4

M 32 (QMG)

BRITISH ARM
Q. M. G. BRANCH
Nov. 8, 1943. in 1967
JUL 0
Colonel M. R. Lubbock, O.B.E.

Comdg. General Staff chool,

Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Subject: Battic Lessons fro- a British Airfloured Division

The attached docu_:..11'6s have been received with a D. 0, letter

fro:. the G.I 7th Ar. Division, an extract from is renroduccd

below. The coil:,.ents refer to a rai:mhlot on Platoon Training.

"You have rightly stressed t:lanoeuvre in ordcr to : Let control'

which is of course vital and thc age old urincinle of fire and .love_ent

which is the basis of all tactics both =loured and unariloured. I do

feel however, that not enough stress is laid on Lunnery. ll our remmt

experience has sho'n that sneed and accuracy in gunnery, in that order,

arc the r:,ost il_mortant thins of the -.hole lot fron the Troop Leader's

and Tank Co Lander's point of vieL.

"The second thing hich you have not c.inhasised, and -yhich is

very nearly equally irrmortn'c, is the use of - Areless. Conflict° fa- Al­
iarity, constant practice and brevity Tiust be very highly developed in

each co= =nder. This has Len 2.:1ply nrovcC durin our operations in

this country. Every troop has been denloyed practically the whole ti,le

and troops, even individu. 1 tanks, can scldo- see each other. It is

obvious fro this that the hol.L) control of th,. troop, sauaOron and

regient devolves on - ircless and unless i -ireless training ol-1,1 disci­

pline is first class, there will obviously be -1 sha bias.

"The only other thins rilich I think should be stressed are

:..ap reading, choice of ground and an eye for country. This very close

country is da_ned difficult for tanks, and choice of ground is vital".

The 7th -r . Division has been in al ost ocntinuous co :bat in

this theatre of war, since June 1940; it is, ther-fcre, felt that their

re. arks .ay flrove of interest.

jor for
1.41R,

'T

OM GENE741

MM:zf

7th ARAOURED DIVISION

REPORT ON OPE1?ATIONS

The following report has been prepared as

a basis for studying conditions which are new to

this Division and for solving the ilroblem which

these conditions present,

. Major General,

Comd 7th Armoured Division.

Main HQ 7 Armd Div.

2021/5/G

17 Oct 43

EY

 S C

"

7th ARfiOURED DIVISION

OPERATIONS FROM NORTH AFRICA rgnOrITHZ,-R-IYER

VOLTURNO v PLES

'_PREPARATION.

lb The Division had moved to ilOMS on the concluSion of tho TUNIS tampaign4 It

was decided that the Division should be rei-equilDped in the HOMS area where it

would train as part of 10 Corps for operationa oVerseas probably ITALY, The

amount of time. available was not specified but it soon btoame clear this would be

at least two and.probably three months..

There were at this time two things :to do; First of all to train the Division

for warfare in .a totally different terrain to any that it had previously met and

secondly to re-equip it,

2. The Division was tired after its recent exertions and perhaps disappointed

that the immediate prospects wore not more exciting than HOMS which could not

be described as anything but a good desert camp area. However, everybody very soon

realised that the ,war was not over and that the Division' still had an important

part to play in the near future. Everybody soon got down to training with a will

and since there was a definite task in front of us it was easy to make training

practical and objective.

The first thing to get right was the individual training and the training of

tradesmen and specialists, TheBo were matters which had been neglected for lack ot

opportunity for very many months. Individual skill at arms and general smartness

were matters which required much attention. After this the training of officers

and senior NCOs in tactics in close count/7 was given very special attention by

moans of TEWTs, exercises and demonstrations. Finally the whole Division had to

be trained in landing on an open beach, This involved practice in driving on and

off ICTs and Las and having a sound knowledge of a Beach Group layout and its

functions, A great deal of time was givaa to the Combined Ops training.

3. The re-equipment of the Division was a most difficult task. When we came to

take stock of the state of equipment it was clearly going to be most difficult

to get' the kit into first-class order in three months. The first thing was to sur­
vey carefully what we had so that we knew uhat we wanted in the form of now vehicles

or equipment, and what we could repair given the necessary assemblies or spares.

We had expected to get something serviceable from the Division returning to

the Delta but in fact very little of their cquinmont was of any use and such little

that there was soon sent to 30 Corps sincg 30 Corps had priority for the SICILY

operation.

So everything we required had to come from the Delta a distance of 1500 miles

and the great majority of it by road as all shining was at a premium for the

Sicily operation.

Much was accomplished in repairing OUT own equipment. Every wireless sot was

stripped, serviced and checked. Every vohicle which ,could possibly be repaired

was repaired and every workshop and LAD worked flat out Spares, assemblies and

now equipment came very slowly but by the strenuous personal efforts of the Comd

10 Corps it did arrive just in time, ,

When the Division sailed it had had three uninterrupted Months of training

and its equipment was in first class order,

4. While the training and rc,equipment of the Division was in progress the plann­
ing of future operations had alsg, to be studied.. As we were a " ­ follow-up"

Division
. .
and not an Assault Division was chiefly a matter of keeping in touch,

and studying ahead, the topography of -419 theatre .of futurc.operations, For this

purpose a small planning staff was formed, under the GS0.1 and it included all the

Intelligence Staff, the IO RE and two pho:boaraphic interpreters. The list of

people in the know was kept as small as pQssible, A month before we sailed I put

all down to Lt-Cols in the full picture.qxcapt for the exact place which was kept

secret until a few days before embarkatiolg. I personally dxplained the type of

operation to all officers and full rank Ns of the Division (but without disclos­
ing the place) immediately before corrunen.Oang embarkation. The final
. story was told

to all men by their own Company Commande.c.A‘

Onc of the chief tasks of the plannimg staff was .to work out the mass of detail

required by the tMovementst Staff fortho7-mAbiirkatip,,o-f-Amen . -.1-apd.79picles. The

order of embarkation had to be decid_ecCa'idtoIè, 018‘pl'cida* 1*p4lbe -

changed,

- I- -4 •

without causing great difficulty. and CThe- order of embarkation is shown

, . •

 7th ARMOURED DIVISION

OPRATIO:TS FRO ORTH AFRICA TO ii

VOLTURNO via SAL:R.I.r0 MT. VESUVIUS AIM NAPLES

PART I.

in Appendix "A". It was based on the assum-otion that .17c might be required to assist

in the battle on the beaches imediately on landing but that the Division would not

be reouired to function as a comnletc formation in merations far from the beach­

head until comlotely lanC.Od. For this reason the order of landing aimed at pro­
ducing the Lorried Infantry Bdc Gp,.comn'osed initially of two Inf Ens, one Armd Rot

one Bty RHA I .one Tp RE - the next stac was to complete this group, then land Main

HQ - then land the Arrod .Bde and further artillery - then land Rar HQ and Services.

The order selected worked out exactly right.

7;1 OURED D Lzslim

4 40.0
4,
,

TE' .1.,TS FROM NORTH AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VO RY0 via SALERO., liT. VESUVIUS AND NAPLES.

PART II,

Landing and Concentration

5. The assault had boon made in the early hours of the 9th Sept. An advance

party had been landed on the first day with the Assault Division. This party

included the Brigade Comd of 131 Bds (whose Edo would be the first to land), re­
presentatives of each unit (on a Company basis) C.ue to land with the loading Ede,

a strong' dQtachment of military .nolicy under the APM and two Divisional Staff Offi­
.cers and DAAG and Staff Captain Q. The Div Staff officers were required to lay

out the Div concentration area,

The first Dart of the Div to embark included the Divisional Commander and a

small Tac HQ. This HQ included Comd and ADC,• G.II ppo,;10, CRP, CRE and 2 i/c Div

Sigs. There were no clerks, no offico, no mess, but the HQ was sufficient to

function.by verbal and wireless means. The rest'of the first party included two

infantry Ens of 131 Bde, 5 R las (placed under command of 131 Ede), one Bty 3 RHL,

one Tp RE, and the Ede Main HQ and Sig Section. The whole of this party sailed in

the ILTs leaving TRIPOLI on 13 Sep with the exception of -bile

.
infantry of the two

Inf Ens. Owing to lack of space in theLSTs and lack of other shipping the infar4i­
try were left out by the Movements Staff. This was most unfortunate and might

have had disastrous results. However, the infantry were sent over three days later.

Instead of landing on the evening .of tho 15th with a Edo Group ready at once to

fight I had one Armd Regt, one 13-by RHAi one Tp of RE and the transport of two inf

Ens.

6. The situation by the 1:=,th Sep was still most difficult. The beaches wore

still under gun fire, the bridgehead was only fairly firmly hold and the

troops of 46 and 56 Dive who had fought magnificently were, much stretched to

cover and hold the ground won. The arrival of 131 Ede Gp provided a rescr'vo for

the Corps. To start with this was placed for mobile cou#ter-attack tasks; later.

it was used to effect certain reliefs and re-adjustments within the Corps. . By

17th Sop the approach of the Eighth Army relieved the situation and dtring the

succeeding days the 10 Corps turned its attention to the preparation of an offen­
sive.

7. During this time the Division 77s building up in accordance with the order

of landing. Although the process of building up was speeded up as much as

possible, and in fact was in advance of schedule, it was a slow process. The reason

for this was the limitation of shipping and the fact that everything had to come

from TRIPOLI - a seven day turn round to the beaches at SALERNO.

S. Concentration commenced on 15th Sop and was completed on 30th Sep,nope Corps

.offensive opened on 22 Sep by which time much. of the Division wacaanded.,

However theoffensive operations of 46 Div 'could not proceed very quickly through

the VIETRI Gap and we were not able to pass through 46 Div until 2fAh Sop;• by than

nothing important was missing and the rest arrived in time to catch up. The land­
ing and concentration went extremely smoothly r the quick disembarkation andcleail

getaway f,rom the beaches was the result of pregious practice and training.- 'I was

told that the rapidity of loading at'TRIPOLI was 'most marked and materially helped.

the rapid turn round of the LSTs..

9. There is. no doubt that the :2,ST is the .perfect ship for the sea transport of

an Armoured Division. The whole Division Was moved by this means except for

the Infantry, of the Lorried Inf Ede. Personnel accompanied their vehicles which is

very convenient and important - it simplifies embarkation and concentration. If

mon are separated from their vehicles and the landing is on an open beach it wastes

much precious time joining them up.

A strong body of Divisional Police directed by the ABA was invaluable. In .

spite of much transport landing at tho,same time for Corps and other Divisions it

was easy to pick out and route correctly your (pm vehicles with your own polioP on

the spot.

