Chap Ter 21

CH A P T ER 21
Early Reasoning about Competence

Is Not Irrationally Optimistic, Nor Does It Stem
from Inadequate Cognitive Representations
ANDREI CIMPIAN
Young children’s reasoning about compe- to this day. According to this canonical per-
tence and achievement often seems out of spective, the differences between younger
step with reality. For instance, after failing and older children’s competence judgments
to solve four puzzles in a row, most 3- and are due to qualitative differences in the con-
4-year-olds are nevertheless “very sure” that cepts with which they are operating (e.g.,
they will be able to solve a similar fifth puz- their concepts of ability, causation, quan-
zle (Parsons & Ruble, 1977). Along the same tity). In other words, the apparent irratio-
lines, after getting only about 15 points out nality of young children’s reasoning about
of 100 on the first few rounds of a game, achievement was assumed to stem from
preschoolers generally expect that they will structural flaws in their mental represen-
get more than 90 points on the next round tations. My main goal in this chapter is to
(Stipek & Hoffman, 1980). Young children’s challenge this long-held assumption.
judgments about competence are puzzling Although once it may have been reason-
Copyright © 2017. Guilford Publications. All rights reserved.
across a variety of contexts and tasks: Con- able to assume that development brings
sider also that 5-year-olds often judge a per- about dramatic, qualitative changes in chil-
son who breezed through a test to be less dren’s concepts, the contemporary literature
smart than a person who had to work really on cognitive development no longer sup-
hard to get the same grade (Nicholls, 1978). ports such a view. In fact, as I outline later in
Beyond these specific examples, classic work this chapter, most of the concepts involved
on this topic in the 1970s and 1980s iden- in reasoning about competence seem to be
tified dramatic developmental differences present in relatively mature form in chil-
in reasoning about competence. Relative dren as young as age 3—and sometimes
to older children and adults, young chil- even in infants (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, &
dren were often found to display irrational- Bian, 2016; Izard, Sann, Spelke, & Streri,
seeming judgments and inflated assessments 2009). Thus, we must look elsewhere—not
of their abilities and chances of success. to young children’s conceptual shortcom-
These differences inspired a general per- ings—to understand why their competence
spective on children’s early reasoning about judgments in many laboratory tasks seem
competence that is considered largely correct out of step with reality.
387
Elliot, A. J., Dweck, C. S., & Yeager, D. S. (Eds.). (2017). <i>Handbook of competence and motivation, second edition : theory and application</i>.
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388 IV. DEVELOPMENT
This chapter proceeds as follows. After canonical view. While doing so, I also out-
some introductory remarks, I go on to sum- line the reasons why one should be skeptical
marize several of the major claims making of this view.
up the canonical view that there are qualita- The assumption of qualitative shifts in
tive differences between younger and older children’s competence- related concepts is
children’s competence- related concepts. I best understood in its historical context.
then present evidence that contradicts this This assumption is in line with the style of
canonical view and instead suggests con- developmental theorizing that was popular
tinuity in the underlying concepts. Finally, when the canonical perspective emerged (in
I reconcile the continuity claim with the the 1970s and 1980s). Theories at the time
observed discontinuity in judgments: If tended to portray development as a series of
younger and older children have access to a step-like transitions between stages that dif-
similar set of concepts, why does their rea- fered dramatically in their representational
soning about competence often look so dif- capacities. In particular, Piaget’s stage the-
ferent? ory of cognitive development (e.g., Piaget,
Throughout, I highlight the implica- 1952; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) was still
tions of this debate about discontinuity influential—and was probably a source of
versus continuity in mental representations inspiration—despite the fact that many of
for children’s motivation. According to the Piaget’s specific claims were already begin-
canonical view, children’s conceptual short- ning to be overturned (e.g., Baillargeon,
comings make them optimistic about their Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; McGarrigle
abilities, which in turn is thought to have & Donaldson, 1974). According to Piaget,
adaptive consequences for children’s motiva- before the age of 6 or 7 (i.e., during what he
tion, allowing them to remain engaged with termed the preoperational stage of cognitive
a task even in the face of failure (e.g., Har- development), children’s thinking exhibits
ter, 2012; Nicholls & Miller, 1984a; Stipek, serious structural flaws (e.g., an inability to
1984). However, if young children’s con- think logically and abstractly) that impose a
cepts do not actually limit them to clueless hard limit on how accurately they can repre-
optimism, their motivation may not be as sent reality. If this is right, then, of course, it
resilient to failure as previous theories have is plausible to assume that young children’s
supposed. Instead, the same sorts of expe- reasoning about competence is necessarily
riences and beliefs that demotivate older flawed as well, which provides a ready-made
children are likely to take a toll on young explanation for their puzzling behaviors in
children’s motivation as well (e.g., Heyman, achievement contexts.
Dweck, & Cain, 1992). The problem, however, is that very few of
Finally, I should point out that I do not Piaget’s claims about the representational
attempt to be comprehensive in my review deficits of preoperational thought are left
of the competing claims (discontinuity vs. standing in the contemporary literature on
continuity); the literatures relevant to these cognitive development. In fact, most of the
issues are vast. Thus, I discuss the evidence post-Piagetian work on cognitive develop-
that I think best illustrates the two views and ment can be summarized with a simple
highlights the contrast between them. Also phrase: “more capacity than meets the eye”
note that the argument I am making here (Gelman & Gallistel, 1986). On task after
is not new. Others have challenged aspects task, young children’s wrong answers turned
of the canonical view on similar grounds out to be less due to their cognitive inepti-
(e.g., Butler, 2005; Dweck, 1998, 1999), and tude and more to our own shortsightedness
much of what I say here echoes these other as researchers. Irrational judgments that
scholars’ comments. were initially taken as evidence for imma-
ture, undifferentiated concepts were later
revealed to be reasonable extrapolations
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS from children’s everyday experiences— a
conclusion that, as I argue later, applies to
In this section, I provide some of the back- their irrational- seeming judgments about
ground that is needed to understand the competence as well.
21. Early Reasoning about Competence 389
To understand the interpretive problems mental states?) and in their general approach
that arose with many Piagetian tasks, con- to pursuing these questions (e.g., investigat-
sider a classic test of children’s understanding the normative course of development),
ing of number (Piaget, 1941): The experi- not at the level of specific claims about
menter lays out two rows containing the what young children can and cannot repre-
same number of coins and asks the child sent (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2016; Spelke &
if these rows have the same number. (Chil- Kinzler, 2007).
dren almost always get this question right.) In contrast, Piaget-inspired claims about
The experimenter then deliberately length- qualitative differences between the rep-
ens one of the two rows by stretching the resentational capacities of younger and
coins father apart and asks the child, for older children still dominate the literature
a second time, whether the two rows have on children’s reasoning about competence
the same number of coins in them. At this and achievement. Of course, in principle,
point, the vast majority of preschoolers say it is possible that the competence domain,
“no,” incorrectly choosing the longer row as unlike those that have been studied by cog-
having more coins. For Piaget, this typical nitive developmentalists, relies on mental
mistake signaled an inability to represent representations that undergo radical trans-
number as distinct from spatial extent—the formations. More likely, however, reasoning
two concepts were assumed to be undiffer- about competence invokes the same basic
entiated in children’s minds. Others, how- representations that children use to navigate
ever, pointed out a plausible alternative the world more generally (e.g., concepts of
explanation for children’s answers. In every- cause and effect, quantity, mental states,
day conversation, adults’ actions typically traits and dispositions) and that are now
direct children’s attention to information understood to be largely continuous across
of relevance to the ongoing conversation development (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004; Bail-
(quite unlike the experimenter’s lengthening largeon et al., 2016; Cimpian, 2016; Schulz,
of the row; e.g., McGarrigle & Donaldson, 2012; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Most devel-
1974). In addition, adults do not usually opmental changes seem to be quantitative in
repeat a question unless the first answer is nature and to occur in the control processes
no longer valid (e.g., Rose & Blank, 1974). that operate over these representations (e.g.,
Might children’s mistakes have been due to working memory, inhibitory control, meta-
the simple fact that they did not realize that cognitive monitoring; Carlozzi, Tulsky, Kail,
the rules of everyday conversation are sus- & Beaumont, 2013; Cowan, 2005; Kuhn,
pended when talking with an experimenter? 2000; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan,
Indeed, when the conversationally odd ele- & Tannock, 1999), as well as in children’s
ments are removed from the task (e.g., the knowledge about how these basic concepts
row is lengthened by accident rather than on are instantiated in the world. Correspond-
purpose), children’s performance improves ingly, as was the case with the supposed
dramatically (McGarrigle & Donaldson, conceptual confusions of the preoperational

