Michael W.

Eysenck

Attention and Arousal

Cognition and Performance

With 56 Figures

Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg N ew York 1982
Dr. Michael W. Eysenck
Birkbeck College
University of London
Department of Psychology
Malet Street
London, WCIE 7HX, England

ISBN-13 :978-3-642-68392-3

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Eysenck, Michael W.
Attention and arousal. Cognition and performance.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
I. Cognition. 2. Performance. 3. Motivation (Psychology) 4. Selectivity (Psychology) 5. Atten·
tion. 6. Arousal (Physiology) I. Title.
BF311.E93 153 81-21240
ISBN-13 :978-3-642-68392-3 e- ISBN-13 :978-3-642-68390-9
DO!: 10.1007/978-3-642-68390-9
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 This book is dedicated
to my mother
for everything
Preface

The thinker who has a mortal fear of being wrong

will give all that is valuable in himself to that little ambition.
Walter Lippmann (1914)

Psychology has always been plagued by passing fads and fan-

cies to a greater extent than is seemly in a scientific discipline.
Over the past few years the Zeitgeist can be summed up by the
two words 'cognitive psychology'. Indeed, a recent poll of
academic psychologists in American indicated that over 80%
of them regarded themselves as cognitive psychologists!
Cognitive psychology is in the ascendant, but it has never
been clear to me that it has addressed all of the appropriate is-
sues. In particular, information processing in the real world
(and even in the laboratory) occurs within a motivational and
emotional context, but cognitive psychologists usually main-
tain the convenient fiction that cognition can fruitfully be stud-
ied in isolation. The main reason for writing this book was to at-
tempt to demonstrate that there can be a useful cross-fertiliza-
tion between cognitive and motivational-emotional psycholo-
gy and that there are already tantalizing glimpses of the poten-
tial advantages of such inter-disciplinary research.
The ideas of Donald Broadbent and his associates have exer-
cised a formative influence during the writing of this book.
They discovered some years ago that there are intriguing simi-
larities (as well as differences) in the effects on performance
of such apparently quite disparate factors as white noise, time of
day, introversion-extraversion and incentive. They argued that
all of these factors (as well as others) increased arousal and
supported their argument with physiological and behavioural
evidence. This attempt to explain a great variety of findings by
means of a fairly simple arousal model was surprisingly suc-
cessful, and one of my main aims has been to assess this whole
approach in the light of recent research.
I would like to express my thanks to several people. I had an
enjoyable time at the University of South Florida in Tampa
during the initial stages of writing this book, and I am very grate-
ful especially to Doug Nelson but also to Jim Anker, Tramm
Neill and Cathy McEvoy for providing a friendly and helpful
atmosphere and for interesting discussions of ideas. In addi-
tion, the weather in Florida lived up to all expectations.
I would like to thank my students, especially Kathy Cohen,
Anna Eliatamby, Jackie Laws, Chris Morris and Jan Graydon,
for their contribution to my education - I only hope this has
been a two-way process! I have also learned much from a num-
ber of my professional colleagues and friends, including Bob
VIII Preface

Hockey, Simon Folkard, Tony Gale, Dylan Jones and Tim

Monk. A debt of gratitude is also owed to the Social Science
Research Council for providing generous financial support for
my research over the past several years.
Finally, I am especially indebted to my family. This book is
appropriately dedicated to my mother, and my wife Christine
has provided me with limitless personal and professional sup-
port. Without her help and that of our daughter Fleur the writ-
ing of this book would have taken less time but would also have
been less pleasurable.

Michael W. Eysenck
Table of Contents

1 Introduction .....

2 Theories of Attention . 8
2.1 Early Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Posner and Snyder: Automatic Activation and
Conscious Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Shiffrin and Schneider: Controlled and Automatic
Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Treisman and Gelade: Features and Objects. 24
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 Theories of Processing Resources 28

3.1 Baddeley and Hitch: Working Memory . 28
3.2 Norman and Bobrow: Data-Limited and
Resource-Limited Processes . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Johnston and Heinz: Multi-Mode Theory 35
3.4 Navon and Gopher: Multiple Resources. 39
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4 Theories of Arousal and Performance 47

4.1 The Yerkes-Dodson Law . . . . 47
4.2 Easterbrook's Hypothesis . . . . 49
4.3 Broadbent: Decision and Stress. 54
4.4 NiHitiinen's Theory. . . . . ... 56
4.5 Kahneman: Attention and Effort 57
4.6 Thayer: Self-Reported Arousal . . 60
4.7 Hasher and Zacks: Automatic and Effortful Processes 63
4.8 Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5 Incentives and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 67

5.1 Reinforcement and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Learning and Memory: Atkinson and Wickens (l971) 68
5.3 Short-Term Memory: Weiner. 73
5.4 Task Characteristics . . . . . . . . 74
5.5 Performance Efficiency . . . . . . 83
5.6 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation 84
5.7 A Theoretical Overview . 87

6 Anxiety and Performance 95

6.1 Worry and Emotionality. 97
6.2 Working Memory Capacity 99
X Table of Contents

6.3 Spence and Spence (1966): Task Difficulty 101

6.4 Anxiety and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.5 Failure and Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.6 Failure and Success: A Cognitive Approach . 113
6.7 Depth and Elaboration of Processing 115
6.8 Theoretical Positions . . . . . . . . . . 120

7 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal . . 124

7.1 Introversion - Extraversion . . . 124
7.2, Time of Day ... 138
7.3 Sleep Deprivation . . . . . . . . 146

8 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise. . . . . 156

8.1 Vigilance Task Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.2 Continuous Tasks: Serial Reaction and Tracking. 157
8.3 Learning and Memory . . 159
8.4 Attentional Selectivity. . 164
8.5 Theoretical Formulation 167
8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . 172

9 Conclusions and Speculations 173

9.1 The Yerkes-Dodson Law . 173
9.2 Stages of Processing . 178
9.3 Two Arousal Systems . . . 182

10 References . 187

11 Author Index . 201

12 Subject Index . . 205

1 Introduction
It may truly be said that theories in the area
of cognitive psychology are in many ways
like rabbits in a hutch: they multiply rapidly
but all manage to look remarkably similar.
This similarity applies both to what they say
and, perhaps even more strongly, to what
they do not say. Closer examination of this
conspiracy of silence suggests that the most
striking omission from the great majority of
information-processing theories is any seri-
ous consideration of the dynamic interrela-
tionships among motivation, emotion and
cognition.
This rather narrow approach to theory
construction has a number of important dis-
advantages. It has, for example, encouraged
the simplistic notion that humans possess
considerable single-mindedness and unity
of purpose. At the theoretical level, this has
led to computer simulations of human
thinking based on the assumption that only
a single goal (e.g. satisfactory task comple-
tion) is operative at any given point in time.
A hierarchy of subprograms or subroutines
is often postulated, with all information pro-
cessing being done in the service of the high-
est level executive program. As Simon
(1967) pertinently remarked, "This appar-
ently single-minded, single-purpose behav-
iour of most existing simulations of infor-
mation-processing systems provides a stri-
king contrast with human behaviour"
(p.32).
Any attempt to understand human cogni-
tion and behaviour must recognize that peo-
ple are often responsive to several goals si-
multaneously rather than to just one. In
other words, most goals are not unitary;
rather, the achievement of a goal typically
requires a pattern of behaviour that fulfills
multifaceted criteria. For example, an acad-
emic may make writing a book one of his
goals, but he will often have ancillary goals
such as making the book readable and enter-
taining, advancing his career and perhaps
even earning a few bob in the process! In a
similar way, even when the participant in
psychological research is apparently en-
grossed in an experimental task, he or she
will usually continue to have as an addition-
al goal the task of monitoring the environ-
ment for important sources of information.
There is plenty of evidence that some at-
tentional capacity is invested in non-task ac-
tivities, except perhaps under hypnosis.
Consider for example an experimental task
which requires the subject to learn a list of
words. Subsequent retention tests almost in-
variably indicate that some task-irrelevant
information (e.g. the colours in which the
words are printed, the spatial locations of
the words and the nature of additional sti-
muli presented alongside the to-be-remem-
bered words) has been attended to (see Eas-
terbrook 1959 for a review).
Why do we habitually assign some of our
spare processing capacity to the task of
monitoring the environment? The reason
appears to be that this monitoring allows us
to handle any sudden emergencies that may
arise by alerting the processing system to im-
portant changes occurring in the immediate
environment. On those occasions that the
monitoring system does detect the existence
of a new need of high priority, the ongoing
information processing is interrupted, and
the previous goals are replaced by goals
more appropriate to the changed circum-
stances.
In contrast to the rapidly changing and
2 Introduction
unpredictable conditions that frequently
prevail in the real world, there is the drasti-
cally restricted environment of the typical
laboratory experiment in psychology. It is
unusual in such an environment for any dra-
matic changes in the subject's goals to be re-
quired as the experimental session pro-
gresses.
We have emphasized the point so far that
there are considerable changes over time in
the goal systems which control behaviour. It
seems intuitively obvious that goals playa
major role in determining the direction of
attention at any given moment. As a conse-
quence, most of the effects of goals on be-
haviour are mediated by attentional me-
chanisms. This line of argument can be tak-
en further. It is one of the major contentions
of this book that there is an intimate rela-
tionship between motivational and atten-
tional processes. In geneAl terms, motiva-
tional states affect attentional selectivity, i.e.
they determine the contents of attention.
This theoretical position is not original; in-
deed, it has been espoused by several re-
searchers and was given expression in the
following terms by Simon (1967): "We can
use the term motivation . .. simply to desig-
nate that which controls attention at any giv-
en time. The motivation may be directed
toward a single goal, or, more commonly,
toward multiple goals" (p. 34).
It may seem fairly obvious that motiva-
tional forces affect the allocation of atten-
tional resources within the information-pro-
cessing system. However, many researchers
apparently fail to find the connection obvi-
ous at all. As I am writing these words, I
have in front of me two books on motiva-
tion: Theories of Motivation by Bernard
Weiner and Motivation: An Experimental
Approach by Eva Dreikurs Ferguson. The
former book does not even have 'attention'
as a heading in its subject index, and the lat-
ter book contains only one reference to the
concept.
It seems probable that emotional states al-
so affect behaviour via attentional pro-
cesses. A plausible way in which this might
happen was outlined by Simon (1967). He
postulated the existence of an interrupt sys-
tem based on continuous monitoring of the
environment. When the monitoring system
detects needs of high priority, new goals
which are appropriate to handling these
needs replace those previously in operation
(i.e. the interrupt system is used). As a con-
sequence, the attentional focus shifts to
those stimuli which are relevant to the new
goals. According to Simon, the interrupt sys-
tem can be triggered by sudden and intense
stimuli, by physiological needs or by emo-
tionally laden cognitive associations. It is ty-
pically the case that interrupting stimuli of
all kinds produce arousal of the autonomic
nervous system and feelings of emotion,
leading Simon (1967) to the following con-
clusion: "All the evidence points to a close
connection between the operation of the in-
terrupt system and much of what is usually
called emotional behaviour" (p. 36).
If we are prepared to assume that motiva-
tional and emotional processes both have
important effects on attentional mechan-
isms, then the next issue is to indicate pre-
cisely what those effects are likely to be. The
most influential attempt to address this is-
sue was made by Easterbrook (1959); his
quintessential theoretical assumption was
that motivation and emotion influence at-
tentional selectivity by narrowing attention
and thereby reducing the attention paid to
non-task sources of stimulation.
While there is impressive empirical sup-
port for Easterbrook's (1959) viewpoint,
there are other possible effects of motiva-
tion and emotion on attentional processes
that deserve to be considered. For example,
it might be the case that attentional capacity
is affected systematically by motivational
and emotional factors. Alternatively, the
rate of change of the contents of attention
(cf. mental tempo) might be affected; an ap-
propriate analogy here might be with a cine
film, which looks very different when pro-
jected at a number of different speeds. A fi-
nal major aspect of attention is the extent to
which one is able to prevent it from being di-
verted to irrelevant sources of information;

in other words, motivational and emotional
factors may influence distractibility.
In sum, there are a variety of ways in
which motivation and emotion might affect
attention; these include the selectivity and
capacity of attention, the rate of change of
attention and susceptibility to distraction.
Evidence is presented in later chapters
which indicates that all four aspects of at-
tention are affected by motivational and
emotional factors.
Several attempts have been made over the
years (e.g. Broadbent 1971, Duffy 1962, Eas-
terbrook 1959, Schachter and Singer 1962)
to relate motivation and emotion to arousal,
which has usually been thought of in phy-
siological terms. It has been claimed that
there is a continuum of arousal ranging
from deep sleep or coma at one extreme to
panic-stricken terror or great excitement at
the other extreme.
In many ways, the concept of 'arousal' is
an amorphous one; furthermore, it has been
used in several different senses. Duffy
(1962) defined arousal or activation in terms
of metabolic activity in the tissues: "The
construct energy mobilization, or activation,
derives from and emphasizes the fact that a
living organism is characteristically an ener-
gy-system ... The level of activation of the
organism may be defined as the extent of the
release of potential energy, stored in the tis-
sues of the organism, as this is shown in ac-
tivity or response" (p. 17). A very different
approach was adopted by Broadbent (1971),
who argued as follows: "The physiological
concept of arousal is certainly of interest
and of ultimate relevance to the one we have
found from behaviour, but at this stage the
connection of any suggested physiological
measure and the psychological state is too
remote to make it practical to attach one
concept directly to the other" (p. 4\3).
The position taken in this book is that
there are important but indirect relation-
ships between arousal defined psychologi-
cally and arousal construed in physiologi-
cal terms. The emphasis is primarily on a
psychological concept of arousal; as a first
approximation, arousal refers to the com-
Introduction 3
mon effects on behaviour of several appar-
ently disparate factors such as incentives,
failure feedback, ego threat, intense noise,
time of day, sleep deprivation, introversion-
extraversion and a number of stimulant and
depressant drugs.
The notion that there may be partial over-
lap in the effects on performance of each of
the above factors may be referred to as the
'weak' arousal theory. According to the
'strong' arousal theory, virtually all of the ef-
fects of these stressors and arousing agents
on behaviour are mediated by a single
arousal system. This strong theory can be
evaluated in terms of a number of criteria.
The first criterion is that of equivalence,
i.e. the various arousing agents should have
broadly comparable behavioural conse-
quences. Perhaps the most important aspect
of the equivalence criterion is the assump-
tion that different arousing agents should
produce a similar pattern of improvement
and impairment of performance across a
variety of tasks.
The second criterion is that two different
arousing agents or stressors should tend to
interact with each other if they are, in fact,
striking at the same mechanism in the same
way. On the other hand, if two arousing
agents affect different mechanisms, then
they should exert independent effects on
performance. Consider as an example two
stressors, A and B. On a particular task,
stressor A produces a 15 % decrement in per-
formance when applied on its own, and
stressor B has exactly the same effect. If the
two stressors affect different mechanisms,
then there should be a decrement of approx-
imately 30% in performance when both
stressors are applied together. In contrast,
the combined effects of the two stressors
might be considerably in excess of a 30 % de-
crement if they both affect a common me-
chanism of arousal. This point is developed
at greater length by Broadbent (1971).
If arousal is thought of in physiological
terms, it is reasonable to propose a third cri-
terion, namely, that the effects of different
arousing agents on physiological response
patterns should be comparable. One of the
 4 Introduction
major difficulties in attempting to use this
criterion is the lack of any satisfactory mea-
sure of the level of arousal. It is typically the
case that different physiological measures
of arousal (e.g. skin conductance, EEG,
heart rate and pupil dilation) only correlate
approximately + .2 to + .3 with each other.
Moreover, as Lacey (1967) pointed out,
there are pronounced individual differences
in terms of which physiological indexes of
arousal are most affected by stress.
In a number of situations, some physio-
logical measures indicate increased arousal
at the same time as other measures suggest
the opposite. Lacey (1967) introduced the
term 'directional fractionation' to refer to
such discrepant patterns. Perhaps the most
thoroughly investigated example of direc-
tional fractionation occurs during the time
interval between an alerting signal and the
stimulus in reaction time studies (reviewed
by Kahneman 1973). While some of the
components of the EEG indicate height-
ened arousal, there is typically a reduction
in heart rate (i.e. cardiac deceleration). In
general, directional fractionation and card-
iac deceleration both occur under condi-
tions of waiting for an expected event.
Much space in later chapters is devoted to
comparing and contrasting the effects of dif-
ferent arousing agents and stressors. How-
ever, it is worth noting here that while there
is some evidence that fulfills the three crite-
ria discussed previously, there are other
findings apparently at variance with each of
them. The obvious conclusion is that the
various arousing agents operate in part
through a common arousal mechanism and
in part through rather more specific me-
chanisms.
Eysenck (1917) drew an analogy between
the pattern of results in the areas of intelli-
gence and arousal research. He pointed out
that different kinds of intelligence test items
are typically positively intercorrelated but
that these correlations are often rather
small. The usual interpretation of these find-
ings is that there is a general factor of intelli-
gence (which explains the preponderance of
positive intercorrelations) but that more
specific factors (e. g. verbal and spatial) also
need to be postulated. These specific factors
account for the finding that all of the tests
within a small group of, say, spatial tests in-
tercorrelate highly, but none of these tests
shows a sizeable correlation with other tests.
In other words, a hierarchical set of factors
ranging from the very general to the fairly
specific can account for intelligence test
performance. It may well be that several
arousing agents all affect a general arousal
system but that differences among them
must be explained in terms of more specific
mechanisms and processes (e.g. effort and
stress).
Further justification for the postulation
of more than one arousal-related mechan-
ism is available when one considers the
complexities of the performance data in a
little more detail. The best-known generali-
zation concerning the effects of arousal on
performance was offered by Yerkes and
Dodson (1908). On the basis of a series of
experiments involving hungry rats learning
mazes, they argued that there is a curvilinear
relationship between arousal or motivation-
allevel (determined by the hours of food de-
privation) and performance; in other words,
performance was best at a moderate level of
motivation and suffered if motivation were
either very low or very high. They also as-
sumed that the optimal level of motivation
or arousal was lower for difficult tasks than
for easy ones.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in
favour of the two major assertions made by
Yerkes and Dodson (1908) was obtained by
Broadhurst (1957). Rats were trained to
swim in an underwater maze in the shape of
a y. One arm of the Y was lighted and gave
access to the open air, whereas the other was
a dark cul-de-sac. Four levels of motivation
were created by submerging the rats for 0, 2,
4 or 8 s immediately before releasing them
directly into the maze. Task difficulty was
manipulated by using three different light
intensities in the illuminated part of the
maze. These were bright, moderate and very
dull; in the last condition, it was hard to dis-

Fig. 1.1. Efficiency of learning as a function of
task difficulty and degree of motivation. (Broad-
hurst 1957)
criminate between the illuminated and the
dark arms of the maze.
The main findings obtained by Broad-
hurst (1957) are shown in Fig. 1.1. It is clear
that the findings are broadly consistent with
the theoretical assumptions of Yerkes and
Dodson (1908). However, Yerkes and Dod-
son failed to indicate precisely why increas-
ing levels of motivation or arousal should
first improve performance and then impair
it. This rather paradoxical effect can be ex-
plained in terms of the operation of a single
arousal system but is perhaps more readily
accounted for in terms of the workings of
two or more partially separate systems.
A speculative attempt to explain the cur-
vilinear relationship between arousal and
performance was made by Cattell and Child
(1975). They argued that it was not really ac-
curate to state that very high levels of moti-
vation result in poor performance, because
this overlooks the fact that motivation and
anxiety are positively correlated in most si-
tuations. According to Cattell and child, in-
creased motivation or drive improves per-
formance, whereas anxiety worsens it. This
led them to the following equation, in which
P stands for performance, E for drive and A
for anxiety:
P = aE - bA (a and b being constants).
Cattell and Child specified the precise in-
Introduction 5
85 n
~~
80 r:o
fTlfTl
75 ~ ~
70 ~--f
Z:o
Glj;
65 ~r
(/l
o
terrelationship between anxiety and drive in
the formula A = EC, with C representing
the amount of frustration and complication
producing conflict. The two formulae can
be amalgamated into a third formula as fol-
lows:
P = aE- b.EC.
They then went on to claim that, at least in
the pursuit of complex goals, C is usually a
function of drive (E). As a consequence,
they reached the following conclusion with
respect to the third formula: "The second
term has really E2 in it, and a parabolic rela-
tion of performance P to ergic drive
strength, E, ensues, explaining the Yerkes-
Dodson curve without requiring the Yerkes-
Dodson law's paradoxical quality" (p. 117).
It is undoubtedly the case that the theoret-
ical proposals of Cattell and Child (1975) re-
present a gross over-simplification of a com-
plex reality. Nevertheless, the notion that
motivation per se typically facilitates per-
formance, whereas emotional reactions
such as frustration and anxiety tend to im-
pair performance, is interesting and seems
to capture an important truth.
Humphreys et al. (1980) also suggested
that many of the effects of arousal on per-
formance could be explained by assuming
that there are two separate activation states:
arousal and on-task effort. According to
their model, the arousal mechanism is af-
6 Introduction
fected by several factors, including anxiety,
caffeine and impulsivity. Increased arousal
reduces the capacity of short-term memory
but improves attention. In contrast, on-task
effort is reduced under high anxiety but is
unaffected by impulsivity and caffeine; in-
creased on-task effort improves attention
but has no effect on short-term memory ca-
pacity. While the precise effects on perform-
ance of changes in either of the two activa-
tion states depend in part on the demands of
the task being performed, the general as-
sumption is that performance is a positive
function of both attention and the capacity
of short-term memory.
Most of the research investigating arousal
and performance has concentrated on the
effects of arousal on performance. How-
ever, it may very well prove just as impor-
tant to consider the impact of task perform-
ance on arousal. As Kahneman (1973) has
pointed out, there are at least two well-docu-
mented effects of task processing on a num-
ber of physiological variables: (I) the grea-
ter the processing demands imposed by a
task, the larger are the effects on physiologi-
cal measures of various kinds and (2) phy-
siological indexes often reflect with great
sensitivity moment-by-moment fluctuations
in the processing demands of a task.
These intimate interrelationships be-
tween processing activities and arousal were
demonstrated very clearly by Kahneman et
.1-0
~
E
E
z
0:
w .0-5
f-
W
~
«
0
..J
Q.
~ BASELINE
-0-2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DIGIT P RESPOND
PRESENTATION C and task complexity (add
S
E tion. (Kahneman et al. 1969)
al. (1969). Three levels of difficulty of a digit
transformation task were used. On each tri-
al, 0, I or 3 had to be added to each of four
serially presented digits, with the trans-
formed series being read out by the subject
after a 2-s pause. Three physiological mea-
sures (i.e. pupil diameter, heart rate and skin
resistance) were recorded continuously. The
same pattern of activity was observed for all
three measures: an increase during the input
and processing of the information, followed
by a decrease during the report stage. The
pupillary diameter data are shown in
Fig. 1.2. Pupil diameter grew steadily as the
task load (i.e. number of digits presented)
increased, and pupil dilation was also re-
sponsive to the difficulty of the required
transformation.
What significance should be attached to
the existence of such a close correspon-
dence between processing demands on the
one hand and physiological measures of
arousal on the other? Since most cognitive
theories fail to discuss this correspondence
at all, it is apparently the case that most the-
orists regard it either as an epiphenomenon
or as a relatively trivial finding. In contrast,
the view taken in this book is that an ade-
quate understanding of human cognition
must involve some consideration of the pre-
cisely modulated physiological changes as-
sociated with processing activity.
The basic themes and assumptions ex-
Fig. 1.2. Effects of memory
(TIME IN SEeS) load (digit presentation)
factor) on pupillary dila-

plored in this book can now be summarized.
Firstly, it is assumed that information pro-
cessing and cognition generally are affected
by the prevailing motivational and emotion-
al conditions. Secondly, the assumption that
a large variety of motivational, emotional
and other factors all affect performance via
a unitary arousal system is discussed at
some length. The notion that there is a single
arousal system is clearly an over-simplifica-
tion; it is probably more fruitful to distin-
guish a number of sub-components of the
arousal system. It is further assumed that
many of the performance effects of arousing
agents (e.g. incentives, ego threat, white
noise and stimulant drugs) are mediated by
attentional mechanisms. There are several
ways in which stressors or arousing agents
might affect attentional processes; these in-
clude changes in attentional selectivity, at-
tentional capacity, speed of functioning of
attentional mechanisms and susceptibility
to attentional distraction.
The structure of the book is determined in
large measure by the requirement to provide
adequate coverage of these main themes.
Chaps. 2 and 3 deal with contemporary the-
ories of attention and processing resources,
together with a discussion of the earlier sem-
inal views of Broadbent, Treisman and
Deutsch and Deutsch. The hypothetical
constructs examined in these two chapters
provide a suitable basis for considering the
effects of arousal on attention.
Introduction 7
Chap. 4 looks at the effects of arousal on
performance from the perspective of the
most influential theories in the area. Many
of these theories assume that changes in a
unitary arousal system (however produced)
have predictable consequences for perform-
ance. In contrast, Chaps. 5 to 8 consider the
possibility that there may be relatively spe-
cific effects on performance of applying any
particular arousing agent. Motivational ef-
fects on performance are explored in
Chap. 5, with the emphasis primarily on the
ways in which incentive manipulations af-
fect information processing. Chap. 6 deals
with the effects on performance of anxiety,
whether construed as an important person-
ality dimension or produced by an external
stressor. The fact that incentives and anxiety
have somewhat dissimilar effects on behav-
iour suggests the value of distinguishing
among components of arousal.
A number of other factors thought to in-
volve the arousal system are considered in
Chaps. 7 and 8. These include such dispa-
rate factors as white noise, time of day, sleep
deprivation and introversion-extraversion.
Finally, in Chap. 9 an attempt is made to
produce a Hegelian synthesis out of the ear-
lier thesis and antithesis. In contemporary
jargon, a 'framework' or 'sketch-map' is
supplied rather than a fully fledged and
quantitatively precise hypothetico-deduc-
tive theory.
2 Theories of Attention
The concept of attention has led a rather
chequered existence during the history of
psychology. It was highly regarded by the
introspectionists and armchair theorizers of
the nineteenth century, some of whom had
important things to say about attention. For
example, the following quotation from Wil-
liam James (1980) anticipates a number of
later theoretical developments: "If, then, by
the original question, how many ideas or
things can we attend to at once, be meant
how many entirely disconnected systems or
processes of conception can go on simul-
taneously, the answer is, not easily more
than one, unless the processes are very habi-
tual; but then two, or even three, without
very much oscillation of the mind from one
to the next, and no consequent gain of time"
(p.409).
The arrival of Watson and the start of the
Behaviourist revolution soon put a stop to
such idle speculation. It was deemed fruit-
less to speculate on the processes interven-
ing beween stimulus and response, and so
all consideration of attention (an interven-
ing process par excellence) virtually came to
an end for some 40 years or more. As recent-
ly as 1953, Osgood published a renowned
and massive 800 page textbook on experi-
mental psychology and failed to refer to at-
tention at all.
It was against this background that
Broadbent's (1958) book appeared. In it, he
developed the notion that attention was of
central importance in accounting for human
functioning and in many ways set the scene
for the subsequent burgeoning of cognitive
psychology. Indeed, the concept of atten-
tion lies at the very core of much contempor-
ary thinking and may even be the main fea-
ture distinguishing the cognitive approach
from the earlier Behaviourist conceptualiza-
tion.
2.1 Early Theories
Major theories were put forward in the late
1950s and early 1960s by Broadbent (1958),
Treisman (1964) and Deutsch and Deutsch
(1963). While there were important differ-
ences among them, these three theories had
in common the notion that there was a bot-
tleneck at some point in the course of infor-
mation processing. They differed primarily
with respect to the putative location of the
bottleneck. Broadbent (1958) argued that it
occurred early in processing. According to
him, when two stimuli or messages occur to-
gether, they are entered in parallel to a sen-
sory buffer. In the absence of peripheral
masking, no interference occurs at this
stage. One message is then allowed through
a filter on the basis of its physical character-
istics, while the other message is held in the
buffer for later processing. The filter pre-
vents overloading of a limited-capacity me-
chanism that translates the stimulus to some
other code stored in long-term memory. In
contrast, Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) sug-
gested that all incoming stimuli receive full
perceptual analysis and that the selection
shown in attentive behaviour (i.e. its bottle-
neck) occurs thereafter when it comes to the
selection of a response.
Treisman (1964) preferred a modification
of Broadbent's (1958) theory in which unat-
tended information is attenuated rather

