compelling. Even if it is
Second, the liberal critics contend that any connection between the appeals compelling, the liberal critics insist that the New Traditionalists have
to rights in liberalism, on the one hand, and a tendency toward ignored an important option, viz., a minimalist account of liberal
individualism in its citizens, on the other, is highly contingent. Perhaps it democracy. According to this position, liberalism is committed to the
is true that contemporary liberal democracies have in fact had a strong following pair of theses. First, the state is to be neutral with respect to
tendency to promote individualism, where this is understood as a person's different conceptions of the good. The neutrality in question, however, is
having a distorted focus on her rights to the exclusion of her obligations inclusive in nature. It does not rule out the appeal to comprehensive
and responsibilities to others. But if we construe a liberal democracy conceptions of the good when making fundamental political decisions.
minimally, as a political structure that effectively protects a certain Rather, it only rules out the claim that the state is committed to promoting
schedule of individual rights (to religious freedom, speech, due process, one such conception. Second, the state is to protect a schedule of basic
and the like), it is plausible to suppose that exclusive focus on individual rights and liberties enjoyed by all its citizens. Its role is to ensure that its
rights is itself a betrayal of liberalism. After all, claim-rights almost citizens can enjoy such goods as freedom of religion, freedom of
always have correlative obligations: if you have a right to religious conscience, and equality before the law.
freedom, then I have an obligation not to violate that right. Furthermore, I
also have an obligation to take feasible measures to support political The liberal critics maintain that a view such as this deserves serious
institutions that protect that right. Any understanding of a liberal consideration by both defenders of the standard view and orthodox
democracy according to which citizens may insist on their rights without religious believers. The challenge that liberal critics such as Stout and
due regard for the obligations they bear to others and social institutions Wolterstorff pose to New Traditionalists in particular is this: Given that
that protect these rights is arguably both incoherent and a betrayal of basic moral and religious pluralism are here to stay, why would Christians and
liberal commitments. Thinkers such as Wolterstorff add that for theists other people of faith want to reject minimal liberal democracy—liberal
who affirm liberal democracy, it is natural to suppose that citizens who democracy shorn of its commitment to the standard view? What morally
ignore their obligations to respect the rights of their compatriots thereby feasible alternative is there to a political order in which the state employs
also violate God's rights. For, according to these thinkers, God has a right its coercive powers to protect the rights of each of its citizens?