1974; Rose & Blank, 1974)—“more capac- child, the puzzling behaviors documented
ity than meets the eye.” Thus, what was ini- in the classic work on achievement may be
tially interpreted as a representational defi- better explained by nonconceptual factors
cit instead turned out to be a sophisticated such as young children’s inexperience with
pragmatic inference about the communica- laboratory testing situations, where many
tive intentions of the experimenter (see also everyday rules no longer apply.
Clark, 1987; Diesendruck, 2005; Horowitz Thus, the central claim of this chapter is
& Frank, 2016). Countless variations of this as follows: The nature of the mental repre-
scenario have played themselves out over the sentations underlying early reasoning about
past 40 years of research in cognitive devel- competence has long been mischaracterized.
opment, to the point that the influence of For the past 40 years, young children’s opti-
Piaget is nowadays felt mostly at the level of mistic predictions in achievement contexts
the broad questions cognitive developmen- have been used to argue for deficits in their
talists tend to pursue (e.g., How do children mental representations. In contrast, the
represent number? How do they understand vast contemporary literature on cognitive
390 IV. DEVELOPMENT
development—from which the work on com- cognitive shortcomings, as the canonical

petence cognitions has remained isolated— view assumes, we cannot take it for granted
suggests far more continuity than change that children will remain motivated regard-
in the basic representations children use to less of the outcome. In addition, if their opti-
understand reality. In light of this new evi- mistic outlook is in part a function of their
dence, differences in the competence-related typical achievement environments, changes
judgments of younger and older children in these environments could bring about
are more plausibly explained as reflecting systematic changes in children’s attitudes
a rational process of extrapolation from toward learning as well, potentially for the
children’s typical schooling/achievement worse.
environments, which change dramati- Consider that, over the last decade or so,
cally over the course of childhood (e.g., the early childhood education system in the
Butler, 2005; Eccles, Midgeley, & Adler, United States has seen ever greater regimen-
1984; Rosenholtz & Simpson, 1984), than tation and emphasis on testing, and less
stage-like transitions in the underlying con- of the self-directed activity that used to be
cepts. Setting aside gradual improvements the norm in preschools and kindergartens.
in resources such as working memory and For example, a recent study that compared
inhibitory control, younger and older chil- nationally representative samples of kinder-
dren have access to largely similar ways of gartens in 1998 and 2010 found that the
thinking about competence and achieve- percentage of teachers who thought that
ment. Which one dominates their reasoning most children should learn how to read in
at any one point in development is a function kindergarten jumped from 31 to 80% in this
of, among other things, the typical contexts relatively brief interval (Bassok, Latham, &
in which they spend their time. To the extent Rorem, 2016). Similarly, use of textbooks,
that the ways of thinking and talking about teacher-directed whole-class instruction,
competence that are salient in these contexts and standardized tests in kindergarten saw
present a mismatch to the ones children are considerable increases over this period,
expected to adopt when talking to an exper- whereas resources for child- selected and
imenter, their answers will seem irrational. directed activities (e.g., sand and water
But being naive about the “appropriate” way tables, dramatic play areas) decreased by
to conceptualize competence in an unfamil- a similarly wide margin. If young children
iar context is not evidence for the absence of have access to multiple ways of conceptual-
the relevant concepts, and is a far cry from izing competence, then a shift toward more
being irrational. formal, evaluative, and competitive early
Moreover, to the extent that optimism schooling environments might induce a cor-
about one’s abilities and future performance responding activation of conceptions of abil-
is a source of sustained motivation in the ity as a stable capacity that one possesses
face of failure, showing that young chil- more or less of than others—a perspective
dren’s optimism is not an unavoidable by- that has been shown to bring about negative
product of their cognitive immaturity (as I self-
assessments, lowered persistence, and
intend to do here) has clear implications for maladaptive achievement outcomes in many
motivation science. Specifically, the pres- older children (e.g., Dweck, 1999, 2006;
ent argument suggests that young children’s Nicholls, 1990; Nicholls & Miller, 1984a).
ability to remain engaged with a task that Thus, a more accurate understanding of
they find difficult is far more fragile than young children’s reasoning about compe-
previously assumed. This point underscores tence is essential for predicting the effects of
the substantial real-world implications of these secular trends in the education system,
investigating early reasoning about achieve- and more generally for fostering a positive,
ment. Adequate theories on this topic are constructive attitude toward learning in
essential in determining how to optimize early childhood.
motivation and achievement in early child- Returning to the issue of continuity versus
hood. If young children’s optimism about discontinuity in mental representations, one
their abilities is not due to their inescapable may wonder why theories regarding young
children’s reasoning about competence An Undifferentiated Concept of Ability