than completely rejected and in which the
location of the bottleneck is somewhat flexi-
ble. She described a hierarchy of analyses
based on physical cues, syllabic pattern,
specific sounds, individual words, grammat-
ical structure and meaning. Tests are carried
out in order, starting at the bottom of the
hierarchy and working up. If there is inade-
quate capacity to process all of a message,
tests low in the hierarchy can be completed,
providing information about, say, its physi-
cal characteristics and syllabic pattern, but
tests higher up the hierarchy have to be
omitted. In addition, Treisman argued that
if a particular word was expected, all of the
tests relevant to selecting that word might be
pre-biased or pre-sensitized towards it.
Some of the initial empirical evidence fit-
ted in well with Broadbent's notion that the
selective filter rejects information from un-
wanted sources after a preliminary analysis
of its physical characteristics. Of particular
importance was the work of Cherry (1953).
True to his English background, Cherry got
interested in the 'cocktail party' problem,
i.e. how are we able to follow just one con-
versation when several people are talking at
the same time? The answer to the problem is
that people use physical differences be-
tween auditory messages to sort them out: if
two messages are in different voices or pre-
sented one to each ear, there is no problem.
However, if both messages are presented in
the same voice to both ears, it is extremely
difficult to separate out the messages on the
basis of meaning alone. These findings
clearly suggest that efficient selective atten-
tion depends on the filter being able to reject
unwanted information at an early stage on
the basis of simple physical features such as
voice or spatial location.
Cherry (1953) obtained even more stri-
king findings in other experiments in which
the auditory message in one ear had to be
shadowed (i.e. repeated back aloud) while
another message was played to the other
ear. He found that his subjects were ama-
zingly poor at extracting information from
the non-shadowed message. Even when that
message was in a foreign language or in re-
Early Theories 9
versed speech, the subjects did not usually
notice anything unusual. On the other hand,
physical changes in the non-shadowed mes-
sage (e.g. the introduction of a different
voice or a pure tone) were nearly always de-
tected.
Thus early work with the shadowing task
seemed to indicate that Broadbent was right
to assume that there was extremely limited
processing of unattended information. One
of the more striking findings was obtained
by Moray (1959), who found that subjects
completely failed to remember words pre-
sented 35 times each on the unattended mes-
sage.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to
see that the shadowing task may in many
ways be unrepresentative of normal atten-
tional functioning. Inter alia, the subjects
used in the early experiments had no previ-
ous experience of shadowing messages, and
so the shadowing requirement may have
used most of their available attentional ca-
pacity. If that was the case, it might explain
the subjects' relative inability to process the
non-shadowed message. In addition, people
seem to be better at performing two activi-
ties at once when the activities are dissimilar
(e.g. driving a car and holding a conversa-
tion), whereas shadowing experiments typi-
cally require two extremely similar activities
to be performed (i.e. processing each of two
auditorily presented messages). The notion
that people ought to be able to perform two
simple and dissimilar activities together
presumably lies behind the remark made by
former American President Lyndon
B. Johnson about Gerald Ford viz., that he
was so dumb that he couldn't fart and chew
gum at the same time!
The importance of practice was demon-
strated very clearly by Underwood (1974).
He compared the performance on a shad-
owing task of naive subjects and of Neville
Moray, an eminent researcher who has
spent hundreds or thousands of hours con-
ducting shadowing. experiments. The sub-
jects shadowed one list ofletters while a sec-
ond list was being presented, and their task
was to detect a single digit appearing in eith-
10 Theories of Attention
er list. Detection rates were uniformly high
when the digit appeared on the shadowed
list. However, there was a huge difference
between Moray and the other subjects when
it came to detecting digits in the non-sha-
dowed list, especially when the digits were
spoken in the same voice as the letters: the
naive subjects detected 8 % of such digits,
whereas Moray detected 67 %. Moray thus
has some. claim to be the world champion
shadowing task expert, and his extremely
high level of performance presumably oc-
curs because he can shadow with minimal
use of attentional capacity.
The importance of the similarity between
two concurrent tasks was shown by Allport
et al. (1972). The task of shadowing pas-
sages taken from George Orwell's Selected
Essays was combined with the presentation
of a learning task. When the learning task
consisted of a list of auditorily presented
words, subsequent recognition memory for
the words was at chance level. However,
when the learning task involved a series of
pictures, 90% of them were correctly recog-
nized. Obviously, the limitations on the pro-
cessing of two concurrent inputs that were
stressed by Broadbent (1958) can be largely
overcome if the inputs are sufficiently dissi-
milar. This conclusion was strengthened by
the results of a further experiment carried
out by Allport et al. in which expert pianists
were able to shadow an auditorily presented
passage and play the piano using sight read-
ing at the same time, with no discernible im-
pairment in either task compared to its per-
formance when done alone.
A general problem with early theoretical
and experimental approaches was the impli-
cit assumption that people are aware of the
processing which they do or at least of the
products of such processing. There is increa-
sing evidence that this assumption is errone-
ous and that substantial amounts of process-
ing occur below the level of consciousness.
As an example, consider a study by on
Wright et al. (1975). They presented a long
list of words to the attended ear, and the
Finnish word for 'suitable' occurred six
times. On two of those occasions, it was fol-
. lowed by an electric shock. Later on, two
lists of words were presented, one in each
ear, and the subjects shadowed one ear and
ignored the other. When the previously
shocked word (or its synonym or homonym)
appeared in the ignored list, there was a dis-
cernible galvanic skin response, which is
part of the typical response to shock.
Since the subjects were not consciously
aware that any of these words had been pre-
sented, the inadequacy of relying entirely on
introspective awareness is obvious. In addi-
tion, of course, the results go against the ear-
ly filter notion, since they suggest that infor-
mation on the ignored ear is not blocked pri-
or to semantic analysis in long-term memo-
ry. However, it should be noted that Ward-
law and Kroll (1976) were unable to repli-
cate the galvanic skin response findings of
Von Wright et al.
The history of work on the shadowing
task demonstrates that the amount of pro-
cessing on the non-shadowed message of
which the subject is aware can vary between
practically nothing (Cherry 1953) and virtu-
ally everything (Allport et al. 1972), depend-
ing on various factors such as the stage of
practice and the degree of similarity be-
tween the shadowed and non-shadowed in-
puts. In a nutshell, the problem with Broad-
bent's (1958) theory is that it postulates a rel-
atively rigid system of selective attention
that cannot cope with the great flexibility
actually observed. This problem can be fur-
ther illustrated by considering the dichotic
listening task, to which we now turn.
Broadbent (1958) invented a task in
which three pairs of digits were presented
dichotically, i.e. one set of three digits
read serially was heard at one ear at the
same time as a second set of three digits was
heard at the other ear. After all of the digits
had been presented, subjects had to recall
them. The key finding was that subjects pre-
ferred to recall the digits ear by ear, rather
than in terms of the temporal order in which
they had heard the digits. According to
Broadbent (1958), this indicated that the fil-
ter selected information on the basis ofphy-
sical features (i.e. ear of arrival).

Gray and Wedderburn (1960) rejected the
notion that selective attention necessarily
operates on the basis of the physical charac-
teristics of sensory channels. They used a
dichotic task in which one ear might re-
ceive "Who 7 there" while the other ear
was hearing "2 goes 3". The order of report
was usually semantically determined (e.g.
"Who goes there" followed by "2 7 3"). In
other words, attentional selection can occur
after the processing of information from
both ears rather than before as predicted by
Broadbent (1958).
In spite of the intuitive plausibility of
Broadbent's notion of a selective filter that
acts to minimize the amount of processing
that must be performed by more complex,
higher level processes, it is clear that there is
frequently extensive processing of unat-
tended sources of information. The theories
of Treisman (1964) and Deutsch and
Deutsch (1963) both allowed for this, so
there was a search during the 1960s for an
experimentum crucis to decide between
them. The two most impressive attempts
were those of Treisman and Geffen (1967)
and Treisman and Riley (1969).
Treisman and Geffen asked their subjects
to shadow one of two dichotic messages
and at the same time to monitor both mes-
sages so that they could tap whenever they
heard a particular target word in either ear.
They argued that since the tapping response
and its stimulus were identical for both mes-
sages, any difference in the efficiency of de-
tecting targets in the two messages must be
due to a failure to perceive targets in the
non-shadowed message. If perceptual anal-
ysis of both messages is complete, as sug-
gested by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963),
there should be no difference in target de-
tections between the two messages. In con-
trast, Treisman's notion that perceptual an-
alysis of the non-shadowed message is at-
tenuated leads to the prediction that fewer
targets would be detected on the non-sha-
dowed message.
Who was right? On the face of it, Treis-
man won hands down: there was an enor-
mous advantage of the shadowed or at-
Early Theories II
tended message over the unattended mes-
sage in terms of the targets detected (87 %
versus 8%). However, Deutsch and Deutsch
(1967) were disinclined to take the results at
face value. They pointed out that while their
theory claimed that all inputs were analysed
completely, it also stated that only import-
ant inputs led to a response. Since subjects
had to make two different responses to tar-
gets in the shadowed message (i.e. shadow
and tap) but only had to make one response
to non-shadowed targets (i.e. tap), it could
be argued that the shadowed targets were in
some sense more important than the non-
shadowed targets.
Treisman and Riley (1969) returned to the
fray with an experiment designed to obviate
this problem. Subjects were told to stop
shadowing at once and to tap whenever they
heard a target in either message, and they
were explicitly instructed not to shadow the
target word if it occurred on the shadowed
message. This ensured that the response was
precisely the same to targets in either mes-
sage. The targets were either in the same
voice as the rest of the message or in an op-
posite-sexed voice. Since the difference in
voice would not affect the relative import-
ance of shadowed message and non-sha-
dowed message targets, it should not affect
performance according to Deutsch and
Deutsch's theory.
The results of this experiment are shown
in Fig. 2.1. They clearly fail to support the
approach of Deutsch and Deutsch (1963).
The targets were detected far more often
when they were presented in a voice differ-
ent to the rest of the input than when they
were presented in the same voice. Further-
more, same voice targets were detected al-
most twice as often on the shadowed ear as
on the non-shadowed ear.
There are some problems of interpreta-
tion with the findings of Treisman and Gef-
fen (1967) and Treisman and Riley (1969)
which have not always been recognized. The
shadowing requirement may have meant
that the speech presented to the non-sha-
dowed ear had to be actively prevented from
12 Theories of Attention
100 DIFFERENT
VOICE
z 90
Q 80
f-
U
w 70 SAME
f- VOICE
W
0 60
f-
Z
w 50
U
tr
w 40
0..
30
I
NON-SHADOWED SHADOWED
MESSAGE
commanding the shadowing response rath-
er than merely remaining passively unat-
tended. In addition, the differential detec-
tion rates on the two ears may reflect the de-
mands of selective shadowing rather than
general capacity limitations. When there is
no shadowing requirement, it has some-
times been found that target detection is
equivalent, whether one ear or both ears
must be monitored (e.g. Moray et al. 1976).
As we have already mentioned, the early
theories of attention all assumed that there
was a bottleneck somewhere in the stream of
information processing that made it ex-
tremely difficult, or even impossible, for
people to perform two activities efficiently
at the same time. In recent years, however,
there has been accumulating evidence to
suggest the possibility that there is no bottle-
neck at all.
Perhaps the most striking support for
such a viewpoint was obtained by Spelke et
al. (1976). They gave two students (Diane
and John) 5 h of training per week for 17
weeks on a variety of tasks. At first, they
asked the students to read short stories se-
lected from collections of works by Ameri-
can, English and translated European wri-
ters and at the same time to write down
words at dictation. The students found it
very difficult to do these two tasks together:
their reading speed decreased substantially
and their handwriting deteriorated. After
six weeks of training, however, they were
Fig. 2.1. Target detection in the shadowed
and non-shadowed messages when the tar-
gets were presented in the same voice as,
or a different voice to, the non-target sti-
muli. (Treisman and Riley 1969)
able to do these two tasks together extreme-
ly well and could read as quickly and with as
much comprehension when taking dictation
as when only reading, and their handwriting
had improved.
At this stage, they did not appear to be
processing the dictated words at all thor-
oughly. Diane and John were only able to
recall 35 out of several thousand words
which they had written down. When 20 suc-
cessive dictated words all belonged to the
same semantic category (e.g. articles of fur-
niture) or formed a sentence, they were un-
aware of the fact. With more training, they
were able to detect rhyming words, semanti-
cally related words and sentences among
the dictated words while reading a story
with full comprehension. Eventually they
learned to write down the names of the cate-
gories to which the dictated words be-
longed, rather than the words themselves,
while maintaining normal reading speed
and comprehension.
If you have any doubts about the achieve-
ment of these two students, just try to read a
book with full comprehension while writing
down dictated words! Spelke et al. (1976)
drew the following conclusions from the re-
markable results obtained from John and
Diane: "They understood both the text they
were reading and the words they were copy-
ing. In at least this limited sense, they
achieved a true division of attention: they
were able to extract meaning simultaneous-
 Posner and Snyder: Automatic Activation and Conscious Attention
ly from what they read and from what they
heard ... People's ability to develop skills
in specialized situations is so great that it
may never be possible to define general li-
mits on cognitive capacity" (p. 229).
The data of Spelke et al. are consistent
with the notion that there is no fixed atten-
tional capacity. However, alternative inter-
pretations are possible. Perhaps the writing
task became automatic and so did not re-
quire any attentional capacity, or there
might have been a rapid alternation of atten-
tion between reading and writing. Hirst et
al. (1980) attempted to adjudicate among
these possibilities. They rejected the hypo-
thesis that writing to dictation was done au-
tomatically on the basis that subjects clearly
understood what they were writing (e.g. they
made fewer copying errors with real sen-
tences than with random words). They fur-
ther argued that successful performance of
the two tasks with rapid alternation could
only readily be accomplished when the ma-
terial to be read was highly redundant.
However, most subjects who were trained to
copy words while reading very redundant
material were able to cope extremely well
when switched to less redundant reading
matter. This would not have been possible if
attentional capacity were being alternated
between the two tasks, according to Hirst et
al.
Hirst et al. (1980) came to a conclusion
dramatically at variance with the theoretical
positions adopted by the early attention the-
orists: "The ability to divide attention is
constrained primarily by the individual's le-
vel of skill, not by the size of a fixed pool of
resources" (p. 98). An equally plausible in-
terpretation of their data is simply that high-
ly practised skills require less attentional ca-
pacity than newly acquired ones.
In sum, the greatest inadequacy of the pi-
oneering theories of attention was that they
all under-estimated the flexibility of atten-
tional mechanisms and processes. It may be
correct to say that some people in some situ-
ations behave in the way specified by each
of the three theories dealt with in this sec-
tion, but broader conceptualizations are
13
needed to capture the cross-situational var-
iability that is so noticeable in the function-
ing of attentional mechanisms. Some of the
major current attempts to provide such con-
ceptualizations are discussed in the follow-
ing pages.
2.2 Posner and Snyder: Automatic
Activation and Conscious Attention
An interesting new theory of attention was
proposed by Posner and Snyder (1975a, b)
in which they develofJed a conceptual dis-
tinction between automatic processes and
conscious attention. They suggested that
there were three useful operational criteria
that had to be satisfied in order for a process
to be classified as automatic: (1) it must oc-
cur without intention, (2) it should not give
rise to any conscious awareness and (3) it
should not interfere with any other ongoing
mental activity.
Posner (1978) related automatic pro-
cesses to the notion of a "psychological
pathway', which was defined as "the set of
internal codes and their connections that
are activated automatically by the presenta-
tion of a stimulus" (p. 90). It was further as-
sumed that automatic activation occurs as a
result of prior learning.
In contrast to the relative invariance of
automatic processes, conscious attention
can be used in an extremely flexible way at
several different stages of information pro-
cessing. As Kerr (1973) demonstrated in a
review of many of the relevant studies, con-
scious attention can be applied to the mak-
ing of an overt response, to retrieval from
memory, to stimulus transformation or to
hypothesis formation. It can ev~n be ap-
plied to processes that are normally auto-
matic, although not always with success.
For example, if you think too deeply about
the leg movements involved in walking
down a flight of stairs, you may well finish
up in a heap at the bottom of those stairs!
According to Posner (1978), the most im-
portant characteristic of conscious attention
14 Theories of Attention

is its limited capacity. Two fairly obvious
manifestations of this capacity limitation
are the narrow range of conscious experi-
ence at any given moment (James 1890) and
the decrements in performance usually
found when people attempt to perform two
tasks at the same time (Kerr 1973).
Can these various theoretical ideas be
tested experimentally? Posner and Snyder
(1975a) attempted to show that they could,
using a letter-matching task. A priming sti-
mulus (either a plus sign or a letter) was fol-
lowed by a letter pair, and the subject had to
decide whether the two letters in the pair
were the same as quickly as possible. Posner
and Snyder made two basic predictions:
1. The priming stimulus automatically acti-
vates its own representation in memory; this
facilitates performance whenever the letter
pair is the same as the prime (e.g. "A" fol-
lowed by "AA") and has no effect on per-
formance when the letter pair is different
from the prime.
2. Conscious attention responds to the prob-
abilities of different events, speeding up de-
cision making when an expected event oc-
curs, but slowing it down when the unex-
pected happens. It takes a long time to han-
dle unexpected events because attention has
to shift from its focus on the expected event
to the event which has actually occurred,
and this shift is time consuming. If no spe-
cific expectations can reasonably be
formed, conscious attention may have little
effect on performance.
Some of the main conditions used by Pos-
ner and Snyder are shown in Table 2.1. In
order to evaluate their predictions about the
coasts and benefits associated with the use
of automatic activation and conscious atten-
tion, they had to have a control condition to
use as a baseline. This was provided by us-
ing " + " as a prime. As can be seen in Table
2.1, the results were in good accord with the
theoretical predictions and suggested fairly
strongly that at least two different processes
were determining performance.
The proper interpretation of the finding
that expected events were responded to fas-
ter than unexpected events merits further
consideration. Posner and Snyder claimed
that limited-capacity attention was allocated
preferentially to expected events, which
seems intuitively reasonable. However, the
use of primes or cues to indicate the proba-
bilities of different subsequent events has
been considered to influence the response

Table 2.1. Speed of deciding that the two letters in a pair are the same as a function of automatic activa-
tion and conscious attention. Times are in milliseconds. (Posner and Snyder 1975a)

Positive trials

Prob. that Control Expected Unexpected Benefit Cost

prime matches (e.g. + AA) (e.g. A AA) (e.g. BAA)
letter pair

80% 414 329 450 85 36

Automatic activation and conscious attention facilitated performance when the letter pair was expect-
ed, but conscious attention slowed performance when it was unexpected.