10. If a dry landing is possible it is a very great advantage not to have to

waterproof. 7atorproofing must be carefully done if it is done at all and

it must be thorough. There is a tendency to slap grLase and pitch everywhere and

unless this is carefully supervised vehicles will be rendered unserviceable.

 7th ARMOURED DIVISION

OaRi,.TIONS FROU NORTH LFRICk TO T 1,RIVER

VOLTURNO via SALERUO .MT VESUVIUS',LND/NhPLE.S.

PLRT II. ,

The design of military vehicles should take into account the possibility of

having to be7aterproofed. For instance it.is practically impossible to waterproof

the petrol (radial) Sherman. The design of tanks should aim at the highest possible

fording level since their 7eight'for bridging purposes.presents a most'difficult

problem and a ford is a far easier solution.

The landing and concentration presented no problems rhich had not been pre­
viously considered and solved..

 /r

14
7th ABLIOURED DIVISION Welif

te

OPERATIONS FROil NORTH LFRICY. TO THE RIVER

1OIJERII0 via F4:LERNO MT 4r4VESUVIUS AND NIP4ES.

P.1..RT III.

NILRELTIVE OF THE LDUNCE THROUGH THE VILTRI al TO RIVER VOLTURNO.

O.MW,...•••••••• •11..•• M
• • •••••

The 46 Div wore .to clear the narrow VIETRI Gap as far as :GOLRELLE. The 7th

Armd Div were to pass through as soon as that point had been roached. In conjunc­
tion with the last stage :of the 46 Divis advance the American forces on the hills

to the VEST at 1.10NTE CHIUNZI wore to secure a bridgehead to cover the repair of a

bridge down the pass road. The 23 Armd Bdc were then to be released over this pass

and once down in the plain were to come .un,iticr command of 7th Lrrild Div.

••

The .cOnceptioh of .t4t advance. was that 23.1,rmd Ede and 7th Armd Div should

convelte on the B: 8LRNO.at Sel*FaI after cross.n . -thq SaNO the 23 Lrmd Edo:wqre

to take the coast road j3etween VESUVIUS and the sea tO-NAPLES, .and thence skirting

round the EAST of niat2s to 'plac VOLTURNO at UNCELL04' The remainder of the Division

-(131 Ede, 22 lrmd Bide cd all Div Tps) wore d,irected on anExis which passed tileth

round the nOrthsidd of Mti Ii83INIUS.towards the VOLTURNO.at.CLPUil..

The 23 krmd Bdp were not more than a strong Regtl GrOup consisting of The

Groys (ro4.cquipped with SiEltINS),1 The KDGs (Armd Oars) one. sqn 46 Recce Unit

24 Fd ficub less one-bty (1055?) and 573 Ed Coy. This force was very short of in­
fantry but the deficiency 77(2.1i made good by feeding forwarF.'. Lmerican units as ro..

quirod. Naturally this was slow and less satisfactory: than having their 0711 infan­
try. The remaindo,r of 7th .1',rma Div on the inland axis had to keep clear of 46 Div

until the time came to pass through. There 7E.0 no possible forward concentration

area and therefore thc,onlything to he done was to lay the Divi,sion out 'ill 'a Pre­
determined order of march along the road with its head as far foriard as the oper­
ations of 46 Div permitted, The length of road space required for the Div at 40

.V.T.E4 (excluding the 2nd line echelon) was 55 miles so when the head was emerging

the tail was still in the original concentration area near the beaches.

It was appreciated. that the first task On passing through .46 Div would be to

secure certain dominating ground. on our right and subsequently carry the advance

down the centre line through very close orchard country where the±e -ere few roads

and little opportunity for employing tanks across country'. For these reasons 131

Ede led the advance with one .1..rmd

.
Regt (5 R Tics), one Regt RHL and a' tp of RE undar.

command, The remainder of the DL with the Eediums leading rare under the CRL and

all RE except for one tp with the leading Ede were under GRE's control.

Liter crossing the SaNO and pasrsing the bottlo..neck made by VESUVIUS and

the hills to the north it was hoped there would be an opportunity of launching the .

Lrmcl. Bdc:

By the 'afternoon of 27 Sop it was clear that 46 Div would complete their

task thai evening.' It 7C1S therefore decided to launch 23 1.i-rid Ede down fi?om the

hills on our left during the night 27/2C Sep and pass 7th Armd Div through 46 Div .

at first light 2t3 Sep. Lt 0530 hrs on 21 Sop 131 Ede sent0 Queens to capture

the dominating c;round just outside the 46 Div final objective. This was . done quickly

and without sorious opposition. 131 Bde then led off down the main road CAVL DI

TIR4ENI NOCERL SCLFaI with a forward body as practiced and rehearsed during our

previous training. This consisted of a sqn of tanks, coy of inf, bty of RH/L comman­
ded by Tank Squadron Loader who was himself comthailded by the CO of the In En. Close

behind the forward body was the rest of the Inf Bn and Arty. The CO of the Inf En

(116 Queens) was very well forward himself an.: urged on the forward body at a good

pace.'

The very important bridge at SCI.FaI was captured intact by the forward body

7:ho drovo in the enemy covering troops and seized the, bridge before the enemy could

dostroy it although it Imo fully prepared for demolition. The rest of the day

evolved itself with a En battle in the streets of SCLMTI to clear the tarn and

resist strong enemy counter attacks to recrover the bridge. Grgdually the town

. was cleared and all counter attacks beaten back. This vies a fine days work by 6

Queens and their supporting. arms. •The neNt'da'i the. position was further improved

at SCLFLTI and it vies posible to pass over the 23 ,lrmd Edo'on their uay to POMPEII

and NLPLES. By this time a second bridge (Bailey) had buon built over the slam to

avoid the SCLFLTI bottleneck,

.e
famd Ede on the coast and 131 Ede inland fought

During the 29th and 30th th .23

their way forward through most difficult country where the enemy had only a few

narrow rds to watch and plenty of cover on each side in the *form of built up areas

or thick orchard country, On the. morning of 1 Oct the leading patrols of the KDG

entered NLPLES an'd 131 Ede reached &HU. VESUVI4NL, the bottlerneck on the north

 7th.ARMOURED DIVISION

OPLRATIONS FROM NORTH AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VOLTURNO via.
_
anEp .,d\TO MT.- VESUVIUS AND NAPLES.

FUT III..

side of VESUVIUS. The 11th Hussars commenced to work their way forward. 0n .2 Oct

it was decided to pass22 Armd Edo through 131 Ede as thc country stemed to open out

a little - that is to say there wore, more roads although the country itself was

just as close. SOIEA VESUVIANA was a most difficult bottle,nock as it was .com plc­
tely smashed and every bridge blown but'1 R Tks (leading 22 Armd Ede) found a way

round and made most'useful progress so that the. 4 CLY were able to work out on the

loft of 1 R Tks by the ,evening.

During Oct 3rd and .4th 1 R Tks made excellent progress in spite of the very

great difficulties of the country, and stubborn resistance by enemy infantry and

SP guns, There were many encounters with the enemy roarguards in the villages and

orchard country. In such circumstances the Gorman does not surrender when surroun­
derl. Ho must be killed and it is very wrong training to teach othcrwisq, The

object of getting round and behind your enemy is to kill him r. not to give him

an excuse to surrender.

At the same time 4 CLY were working forward on the loft of 1 R Tks experienc­
ing very much the same conditions and finding progress difficult and slow while

they picked their way through a mass of demolitions covered by rearbuard. Further

to the left again the 23 Armd Edo were making good progress until they reached the

QUALIANO area where demolitions and rearguards held them up until more American

infantry could be brought forward to deal with the villages and close cou#try,

On the 5th Oct the 1 R Tks crossed the REGI LLGNI after making causeway

crossing and turned WEST to clear the enemy from S WAIALA FOSSA.- At the same

time 23 Armd Ede cleared VILLA LITERNO and reached the REG' LAGNI. All bridges on

the REGI LAGNI, which runs parallel and aloproximately 3 miles SOUTH of the R

VOLTURNO, were blown. All brie,ges over the R VOLTURNO were also blown.
. By 6th

Oct it was clear that we would be unable. to capture any bridge intact on the R

VOLTURNO, It remained for the 1 R Tks on the riaht and 23 Arma Belo on the loft to

clear up all Dockets of resistance between the REGI LIGNI and the VOLTURNO. This

was.accomplished without difficulty, Tile next phase then opened with 56 Div coming

up on our right. to GAPUA and 46 D:.v takjinc; over the GANCELLO front from 23 Armd

Ede, 131 Bde then came forward and closed up on the S MRIA LA FOSSA GRAZZANISE

sector of the VOLTURNO.

 7th ARMOURED DIVISION

OGERATIO:TS PIM NORTH AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VOLTURNO via SAL:RNO T:IR: VESUVIUS AND NAPLES,

PART IV,

GENERAL LESSONS

1. The country through which the division operated was unusually difficult.

would therefore be a mistake to make deductions or offer solutions to mee'b

exclusively this type of country, But it is certainly possible to recognise the

kind of difficulties which Armoured Divisions will moot in close country and to

draw useful deductions from this experience.

2, In close country Tanks must have available more infantty to work with them

than the one Motor En in the Arpd Edo. The Motor Br, was just sufficient in

open country, In close country there must be plenty of infantry for clearing, zurr­
bunaing and Searching villages and also for clearing thickly wooded country. The

Tanks .themselves are much restricted" to roads and tracks if there is an abundance

of ditches and :bank obstacles. Tanks are remarIcably blind when vines and trees

just cover Tthe turret. The probabiliby of these conditions was appreciated and for

this reason much training was carried out by each,A.rma.. Regt with Bns of 131 Infanr,

try Edo, A technique was worked out by 131 Edo for such conditions assuming one

ArMd .Rerrt, under command. This was applied from CAVA:to SOMA VASUVIANA and was

most successful since it led to the capture of the crossings over thc R SARNO at

4WATI intact, opened the road to NAPLES and got the Division round VESUVIUS. The

training had bocn basically sound. The Tanks play a.predominant role until contact

and thereafter a supporting role to the infantry. Success is dependant on a very

intimate understanding between the Tanks, the Infant7 and the !Artillery.