(which posit discontinuities in the underly-
As adults, we have multiple ways of think-
ing concepts) have remained isolated from
ing about success and failure. Sometimes
the contemporary literature on cognitive
we see achievement outcomes as reflecting
development (most of which reveals continu-
a dynamic process (e.g., putting in effort,
ity instead). Part of the reason may simply be
that research on early achievement cognitions applying strategies); other times, we see them
slowed to a trickle after the early 1990s. This as reflecting a static underlying entity (e.g.,
slowdown might have been caused in part capacity, talent) or a combination of the
by the success of the canonical view itself. two (e.g., effort matters, but only up to the
Persuaded by the claim that young children’s limit imposed by capacity) (Dweck, 1999,
conceptual deficiencies make them irrational 2006; Nicholls, 1978, 1984, 1990). In con-
optimists whose motivation is invulnerable trast, a major claim of the canonical view is
to failure (e.g., Nicholls & Miller, 1984a), that young children have access to only one
many achievement researchers may have of these perspectives. According to Nich-
chosen to focus on older children instead, olls (1978; for reviews, see Nicholls, 1984,
whose presumed conceptual sophistication 1990; Nicholls & Miller, 1984a), young
put them at greater risk for maladaptive children simply cannot conceive of outcomes
thoughts (e.g., low self-esteem, helplessness). as being influenced by capacity. For them,
Due to the scarcity of contemporary work effort is the only relevant causal variable. In
on early reasoning about competence, I will fact, Nicholls (1978, 1990) went so far as
occasionally rely on research from outside the to claim that through the age of 6, children
competence domain to illustrate young chil- may not even see the relationship between
dren’s greater-than-anticipated facility with effort and outcome as causal. Rather, they
relevant concepts. It is encouraging, how- may simply think of effort and outcome as
ever, that this line of research has recently the same thing: “Effort and outcome are not
seen something of a resurgence, with several distinguished as cause and effect. . . . Ability,
important contributions to our understand- effort, and outcome are not distinguished
ing of early competence beliefs coming out as separate dimensions” (Nicholls, 1978,
just in the last 5 years or so (e.g., Beilock, p. 812). According to Nicholls, even when
Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010; Cim- children become able to differentiate effort
pian, Mu, & Erickson, 2012; Gunderson as cause and outcome as effect (at around
et al., 2013; Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016; age 7), they still cannot grasp that any fac-
Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013). I highlight tors beyond effort might affect performance.
some of these contributions in the relevant The concept of capacity as a causal influence
sections below. on achievement outcomes is argued not to
be reliably present until children are 12 or
13 years old.
THE CANONICAL VIEW: CONCEPTUAL The most direct evidence for these claims
DISCONTINUITIES BETWEEN YOUNGER came from children’s reasoning about
AND OLDER CHILDREN vignettes in which one student works harder
than another yet performs either as well or
In what follows, I summarize three key less well (e.g., Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls &
claims concerning children’s supposed con- Miller, 1984b). After being presented with
ceptual shortcomings in the competence these vignettes, children were asked to judge,
domain. It is hard to overstate the influence for example, which child is smarter or “how
these claims still have on the contemporary come they got the same when one worked
literature investigating the development of hard and one didn’t work hard” (Nicholls,
achievement cognitions. As a simple search 1978, p. 803). Their answers to a number
will reveal, most work published on this of these questions were considered holisti-
topic in recent years references at least one cally and used to assign children to a par-
of them as an established fact about young ticular stage of reasoning about ability; the
children’s reasoning about competence. first two stages (in a sequence of four) are
392 IV. DEVELOPMENT
characterized by major conceptual short- shortcomings of preoperational thought

comings, as just described. (e.g., centration, inability to seriate), was
According to this perspective, young chil- also invoked to explain why children in the
dren’s conceptual immaturity explains many early elementary grades are clueless about
of their strangely optimistic judgments in the their relative standing among their peers,
competence domain. For instance, if children which they often grossly overestimate (e.g.,
initially conflate effort and outcome (or, at Nicholls, 1978; Stipek, 1984).
best, think that effort completely determines In summary, Nicholls’s view posits struc-
the outcome), there is no reason not to be tural limitations on the concepts young
optimistic in the face of failure. Past fail- children use to understand achievement. In
ure is more or less meaningless—with more turn, these limitations are used to account
effort, one can always succeed in the future. for the optimistic character of children’s
Thus, the flawed conceptual framework early competence-related reasoning.
young children use to reason about compe-
tence serves an important protective role,
whereas more mature concepts automati- Overly Concrete and Positive Representations
cally expose older children to maladaptive of Self
thoughts and outcomes: “Ironically, a more Harter’s influential theory on the develop-
mature understanding of ability can have ment of children’s representations of the
unfortunate consequences for competence self is another pillar of the canonical view
motivation and, thereby, for continued intel- (e.g., Harter, 1982; Harter & Pike, 1984;
lectual development. Development has its for recent reviews, see Harter, 2001, 2012).
discontents. These discontents stem [in part] Harter argues that young children’s imma-
from the ‘natural’ process of cognitive and ture mental representations impose a funda-
affective development” (Nicholls & Miller, mental limit on their ability to reason about
1984a, p. 186). the self, with downstream consequences for
Once children’s concepts mature to the their reasoning about competence as well.
point where they can understand that per- Below, I describe several of these hypothe-
formance can reflect one’s capacity or talent, sized cognitive limitations and their implica-
failure becomes more aversive. Failure (espe- tions for children’s thinking about achieve-
cially on tasks that others can accomplish) ment, as well as their motivation.
signals that one is somehow deficient, which First, Harter (2012) argues that young
in turn can undermine one’s motivation to children are unable to conceive of them-
pursue the tasks in question.1 selves as possessing general capacities or
Young children’s inability to understand traits. Instead, young children “can only
that one’s performance depends in part on construct very concrete cognitive representa-
one’s talent or capacity, and not just on tions of observable behaviors or features of
effort, was argued to contribute to another
the self (e.g., ‘I’m a boy,’ ‘I have a television

facet of their optimism as well: their curi- in my room,’ ‘I have a kitty that is orange’)”
ous disinterest in social comparison (i.e., (p. 30). Because children cannot abstract
figuring out how their performance stacks any broader commonalities across such con-
up against that of others). Young children’s crete features, their self-representations are
self-
evaluations seem unaffected by infor- “isolated from one another,” “compartmen-
mation about others’ performance: Whether talized,” “disjointed,” and lacking in coher-
their performance is better or worse than ence (p. 30). Even when children mention
that of other children, kindergarteners and abstract-sounding trait terms in their self-
first graders remain equally optimistic about descriptions (e.g., “I’m smart”), these should
their abilities (e.g., Ruble, Boggiano, Feld- not be taken at face value, since their seman-
man, & Loebl, 1980). This is as expected, of tic content may not be the same as for older
course, if young children cannot understand children and adults:
others’ performance to reveal anything
beyond the amount of effort expended. Although children may describe themselves
This limitation, along with other supposed in such terminology as good or bad, nice or
mean, smart or dumb, these characteristics do In summary, Harter’s theory accounts