Prob. that Control Match Mismatch Benefit Cost

prime matches (e.g. + AA) (e.g. A AA) (e.g. BAA)
letter pair

20% 439 408 439 31 o

Automatic activation facilitated performance when the letter pair matched the prime, but there was no
cost because no specific expectations were formed.
 Posner and Snyder: Automatic Activation and Conscious Attention
bias parameter of signal detection theory. It
is thus not clear that the data necessarily re-
veal the functioning of a limited capacity at-
tentional mechanism.
Why was such an elaborate experiment
necessary? Part of the answer is that in
many instances it is extremely difficult to
separate out the processes at work. By refer-
ence to Table 2.1, you can see that if 'A' is
followed by the expected letter pair 'AA',
there are two quite different reasons why
performance should be facilitated: (1) con-
scious attention is prepared for the letter
pair before it is presented and (2) automatic
activation allows more rapid processing of
the letter pair. Several other conditions were
required to decide on the relative import-
ance of those two factors.
An important theoretical point to note is
that, accord~ng to Posner and Snyder, facili-
tation of performance can be due either to
conscious attention or to automatic activa-
tion, whereas impairment of performance is
due only to conscious attention. Posner and
Snyder (1975a) made use of these theoreti-
cal assumptions in a further experiment
based only on the conditions from the top
half of Table 2.1. They tested the prediction
that an important difference between auto-
matic activation and conscious attention is
that automatic activation, as a result of ex-
tended practice, operates at greater speed.
They did this by varying the time interval be-
tween the prime and the letter pair.
z~
60
Ou
-w
f-",
~l: 40
:::i~
-z
U o
it;:
LLiii
o-J:
f-z
20
z-
:>Q:
00
0
l:
«
Fig. 2.2. The differential time course of the
development offacilitatory and inhibitory
effects. (Posner and Snyder 1975a)
15
In this experiment, Posner and Snyder
(1975a) predicted that inhibitory effects
(due entirely to conscious attention) should
take longer to appear than facilitatory ef-
fects (due to a combination of automatic ac-
tivation and conscious attention). The suc-
cess of their prediction can be seen in
Fig. 2.2.
The most noteworthy application of the
basic theoretical ideas of Posner and Snyder
has been to work on lexical decision, in
which subjects are typically asked to decide
rapidly whether or not a letter string is a
word. One of the fundamental findings is
that the amount of time taken to decide that
a particular letter string (e.g. 'NURSE') is a
word is shorter if the preceding item or
prime is a semantically related word (e.g.
'DOCTO R') than if it is a semantically unre-
lated word (e.g. 'BUTTER'). In terms of
Posner and Snyder's approach, the main is-
sue is whether this so-called semantic-pri-
ming effect is due to automatic activation, to
conscious attention or to a combination of
the two.
One obvious way of attempting to show
the role played by automatic activation un-
confounded by conscious attention is to
present the priming word so rapidly that
subjects have no awareness of which word
was presented. Fischler and Goodman
(1978) presented a priming word for only
40 ms, followed immediately by a letter
string for lexical decision. The usual seman-
()o---------~ INHIBITION
I
,/
FACILITATION
,fio...., /
I
"
JI "'/
0 100 200 300 400 500
PRIME TO LETTER PAIR
INTERVAL (MSEC)
16 Theories of Attention
tic-priming effect was obtained: the letter
string was identified as a word more quickly
when the prime was an associated word
than when it was unrelated.
In spite of the fact that subjects had been
instructed to attempt to recall the prime
word immediately after each lexical deci-
sion, only 2 % of the primes were recalled.
This suggests that there was little conscious
awareness of the prime words and that the
semantic-priming effect obtained was prob-
ably due to a rapid automatic activation of
the representation of the prime word
spreading out to nearby locations of seman-
tically associated words. This presumably
happens as a result of many years of using
language.
The approach of Fischler and Goodman
was taken to its logical conclusion by Mar-
cel. He presented the priming word very
briefly and followed it immediately with a
pattern mask that inhibited any further pro-
cessing. Initial testing was done to discover
the time between onset of the prime and the
mask at which each subject individually was
no longer able to detect the presence of a
word at above chance level.
Although his subjects apparently did not
even realize that a priming word had been
presented, Marcel nevertheless obtained a
fairly substantial semantic-priming effect!
Since this effect depends on the congruence
of meaning between the prime and the sub-
sequent word, the implication is that auto-
matic processes can reach that level of anal-
ysis.
These findings may seem counter-intui-
tive or even downright unbelievable, but the
reason for this is that we have a natural tend-
ency to exaggerate the role of consciousness
in our everyday lives. A commonplace ex-
ample of automatic processing occurs some-
times when you turn over the pages of a
book and start to read the top line, but find
that an unattended word near the bottom of
the page seems to 'catch your eye'.
Neely (1977) used an ingenious technique
to disentangle the effects of automatic
spreading activation and conscious 'atten-
tion on performance of the lexical decision
task. The priming word was the name of a
semantic category (e.g. 'Bird'), and it was
followed by a letter string requiring a word-
nonword decision. In the crucial condition,
subjects were led to expect that a category
name would usually be followed by a mem-
ber of a different, pre-specified category
(e.g. 'Bird' followed by part of a building).
In this condition, there were two important
kinds of trials:
1. The category name followed by a member
of the expected category (e.g. 'Bird-Door').
In this case, conscious attention can facili-
tate performance, but automatic activation
is irrelevant, since it only activates semantic
associates of 'bird'.
2. The category name followed unexpected-
ly by a member of the same category (e.g.
'Bird-Robin'). In this case, automatic activa-
tion will facilitate performance (because the
words are semantically related), but con-
scious attention will impair performance
(because the event is unexpected).
The rule of thumb to use in understanding
the findings is that conscious attention facil-
itates performance when the word requiring
lexical decision belongs to the expected
category and impairs performance when it
belongs to an unexpected category; auto-
matic activation improves performance
when the word is semantically related to the
priming category name (i.e. same category)
and has no effect when there is no semantic
association between the prime and the tar-
get word. There is one important qualifica-
tion to the above predictions: since con-
scious attention requires some time to devel-
op an expectation, little or no effect of con-
scious attention on performance is discerni-
ble at the shortest interval between the cate-
gory prime and the target word. Amazingly
enough, virtually all of these detailed pre-
dictions were supported by the data, as can
be seen in Fig. 2.3.
Posner (1978) provided more extensive
support for some of the ideas put forward by
Posner and Snyder (1975a, b). He pointed
out that there is evidence from other situa-
tions suggesting the importance of automat-
ic activation. One example is the Stroop ef-
 Posner and Snyder: Automatic Activation and Conscious Attention
'+
~u
ZW
01/)
-~
I-
«Z
1--
:ii
u~
~~
IJ..-
Ot:
f-~
zI
:::>z
0-
~a::
«0
Fig. 2.3. The time course of fa-
cilitatory and inhibitory effects
as a function of whether or not
the target word was semantical-
ly related to the prime word and
of whether or not the target
word belonged to the expected
category. (Neely 1977)
fect in which people find it extremely diffi-
cult and stressful to name the colours in
which colour words are printed (e.g. the
word 'Red' printed in blue). While the pre-
cise processes involved in the Stroop effect
are unknown, it is clear that subjects cannot
choose to avoid processing aspects of an in-
put that they wish to ignore.
There is also evidence for automatic pro-
cessing of unattended inputs in the shadow-
ing 'task. In a study discussed earlier in this
chapter, Von Wright et al. (1975) found that
an unattended word produced a galvanic
skin response if it was synonymous with a
word previously associated with electric
shock. This indicates that there can be sub-
stantial processing of unattended informa-
tion, presumably via automatic processes.
A related finding was obtained by Lewis
(1970), who found that the reaction time to
shadow a word on the attended ear was
slowed down slightly when a synonymous
word was presented simultaneously to the
unattended ear. Since the subjects reported
no 3lwareness of the content of the unat-
tended words, this suggests that automatic
processes may have been responsible.
The effect observed by Lewis may be
more limited than he implied. Treisman et
17
+60
+40
+ 20 1:.. .....
' .......
0 .... .......,
--------~~------------
..........
- 20 ............
...........
..... ....-6
-40
-60
250 350 450 550 650 750
PRIME TO TARGET INTERVAL (IN MSEC)
0---0 EXPECTED, SEMANTICALLY RELATED
_ EXPECTED; SEMANTICALLY UNRELATED
!:r'-'-6. UNEXPECTED; SEMANTICALLY RELATED
---.. UNEXPECTED; SEMANTICALLY UNRELATED
al. (1974) replicated some features of Le-
wis's experiment; they found that the se-
mantic relationship between simultaneous
shadowed and non-shadowed words had a
modest effect on the time taken to shadow
early in the list, but the effect disappeared
by the seventh item shadowed.
Posner (1978) pointed out that conscious
attention should be regarded as a discrete
event that plays a specific role in the stream
of information processing. Its presence in
that stream gives rise to a number of indi-
cants at the behavioural and physiological
levels. For example, as we have seen, Posner
and Snyder (1975a) argued that the occur-
rence of a performance impairment when
responding to unexpected events is one
measure of the involvement of conscious at-
tention.
An alternative method is to present a
probe stimulus at some point during the per-
formance of a main task and observe the
reaction time to that stimulus. The basic ar-
gument is that reaction time to the probe
will be increased when conscious attention
is most committed to the main task. In one
of Posner's studies, the subjects carried out
a letter-matching task on two letters separat-
ed by a short interval of time, and the probe
18 Theories of Attention
stimulus was presented during that interval.
The point at which the probe stimulus pro-
duced the slowest reaction time moved pro-
gressively further away from the presenta-
tion of the first letter as the time interval be-
tween the two letters was increased. In this
case, conscious attention was deployed flex-
ibly, with subjects using their knowledge
about the time between letters in such a way
that maximal attention to the first letter was
delayed until shortly before the presenta-
tion of the second letter.
At the physiological level, Posner (1978)
argued that the P 300 component of the aver-
age evoked potential may reflect conscious
attention. It is referred to as P300 because it
is a positive wave occurring approximately
300 ms after the presentation of a stimulus,
although it may occur as early as ISO ms or
as late as 600 ms after input. The evidence
suggests that P 300 occurs whenever a signal
or a time interval can reasonably be said to
demand close attention in a particular task.
It does not appear to represent merely some
invariant response to a stimulus, because it
can be obtained when an event is omitted af-
ter a repetitive series of stimuli. This, of
course, relates P 300 to the subject's expecta-
tions, and we have seen in the behavioural
data of Posner and Snyder (l97Sa) that the
formation of expectations is one of the func-
tions of conscious attention.
Posner et al. (1973) looked at the average
evoked potential in a letter-matching task in
which the first letter was followed after I s
by a letter that either matched it or did not.
Their main interest was in the evoked poten-
tial to the second item as a function of
whether there was a match or mismatch. At-
tention was manipulated by asking the sub-
jects to count only matches or only mis-
matches. The instructional manipulation
had a considerable effect on P300, with its
magnitude being greater for matches than
mismatches when matches had to be count-
ed (i.e. attended to) and the opposite occur-
ring when mismatches had to be counted. It
seems probable that these effects on P300
reflect the use of conscious attention.
The empirical evidence seems to indicate
fairly convincingly that there is a valid con-
ceptual distinction between automatic and
conscious processes, and Posner and Sny-
der (197Sa, b) have provided a plausible ac-
count of the salient differences between the
two kinds of processes. Perhaps the weakest
theoretical assumption is that automatic ac-
tivation cannot impair other ongoing men-
tal processes. One of the few studies to in,
vestigate this assumption directly was that
of Neely (1977), and his data seemed to sup-
port Posner and Snyder. However, while
there was no impairment in reaction time
when automatic activation was irrelevant to
the target word, there did appear to be some
"cost" in terms of increased error rate. Since
Antos (1979) found evidence of a substan-
tial speed-accuracy trade-off on the lexical
decision task (i.e. a small increase in error
rate was associated with a large increase in
response speed), Neely's data cannot be
considered to be definitive.
There may also be some problems with
the assumption that the delay in responding
to an unexpected event occurs simply be-
cause of the time required to switch atten-
tion. The expectation from this point of
view is that the time to switch attention will
depend on the semantic dissimilarity or dis-
tance between the actual and expected
events. Neill (1979) found that it was some-
times more difficult to switch attention to an
unexpected event in the same category as
the expected event than to an unexpected
event in a different category, which is diam-
etrically opposed to the theoretical predic-
tion. As Neill suggested, the time to switch
attention may be determined by several fac-
tors, including the time taken to signal the
switching mechanism, the time to disengage
attention from the expected event, the trans-
it time between the expected event and the
actual, unexpected event and the time to en-
gage attention with the unexpected event.
2.3 Shiffrin and Schneider: Controlled
and Automatic Processes
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shif-
frin and Schneider (1977) proposed an am-
 Shiffrin and Schneider: Controlled and Automatic Processes
bitious theory that attempted to integrate
work and theorizing in the related areas of
selective attention, short-term memory
search and visual search. While their basic
theoretical position resembles that of Pos-
ner and Snyder (197 Sa, b), they have carried
out very different kinds of experiments.
Since the paradigm which they used repres-
ents an amalgam of standard memory
search and visual search situations, we shall
begin by considering these component
tasks.
Sternberg (1966, 1975) introduced a sim-
ple method for investigating short-term
memory search. In essence, a small set of
items (typically one to six in number) known
as the memory set is presented and entered
into short-term memory. Very shortly there-
after a single input item (or probe) is pre-
sented, and the subject reacts as rapidly as
possible with one response if the input item
is in the memory set (a positive response)
and with a different response if it is not (a
negative response).
The typical finding is that the time taken
to respond is a linear function of memory
set size, with reaction time being increased
by about 40 ms for each additional item in
the memory set. In addition, the functions
based on positive responses and on negative
responses are usually parallel (see Fig. 2.4).
Sternberg explained these findings by pro-
posing that the input item was compared in
u 650
w
If)
~ 600
~ ",,""
>- 550
u ,P"
z (f'
W
« 500
t-
...J
w ,/
z 450
If)
1:1'
~ 0""'..., '
...
w 400
If)
a:
z
<{
w
~
1 2
NUMBER OF ITEMS IN MEMORY SET
Fig. 2.4. The effects of memory-set size on response speed in the Sternberg paradigm (illustrative data)
19
turn to each item of the memory set at a rate
of 40 ms per comparison.
Very similar results have been obtained in
studies of visual search. In a typical study
(Atkinson et al. 1969), a single memory item
was placed in short-term memory, and then
the items comprising the visual display were
presented simultaneously. The task was to
decide as quickly as possible whether or not
the memory set item was present in the dis-
play. Mirabile dictu, there was a linear rela-
tionship between the number of items in the
visual display and reaction, and there was a
regular increase of about 40 ms per item.
Furthermore, the functions for positive and
negative functions were parallel. It is obvi-
ously tempting to apply Sternberg's theory
to these data.
A closer examination of studies of short-
term search and visual search indicates that
an attention-demanding, serial comparison
process cannot possibly account for all of
the data. In particular, if the memory set re-
mains unchanged throughout extended
practice in the Sternberg paradigm, the
function relating number of memory-set
items to reaction time increases much more
slowly than 40 ms per item and is curvilinear
rather than linear. Similar results have been
observed in studies of visual search.
Shiffrin and Schneider argued that these
and other findings suggest a distinction be-
tween two basic kinds of processing: con-
NEGATIVE TRIALS
,,0 POSITIVE TRIALS
"
",,'
"P'"
3 4 5 6
20 Theories of Attention
1200
U
W 1100
1/1
:I 1000
Z ,////
900
w
:I 800
i=
J ",'"
z 700 ,.....0
0
i= 600 ...... """,,",,"
'"
U 0--------0- ......¥
« o 0 .,.> ... 0--=-
500
-------
W • POSITIVE
0: • _-------...
400 ... - - - - - - - - - - TRIALS
I I I I
MEM.SET= 1 MEM.SET.1 MEM.SET.4 MEM.SET.4
0ISP.SET.1 DISP.SET.4 DISP.SET.1 DISP.SET.4
Fig. 2.S. The effects of memory-set size, display-
set size and consistent versus varied mapping on
trolled and automatic. Controlled processes
are of limited capacity and require atten-
tion; their constraints are those of short-
term memory (such as the limited compari-
son rate and the limited amount of informa-
tion that can be stored without loss), and
they can be used flexibly in changing cir-
cumstances. The typical pattern of findings
in studies of visual search and short-term
memory search is attributable to controlled
processes making serial comparisons at a
rate of 40 ms per comparison.
Automatic processes, on the other hand,
are not hindered by the capacity limitations
of short-term memory and do not require at-
tention. They require considerable training
to develop and are extremely difficult to
modify once they have been learned. The
finding from visual and memory search
studies that extended practice can greatly
reduce the effects on reaction time of increa-
sing the number of items can be attributed to
the gradual development of automatic pro-
cesses.
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) and
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) attempted to
clarify the distinction between these two
kinds of processes in a task in which sub-
jects were given one, two or four items as
members of the memory set (as in Stern-
berg's paradigm). They were then shown
visual displays containing one, two or four
P NEGATIVE
/ TRIALS
VARIED
MAPPING
/ ~ POSITIVE
/ ",'-- TRIALS
)
tfI'-'
--0 NEGATIVE
TRIALS
CONSISTENT
MAPPING
speed of response in a detection task. (Schneider
and Shiffrin 1977)
items (as in visual search tasks), and they
were asked to decide whether anyone of the
visual display items was the same as anyone
of the memory set items. The task could thus
be made extremely easy (one item to mem-
orize and one item in the visual display) or
quite difficult (four items in memory and
four items in the display).
Some subjects were run urider consistent
mapping conditions, in which only numbers
were used as items in the memory set and
only consonants were used as distractor
items in the visual display (or vice versa).
Consider someone who was given only
numbers as members of each memory set. If
a number was seen in the visual display, it
had to be a member of the current memory
set. In other words, the simple strategy of
looking for any member of the number cate-
gory could be used, with a 'yes' response be-
ing appropriate if one was discovered.
Other subjects received varied mapping
conditions in which numbers and conso-
nants were used both as items in the memo-
ry set and as distractors .
.What do you think the results of this ex-
periment looked like? While you may have
guessed that the consistent mapping condi-
tion would produce better performance
than the varied mapping condition, you may
be surprised at the size of the difference (see
Fig. 2.5). Under varied mapping conditions,
 Shiffrin and Schneider: Controlled and Automatic Processes
there were large effects of both memory-set
size and display-set size, and the effects
were approximately twice as large on nega-
tive trials (i.e. when there was no match be-
tween any of the memory items and any of
the items in the visual display). According to
Shiffrin and Schneider, subjects used a con-
trolled search process in these conditions.
Why does controlled search take longer
when there are more items to be considered?
The answer is that each item in the visual
display needs to be compared against each
item in the memory set in the search for a
match, and these comparisons can only be
made serially and at a limited rate.
The picture is completely different for the
consistent mapping conditions, in which
there was almost no effect of either memory
set size or visual display size on reaction
time. Performance in these conditions was
attributed to the use of automatic processes
operating independently and in parallel.
These automatic processes have developed
as a result of a lifetime's practice in distin-
guishing between letters and numbers.
If automatic processes occur as a result of
practice, it should be possible to demon-
strate in a laboratory setting the way in
which they develop. Shiffrin and Schneider
used consistent mapping, with the conso-
nants B to L forming one set and the conso-
nants Q to Z forming the other set. Items
from only one set were used in the memory
set, and all of the distractors in the visual
display came from the other set. Several vis-
ual displays were presented very rapidly,
and the main measure of performance was
the accuracy of detection.
After 2100 trials, detection accuracy had
climbed from an initial 55 % to over 80 %,
and performance seemed to be determined
by automatic processes. It thus appears that
practice is an extremely important factor in
producing automaticity and that really sub-
stantial amounts of training may be re-
quired for automatic processing to develop
fully.
We have seen that automatic processes
can lead to greatly enhanced levels of per-
21
formance. Are there any disadvantages as-
sociated with the use of automatic pro-
cesses? Theoretically, since they are inflexi-
ble and difficult to modify, they should be a
handicap when circumstances change. In
the study just described, the 2100 trials of
consistent mapping were followed by an-
other 2400 trials of consistent mapping but
with everything reversed. In other words, if
the items in the memory set had previously
been drawn from the first half of the alpha-
bet, they were subsequently always taken
from the second half of the alphabet, and
vice versa.
After this reversal, detection accuracy fell
to about 30%, a level well below that seen at
the start of training when the subjects were
completely unpractised. Indeed, it took al-
most 1000 trials under reversal conditions
before performance recovered to its initial
level! Automatic processes were continuing
to detect items in the visual display that had
been targets in the first part of the experi-
ment, but were no longer, and this interfered
with the performance of the task.
A similar interfering effect was noticed
informally by subjects who were exposed to
hundreds of trials of consistent mapping
with the memory-set items always being
drawn from a limited number of conso-
nants. They reported that these memory-set
items seemed to 'jump out' from the page
during normal reading. One subject found
this effect so distracting that he would not
attempt to read for an hour or more after an
experimental session, which is certainly a
novel excuse for not studying.
In contrast, the effects of altering the con-
ditions for subjects exposed to varied map-
ping were relatively small, indicating that
controlled processes can be modified much
more readily than automatic processes. The
same conclusion was suggested by further
experiments in which consistent or varied
mapping was followed by a modification in
which subjects were told to look for targets
in only one part of the visual display and to
ignore targets in the remaining part of the
display. It was much harder for subjects to
ignore part of the visual display when they
22 Theories of Attention
had developed automatic search processes
(consistent mapping conditions) than when
they had been using controlled search pro-
cesses (varied mapping conditions).
The main findings of Shiffrin and
Schneider will now be summarized. In do-
ing so, it will be useful to distinguish be-
tween divided attention situations, in which
attention must be paid to all the stimuli in
the visual display, and focussed attention si-
tuations, in which attention is to be paid to
some stimuli but not to others. In essence,
subjects can divide attention among several
items without impairing performance when
automatic processing is utilized but cannot
divide attention without worsening per-
formance when controlled search is used.
In contrast, there is a substantial decre-
ment in performance on a focussed-atten-
tion task from automatic responses to to-be-
ignored items but only a slight decrement
from controlled processing of such items,
since the subjects' control is usually suffi-
cient to prevent unwanted processing. In a
nutshell, automatic processes function rap-
idly and in parallel but suffer from inflexi-
bility; controlled processes are flexible and
versatile but operate relatively slowly and in
a serial fashion.
On the basis of their various findings,
Shiffrin and Schneider proposed a general
theory of memory and attention. The long-
term store was regarded as an elaborate col-
lection of interrelated information, most of
which is passive at any given moment. The
short-term store consists of that subset of in-
formation in the long-term store which is
currently active. In contrast to the multi-
store approach (e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin,
1968), which treated the short- and long-
term memory stores as separate, a flow chart
of Shiffrin and Schneider's theory would
show the short-term store as a small box
contained completely within the larger box
of the long-term store.
Automatic processes are assumed to op-
erate at input, with all features of incoming
stimuli being analysed and represented
briefly as active elements within the long-
term store. While there are no attentionalli-
mitations on the input, the complete analy-
sis of all inputs is followed by almost imme-
diate forgetting unless the relevant informa-
tion receives attention.
The notion that all stimuli are fully ana-
lysed in an automatic fashion is similar to
theoretical ideas put forward by Deutsch
and Deutsch (1963). While it is difficult to
know how we can distinguish empirically
between full analysis followed immediately
by forgetting, on the one hand, and a total
lack of analysis, on the other, the evidence
reviewed in this chapter broadly supports
the complete analysis position. However,
since there is an almost infinite number of
potential ways of encoding a complex sti-
mulus array, it seems doubtful that the
whole range of possible encodings could all
be processed automatically. If 'full analysis'
simply means that all stimuli contact their
representations in long-term memory, then
that is a defensible position, except perhaps
for stimuli which have only rarely been en-
countered. If it means more than that, then
the available data cannot be taken to indi-
cate the existence of an automatic full analy-
sis in that broader sense.
While the approach adopted by Shiffrin
and Schneider has much to recommend it,
they made some dubious theoretical as-
sumptions. For example, they claimed that
control processes are "limited-capacity pro-
cesses requiring attention. . . these limita-
tions prevent multiple control processes
from occurring simultaneously" (p. 160),
and they regarded rote rehearsal, serial
search, various decisions and strategies and
long-term memory search as examples of
control processes. Despite their claim, there
is in fact strong evidence that rote rehearsal
can occur concurrently with other control
processes. Hitch and Baddeley (1976) found
that the speed and accuracy with which ver-
bal reasoning problems were solved were
hardly affected by concurrent overt rehear-
sal of the word 'the' or by rehearsal of the se-
quence 'one-two-three-four-five-six'. In
other studies, it has been found that rote re-
hearsal has essentially no effect on normal
silent reading comprehension.
 Shiffrin and Schneider: Controlled and Automatic Processes
Consideration of the operation of control
processes leads naturally to the issue of the
mechanism that controls the control pro-
cesses. Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) pro-
vided their answer in a brief discussion of
the ways in which control processes are
used to retrieve information from the long-
term store: "On each cycle, (a) the subject
generates probe information and places it in
STS ... (c) the subject searches the STS set;
(d) the subject decides whether the approp-
riate information has been found" (p. 159).
The notion that it is 'the subject' who con-
trols his or her own control processes lacks
something in terms of scientific respectabili-
ty and seems to hark back to very primitive
homunculus theories.
Shiffrin and Schneider were perhaps
more successful in elucidating some of the
ways in which automatic processes can de-
velop. They showed convincingly that ex-
tended practice under conditions in which
any given stimulus is always associated with
the same response can lead to automaticity.
However, it is not altogether clear from their
studies exactly what aspects or features of
the stimuli were being detected, i.e. they did
not specify the nature of the information
which comes to be processed automatically
as a result of practice. This issue is of central
interest to the theory of attention recently
put forward by Treisman and Gelade
(1980), which is dicussed later in this chap-
ter.
There are some problems with the method
by which Shiffrin and Schneider decided
whether processing was automatic or con-
trolled. In essence, they identified automati-
city with a slope of zero in the function relat-
ing reaction time to the memory-set size or
to the visual display size, and they identified
the degree of involvement of conscious at-
tention with the amount by which the slope
was greater than zero. This is a rather strin-
gent criterion, and very prolonged practIce
is sometimes needed to achieve a slope of
zero. In a multiple-choice task, Mowbray
and Rhoades (1959) found that several hun-
dred sessions of practice with same sti-
mUlus-response mappings (a total of 45 000
23
responses) were required to eliminate the
difference between four-choice and two-
choice reaction times (Le. to produce a slope
of zero).
It is interesting to note that Shiffrin and
Schneider themselves did not in practice ad-
here too rigidly to their own criterion. They
argued that their consistent mapping condi-
tions produced automaticity, and yet in vir-
tually every experiment they failed to de-
monstrate a slope of zero as a consequence
of consistent mapping! They typical finding
was that increases in memory-set size and
visual display size led to increases of ap-
proximately 15 % in reaction time under
consistent mapping conditions.
Their use of the zero-slope technique is
based on the assumption that there is only
one capacity (Le. controlled attention) limit-
ing performance. On this assumption, a
non-zero slope indicates that controlled at-
tentional processing is being used. How-
ever, it is entirely possible that there are
other capacity limitations, in which case a
non-zero slope would not necessarily mean
that attention was being paid to the task in
question.
Some important experimental evidence
relating to these issues was obtained by Lo-
gan (1979). Subjects performed a multiple-
choice reaction time task with two, four, or
eight stimulus-response alternatives. The
stimulus-response mappings either re-
mained unchanged from day to day (con-
sistent mapping) or were altered every ses-
sion (varied mapping). This task was either
performed by itself or during the retention
interval of a memory task making consider-
able demands on attentional capacity (or-
dered recall of eight digits). The memory
task would be expected to impair perform-
ance on the multiple-choice task to the ex-
tent that the multiple-choice task demands
attention. Furthermore, if the attentional de-
mands of the multiple-choice task vary di-
rectly with the number of stimulus-response
alternatives, then there should be an interac-
tion, with the detrimental effect of memory
load being greatest with eight alternatives
and least with two alternatives. As can be
24 Theories of Attention

CONSISTENT MAPPING
1800 DAY 1 DAY 6
"D

Y
1500 ////

1200
u 900
w
c:f"" ....
~
\J1 600
CY'''
~ 300
z
l' l' I I
2 4 6 2 4 6
w
NUMBER OF S - R ALTERNATIVES
~

I- VARIED MAPPING
1800 DAY 1 DAY 6
Z
1500 ",0
0 ",'
",/J
- , ",'" ","

::/
1200

V
","
I-
"
u 900
« 600 cr"
w
Cl:: 300
Fig. 2.6. Choice reaction time as a
l' I I I I I
1 I
function of the number of stimulus-
response alternatives, concurrent
2 4 8 2 4 8
memory load, amount of practice

-
NUMBER OF S -R ALTERNATIVES
and consistent versus varied map-
0---0 8 DIGIT LOAD NO DIGIT LOAD ping. (Logan 1979)

seen in Fig. 2.6, these predictions were con-
firmed on the 1st day of practice for both
consistent and varied mapping conditions.
As would be predicted by Shiffrin and
Schneider, the effects of extended practice
on the performance of those subjects receiv-
ing varied mappings were slight, presu-
mably because changing the stimulus-re-
sponse mappings precludes the develop-
ment of automatic and attention-free pro-
cessing. In contrast, several days of practice
with a consistent stimulus-response map-
ping led to a considerable improvement in
reaction time, and there was a marked re-
duction in the effects of the memory load
(see Fig. 2.6).
Do these data indicate the development
of automaticity? According to Logan, the
fact that the attention-demanding memory
task has no more effect on the eight-alterna-
tive condition than on the two-alternative
condition after 6 days of practice indicates
automaticity. In terms ofShiffrin and Schnei-
der's zero-slope criterion, of course, auto-
maticity has by no means been demonstrated.
At the most mundane level, the implica-
tion is that different techniques for measur-
ing automaticity cannot be considered to be
equivalent. More interestingly, Logan may
have shown that a set of tasks can be per-
formed with minimal reliance on attentional
capacity (as indexed by memory load inter-
ference) without producing a slope of zero.
If so, then the dichotomy of controlled and
automatic processes may represent a sub-
stantial over-simplification.
2.4 Treisman and Gelade: Features and
Objects
·Treisman and Gelade's (1980) theory of at-
tention resembles that of Posner and Sny-
der (l975a, b) and Shiffrin and Schneider
(1977) in that it emphasizes the conceptual
distinction between attention-demanding
and automatic processes. They contended
that there are very important differences be-

tween the ways in which features and ob-
jects are perceived, using the term 'feature'
to refer to a particular value on a dimension
which is analysed by some functionally in-
dependent perceptual sub-system. For ex-
ample, colour is a perceptual dimension,
and blue is a feature on that dimension.
According to Treisman and Gelade's fea-
ture integration theory of attention, features
are registered automatically and in parallel
within the visual field, whereas objects com-
prising conjunctions of features are identi-
fied as the result of a serial process which in-
volves focussed attention. Why is focussed
attention necessary? Treisman and Gelade
argued that attention ensures that the fea-
tures of an object are appropriately com-
bined in perception; what happens is that
all of the features simultaneously present
during focal attention are integrated to form
a perceptual object. In other words, focal at-
tention provides the 'glue' which combines
features into unitary objects.
Perhaps the strongest support for the the-
ory was obtained in an experiment in which
Treisman and Gelade asked subjects to
search for a specified target in a visual dis-
play of between I and 30 items; a target was
presented on half of the trials. In one condi-
tion, the target was a green letter 'T'; in the
other condition, it was either a blue letter or
2400
U
W
If) 2000 - - - - - : SINGLE FEATURE
~
TARGETS
z 1600
w .
~ 1200
~ TRIALS
/
Z
-
0 800 tI'
l-
U
v'
<f
w 400
0:
5 15
Fig. 2.7. Performance speed on a detection task as
a function of target definition (conjunctive versus
Treisman and Gelade: Features and Objects 25
an'S' (either target could be presented on
any trial). The basic assumption was that fo-
cal attention would be necessary to detect
the target in the former condition (because
the target was defined by a combination of
features) but would not be required in the
latter condition. While the two task condi-
tions may appear to be of equivalent diffi-
culty (and reaction time was the same in
both conditions with a one-item display),
the overall pattern of results was very differ-
ent in the two conditions (see Fig. 2.7).
The data for the condition in which the
target was defined by a conjunction of fea-
tures are most straightforwardly explained
by assuming that focal attention was in-
volved and that a self-terminating serial
search was employed. A self-terminating
search means that the search ends as soon as
a target is detected; on average, this will re-
quire searching through half of the items
when a target is present, as against all of the
items when there is no target. It thus follows
that the negative slope should be approxi-
mately twice as steep as the positive slope,
and this was what happened.
In contrast, there was very little effect of
display size on reaction times on positive tri-
als when the targets were defined by single
features. These findings point to a parallel
search that operates automatically. How-
: CONJUNCTIVE NEGATIVE
TARGETS
","
""A TRIALS
",'"
,,'"
",'"
",'"
/h POSITIVE
//
-_.._..
TRIALS
....
/
// NEGATIVE
........
//
--,'
POSITIVE
TRIALS
30
DISPLAY SIZE
single·feature) and display size. (Treisman and
Gelade 1980)
26 Theories of Attention
ever, the existence of a substantial effect of
display size on speed of responding on ne-
gative trials suggests that there is some serial
searching of the display if no target is pres-
ent.
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) have
stressed the role played by practice in pro-
ducing the switch from attentionally de-
manding to automatic processing. In con-
trast, Treisman and Gelade found that fairly
prolonged practice with the target defined
by a combination of features did not pro-
duce evidence for automatic processing in
the form of parallel search.
The feature integration theory of atten-
tion leads to a further rather striking predic-
tion. If focussed attention to particular ob-
jects is prevented for any reason, then the
features of different objects are processed
but remain 'unglued'. This opens up the pos-
sibility of 'illusory conjunctions', in which a
feature from one object is erroneously com-
bined with a feature from a different object
to form a perceptual object. Treisman (1977)
found that in the absence of focussed atten-
tion, subjects often reported these illusory
conjunctions, combining the shape of one
object with the colour of a second. Of
course, such illusions are much less likely to
occur when we possess relevant knowledge
about objects: we rarely perceive green dogs
or black and white traffic lights!
Illusory conjunctions can also occur
when the subject is attempting to detect a
target letter among distractor letters con-
taining features which can combine to form
the target letter. For example, if the target
letter is 'R', then distractor letters 'P' and 'Q'
can combine to form the target letter if the
diagonal of the 'Q' links up with the 'P'. Ac-
cording to the theory, the way to avoid such
illusory conjunctions is to resort to serial
processing involving focal attention. As ex-
pected, the search through the visual display
was serial when illusory conjunctions
among distractor letters could occur, but it
was largely parallel otherwise.
These results can be compared to those of
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), who found
that subjects could search in parallel for
specified letters, provided that they received
protracted practice and that targets and dis-
tractors never interchanged their roles.
Treisman and Gelade offer a more detailed
explanation of the conditions under which
parallel search can occur: the prime necessi-
ty is that the targets can be discriminated
from non-targets on the basis of a single fea-
ture. Practice might achieve this state of af-
fairs in at least two different ways: (I) each
target is processed as a unit, i.e. as a single
functional feature or (2) subjects learn to
identify a single feature that differentiates a
target from all of the distractors (e.g. with
'N' as the target and 'HOTU' as distractors,
the target is the only letter with a diagonal
line in it).
A final interesting finding obtained by
Treisman and Gelade concerned the ability
to locate correctly perceived targets. In
those conditions in which focal attention
was supposedly utilized, it transpired that
approximately accurate information about
target location was both necessary and suffi-
cient for target identification. In contrast,
when processing was automatic and in par-
allel, the target was identified correctly on
approximately 40 % of the trials on which
the location was totally misjudged. It seems
intuitively reasonable that one of the advan-
tages offocussed attention is that it provides
accurate information about the spatialloca-
tions of any objects to which attention is di-
rected.
Treisman and Gelade have shown be-
yond peradventure that relatively slow, seri-
al, attentional processes can fulfil the vital
function of combining feature information
to form integrated percepts. However, one
of the problems with their theory is whether
unattended stimuli are invariably processed
only at the feature level. There is accumulat-
ing evidence (e.g. Lewis 1970, Treisman et
al. 1974) that the meaning of unattended
words is registered on occasion without
reaching conscious awareness. This is prob-
lematical for the theory because it seems im-
probable that meaning is represented as a
single feature. In other words, it is possible
that there can be some integration of fea-

tures even for unattended stimuli; a resolu-
tion of this issue awaits a more precise con-
ceptualization of the notion of a 'feature' at
the semantic level.
The feature integration theory of atten-
tion is obviously somewhat circumscribed
in a number of ways. While it is a theory of
attention, it is concerned exclusively with
the role played by attention in visual percep-
tion. None of the other possible functions of
attention is considered by Treisman and Ge-
lade.
2.5 Summary
Six major theories of attention have been
considered in this chapter. The early the-
ories of attention (Le. those of Broadbent
1958, Deutsch and Deutsch 1963, and Treis-
man 1964) are often thought to represent
very different ways of regarding attentional
phenomena. In fact, all three theories as-
sumed that there was a bottleneck some-
where in the various stages of processing
which tended to preclude successful concur-
rent performance; the dissimilarities among
these theories revolved around the putative
locus of the bottleneck.
Summary 27
More recent theories of attention, such as
those of Posner and Snyder (1975a, b), Shif-
frin and Schneider (1977), and Treisman
and Gelade (1980) have emphasized the
conceptual distinction between attention-
demanding and automatic processes. While
this distinction has been proposed by sever-
al theorists over the years, it is only compar-
atively recently that convincing empirical
support for such a distinction has been ob-
tained. It is to the credit of all these investi-
gators that they have demonstrated the exis-
tence of important qualitative differences
between attention-demanding and automat-
ic processes. It is as a result of such research
that a more precise concept of 'attention' can
be attained. However, there is a pressing
need for greater differentiation among dif-
ferent kinds of automatic processes, since
otherwise automatic processes tend to be
defined solely in terms of a lack of attention-
al involvement. It may be profitable to dis-
tinguish between automatic processes hav-
ing direct effects on attention and/or overt
responding and those that do not. Only the
former type of automatic process should
have the potential ability to disrupt per-
formance when environmental conditions
change.
3 Theories of Processing Resources
We saw in the previous chapter that one of
the major recent developments in the area of
attention has been the distinction between
attention-demanding processes and auto-
matic processes that do not require atten-
tion. There have been at least two other sign-
ificant shifts in thinking. One is that the ori-
ginal notion of attention as a bottleneck has
been replaced by a conceptualization in
which attention is regarded as a limited
power supply. The basic idea is that atten-
tion represents a general I urpose limited ca-
pacity that can be flexibl J allocated in many
different ways in response to task demands.
The second shift in the status quo anteis that
attention is increasingly regarded as consti-
tuting only one out of a number of different
processing resources.
The approaches dealt with in this chapter
exemplify contemporary thinking. As will
become apparent, there are substantial the-
oretical disagreements despite a measure of
consensus on the broad framework. Some
theorists (e.g. Baddeley and Hitch 1974)
choose to regard attentional mechanisms as
being intimately linked to the processes in-
volved in short-term storage, whereas others
(e.g. Navon and Gopher 1979) believe that it
is more profitable to postulate the existence
of a number of relatively specific processing
resources. At the end of this chapter, an at-
tempt is made to identify the significant ad-
vances in our understanding achieved by
the various theorists discussed.
3.1 Baddeley and Hitch:
Working Memory
At least from the time of James (1890), it
has been popular among psychologists to
regard attention and short-term retention as
being closely related. A comparatively re-
cent example is the attempt by Baddeley
and Hitch (1974) to integrate thinking on
problems of attention and short-term mem-
ory. Their starting point was the concept of
the short-term store, which was an integral
part of several multi-store theories of memo-
ry put forward during the 1960s (e.g. Atkin-
son and Shiffrin 1968, Waugh and Norman
1965).
In essence, Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
suggested replacing the concept of 'short-
term store' with that of 'working memory';
one of the main differences is that the no-
tion of working memory is broader than that
of short-term store and is relevant to a much
greater variety of situations. Working mem-
ory is a processing mechanism comprising
the two separable components of a modali-
ty-free central processor of limited capacity
and an articulatory loop. The central pro-
cessor is similar to, or even the same as, an
attentional processing mechanism and is al-
most invariably used in a wide range of cog-
nitve tasks. In contrast, use of the articulato-
ry loop is largely optional; its function is
primarily to permit transient storage of a li-
mited amount of information in a phonemic
code at relatively low 'cost' to the process-
ing system.
The potential advantages of this concept-
ualization over that of the multi-store ap-
proach, with its emphasis on the distinction
between the short-term and long-term
stores, can be seen in terms of the memory
deficits exhibited by the patient K. F. He
had a digit span of only two items but
showed no apparent deficit in either com-
prehension or long-term learning. This is