.3. In the next phase it was hoped to pass throuh the Armoured Car Regi but al7

' thoUg14 a
few troops got outand provided some valuable information it was never

possible to. L_et them well ahead since they were themselves held up by the demolir

tions and restricted country. The battle in fact never opened- up enough to Ave

the Armoured Cars their chan6e except for a short -period on the left wl?.on thp °new

abandoned the coast road to NAPLES and the KDGs.'weTre Quick to 'take advantage enter.,.

ing HAPES'and quickly regaining contact beyond the -town, There was nothing to

indicate any flaw in the organisation of the Armoured Car. Regt but undoubtedly the

Armoured Car troops have got to fight their way forward much more than has been

necessary hitherto. The dismounted troop and the SP 75 mm gives them the means to

do so. WC have been so accustomed to a complete screen of Armoured Cars on the

frontand flank of the Division that we must now recognise that this will often be

absent particularly when the enemy is able to present an intact front in close

country.

The 22"rmd Ede was passed through 131 Bde as the country seemed to open up with

a network Of roads and it was desired to maintain the impetus of the advance at the

highest possible speed and at the same time collect 131 Edo in hand IH case there

was any opporunity of a quick operation to seize a crossing over the VOLTURNO.

The 22 Armd Bdc moved with two regiments forward each on approximately parallel

centre lines. The progress of the Edo was rapid considering the difficulties and

1 R Tksiin particular did very well. But there is no doubt, that progress-Would

have .boon more rapidif both leading reats had more infantry at their disposal. To

moot a situation of this kind it is most desirable to have the ability toThond

forard some infantry from the Lorried Infantry Ede in armoured semi-tracked vehicles.

Each armoured regt had one Motor Coy and at one stage T R Tks had two Miotor.Coys.

Mne En of 131 Bde . was also placea under command 22 Armd Ede to establish a bridgehead

Over the REGI'LAGNI but what is required is the means of augmenting the infantry

working in direct co-operation with the -Tanks when the Motor En proves insufficientp

as it may often do in close country.

It is considered that the infantry in an Armoured Division is sufficient. The

Divisional Commander can either lead with the Lorried Infantry Bdc and some Tanks

(as was done up to SO....,E‘,,IA VESUVIANA) and the infantry is thenadqquate but the pace

.after contact will he that of infantry, on foot. Qt. the Divisional Commander can

lead with the Armd Edo whose infantry my not prove sufficient unless augmented by

the lorried Infantry Bde, infantry sent forward in such circumstances to work with

the Armd Edo cannot be satisfactorily sent forward in 3 ton lorried - if they are

sent. in 3 ton lorries they will have to debuss well behind the Tanks, they :will hav.c.

no wireless communication to the Tanks and the 'object of quickworking infantry in

close co7o13eration.with the Tanks will not -be achieved.- The ability to send for

ward an infantry coy in semi-track Armoured White Scout Crs would be invaluable

This Goy would' not reouire, anything beyond the usual coy weapons since the support-.

ing arms with the Tanks and the Tanks themselves would 7-provide all that is required.

The solution offered is. to molInt, pac( coy ofeaCII:l.prried'HinNitry Bn in ser:Ii­

track Armoured White Scout Cars. 11,14be,C,-„LrOIC;\b-c
on th9lpist±lAishment of the

ii . 1_,,, '.1)...) •

.L:­);..i '1
 girifigit4kiiit,1. Lie

7th AMOURED

OPTIONS FRal NORTH AFRIGh I

VOTJTURM via SALT,RNO, MT ITI]SUV_

'"

troop carrying coy RASO which works with the Lorried Infantry Bde and should com­
prise one section of each transport platoon. The Coy and P1 Comds must have 19 Sets

so that the whole party can link on to the Armd•Regt Cod's net this is most

important as the infantry must be fully in tho picture of the battle the whole time.

5, JUIJIOR TEADERHIP. In 'open country the more senior colilduanders can exorcise coia­
. trol and give suitable diredtions dma .orders. In close

country this is far more difficult Much more res-consibility is thrown on the

- Junion. Leaders whose standard of tactical training must roach a very high standard.

This standard•will.only be reached by constant attention and education by commanding

officers. This education must be regarded as part of operations and not a.matter

which can be shelved until the next training period. Under the heading of leader­
ship the training in recce duties is most important, particularly in the recce ­
troops of the Armd Regts. The study must be appropriate to the immediate theatre

of war,

6. DIV ORGANISATION. This is sound basically except that it is felt there is a case

for increasing the- number of Armd Regts in the Armd Bide from

three to four. On first sight this seems a contradictory recommendation whdn thq

experience has boon a desire for more infantry rather than more armour. The reco­
mmendation is based on the desirability of being able to give the Lorried Infantry

Bdc an Armd ReLt under command and yet keep the Armd Bde with three Rec.;ts
,
the

minimum required when it operates as a Bdc.

7. MISCELLANEOUS. Details are Liven by arms but there are certain poini,o of ,.;enera4.

nature which it is desired to stress.

(a) Insufficient use' is made in the BrAish Army of the 5mA-track vehicle, In

the, desert they wore- a luxury which could be dispensed with but over wet,

boggy and sodden ground they are far superior to the theeled vehicle. The

White Scout Car san.i-track has proved itself very reliable and should be' the

basic 15 cvt vehicle. It is a very good tower and load carrier.

(b) .Two wheeled drive vehicles of 15 cwt and over should be regarded as obsolqte.

(c) The SP (Priest) Fd Arty is excellent and should be the standard equipment

for an Armd Divls field arty !- both reLts and not only the one which is.

expected to give close support to,the Armour.

(d) The Bailey is an e xcellent bridLe. It is not necessary to carry more than

the. 80 ft at present allowed in the Armd Div provided there is a ready .

supply behind under the C,E.

The fording. levels Of a

tank should be as high as possible and be a. definite

part of the design of a tank. The bridging problem for the. tank over a wide

water obstacle is so great that far the easier solution is a ford. It

should not be 'necessary to waterproof tanks..

, The Motor Bn motor pl and mortars Dust be carried in ArLid White Scout Cars

. (preferably seYA-track), This has been stressed in many previous reports.

(g) Company Commanders in Lorried Inf Bns require Jeeps to get about and do

their recces - 15 cwts take up too much room on the road.

 7th ARMOURED DIVISION

OPERATIONS FROM NORTH AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VOLTURNO via SALERNO HT. VESUVIUS 1-iED NAPLES.

..........__ ....v.; ........ft.e......sw.onni..........r,.6.a......,a.,—...a.....s..-.........0.1.

PART V
„........-. .....
..,,,,„.,,'
•

LESSONS BY ARS, Li

1.. RA

1. Experience during the last few weeks has revealed certain colalunication

difficulties.

On the CPA's fwd net all thc sots are no 190 oxcopt for a No 9 in ACV. 5,

When Regts çro widoly spread out in this type of country wireless .communications

frequently fail. While this set may .bc satisfactory in an Arrad Rogt whore distances

arc not so great, in Arty units a Dore powerful set is required,

?. HQ RA of an Ard Div on Hone Establishuent has f'our LOs, These LOs in Arrad

Cars with wireless could be usefully erlployecl. as step. up sets in between

the
CRA and distant reats, ilso to nerforn the nuz.orous LO jobs now carried out by

untrained officers called in frau mats.

3, Similarly HQ RA on Hone Establishuent have six 1Jotor cycle DRs. In this

typo of country with narrow crowded roads sa:.0 DRs would be useful for thc

rapid i ssue of firo plan tracos etc, which otherwise have to be collected by Rets

theuselvo,s,

4. The Air Op has proved valuable, and has been. used 'constantly. Suitable

landing grounds are not always easy to find, especially in wot weather, - If

Datting strips were carried pc=ncntly as part of the flights cquipi:lent there

would be less Chance of aircraft being grounded by unexpected bad weather. 250 yds

would be sufficient and would need 2 three tanners.

,5. SP ,A tk guns could have been euployed in this area EAST of VESUVIUS. They

could have uoved off tho roads and through vineyards to attack enci:iy tanks

holding up 131 Queens Bdc. This was ,I.possiblo with the present oquipent,

6..Observation in the close .coulltry round VESUVIUS was difficult. Good results

were obtained on eneuy guns by sound bearins by-cor::pass in one case near

CARDITO. Six 105 rA:c.,s were found knocked out after being located by this uethod.

(1) Roads. This Div has advanced up a single road before couing to ITALY but it

has always been able to by-pass the 'road and take to the desert. Bypassing now is

often out of the question so brides or deviations have to be Liado:. 2icanwhile the

whole Div is halted. 'VTher'eas in tie - desert Tps• of Fd.Sqns could be fed into.a road

at right angles over a •length of several lailus and so. work on a long stretch of road

at a tine, to do the., sane thing npv: the Fd Tns have to .overtake- a long,colum„ This

is necessary and it should be recognised that-Sapper units, including the bridging

lorries and Bulldozers, should 1)0 cased forward and given leaguer areas to the side

of the Div axis in preference to other an,s. Then they can work on the greatest

possible length of road frou front to roar.

(2) Water Sup-qy. Unit war trucks arc handicapped by having a pp which will

only lift about 15-ft and'eater points have had, surprisingly enough, to be provided

on the sane scale as in the desert, .

(3) Bridr,,-Usa. Bridging 1c4rries have always coe up quickly when asked for. Bridge

sites are a choice between two evils.

(a) That
on a good ap..proc..ch road accurately registered by ena:ly arty.

(b) That on a badayoroach road needing Duch labour to wake it all weather.

The ideal site would be one on a covered approach out of .-:lany equally good.

The . choice of a bridge site nay dictate the CoDdls plan.

(4). . Rivor Crossins. 'TILisp need as careful training and tine for preparation

of stores as a coJoined operation, which • in fact it is without the technical shill

of the Royal Navy to assist j.T wateransIti,- and navigation.

3.. SIGNALS

1.• Wj_releps. The effective- range of wireless is decreased on an average by

about 5670 as'collpared with thcl desert (ground wave). It is also greatly affected

by:

(±) liountains,

.(ii) .Li profusion of crverheaci 'Ares, railway lines and built up areas contain­
ing steel fraed. buildings.

(iii) Electrical ston-ls,

(iv)
Wet -cmatliur.rrzRfl 0,
u .I(

COunter ueasurcs are •possible to a co tri

).-Litif.t:: \iovitsiz

 , 4
. 21,0049S4rakt
4g

7th .L.f?,i'.i0UTIED DIVISION

OPERL.TIO-ZS FRO TO T.I.1 RIVER: m

VOLTURif0 via _11 VESUVIUS AtD IPLS,
r..
R.HT

Liountains .