not represent “traits,” given their typical psy- for the quirks in children’s early reasoning
chological meanings. . . . At this age, the use about competence by appealing to a number
of such terms are more likely to reflect the use of fundamental deficits in their concepts.
of self-labels that have been modeled by oth-
As was the case with Nicholls (e.g., 1978,
ers (e.g., parents or teachers). (Harter, 2012,
p. 52)
1990), these cognitive limitations were also
thought to serve important protective func-
In other words, whenever trait terms appear tions for their motivation, enabling young
in young children’s self- descriptions, it is children to remain resilient in the face of
daunting challenges.
likely that children are simply mimicking
adults’ use of trait terms (e.g., mom saying
they are smart), without truly understand- Wishful Thinking
ing their meaning. 2 This claim was consis-
A narrower, but nevertheless influential,
tent with several prominent studies from the
element of the canonical view proposes
same period (e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1984;
that young children’s positivity is due to a
Rotenberg, 1980), which appeared to show
single conceptual confusion. Prompted by
that children are unable to interpret others’ the observation that children are often more
behaviors in terms of general dispositions realistic and accurate when they’re reason-
(traits, capacities, etc.) until they are 9 or 10 ing about others’ competence rather than
years of age (for a review, see Rholes, New- their own, Stipek (1984; Stipek, Roberts,
man, & Ruble, 1990). & Sanborn, 1984) hypothesized that the
So far, I have described the claim that source of their optimism lies in an imma-
young children’s concrete thinking prevents ture, egocentric understanding of physical
them from forming more sophisticated types causality (Piaget, 1930). Having frequently
of self-representations (e.g., traits, abilities). experienced the contiguity between their
Several other cognitive deficits are invoked desires (e.g., “I want food”) and events in
to account for the irrational-seeming positiv- the world (e.g., “I am fed”), young children
ity of young children’s self-representations. may develop an exaggerated sense of per-
For instance, young children are claimed to sonal efficacy, believing that their desires
be unable to compare abstract quantities, have a direct causal effect on the world.
such as their performance versus another’s Perhaps, then, this “wishful thinking” ten-
(Harter, 2012), which means that they can- dency explains why children display inflated
not use social comparison to bring their self- expectations of success.
evaluations to more realistic levels. Follow- As just mentioned, this claim is supported
ing Piaget (1960), Harter (2012) also argues by self–other asymmetries in competence
that young children are egocentric— that judgments. When it comes to predicting
is, unable to understand other people’s per- their own future performance, preschool-
spectives, and mental states more generally. ers typically expect to do well, regardless of
Because of this perspective- taking failure, how they did in the past; in contrast, when
young children do not understand that oth- making predictions about how another per-
ers can be critical of them and therefore fail son will do, young children reason much
to incorporate this information into their like older children and adults, lowering
self-views. Another representational deficit their expectations if the person has failed
that was thought to exacerbate the positivity in the past (e.g., Stipek & Hoffman, 1980).
of young children’s self-views is their “dif- A similar conclusion applies to how young
ficulty distinguishing between their desired children evaluate themselves compared to
and their actual competence” (p. 31). That others: Although kindergartners and first
is, young children have overly positive self- graders overestimate their own standing
views in part because they confuse want- among their peers, they are as accurate as
ing to be good at many things with actually older children when estimating where others
being good at these things (see the next sec- rank in terms of their smarts (Stipek, 1981).
tion for an elaboration of this claim). In addition, their estimations of others’ (but
394 IV. DEVELOPMENT
not their own) rank are in agreement with Thus, the first argument questions the very
more objective standards, such as teacher existence of the phenomenon that inspired
ratings. Also consistent with claims of wish- the canonical view. Second, I argue directly
ful thinking, young children are overopti- against the claim that the concepts under-
mistic about another person’s future per- lying reasoning about competence undergo
formance when they stand to benefit from qualitative shifts. Although this claim was
this person’s success: When 4-year-olds at one point in agreement with the state of
were told that they would receive a bag of the art in cognitive development, it no lon-
marbles if another child did well, the chil- ger is. With increasing use of methodolo-
dren’s expectations for the other child were gies that are less taxing on young children’s
as inflated as when they predicted their own attention, memory, and language, research
future performance (Stipek et al., 1984). The in this area has shown early concepts to
influence of self-interest on young children’s be remarkably sophisticated. This evidence
expectations, whether for their own or for undermines any strong claims of qualitative
others’ performance, seems to support the changes in the mental representations that
“wishful thinking” claim that they possess younger and older children use to under-
an immature concept of causality (i.e., that stand the world.
they believe their wishes have a direct causal
effect on the world).
Is There a Sharp Discontinuity
in Competence Judgments?
Interim Summary
If young children are truly incapable of
Although they differ in their details, the grasping reality in the same way as older
previous views are all instantiations of the children and adults, their judgments about
same claim—namely, that younger and older competence should be consistently off-
children operate with fundamentally dif- target. To the extent that young children’s
ferent sets of concepts, which is why their judgments look rational in some contexts
competence judgments are so different. This or tasks and irrational in others, it becomes
discontinuity claim is assumed to be true in less plausible to argue that they are inca-
most contemporary research on children’s pable of rational responses because of their
motivation and achievement. There are, inherent conceptual limitations. Such vari-
however, valid reasons to be skeptical of it. ability across contexts or tasks would sug-
gest instead that young children might grasp
the relevant basic concepts but sometimes
THE CASE AGAINST fail to demonstrate their grasp because of
DEVELOPMENTAL DISCONTINUITIES extraneous factors (e.g., unusual pragmat-
ics, unfamiliar contexts, tasks that exceed
This section contains two arguments against their linguistic ability). In what follows, I
the canonical (discontinuity) view. First, I review evidence revealing substantial vari-
argue that the developmental differences in ability in the judgments that the canonical
competence judgments—which the canoni- view sought to explain.
cal view seeks to explain— are not nearly
as stark as one would expect if they were
Insensitivity to Outcomes
due to the fundamental, inescapable limita-
tions of young children’s concepts. Look- Do young children always fail to integrate
ing at the sum of the evidence, one finds no information about outcomes into their
real discontinuity in competence judgments. competence judgments? Are they blindly
In fact, there are many circumstances in optimistic about their abilities and their
which younger children’s reasoning is iden- chances of success? The answer is “no.” In
tical to that of older children. And without fact, I have already reviewed evidence that
a sharp discontinuity in judgments, there is preschoolers are perfectly capable of factor-
little reason to posit a sharp discontinuity ing outcome information into their judg-
in the concepts underlying these judgments. ments: Past performance is routinely taken
into account when evaluating and making children could cross the monkey bars faster,
predictions about others’ performance (Sti- using only one hand per bar, and it was clear
pek et al., 1984); young children’s optimism to her that she could not. To the extent that
is restricted mostly to assessments of their these observations capture young children’s
own competence. In many contexts, how- actual achievement cognitions and behavior,
ever, young children use evidence to adjust they also raise doubts about the claim that
their self-evaluations as well. For instance, children this age are undaunted optimists
when 4-year-olds rank themselves and their who always overestimate their abilities.
peers on dimensions that are familiar and
meaningful to them (e.g., how fast they can
Absence of, and Insensitivity to,
run), their rankings actually correspond
Social Comparisons
with objective measures (Morris & Nem-
cek, 1982; see also Marsh, Ellis, & Craven, The canonical view is premised in part on
2002). When their past failures are made the idea that young children are neither
salient, such as when their unsolved puzzles motivated nor able to (1) engage in social
are left out in front of them, 4- and 5-year- comparisons, and (2) use social comparisons
olds lower their expectations of future suc- to evaluate their abilities. However, these
cess (Hebert & Dweck, 1985, described in empirical claims may not be valid. Much of
Dweck, 1991; see also Stipek et al., 1984). the evidence supporting them came from lab-
Similarly, many 5- and 6-year-olds display oratory studies in which the social compari-
negative self- evaluations and low expecta- son information was provided to children
tions when their performance is criticized in unfamiliar, decontextualized ways. For
by an adult, which also makes failure salient example, a classic study measured whether
and relevant to children (Heyman et al., young children engage in social comparison
1992). by counting how often they pressed a but-
More generally, the claim that young chil- ton to display an image of another child’s
dren are irrationally optimistic about their work on a video monitor—arguably, quite
abilities is difficult to reconcile with their unlike what children might do outside the
behavior outside the laboratory (Butler, laboratory to obtain this sort of informa-
2005). In real life, young children’s achieve- tion (Ruble, Feldman, & Boggiano, 1976).
ment behavior does not seem qualitatively Similarly, studies investigating whether chil-
different from that of older children and dren make use of social comparison infor-
adults. Even casual observations of a pre- mation often presented this information in
school classroom, for example, are likely complex, abstract formats that may not have
to reveal that 4-year-olds generally know held much meaning for young children. For
when they have failed and when they have example, Nicholls (1978) showed children
succeeded, and adjust their behavior accord- cards with 18 schematic faces that differed
ingly (e.g., asking for help when they run into in color (yellow vs. white) depending on
difficulties). In addition, failure often takes whether the individuals depicted could or
a toll on young children’s motivation, much could not solve a problem. Although adults
like it does on that of older children. Many are familiar with such symbolic means of
preschoolers give up on tasks they cannot depicting frequencies or proportions, young
master in a few tries; they do not simply children are probably not.
breeze past their failed attempts as if nothing Evidence obtained with simpler, more nat-
happened. Moreover, young children’s self- uralistic methods contradicts these claims
assessments outside the laboratory are not and suggests instead that young children
consistently off-base; many children seem to both perform and use social comparisons.
have surprisingly precise insights into their Observational studies of classroom contexts,
abilities. I remember, for example, talking to for example, revealed that social compari-
a preschooler who explained that she could son behaviors such as looking at other chil-
cross the monkey bars in only one way— dren’s work or making comparative state-
by getting both hands onto one bar before ments are common as early as kindergarten
reaching for the next. She knew that other (e.g., Pomerantz, Ruble, Frey, & Greulich,
396 IV. DEVELOPMENT
1995) and even preschool (e.g., Mosatche & irrational judgments that the canonical view
Bragonier, 1981). Given that young children was formulated to explain may be, in some
can accurately estimate their own and oth- measure, an artifact of the methods initially
ers’ relative standing on meaningful dimen- used to investigate young children’s think-
sions (e.g., Morris & Nemcek, 1982; Stipek, ing.
1981), this seems hardly surprising: It is dif-
ficult to see how children could rank them-
Are There Sharp Discontinuities
selves and their classmates with any degree
in the Concepts Underlying
of accuracy if they were completely uninter-
Competence Judgments?
ested in, or incapable of performing, social
comparisons. The preceding section suggests that reason-
Notably, this rank- estimation evidence ing about competence is relatively continu-
also suggests that young children use social ous across development. In and of itself, this
comparisons to inform their evaluations of conclusion makes moot any claims of discon-
themselves and others, contradicting ear- tinuities in the underlying concepts. How-
lier claims (e.g., Ruble et al., 1976, 1980). ever, even when judged on its own merits,
Young children’s sensitivity to social com- the idea that development brings about radi-
parison information was subsequently docu- cal transformations in the concepts involved
mented in experimental work as well, using in reasoning about competence is out of step
simpler paradigms that better reflected how with contemporary developmental science.
young children might compare themselves Although children’s information-processing
to others in everyday contexts. For example, abilities (e.g., working memory capacity,
Butler (1998) used a drawing task in which inhibitory control) and their knowledge
children had to trace as much of a winding undoubtedly grow as they get older, their
path as they could in a certain amount of understanding of the world does not change
time. Children were then shown the draw- in fundamental ways. Below, I briefly review
ing of a child who had clearly traced more recent evidence against the conceptual
or less of the path than they had. In this con- limitations invoked by the canonical view.
text, even 4- and 5-year-olds took notice of Where relevant, I also articulate the impli-
the comparison: They judged that they did cations of this new evidence for children’s
less well—and even that they were less good motivation.
at tracing tasks in general—when the other
child traced more than they had (see also
Egocentrism
Rhodes & Brickman, 2008). Preschoolers’
motivation was also affected by the social Is it possible that young children’s seem-
comparison information, as was that of ingly inflated self-views arise because they
older children. Children who experienced are egocentric— unable to consider other
relative failure often avoided the tracing people’s perspectives about themselves (e.g.,
activity when allowed to choose between it Harter, 2012)? Others’ negative views about
and another activity. them should lower their self-assessments, so
In summary, there is little evidence of a perhaps children’s positivity is due in part to
sharp discontinuity between younger and a failure to understand other people’s men-
older children’s reasoning about compe- tal states. This claim is implausible. In fact,
tence. Whether one looks at young chil- even infants understand that others’ percep-
dren’s ability to incorporate outcomes into tions, preferences, beliefs, and so forth, may
their evaluations or at their motivation to be different from their own (e.g., Luo &
engage in social comparisons and their use Johnson, 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
of this information in their subsequent judg- Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; for a review,
ments, the same conclusion emerges: In see Baillargeon et al., 2016). The prior evi-
contexts that are familiar and meaningful, dence for egocentrism, as well as for other
young children’s competence judgments are major flaws in young children’s “theory of
much more similar than dissimilar to those mind” (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983), was
of older children, as are their motivational largely a methodological artifact. The use of
patterns in response to failure. Thus, the tasks that needlessly taxed young children’s
information-processing resources made it relations between objects (e.g., Ferry, Hes-