rather mysterious from the perspective of
multi-store models, because they claimed
that long-term memories could only be laid
down as a result of extensive processing in
the short-term, store. If the short-term store
were impaired (as it appeared to be in this
case), normal long-term learning ought to be
impossible.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) suggested that
K. F. was suffering from a deficient articula-
tory loop, but that his central processor was
intact. Since long-term learning and com-
prehension depend primarily on the central
processor, the mystery is solved. They justi-
fied their theoretical formulation in a series
of experiments using a pre-loading para-
digm: subjects were presented ('loaded')
with up to six random digits, which were fol-
lowed by a short interpolated verbal task
and then serial recall of the digit string. The
verbal tasks used included reasoning, com-
prehension and free recall learning.
As anticipated, all of the interpolated ver-
bal tasks were performed more poorly when
as many as six digits had to be remembered.
A more interesting finding from the theoret-
ical point of view was that the various verbal
tasks were performed equally well whether
three digits or no digits (control condition)
had to be retained. Why did remembering
three digits not interfere with the verbal
tasks? According to Baddeley and Hitch
(1974), performance of the verbal tasks de-
pended mainly on the central processor,
whereas three digits were within the capaci-
ty of the articulatory loop. Since the central
processor was only substantially involved in
the digit-string task when more than three
digits had to be retained, it was only with
such digit strings that the two tasks could
not be combined satisfactorily.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) concluded
that the central processor and the articulato-
ry loop could be used concurrently and in
parallel. It has to be pointed out, however,
that there is a fairly serious methodological
problem with the pre-load technique, since
we do not know whether the subjects are ac-
tively processing the digits at all during the
performance of the interpolated verbal task.
Baddeley and Hitch: Working Memory 29
This problem was obviated by Hitch and
Baddeley (1976), who utilized a concurrent
load technique in which a random sequence
of six digits was repeated out loud by the
subject at high speed during the perform-
ance of a verbal reasoning task. This digit
task produced a substantial detrimental ef-
fect on the task of verbal reasoning, in con-
trast to the minimal effect of a digit task in-
volving only the articulatory loop (e.g. cycli-
cal repetition of 'one-two-three-four-five-
six'). These data suggest that the concurrent
load of six digits impaired performance be-
cause of the involvement of the central pro-
cessor rather than simply due to use of the
articulatory loop.
Have these findings definitely shown that
the central processor is a modality-free sys-
tem possessing the characteristics of a gen-
eral attentional capacity? Not really, be-
cause all of the tasks we have considered
have involved verbal processing, so that
the central processor might merely be a ver-
bal coding system. However, other data sug-
gest that the functions of the central proces-
sor may be fairly general. For example, Wat-
kins et al. (1973) found that memory for ver-
bal information in short-term store was se-
verely disrupted by performing a visual
tracking task on the pursuit rotor during the
retention interval.
In similar fashion, Reitman (1974) found
that verbal short-term memory was reduced
when subjects detected pure tones in a back-
ground of white noise during the retention
interval. The fact that short-term memory is
interfered with by completely non-verbal
tasks, although less than it is by verbal tasks,
suggests that verbal short-term memory re-
lies on a specific capacity for verbal coding
(the articulatory loop) as well as a general
attentional capacity (central processor).
The characteristics of the articulatory
loop were explored by Baddeley et al.
(1975). They found that word span (i.e. the
number of words that can be recalled imme-
diately in their correct order) was inversely
related to the number of syllables per word;
more specifically, they discovered that sub-
jects recalled approximately as many words
30 Theories of Processing Resources
as they could read in 2 s. Obviously, fewer
multi-syllable than one-syllable words can
be read in that time, and the word span was
correspondingly less. These findings ap-
peared to be due to the articulatory loop, be-
cause the word length effect disappeared
when articulatory suppression (i.e. rapid
repetition of a single sound by the subject)
accompanied word presentation. Thus the
articulatory loop is a time-based system op-
erating at the phonemic level; it is plausible
to assume that rehearsal is its primary func-
tion.
The most interesting implication of the
approach proposed by Baddeley and Hitch
(1974) is that working memory is a resource
that plays a major role in a great diversity of
situations. Mental tasks of all kinds appear
to make temporary demands upon working
memory. Such demands arise whenever in-
formation becomes available at one point in
the solution to a problem and must be main-
tained for use at a subsequent point. These
considerations suggest the intriguing pos-
sibility that many of our intellectuallimita-
tions may actually be memorial limitations.
A very simple problem-solving task was
used by Wanner and Shiner (1976) involving
auditorily presented subtraction problems
of the following type: (5 -4) -1. Nearly
everyone reports remembering only one di-
git at each successive stage of problem solu-
tion (first 5, then 1 and then 0). There were
other subtraction problems that were super-
ficially similar, such as 5 - (4 - 1), but
which necessitate remembering two digits
25
I/)
cr 20
0 NORMAL
cr
cr
w 15 "A,,
I-
z "
w
u
10 " " ",
cr
w
!l. 5
if ""''0
'HUNDREDS' 'TENS' 'UNITS'
FIGURE FIGURE FIGURE
during the middle part of the problem.
When a short-term memory task was intro-
duced half way through the presentation of
problems of the latter type it was more dis-
ruptive of both subtraction accuracy and
short-term memory than when it was placed
in the middle of problems of the former
type. The reason for this difference is that
problems of the latter type place greater de-
mands on working memory and thus com-
pete more strongly with the short-term
memory task for the limited resources of
working memory.
The importance of transient demands on
memory during the solving of addition
problems was shown by Hitch (1978). One
approach which he used was to present an
addition problem auditorily (e.g. 348 + 27)
and to ask the subjects to work through the
problem starting with the units column, then
moving on to the tens column, and finally
on to the hundreds column. The demands
on memory were minimized when the solu-
tion was written down in the order units,
tens and hundreds, because partial results
could be written down as they were calculat-
ed, whereas they were maximized when the
normal order (hundreds, tens and units) was
used. As can be seen in Fig. 3.1, there were
almost 50% more errors when the normal
order was used with its greater demands on
working memory.
Hitch (1978) obtained even more direct
evidence of the role played by working
memory when he combined auditory pres-
entation of addition problems with visual
OUTPUT
ORDER
REVERSE
OUTPUT
ORDER Fig. 3.1. Error rate on a addition
task as a function of the order in
which the answer is given. (Hitch
1978)

aids varying between the entire problem and
nothing. The error rate increased from only
3 % with complete visual information to
22 % with no visual information. It may well
be that the initial information and the re-
sults of interim calculations are both held in
the articulatory loop, where they are subject
to some form of decay. Complete visual in-
formation greatly eases the storage problem
in the articulatory loop. The central process-
or performs various functions, including se-
lecting information from the articulatory
loop (e.g. 4 + 5), transforming it on the basis
of information in the long-term store (e.g.
4 + 5 = 9) and putting the result back into
the articulatory loop (e.g. 9).
The available evidence is consistent with
the notion that working memory is one of
the most useful processing resources. Un-
like most attention theorists, Baddeley and
Hitch (1974) have explicitly suggested that
short-term storage and attention are so
closely related that they should be consid-
ered together at a theoretical level. Another
advantage of their approach is that working
memory is viewed mainly as a process; this
contrasts with multi-store theories (e.g. At-
kinson and Shiffrin 1968), in which the
short-term store was conceptualized in
structural terms as a box with arrows lead-
ing to and away from it.
Hitch (1980) has recently proposed a
modification of some of the views expressed
by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). He argued
that it was important to distinguish between
BO
..J 70
..J
«
u 60
w
a: 50
I-
z 40
w p-~-o
U
a: 30
w TASK
11. 20
1"
5 10
SERIAL POSITION
Fig. 3.2. Free recall with no delay and with a 10 s interpolated task. (Glanzer and Cunitz 1966)
Baddeley and Hitch: Working Memory 31
two sub-systems of working memory: (1) a
relatively passive input register which holds
information about recent verbal inputs and
resembles Waugh and Norman's (1965) con-
cept of primary memory and (2) an output
system which holds information about po-
tential verbal responses and which is used in
articulatory rehearsal. The latter corre-
sponds to the articulatory loop component
of working memory postulated by Baddeley
and Hitch (1974).
Since Hitch (1980) retained the notion of
a limited-capacity central executive, the ma-
jor alteration from the position adopted by
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) is the postula-
tion of a passive input register. This register
can be investigated in studies of free recall
in which the subject is presented with a list
of words and then has to recall as many as
possible in any order. It is usually found
that the subject recalls well from the begin-
ning (the primacy effect) and the end (the
recency effect) of the list. If a short distract-
ing task is interpolated between the end of
list presentation and recall, the recency ef-
fect is eliminated, but there is little effect on
recall from the rest of the list (Glanzer and
Cunitz 1966). This result, which is illustrated
in Fig. 3.2, suggests that most of the items are
in a stable long-term store but that those
from the end of the list are in a rather fra-
gile short-term store which can hold approxi-
mately three items. Hitch (1978) argued that
the recency effect in free recall reflected the
workings of the input register.
NO DELAY
10 - SEC
'~ INTERPOLATED
I I
15
32 Theories of Processing Resources
There is some evidence to support the
notion that the input register is passive and
thus does not depend on active processing
strategies (e.g. rehearsal). The recency effect
is not reduced when subjects are given a
concurrent task (e.g. mental arithmetic) to
perform during the presentation of a free re-
call list, whereas recall from the rest of the
list is impaired.
The distinction between the input register
and the articulatory loop becomes clearer
when one considers language comprehen-
sion and production. On the one hand, the
input register holds a parsed representation
of the most recent words of spoken lan-
guage, and paves the way for comprehen-
sion; on the other hand, the articulatory
loop acts as an output buffer in the produc-
tion of overt speech. It seems likely that the
articulatory loop may be involved in Spoon-
erisms, which typically involve the acciden-
tal transposition of the initial letters of two
or more words (e.g. "He has just received a
blushing crow").
One of the greatest weaknesses of the
working memory model is that it is not clear
that there is any good measure of its capaci-
ty. Memory span (i.e. the limit on the num-
ber of items that can be recalled immediate-
ly in the correct order) undoubtedly de-
pends in part on working memory, but it
seems to involve other factors as well. This
is suggested by a closer examination of the
data of Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Even
when they used a near span memory load of
six digits, subjects were still able to perform
a variety of concurrent verbal tasks reason-
ably efficiently. If memory span really re-
quired all of the resources of working mem-
ory, a more precipitous fall in performance
of a concurrent verbal task might have been
expected.
More direct evidence on the issue of
whether memory span is a good measure of
transient storage capacity was obtained by
Hebb (1961), who discovered what has
come to be known as the "Hebb effect". He
presented subjects with nine-digit strings for
immediate serial recall and surreptitiously
repeated precisely the same string on every
third trial. The repeated string was better
remembered than non-repeated strings, in-
dicating that there is some long-term storage
of information in span studies. Subsequent
work has indicated that there is greatest
long-term storage of the initial part of the
string, possibly because that is the part re-
ceiving the most rehearsal (Corballis 1969).
If memory span is based both on working
memory and on long-term storage, then
span measures provide an inexact estimate
of working memory capacity.
The general theoretical approach has
proved successful in explaining a number of
puzzling findings. For example, Baddeley
and Hitch (1974) used an experimental par-
adigm in which a digit span task was per-
formed simultaneously with the presenta-
tion of a free recall list. As the number of
digits increased from one to six, free recall
of most of the list items was impaired, but
the recency effect was left intact. If, as has
sometimes been assumed, memory span and
the recency effect in free recall depend on
the same limited-capacity, short-term store,
then it is very surprising that there is no per-
formance decrement when the two tasks are
combined.
Hitch (1980) explained this apparently
anomalous finding by arguing that memory
span depends primarily on the articulatory
loop whereas the recency effect depends on
the input register. The basic logical argu-
ment is that non-interference between two
concurrent activities indicates that they in-
volve separate mechanisms; on this argu-
ment, the postulation of four different com-
ponents of working memory (input register,
articulatory loop, short-term visuo-spatial
store and central executive) can perhaps be
justified.
However, there is still no strong evidence
for a clear distinction between the two ma-
jor components of working memory (i.e. the
articulatory loop and the central executive).
Matters would be improved if a double dis-
sociation could be demonstrated, i.e. if
some tasks could be found that relied exclu-
sively on the central executive whereas
other tasks only involved the articulatory
 Norman and Bobrow: Data-Limited and Resource-Limited Processes
loop. In practice, most of the tasks that have
been used actually involve both compo-
nents. For example, Hitch and Baddeley
(1976) argued that the verbal reasoning task
which they used in a number of experiments
primarily involved the central executive.
However, speed of reasoning was slowed
down when there was concurrent overt re-
hearsal of the word "the", which suggests
some involvement of the articulatory loop.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) suggested that
rehearsal of random items would typically
involve the articulatory loop but that the
central processor would only be used when
there were several items requiring rehearsal.
However, there is no compelling evidence
for a qualitative shift in processing of this
kind. Furthermore, even if a second process-
ing resource is increasingly employed as the
number of items requiring rehearsal is in-
creased, it is not clear that a general purpose
central processor constitutes this second re-
source.
In general terms, Baddeley and Hitch
have clarified the functioning of the articu-
latory loop much more than that of the cen-
tral processor. They have argued that the
central processor is of limited capacity, but
they have not been able to assess that capac-
ity; in addition, the central processor is alle-
gedly "modality free" and used in numerous
processing operations, but the precise con-
straints on its functioning are by no means
clear.
3.2 Norman and Bobrow: Data-Limited
and Resource-Limited Processes
A theoretical viewpoint bearing some
similarity to that of Baddeley and Hitch
(1974), and which also regards general ca-
pacity limitations as important, was pro-
posed by Norman and Bobrow (1975). In
particular, they argued that resources are
limited, using the term 'resources' to apply
to processing effort, the various kinds of
memory capacity and communication chan-
nels. Performance of any complex cognitive
33
task depends on the amount of resources ap-
plied to that task; more specifically, they
postulated that the function relating per-
formance to resource allocation was mono-
tonically non-decreasing.
According to Norman and Bobrow
(1975), it is necessary to distinguish between
two possible reasons for a task being per-
formed relatively poorly. On the one hand,
performance may be resource limited,
meaning that an increase in the amount of
resources invested in the task would result
in an improvement in performance efficien-
cy. On the other hand, performance may be
data limited, in which case the further allo-
cation of processing resources would not af-
fect performance. Data limitations can re-
sult either from the poor quality of the pre-
sented stimuli or the inadequacy of memori-
al information. In practice, task perform-
ance will typically be resource limited up to
the point at which all of the possible pro-
cessing has been done, after which it will be
data limited.
This theoretical approach has most rele-
vance to the prediction of performance
when two or more tasks are being performed
at the same time. In general terms, different
tasks should not interfere with each other
unless the total processing resources which
they require exceed the upper limit on avail-
able resources. Furthermore, only tasks that
are being performed within their resource-
limited region are susceptible to interfer-
ence. In many situations, the main or high-
priority task will be data limited, whereas
the subsidiary task will be resource limited.
In such cases, the interference effect will be
asymmetrical, with the main task interfering
with the subsidiary task, but not vice versa.
Norman and Bobrow (1975) argued that
the degree of practice which a skill receives
has important implications for the alloca-
tion of processing resources. The learning
that results form practice means that there is
enhanced performance for a given resource
allocation and also that a given level of per-
formance requires fewer resources.
The latter point can be illustrated with
reference to data obtained by LaBerge
34 Theories of Processing Resources
(1973) in a study involving the processing of
perceptual figures. When the subjects were
attending fully to the stimulus, they typical-
ly showed equivalent levels of performance
on newly learned and well-learned patterns,
although more resources were presumably
needed to process the newly learned pat-
terns. This difference in resource expendi-
ture was revealed when subjects were ex-
posed to attentional distraction requiring
some of the available resources: under those
circumstances, performance on the newly
learned patterns was more detrimentally af-
fected than performance on the well-
learned patterns.
An even more striking demonstration of
the way in which practice can reduce the de-
mand for resources was provided by Logan
(1979). A multiple-choice reaction time task
was performed during the retention interval
of a memory task making substantial de-
mands on attentional capacity. Initially,
performance on the reaction time task was
very adversely affected by the concurrent
memory task, indicating that the reaction
time task required considerable processing
resources. However, after 6 days of practice
on the same version of the reaction time
task, the interfering effect of the memory
task was greatly reduced, and reaction times
were much faster. In this case, practice pro-
duced improved performance combined
with a reduced allocation of resources.
Norman and Bobrow (1975) claimed that
HORIZONTAL LINE:
/ Only (1) is Data Limited
'-'-'-'-\,
'\. / " (1) and (2) are both
w ", Resource Limited
u
z "
~ "
1: ""
a:: ...................
~
a::
w .
Q.
PERFORMANCE (2)
it was possible to predict the degree of per-
formance efficiency for each of two concur-
rent tasks on the basis of the principle of
complementarity, according to which an in-
crease in the use of resources in one task re-
sults in a commensurate decrease in the re-
sources available for the processing of the
second task. One method of testing this
principle is by manipulating the allocation
of resources by using instructions to vary the
relative importance to be attached to the
performance of each of two tasks and then
using the data obtained to construct per-
formance operating characteristics.
These performance operating characteris-
tics involve plotting the performance level
of one task against the concurrent perform-
ance level of a second task (see Fig. 3.3). In
regions where one process is data limited,
but the other is not, the function will be eith-
er a vertical or a horizontal line. One of the
putative advantages of such performance
operating characteristics is that they permit
one to identify the extent to which perform-
ance is either data limited or resource limit-
ed at several points along the resource ex-
penditure continuum.
A useful clarification of the circum-
stances under which a single performance
operating characteristic may appropriately
be constructed was offered by Norman and
Bobrow (1976). They pointed out that the
tasks performed by the subject must remain
completely unchanged; all that is manipu-
•... ·...i/VERTICAL LINE.
I
Only (2) is
Data Limited
Fig. 3.3. A hypothetical per-
i formance operating charac-
teristic for performance on
two tasks. (Norman and Bo-
brow 1975)

lated should be the division of resources,
perhaps by means of instructions about the
relative weighting to be placed on each task.
If there are obvious qualitative changes in
the demands of the tasks being performed
concurrently, it is not surprising that the re-
sultant data cannot be accounted for by
means of a single performance operating
characteristic.
The cornerstone of the Norman and
Bobrow approach is the principle of com-
plementarity, according to which all avail-
able resources can be allocated in a flexible
way to two concurrent tasks. However, the
system probably does not work as efficiently
as is implied by this principle. It is likely
that there are many occasions on which the
subject has unused resources which he does
not know how to utilize to improve the per-
formance of either of two concurrent tasks.
It may also be an over-simplification to sug-
gest that the total available resources remain
constant under different instructional con-
ditions; in this connection, Kahneman
(1973) made a strong case that the total
available processing capacity changes as a
function of task demands.
There is a fundamental problem at the
heart of the theoretical analysis put forward
by Norman and Bobrow (1975). On the one
hand, they identified several different re-
sources, including processing effort, memo-
ry and communication channels. On the
other hand, their principle of complemen-
tarity is based on the assumption that two
concurrent tasks compete for a single gen-
eral pool of resources. It follows that when
performance on one of two concurrent tasks
is unaffected by varying performance on the
other task, performance of the first task is
said to be data limited. It would be equally
persuasive to argue that the two tasks are
competing for different specific resources.
Norman and Bobrow's failure to indicate
exactly how we can distinguish between
competition for a general pool of resources
and competition for a specific resource
greatly limits the usefulness of their con-
ceptualization.
Johnston and Heinz: Multi-Mode Theory 35
3.3 Johnston and Heinz: Multi-Mode
Theory
While several theorists have argued that
there are important capacity limitations as-
sociated with attention and information
processing, there has been much controver-
sy concerning the particular stage of pro-
cessing at which the major capacity limita-
tion or bottleneck is postulated to occur. In
the most general terms, theories of attention
have typically argued for the existence of
three stages of perceptual processing.
Stage I constructs sensory representations
of the inputs to the system, Stage 2 con-
structs semantic representations of these
sensory representations and Stage 3 admits
the products of the earlier stages into con-
sciousness.
Selective attention, in the sense of the dif-
ferentiation between targets and non-tar-
gets, could conceivably occur at any or all of
the three stages. Over the years, most of the
various possibilities have been favoured by
one or more theorists. At the two extremes,
Broadbent (1958) argued that selection oc-
curred only at Stage 1, whereas Deutsch and
Deutsch (1963) claimed that selection oc-
curred only at Stage 3. Various intermediate
positions have been adopted by other theo-
rists; for example, Broadbent (1971) and
Treisman (1964) argued that selection could
occur either at Stage I or Stage 2, and Nor-
man (1968) proposed that Stages 2 and 3
were the ones involved in selection.
A major inadequacy of some of the earlier
theories is that they assumed that the atten-
tional system could only operate in a single,
invariant way. The assumption that the at-
tentional system is highly flexible in its
mode of operation seems more realistic and
suggests a re-appraisal of the issue of the
stage or stages of processing at which selec-
tion occurs. Theorists such as Kahneman
(1973) and Johnston and Heinz (1978) have
proposed that selective attention is possible
at all three stages. According to Johnston
and Heinz, selective attention consumes
36 Theories of Processing Resources
processing capacity, and the amount con-
sumed increases as one moves through the
various attentional stages or modes. While
the system may on occasion delay selection
until Stage 3, as Deutsch and Deutsch
(1963) claimed, it will not normally operate
in this way because of the very substantial
cost in terms of processing capacity.
Johnston and Heinz (1978) suggested that
the essential properties of Broadbent's
(1958) theory could be simulated if subjects
attempted to differentiate between targets
and non-targets at Stage 1, whereas the es-
sential properties of Deutsch and Deutsch's
(1963) theory could be simulated if selection
occurred at Stage 3. What determines the
stage or mode of analysis chosen for selec-
tion? According to Johnston (1978), the na-
ture of the prevailing circumstances is im-
portant: "Late modes should become more
optimal as the importance of breadth of at-
tention approaches or exceeds that of selec-
tion efficacy; for example, during a war-
time night patrol in an enemy-infested area,
or during a boring conversation at a cocktail
party" (p. 41).
One of the major predictions flowing
from these theoretical assumptions is that
selection based on semantic information
(Stage 2 analysis) requires more processing
capacity (i.e. the limited pool of energy, re-
sources or effort by means of which some
cognitive operations are mobilized or main-
tained) than selection based on sensory in-
formation (Stage 1 analysis). Johnston and
Heinz (1978) asked subjects to pay attention
to one of two concurrently presented binau-
ral messages. The target message was distin-
guished from the non-target passage by a
sensory cue (different voices) in one condi-
tion, by a semantic or meaning cue in a sec-
ond condition and by both sensory and se-
mantic cues in a third condition.
In addition, there was a subsidiary task in
every condition, which required rapid reac-
tion to a visual stimulus. The subjects were
instructed to devote as much mental energy
as required in order to perform the listening
task as well as possible, with any surplus en-
ergy or resources being allocated to the reac-
tion-time task. The rationale was that the
more resources or expended processing ca-
pacity that were required to perform the lis-
tening task, the less residual capacity would·
be available for monitoring the visual stimu-
lus, and thus the slower the reaction time
would be.
Johnston and Heinz (1978) confirmed
previous findings by obtaining better per-
formance on the listening task when only
sensory cues were available than when only
semantic cues were available. Of greater the-
oretical interest, they consistently found
that subsidiary reaction time was shorter
when sensory cues were available than
when semantic cues were available. These
findings suggest that selective attention is
less effortful or demanding when two audi-
tory inputs can be discriminated on the ba-
sis of sensory or Stage 1 analysis than when
semantic or Stage 2 analysis is necessitated.
Johnston and Heinz (1978) pointed out
that there was an alternative interpretation
of their data. In line with the theoretical
views of Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), it
could be argued that selection always oc-
curs at Stage 3, but that it is more efficiently
guided by sensory cues than by semantic
cues. This suggested a further experiment to
Johnston and Heinz, using the same basic
paradigm as before but varying the instruc-
tions. If subjects were told to extract as
much information as possible from both
messages, this would lead them to use a late
mode or stage of processing in all condi-
tions.
What effect should these new instructions
have on the difference in expended process-
ing capacity between the sensory cue and se-
mantic cue conditions? According to Shif-
frin and Schneider (1977), both messages
are always processed up to the Stage 3 level
irrespective of instructions, so the previous-
ly obtained difference should still occur. Ac-
cording to Johnston and Heinz (1978), on
the other hand, the difference in expended
processing capacity should only occur when
an earlier mode or stage of selection is uti-
lized in the sensory cue than the semantic
cue condition. Since the new instructions re-