(a) Site wireless stations wherever possible on fl Lroune­ c`<•>

the uinimuLl land 'lasses between it and the distant stc...tion. ,4

(b) Try alternative sites, "Dead spots" of lLitcd area: are notf:1

uncoL,i.].on.

(ii) Oyerb.ead_wires Otc.

(a) Select the ..lost open site possible.

(b) Erect an aerial woll . abovc the wires ,:therever possible.

(C) Note that transversu 'Ares are Dore hary:Iful than .Wires running

parallel to the desired direction of trans:Assion.

(d) Towns (containinL steel frahed buildinLs etc), lyinr, in or near

the direct line of trana_iission cause considerable attenuation

by absorbtion and should be avoided.

(o) Where, owing to the necessity for fin:, standing, it is necessary

to site wireless stations in towns, aerials should be erected

as high as possible. To obtain the necessary effective height

a 3/4 wave typo of aerial my be found preforble to the ::,ore

usual 1/4 wave typo.

(iii) .The host efficient Leri'al possible in the 1:Lost open site possible will,

in conjunction with adjust.cmt of the H.F. gain control, Live the op-

signal noise_ ratio. But partial or coplete 'blackouts' are

to be expected. 'Key conversations' by Q.W. nay succeed where speech

fails.

(iv) Unless great care is taken -considerable loss of signal strenth will

result fro:. leakage across aerial insulators. These .11ist be ke-ot

clean, and free fro caoufla, nets etc which I.ALht short circuit

:thou.

In Lenural every care 1:Lust. be taken to• reduce aerial . resistance by kC:eninc.;

aerial sockets and the joints betl'i:.en acrj.al sections scrupulously clean and lightly

sacared with..petrolou-L jelly -

NOT onLino• oil.• .Where sets are carried in rubber

typed vehicles result's nay often be L:.proved by earthing the set to an earth in

.driven into the ground,

2. The reduced efficiency of wirdess. co-=

uust be off set by. the 1:lore libera

provision of line cam, and the cr)loy::lent of LOs .and DRs.

This reuires, the siting of Hr2s i::11(.,r6ver possible in•proxiity.to arteries of

coTan waick ither exist or are to be developed. It also involves a decreas in the

nobility of HQs,

3. Line Gums.,

(7-Ticl.d cable. Exprience has shown that field cable laid on the ground is

extreLely unreliable. It is also difficult to mintain, hioreovr field cable, par­

ticularly Ililerican 'ET rapidly deteriorates in ,E.ud and water. Field cable routes

Dust wherever possible be 'kept off. the around by taking advantage of hedges, walls,

fences, trees and buildings.• Cab.L.;s Dust_ be tied back at frequent intervals, slack

mist be left at suitable intervals_ to facilitate repairs,• and crossings either

overhead or buried, Dust be properly constrcted. This consider:.bly reduces the

speed of laying, but neglect of these rrecautions will probably delay setting lines

through and will 'certainly result in interruptions. The Lzportance of recce reuirs

increased er]phasis.

(b) Porimnont_Line. There is a profusion of PA and powermablos in the country,

and care u1 prior recce frequently enables these to be used to advantage. 1:laxiLluD

use laust be IJade of existing coons, including cncy poled cable and cuad routes.

By this ec-ins better speech . is obtained over -longer distances, and expenditure of

field cable is econouised, The existency of P/I, routes, their capacity and condi­
tion, and the nuDber of identity of cirouits appropriated :Aust be .reported without

delay to the next higheriforDation. Negative reports are also of value.

4. Anticipation, Great iuportaneo attaches to the anticipation of 1.1oves, and the

develowlont of th6 artery as far forward as possible. Iii a nuuber of cases it ha2

been possible by this y:ioans.to provide line corm on, or shortly after the arrj,val

of Div H(7.1 in a new location. To do this laist bd the ailA of Sinals. •

5. Conclusion._ Wireless,reains the prii:iary zieans of col:in in an l'iroured Divi­

sion.. The, broadcasting of inforiJation is as iidportant as ever. • Increased. ii:ipor

tance attach,:s to anticipatory action by Signals. The organisation and training of

the Divisional Signals developed in the dd,sert re::_ains.effebtivc.

1

I I.' , a.4
.

 1-
7th (..-q7)1JJA,4p ­ pi:vicsioN ,

OPE:it.lr.PIONS FRO., 1\10P,Tis-T_ L.FRIC4-. TO 1J-113

f VLR'

VOLTUEj0
_ via SALRPO 1P7 UVIUS AFT . NIT)L7S

"

•
4. aLaVI.CES.

(1) ;..i.aintenance.
- In the desert the problo-f.2 of i_laintaininrJ.: an firtld Div v,Tas
one

of distance, In the. close country encouttcred during these operations the problcu

is one of. road space, It 7,;- as found necessary to keep five days rations and 200 railes

of POL vilth both the ArEd and the Lorried Infantry Bdes so that v,,hen a final break

through happened it was unnecessary to encuuber the road with replonish:Jent vehicles.

(2) In this o-eration no trouble was encountered -with [,,ett4aa ann forward but

it is felt that had there been a higher expenditure this night have been a serious

probler.:,

(3) It was found that the best nothod of roplcnishent was for 2nd Line to. for]:,

Bde FMC in RASO . Coy areas and for the replonishr2ent vehicles to draw frcm there.

The 2nd Line Coy to be located well forward and ntt in the Corps. FMB area.

(4). Reinforcents. Insufficient. provision hds boon nade in the scale of rein­
forcerlents provided to cope for the increased nuAper of sick evacuated in this

theatre.

-
i.einforceilents received since disol:ibarkation have rJore than
. covered battle

casualties in this Division, but dfic to the nuuber of sick evacuated (who 1­j_11 return

in duo course) units have renamed in many cases well below WE. This is particularly

so in the case of infantry bfficers and ORs.

If units arc to be kept at WE this moans that a sufficient supply of rein

forceents zaist be available to take the place of those evacuated Sick, who will

return (in jLost cases) within a uonth, In addition, pcmanent replacecnts Ilust

be provided for nost battle casualties,

- It is difficult to give any definite figure as conditions will vary widely

at different seasons and in different counts.

(5) Little difficulty Izs experienced in the handling of R.= . units­.

It cannot be overuojhasised that at the first npi.D.ortunity a suitable place as far

forward as possible and with a hard standing should be found for workshops. This.

enables then to put in the Imxinuu auount of repairs for the uaxi=u length. of tiOe.

 ....12,...

r)t

7th AR-J.,0U­RED DIVISION

OPE:LLTIONS FRU;: NORT.I. AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VOLTUR.I0 via SL.LEIYO, -J',­IT. VESUVIUS AND iTAPLIZ

haw,

Piii_ZT VI,

NOTES ON THE COHAND AND CONTROL OF AN AMdOURED DIVISION.

1. Sub-Division of

Fm Both in the Cosort and in closG country it has buun found

advisablO to oporate three Figs,

-Tad HO

This is of variable size. It always includes thu Cod, ADC GII(Ops) and

a. LO. It is rlountod in whathappons to bo thu z,ost suitablo vehicles for thu

occasion. It is prepared to stay out indefinitoly but it :Just bo backbd by a Main

HQ for roplonishucnt, roPlacelJont of battcrics and written clerical work. It has

no ciphcr porSonnol and can only keop continuous watch on thu wiroless by day. It

Dust rzet onto a tolephone by night, The LO always travois in a Jcon.(with W/T.Sot).

Thor° is also a s.-all sianal party in a Whito Scout Car Carryi_n sparo battorios,

cable and chargina plant. A throb ton lorry carryinL; replonishont fuel oithor

accuLpanis or visits daily. •Thu altornativc .oans of conveyanco of tho .Co:Jd and

his Staff Officors is-drawn fron a coiYoinati_on of thu followins whiclos.

(a) Cacild Grant fittod as an offico. with two wiroluss sets. It has iood

cross-country -aapabiltios,- is arDourod and can follow whero thu tanks

(b) Cut, down Grant - sahlo as CoLd Grant but with a boiAor view and :Jam

rool2y - not suitablo at ni2;ht or in vcry inclonont wcathor,

(c) Cut down H6nuy thoro aro throo of thuse so that ono can bo loaned

to CPA or CRE wh,11 roouirod. Thus() aro very L;ood recco vohicic)s - fast and handy

with ,00d cross-country ability. Fittod with two No 19 Sets.

(d) White Scout Car - fitted as an office - suitablo for lonL distance

road work.

(0) Two Jours oach fitted to takc a No. 19 So-t,

TAO HQ uovos about in accordance with the reQuirc:Lonts of the battle 9

usually near thu Bdo Coad wost involvoa. Thu CPA :Jay accoJ1Dany Tac or attach hLi­
solf to thu loadinc; Bdo. The ORE gonorally iiiovos during the day but joins up with

Tao at night.

Thore is no necd to put Tao on thu telophono by day but at niLht it is

always hoped to gut a telephone to Main and this is usually dono by placing Tac

noar a Bde HQ. This is nocossary for soveral roasons (i) the signal personnel and

Staff arc ,not sufficient to mintaJn continuous wireless watch (ii) discussion of

futuro plans by CoLd with -G I and A/Q is facilitatod (iii) discussion by thu Co;:pd

with thu IntelliL,once Øtaff is often LJ-oortant and tl-d.s yJust for security reasons.

be dono by tolophono.

lain 40 This j.s run during operations by the GS0 I. It is thu co-ordinating'

contro for tho God's ordors and ducisions. It.is also the rocuptable for ordurs

fro above. It thorefor° includcs tho.•full staff of 0ps, Intullionce, Sinals,

RA and RE. It has an air sup-Port torltaclo if allottbd to Div. It can opuratc on

thu aovo. Thu Div Cod is very dopo,ndunt on his Main HQ, and can only function'in­
dupondontly of it for a short tt:to br with great loss of control arid officioncy,

Roar_ lic'; This is run during oporiations by the AA and CIEG. • It includes all the

adinistration staff .and the Roads. of Sorvicos. It can work on tho .joVC:,. All

planninc: of theCoirid 1 5depondcnton the Ad.

..nistrativc Staffs .and &rvicos buin3

able to Doot his reuiro;_onts.

It way be that Tao HQ rojoints 7.1ain in the ovonin& or that the CoLd

joins Hain locvin th vcj, cls of hi S Tac HQ forward to be pickud up again in tho

uorning.

The sub-division of HP,is .0, :plainod in SOU° detail because it is i.Liportant

•that the Cod and Staff should eivolvo a dofiniL syste:_i_ of working and thoroughly

understand Oach other. 13. dofinto systun also helps the Signals.