appear that they had a limited understand- pos, & Gentner, 2015; Walker & Gopnik,
ing of others’ minds, when in fact their 2014), how they reason about living organ-
understanding was fairly sophisticated (e.g., isms (e.g., Setoh, Wu, Baillargeon, & Gel-
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). man, 2013; Simons & Keil, 1995), and so
on. Thus, there is no longer any reason to be
skeptical of young children’s ability to think
Inability to Compare Abstract Quantities
abstractly about their achievement experi-
Can it be that young children’s seeming ences (in fact, see Cvencek, Greenwald, &
insensitivity to (relative) failure is due to Meltzoff, 2016; Marsh et al., 2002).
their inability to compare abstract quanti-
ties, which prevents them from realizing
Immature Reasoning about Physical Causality
when their performance is inferior to oth-
ers’ (e.g., Harter, 2012)? Contrary to this Perhaps young children don’t understand
possibility, it seems that humans are actu- how the physical world works, believing
ally born with the ability to perform such that their wishes—in and of themselves—
abstract quantitative comparisons. For have causal effects. This misunderstanding
instance, newborns familiarized with strings was thought to be part of the reason why
of four syllables subsequently looked lon- young children display overly optimistic per-
ger at images containing four objects than formance expectations (e.g., Stipek, 1984).
at images containing 12 objects, and vice However, none of the subsequent research
versa— newborns familiarized with strings on early causal reasoning provides any sup-
of 12 syllables looked longer at sets contain- port for this “wishful thinking” claim. On
ing 12 rather than four objects (Izard et al., the contrary, humans’ basic understanding
2009; see also Jordan & Brannon, 2006). of physical objects and their causal interac-
Newborns’ ability to compare numerical tions seems, by and large, to be preserved
quantities across sensory modalities speaks across development (for reviews, see Bail-
to the abstractness of the numerical and largeon, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007)
quantitative representations with which our and even across species (e.g., Chiandetti &
species is endowed (for a review, see Hyde, Vallortigara, 2013; Wood, 2013). Impor-
2015). Thus, there is no reason to believe tantly, this initial understanding is unlikely
that an inability to make abstract quantita- to contain any “wishful” beliefs. Consider,
tive comparisons hinders children’s reason- for example, that when 9-month-olds were
ing about competence. allowed to reach toward one of two similar-
looking boxes that differed in weight, they
reached preferentially toward the lighter
Overly Concrete Mental Representations
box, which they had been able to manipu-
The seeming irrationality of young chil- late more easily in the past (Hauf, Paulus,
dren’s reasoning about competence was & Baillargeon, 2012). Thus, infants do not
also attributed to the concreteness of their disregard past failures—they do not expect
mental representations, which was argued that just because they might wish it so, all
to prevent them from conceiving of general, of a sudden it might be easier to play with
abstract abilities (e.g., Harter, 2012). How- the heavier box. This result, and others like
ever, as illustrated by the foregoing discus- it (e.g., Hespos & Baillargeon, 2008), speak
sion of numerical concepts, young children’s against the idea of irrational optimism in
thinking turns out to be surprisingly pow- early causal reasoning.
erful and abstract. This conclusion is sup- All this being said, even if young children
ported by a wide range of studies investigat- did occasionally allow their wishes to color
ing how infants generalize from experience their judgments, they would be in good com-
(e.g., Dewar & Xu, 2010; Yin & Csibra, pany: Motives and desires influence reason-
2015), how they learn language (e.g., Mar- ing throughout life and across domains, to
cus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Smith, the point that adults may also be reason-
Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samu- ably characterized as “wishful thinkers”
elson, 2002), how they reason about the (e.g., Hughes & Zaki, 2015; Jost, Glazer,
398 IV. DEVELOPMENT
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Mather & but they also assume that the influence of
Carstensen, 2005). If adults’ concepts are traits on behavior is more deterministic
not deemed inadequate simply because their than seems warranted; that is, one can fully
reasoning is sometimes motivated, children’s appreciate that human behavior is guided by
concepts should not be either (see also But- traits, yet still be unsure whether the pro-
ler, 2005). tagonist will spend “all her play time raking
leaves” (Rholes & Ruble, 1984, p. 552) just
because she shared part of her lunch with
Inability to Understand Ability as a Trait
someone who had nothing to eat.
Arguably, the most influential claim of the Evidence obtained with simpler, less
canonical view is that young children can- ambiguous tasks suggests that young chil-
not understand ability as a capacity or trait dren do in fact possess the concept of a
(e.g., Harter, 2012; Nicholls, 1978, 1984, dispositional trait. Even 3- and 4-year-olds
1990), partly because they cannot under- infer traits from relevant behaviors, espe-
stand behavior in terms of stable traits in the cially when these behaviors are intentional
first place (e.g., Rholes et al., 1990). Young and frequent (e.g., Boseovski, Chiu, &
children’s immature concept of ability (as Marcovitch, 2013; Boseovski & Lee, 2006;
depending exclusively on effort) was thought Giles & Heyman, 2003; Hermes, Behne, &
to account for their optimistic outlook on Rakoczy, 2015; Liu et al., 2007). Moreover,
achievement. Despite its remarkably persis- 3- and 4-year-olds reliably use trait infor-
tent influence on the field, this claim does mation to predict a person’s future motives,
not fare any better than the others when behaviors, and emotional reactions (e.g.,
evaluated against the relevant evidence. Heyman & Gelman, 1999, 2000; Hermes et
Let us consider, first, the broader claim al., 2015; Liu et al., 2007; see also Boseovski
that children do not understand others’ et al., 2013; Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Cain,
behaviors in terms of underlying traits— Heyman, & Walker, 1997).
that is, stable psychological tendencies that Strikingly, even infants seem to have a
predispose people to act a certain way. basic understanding of dispositional traits,
Several researchers have pointed out that consistent with the recent surge of evidence
in many of the studies providing evidence suggesting sophisticated mental-state under-
for this claim, children’s responses were standing early in life (e.g., Baillargeon et
judged against an unreasonably high bar: al., 2016). For example, 15-month-olds
Children were told about one trait-relevant expected a person who had repeatedly dis-
behavior (e.g., Jill shared part of her lunch played anger toward an action to continue
with a child who had nothing to eat) and displaying this emotion on later occasions
were asked whether the protagonist would when similar actions were performed (e.g.,
exhibit behavior consistent with this trait in Repacholi, Meltzoff, Toub, & Ruba, 2016;
a different circumstance (e.g., Will Jill help see also Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003;
another child rake the leaves in the yard?; Repacholi, Meltzoff, Hennings, & Ruba,
e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1984; Rotenberg, 2016); 13-month-olds expected a person
1980). To show that they understood traits who had performed an action with several
in such a task, children would need to go objects (e.g., sliding them back and forth)
through a complicated chain of reasoning to continue performing this action with dif-
(for details of this argument, see Heyman & ferent objects on later occasions (e.g., Song,
Gelman, 1999; Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2005); and 5-month-
2007). Specifically, children would need to olds expected an unfamiliar agent who had
(1) infer a stable trait (e.g., generous) on the repeatedly reached toward one of two objects
basis of a single trait-relevant behavior (e.g., to continue reaching toward the preferred
sharing one’s lunch) (behavior → trait step), object, even when their positions were later
then (2) use the inferred trait to predict a switched (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; see also
different trait-consistent behavior in a dif- Luo & Johnson, 2009; Woodward, 1998).
ferent context (e.g., helping with yard work) Why did the infants expect behavioral
(trait → behavior step). Not only do such consistency in these studies? In particular,
tasks involve a multistep inferential chain, did they actually attribute a disposition to
the actor, or were their expectations driven young children. For example, 4-year-olds
by shallower processes (e.g., a superfi- who saw an actor provide accurate, detailed
cial tendency to expect more of the same)? names for a number of objects (e.g., super-
Although this question cannot be conclu- sonic airplane, fusilli pasta) subsequently
sively settled with the data available, two judged this actor to be “smarter” (but not
considerations favor the richer, trait-based “stronger” or “nicer”) than an actor whom
interpretation. First, infants did not display they had seen successfully lift a number of
the same expectations of consistency in con- heavy objects (e.g., a potato sack, a big suit-
trol conditions that were superficially simi- case; Hermes et al., 2015). Moreover, they
lar to those described earlier. For instance, expected the “smart” actor to be able to
the 5-month-olds in Luo and Baillargeon’s name other, unfamiliar objects, as well as
(2005) experiments did not expect the agent succeed in a number of knowledge- based
to reach toward the same object on later (but not strength-based) activities. The latter
occasions if that object had been the only result suggests that children had a relatively
one present during the initial phase. It was abstract understanding of the trait “smart,”
only when infants saw the agent actively extending it to an appropriately broad set of
choose between two objects during the ini- activities beyond the ones initially used to
tial phase—that is, when they had evidence infer the trait. The 4-year-olds also accu-
for a preference (a disposition)—that they rately labeled the actor who had been able
later expected behavioral consistency. Sec- to lift heavy objects as “stronger” (but not
ond, since 3- and 4-year-olds seem to under- “smarter” or “nicer”) than the other actor,
stand traits already (e.g., Heyman & Gel- and they expected this “strong” actor to be
man, 1999, 2000; Liu et al., 2007), it seems able to manipulate unfamiliar objects with
uncharitable to interpret infants’ trait-like ease and succeed in other strength- based
judgments as driven entirely by low-level (but not knowledge- based) activities. This
processes. How likely is it that infants’ nuanced pattern of competence judgments
expectations of behavioral consistency arise and predictions contradicts the view that
from superficial associations when (1) their young children’s concept of ability is inad-
expectations are nuanced and context- equate. A concept that simply equates ability
sensitive, (2) there is extensive independent with effort cannot account for 4-year-olds’
evidence for sophisticated theory- of-mind domain- differentiated, sensible responses
abilities at this age (e.g., Baillargeon et al., in this and similar studies (e.g., Cain et al.,
2016), and (3) the same expectations of con- 1997; Marsh et al., 2002).
sistency seem to stem from a veridical under- Second, consistent with the idea that
standing of traits in children who are only younger and older children have access
slightly older? to similar ability concepts, Heyman and
In summary, young children interpret oth- Compton (2006) demonstrated that young
ers’ behaviors in terms of stable underlying children give “mature,” ability- as-trait
traits at least by the age of 3 or 4 years, and responses with a minimal change to the
perhaps as early as infancy. In and of itself, classic Nicholls (1978) task. Recall that, in
this evidence casts some doubt on the claim this task, children are asked to reason about
that young children cannot understand abil- two actors who get the same score on a test
ity as a trait (e.g., Harter, 2012; Nicholls, despite spending different amounts of time
1978, 1984, 1990). Aside from this general working on it. The first question children
reason to be skeptical, there are now many are always asked in this task is, “Was one
findings that contradict this claim directly. working harder or were they the same?”
These findings suggest instead that young (Nicholls, 1978, p. 803; see also Nicholls &
children are able to interpret competence- Miller, 1984b). The fixed order of the ques-
related behaviors, just like any other behav- tions in this task raises the following pos-
iors, as arising from stable underlying dis- sibility: Perhaps young children’s responses
positions. to the subsequent questions about ability
First, ability-related traits were featured typically reveal an ability-as-effort concep-
in some of the previously mentioned stud- tion simply because the first question (about
ies that documented trait reasoning in working hard) activates this conception.
400 IV. DEVELOPMENT
If so, asking a question that activates the have access to the same ways of thinking
ability-as-trait conception instead should about ability as older children and adults,
produce a corresponding shift in children’s and that subtle features of the context deter-
responses to the later ability questions. For mine which of these ways is most salient to
example, we might ask children whether one children at a particular time.
actor found the test easier. Even 2-year-olds Third, not only can young children con-
recognize that someone who needs to exert ceive of ability as a trait, but they also dis-
less effort to complete a task finds it easier play the maladaptive behaviors that often
(Jara-Ettinger, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2015; accompany this conception in older children
see also Heyman & Compton, 2006). More- and adults. Experiments on the effects of
over, prompting children to think about dif- trait versus nontrait praise provide direct
ferences in the actors’ mental states (rather evidence for this point. For example, when
than just their behaviors) may draw their 4-year-olds’ successes were praised with a
attention to differences in the underlying trait term (e.g., “You are a good drawer”; see
mental capacities (Heyman, Gee, & Giles, also Gelman & Heyman, 1999), they reacted
2003), thereby activating the ability-as-trait more negatively to later mistakes than when
conception. In turn, activating this concep- their successes were praised with a nontrait
tion might lead children to give more trait- phrase that was otherwise analogous (e.g.,
based responses to the subsequent ques- “You did a good job drawing”; Cimpian,
tions about the actors’ abilities (assuming, Arce, Markman, & Dweck, 2007; Morris
of course, that young children possess the & Zentall, 2014; Zentall & Morris, 2010,
ability-as-trait conception in the first place). 2012). Note that, initially, the trait and non-
Following this logic, Heyman and Comp- trait praise statements were equally reward-
ton (2006) presented Nicholls-style vignettes ing: Regardless of which praise they got,
to kindergartners and simply manipulated children felt happy and competent. How-
which question was asked first: whether the ever, their reactions diverged dramatically
actors tried hard or not on the test (as in the the moment they made a mistake. Relative
original task), or whether the actors thought to children who received the nontrait praise,
the test was easy or difficult. When first children who had been told they were “good
asked whether the actors tried hard, children drawers” felt sadder, thought they were
did not subsequently judge the faster actors less good at drawing, and said more often
to be smarter, consistent with the findings that they would not want to draw again
of Nicholls (1978) and others. However, in the future—in short, they displayed the
when first asked whether the actors found helpless reaction to failure that is common
the test easy or difficult, the vast majority of when people conceive of ability as a fixed
children (82%) did judge the faster actors to trait that is out of their control (for similar
be smarter and the slower actors to be less results, see Cimpian, 2010; Cimpian et al.,
smart, as would be expected if this question 2012; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Rhodes &
had prompted children to think of ability as Brickman, 2008). These findings under-
a trait (Heyman & Compton, 2006, Study score that even young children are capable
2). Also consistent with this possibility, the of conceiving of ability as a trait, with all
easy–difficult question led children to pre- that entails for their self-evaluation, moti-
dict that the slower actor would do “worse vation, and achievement. Moreover, these
than most of the kids in [the] class” in the studies highlight how exquisitely sensitive
future, which suggests that they attributed to context children’s conceptual frameworks
a stable trait to this person (Study 3). Simi- are. A few simple statements from an unfa-
larly, a full 65% of the children primed with miliar experimenter were able to shift how
the easy–difficult question also agreed that children conceptualized their successes and,
“some people . . . could never be really good” subsequently, how they reacted to failures.
(which is a clear expression of the ability-as-
trait perspective), compared with only 29%
Interim Summary
such responses when the effort question was
first. In summary, the results of this simple The evidence in this section suggests that
manipulation suggest that young children competence judgments and concepts do not
change qualitatively across development. skills and capacities are of little importance.
The canonical view, despite its intuitive As children progress through the school sys-
appeal and continuing influence on the field, tem, however, the frequency of challenging,
is no longer tenable. Young children can teacher-directed, whole-class activities—
make sense of their achievement experiences which provide ample opportunities for
in all the same ways that older children can, social comparison—increases considerably,
and they are thus vulnerable to the same and with it the prominence of grades, class
negative, helpless patterns of cognitions and ranks, and other formal systems of evalu-
behaviors. ation. Such environments inevitably draw
attention to differences between children’s
abilities, highlighting the idea that success
WHAT EXPLAINS THE GREATER depends on more than just paying attention.
POSITIVITY IN YOUNG Thus, young children’s responses may be
CHILDREN’S JUDGMENTS? somewhat more positive and effort-focused
than older children’s because that is the
This final section is intended to resolve default perspective they bring with them to
a lingering tension. On the one hand, it is the laboratory. Young children are perfectly
clear that young children’s judgments are capable of adopting the alternative, ability-
not blindly optimistic. Under certain cir- as-trait perspective (with its more realistic
cumstances, they can be as realistic as older outlook and its higher risk of helpless reac-
children are—consistent with the argument tions to setbacks), but they are unlikely to do
that they have access to similar competence- so unless somehow prompted. I have already
related concepts. On the other hand, young reviewed some evidence that supports this
children’s answers in many studies do have view. For example, despite young children’s
a more optimistic bent than those of older typical focus on effort, just a few statements
children. What explains this tendency or questions from an adult seem sufficient
toward positivity, especially if conceptual to prompt children to think of ability as a
limitations are not to blame? As anticipated trait (e.g., Cimpian, 2010; Cimpian et al.,
earlier in the chapter, the answer might have 2007, 2012; Heyman & Compton, 2006;
to do with the dominant messages in chil- Morris & Zentall, 2014; Zentall & Mor-
dren’s environments. What changes across ris, 2010, 2012). Also consistent with this
development is not the content of children’s view, young children whose home environ-
ability concepts, but rather which of these ments differ systematically in whether effort
concepts or perspectives is emphasized in or traits are emphasized seem to adopt dif-
their daily lives. Many children’s early envi- ferent “default” beliefs about ability as well
ronments (e.g., home, daycare, preschool) (Gunderson et al., 2013; see also Haimovitz
are centered around learning and growth & Dweck, 2016; Pomerantz & Kempner,
(e.g., Butler, 2005; Eccles et al., 1984; Rosen- 2013). The structure of young children’s
holtz & Simpson, 1984; Stipek & Daniels, classroom environments (e.g., more vs. less
1988). These environments are relatively evaluative) is similarly predictive of their
unstructured, with children having consid- competence judgments. For example, in kin-
erable control over the activities in which dergarten classrooms that were more regi-
they engage. Because there are few group mented, and in which evaluative feedback
activities (at least academic ones), children was more common and salient, children
often cannot compare their performance were significantly more realistic when esti-
with same-age peers on the same task. In mating their class rank (Stipek & Daniels,
addition, children’s performance is seldom 1988; see also Butler & Ruzany, 1993). This
formally evaluated, especially since chil- evidence converges on the idea that young
dren this age are expected to acquire only children can flexibly switch between differ-
very basic skills (e.g., counting from 1 to 10, ent ways of conceptualizing ability, depend-
reciting the alphabet). In summary, in chil- ing on their experiences; the fact that they
dren’s early environments, success is largely are typically optimistic is just a reflection of
a function of paying attention and trying their typical environments. An implication
hard; differences between children in their of this view is that systematic changes in
402 IV. DEVELOPMENT
young children’s environments, such as those In summary, the relative positivity of