quired the subjects to use an equally late
mode or stage of processing in both cue con-
ditions, the difference in expended process-
ing capacity should be eliminated. The data
were entirely consistent with this latter pre-
diction and were thus apparently at var-
iance with late selection models of the type
favoured by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963)
and by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977).
Some of these important theoretical is-
sues were considered further by Johnston
and Heinz (1979). Subjects shadowed (i.e.
repeated aloud) target words that were pre-
sented binaurally at the same time as non-
target words. Both sets of words were spo-
ken in the same male voice in the low senso-
ry discriminability condition; under condi-
tions of high sensory discriminability, target
words were spoken in a male voice and non-
target words in a female voice. According to
late selection models (e.g. Shiffrin and
Schneider 1977), there should be essentially
complete perceptual processing of non-tar-
get words, irrespective of the degree of sen-
sory discriminability between targets and
non-targets.
In contrast, the multi-mode theory of
Johnston and Heinz (1978) predicts that
more processing of non-target words is ne-
cessary under conditions of low sensory dis-
criminability, since Stage 1 analysis is insuf-
ficient to discriminate between targets and
non-targets in those circumstances. In other
words, the thoroughness of non-target pro-
cessing should be consistently high accord-
ing to late selection theories but should be
inversely related to sensory discriminability
according to multi-mode theory.
The actual findings were that recall of
non-target words was better with low than
with high sensory discriminability, ex-
pended processing capacity was greater
with low sensory discriminability and the
existence of a semantic relationship be-
tween targets and non-targets only disrupt-
ed the efficiency of shadowing performance
when there was low sensory discriminabili-
ty. The implication of all of these findings is
that analysis of non-target information is
flexible and is typically only as thorough as
Johnston and Heinz: Multi-Mode Theory 37
is necessary to discriminate between target
and non-target information. High sensory
discriminability permits a substantial reduc-
tion in the processing of non-targets, thus
reducing the consumption of processing ca-
pacity, the memorability of non-target infor-
mation and the extent to which non-targets
are processed semantically.
The notion that different levels or stages
of analysis may make varying demands on
processing capacity has been explored in a
very different paradigm by M. W. Eysenck
and M. C. Eysenck (1979a). Visually pre-
sented words were preceded either by a
physical (e.g. 'letter R 1') or a semantic (e.g.
'solid 1') question and required a decision
whether the word contained the specified
letter or was appropriately described by the
given adjective, respectively. Elaboration
was introduced at the physical level by pro-
viding two letters (e.g. 'letters R,DT), and at
the semantic level by giving two adjectives
(e.g. 'solid, edibleT). Expended processing
capacity was indexed by means of a subsidi-
ary reaction time task.
As is shown in Fig. 3.4, semantic analysis
required more processing capacity than
physical analysis, and elaborate processing
was more demanding than non-elaborate
processing. Thus the data confirmed the no-
tion that Stage 2 processing requires more
expended processing capacity than Stage 1
processing. While it is, of course, undoub-
tedly true that factors such as degree of
practice substantially affect the demands of
different task activities on processing capac-
ity, it may nevertheless be an important gen-
eralization that semantic processing re-
quires greater processing capacity than does
physical processing.
M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck
(1979 a) carried out a further experiment in
which they investigated the hypothesis that
retrieval from long-term storage requires
more expended processing capacity than re-
trieval from short-term storage. It was as-
sumed that events in short-term storage are
those being attended to or rehearsed at any
given time; they are thus readily accessible
38 Theories of Processing Resources
550
500 ELABORATE
Cl
z~
-u 450
"'w
"'", NON-ELABORATE
tl~
Oz 400
0:-
n.~
wt:: 350
0>-
Ou
z~
wn. 300
n.~
xu
w
250
f I I
PHYSICAL SEMANTIC
PROCESSING TASK
and can be retrieved with a relatively mod-
est use of processing capacity. Performance
on an simple reaction time task that was car-
ried out at the same time as the retrieval task
was worse when subjects were retrieving
from long-term storage than from short-
term storage, indicating that more process-
ing capacity is needed for retrieval from
long-term storage. The various findings
from this study indicate that there are im-
portant differences in processing demands
among several of the processing activities
involved in learning.
Some of the major findings within the
shadowing paradigm may be explicable by
reference to the theoretical views advanced
by M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck
(1979 a) and by Johnston and Heinz (1978).
In this paradigm, one of two concurrent au-
ditory inputs must be shadowed or repeated
out loud, and at the same time target items
presented in either the shadowed or the
non-shadowed message must be detected.
The usual finding is that target detection is
much better in the shadowed message (e.g.
Treisman and Geffen 1967, Treisman and
Riley 1969); part of the reason for this is that
shadowing is a demanding activity that
seems to 'lock' attention on to the message
being shadowed.
If shadowing uses up most of the avail-
able processing capacity, then only those
targets on the non-shadowed message that
Fig. 3.4. Expended processing ca-
pacity as a function of elaboration
and depth of processing. (Eysenck
and Eysenck 1979a)
make small demands on processing capacity
will be detected. The expectation is that se-
mantically defined targets will require more
processing capacity than physically defined
targets (M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck
1979 a). This would explain Lawson's
(1966) finding of virtually perfect detection
of targets on the non-shadowed ear when
the targets consisted of auditory pips super-
imposed on verbal messages.
Treisman and Riley (1969) directly com-
pared the ability to detect targets as a func-
tion of the processing which they required.
The targets in their study were letters pre-
sented among digits. When the target letters
were spoken in the same voice as the digits,
so that semantic analysis was needed in or-
der to identify them, the detection rate for
targets in the non-shadowed message was
33 %. However, when the target letters were
in a different voice from the digits, so that
only physical analysis was required for tar-
get detection, the detection rate on the non-
shadowed message was 99 %. While these
data are consistent with the hypothesis that
semantic analysis consumes more process-
ing capacity than physical analysis, it could
also be argued that the improvement in tar-
get detection in the different voice condition
was due to the use of two differentiating cri-
teria for targets (i.e. voice and type of item)
rather than only one (i.e. type of item).
The analysis of shadowing task data in

terms of processing capacity considerations
implies that the detection of targets on the
non-shadowed message should depend on
the capacity demands of the shadowing
task. Sullivan (1976) manipulated shadow-
ing demands by varying the overall redun-
dancy of the message that was shadowed.
As expected, fewer targets were detected on
the non-shadowed message when the shad-
owed message was less redundant and so
made more demands on processing capaci-
ty. In addition, target detection was much
higher when a single word was used as the
target (thus permitting detection on a pho-
nemic basis) than when any word from a
particular category could be used as the tar-
get (thus necessitating semantic analysis).
The greatest problem with the work of
Johnston and Heinz is that their experimen-
tal data fail to provide unequivocal support
for their theoretical position. They claimed
that selection based on semantic informa-
tion requires more processing capacity than
selection based on sensory information.
However, it is surely the case that ease of se-
lection must depend on the discriminability
of two inputs (T. Neill, personal communi-
cation). Would attentional selection based
on sensory information still require very
little capacity if subjects had to select a mes-
sage spoken by one identical twin while re-
jecting the same message spoken by the
other identical twin? It is clear that atten-
tional selection based purely on sensory in-
formation can require considerable process-
ing in some circumstances; similarly, selec-
tion based on the semantic difference be-
tween two messages would presumably re-
quire relatively little processing capacity if
that difference were sufficiently great.
In spite of this complication, the findings
of Johnston and Heinz (1978), M. W. Ey-
senck and M. C. Eysenck (1979 a), Treis-
man and Riley (1969) and Sullivan (1976) all
suggest that attentional selection can usual-
ly be achieved more readily on the basis of
physical than of semantic features. As
M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck pointed
out, that still seems like a reasonable gen-
eralization, even though one must beware of
Navon and Gopher: Multiple Resources 39
the potential danger of confounding the
level at which selection occurs (sensory ver-
sus semantic) with ease of discriminability.
Johnston and Heinz seemed to assume
that processing at any given level involves
either automatic or attentional processes,
but not both. In fact, while their data imply
that different kinds of attentional selection
make varying demands on attentional ca-
pacity, it is still entirely possible that both of
the stimulus inputs in their experiments
were always thoroughly processed in an au-
tomatic fashion. In other words, their data
do not eliminate the possibility that full au-
tomatic processing of all inputs occured.
3.4 Navon and Gopher:
Multiple Resources
Navon and Gopher (1979) proposed a
new theoretical perspective based on the no-
tion of multiple resources, an approach
which they contrasted with central capacity
interference models (e.g. Baddeley and
Hitch 1974, Johnston and Heinz 1978,
Kahneman 1973, Norman and Bobrow
1975). Since their theory of multiple re-
sources is in large part an attempt to over-
come the alleged deficiencies of the central
capacity approach, it is useful to start by
considering the merits and demerits of that
approach.
In essence, central capacity interference
models claim that there are finite resources
(sometimes referred to as effort, capacity, or
attention) which can be flexibly deployed
across a wide range of activities. It is usually
assumed that performance of a task is posi-
tively related to the amount of available re-
sources. The processing system supplies re-
sources to meet the demands associated
with the intended level of performance to
the extent that they are available.
Capacity models have most often been
applied to dual-task performance. The most
natural assumption is that the demand for
resources of two tasks when performed to-
40 Theories of Processing Resources
gether should equal the sum of the demands
for the same tasks when performed sepa-
rately. This assumption that there is additiv-
ity of demands is often erroneous, usually
because the apparent demands on resources
are increased by having to do the two tasks
together. Why should this be so? A probable
reason is that the process of co-ordinating
resources between two tasks itself requires
resources.
Capacity models have typically made the
simplifying assumption that tasks preserve
their separate identities while being per-
formed together. However, there is increas-
ing evidence that new or emergent processes
come into operation when certain tasks are
combined (as the Gestaltists used to tell us,
the whole is more than the sum of its parts).
Duncan (1979) illustrated this Gestaltist
principle in an experiment on the psycho-
logical refractory period. Subjects had to re-
spond as rapidly as possible to two closely
successive stimuli, one requiring response
from the left hand and the other requiring
response from the right hand. The relation-
ship or mapping between the first stimulus
and response was either corresponding (i.e.
leftmost stimulus location requiring re-
sponse of the leftmost finger, and rightmost
stimulus location requiring response of the
rightmost finger) or it was crossed (i.e. left-
most stimulus location requiring response
of the rightmost finger). The mapping of the
second stimulus and response could also be
corresponding or crossed.
The most interesting finding was that per-
formance was especially poor when one
corresponding mapping and one crossed
mapping were used. The new or Gestaltist
factor here is the element of choice and un-
certainty over which mapping to use. This
interpretation of the data was supported by
an analysis of the error data; when the two
mappings differed, errors tended to be those
expected from selection of the inappropri-
ate mapping, something that did not occur
when the two mappings were the same. You
can obtain a similar effect by attempting to
rub your stomach and tap your head at the
same time - there is an almost irresistible
tendency to start tapping your stomach
and/ or rubbing your head.
The simpler versions of the capacity-mod-
el approach assume that there is fixed ca-
pacity and availability of resources. How-
ever, Kahneman (1973) suggested that ca-
pacity might be elastic to some extent; more
specifically, he proposed that increasing
processing load leads to a rise in arousal,
which in turn permits the system to mobilize
resources that were not available with a low-
er load. This notion is plausible but obvious-
ly makes it more difficult to predict what is
going to happen when two tasks are com-
bined.
Although it is not usually stated explicit-
ly, most central capacity interference mod-
els assume that processing resources are at
the disposal of the system to be allocated as
required. In other words, the system can se-
lect any combination of performance levels
on each of two tasks, provided only that ca-
pacity limits are not strained. In practice, of
course, the system is often not perfectly free
to decide how to allocate its resources.
A very clear example of this is the Stroop
effect, in which people name the colour in
which a colour name is printed (e.g. the
word 'red' printed in blue). Even with exten-
sive practice, there is interference from the
printed word, indicating that resources are
applied to it, in spite of all attempts to pre-
vent this happening. A second example is
the way in which intense, novel or surprising
stimuli attract attention to themselves and
produce orienting responses. There is thus
an important distinction between mandato-
ry and optional processes that has not been
emphasized by central capacity theorists.
Central capacity theories often assume
that all of the available fixed capacity is al-
located to the two tasks in dual-task situa-
tions. For instance, Norman and Bobrow's
(1975) principle of complementarity
claimed that the sum of the resources ap-
plied to two concurrent tasks was equal to
the sum ofthe available resources. There are
several reasons why the resources invested
in the two tasks might fall short of the total
pool of resources. Some resources might be
 Navon and Gopher: Multiple Resources 41

't:J 2·25 VISUAL

IMAGERY
>-
l-
S; 2·00
i=
Vi
z
~ ',75 AUDITORY
IMAGERY
...J
<{
:::l
I-
0.. 1'50
w
u
Fig. 3.5. Sensitivity of signal detection as a
function of signal modality and modality
~ 1r~_______I'-__________'I________
of concurrent imagery. (Segal and Fusella VISUAL AUDITORY
1970) SIGNAL

invested in other activities, or the joint de-
mands of the two tasks might be well within
the capacity of the system. Another possibil-
ity is that people might choose not to exert
themselves maximally (how often does any-
one work 'flat out' ?).
N avon and Gopher (1979) concluded that
central capacity interference theories have
only been able to account for the experi-
mental data by adding several extra explan-
atory principles to the basic formulation.
These include the notion of elastic capacity,
Gestalt-like properties of combining tasks,
data-limited processes and automatic pro-
cessing. The present state of affairs is sum-
marized by Navon and Gopher in the fol-
lowing way: "The most parsimonious view
of the field (i.e., the central capacity interfer-
ence theory) seems to have proved inade-
quate; the remaining alternatives are either
to augment, patch and hedge that view so
that it barely resembles its original form, or
to substitute it altogether with a broader,
and necessarily more complex, view" (pp.
247-248).
One of their reasons for preferring the lat-
ter alternative was that there are several
studies (e.g. Segal and Fusella 1970, Treis-
man and Davies 1973) obtaining results that
are completely inconsistent with the central
capacity notion. Segal and Fusella (1970)
combined the tasks of image construction
(visual or auditory) and signal detection
(visual or auditory). As can be seen in Fig. 3.5,
the auditory image task interfered more
with the detection of auditory signals than
with the detection of visual signals. Central
capacity theories would interpret this to
mean that the detection of auditory signals
makes greater demands on precessing re-
sources than does the detection of visual
signals and would predict that the same pat-
tern of results should be obtained when the
visual image task was combined with each
of the signal detection tasks. In fact, exactly
the opposite result was obtained.
The general position is that central capac-
ity interference theories are embarrassed
when the performance of a given task is dis-
rupted more than the performance of an-
other one by pairing either of them with a
third task but is disrupted less by a fourth
task. The natural inclination in such cases is
to assume the existence of relatively specific
processing mechanisms, rather than a single
general capacity. With respect to the data of
Segal and Fusella (1970), the most plausible
explanation is that visual perception and
visual imagery share common structures
and mechanisms, as do auditory perception
and auditory imagery.
One of the reasons for the popularity of
central capacity interference models is that
they usually provide a simple explanation of
dual-task performance. Whenever two con-
current tasks interfere with each other, we
can argue that this is due to competition for
a limited general-purpose central capacity
or attention. In contrast, if two tasks are per-
formed together without disruption, then
the conclusion is that one or both of the
42 Theories of Processing Resources
tasks must be data limited or automatic. It is
only when additional task combinations are
considered (as in the work of Segal and Fu-
sella 1970, or Treisman and Davies 1973)
that data obviously incompatible with the
central capacity approach can be obtained.
It has too often been assumed by propo-
nents of central capacity interference mod-
els that questions regarding the limitations
of performance of two or more concurrent
tasks are essentially the same as questions
concerned with the limitations of attention.
The only measure of limited attentional ca-
pacity is often mutual interference between
two tasks, with this interference being 'ex-
plained' in terms of limited attentional ca-
pacity! Some of the problems associated
with the use of the dual-task paradigm as a
way of demonstrating capacity limitations
are discussed in detail by Duncan (1980).
Specific interference effects have led
some theorists (e.g. Allport et al. 1972) to
postulate the existence of mUltiple channels
or mechanisms. However, a strict model of
this type seems inadequate in view of the
fact that processes using the same mecha-
nisms often interfere with each other but sel-
dom block each other completely. Navon
and Gopher (1979) proposed instead a mul-
tiple capacity or resource theory. According
to this theory, auditory imagery interferes
more with auditory signal detection than
with visual signal detection because the for-
mer pair of tasks has more types of required
resources in common than the latter pair.
Fig. 3.6. The four kinds of resources in-
volved in the concurrent performance of
two tasks x and y. (Navon and Gopher
1979)
The basic notions of their theory were ex-
pressed in the following words by Navon
and Gopher (1979): "Not only can the pro-
cessing system as a whole be involved in
several activities in variable~proportions but
a specific mechanism or modality is not ne-
cessarily dominated by one process exclu-
sively but instead can accommodate more
than one process at the expense of quality or
speed of performance ... Each channel may
have its own capacity (which is, roughly, the
limit on the amount of information that can
be stored, transmitted, or processed by the
channel at a unit of time)" (p. 233).
According to multiple resource theory,
the concurrent performance of two tasks
(x and y) involves four categories of re-
sources (see Fig. 3.6):
1. resources that can be used by task x but
not by task y;
2. those resources that can be used by both
tasks;
3. resources that can be used by task y but
not by task x;
4. resources that are irrelevant to both tasks.
If either or b9th of the tasks can be per-
formed with various combinations of re-
sources, the optimal strategy is to minimize
the extent to which the same resources are
involved in the two tasks. Indeed, if there is
no overlap in the resources required by each
task, then it should be possible to perform
the tasks in parallel.
Gopher and Navon (1979) argued that
their theory led to an alternative interpreta-

tion of observations suggesting that capaci-
ty is elastic and grows as the processing load
increases. It may simply be that a new task
added to an old one is often able to utilize
formerly unused resources because of dis-
similarities in the resources required by the
two tasks. The high arousal typically asso-
ciated with a heavy processing load may
reflect the stress produced by the processing
requirements rather than an increase in pro-
cessing capacity.
It is obvious that the theorizing of Navon
and Gopher (1979) is still at a very early
stage of development. While they made a
strong case for the general multiple resource
approach, their failure to specify the num-
ber and nature of the various resources
means that their theory is not logically falsi-
fiable. However, they suggested that this
omission could be rectified by pairing each
of a number of tasks with each other. Pro-
vided that a sufficiently variegated set of
tasks were used, it could be assumed that
every type of resource would be competed
for by at least two tasks. Interference data
from all of the task combinations could then
be used to identify the major resources used
in information processing.
3.5 Conclusions
There has been a tremendous explosion in
the number of theories of attention and
processing resources proposed in recent
years. In this chapter, and the previous one,
we have considered ten of them and that
number could have been doubled without
any difficulty. Fortunately enough, in terms
of not overtaxing the reader's attentional ca-
pacity, there does seem to be a substantial
overlap of ideas among these theories. In
addition, there are only a limited number of
key findings that need to be extracted from
the plethora of experimental data. Four of
these crucial findings, together with the the-
oretical explanation which seems most ap-
Conclusions 43
propriate, are discussed in the remainder of
this chapter.
3.5.1 Dual-Task Performance:
Non-Specific Interference
The basic notion that two inputs sharing
the same limited capacity system might in-
terfere with each other was initially put for-
ward by the biologist Loeb and then tested
empirically by his student Jeannette Welch
(1898). She used a standard secondary task
(maximal hand grip) and combined it with a
variety of primary tasks such as calculation
and reading. Her argument was that one
could use the degree of interference with the
secondary task as an index of the attentional
demands of the primary task.
In the years since then, this basic tech-
nique has been applied extensively in sever-
al different ways. One application has been
to work on the psychological refractory pe-
riod in which two stimuli occurring very
closely together in time require separate re-
sponses. Another example is the paradigm
used by Johnston and Heinz (1978), involv-
ing a simple reaction time subsidiary task to
ascertain expended processing capacity on
the primary task.
One of the most impressive findings from
a theoretical point of view is the extent to
which apparently dissimilar activities inter-
fere with each other. Welch, for example,
found that performance of the physical
hand grip task was impaired when it was
combined with purely mental activities. In
similar vein, Earl Hunt (personal communi-
cation) has used a hand-steadiness task in
which the subject is simply told to keep his
or her hand still between two metal plates.
When this task is combined with items taken
from an intelligence test, it is performed
progressively worse as the test items become
more difficult. A final example is the study
by Watkins et al. (1973) discussed earlier in
the chapter; they found that visual tracking.
interfered with verbal short-term memory.
The implication of such findings is that
there is some non-specific resource of limit-
44 Theories of Processing Resources
ed capacity that is importantly involved in
the performance of an enormous variety of
tasks and in the co-ordination of two con-
current tasks. This resource has been de-
scribed in a number of ways; Posner (1978)
called it 'conscious attention', Baddeley and
Hitch (1974) referred to it as a 'modality-
free central processor', Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) described it as 'controlled
processing' and Johnston and Heinz (1978)
referred to 'expended processing capacity'.
3.5.2 Dual-Task Peiformance: Specific
Inteiference
Some theorists have used the data from
dual-task studies as strong evidence for the
existence of a general processing resource
(i.e. attention). However, other theorists
have quite correctly pointed out that the
same data also indicate that this view must
be regarded as a substantial over-simplifica-
tion.
The kind of result that is especially em-
barrassing for a theory postulating only a
single non-specific resource of limited ca-
pacity can be illustrated most simply by con-
sidering two primary task (P 1 and P2) and
two secondary tasks (S 1 and S 2). Initially,
we pair P 1 with S 1 and P2 with S 1, and we
discover that P 1 interferes more with the
performance of S 1 than P2 does. Central
capacity theorists would interpret this result
as meaning that P 1 requires more of the
limited attentional capacity than does P2.
That conclusion leads to the prediction that
PI should also interfere with the perform-
ance of S 2 to a greater extent than P 2. If it
turns out that PI interferes significantly less
than P 2 with the performance of S 2, then a
simple central capacity theory cannot ex-
plain the data.
So far, we have simply described a hypo-
thetical state of affairs. In fact, there are
now several studies in the literature demon-
strating precisely this kind of interaction in-
volving two pairs of tasks. We have already
discussed the study by Segal and Fusella
(1970). Treisman and Davies (1973) report-
ed that monitoring tasks interfered much
more with each other when stimuli were pre-
sented in the same sense modality (visual or
auditory) than when they were presented in
different modalities. A number of other rele-
vant studies are discussed by Navon and
Gopher (1979).
Is mixed modality presentation always
superior to single modality presentation
when it comes to performing two concurrent
tasks? Not necessarily, according to the
views expressed by Treisman and Davies
(1973). They argued that separate visual and
auditory processing capacity exists for phys-
ical analysis of inputs but that only shared
capacity was available for semantic analy-
sis. According to this viewpoint, recall of si-
multaneously presented pairs of words
should be superior when the words within
each pair are presented in different modali-
ties (i.e. one visually and one auditorily)
than when they are in the same modality (i.e.
both presented visually or auditorily), pro-
vided that the words are analysed at the
physical level. If the words are processed se-
mantically, then recall should be the same
irrespective of whether or not the same or
different modalities are used. In fact, Mar-
tin (1980) discovered that there was indeed a
larger advantage of mixed-modality presen-
tation for physical analysis than for seman-
tic analysis (see Fig. 3.7), but there was still
some advantage for semantic analysis.
These findings suggest that at least some
central processing capacity is modality spe-
cific in nature.
Theoretically, these findings obviously
indicate the necessity for postulating a num-
ber of specific resources or mechanisms,
over and above a non-specific attentional
resource. As Navon and Gopher (1979)
pointed out, the available data are quite in-
sufficient to permit accurate identification
of these specific resources. However, it is
fairly clear that there are a number of mo-
dality-specific processing resources. It may
well be that the articulatory loop (a tempo-
rary holding mechanism for verbal informa-
tion) exemplifies a specific processing re-

z
0 65
~
z
w 60
~
W ANALYSIS
D:
~ 55
z
w
U
w 50
D:
11.
Fig. 3.7. Recall as a function of depth of
analysis and of presentation modality.
(Martin 1980)
source, and there may be analogous holding
mechanisms for other kinds ofinformation.
3.5.3 The Effects of Practice
Professional psychologists and laymen have
long known that practice can produce
large effects on performance, and the thou-
sands of hours of training undergone by out-
standing sportsmen and wom~n in order to
perfect their skills bear testimony to the ac-
curacy of that viewpoint. However, it is true
to say that the recent work of Posner and
Snyder (1975a), Shiffrin and Schneider
(1977) and others has demonstrated that the
effects of practice on information process-
ing are much more dramatic and profound
than !lad previously been supposed.
We have seen that there is some ambigui-
ty about the appropriate criteria for decid-
ing that automaticity has occurred, but there
is little doubt that fairly complicated pro-
cesses can occur entirely outside of con-
scious awareness. A plausible conceptuali-
zation of the organization of the attentional
system involves the postulation of a hierar-
chical structure of processes, with the cen-
tral processor at the top of the hierarchy and
more specific processing resources below it.
The position of any processing system with-
in the hierarchy is determined by two major
criteria: (1) the generality-specificity of the
processing system and (2) the degree of au-
tomaticity of the processing system. Rela-
Conclusions 45
70 PHYSICAL
ANALYSIS
SEMANTIC
L I I
SINGLE MIXED
PRESENTATION MODALITY
tively general and non-automatic processes
appear towards the top of the hierarchy, and
specific, automatic processes occur at the
bottom. As a rule of thumb, the location in
the hierarchy of the processes involved in
the performance of a task can be assessed by
a series of dual-task experiments in which
the task is paired with several others: high-
er-level processes will more consistently
produce interference than will low-level
processes.
Since higher-level processes are more
widely deployed than lower-level processes,
and since they are also more susceptible to
interference, they can be regarded as espe-
cially useful and valuable. Practice plays a
vital role in reducing the congestion at the
higher levels of the hierarchy. It accom-
plishes this by permitting tasks to be carried
out increasingly by lower-level processing
systems as training proceeds.
3.5.4 The Central Processor:
Rigidity Versus Flexibility
The pioneering attention theorists such as
Broadbent, Deutsch and Deutsch and Treis-
man were all in some sense attempting to lo-
cate the bottleneck in information process-
ing. It was assumed that a limited capacity
attentional system was responsible for the
bottleneck and that it was valuable to track
down the precise point at which the central
processor was located.
46 Theories of Processing Resources
Subsequent research has indicated that this
was too rigid a conceptualization. Bothle-
necks in different tasks do not necessarily
occur at the same point in the stream of in-
formation processing. Several contempo-
rary theorists of otherwise very different
persuasions agree that the central processor
is used in a remarkably flexible way and can
be employed to facilitate processing at virtu-
ally any stage of information processing.
The central processor resembles a trou-
ble-shooter in a number of respects. It ap-
pears to be responsive to indications that
some lower-level process is experiencing
difficulty. For example, walking is usually
largely controlled by lower-level processes.
However, if walking poses unusual prob-
lems (e.g. because of a limp or while des-
cending very steep steps), then the central
processor can be used to facilitate walking
by attending closely to the taking of each
step.
The central processor possesses a number
of important characteristics in addition to
flexibility. As virtually everyone has as-
sumed, the central processor appears to
have relatively limited capacity, and this as-
sumption is buttressed by the widespread
interference effects obtained in the dual-
task paradigm. As Kahneman (1973) has ar-
gued, the full resources of the central pro-
cessor are rarely used in everyday life. The
central processor is responsive to the de-
mands made on it and supplies attentional
resources commensurate with the demands.
It is only when substantial demands for at-
tentional capacity are imposed by a task that
its total resources will be used.
3.5.5 A Sketch-Map of the Processing
System
The basic theoretical assumption is that
there is a hierarchical system of processes or
capacities involved in information process-
ing. Higher-level processes are general and
non-automatic, whereas lower-level pro-
cesses are relatively specific and automatic.
Practice enables a task to be performed by
processes further down the hierarchy than is
possible without training.
There is a central processor at the top of
the hierarchy. This central processor is used
in a very flexible way to assist lower-level
processes, and it also has its own special
functions (e.g. transformation of informa-
tion and executive decision making). It is
characterized by limited capacity, and its
functional capacity at any given time, is de-
termined by the demands placed on it.
This theoretical position is to be contrast-
ed with the notion that only one processing
resource (i.e. attentional capacity) needs to
be postulated. That notion is refuted by the
evidence for specific interference effects.
Another theoretical possibility is that there
are many capacities limiting performance
but that none of them can be identified un-
iquely with attention. Such a system is hetar-
chic, with different capacities assuming ex-
ecutive control in different tasks (Treisman
1969). The substantial evidence from dual-
task studies that a single resource plays a
dominant part in a vast range of processing
tasks seems to favour a hierarchical system
rather than one based on hetarchic control.
4 Theories of Arousal and Performance
The emphasis in contemporary ap-
proaches to attention and performance, as
we saw in the previous two chapters, is very
much on theoretical constructs of a cogni-
tive nature. However, it seems probable,
both in terms of everyday experience and
the relevant experimental evidence, that the
physiological state of the organism while
engaged in information processing is im-
portant and ought to be considered.
Early theoretical positions emphasized
only one side of the interrelationship be-
tween physiological state and task perform-
ance, namely, the effect of a greater or lesser
level of physiological arousal on an individ-
ual's ability to perform efficiently. How-
ever, it is equally important to consider the
effects of performing a task on physiologi-
cal activity. If you look into a mirror while
attempting to solve a difficult problem in
mental arithmetic (e.g. multiplying 69 by
17), you will find that your pupil will dilate
and there will be several other less ob-
servable physiological effects. It is only
comparatively recently that serious attempts
have been made to account for such effects
in a systematic way.
This chapter considers some of the main
theoretical approaches that have attempted
to explain the bi-directional effects of phys-
iological states on information processing,
and vice versa. The relevant theories are dis-
cussed more or less in their actual historical
sequence; the main reason for doing this is
that it facilitates an understanding of the
ways in which ideas in this area have dev-
eloped over the years.
4.1 The Yerkes-Dodson Law
The first attempt to provide a simple gen-
eralization that would be of wide applicabil-
ity to the very complex and apparently in-
consistent findings on arousal and perform-
ance was made by Yerkes and Dodson as far
back as 1908. They proposed what has since
been referred to as the Yerkes-Dodson law,
consisting of two crucial assumptions. First-
ly, it was assumed that there was an invert-
ed- U relationship between the level of ten-
sion, motivation or arousal on the one hand
and performance on the other, with per-
formance efficiency being optimal at some
moderate level of arousal; secondly,
strength of motivation or arousal was as-
sumed to interact with task difficulty in such
a way that the optimal level of arousal was
inversely related to task difficulty. The pre-
dicted relationships among arousal, task
difficulty and efficiency of performance are
shown in Fig. 4.1.
In their 1908 study, Yerkes and Dodson
used mice as subjects, aversive drive was
provided by electric shock and task diffi-
culty was defined in terms of ease of discri-
mination along a brightness dimension. The
pattern of results which they obtained re-
sembles that shown in Fig. 4.1 and has been
replicated in most respects in several other
studies manipulating arousal and task diffi-
culty in very variegated ways (see Broad-
hurst 1959).
The strength of the experimental support
for the Yerkes- Dodson law can be evaluated
most straightforwardly by taking the two as-
48 Theories of Arousal and Performance
>-
u
""'--',
/
z I
w /
U TASK /
LL /
LL / arousal, task difficulty
W /
;~ /
/ """
~,
AROUSAL
sumptions of the law separately. The main
problem with the first assumption is that it is
quite difficult to disprove the predicted in-
verted-U relationship between arousal and
performance. If, as in many studies, three
levels of arousal are compared, there are six
possible orderings of these three levels with
respect to performance. Only two of these
orderings are inconsistent with the Yerkes-
Dodson law (the medium level of arousal
cannot be associated with the worst level of
performance). In other words, two-thirds of
studies investigating this assumption of the
Yerkes-Dodson law with three arousal lev-
els would obtain supportive evidence by
chance alone!
The position is much better if four differ-
ent points along the arousal continuum are
sampled; there are 24 possible orderings of
four conditions with respect to perform-
ance, 16 of which are inconsistent with the
inverted-U function. Unfortunately, very
few studies have used four or more different
levels of arousal.
There is rather more convincing evidence
that the optimal level of arousal is inversely
related to task difficulty. A thorough exami-
nation of the anxiety literature by one of my
students, Kathy Cohen, uncovered approxi-
mately 50 studies looking at the effects of
anxiety on two or more tasks of varying dif-
ficulty (usually paired-associate learning).
The Yerkes-Dodson law would tend to be
supported if anxiety interacted with task dif-
ficulty in such a Way that high anxiety had a
greater detrimental effect on hard than on
easy tasks. This interaction was not statisti-
cally significant in 30 experiments; it was
\
,
\
Fig. 4.1. The anticipated
\
,, relationship among
,
and performance effi-
ciency according to the
" Yerkes-Dodson law
(1908)
significant and in line with the Yerkes-Dod-
son law in 22 experiments, and the 'reverse'
interaction was significant in two experi-
ments.
It is probably true to say that there has
been more support for the Yerkes-Dodson
law when arousal has been produced by
aversive stimulation rather than by incen-
tives. The usual finding with incentives is
that there is no interaction between incen-
tive conditions and task difficulty (M. W.
Eysenck, in preparation; Wilkinson et al.
1972; Willett 1964a).
This apparent discrepancy in the effects
of anxiety and incentives on performance
highlights one of the problems with the
Yerkes- Dodson law. It is difficult to define
'arousal' in an unequivocal way, and it is
probably very misleading to assume that
such diverse methods of producing arousal
as monetary incentives and threat of electric
shock affect performance in comparable
ways. Some of the evidence supporting this
viewpoint will be discussed in later chap-
ters.
A further problem with the Yerkes-Dod-
son law is that it is not entirely clear how the
dimension of task difficulty can best be con-
ceptualized. Kahneman (1973) has suggest-
ed that difficult tasks require greater mental
effort or attentional capacity than easy
tasks. He reviewed a number of studies in
which physiological measurements (possi-
bly reflecting mental effort) were taken dur-
ing the performance of tasks of varying
complexity. The consistent finding was that
more effort or arousal appeared to be invest-
ed in the performance of relatively difficult