All HQs can bo.indepondont: of buildings but in,a country full of btildinss,

and vihn,tho -A­.:ather is inclement, it is Often convoniont to wake use of buildinL;s

and the hard standings adjaeon to thou. Siting Hqs in wet . eathor is not easy

and thu disnersod .i.ethods. of tibo desert are not suitable on ,:fot and buggy fields.

The location of HQ is ipportant since it Dust be convcniont to thu contro lino and

ca-oablo of dovolopinL good cp,unications. The Co:Jd and G I :All be continually

thThking out their next yovo,,

Diroctinan advance. The advance is controlled by defining a .centre lino and

laying down curtain bounds. ,

The centre line =st bc carefully chosen_so that a success­

ful advanco will provide thp •Division with a two way route for its ;:ip.intonanco.

T4hon,thc Division is col.Apoqcd of ono.ArLid.Bdo and ono Lorriod Infantry DJo ono .centro

line is given. One Bdc loc;ds followed by tho other Bdo and Divisional Troops. It

is a 2­ _attor for decision; according to thu nature of thu country, which Ddo leads.

If the ArEd Bdo loads the Lorried Infantry Bdo follows ready to take over ground

won and doveloP a fin; base or ready to pass through the Arad Bdc if a task suitable

 1 i
,.."'! fl *C.T--' r7 71 iø%i-i­
7".‘ •ii l./
-;,"7-17-
r,,,,--4, t...•, .- .1 .:,
.i.. i. ;

, ,',..,.,,
t)c.
41,- ''',. \\ *_. P:r.11

ti.. 1
v
,i _ 4 -n 7t1.
- I ,1
7' ,i31, it:- . f,j.v.ipt,„

\*--‘•

1 i. A:,\c„,).,4.,,, - ­ -, •• __,
'..!' "

, , •:,-, '17„,,:i -,. , .

AFRICA TO THE RIVI,R,

VOTiTURNO via SALERNO MT, •VESUVIUS AND TAPLES.

PART VI.

..........._...............

to them is presented. When the Lorriod Infantry Ede leads th _ Bde.follows

in readiness to pass throun:h as soon as an opportunity occurs nr.to support the

flank or flanks of the Lorried Infantry Bde..

• When thure is a sGcond Ilnad Ede it miEht well be given a separate

cnntrc line, but if this is done the two centre lines should be kept within sup- ort­
ing distance of each .other.

.A bound is a necessary means of control. The bound is chosen for its

tactical and topograrhical @significance and one bound should bo within field artil­
lery range of the last - say 5 to 6 niles This facilitat-s the development of

full arty support - from one bound to cover the advance to the next when opposition

is not - but the advance does not. norually wait for this deployment of arty which

is only =do when a strong apposition s net, Bounds are therefore captured in

succession - recce at once proceeds to the next - and the advance continues without

pause but the systom gives the Div Coud an opportunity to intervene if he wishes to

do• so.

Therefore the centre line and bound is the foundation of the advance.

Everybody knows they must exert the maximum pressure down the centre lino and not

be side tracked or drawn into minor battles to the flank which do not help to de­
velop the rapid advance down the centre line. Unless there is soLo final objective

there is no liyAt to the advance which must be pressed from first light until the

light fails. As a matter of routine ap rox one hour before dark co ds automatically

begin to make their night dispositions and if possible got themselves disengaged,

secure and capable of being replonishod. If this is done well.a good start can be

madc at first light the next day. An untidy end to the day :loans unnecessary loss

of rest and bad replenishment, The Bde leading down the centre line may not be able

to follow exactly' the centre line given and it will then select the best alternative,

always keeping as near the centre line as possible. Bounds :.lay lead to battles.

Since they arc selected for their tactical significance this .111.st be expected. The

development of a battle on a bound should be no surprise to anybody. Because it is

p.o surprise everybody will be prepared.

The development of thc_advanco. SoDetiLes the advance may go without pause or

hindcrance until the final.objective Is reached or until thc limit of administrative

possibility has been attained. But if the enemy resists the advance he must be over­
come, The first card to play is more artillery and that is why the Armd Div; should

always move in such a way that this card can be played in full and quickly. ijedium

arty well up behind the leading bdc will often make the enemy decide to quit. hare

and more arty is the best and surest answer to eject the enemy. The flanks must

be found and any way of surrounding these must be exploited without delay. If the

enemy has an intact front on a prepared position it may be that an Armd Div will

not be able to penetrate his front or envelope his flank. It then becomes a matter

for assault or lar2ie scale manoeuvre. At this stage it is wise to get close enough

to your eney:,y'to.corvo hiu closely but not so close that you yourself are pinned

to the sround. Infantry whose task will be to assault the enemy will have to get

.v0i7 close in order to develop their patrollinL, and gain the most intimate knowledge

of the enemy's defence and his dispositions.

The Ari.ld Ede at this stagc should stand back sufficiently to maintain

observation and retain the power of Dalocuvre whilc, the cross probing of the enemy's

position is undertaken by the Lorried ,,Infantry Ede,

44 Holding ground. By its presence in any particular area an Armd Div will deny

' this ground to t4e enemy. In this LiannGr armour can hold ground

but this is not an economical way of holding ground for any length of time. The

same ground can be held far more effectively by A tk guns, infantry and Arty and if

the nedd for holding ground is likely to continue for any length of time it is im­
portant that the ground should be taken over by a force of all arms, withour armour,

so that the armour can box:leased tp play a more mobile role... In the first place

the Armd Div can relieve itself with its Lorried Infant/7'13de and restore mobility

to the armour, Eobility is not r9stor,ed to the armour in order that the armour can

go away and have a rest. When motility is restored to the armour the forces holding

the ground in front of it can be, sure of quick and rapid supi,ort at any threatened

r,oint. Without mobility of this, kind armour will not dare move for fear of uncovcr­
ing a vita point in the battlefield,

5. The defence On ground wheretari:rour has any freedom of manoeuvre it can play an

iDnortant and even vital pc.rt in the syst-:, of defence.

. •

The systcEi. of:*defence must be built • Up without armour. That is to say the

disposition mist depcnd on A tic guns, i,.nfantry e and arty and perhaps natural and

artificial obstacles. Behind this screen tie armour must be repAy to move up and

iLullodir_,.tuly strengthen the threatened poi nt, This-, cm. uaidaT3'y 166 V.one by hoIdino;

- t
t

J ,

.„,

 OPEIL1TIai\ A i

VOLTURNO vic MT. VESUVIUS AHD NAP

PART VI.

which it

the amour centerally and having various alternative battle. positions to

find. The

can ove,
By judicious selection such positions arc not difficult to
arour can quickly give depth to the defence and intervene in the battle,
It does

whether the defence position is being attacked by infantry

not natter tole amour

or armour or both'- it is equally capable of dealing with either or both by day.

on

By night or during fog' or mist its value is almost nil since the armour depends
its . firc.power:to produce results and this cannot be developed in conditions of

bad visibility.

recog-

It is very imortant that the infantry working with the armour should
this way,
If the infantry are of weak morale

nise that the amour is best used in

and ask for tanks to stand close to them in defence before an attack has opened

to

they mist realise that while this can be done it liuits the scope of the arour
assist in strength at the threatened . point when the attack of the ene4 is

developed-.

Infantry of high -rJorale and good training will be quite happy to rely on their .own

resources and A tic guns to repel at least the first 'fury of an enemy attack.

The infantry DUSt have had a reasonable time to prepare their defence system.

Modern weapons enable the infantry to do this very well and very quickly. When

tanks Cone up to support infantry they do so by using their weapons. The chief

tank' weapon is the 75 Da and the main concern of the armour will be to find good

huIldOwn positions from which to develop this weapon, . Careful recces of all likely

areas Dust be made.

6, The. SLImILLaf the Infantrv Attack. .The Ar.cloured Division is not designed to

support the infantry assault. in a.prepared

position but, in C;ODO ways and to soLle extent it can' help

. ,j,n .the . absence of "ft tanks:

The enemy will defend himself against . ar:::,Our -

that is to say he will stand behind

a 'natural or artificial tank obstacle. The infantry will have the task of thi4oring

him out of such position.

The infantry will be able to do this with the assistance

of properly co-ordinated and adequate artillery support; :The ,greatest difficulty

the,infantry will rAcet is in overcoming the enemy's counter-attack which - must be

expected within a few hours of their assault and which will include armour. The.

atthcking infantry"must get up their own .supporting anti-tank weapoha-but this is

often extrec.ly difficu33 to do quickly and before the cnc.

:37 counterattack dOre­
lops. .,At this tine the armour a. the Aroured Division may ho required to stand

in with the assaulting - infant

and help then to .repel this type, of counter-attack

until the infantry themselves/ have been able to bring up their own antitank weapons

and coplete their .re-organ4;ation af,the defence systeu on the r.-rouna

recently

gained.

At this tine the ax.nour Often has to stand out in exposed and highly unsuita-

ble positions to suppol7t the infantry,.

But this must be done u#til the infantry

have put their defencc!s in order. It is imperative that the infantry should put

their house in order as it is also ihpo,rative that the armour should support then

until they have done SO.

7, PasuiLIL_Throuh. Armoured Divisions which are held up by the eneDy in a pre-

Snared Position are dependant on Infantry Divisions for throw­

ing the enoDy out of such positions. Subsequently the 2/-.,loured Division will be

oxpocted to take advantage of the situation created by a successful infantry assault.

d. Division, except in the desert, will be

It is uost unlikely that the Ar,ioure.

able to deploy behind the assaulting Infointry Divisions and pass through on a wide

front, It is much more likely that the Aoured Division will have to hold back

durinL, the infantry battle and slip-throuh, to start with at any rate, on a very

narrow front. It „dust be ready to pass through at exactly the fight malent ao that

the ilApetus of the infantry attack is not lost and the ground becades reasonably

favourable for the .Lr'ioured Division.