Proponents of the New Traditionalism find this attempt on the part of the Is there likely to be any sort of rapprochement between these views? It is
liberal critics to marry liberal democracy with traditional religious belief difficult to know. Sometimes, however, positions that occupy the
naïve. If they are right, any political system that professes neutrality with conceptual middle-ground in a debate are the best candidates for unifying
respect to conceptions of God and the good is unacceptable. At best, it will what can appear to be irreconcilable positions. In the case at hand, the
be inhospitable soil for a genuinely virtuous and religious way of life. At liberal critics appear to occupy this conceptual middle-ground, straddling
worst, any such system will be an attempt to conceal the fact that the deep the standard view and the New Traditionalism. On the one hand, the
structure of liberal democracy, with its emphasis on personal freedoms and liberal critics find themselves sympathetic with the political commitments
procedural justice, fits poorly with the thick account of the good that of the standard view but not with the wariness about religion that often
orthodox religious believers endorse. According to these thinkers, the animates this position. On the other hand, the liberal critics find
conflict between liberal democracy and traditional religion runs too deep themselves sympathetic with some of the religious commitments
for appeals to minimalist accounts of liberalism to be effective. embraced by the New Traditionalists but not with their suspicion of liberal
democracy. Nevertheless, the liberal critics are vulnerable to criticisms
9. Summary from both sides. Advocates of the standard view will charge that they do
not take seriously enough the destructive and divisive effects of religion,
The theologico-political problem is one that concerns the problem of hard to quantify as they might be. And friends of the New Traditionalism
political authority. In its contemporary form, it primarily concerns the will maintain that they fail to recognize the corrosive effects of liberal
justification of authoritative political acts, such as the implementation of democracy on traditional religious ways of life. These are important
coercive laws. Can religious reasons justify the implementation of such criticisms, married to passions that deeply divide the proponents of these
laws? This is the central question with which political philosophers have views. Still, members of all parties to the debate agree that the task at hand
been concerned. The standard view tells us that religious reasons are never is to articulate ways in which citizens of a deeply pluralistic liberal
sufficient to justify coercive law. It therefore champions the DRR, or the democracy can conduct their behavior in manners that are not only faithful
claim that, if a citizen is trying to determine whether or not she should to whatever religious identities they may have, but are also just and
support some coercive law, and if she believes that there is no plausible contribute to the common good.
secular rationale for it, then it is impermissible for her to support that law.
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Boise Center for Religion and American Public Life, at Boston 1. Strauss borrows the phrase from Spinoza. Smith (2006) lucidly explores
College Strauss' views.
Center for the Study of Law and Religion, at Emory University
The Centre of Theology and Philosophy, at the University of 2. It proves tricky to distinguish religious from secular reasons. For our
Nottingham purposes, we'll assume that a secular reason is a set of claims that does not
Commonweal Magazine, a review of religion, politics, and culture include among its members any claim that has more or less explicit
First Things, a journal of religion, culture, and public life theistic content, such as the claims that God exists, that the Bible has been
The Immanent Frame, a Social Science Research Council blog on inspired by God, or that the Pope accurately represents the divine will. A
secularism, religion, and the public sphere religious reason, by contrast, is a set of claims that does include as a
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, a project of the Pew member a claim that has such content. Far more complicated is what to
Charitable Trusts make of the concept of a “plausible” or “adequate” secular rationale.
Radical Orthodoxy Online, resources and information maintained by Advocates of the standard position have articulated widely varying
James K.A. Smith at Calvin College accounts. We broach this issue in the next section.
Religion Clause Blog, maintained by Howard Friedman, University
3. Three clarifying points: first, the DRR has been formulated in
of Toledo
importantly different ways. In this essay, we consider what we take to be
one of its most plausible formulations. Second, there is conceptual space
Related Entries for the view that coercive legislation requires the support of both religious
and secular reasons. Since this view goes undefended, we will not explore
authority | autonomy: in moral and political philosophy | citizenship |
it. Finally, there are correlates of the DRR that apply to occupants of social
communitarianism | contractarianism | democracy | Habermas, Jürgen |
roles other than being a citizen. For example, there are correlates of the
justification, political: public | liberalism | political obligation | publicity |
DRR that we could formulate for judges, legislators, military officers, and
Rawls, John | religion: epistemology of | rights: human | sovereignty |
other public servants. For simplicity's sake, we focus on its application to
toleration
citizens. That said, some theorists claim that citizens need not adhere to
Acknowledgments the DRR, or any relevant correlate, by virtue of the fact that their causal
contribution to the enactment of coercive state measures is negligible. For
Thanks to David Billings, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Kevin Vallier, discussion, see Kevin Vallier, (2014).
Paul Weithman, Lori Wilson, and several anonymous referees for their
helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this essay. 4. To be maximally explicit: we assume that if a citizen believes that she
has only a religious rationale for supporting a coercive law, then she also
Notes to Religion and Political Theory believes that she does not have a plausible secular rationale for supporting
that law, which she can offer to other citizens.