tasks. Some of this evidence is discussed in
Chap. I.
The Yerkes-Dodson law indicates that for
successful performance an individual's lev-
el of arousal should become progressively
lower the more difficult and demanding the
task involved. However, the findings re-
ferred to in the previous paragraph indicate
that people in fact exert more effort and be-
come more aroused as task difficulty in-
creases. There is an apparent paradox here,
in that the typical reaction to increased task
complexity ought to be counter-productive
according to the Yerkes-Dodson law. How-
ever, this paradox disappears if it is argued
that effort differs from other manifestations
of arousal in usually being positively related
to the quality of performance.
A further inadequacy with the Yerkes-
Dodson law is the assumption that perform-
ance efficiency can be assessed properly by
a single, global, behavioural measure. In
many cases, it is relatively meaningless to
say that arousal has increased or decreased
performance efficiency; this becomes clear
when two or more behavioural measures are
calculated, and a complex pattern emerges.
An example of such a pattern was obtained
by Hamilton et al. (1977). They found that
intense white noise increased the speed with
which simple transformations could be
made on a letter transformation task but re-
duced the ability to retain the products of
previous processing at the same time. The
utilization of any global estimate of per-
formance efficiency would clearly represent
an over-simplification, since noise led to in-
creased efficiency for certain aspects of the
task but to decreased efficiency for other
aspects.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Yerkes-
Dodson law merely refers to predicted in-
terrelationships among arousal, task diffi-
culty and performance efficiency. While the
law has received some empirical support, it
provides no indication of the appropriate
theoretical explanation of the various in-
terrelationships. Accordingly, the Yerkes-
Dodson law at best describes certain pre-
dicted patterns of results but is uninforma-
Easterbrook's Hypothesis 49
tive with respect to the underlying mechan-
isms and processes.
4.2 Easterbrook's Hypothesis
One of the most prevalent views concern-
ing the effects of arousal on performance
has been that they are mediated by atten-
tional mechanisms. More specifically, it has
often been assumed that heightened arousal
has a substantial effect on attentional selec-
tivity. The best-known exponent of this po-
sition is Easterbrook, who argued in 1959
that states of high emotionality, arousal and
anxiety all produce comparable effects on
cue utilization. There is a progressive reduc-
tion in the range of cues used as arousal in-
creases, which "will reduce the proportion
of irrelevant cues employed, and so improve
performance. When all irrelevant cues have
been excluded, however, ... further reduc-
tion in the number of cues employed can on-
ly affect relevant cues, and proficiency will
fall" (p. 193).
One of the advantages of Easterbrook's
formulation is that it provides a potential
explanation for the inverse relationship be-
tween the optimal level of arousal and task
difficulty. If difficult tasks involve a greater
number of relevant cues than do easy tasks,
then attentional narrowing under high
arousal will disrupt the performance of dif-
ficult tasks more readily than the perform-
ance of simple tasks.
Walley and Weiden (1973,1974) attempt-
ed to develop some of Easterbrook's ideas,
and they proposed a speculative mechanism
whereby arousal might produce a reduction
in cue utilization. They claimed that pattern
recognition was accomplished via a hierar-
chical network of feature analysers and that
encoding represented the function of the
highest level of the pattern recognition net-
work. Encoding is potentially a parallel pro-
cess, so that more than one input can be en-
coded concurrently.
In practice, however, the encoding of one
50 Theories of Arousal and Performance
input tends to interfere with the concurrent
encoding of any additional inputs; they re-
ferred to this interference effect as 'cogni-
tive masking'. They argued that cognitive in-
terference was due to inhibitory interactions
among cortical neurons at the highest levels
of the hierarchical pattern recognizers. One
of the major determinants of cognitive
masking is the degree of similarity of the
processes involved in encoding the various
inputs: the greater the similarity, the more
the cognitive masking that occurs. Of more
immediate relevance, Walley and Wei den
also argued that increments in arousal pro-
duce increased cognitive masking, the rea-
son being that the degree of lateral inhibi-
tion in the cortex is related to arousal. As a
consequence, while shared or parallel pro-
cessing would be possible at low levels of
arousal, it would become decreasingly so as
arousal increased.
At the physiological level, Walley and
Weiden claimed that arousal produced an
amalgam of excitatory and inhibitory ef-
fects. Steriade (1970) discussed a number of
studies dealing with the responsiveness of
the cortex and the thalamus during states of
high arousal. He concluded that although
there is some facilitation of thalamic excit-
ability during arousal, a state of tonic arous-
al is associated with reduced cortical re-
sponsiveness.
Demetrescu et al. (1965) found that arous-
al based on activity in the brain stem reticu-
lar formation produced a combination offa-
cilitatory and inhibitory effects on the re-
sponsiveness of the cortex. There was some
evidence for a diffuse ascending inhibitory
system originating in the ventral pontine re-
ticular formation. This system activates an
intracortical inhibitory network which is ex-
cited by specific input to the cortex and
which may be responsible for cognitive
masking.
The crucial assumption that high arousal
produces attentional narrowing has usally
been tested by using a paradigm in which a
main or primary task and a secondary or in-
cidental task are performed concurrently.
The natural prediction from Easterbrook's
hypothesis is that high arousal will increase
the attentional bias towards the primary
task at the expense of the secondary task
and thus impair performance on the secon-
dary task. This result was obtained in many
of the studies reviewed by Easterbrook
(1959).
In most of these studies, it is not clear
whether the performance decrement under
high arousal is due to an actual attenuation
of sensitivity of the processing system or
whether it reflects an increase in the re-
sponse criterion (Le. greater cautiousness of
responding). Bacon (1974) asked subjects to
perform a pursuit rotor tracking task and an
auditory signal-detection task at the same
time. Arousal was manipulated by electric
shocks, and performance on the two tasks
was analyzed by the measures of signal de-
tection theory. As is implied by Easter-
brook's hypothesis, the decrement in per-
formance on the subsidiary task under high
arousal resulted from a reduction in sensi-
tivity rather than from an increase in the re-
sponse criterion.
Bacon (1974) also found that high arousal
only impaired performance on the subsidi-
ary task when there was a delay of a few sec-
onds between stimulus presentation and re-
port. This indicates that there is a reduction
in the ability to 'hold' information in states
of high arousal and suggests that arousal
may reduce working memory capacity.
One unfortunate feature of Easterbrook's
(1959) hypothesis is that there are in fact
three rather different patterns of results
which are all consistent with the notion that
arousal produces increased attentional se-
lectivity. An improvement in performance
of the main task coupled with an impair-
ment of performance on the subsidiary task
under high arousal clearly suggests a re-al-
location of attention, as does improved
main-task performance combined with no
effect on the subsidiary task or no effect on
the main task in conjunction with impaired
performance on the subsidiary task. Overall,
there are nine possible combinations of
main-task and subsidiary-task performance,
only three of which are clearly incompatible

with Easterbrook's hypothesis; in those
cases, arousal either has a less detrimental
effect or a greater enhancing effect on the
subsidiary task than on the main task.
A summary of the various findings from
experimental tests of Easterbrook's hypothe-
sis is given in Table 4.1. It can be seen that well
over half of the published studies produced
patterns of results in line with the hypothesis.
However, it is clear that there are interesting
differences among the various methods of
producing arousal. Ifwe consider main-task
performance on its own, then electric shock
enhanced performance in 0% of the studies
(0 out of 10), and anxiety improved per-
formance in 10 % (lout of 10). In contrast,
incentives improved main-task perform-
ance 40% of the time (6 out of 15) and noise
enhanced performance 30% of the time
(5 out of 17).
The various methods of manipulating
arousal also have rather variable effects on
Easterbrook's Hypothesis 51
subsidiary-task performance. Anxiety and
shock both produced a significantly detri-
mental effect on the secondary task in be-
tween 70% and 80% of the experiments in
which they were used; for incentive and
noise the figure is under 50%.
Thus the modal finding with respect to
anxiety and electric shock is no effect of
these factors on the main task combined
with impairment of the subsidiary task. In
contrast, incentive often leads to improved
performance on the main task combined
with no effect or a performance decrement
on subsidiary task performance.
At the very least, these data suggest that it
may be unwise to follow Easterbrook in em-
phasizing the similarity of the effects on du-
al-task performance produced by various
arousing or stressful factors. One way of
conceptualizing the different behavioural
patterns induced by these various arousal
agents is to argue that high anxiety and elec-

Table 4.1. Effects of arousal on dual-task performance

Shock

Effect of
arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Main Other

Bacon (1974) Tracking Signal detection N.S. X

Bacon (1974) Signal detection Tracking N.S. N.S.
Kohn(l954) Relevant recall Irrelevant recall N.S. X
McNamara and Fisch (1964) Serial learning Irrelevant recall N.S. X
Reeves and Bergum (1972) Light detection Light detection N.S. N.S.
Silverman (1954) Line discrimination Incidental learning X X
Silverman and Blitz (1956) Intentional learning Incidental learning N.S. N.S.
Tecce and Tamell (1965) MotorR.T. RetumR.T. N.S. X
Thornton and Powell (1974) PAleaming Incidental learning N.S. X
Wachtel (1968) Tracking R.T. N.S. X

Anxiety

Effect of arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Scale Main Other

Eysenck and Eysenck Intentional learning Incidental learning EPI-N N.S. X

(unpuhl.) EPI-E
Kausler, Trapp and Brewer Serial learning Incidental learning MAS + X
(1959)
Markowitz (1969) Intentional learning Incidental learning R-S N.S. N.S.
Miller and Dost(1964) Word sorting Incidental learning MAS N.S. X
Silverman and Blitz (1956) Intentional learning Incidental learning MAS N.S. X
52 Theories of Arousal and Performance

Table 4.1 (Continued)

Effect of
arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Main Other

Wachtel (1968) Tracking R.T. TAS N.S. N.S.

Weltman and Egstrom Detection Detection Diving N.S. X
(1966)
Weltman, Smith and Visual acuity Detection Sim.press. N.S. X
Egstrom (1971)
Wolk and DuCette (1974) Typographical error Content recall L.c. X X
detection
Wolk and DuCette (1974) Intentional learning Incidental learning L.C. X X

Incentive

Effect of
arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Main Other

Bahrick (1954) Serial learning Colour learning + X

Bahrick, Fitts and Rankin Tracking Light detection + X
(1952)
C~hen, Telegdy, Laroche Concept classification Concept classification N.S. N.S.
arid Getz (1973)
Davies and Jones (1975) Serial learning Location lea~ing + N.S.
(incidental)
Dixon and Cameron (1976) Serial learning Colour learning N.S. +
Dornbush (1965) Intentional learning Incidental learning + N.S.
Dornbush (1965) Intentional recall Incidental recognition N.S. N.S.
Johnson and Thomson Intentional recall Incidental recognition N.S. X
(1962)
Johnson and Thomson Intentional learning Incidental recognition N.S. N.S.
(1962)
Kausler, Laughlin and Serial learning Colour learning + +
Trapp (1963)
Kausler and Trapp (1962) Serial learning Incidental learning N.S. N.S.
McNamara and Fisch (1964) Serial learning Incidental recall N.S. N.S.
Rubin, Shantz and Smock Form retention Form retention + X
(1962)
Wolk and DuCette (1974) Typographical error Content recall N.S. +
detection
Wolk and DuCette (1974) Typographical error Content recall N.S. X
detection
Noise

Effect of
arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Main Other

Bell (1978) Tracking Number detection N.S. X

Boggs and Simon (1968) Reaction time Number detection N.S. X
Cohen and Lezak (1977) Free recall Incidental learning N.S. X
Davies and Jones (1975) Serial learning Location learning N.S. X
(incidental)
Finkelman and Glass Tracking Short-term memory N.S. N.S.
(1970; predictable noise)
Finkelman and Glass Tracking Short-term memory N.S. X
(1970; unpredictable noise)
 Easterbrook's Hypothesis 53
Table4.1. (Continued)
Effect of
arousal
Researchers Main task Other task Main Other

Forster and Grierson Tracking Light detection N.S. N.S.

(1978; 4 exps.)
Hartley (1981) Tracking Light detection X N.S.
Hockey (1970a) Tracking Light detection + N.S.
Hockey (1970b) Tracking Light detection + X
(unbiased probs)
Hockey (1970c) Tracking Light detection + N.S.
(biased probs)
Hockey, Dornicand Intentional learning Incidental learning + N.S.
Hamilton (unpubl.)
Hockey and Hamilton Serial learning Location learning + X
(1970) (incidental)
O'Malley and Poplawsky Serial learning Incidental learning N.S. X
(1971)

EPI = Eysenck Personality Inventory; MAS = Manifest Anxiety Scale; TAS = Test Anxiety Scale;
Sim. press. = simulated pressure; L.c. = Locus of Control; R-S = Repression-Sensitization Scale;
R.T. = reaction time; PA = paired-associate; + = arouser significantly improved performance;
N.S. = arouser had no significant effect on performance; X = arouser significantly impaired perform-
ance.

tric shock both lead to increased attentional
selectivity and reduced attentional capacity
with respect to the performance tasks,
whereas incentive increases attentional se-
lectivity without necessarily reducing atten-
tional capacity.
It should be pointed out that several of
the studies summarized in Table 4.1 may
not in fact be as relevant to the issue of the
effects of arousal on attentional selectivity
as their authors suggested. The subsidiary
task often involved incidental learning;
since the test for incidental learning typical-
ly occurred several seconds or minutes after
the relevant stimulus material had been pre-
sented, there can be no unequivocal inter-
pretation of the data. Reduced incidental
learning is clearly consistent with increased
attentional selectivity favouring the main
task, but storage, consolidation, and retrie-
val processes may all be implicated.
There is a further amlJiguity about these
findings. It is important to know whether
the poor incidental learning under high
arousal occurred because aroused subjects
chose not to process the irrelevant stimuli or
because they could not process them due to
limited attentional capacity. Subjects must
be instructed to attempt to perform the sub-
sidiary task in order to make the interpreta-
tion of the data unequivocal.
Easterbrook's notion that heightened
arousal produces greater attentional selec-
tivity provides a valuable point of depar-
ture. However, it leaves certain key issues
unresolved. Why does arousal have this ef-
fect on attention? Easterbrook (1959) re-
garded the basic phenomenon of attentional
narrowing under high arousal as reflecting
the operation of a relatively passive and au-
tomatic process. However, it is more reason-
able to view attentional narrowing as an ac-
tive coping response, i.e. under those cir-
cumstances in which the total information-
processing demands cannot be handled by
the available processing capacity, people
may decide to restrict attention voluntarily
to a small number of information sources.
In other words, increased attentional selec-
tivity may be only a probable, rather than an
inevitable, consequence of heightened
aro·usal.
54 Theories of Arousal and Performance
A detailed consideration of Easterbrook's
hypothesis indicates that it makes a number
of somewhat bizarre predictions. The hypo-
thesis implies that tired, bored and listless
people in a state of low arousal who are
slumped in front of a television set are suf-
fering from an excessive openness to experi-
ence! It is surely necessary to consider the
effects of arousal not only on attentional se-
lectivity but also on attentional capacity; it
makes intuitive sense to argue that people
who are bored and listless are operating un-
der conditions of reduced attentional capac-
ity.
Another curious prediction concerns the
effects of anxiety on attention. Easterbrook
(1959) implies that high anxiety impairs per-
formance because it leads to intense concen-
tration on some, rather than all, of the task
elements. Common sense, as well as much
of the available evidence, indicates that the
effect of high anxiety is exactly the oppo-
site: anxious individuals find it unusually
difficult to concentrate on the task in hand.
Anxious subjects report that they spend a
smaller percentage of the available time
than non-anxious subjects attending to the
task (Deffenbacher 1978), and they also
seem to engage in more off-task glancing
(Nottelman & Hill 1977).
A second strange prediction concerning
the effects of anxiety on attentional pro-
cesses is that high-anxiety subjects should
be less distractible than low-anxiety sub-
jects. While the avialable data are rather in-
consistent, there is evidence in some studies
(e.g. Dornic 1977; Pallak et al. 1975) that
anxiety can lead to increased rather than de-
creased distractibility. Pallak et al. found
that anxious subjects performed the Stroop
test (a naming task in which each colour
name is printed in ink of a different colour,
such as 'red' printed in green) better than
non-anxious subjects under low distraction
but performed it wor~e under high distrac-
tion.
Easterbrook's hypothesis has been ex-
tremely influential and has been used as the
basis for several subsequent theories. In es-
sence, arousal usually does lead to in-
creased attentional selectivity, but several
additional theoretical assumptions need to
be made in order to account for the data.
4.3 Broadbent: Decision and Stress
Broadbent's (1971) theory has several im-
portant things to say about the effects of
arousal on performance, so that it will only
be possible to discuss a few of the main
points here. He argued that it was valuable
to carry out studies in which two stressors or
arousing agents are applied singly and to-
gether. If the combined effects on perform-
ance of the two stressors substantially ex-
ceed pure additivity, one can conclude that
both stressors are affecting the same me-
chanism in the same way. In other words,
predictable interactions between stressors
can strengthen the argument that they are
affecting the processing system in the same
way.
This strategy fairly often suggests the ex-
istence of a general factor of arousal, but
there are sufficient exceptions to indicate
that more than one arousal mechanism must
be postulated. For example, Wilkinson and
Colquhoun (1968) used the five-choice seri-
al reaction task, and there were two stressors
(incentives provided by knowledge of re-
sults and alcohol). Incentives are known to
increase arousal, whereas alcohol is a corti-
cal depressant. It was accordingly predicted
that any impairment in performance under
alcohol would be due to suboptimal arousal
and thus would be reduced by incentives. In
fact, exactly the opposite result was ob-
tained, with incentives increasing the ad-
verse effect of alcohol.
The implication of this kind of finding is
that a single arousal mechanism is probably
insufficient. This is also suggested by a com-
parison of some of the effects of noise,
which increases arousal, and sleeplessness,
which decreases arousal. They are similar in
that prolonged work is necessary before
they show their effects but dissimilar in that

Fig. 4.2. Two hypothetical interrelated
arousal mechanisms: upper and lower.
INPUT
(Broadbent 1971)
the effects are quite different when they do
appear.
Further puzzling findings concern the ef-
fects of individual differences in introver-
sion-extraversion on performance. Intro-
verts are usually regarded as more cortically
aroused than extraverts (H. J. Eysenck
1967), and the effects of introversion-extra-
version appear to be closely related to the ef-
fects of time of day and circadian rhythms
of arousal. However, the effects of introver-
sion-extraversion are only tenuously related
to those of sleeplessness.
Broadbent (1971) suggested that many of
these anomalous findings could be account-
ed for by postulating two interrelated arous-
al mechanisms (see Fig. 4.2). The 'lower' me-
chanism is concerned with the execution of
well-established decision processes, and it is
this mechanism which is affected by noise
and by sleeplessness. Sleeplessness, which is
a low arousal state, produces very cautious
and unreactive decision criteria, whereas the
arousing agent noise leads to a very risky
and hyper-reactive state.
A crucial assumption is that the conse-
quences of inefficiency of the lower me-
chanism will not become manifest in per-
formance provided that the 'upper' mecha-
nism remains in an efficient state. The task
of the upper mechanism is to monitor and
alter the parameters of the lower mechanism
in order to maintain a given standard of per-
formance. Introversion-extraversion and al-
cohol may both affect the upper mechanism
rather than the lower mechanism.
This theory can account for the relative
independence of the effects of introversion-
extraversion and sleeplessness: the former
affects the upper mechanism, whereas the
latter affects the lower mechanism. The fai-
Broadbent: Decision and Stress 55
UPPER MECHANISM
which compensates
tor sub - or supra- ~
optimal activity of
lower mechanism
~
LOWER MECHANISM
(Affected by noise
and sleeplessness) OUTPUT
lure of either noise or sleeplessness to affect
performance at the start of the work period
is attributable to the efficient state of the up-
per mechanism at that time. Mter prolonged
monotonous work, the opposite effects of
noise and sleeplessness on performance be-
gin to appear because the developif).g ineffi-
ciency of the upper mechanism prevents ap-
propriate compensatory activity occurring.
The upper mechanism can compensate
much more readily for inefficiency of the
lower mechanism on unpaced tasks, where
the subject can make up for brief periods of
slow performance, than on paced tasks,
where he cannot do this. Mirsky and Ros-
void (1960) found that barbiturates (depres-
sant drugs which first affect cortical centres)
had more effect on the unpaced than on the
paced version of a task. This suggests that
barbiturates influence the upper mecha-
nism.
In contrast, Mirksy and Rosvold found
that tranquiliziers, which lower activity in
the brain stem, mainly affected the paced
version, and the same was true of sleepless-
ness. It may be that the effects of sleepless-
ness and of tranquilizers are mediated by
the lower mechanism.
One of the most interesting implications
of the theory proposed by Broadbent (al-
though not emphasized by him) is that
behavioural measures can be inadequate.
Precisely the same level of performance can
be achieved in two very different ways: effi-
cient functioning of the lower mechanism
combined with modest use of the upper me-
chanism or inefficient functioning of the
lower mechanism which is compensated for
by extensive involvement of the upper me-
chanism.
Broadbent (1971) agreed with Easter-
56 Theories of Arousal and Performance
brook (1959) that one of the major effects of
arousal is on attentional selectivity: "The
aroused system devotes a higher proportion
of its time to the intake of information from
dominant sources and less from relatively
minor ones" (p. 433). He also proposed that
noise, and perhaps other stressors, made
perceptual selection more difficult: "The
difficulty in noise is one of selecting one of
the stimuli present for reaction and ignoring
another, and not one of changes in response
bias causing performance to be inefficient"
(p.431).
The importance of perceptual selection
was suggested by the results of a number of
experiments. In one study, Broadbent and
Gregory (1965) presented a mixture of red
and white digits and asked for recall of the
digits presented in one of the colours. Noise
produced a deterioration in performance,
but this was reversed when subjects were
asked to recall the digits irrespective of col-
our.
Obviously, Broadbent hs made a number
of important contributions to our under-
standing of the effects of arousal on per-
formance. His distinction between upper
and lower mechanisms of arousal is espe-
cially interesting, because it sheds some
light on the often surprisingly small detri-
mental effects of stressors on performance.
4.4 Naatanen's Theory
Niiiitiinen (1973) addressed himself primari-
ly to the assertion that there is an opti-
mal level of activation or arousal for any
task, above which there is an impairment of
performance (Yerkes and Dodson 1908). It
has often been assumed that this perform-
ance decrement at high levels of arousal is
directly attributable to the level of arousal
per se. Niiiitiinen argued for a theoretical
position in which over-arousal is regarded
as impairing performance in a rather more
indirect fashion. In his own words, the over-
arousal effect is "an artifact of the change of
direction in behaviour farther and farther
away from that of the task at hand as 'activa-
tion' increases under conditions in which
deteriorating effect has been observed"
(p. 160).
What kinds offactors produce this shift in
the focus of behaviour away from the main
task? Niiiitiinen pointed out that arousal is
often produced by using a non-task source
of stimulation (e.g. intense white noise,
hand dynamometer) which may distract at-
tention. Anxiety reactions, intentional at-
tempts to try harder and divided attention
(Le. the subject simultaneously performing
the task and observing himself performing
the task) are all more likely to occur in states
of high activation; all of these factors will
interfere with task performance.
Mandler's (1975) explanation of the detri-
mental effects of high arousal on perform-
ance similarly argued that distraction
played a major role. He claimed that arousal
generated internal cues. As arousal in-
creases, more internal cues are created, and
there is an increasing tendency for the sub-
ject to pay attention to his own arousal cues
rather than to the task.
Niiiitiinen (1973) reported some empirical
findings which provided support for his the-
oretical viewpoint. Two activities had to be
performed at the same time: riding a bicycle
with an ergometer set at different power
levels and a simple reaction-time task. The
various cycling conditions produced sub-
stantial differences in arousal (as measured
by heart rate), with reaction-time lengthen-
ing considerably under the more arousing
conditions.
There are two possible kinds of explana-
tion of this result: (1) supra-optimal arousal
directly impaired performance or (2) the
more demanding cycling conditions led sub-
jects to direct more attention to the cycling
task and away from the reaction-time task,
producing an increasing divergence be-
tween the actual patterning of activation
and that required by the reaction-time task.
Niiiitiinen attempted to distinguish be-
tween these two explanations in a further
experiment. This time the cycling activity
immediately preceded the reaction-time

task but did not overlap with it in time. In
this experiment, there was no relationship
between arousal (heart rate) and reaction
time, in spite of the fact that heart rate had
been varied almost as much as possible in
the waking subject. Thus the impairment of
performance in the previous experiment
was probably due to the distracting effect of
the cycling task rather than to the intensity
of arousal.
Niiiitiinen (1973) concluded that there
had been far too much emphasis in previous
theories on the notion of arousal as a uni-di-
mensional measure varying only in intensi-
ty. There are important qualitative differ-
ences among activation states, so that an ex-
clusive focus on quantitative variations in
arousal is doomed to failure. Performance
of a task ultimately depends on the appropi-
rateness of the activation pattern of the or-
ganism with respect to that task's demands.
Niiiitiinen is right to argue that the detri-
mental effects of high arousal on perform-
ance have often been interpreted in grossly
over-simplified ways. There are undoubted-
ly many different reasons why high arousal
impairs performance, and he has delineated
some of the main factors. Furthermore, he is
probably correct in proposing that the quali-
tative patterning of arousal is a more conse-
quential determinant of performance than is
the quantitative or intensive aspect of arous-
al.
On the other hand, it is not immediately
obvious that there are no detrimental effects
of high arousal per se on the performance of
many tasks; for example, high arousal
seems incompatible with quiet and reflec-
o /
W /
-l
a..
a..
:::>
til
_.--.-;
>-
I- -'
U /
<{
a.. /
<{
U
Kahneman: Attention and Effort 57
tive thought. Another difficulty with
Niiiitiinen's views is their relative untestabil-
ity; it is unclear how one determines either a
subject's qualitative patterning of activation
or the optimal qualitative patterning for any
given task.
4.5 Kahneman: Attention and Effort
Kahneman (1973) proposed an interesting
theoretical framework which dealt with
some of the major interrelationships among
motivational, attentional and arousal pro-
cesses. He assumed that theories of atten-
tion must consider both the selectivity and
the intensity or capacity of attention and
that "the intensive aspect of attention corre-
sponds to effort" (p. 4). The amount of ca-
pacity or effort supplied to the task is deter-
mined primarily by the evaluation of de-
mands at a cognitive level. Task difficulty
will typically play the main role in determin-
ing effort, but incentive or motivational fac-
tors may also be involved.
Some important aspects of Kahneman's
theorizing are shown in Fig. 4.3. Effort in-
creases fairly steadily as the processing
demands of the main or primary task
increase due to greater task difficulty or
complexity; however, as these demands
increase, the discrepancy between the effort
or capacity required and the effort that is
actually supplied becomes greater. There
is an inverse relationship between the
effort supplied to the main task and the
/~ SUPPLY = DEMAND
/
/
/
/
/
// _._._._.-.- TOTAL CAPACITY
,/-'-'
_ _ CAPACITY SUPPLIED
// TO PRIMARY TASK
/
/