8, The Artillerr,and., infanLt

.sz. The 'amour
not reap its full reward unless it

has soi;le artillery and infantry in very close and

intkate support -
often it will find the aoed for both these arils and therefore

sone :lust be pemanently with the .Lrmourec.1 ,Brie;ade,

l'Iore artillery (particularly

Lk:di-ff.' Arty) and more infantry must be at the disposal of the Divisional Co-Lii.lander

to develop the battle; The ArLloured Division as at present organised provides for

this by means of two 25-pdr ;Iegts, a Motor li3n and a Lorried Infantry Brigade s

Liedium mat is essential and if provided by the Corps Arty i lust be the saiae reLt

since a new and inexperienced regt will tako, some time to settle down to the role

of Heavy Horse Artillery,

9, Reconnaissance. When not in close contact with the enemy, fast moving and long

tance is r4quireet. This is provided.by

range ground reconnalsc,

the Arrloured Car Roc;t which can also obscT ric icnort o\f1n1thcontact is

gaine0.. The intivate reconnaissance on' 4120116

,1 'after contact

1116
\-\ r

is best provided by the Armgtd Ro tel cdctpOr T4eniLrpose. In

4,1
wA 4

 ,
..(
, ,ir\E",*-- .\5.•-,;„, 7.1. 1 ,

-, , , (;,,,,.,__ 7.*7---'11'!
4'._, )`-',,'q
,Vi ,5, r.,

;,,,,!

1 t. • A\ \N `,....:,,, 't \ !-,..k

.6
1 rIA
_FA‘A , . \--.,,L
opERLTIONS
..
I,----,...-...­
cURT111AFRICA TO THE RIVER'

i,1 ,..,..,

VOLTERITO, via -s.L.tLo

-
PT VESUVIUS AND NAPLES.

PART VI. .

Ap00.

0 *

very close country these recce tps :Jay be the only rucce in fA of the Ar::_d Reats,

The principle is that wher(e contact is light th. rnc. Car Regt will recce but as

opposition beco,:es stronger the Ar..d Recfts with their own reconnaissance take over.

This ensures that a strong force of all anis is i::orking iD.flediately bohind its own

recce, The sane officer can direct the recce and the punch,

ao. The R .F, The greatestblessin's, which the R.11.F. can confer on an Ar.:.d Div

. is irmunity fro:i the enel2yls air. This gift is priceless since it

enables the Ar_d Div to take liberties with the uno.:yis air force and .,ove in far

closer and 12ore compact manner than could be done if wide dispersion was necessary.

The .;.,r12.d Div can often clear encl:iy airfields and got than (deloused! and opera­
tional for the R....Z. An Anld Div, particularly when it appreciates the blcssinas

of air superiority, will, do everything in its power for the R.AF. the will be

anxious to shin forward their landing grounds in pace with the Amy.

Tactical recce is vital in a fast ilovina battle and :ay often ,ive the earliest

cllic to the onelAy's intentions. The inforl.ation :.lust be received quickly and broad­
cast quickly.

Close bo;thinr, support of the advance is a .ore difficult problal o7inL to the

speed of the advance of the amour, the definition of the bo.,b line is often diffi­
cult and the tendency is to allow a little _arcLin of error. The best results arc

obtained by directina the air force on targets found by the air outside the close

sup-ort of the advance - this indirectly assists the ar.:.our very .1a-Lrially, Co_2­
plicated arranLeonts for close boAping support do not work during a rapid advance

and the type of thing . hich holds un the amour, such as the A tk Lun, is al:2ost

i::_rossible to spot on the ,,round sufficiently accurately to describe, to the air,

Therefore do not expect pin-point bonbing but be grateful for the loosening effebt

of bol:ibinE further back yhich you :ay not even see.

11! Counicatiops. Wireless is the life blood of an Arl.,,d Div durin nobile

operations, no other systel:;. is .possib.lc,. Therefore the wireless

discipline and efficiency in every aml. and every branch is vital. All officers

:;iust be so at ho­z.0 with the wireless that they will use it as the usual and the

norEal rlothod of cLnversation, At the smile tine they hiust cultivate the hi3hest

possible sense of security and realise that every conversation is a 1­)Ctential gift

to the eney. But this need net deter then froL using the wireless , )rovided they

observe the rules and use their coen sense.

12. In the Ar:IC Div the writteii-and formal operation order • is rare exc.,,pt at the.

cuiLlenceent of a phase in opeTations. Thereafter all orders 'Jill aL:_ost

certainly be verbal and nobody need expect to get such orders c=fir:Jed in 'zritin.g.

13. Invention and progress of design oill be continually producin ne7; .Jeapons,

now vehicles, new equiJIHcnt and nor ideas. It is very i.z_portant that'_hose

who design know where improve-Lent is reqpi_red.

These whc: use new couipl.,nt :Just

be quick to appreciate their tactical t.se and liitations.

Great progress has been z_,ade in inproving the equiprJent of an Arad Div. It Us

difficult to Live definitions' which wi111 cover all requireents but it is subitt4(1

that the folloTAng points are iYJnortanti althour* this does not set out tc be an

exhaustive list:,

(a) The .Tank must he able to dual,•ouickly and effectively iith the unanieured

eney and his vehicles includinc, the 4,tk gun. For this purpose the =chine gun and

an. HE shell such as the 75

is a very good ansuPr.

'(b) The Tank mist be able to take on tho non al enelAy amour on at least

eoual ters and have the ;leans

­ of dealing:Ion[3ter tanks such as the Tiger.

(c) Thu Tank be kept don. to Class 40 bridging, be capable of rail trans­
port, bo capable of loading- onLCT °and LST, and be =phibious or al, least have a very

high fording level.

(d) Radius of action approx 80 100 =iles 'Athout refuelling,

(e) ilax­LJu:.1 iclainity fron caching fire.

(f) The Tank l_ust bu :lechani,cally reli,able and easy to 1­2aintain and accessi­
ble for cs;rkshon pur7loscs.

L) The body of the Tank should not. c.,h so i:

( ,Wmv

,t1;1&-
4 bellied and

the tracks 1:,ust be -,:ide enow-

. -
h to holr'l
,-, ' ground.

,, r!

(h) The equim.ent of t-::o s Tr)poI Ili ,SU 1- -„Retf;t,.., should-be.'self-propelled

.,
' 4

7th AMIOURED DIVISION

OPLRATIONS FRO.1 NORTH AFRICA TO THE RIVER

VOLTURNO via SLLERNO, NT. VESUVIUS AND NAPLES

PART VT. .

and amourod in fact Tanks whose sole object is to kill and destroy by technical

artillery LAAhocils (as opposed to direct'fire) and ho accept less all round amour

since fire will usually be. indirect.

(i) The A tk Regt riust include SP A tk guns of the highest weight capable

of knocking out the largest eneDy tank at 1500 yards or bettor. In fact a tank .

whose sole object is to destroy the largest ene­ziy tank at the longest possible range.

All the A tk guns should not be SP since in defence it must be possible to dig in

the •siJaller type of A tk gun and forlA an inconsnicuous A tk gun screen. The sailer

type of A tk gun liust be able to kill u,:

..-, to 600 yards. The proportion. of snail to

large A tk guns and the nuniber which should be SP will vary according to the enci:,y's

superiority in the tank which is inpurvious to the gun ulounted in our own tank.

(j) FightD.ng troops liable to opercIte closely ;:ith Arnd ReEts aust the:Iselves

be conveyed in splinter-proof, bullet proof aruoured vehicles. .This applies to RE,

ifilotor Infantry, and a proportion of the, Lorried Infantry Bde.

(k)- The Tank will be too large and slmT to perfom its own recce - a 5=11

tracked vehicle with speed, ;00 :Ale radius, good cross-country perfor=ce, and

low inconspicuous design will always be required for various recce duties. ,A

present the Carrier Universal is used but this is not ideal.

(1) • The A tk :line and the anti personnel nine aust be overcoe by better

pethods of detection and destruction. Our own nine requires developi:lent to defeat

detection,

(a) Developuent - of -iethods of knocking out tanks from the air and counter

action against this danger should be studied.

(n) The foruation of the Tank Users Couiaittee should help to inprove details

14. What is a Tank? A tank is a vehicle with the hcst possible cross country per- .

foraance which cordbines gun nower, amour and speed. In a

tank none of those three requireuents can be ignored and consequently the result will

be a copproaise. Specialists nay use a cross-country vehicle, or even the chassis

of a tank, for a special purpose - i.e. the S.P. Field gun or Anti-Tank sun which

are the speciality of the H&- the Scissor bridge which is the speciality of the RE-

the Scorpion equipnnt specially designed for anti-tank nine destruction - such ve­
hicles arc not tanks because they are designed for a special purpose and to achieve

this purpose the designer is prepared to ;­ :lakc heavy sacrifices in gun power, amour

or speed.

The developL.ont of such special vehicles directly affects the design of the

tank. For instance, it DiEjat prove at present.izIpracticable to, develop a tank

with a 17-pdr an sufficient =our and speed, It might be 'better to accept a good

17-pdr rather than create a tank which is insufficiently arEoured or too slow

or too bulky.' For this reason the des;i_n of the Tank and its first cousins in the

supporting :lust be considered together and as they will bc er:Iployed in the

tactical battle.

 1PPEiq

LL L ­
• 7th .1,.-
192:.OURED/

FROM NORTH AFRICA

DIVSONPERAT1 TO
RJER

VOLTURNO via SALERITO, TIT. VESUVIUS AND Nthl" ,

ORDER OF LANDING.

1, Tac HQ 7 Ar2d Div.

2, Main .HQ 131 Bdo incl Sias

3, Dot Pro (131)

4. 1/5 Queens incl Sias

5. 1/6 Queens incl SiEs

6, 5 R Tks incl SiEs and LLD

7. One Bty 3 RM.

8, 42 Bby. 15 Lt 111"- Rot

c
One Tp 621 Fd Sqn incl Bulldozer dot

10. 1,(1v Party No. 2

11. A Coy 131 Fd•Amb.

12. Dot Coml.) P1 507 Coy incl dot HQ RASC

13, Press Dot

14. Allied Military Govox'nmont Party

15: .Two Pis 287 Coy RASC

16. 16 AMCU incl dot 70 Fd Hyg Sec

17. 131 Edo LLD incl two vohs 131 Edo WiShops

and " 7 AD OFF

18, C Sqn 11 H.