currently under way in the American educa- young children’s competence judgments
tion system (Bassok et al., 2016), are likely is likely to arise not from their conceptual
to bring about corresponding shifts in how shortcomings but rather from the fact that
children reason about ability. In the coming their typical social environments (1) empha-
decades, kindergartners’ default perspective size effort and downplay individual differ-
on achievement may bear little resemblance ences between children, and (2) condone, or
to that of the resilient kindergartners from even encourage, self- congratulatory judg-
20 or 30 years ago. ments and behavior.
The relative positivity of young children’s
judgments may also be due to the rela-
tive appropriateness of self-congratulatory CONCLUSIONS
behaviors in the first few years of life (e.g.,
Butler, 2005; Frey & Ruble, 1987; Pomer- Young children’s competence judgments are
antz et al., 1995). In many contexts, it is often portrayed as qualitatively different
socially acceptable, even desirable, for young from those of older children (e.g., grossly
children to boast about their abilities and inflated, irrationally oblivious to evidence).
performance, even when their claims are Moreover, these differences in judgments
not entirely warranted. Parents of young are often claimed to be due to flaws in the
children (in the United States, at least) mental representations with which young
may encourage these self- congratulatory children reason about competence (e.g.,
behaviors partly as a means of fostering inadequate concepts of ability, traits, cau-
children’s self-
esteem (e.g., Miller, Wiley, sality, quantity). The evidence reviewed
Fung, & Liang, 1997). With age, however, here suggests that neither of these claims is
overt behaviors of this sort are increasingly valid. In reality, younger and older children
perceived as undesirable, not just by adults interpret their achievement experiences with
but by children themselves. For example, largely the same set of concepts. And while
in Pomerantz and colleagues’ (1995) study, competence judgments are on average more
only about 5% of kindergartners had a nega- optimistic in early childhood, this differ-
tive perception of others’ boastful statements ence is simply the result of contingent facts
(e.g., “My picture is the best”), whereas more about the typical environments of young
than 50% of fourth and fifth graders did. (middle-class American) children that instill
Paralleling this increase in negative percep- a default—but easily revisable—perspective
tions, the frequency of the behaviors them- on achievement that is effort- centric and
selves (i.e., overt comparison statements) confident.
declined sharply. These shifting norms likely By portraying young children as irratio-
explain part of the decrease in children’s self- nal optimists, the outmoded ideas that cur-
reported optimism about their abilities. To rently dominate the literature have stifled
the extent that statements about one’s high research on early reasoning about achieve-
ability are not frowned upon in young chil- ment. There is much we do not know, but
dren’s everyday lives, such statements may be should know, about the achievement beliefs
relatively common in response to an experi- and mindsets (e.g., Dweck, 2006; Yeager,
menter’s questions. (Interestingly, although Paunesku, Walton, & Dweck, 2013) of
self-
congratulatory behaviors become less young children: how to measure them, what
socially acceptable with age, the motivation shapes their content, how to change them,
to present oneself in a positive light might what their long-term effects are, and so on.
actually ramp up, as children are exposed to The early years set a crucial foundation for
an increasingly competitive environment in children’s attitudes toward school. Without
which it is desirable to look more competent a better understanding of young children’s
than others [e.g., Butler, 1998]. Thus, chil- thinking about competence, we are miss-
dren need to learn how to balance the desire ing an opportunity to help every child enter
to enhance their image in others’ eyes with school with, and maintain, a productive,
the social costs of doing so.) learning-focused mindset.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Bassok, D., Latham, S., & Rorem, A. (2016).