5. Habermas, it should be noted, gives citizens wide latitude to rely on laws prohibit figures such as Qutb from practicing their religion as they
their religious convictions in public political discourse, but also advocates see fit; they are coercively prevented from, among other things,
expunging religious intrusions from the legislative record. implementing shariah code as legally binding.
6. It is plausible to hold that the normative standards that apply to the On a different note, it might seem that figures such as Qutb pose no threat
political role of religious reasons are context sensitive. For example, to the standard view. For it might be claimed that Qutb is not reasonable in
religious reasons might play importantly different justificatory roles in the relevant sense. Why not? To be reasonable in the relevant sense is to
liberal democracies that have relevantly different histories, traditions, be willing to cooperate with others. And, thus, it is to agree to fair terms of
levels of commitment to liberal democracy, and the like. To keep things social cooperation. Since coercion need be justifiable only to persons who
manageable, in this essay, we'll have our eye on liberal democracies that are reasonable in this sense, the presence of figures such as Qutb does not
bear a close resemblance to that found in the United States. undermine the legitimacy of government's coercive enforcement of the
right to religious freedom.
7. In that case, advocates of the DRR might require that citizens have a
sufficiently wide spread of secular reasons, though there is room for Suppose, however, that what leads Qutb to reject a right to religious
considerable disagreement regarding how wide that spread must be. freedom has nothing to do with his lack of concern for fair cooperation
and everything to do with a particular set of background theological
8. Mar Aba's commitment to “free faith” has been echoed by many and commitments that determine how fair cooperation should take place.
varied religious thinkers, from the early church fathers Tertullian and According to these background theological commitments, rejection of a
Lactantius to the early modern theorists Sebastian Castellio, John Locke, robust right to religious freedom is essential to social harmony and
and Roger Williams. This free faith argument is a religious argument communal flourishing. Those who insist on the coercive imposition of that
insofar as it depends crucially on a claim about what makes for genuine right are a grave danger to both individual and communal well-being. If
piety, a claim that some religious traditions have rejected (Digeser, 2000). this is correct, it is precisely Qutb's willingness to cooperate with others
that leads him to reject religious freedom.
9. For an expression of such a view, see Stout (2004).
Advocates of the standard view will not be satisfied with this response.
10. It is important to stress, however, that the argument receives other
The fact that Qutb relies in this way on his religious convictions to
formulations. For a nice summation, see Boettcher (2007).
determine what counts as legitimate social cooperation is precisely what
11. For a probing treatment of Qutb's objections to liberal democracy, see they regard as unreasonable. Suffice it to say that the role that appeals to
Berman (2003). reasonableness (and reciprocity) play in these discussions is vexed.
12. A point of clarification: we assume that even laws that protect certain 13. Perry further argues that the inviolability of the person can be
freedoms, such as the right to religious freedom, are coercive. For such defended satisfactorily only on theistic grounds. Other liberal critics, such

as Stout, however, do not accept this claim. 17. Thus, for example, Tertullian (2004): “It is a fundamental human right,
a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own
14. Of course, advocates of the standard view have the option of convictions: one man's religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is
reformulating the DRR in a manner that accords to religious and secular assuredly no part of religion to compel religion—to which free will and
reasons exactly the same justificatory force. According to such a not force should lead us—the sacrificial victims even being required of a
reformulation, a citizen may support only those coercive laws for which willing mind. You will render no real service to your gods be compelling
she has, and is prepared to offer, some spread of reasons that provide all us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling,
affected parties with reason that they regard as plausible. According to this unless they are animated by a spirit of contention, which is a thing
reformulation of the DRR, if a citizen knows that some of her compatriots altogether undivine.”
have (what they regard as) compelling religious objections to a given
coercive law, and if she cannot meet these objections, then she should not Copyright © 2017 by the authors
support that law. She should do so even if she has a plausible secular Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo
rationale for it. As we say, a version of the standard view that incorporates
this thorough-going impartiality between the religious and the secular is a
theoretical possibility, though we doubt that many advocates of the
standard view will be inclined to embrace it. (So far as we know, only one
has formulated a version of it; see Gaus, forthcoming.)
15. This is what Rawls calls “the proviso”: reasonable comprehensive

doctrines (and so religious reasons) may be offered “in public reason at
any time, provided that in due course public reasons … are presented
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced
to support” (1993: li-lii).
16. By saying that the narrative is similar to MacIntyre's, we do not mean

to claim that the New Traditionalists simply borrow their narrative from
MacIntyre. It is true that New Traditionalists such as Hauerwas borrow
liberally from MacIntyre. But, as best we can tell, New Traditionalists
such as Milbank tell a narrative that is not so much indebted to
MacIntyre's as isomorphic with it in crucial respects.

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Religion and Political Theory

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Perry, Michael, 2012. The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy, 6.

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16. By saying that the narrative is similar to MacIntyre's, we do not mean

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