19. 260 A Tk Bty

,

20. C Coy 1 Chohiro

21 621 Fd Sqn (less one tp)

22. 3 RHA (less ono bty) incl Sigs and LLD

23, 1/7 Queens incl Sigs

2/4. Main HQ 22 Arl-ad Bdo incl Sias

25, Pro Dot 22 Ar:::,.d Bac

26,. Main HQ 7 Arrad Div incl CRL.i s HQ

27; 270 FS Sec

28. 7 Arid Div Pro Coy (loss dots

29. HQ Div Sigs and Main Div Sigs

30. 1 R Tics incl Sigs and LLD

31, 4 CTY
ii it It it

32. 1 RB
41 • 11 11 it

33. 5 RHA
H t; 11 It

34. 15 Lt AA (loss one bty) incl Sigs and LAD

35. 4 Fd Sqn

36, 11 H (less one son)

37, Adv Party No. 3 (Div Tps)

38. Lt NDS and tvio sees

39. 76 J7 U

40. Dot Coap P1 67 Coy incl dot HQ RASC

41. 22 Amd Edo Roc Poc

42. Rear HQ 7 Armd Div incl CRSC HQ

43, Rear Div Sias

44, Adv Party No. 4

45. 146 Fd Rogt incl Sigs and LAD

46. 65 A Tk Rost (less 260 Bty)

47. 143 Fd Pk San incl LAD

48. 131 Fd Arib (less one coy) incl 132 Mob

Dental Unit and dot 70 Fd Ilyg Soc (loss 6 x 3 ton)

49. 2 It Fd A:114 (loss dots) incl 135 Mob Dental Unit

50. 287 Coy (loss two pls)

51. 22 Arlid Bde WShops (less Roc See)

52. 131 Edo U/Shops (loss two vchs)

53. Dot 131 Fd AA.)

54. 507 Coy (loss Canp Pl) •

55. 67 Coy (less Co::1-11 P1)

56. 58 Coy ihcl Dot HQ RASC incl Postal Unit

57, 7 Armd Div OFF loss two veils

 7th ARMOUR:ED, DIVISION' .

OPERATIONS FROLJ NORTH •1-`,.FRIC4. ANb-titER

VOLTURNO
_
7 via SALERNO, MT. VESUVIUS 1.WA

-NOTES ON TBE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE LORRIED INFANTRY BRIGADE...

1, GENERAL.
\

(a) The full power. of an Armoured Division can only be do pod when the Divi-­
sion is accompanied by its min infantry. The infantry arc: -

(i) The Motor Battalion which operates intimately under command of the

Armoured Brigade.

(ii)
-
The Lorricd Infantry Brigade.

(b) This paper deals only with the Lorried Infantry Brigade, The Lorried Infan­
try Brigade provides the means with which the Divisional Gomander restores mobility

to the Armoured Brigade by taking over ground gained. It is also available for

immediate use on such purely infantry tasks as may be required and arc within- its

scope,

It follows therefore that the Lorriod Infantry Brigade will not be called

upon to carry out tasks other than those expected of infantry. 'But the rapidity of

movement and standard of training with armour will be of a very high level.

(c) In carrying out infantry tasks with armour there are certain constant

factors of importance to be considered.,

'These factors.aro that: ­

(i) .Acting with armour, it will often be opposed by armour.

(ii) . The armoured battle being very fluid,. decisions will be taken later

and tire for recce and preparation shortened accordingly.

:(iii) One of the functions of amour being the break through and pursuit
:

operations will be carried out, at times, without the assistance oflflanking forma­
tions,

(iv) The nnemy attack or counter-attack will be quick and from any

direction, and generally with armour. •

.2, AgTION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE DIVISION.

(a).-Normally the armoured diliision would not be employed oh unsuitable ground,

and the armoured brigade would lead. Should the Lorried .BriLade lead, it would do so

only when

- • (i) The Armoured Brigade had been halted by ground or an obstacle; with

which it is =bac to deal immediately, or

(ii) After contact had boon gained.

(b) While the. Lorried Infantry Brigades are not likely to make the first contact

with the enew, they must be prepared to load in ground suitable to the Infantry and

unsuitable to the arrlbarIn 0,PWeircumitances.thq.Infantry, supported by all

availablp sUptpoi-iing weanons'ingludina proportion of the arz.our.of the Armd. Bdo,

must be prepared to press the enemy back until either suitable ground is reached for

the employment ofarmur or the enelly has resorted te the occupation of fortifications

requiring a .deliberate attack. .

(c) Although a small number of tanks might be expected to assist the forward

movement, the lorried Infantry Brigade would-

be prepared to function without armoured

support for an4ndefinite period. During this period attacks by enemy armour in

strength would be unlikely.

3,
NORMAL INFANTRY TASKS MODIFIED FOR ARMOURED DIVISION. The following Infantry tasks

will be performed.
They will be discussed In detail

(a) The . occupation of a firm base (Infantry in Defence),.

(b)
The movement from one firm base to another..

(c) The •domination.OP the tank battlofj+.eld by night..

(d) The night attack at short notice,

(o) The formation of an anti-tank scroan.

(f) Movement by road ) to occupy firm ,3Dase.

'(p) to gain contact.

 rl 5.71

RED DIVISI

OPERATIONS n6 )AEI9. Tiq HEr ZUER, ,

VOLTURNO _via SALE '10 ..1.11177. ITUV-It&AND dtif;a47,

(g 'Normal infantry operations,

It will be seen from the above that the only unusual operations arc the

laying out of an anti-tank screen and the domination of the tank battlefield by

night.

4. THE..OdCUPATION _OF A FIRLi

(a) The object of the fii'm base is to occupy ground that dominate. the battle

fieldover which the armoured Brigade wishes to operate..

(b) firm base is not so much a pivot round which the ar'mour works as an area

from which full artillery sup' ort Can be provided and which is within itself and

without the assistance of armour, prepared to defend itself and the contents

against armoured attack.

(6) In the advance a firm base is moved forward in readiness to support the

nett armoured objective.. In the defence firm bases are chosen to fit in with the

remainder of the Corps and Ari4y dispositions.

(a)The power of the armour in defence lies in the ability to deliver a quick

and decisive counter attack or counter stroke, The role of all infantry, including

the Lorried Infantry, is to secure ground with their own weapons In this role

they will have the full immediate sutmort of an...supporting arms and the assurance

of intervention by the armour if required,

(e) The ground to be occunied will probably be daptued,in the first place by

the armour, who cannot be expected to retain it for an indefinite perinr1 without

loss of efficiency,

(f) The requisites for the firm base are: ­

(1) A strong anti-tank layout; This forms the fral=ror'k and .should be so

designed that the guns are defiladed froM the enemy; with a close and killing shoot

for the .6-93dr, and ajong Shoot for the 17-pdr: The latter are used for breaking

up a tank attack at long range.

(ii) The inclusion of lIns. Their task is to make the enemy tanks close

dorm at extreme range, and afford protec ion to anti-tank guns against infantry

attack,

(iii) The inclusion of the arty o.41.C. arty OPs within the protective layout;

Arty Ops of the base should be actually occupied by infantry by night,

(iv) The protection of the whole by ni.ht by the available infantry;

The following difficulties have to be faced:

(1) Due to the mass of vehicles, guns', etc4, to be accommodated, the In

fantry Battalions must be prepared to hold very long frontages with little:depth;

With all flanks and rear exposed, the infc.ntry may be inadequate, and the Ai'mouied

Brigade, or portion of it, might have to bp positioned to protect. by their presence

Arty must be prepared to protect itself by,night:

(ii) Owing to the fluid nature of e. tank battle, the occupation of the

firm base has to be carried out with littlq recce. There are few things so annoyc;

ing to the tank cormander as the presence of soft skinned vehicles in the tank

battle arca.

(iii) That speed is required by Divisional Commanders for the base to be made

secure, or sufficiently secure to enable the armour to be sent to the next task, or

disengaged in adequate time. As a result rocCe by Brigade and Battalion Commanders

comes down to a directive from Brigade Col.-.:- ander rather than detailed ordersi and

similarly from Battalion Commanders to OsC ,Coys, Both Brigade and Battalion

Commanders Complete their tasks by coAordination

(h) On the assumption that the minima foi'ce under' the Lorried, Infantry Brigade

.Commander in addition to his Brigade is one; PEA ReA, one EMG Coy, two Btys. Anti

Tank Artyr a suggested sequence for the occupation of the firm base is as follows:;-:

(1) Brigade Commander will receive orders on the ground for taking up the

tiosition. Normally all flanks can be consiacred dangerous but it may be possible.

to indicate a particularly dangerous dirbOtion:

• ,! . . . . !. -,...,

NOTE. A characteristic of working tdth arlii54i

- -if-16Hi'tfipt 411.:',:fl4103,-ig.
- - 1., !,,pio4pr
i litia.11y

dangerous since the nobility of an arn:ourgNi231ily - - l ib l i11.1itlis'a:t

\- .24y.1 sng tactical

. 91-.-

surprises on you. It is. often possible to 4.j.11;• 4, 1c, Vt-fl i

......_
l
ank8i,O1i,i.. flanki but Tit '
.6 annot he

tt..
 '0.0‘
.46;e14P
'14
Enti/110:311'; 9
It 7t1 L.R.I.IOURED DIVISIOT "
OPERAT V130, N3B.TH1 ri; 7..

VOLTURN6 TF_jjjiud
S4J _
I\ L,L4J •
,

regarded as a certainty.

(ii) Brigade CamanCer, carries out recce with his R Gp, decides on arty

areas and OPa, advised by .C2A or Chief :,RAadviser, areas for Battalions, and allots

EalGs and:Anti-...Tank Arty, on a Brigade basis,.

Brigade Cormandor,issues orders to Battalj,on Con-_,.ander6 and btaul­ ..

taneously Ary, Anti-Tank.Artyr and. 'AEG Commanders issue orders tO their Bty and PI

Commanders -resD6ctively. (It is essentialthat when two anti-tank ID -Vs or more

are allotted *a . comuander Anti-Tank is allowed.)

It is. essential that Arty and Anti

Tank Bty Commanders and MMG Pl. COmmanders should accompany Battalion Commanders on

their. recce.
t.

(iv) Troops begin to arrive in the follo7in order: --­

1. MEG 2. One Bty A Tk 3. Arty.

4. "A" •Bn 5. .13n 6, Cit

7. One Bty A Tk.

NOTE:

1,. If further A/Tk arty allotted they will p:)ve'withi and be .definitely

allotted to,,prbtectinn•of Arty and will normally be required to close in the rear.

of the position;

2,
MMGs and 17-prs will work very much together.

aligHENT.FROM . ONE FIRE BASE TO ANOTHER.

(a) . 11115,s is prohablythe most dangerous time for the BriE;ade. Group, opocially

if it moves. in .any:exCeRt:Pesert Formation when' it is capable of fighting at.

once

owing to its normal layout.

(b) The following are essential points: ­

(i) Mobile force:, i.e. Anti-tank guns, 1.11Gs,...Carriers, will move to new

position boor Brigade leaves previous one.

(ii).
-
Recce parties from units and pistol guns from Arty move with this party;.