DEMAND OF PRIMARY TASK

Fig. 4.3. Supply of capacity in response to the demands of the primary task. (Kahneman 1973)
58 Theories of Arousal and Performance
spare capacity or effort that is available for
processing subsidiary tasks or simply moni-
toring the external environment.
In answer to the question of how one can
index the amount of effort invested in task
performance, Kahneman (1973) argued that
increased effort would tend to produce
physiological arousal. However, most mea-
sures of arousal are also sensitive to factors
other than effort. He proposed pupillary di-
lation as the most generally suitable and
sensitive measure, in spite of the fact that
pupil dilation occurs in response to more
than 20 different factors.
Reasonable evidence that pupillary dila-
tion reflects intra-task fluctuations in effort
was obtained in a series of studies by
Kahneman and his co-workers (Kahneman
1970; Kahneman et al. 1967; Kahneman et
al. 1969). The main task was a digit transfor-
mation task in which subjects listened to a
series of four digits (e.g. '4826') and re-
sponded by adding one to each digit (e.g.
'5937'). During list presentation, there was a
subsidiary task which involved either moni-
toring a display for a specified letter or re-
taining a single letter that was presented
briefly.
On the assumption that task demands in-
creased progressively as each additional
digit was presented, the predicted results
can be deduced by reference to Fig. 4.3. As
expected, pupil dilation increased steadily
during digit presentation, whereas perform-
ance on the subsidiary tasks declined pro-
gressively the further into the digit presenta-
tion trial that the critical stimulus occurred.
The latter finding follows from the postulat-
ed inverse relationship between effort or ca-
pacity expenditure on the main task and
performance on the subsidiary task, which
depends on the amount of spare processing
capacity.
There is an alternative interpretation of
this finding based on the notion that the
worsening performance on the subsidiary
task is due to decreased perceptual sensitivi-
ty when the pupil is dilated. Disconfirming
evidence was obtained by Kahneman
(1970), who found that similar subsidiary-
task decrements were obtained when the tar-
get stimulus was sighted through an artifi-
cial pupil.
In addition to using pupillary dilation as
an index of intra-task effort, there have been
attempts to investigate the viability of pupil-
lary dilation as a measure of inter-task dif-
ferences in difficulty or processing de-
mands. A recent study by Beatty and Wag-
oner (1978) used a task devised by Posner
(1978) in which subjects have to decide
whether or not two letters belong to the
same category (vowels or consonants).
'Same' judgements can sometimes be based
purely on feature analysis (e.g. 'AA' or 'aa'),
sometimes on name code extraction (e.g.
'Aa' or 'aA') or may require evaluation of
category membership (e.g. 'AE' or 'ui').
Posner (1978) suggested that subjects per-
formed a hierarchical series of processes,
beginning with feature analysis and pro-
ceeding to name code extraction and finally
to category membership. If a match is ob-
tained at any point, processing is halted,
and a response is made. Beatty and Wagon-
er (1978) obtained the greatest pupillary di-
lation in the most difficult condition, in
which all three analyses must be performed
(i.e. match only at the category level), and
the least dilation in the easiest condition, in
which only feature analysis is necessary (i.e.
match at the level offeature analysis). While
the extent of pupillary dilation corre-
sponded to apparent task difficulty, there is
a confounding between difficulty and pro-
cessing time, with the most difficult task tak-
ing the longest time.
If pupillary dilation does genuinely re-
flect processing effort, then it follows that
attempts to manipulate effort by monetary
incentives should affect dilation in predict-
able ways. Kahneman and Peavler (1969)
varied the monetary incentives within a
paired associate learning task, and obtained
greater pupillary dilation for high-reward
pairs than for low-reward pairs.
There are alternative ways of measuring
effort. The simplest method of all is to use
self-report scales on which subjects provide
an estimate of perceived effort during task

performance (Dornic 1977). A further meth-
od is based upon the assumption that spare
processing capacity is inversely related to
the effort invested in the primary task; this
spare processing capacity can be measured
by adding a concurrent processing task
which is performed only when it is possible
to do so without disrupting performance of
the primary task.
While Kahneman (1973) emphasized the
concept of effort, he incorporated it within a
more general framework, of which the two
central aspects are the allocation policy and
the evaluation of demands on capacity. The
evaluation of demands causes effort or ca-
pacity to be supplied in order to accomplish
the activities that the allocation policy has
selected. The allocation policy itself is in
turn controlled by four factors:
1. Enduring dispositions which are based
on modes of functioning of involuntary
processes (e.g. attention tends to be paid
to novel, surprising or incongruous stimu-
li).
2. Momentary intentions (e.g. look for a
white cat).
3. Evaluation of demands, such that one ac-
tivity is carried through to completion if
two or more activities require in toto more
capacity than is available.
4. Effects of arousal produced by external
stressors, including an increased tenden-
cy to focus on a few relevant cues, a re-
duced ability to discriminate betweefl
relevant and irrelevant cues and in-
creased attentionallability.
The above considerations can be applied
to the. curvilinear relationship between
arousal and performance (Yerkes and Dod-
son 1908), in which moderate levels of
arousal are associated with the optimal level
of performance. In essence, Kahneman
(1973) argued that poor task performance
under low levels of arousal is typically attri-
butable to insufficient effort, whereas inferi-
or performance under high arousal is due to
an amalgam of attentional narrowing,
heightened lability of attention and im-
paired attentional discrimination.
Kahneman's theory belongs to the broad
Kahneman: Attention and Effort 59
category of theories of attention which em-
phasize the importance of capacity limita-
tions on man's ability to perform mental
work. It differs from previous theories of the
same general type in two main ways:
I. Rather than assuming that capacity
limitations or 'bottlenecks' occur almost ex-
clusively at a particular stage of information
processing, as Broadbent (1958) and
Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) did, Kahne-
man assumed that a flexible allocation of
limited capacity occurs, so that the source of
any bottleneck can be quite variable.
2. The assumption is made that the mo-
mentarily available processing capacity va-
ries substantially over time, rather than be-
ing fixed; such factors as task demands and
effort expenditure partially determine avail-
able capacity.
A controversial prediction from Kahne-
man's general theory is that the ability to
perform two tasks together in a divided at-
tention paradigm depends primarily on the
attentional or effort demands of the tasks
between which attention must be divided.
This contrasts with an alternative viewpoint
(McLeod 1977, 1978), according to which
the ability to perform two concurrent tasks
depends on the extent to which the two tasks
are similar and use the same processing me-
chanisms. In fairness to Kahneman, he does
acknowledge the existence of such specific
interference effects; however, his main em-
phasis is on general capacity limitations.
The evidence on this important issue was
discussed in the previous chapter; broadly
speaking, there is good evidence in favour
of both general capacity limitations and spe-
cific interference effects.
In many ways, Kahneman's theory re-
presents an impressive extension of earlier
hypotheses, and it is plausible to assume
that there is an important distinction be-
tween arousal as produced by an individu-
al's active involvement in task performance
and arousal generated by intense or stressful
external stimulation. The notion that the ef-
fective processing capacity varies as a func-
tion of effort expenditure is an attractive
one, and the idea that performance decre-
60 Theories of Arousal and Performance
ments under high arousal may have several
different causes is more realistic than previ-
ous approaches.
The key concept of 'effort' is not defined
as precisely as one would like. At times it
seems to be synonymous with 'concentra-
tion', but at other times it is used in a rather
broader sense, as when Kahneman refers to
"a nonspecific input, which may be various-
ly labeled 'effort', 'capacity', or 'attention'."
Dornic (1977) made the reasonable point
that rather than equating the concepts of'ef-
fort' and 'attentional capacity', it is prefer-
able to distinguish the two concepts and to
argue that effort is the cause of increased at-
tention. For Dornic, 'effort' denotes "a con-
sciously and deliberately initiated activa-
tion of a person's information processing
power, which results in a certain degree of
attention being focussed on a specific task"
(p.2).
It is often difficult to use Kahneman's
theory to make accurate predictions of be-
haviour. On the one hand, increased effort
should generally improve performance; on
the other hand, increased arousal produced
by an external stres~or will often reduce per-
formance because of changes in the alloca-
tion policy (e.g. heightened lability of atten-
tion and attentional narrowing). What on
earth is going to happen when subjects are
exposed to factors (e.g. failure feedback)
which produce increased effort and in-
creased stress? In such circumstances, there
is increased attentional capacity coupled
with impaired attentional selectivity, so that
performance might improve, worsen or re-
main unaffected.
4.6 Thayer: Self-Reported Arousal
Thayer's (1967, 1970) approach to theoreti-
cal issues surrounding the concept of
arousal has been rather different from any
of the other approaches discussed in this
chapter. He has consistently claimed that
self-report data can provide valuable in-
sights, and so he devised the Activation
Deactivation Adjective Check List (AD-
ACL). Individuals are asked to rate each of
a series of arousal-related adjectives on a
four-point scale according to how it de-
scribes their feelings at the moment the test
is taken.
On the basis of a factor analysis with an
orthogonal rotation, Thayer (1967) con-
cluded that there were four arousal or acti-
vation factors. These factors (with high-
loading adjectives in brackets) were as fol-
lows: General Activation (lively, active, full
of pep, energetic, peppy, vigorous, activat-
ed), Deactivation-Sleep (sleepy, tired, drow-
sy), High Activation (clutched up, jittery,
stirred up, fearful, intense), and General
Deactivation (at rest, still, leisurely, quies-
cent, quiet, calm, placid).
Thayer (1970) related these four arousal
factors to physiological arousal in a study in
which skin conductance, heart rate, muscle
action potentials and finger blood volume
were recorded while the subjects were sit-
ting quietly or while they performed a men-
tal arithmetic task in the presence of noise.
The subjects completed an AD-ACL at the
end of each phase of the experiment.
As is frequently the case, the various
physiological measures did not intercorre-
late highly; indeed, none of the correlations
among the physiological variables exceeded
+ 0.15. In contrast, an amalgam based on
information from all four variables correlat-
ed + 0.47 with the general activation factor
of the AD-ACL and + 0.34 with the high ac-
tivation factor. This pattern of results clear-
ly suggests that self-report measures of
arousal have some important advantages
over physiological measures. As Thayer
(1970) concluded, "These results lend evi-
dence to the contention that self report may
be an integrative variable more representa-
tive of general states of bodily activation
than any single psychophysiological var-
iable" (p. 93).
Some of Thayer's contentions have been
disputed. In particular, the notion that there
are four separate arousal or activation fac-
tors has not met with universal approbation.

Mackay et al. (1978), using an Anglicized
version of the AD-ACL, obtained only two
bipolar factors rather than four monopolar
ones; they identified these factors as arousal
and stress. The arousal factor combined
Thayer's general activation and deactiva-
tion-sleep factors, whereas the stress factor
was a synthesis of Thayer's high activation
and general deactivation factors.
Thayer (1978a, b) has independently ar-
rived at an essentially identical solution to
that of Mackay et al. on the basis of further
factor analytic studies. Thayer now distin-
guishes between Activation Dimension A
(ranging from energetic and vigorous to
sleepy and tired) and Activation Dimen-
sion B (ranging from tense to placid and
still).
An alternative conceptualization of Thay-
er's arousal factors that seems quite plausi-
ble was offered by Russell (1979). His study
took as its starting point the factor analytic
data of Russell and Mehrabian (1977), who
found that all emotions could be accurately
described on the basis of a three-dimension-
al emotional space consisting of the follow-
ing dimensions: degree of arousal, pleasure-
displeasure and dominance-submissive-
ness. In an attempt to relate Thayer's AD-
ACL factors to this three-dimensional
space, Russell (1979) asked subjects to com-
• HIGH
DISPLEASURE
Fig. 4.4. The location of Thayer's
arousal factors within a two-dimen-
sional space comprising the ortho-
gonal factors of arousal and plea-
sure-displeasure. (Russell 1979)
Thayer: Self-Reported Arousal 61
plete the AD-ACL, together with seven
other scales constructed a priori to measure
pleasure, displeasure, arousal, sleepiness,
dominance, submissiveness and depression.
Russell (1979) discovered that degree of
arousal and pleasure-displeasure were or-
thogonal factors which formed a two-di-
mensional space accounting for nearly all of
the reliable variance. The way in which
Thayer's arousal factors related to this two-
dimensional space is shown in Fig. 4.4. The
main implication of these findings is that
there may not be a number of different
arousal dimensions; rather, Thayer's arous-
al factors may simply reflect different loca-
tions on the pleasure-displeasure continu-
um in combination with variations on a
single arousal dimension.
Thayer (1978a) reviewed the most inter-
esting research which has been done to vali-
date the claim that there are two separate ac-
tivation dimensions. It has sometimes been
assumed that a variety of manipulations
such as time of day, sleep deprivation, noise,
incentive and stimulant and depressant
drugs all affect the same arousal dimension.
In contrast, Thayer's theoretical stance al-
lows for the possibility that many of these
arousing agents affect one of the two activa-
tion dimensions more than the other.
Consider as an example the effects of
HIGH
AROUSAL
GENERAL
• ACTIVATION
ACTIVATION
PLEASURE
DEACTIVATION- • • GENERAL
SLEEP DEACTIVATION
LOW
AROUSAL
62 Theories of Arousal and Performance
time of day on self-reported arousal. Thayer
(1978a) asked students to complete the AD-
ACL immediately upon awaking in the
morning and just before retiring at night,
and every 2 h in between. Peak arousal on
both activation dimensions occurred at
around mid-day for most subjects, and the
overall pattern of time of day effects was
similar for both dimensions. However, diur-
nal variation was considerably greater with
respect to Activation Dimension A (energy-
sleep) than to Activation Dimension B (ten-
sion-placidity).
In a second study, Thayer (1978a) investi-
gated the effects of physical exercise on self-
reported arousal. Students completed the
AD-ACL on two occasions, once after they
had been sitting quietly and once immedi-
ately after completing a moderately brisk
walk around the university campus. This
physical exercise produced a substantial in-
crease in self-reported arousal on Activa-
tion Dimension A but had a very small ef-
fect on Activation Dimension B.
Thus far, we have seen that time of day
and physical exercise have more pro-
nounced effects on Activation Dimension A
than on Activation Dimension B. Are there
other arousal manipulations that affect the
B dimension (i.e. tension-placidity) more
than the A dimension? Thayer (1978a) has
provided an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion by extending the range of arousing
agents investigated. For example, students
who completed the AD-ACL just before a
college examination showed greatly elevat-
ed scores on Dimension B, but 'examination
nerves' had essentially no effect on Dimen-
sion A scores.
What about the effects of white noise on
self-reported arousal? Thayer et al. (1970)
found that the main effect of 75-dB white
noise presented continuously for 20 min
was to produce a significant increase in Di-
mension B activation. A somewhat more in-
tense level of noise (85 dB) was used over a
period of approximately 20 min in two other
experiments (Patterson 1974, Thayer and
Carey 1974). Reliable increases in Dimen-
sion B activation were obtained in both ex-
periments, but Dimension A activation was
unaffected. Lopes (1971) used even more in-
tense noise stimulation (85 - 88 dB) and
found that noise had differential effects on
the two activation dimensions: Dimen-
sion B activation was increased, whereas
Dimension A activation was decreased. It
thus appears that noise consistently in-
creases Dimension B activation, but it has
smaller and more variable effects on Dimen-
sion A activation.
An additional manipulation which has
been found to influence Dimension B acti-
vation more than Dimension A activation
was investigated by Thayer and Moore
(1972). They produced three levels of anxie-
ty through experimental manipulations
while subjects filled in the AD-ACL. Di-
mension B activation increased progressive-
ly as the level of experimentally induced
anxiety increased, whereas Dimension A
activation increased from low to moderate
anxiety conditions but decreased as manip-
ulated anxiety went from moderate to high.
The discovery that a number of arousing
agents have differential effects on Thayer's
two activation dimensions is of potential im-
portance. As Thayer (1978a) pointed out,
experiments in the area of information pro-
cessing, "have incorporated a variety of
arousal manipulations including time of
day, sleep deprivation, noise, incentive, and
various drugs (Broadbent 1971)... It is risky
to assume that all these manipulations af-
fect a single activation dimension by either
increasing or decreasing arousal as a linear
function of different intensities of stimula-
tion. Activation Dimension A probably me-
diates time of day, sleep deprivation, and in-
centive where no extra anxiety-inducing
treatments are employed. On the other
hand, noise, and possibly certain kinds of
drugs (e.g., tranquilizers) could be expected
to primarily influence Dimension B activa-
tion" (p. 31).
Although the two activation dimensions
are claimed to be conceptually distinct,
Thayer (1978a) hypothesized that they were
positively correlated at moderate levels of
energy expenditure but negatively correlat-
 Hasher and Zacks: Automatic and Effortful Processes
ed at high levels (i.e. high tension is associat-
ed with low energy and vigour, and high en-
ergy and vigour is associated with low ten-
sion). This inverse relationship was demon-
strated in one of the studies already dis-
cussed (Thayer and Moore 1972). It was al-
so shown in an unpublished study by Thay-
er and Wettler. They found that females
when feeling very depressed reported great
tension (high Dimension B activation) com-
bined with low energy and vigour (low Di-
mension A activation).
Since Activation Dimension A appears to
be related to motivational factors, whereas
Activation Dimension B is similar to an
anxiety dimension, it might be anticipated
that Dimension A activation would typical-
ly facilitate performance, whereas Dimen-
sion B activation would impair perform-
ance. In fact, Dimension A activation has
complex effects on cognitive tasks, and Di-
mension B activation often has no effect at
all (for a review see Thayer 1978a). This may
be due in part to the fact that high levels of
tension or anxiety are unlikely to occur nat-
urally during the course of an experiment.
It is a shortcoming of Thayer's approach
that he has as yet shed little light on the ef-
fects on performance of arousal occurring
along each of the activation dimensions.
However, his work represents a promising
first step in the task of unravelling some of
the complexities of arousal.
4.7 Hasher and Zacks: Automatic and
Effortful Processes
Hasher and Zacks (1979) have proposed
an ambitious theory to account for the ef-
fects of age differences, depression and
arousal on memory, but the focus here will
be largely on that part of their theory con-
cerned with arousal. The general theory in-
corporates two basic assumptions as fol-
lows:
1. There is a continuum of attentional re-
quirements among encoding processes; at
63
one end of this continuum there are auto-
matic processes, and at the other end
there are effortful processes.
2. Attentional capacity varies both within
and between individuals.
The first assumption follows from the
work of Posner and Snyder (1975a), Shiffrin
and Schneider (1977) and others, with the
minor exception that a continuum of mental
operations is postulated rather than the
more usual dichotomy into conscious or
controlled and automatic. Automatic pro-
cesses are seen as requiring minimal energy
from the limited-capacity attentional me-
chanism. They occur without intention,
without necessarily giving rise to awareness
and without interfering with other process-
ing, and they do not benefit from practice.
In contrast, effortful operations require con-
siderable attentional capacity and so tend to
interfere with other cognitive activities also
requiring capacity. The efficiency of effort-
ful operations increases with practice, and
their use is voluntary, often occurring only
with specific instructions.
The second assumption, that attentional
capacity is variable rather than fixed, fol-
lows from the research and theorizing of
Kahneman (1973). Hasher and Zacks (1979)
related the notion of variable attentional ca-
pacity to arousal in the following theoretical
statement: "At low levels of arousal, capaci-
ty seems to increase with increasing levels of
arousal. At high levels, a reduction in func-
tional attentional capacity occurs" (p. 364).
They pointed out that the reduced available
capacity in states of high arousal could oc-
cur either because of a straightforward re-
duction in total attentional capacity or be-
cause capacity has been taken from the
cognitive system and applied elsewhere in
the total physical system. In either case, the
predictions from their theory are the same.
The upshot of these various theoretical
assumptions is that the reduced attentional
capacity characteristic of high arousal will
impair those processes requiring attentional
capacity (i.e. effortful processes) but will
have no effect on those processes not requir-
ing attentional capacity (i.e. automatic pro-
64 Theories of Arousal and Performance
cesses). Hasher and Zacks argued that this
general viewpoint is supported by the fact
that trainers of divers, pilots, firemen, para-
chutists and other groups of people exposed
to high levels of stress place great emphasis
on the need for high levels of overlearning
of emergency procedures.
What kinds of automatic and effortful
processes are involved in the main area of
research discussed by Hasher and Zacks
(1979), namely learning and memory? They
claimed that automatic processes encode
the fundamental aspects of the flow of in for-
mation, i.e. spatial, temporal and frequency-
of-occurrence information. As a result of ex-
tended practice, word meanings are also au-
tomatically activated. There is, indeed, rea-
sonable evidence that these different kinds
of information are processed automatically,
at least in terms of the criteria for automati-
city used by Hasher and Zacks. The effortful
orocesses involved in learning and memory
include imagery, rehearsal, organization
and mnemonic techniques.
Does high arousal impair the use of ef-
fortful organizational processes? Hasher
and Zacks (1979) argued that there were on-
ly two relevant studies (Hormann and Oster-
kamp 1966, Schwartz 1975) and that both
had obtained confirmatory evidence. When
a categorized word list is presented (i.e.
several words belonging to each of a num-
ber of categories), the subsequent free recall
tends to be organized in terms of the catego-
ries in the list. This organizational tendency
(often referred to as 'categorical clustering')
presumably requires effortful processing,
and both Hormann and Osterkamp (1966)
and Schwartz (1975) found that high arousal
significantly reduced categorical clustering.
A similar finding was obtained by Ey-
senck (1974a), who asked subjects to think
of as many words as possible belonging to
five semantic categories. He found that
there was reduced categorical clustering
among the most aroused subjects.
Hasher and Zacks (1979) also predicted
that high arousal would inhibit the use of
imagery but claimed that there was no rele-
vant evidence. In fact, some pertinent stud-
ies were discussed by Eysenck (1977). It has
been found on tests of imagery that intro-
verts (allegedly chronically aroused) re-
port less vivid imagery than extraverts. Voi-
cu and Vranceanu (1975) investigated the
learning of lists of pictures and words in
conditions of quiet or of noise, with the par-
ticipants being divided into physiologically
hyper-reactive and hypo-reactive groups.
High arousal (hyper-reactive subjects ex-
posed to noise) impaired picture learning
but had no effect on word learning, suggest-
ing that imaginal processes may be detri-
mentally affected by high arousal.
Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed quite
erroneously that there were no relevant data
with respect to their prediction that high
arousal should impair rehearsal processes.
It has been known for some time that sub-
jects exposed to arousing stimulation from
white noise tend to remember more infor-
mation about the order of presentation of
stimuli (Hamilton et al. 1972), and it seems
likely that a major function of rehearsal is to
preserve order information.
More recently, Wilding and Mohindra
(unpublished) compared the effects of 65
and 85 dbC white noise on ordered recall of
letter strings. High arousal (85 dbC noise)
was associated with superior recall under
control conditions, but this superiority dis-
appeared when rehearsal was prevented by
engaging the subject in an articulatory sup-
pression task (i.e. rapid repetition of the
word 'the') during list presentation. This
suggests that high arousal in the form of in-
tense white noise leads to greater use of re-
hearsal processes, which seems opposed to
the prediction of Hasher and Zacks (1979).
Why does not high arousal consistently
reduce the utilization of rehearsal processes
as predicted by Hasher and Zacks (1979)? A
plausible way of salvaging their theory is
suggested by reference to the working mem-
ory model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974),
which comprises a modality-free central
processor and an articulatory loop. Hasher
and Zacks appear to be suggesting that high
arousal reduces the capacity of the modali-
ty-free central processor while leaving the
 Hasher and Zacks: Automatic and Effortful Processes
articulatory loop intact. If so, they could
reasonably argue that high arousal impairs
only those rehearsal processes that involve
the use of the central processor but does not
reduce usage of the relatively effort-free re-
hearsal processes of the articulatory loop.
According to Hasher and Zacks (1979),
high arousal should have no effect on auto-
matic processes such as the activation of
word meaning. They argued that the most
persuasive evidence that meaning is auto-
matically derived from printed words comes
from the Stroop phenomenon. This refers to
the difficulty which most people experience
in naming the ink colour when a colour
word is printed in ink of a different colour
(e.g. 'red' printed in green).
While Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed
that the available evidence supported their
prediction that high arousal would not af-
fect the Stroop effect, this is not strictly ac-
curate. Indeed, intense white noise im-
proves the speed with which the ink colour
of colour words can be named (Agnew and
Agnew 1963, Callaway and Stone 1960,
Houston 1969, Houston and Jones 1967).
This improvement in performance seems to
be due to an enhanced ability to inhibit ir-
relevant responses under intense noise;
when there is no need to inhibit such re-
sponses (as when subjects have to name the
colours of non-word stimuli), then perform-
ance is actually worse in noise than in quiet
(Houston 1969, Houston and Jones 1967).
Intense noise is not the only arousing
agent that has been found to influence per-
formance on the Stroop test. Folkard and
Greeman (1974) looked at the speed with
which stimuli could be sorted either on the
basis of colour name or in terms of ink co-
lour and found that sorting was faster on the
basis of colour name. Of more immediate in-
terest, high arousal in the form of induced
muscle tension led to increased speed of
sorting on the basis of ink colour but to re-
duced sorting speed of colour names. Fol-
kard and Greeman interpreted their data by
suggesting that muscle tension inhibits sup-
posedly automatic naming responses.
In sum, Hasher and Zacks (1979) have ef-
65
fectively put forward two closely related hy-
potheses concerning the effects of high
arousal on task performance: (1) high
arousal impairs all processes making de-
mands on attentional capacity and (2) high
arousal has no effect on automatic pro-
cesses. The evidence relating to the first hy-
pothesis is broadly supportive, with the ex-
ception of data on the effects of arousal on
rehearsal processes. At the very least, the
theory should distinguish between rehearsal
processes solely dependent on the articula-
tory loop and those involving the central
processor.
There is as yet very limited evidence relat-
ing directly to the second hypothesis. How-
ever, such evidence as is available suggests
that it is not true that high arousal has no ef-
fect on automatic processes; rather, high
arousal seems to make it easier to inhibit the
operation of automatic processes when this
is desirable for efficient task performance.
At a more general level, it seems unlikely
that reality can be quite as straightforward
as Hasher and Zacks (1979) implied. For ex-
ample, there are several studies in which the
effects of arousal on two concurrently per-
formed effortful tasks have been assessed,
some of which are reviewed by Easterbrook
(1959). While Hasher and Zacks would pres-
umably predict that high arousal would im-
pair the performance of both tasks, the typi-
cal finding is that performance on the main
task is maintained or improved, whereas
subsidiary task performance is impaired. It
is unclear how Hasher and Zacks (1979)
would account for this pattern of perform-
ance.
According to Hasher and Zacks (1979),
high arousal must impair the performance
of all effortful tasks. In fact, high arousal
has sometimes been found to enhance the
performance of attentionally demanding
tasks. For example, Hamilton et al. (1977)
found that intense white noise improved
performance on the non-automatic task of
transforming single letters (e.g. 'C + 3 = 1';
answer = 'F').
One puzzling aspect of the theory put for-
ward by Hasher and Zacks concerns the as-
66 Theories of Arousal and Performance
sumption that high arousal reduces the use
of imagery, rehearsal, organizational pro-
cesses and mnemonic techniques. Since all
four forms of processing have been found to
enhance long-term memory, the natural pre-
diction is that high arousal should lead to re-
duced long-term retention of information.
In fact, one of the most robust findings in
the arousal literature is that high arousal in-
creases long-term retention (for a review, see
Eysenck 1976a).
The greatest weakness in the theoretical
position of Hasher and Zacks concerns their
assumption that increasing arousal leads
first to an increase in functional attentional
capacity, followed by a decrease. In prac-
tice, we rarely have any independent mea-
sure of attentional capacity, so that there is a
natural temptation to argue backwards from
the behavioural data. Thus we can 'explain'
good performance in terms of increased at-
tentional capacity, and poor performance in
terms of decreased attentional capacity.
Even if the assumption about the effects of
arousal on attentional capacity turns out to
be correct, we are still left with the puzzle of
trying to understand why arousal should
have these effects.
4.8 Summary and Conclusions
In spite of the fact that an attempt is made in
Chap. 9 to integrate theory and research on
arousal and performance, a few general
comments deserve mention at this point. In
the first place, several theorists have argued
that many of the effects of arousal on per-
formance are mediated by attentional mech-
anisms. While different theorists have
tended to emphasize different possible ef-
fects of arousal on attention, there is reason-
able support for the notion that high arousal
produces increased attentional selectivity;
in addition, there are indications that arou-
sal also increases attentional lability and
makes attentional processes more suscepti-
ble to distraction.
Until fairly recently most theories in this
area incorporated a unitary concept of
arousal. This simplistic approach was justi-
fied by two discoveries: (1) different arousal
manipulations often produced similar beha-
vioural patterns and (2) arousers frequently
interacted with one another in theoretically
predictable ways. However, as a result of an
increasing number of anomalous findings,
there has been a growing tendency to postu-
late two or more partially independent
arousal systems. The theories of Broadbent,
Kahneman and Thayer all fall into that cate-
gory.
If there are a number of arousal systems,
what do they look like? One possibility is
that there is one arousal system which is af-
fected primarily by intense or stressful ex-
ternal stimulation or by various drugs. This
arousal system corresponds closely to the
Lower arousal mechanism postulated by
Broadbent (1971) and may resemble Thay-
er's Activation Dimension B (a tension-
placidity dimension). The arousal level in
this system will be more or less appropriate
for performance depending on task de-
mands. If the arousal level is non-optimal,
the second arousal system comes into opera-
tion. This second system attempts to comp-
ensate for performance decrements pro-
duced by the first arousal system by re-allo-
cating resources in response to task de-
mands. This arousal system is similar in
some ways to Broadbent's Upper arousal
system and shares common features with
Thayer's Activation Dimension A (an ener-
gy-sleep dimension).
A very striking finding is that arousal ma-
nipUlations often have much smaller effects
on performance than one would expect.
One of the advantages of postulating a se-
cond arousal system of a compensatory na-
ture is that it provides a potential explana-
tion for this finding (as well as many others).
These theoretical issues are discussed at
greater length in Chap. 9, after we have
considered in detail the effects on perform-
ance of some of the major arousal manipu-
lations.
5 Incentives and Motivation
In very general terms, motivation depends
on an amalgam of internal and external fac-
tors. Thus, for example, the motivational
state known as hunger is clearly influenced
by internal conditions related to the number
ofhoursoffood deprivation and by external
stimuli providing visual and olfactory infor-
mation about food. It is a meaningless ques-
tion to ask whether motivational states are
more affected by external or by internal fac-
tors, since the relative importance of each
set of factors can vary within extremely wide
limits. In addition, of course, internal and
external factors typically interact with each
other: the incentive value of a bowl of rice is
much greater for a starving peasant in Asia
than forabloated member ofWestern society.
Thinking. on motivation has moved from
an emphasis on internal factors to a growing
recognition of the major role played by ex-
ternal factors. One hundred years ago, moti-
vation was conceptualized largely in terms
of instinct, in keeping with the biological
and phylogenetic approach to the study of
behaviour pioneered by Darwin. As time
passed, some theorists went to great lengths
to account for behaviour by postulating an
enormous variety of instincts. For example,
McDougall (1923) argued that there was a
social (gregariousness) instinct, an assertion
instinct, a parental instinct, and so on. This
type of theorizing fell into disfavour when it
was realized that claiming that assertive be-
haviour was caused by an assertion instinct
did not constitute a proper explanation of
the behaviour in question.
The concept of 'instinct' was replaced by
the notion of 'drive', which resembled in-
stinct in emphasizing the role of hereditary
factors. However, most theorists seem to re-
gard drives as more susceptible than in-
stincts to environmental influence, and the
concept of 'drive' is still to be found in the
contemporary literature.
In contrast to the prominence assigned to
internal determinants of motivation by ad-
vocates of drive or instinct theories, other
theorists have focussed on the part played
by external factors such as incentives and
reinforcing stimuli. The first systematic ex-
position of such a viewpoint was made by
Thorndike (1913), who formulated the well-
known Law of Effect. This law states that
when a particular stimUlus-response bond is
followed by a satisfying state of affairs (re-
ward or positive reinforcement in modem
terminology), the strength of that bond in-
creases. On the other hand, when a particu-
lar stimulus-response bond is followed by
an annoying state of affairs (negative rein-
forcement), the strength of that bond is
weakened.
Thorndike recognized that there was an
element of circularity in his formulation of
the Law of Effect: when a stimulus-re-
sponse bond is strengthened, it is fatally
easy to claim that the response must have
been followed by a satisfying state of affairs.
What is needed is some independent mea-
sure of annoyers and satisfiers, and Thorn-
dike attempted to supply this. He defined a
satisfier as something the organism would
approach, whereas an annoyer was some-
thing the organism would not approach and
would actively avoid. Several years later,
Thorndike abandoned the notion that an an-
noyer decreases the strength of a stimulus-
response bond, primarily because much of
the experimental evidence failed to provide
support.
68 Incentives and Motivation