Is kindergarten the new first grade? AERA
Many thanks to Joe Cimpian, David Yeager, Open, 1(4), 1–31.
and the members of the Cognitive Development Beilock, S. L., Gunderson, E. A., Ramirez, G.,
Lab at the University of Illinois for providing & Levine, S. C. (2010). Female teachers’ math
feedback on previous drafts of this chapter. The anxiety affects girls’ math achievement. Pro-
writing of this chapter was supported in part by ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
National Science Foundation Grant Nos. BCS- USA, 107(5), 1860–1863.
1530669 and HRD-1561723. Boseovski, J. J., Chiu, K., & Marcovitch, S.
(2013). Integration of behavioral frequency
and intention information in young children’s
NOTES trait attributions. Social Development, 22(1),
38–57.
1. The view that conceptual maturity, in and Boseovski, J. J., & Lee, K. (2006). Children’s use
of itself, sets the stage for such negative out- of frequency information for trait categoriza-
comes raises a puzzle, though: Why do many tion and behavioral prediction. Developmen-
adults persevere through difficulties (rather tal Psychology, 42(3), 500–513.
than giving up the moment they fail)? Accord- Butler, R. (1998). Age trends in the use of social
ing to Nicholls (1990), older children and and temporal comparison for self-evaluation:
adults can choose whether to use the most Examination of a novel developmental hypoth-
sophisticated conceptual framework available esis. Child Development, 69(4), 1054–1073.
to them or instead revert to young children’s Butler, R. (2005). Competence assessment, com-
simpler ways of thinking. Under certain cir- petence, and motivation between early and
cumstances, then, even adults “can function middle childhood. In A. J. Elliott & C. S.
like little children” (p. 35), taking failure in Dweck (Eds.), Handbook of competence and
stride and redoubling their efforts on activi- motivation (pp. 202–221). New York: Guil-
ties that their more sophisticated concepts ford Press.
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ization effects on the development of social
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CH A P T ER 21