(M),-. Proportion anti,-tank arty remains wi.th.Brigade until mobile force is

on ground. 1

(i,1r) A definite milbussing.and dobussing drill and very good MT discipline

are require,

(e) The following automatic procedure should be applied:

(1) The most dangero4 flank safeguarded first.

.Astride the axis second importance.

(iii) Least dangerous flank and rear guardod last.

(d) On ..occasion the following aids to occupation could be expected,

(i)_ A proportion of armour left on the ground until base is secure,

(ii)...A..proporti,on of arty either RHA or both RHA and Anti-Tank, already

in position 7:::ith armour, will remain until relieved.

6.• THE DOMIZTA.TION - OF 'THE TANK BAy.TLEF BY HIGHT.

•••
'(a) A - tclnk.battle which ha:Ea; not had a decisive result will die down with tho

approach of . .ck:arld.-iOss. Both sides will have, laid out some form of Anti-tank screen,

behind w4ich. t.tie -ar2our-A7ill wish to withdraw for rest, renlcnish:amt and mainten„ance,

The screen wall probably consist of Anti-Tank guns and Tans„. with infantry prbte­
tion provideaLby the Motor Battalion.

(b) It wiTI be the air:, of each side during the hours of darkness to improve

its position prior t.o..the resumption of thq tank action at . daylight,

• , be

(c) The action called for fro1.7i. the .Lorriec.1 anfan 17yI- \Brirt..0,0:‘,-111 -iit

. Lae over .protection of tile sci.d, 11,

To - -

\ .\\,\77,1!H‘J

To strengthen the Inf..protection to the Anti-,tank.guns and LIFIGs,

 y
J,

rI 7

„APP1-,314

r'IOURhp DIVISI

OPERATIOhS 14.1fL NORTH 21FRICATie/ME t

BOLTURNO via SALERNO LiT. VESUVIUS TD N17,...

(d) In order to prevent the enemy from improving his poaition,* very

"Battle Patrolling" is required throughout the nislat Again little time

given for the actual recce, hut Battalian and Company* Commanders who are

out the duties should have a minimum of 2 hrs daylight for recce and

occupation or oven close approach.

(e) The CO of. the .ator Battalion must be readily available with latest infor­
matj.on, from the infantry standnoint.. This is the only static portion of the tank

battle and the only source of "firm!' information,

(f) Axis narking and the necessity of HQ being on the axis are of paramount

importance..

The following should always be on or near the main axis: ­

(1)- The Ks Brigade and Diyit3ion,

(ii) Regimental Ks _Armoured Cars.

(iii) Battalion HQ Motor Battalion.

7,. THE NIGHT ATTACK AT-SHORT NOTICE,

(a). This form of operation will normally be undertaken in the course of a

pursuit.. The oprosition will be holding. important. ground, probably a defile,_.

eThe

position may be. covered by an obstacle consisting of a:minefield, wire- obstacle and

anti-tank ditch Any greaterobstacle could not be attacked Quickly,. The:f4inefield

will probably not be so strongly laid as in an established position but until proved.

otherwise it will be assumed to have anti-personnel mines and sufficient anti-tank ­

mines for a proper "gappingu'operation to be undertaken before armour • can prococd,.

(b) The Infantry Drill of theattack will rot:lain the sal..le as for night attack,

viz,.asault troops•- ugapring". party . - re-organisation party, but the following

differences must be understood.

(i)* There will be little time for recce,

(ii) T#ere will be no knowledge of the extent or position of the minefield,

the wire, or the anti-tank ditch. •

(iii) There will be no tila.) for obtaining knowledge by patrolling.

(iv) The troops taking part may not even have sbon Ithe ground...

(v) Arty Sup-ort will be weak, Two RHA- and one lied Regiment probably be­
1/12, the maximum available, and ammunition sup.nly may well be inadequate for a

barrage.

(c) In order to overdone those difficulties, the following must be accepted:

(1) That =Ts must take a large part in the barrage plan.

(ii) That the assaulting troops may have to pap.s through the minefield

without gaps.

(iii) That the infantry objectives must be even more easily defined than in

any other form of night attack.

(iv) That a very clearly defined A-

;:is of advance is required with the known

disadvantage that this will be well guarded, .and that a well-marked approach to the

Start line must be organised.

(d) Certain assistance from other arms can be expected:. ­

(i) The allotment of RE personnel must be made in suffici6nt the for thom

to be .conversant with the plane

(14) Provision of Pro for route lighting.

(iii) Continuous renortina. by Motor Battalion Cal-gander Of. information ao

. discovered. Motor Battalion Commander or representative should report to Infantry

Brigade COmmander ear17.

7N 771

 , ,,, , .., ,,,,,,

--,r-7- I :', ., ' ,,, ,.:, 1)

11-7;.E IOURED DIVISION k

OPERATIONS FRG.1 NORTH 11FRICA TO THL-RI

VOLTURNO via, SALE4NO 4_,ITFVESU-VlijaeND NA1PLES--­

(iv)Good Liaison. This prosup-- osos '-'0'13::47-06̀0i.riaandors

4 can be found without

delay on the battlefield and must be on a marked Axis,

(v) Close support by proportioncf ar,.lour at daylialat.

8. THE FOR?.IATION OF AN ANTI,-TLNK SCREEN,

(a) This will normally not be the task of the Lorriecl Infantry *Brigade, . Mould

it be ordered to do so, it will utilise the anti-tank arty and such EEGs as. are all­
otted. The Infantry of the Brigade being hold in .roserve arc prepared to take up

positions to protect the anti-tank guns and 12E0 by night.

(b) Should there be no,MMGs,.. then a proportion .of the Infantry will be rcquirud

to form part of the screen, In that case the extent of the screen would be divided

into Battalion areas, and minimum infantry utilised, The Infantry anti-tank guns .

should not be utilised except in depth arid for close protection of vehicles. •

NOTE: This is in fact the Lorried Infantry Brigade in defence by day.

The defence by day is predominantly a defence against tanks but it must include

the full support of all available 7,111Gs and Arty, At night the same defensive system

must be prepared to defend itself against infantry attack.

9.1!0\..L.MULE_ER94.

(a) Ithere are two occasions when the Lorriecl Infantry Brigade will carry o4

tactical movement by road.

(I) LoadinE the Division to the occupation of a firm base behind protection

of armoured cars only.

(ii) Tactical move - tO gain contact.

A very possible manoeuvre where ari:,oUr is operating on a flank or when

flanks are protected by ground.

(b) The requirements are: ­

(i) That loading troops should consist maily of Carriers, A tk Arty and

1EGs. These form the framework behind which the infantry can deploy, it'is not

nodessary that this screen should be in its final position on first placing..

(ii) That inforuation. of enemy should be available, This is received on

Divisional wireless link,

(iii) That information as. to the layout of armoured cars should be available

and accurate. To produce this, the Squadron Commander should be positioned - uither

in the area to be ocounied or. on the Axis where he can be easily found.

(c) Probable sequence of action is as follows:

(i) Carrier Fl acting as local protection to Brigade Commander and qi.f

Gp proceed.to position to be occupied, meeting there or on the way, on the Axis

the Squadron Cormander Armoured Cax.s.

(ii) Recce is carried out, and forward troos consisting of A tk arty, Gs

and Carriers, are placed on the ground either to form fraLework of layout,• or to

act as •screen further out while position is being occupied. In latter cae.posi­
tions are selected and prupare4,for this screen in the defensive layout,

(iii) One Bty RHA and 'Pistol Guns of =Joining Bt...-y:,ay be expected with

this party as also the Brigade 1 0' GD.

(iv) A gap occurs bef4-0 the arrival of the .ain Body,:in -which will travel

Battalion v01 Gps.

(v) 'Jain Body, in order of march,. TA" Bn, RHA Rciat less Bty, "Be Bn,

Bn, ADS, etc, _Should more than two btys A, tk be allotted, third bty would accom­
pany ilain Body with Arty.

NOTE: RE ReccePaill;"TCWCTwith Me Corad Gp.

Sec RE w,ithtiC G3

Further RE under CRE,

 • yth AR1-10UffalDIVISIOI'l

NORTHAFRIGA. TO TF kthER

VOLTURNO via •SALERHO, n2.IT.. 'VESUVIUS Ai

(d) A possiblelayout in Bdc Ocx.adis nc.flank rirotected,

might be; ­

Two Pia MG astride Axis - one dangerous flank.

One A Tk b-by astride Axis - one danLorous flo,Aak.

Carriers astride, Axis and dangerous flank.

1A'.1311 astriCo Axis.

IB' En one dangerous flank.

JC! En reAdning flank e-'rear and rosLxve.

Rurthor A tk arty is used for roar and gun areas.

Carriers probably concentrated for this operation and rovort Battalion

Coy.amand on occupation of. nosition.

10. MOVEM.tNT BY ROAD TO GAIN CONTACT.

(a) This is a norl.dal operation of war.

(b) Any reasonable. disposition of troops that C6Dbines rocco in the forward

bodies Or . gps, and fighting in,lator gps supported cony by arty, is satisfactory.

There is a great Opportunity to develop a. drill for a forward body composed of a

sqn of tks, .a coy of inf. and a bty of arty. Intimate co-operation can ho achieved

and such a forward body can be most effective.

(c) Provided that armoured cars are .in front and Command well forward the

apparent difficulty of deciding when to dobuss is generally solved.

(a) Each group or body must have - eapons for emergency Anti.Panzer action.

(e) The drill and procedure for action on contact develops similarly to an

Advance Guard on foot except for the speed of movement which requires Commanders

further forward and the fact that tanks are probably available and workingswith

infantry they know.

(f) It is essential to havo all arty deployed as soon as possible, and therefore

well forward in the column.

11. CONCLUSIONS.

(a) It is necessary to havo such a full conception of possible developments

that all Senior Commanders are ready to moot those developments. Long winded and.

detailed orders aro not possible or appropriate. Infantry Cmamandors who are unable

to fit quickly and effectively into the pattern of the armoured battle are of little

use. Lorripd Infantry Commanders are expected to do so because of their superior

knowledgo and experience of conditions.

(b) Time available for the Lorried infantry Brigade to carry out a role will

not allow for pich thought or dis,cussion and a standard method of dealj,ne; x.rith a

given situation is. a groat aid t,o all components.

(c) Considorably greater chances of tho unknown have to be accepted.

(d) Complete-success will C,cpond uocin speed. rather than preparation. Speed

is dependent. on clear thinking, , forethouht and good communication.

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