Early Reasoning about Competence

dramatically (McGarrigle & Donaldson, conceptual confusions of the preoperational

development—from which the work on com- cognitive shortcomings, as the canonical

children’s reasoning about competence An Undifferentiated Concept of Ability

characterized by major conceptual short- shortcomings of preoperational thought

the self (e.g., ‘I’m a boy,’ ‘I have a television

mean, smart or dumb, these characteristics do In summary, Harter’s theory accounts

information-processing resources made it relations between objects (e.g., Ferry, Hes-

young children’s environments, such as those In summary, the relative positivity of

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Bassok, D., Latham, S., & Rorem, A. (2016).

G. Nicholls (Ed.), The development of achieve- for development. Unpublished manuscript,

self-blame and helplessness: Relationship to reasoning in 5-month-old infants. Psychologi-

Attribution of dispositional states by Development, 49, 800–814.

for trait-like attributions. Developmental Psy- B45–B55.

You might also like

Chap Ter 21

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Chap Ter 21

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CH A P T ER 21

Early Reasoning about Competence

dramatically (McGarrigle & Donaldson, conceptual confusions of the preoperational

development—­from which the work on com- cognitive shortcomings, as the canonical

children’s reasoning about competence An Undifferentiated Concept of Ability

characterized by major conceptual short- shortcomings of preoperational thought

the self (e.g., ‘I’m a boy,’ ‘I have a television

mean, smart or dumb, these characteristics do In summary, Harter’s theory accounts

information-­processing resources made it relations between objects (e.g., Ferry, Hes-

young children’s environments, such as those In summary, the relative positivity of

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Bassok, D., Latham, S., & Rorem, A. (2016).

G. Nicholls (Ed.), The development of achieve- for development. Unpublished manuscript,

self-blame and helplessness: Relationship to reasoning in 5-month-old infants. Psychologi-

Attribution of dispositional states by Development, 49, 800–814.

for trait-like attributions. Developmental Psy- B45–B55.

You might also like

development—from which the work on com- cognitive shortcomings, as the canonical

information-processing resources made it relations between objects (e.g., Ferry, Hes-