This chapter addresses certain limited has been refuted many times. In the classic
questions within the field of motivation. study by Macfarlane (1930), rats initially
The emphasis is on the effects of incentive learned to run through a maze for reinforce-
manipulations on performance and on pos- ment. When the maze was then filled with
sible mechanisms mediating these effects. It water, the rats were able to swim through the
is interesting to consider whether the effects maze successfully, in spite of the fact that
of incentives on behaviour are the same as, the specific responses produced differed
or similar to, the effects of other motivation-considerably from those used previously.
al factors but that issue is beyond the scope In his theory of motivation, Bindra (1969)
of this chapter. argued that a combination of internal phy-
siological conditions and external incentive
stimulation produces a central motive state
which persists for some time. Within this
5.1 Reinforcement and Incentives framework, it is worth considering whether
initially neutral stimuli (e.g. money) which
acquire motivational properties do so by be-
It has usually been argued that there are im- coming substitutes for the organismic state
portant similarities between the behavioural component or for the incentive component
effects of incentives and of positive reinfor- of the central motive state. He has obtained
cers or rewards. Indeed, incentive motiva- evidence (Bindra and Palfai 1967) that such
tion is often defined as the energizing effect stimuli assume certain properties of the in-
on behaviour of the anticipation of reinfor- centive but do not reinstate the organismic
cing events. However, some apparently im- state.
portant differences have been identified. In sum, the process of reinforcement does
For example, the process of reinforcement not seem to be intrinsically different from
appears to work 'backwards' on responses - the process of incentive motivation. Motiva-
that precede the reinforcing event, whereas tional states are importantly determined by
inaentives work 'forwards' on events which the presentation or removal of incentive ob-
follow the motivating event. A second ap- jects or reinforcing events, together with an
parent difference between reinforcers and internal organismic state.
incentives is that reinforcers have a highly
specific effect on behaviour (i.e. directly
strengthening reinforced responses), wher-
eas motivational factors such as incentive 5.2 Learning and Memory: Atkinson
stimuli have more general energizing ef- and Wickens (1971)
fects.
Bindra (1974) has persuasively argued
that these apparent differences are illusory There has been considerable research inter-
and that the process of reinforcement est in the effects of incentive on learning
should be subsumed under the more general and memory. The major theory in this area
process of incentive motivation. He pointed was proposed by Atkinson and Wickens
out that both the 'backward-working' rein- (1971). They attempted to explain the role
forcement effect and the 'forward-looking' played by reward or incentive in storage and
incentive effect are actually inferred from retrieval along lines suggested by the Atkin-
subsequent behaviour. As a consequence, son and Shiffrin (1968) model. This model
the data do not clearly demonstrate that assumed that the memory system was di-
reinforcers and incentives operate in oppo- vided into three components: sensory regis-
site temporal directions. ters (e.g. iconic store, echoic store) which re-
The notion that reinforcement always has ceive information from the various sense or-
highly specific effects on response emission gans, a long-term store of essentially unli-
 Learning and Memory: Atkinson and Wickens (1971)
mited capacity, and a short-term store of
strictly limited capacity which temporarily
holds information that has arrived either
from one of the sensory registers or from the
long-term store.
According to Atkinson and Shiffrin
(1968), these three components are so organ-
ized that in order for information to be
stored in the long-term store, it must initially
pass from the sensory register to the short-
term store, from which it is then transferred
or 'copied' into the long-term store. This
transfer of information typically occurs as a
result of rehearsal activity in the short-term
store, although it can also occur as a conse-
quence of other processing activities (e.g.
imaginal coding) taking place in the short-
term store. During the time that information
is being rehearsed in the short-term store, it
is passed on to the long-term store; when the
rehearsal activity ceases, information in the
short-term store starts to decay. In contrast,
information that is stored in the long-term
store is not subject to decay and remains in
store indefinitely. However, subsequent at-
tempts to retrieve the stored information
may fail if an inappropirate retrieval strate-
gy is employed.
Atkinson and Wickens (1971) proposed
that incentive or reinforcement plays two
separate roles in determining the storage of
information: an informational role and an
attentional role. On the one hand, reinforce-
ment provides the subject with feedback
about the correctness of his responses. On
the other hand, reinforcement causes the
subject to attend to certain items or situa-
tional stimuli in preference to others. The
implication of this theoretical position is
that the effects of incentive on learning and
memory are dependent on the way in which
information about to-be-remembered mate-
rial is processed in the short-term store.
The final theoretical assumptions con-
cern two rather different ways in which in-
centive can affect retrieval. If information
concerning the incentive values of to-be-
remembered events is stored in memory at
input, then knowledge given at the time of
test regarding the appropriate incentive va-
69
lues associated with each item may facilitate
the search process. A second possibility is
that subjects will be prepared to engage in
more extensive retrieval activity for high-in-
centive than for low-incentive items, which
would be expected to enhance the retrieval
of high-incentive items.
Experimentation on the effects of incen-
tives (usually of a monetary nature) on
learning of word lists has revealed an im-
portant difference between the results ob-
tained from unmixed lists (i.e. all items high
incentive or all low incentive) and from
mixed lists (i.e. half the items high-incentive
and half low-incentive). The typical finding
(e.g. Harley 1965a, b; Nelson 1976) is that
high-incentive items are significantly better
learned than low-incentive items with
mixed lists, but there is no incentive effect
with unmixed lists.
In the study by Nelson (1976), 40 com-
mon words were presented for immediate
free recall in a mixed or unmixed list. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.1. The incentive
manipulation had a substantial effect on
word recall in the mixed-list condition but a
non-significant effect in the unmixed-list
condition.
The theoretical approach of Atkinson and
Wickens (1971) can account for the incen-
tive effect in mixed lists in a straightforward
manner. If the learning task leads subjects
to establish a limited-capacity rehearsal buf-
fer in the short-term store, then the probabil-
ity of an item entering the buffer and being
rehearsed will be greater for high-incentive
than for low-incentive items. Since the the-
ory also states that long-term storage de-
pends on the amount of rehearsal activity in
the short-term store, it follows that high-in-
centive material will be better learned and
remembered than low-incentive material.
There is no particular reason for assuming
that differential rehearsal of high- and low-
incentive items will occur when unmixed
lists are used, however, and consequently
there is no effect of incentive on recall.
The differential effectiveness of incentive
manipulations on learning in mixed and un-
mixed lists is elegantly accounted for in
70 Incentives and Motivation
65 HIGH
INCENTIVE
60
...J
...J
u 55
-
~
-
(l:
I- 50 LOW
z INCENTIVE
w
u 45
(l:
w
Q.
40
L I
UNMIXED MIXED
NATURE OF LIST
terms of the influence of incentive on atten-
tional selectivity and patterns of rehearsal.
However, the findings are rather more mys-
terious from other theoretical perspectives.
Broadbent (1971) and others have argued
that incentives increase the level of arousal
and that the memorial consequences of
varying incentive:; can be predicted from the
amount of arousal increment produced.
Since high-incentive items should produce
more arousal than low-incentive items
whether mixed or unmixed lists are used, it
is by no means clear how an arousal theory
would account for the absence of any incen-
tive effect with unmixed lists.
Further predictions can be generated
from the Atkinson-Wickens position if we
compare recall of high-incentive items in
mixed and unmixed lists and then perform
the same comparison for low-incentive
items. High- incentive items should receive
more rehearsal (and so be better recalled) in
mixed than in unmixed lists, whereas the op-
posite should be the case for low-incentive
items. While the combined data of Harley
(1965a) and Harley (1965b) provided sup-
port for this prediction, later work by Harley
(1968) indicated that the incentive effect
with mixed lists was due primarily to re-
duced recall of the low-incentive items rath-
er than to enhanced recall of the high-incen-
tive items. The picture was further confused
by the data of Nelson (1976; see Fig. 5.1); he
Fig. 5. 1. Word recall as a function of mone-
tary incentive and nature of list (mixed versus
unmixed). (Nelson 1976)
found that high-incentive words were better
recalled in a mixed list than an unmixed list,
whereas low-incentive words showed com-
parable recall in both kinds of list.
The findings discussed so far do not show
conclusively that differential rehearsal ac-
tivity is the process responsible for the ob-
served incentive effects. A somewhat more
direct attempt to study differential attention
to high- and low-incentive stimuli was made
by Loftus (1972). Subjects looked at pairs of
pictures and attention was measured by
monitoring their eye movements.
As expected, incentive was effective in
improving recognition memory. The notion
that high-incentive stimuli receive more at-
tention than low-incentive stimuli was sup-
ported by the key finding that the number of
eye fixations was much greater for high-in-
centive than for low-incentive pictures. In
addition, recognition memory in the various
incentive conditions was essentially iden-
tical in those cases where the number of fi-
xations was the same.
Cuvo (1974) presented high- and low-in-
centive words for free recall in a mixed list.
Some of the subjects were asked to rehearse
overtly during list presentation, whereas
others were required to count backwards by
threes between the presentation of each
word in order to minimize the amount of re-
hearsal activity. There was a strong incen-
tive effect on recall, but this was reduced un-

der conditions of rehearsal prevention. Of
greatest interest, however, was the finding
that the number of overt rehearsals was sig-
nificantly greater for high-incentive than for
low-incentive words.
One of the potential problems with both
the Atkinson and Wickens (1971) theoreti-
cal approach and the data of Cuvo (1974)
and Loftus (1972) is that the emphasis is
very much on possible quantitative effects of
incentive on attention and rehearsal activi-
ty. Thus Atkinson and Wickens postulated
that incentive effects are due to differential
amounts of rehearsal, Loftus obtained evi-
dence that the number of eye fixations was
affected by incentive and Cuvo found that
incentives affected the number of rehear-
sals. However, it is entirely possible that in-
centive manipulations may affect process-
ing in a qualitative manner in addition to the
purely quantitative.
As learning proceeds, it has been found
that the extent to which rehearsal is semanti-
cally organized becomes an increasingly po-
tent determinant of recall, whereas the op-
posite is true of the amount of rehearsal
(Weist 1972). At the theoretical level, Craik
and Lockhart (1972) contrasted mainte-
nance rehearsal (i.e. mere repetition of pro-
cessing activity) and elaboration rehearsal
(i.e. rehearsal that extends the variety of sti-
mulus processing). They hypothesized that
it was only elaboration rehearsal that en-
65
60
...J
...J55
<{
u 50
w
Il:
~
45
z
w 40
u
Il: 35
w
Q.
30
Fig. 5.2. Recall as a func-
tion of monetary incen-
1"
tive, depth of retrieval
cue and strength of re-
trieval cue. (Eysenck and
Eysenck 1980) - LOW INCENTIVE
Learning and Memory: Atkinson and Wickens (1971) 71
hanced retention. While this has been dis-
confirmed, it still makes sense to think of re-
hearsal activities as falling along a continu-
um ranging from mindless rote rehearsal to
active constructive rehearsal.
Some of these issues were addressed by
M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck (1980).
They presented lists of words for cued re-
call, with half of the words in each list being
associated with a high monetary incentive
and half with a low incentive. They used the
overt rehearsal technique and discovered
that high-incentive words were rehearsed
more frequently than low-incentive words
and also showed much better cued recall.
However, the major focus of interest was on
possible differential effects of incentive on
recall to the various kinds of retrieval cues.
Cues were either semantic (e.g. 'CHAIR as-
sociated with ---') or phonemic (e.g.
'CABLE rhymes with ---'), and the cues
were either strongly or weakly associated
with their respective list words.
The cued recall findings are shown in Fig.
5.2. Incentive had no effect on the kind of
processing, since the effects of incentive
conditions were very similar for phonemic
and semantic retrieval cues. This suggests that
incentive did not produce qualitative chan-
ges in processing. In contrast, there was a sub-
stantial interaction between incentive con-
ditions and cue strength, in which high in-
centive improved recall to weak retrieval
~,
""
"
~
PHONEMIC SEMANTIC WEAK STRONG
RECALL CUES RECALL CUES
0---0 HIGH INCENTIVE
72 Incentives and Motivation
cues but had no effect with strong retrieval
cues. This interaction suggests that incen-
tive increases the extensiveness or elabora-
tion of encoding; in other words, low-incen-
tive words were mainly processed in terms
of the most obvious and readily accessible
features, whereas high-incentive words
were processed in terms of both readily ac-
cessible and less accessible features. It may
well be that this increase in the number of
encoded features or attributes under high-
incentive conditions is produced by the dis-
proportionate amount of the available pro-
cessing time that subjects spend rehearsing
high-incentive stimuli.
In sum, Atkinson and Wickens (1971) as-
sumed that the main reason for the effects of
incentive on learning and memory was the
greater amount of rehearsal accorded to
high-incentive than to low-incentive stimuli.
They also seem to have assumed that this ex-
tra rehearsal resulted in more elaborate or
extensive processing and 'stronger' memory
traces rather than in the utilization of more
efficient learning strategies. As we have
seen, the data consistently support these
various theoretical assumption.
In some ways, it is rather puzzling that
high-incentive stimuli are not processed in a
qualitatively superior manner to low-incen-
tive stimuli. An intriguing explanation is
that people are largely unaware of the dif-
ferential effectiveness of various processing
activities and so fail to maximize learning of
high-incentive stimuli. For example, it has
been found that people underestimate the
memorial advantage usually associated with
semantic processing (Cutting 1975).
It will be remembered that Atkinson and
Wickens (1971) suggested that incentives
might affect retrieval either by supplying
useful information to the search process or
by inducing subjects to prolong the search
process. However, attempts to demonstrate
effects of incentives on retrieval have usual-
ly been unsuccessful. Wasserman et al.
(1968) gave subjects paced and free recall of
a list of paired associates. In spite of the fact
that some subjects were offered 50 cents for
each item correctly recalled against nothing
at all for other subjects, incentives did not
affect recall.
Two studies (Weiner 1966b, Wickens and
Simpson 1968) have considered the effects
of incentives on retrieval in a modified
Brown-Peterson paradigm. Subjects re-
ceived to-be-remembered information, per-
formed an interpolated task and then tried
to recall the items. Information about the
relevant incentive condition was only pro-
vided at the time of recall. Neither study
found any effect of the incentive manipUla-
tion on retention test performance.
One obvious possibility is that incentives
might reduce the criterion for response in a
retrieval situation. Katz (1969) compared a
non-risky incentive condition in which cor-
rect responses were financially rewarded
and incorrect responses were ignored with
a second, risky condition in which correct
responses were rewarded and incorrect re-
sponses were penalized. Free recall per-
formance was better under the non-risky in-
centive condition, but this was largely at the
expense of a substantial increase in errors.
In other words, the manipulation of incen-
tives can affect the location of the response
criterion.
Loftus and Wickens (1970) looked at the
effects of incentive on retrieval in a paired
associate task. When information about the
incentive value of a pair was provided only
at the time of test, high-incentive items were
better recalled than low-incentive items.
However, there was a corresponding in-
crease in the response time, suggesting that
incentive improved retention simply be-
cause subjects spent more time searching
through memory.
All in all, the basic contentions of Atkin-
son and Wickens (1971) appear to be well
founded. A major effect of incentive manip-
ulations is to cause a re-allocation of atten-
tion in which certain stimuli (i.e. those asso-
ciated with high incentives) receive a dispro-
portionate amount of attention at the ex-
pense of other stimuli (i.e. those associated
with low incentives). In the case oflearning
tasks, allocation of attention can be roughly
indexed by rehearsal activity. The extra at-

tention and rehearsal accorded to high-in-
centive stimuli simply lead to extra process-
ing of the same kind as that given to low-in-
centive stimuli, rather than to processing of
a different kind.
5.3 Short-Term Memory: Weiner
A rather different approach to incentive and
memory was pursued in a series of studies
by Weiner (e.g. Kernoff et el. 1966, Weiner
1966b, Weiner and Walker 1966, Weiner
1967). They used a modification of the
Brown-Peterson paradigm in which three or
four consonants were presented for approx-
imately 1 s. Following stimulus presenta-
tion, subjects read digits in time to a metro-
nome and then attempted to recall the con-
sonants after up to 17 s of the interpolated
activity.
In the initial studies (Kernoff et al. 1966,
Weiner and Walker 1966), incentives were
manipulated by means of different coloured
backgrounds on the stimulus slide. Accord-
ing to a pre-arranged system, a particular
colour might indicate a shockforincorrect re-
call, 1cent reward for correct recall, five cents
for recall, or no incentive. The results from
both studies were similar, and those of Ker-
noff et al. are shown in Fig. 5.3. There were
substantial effects of incentive conditions
...J100
...J
3 90
w
Q: 60
I-
U 70
W
Q:
60
Q:
0 INCENTIVE
U 50
I-
Z 40
w
U
Q: 30
W
l'
!l.
I I
2·60
RETENTION INTERVAL (IN SECS)
Fig. 5.3. Recall as a function of incentive conditions and retention interval. (Kernoff et al. 1966)
Short-Term Memory: Weiner 73
on retention, with shock and 5 cent
reward being associated with better re-
call than one cent reward or no incentive.
Incentive conditions interacted with reten-
tion interval, with no effects of incentive be-
ing apparent with short retention intervals.
However, there appears to be a 'ceiling' ef-
fect, with recall being nearly perfect in all
conditions at the shortest retention interval.
Weiner and Walker (1966) argued that the
incentive effect might be due to motivation-
al factors at storage reducing the suscepti-
bility of the memory trace to pre- and post-
perceptual interference, which is a some-
what amorphous notion. Weiner (1967) sug-
gested as an alternative explanation that the
heightened arousal produced by incentives
might produce a prolonged period of re-
verberation or consolidation.
That suggestion was based on Walker's
(1958) action-decrement theory. Walker ar-
gued that there was a temporary inhibition
of retrieval (or action decrement) during the
process of consolidation which preserves
the memory trace and protects it from dis-
ruption. Since such action decrement lasts
longer under high arousal, it would be ex-
pected that incentives would reduce recall at
short retention intervals, but that result has
not been obtained. There is thus no reason
for supposing that Walker's theory can ac-
count for the data. In any case, Walker's the-
ory has been criticized on several grounds
(Eysenck 1977), notably because of the very
narrow range of data that supports it and be-
SHOCK
5-CENT
1,CENT INCENTIVE
NO INCENTIVE
I
9·35 17·00
74 Incentives and Motivation

cause high arousal often fails to produce the
predicted reduction in short-term retention.
The hypothesis that subjects engage in
more covert rehearsal of high-incentive than
of low-incentive items, in spite of the use of
an interpolated task designed to prevent re-
hearsal, was suggested by Tarpy and
Glucksberg (1966). It provides an extremely
straightforward explanation of most of the
available data. Wickens and Simpson (1968)
explored this hypothesis. Their paradigm
was very similar to that used by Weiner, ex-
cept that their subjects had to count back-
wards by threes from a three-digit number
during the retention interval. Information
about the incentive condition was provided
with the to-be-remembered information,
with the three-digit number or at recall.
The findings of Wickens and Simpson
(1968) are shown in Fig. 5.4. High incentive
only enhanced recall when information
about the incentive condition was pre-
sented at the same time as the to-be-re-
membered item. This result should be inter-
preted in the light of the data concerning
the speed with which the interpolated task
was performed. When the subjects were
aware of the relevant incentive condition
while performing the interplated task, there
was more counting backwards under the no-
incentive condition than under the incentive
conditions. The most natural interpretation
of the various findings is that high incen-
tives lead to increased recall in the Brown-
Peterson paradigm because they encourage
extra covert rehearsal of the to-be-remem-
bered material. It is interesting to note that
this explanation is in line with the theoreti-
cal emphasis of Atkinson and Wickens
(1971) on attentional and rehearsal mechan-
isms to account for incentive effects.
5.4 Task Characteristics
At a more general level, there has been a cer-
tain amount of controversy over the issue of
the primary effects of incentive or reward on
performance. On the one hand, Skinner has
for many years argued that a reward or rein-
forcer is a stimulus event that follows a re-
sponse and thereby increases the probabili-

60
,6
..J
..J
55 ,,",,"
« 50 A- __ ~._._ ...t:J.~"''''''
U

~
W
II:: 45
>-
z 40
w
u
II:: 35
w
Il.
30

I
1:
ci'"
zlJ) lJ,. __ ....
;:::~ 1700

'8°°1
- ................. .../j. _._0
Zo

~
=>w 1600
0>-
u«
IL..J 1500
00
>-Il.
zll::
=>w l' I I I
0>-
NO MONETARY SHOCK
Fig. 5.4. Top: the effects of incentive con-
~~ ditions and the time at which incentive in-
« INCENTIVE INCENTIVE IF WRONG
INCENTIVE CONDITIONS formations was provided on recall; bot-
tom: the effects of incentive conditions
INCENTIVE INFORMATION PROVIDED: and the time at which incentive informa-
- WITH TO-BE-REMEMBERED ITEMS tion was provided on performance of the
6---fj. WITH INTERPOLATED DIGIT SLIDE subsidiary task. (Wickens and Simpson
0-'-0 AT RETRIEVAL 1968)

ty of occurrence of that response. The impli-
cation of this position is that rewards or
reinforcers can be relied on to facilitate per-
formance.
On the other hand, Condry (1977) is an in-
fluential anti-reward psychologist: "Com-
pared to non-rewarded subjects, subjects of-
fered a task-extrinsic incentive choose eas-
ier tasks, are less efficient in using the infor-
mation available to solve novel problems,
and tend to be answer oriented and more il-
logical in their problem-solving strategies.
They seem to work harder and produce
more activity, but the activity is of a lower
quality, contains more errors, and is more
stereotyped and less creative than the work
of comparable nonrewarded subjects work-
ing on the same problems" (pp. 471-472).
The antecedents of Condry's position are to
be found in the Holy Bible rather than in the
collected works of Fred Skinner; in particu-
lar, one is reminded of the hypothesis ex-
pounded in the first Epistle of Paul to Timo-
thy: "Money is the root of all evil".
The simplest way of reconciling the ap-
parently opposed viewpoints of Skinner and
Condry is to consider the types of task each
of them has used in his work. Skinner has ty-
pically used extremely simple and repeti-
tious tasks such as lever pressing for food re-
ward in which the emphasis is on the per-
formance of over-learned patterns ofbehav-
iour rather than on the acquisition of new
skills. In contrast, Condry has tended to
look at the effects of incentive on relatively
complicated problem-solving or concept-at-
tainment tasks. Thus we can fairly neatly ac-
count for the differing theoretical perspec-
tives by proposing that incentive or reward
augments performance on simple and unde-
manding tasks but worsens performance on
tasks of great cognitive complexity.
A more detailed examination of the evi-
dence indicates that matters are actually
rather more complicated than this. Let us
begin by considering whether incentive and
reward consistently impair performance on
difficult tasks. Glucksberg (1962) used a
problem in which a candle has to be mount-
ed on a vertical screen; various objects, in-
Task Characteristics 75
cluding a book of matches and a box of
drawing pins, are available. Problem solu-
tion involves using the box as a platform for
the candle. The problem is said to involve
functional fixedness because a box is usual-
ly regarded as a container rather than as a
platform.
Glucksberg used two versions of the
problem, one in which the box was initially
full of drawing pins and matches and the
other in which the box was presented empty.
The former version makes problem solution
more difficult, because it emphasizes the
normal use of a box as a container. When
the problem was presented in its easier ver-
sion, there was no effect of monetary incen-
tive on speed of solution. In contrast, the in-
centivized subjects required approximately
3.5 min more than the non-incentivized sub-
jects to solve the difficult verion of the prob-
lem.
Related findings were reported by Glucks-
berg (1964) using a different functional fix-
edness problem which involved employing
a screwdriver to complete a circuit when the
available wires proved to be too short. Fi-
nancial incentive increased the time taken to
find the solution from 6 to 13 min on aver-
age when the relevance of the screwdriver
was de-emphasized, but there was no effect
of incentive when the task was presented in
such a way that it was reasonably clear that
the screwdriver was involved in solving the
problem.
The difficult versions of these two func-
tional fixedness problems are designed to
demonstrate the fact that habitual ways of
regarding an object tend to prevent the in-
sight that the object can be used in some
novel fashion that is appropriate to the task
in hand. This analysis suggests that incen-
tive increases the tendency to persist with es-
tablished modes of thinking even when
these turn out to be counter-productive; in
other words, incentive can reduce the flexi-
bility of thought.
A further study pointing to the same con-
clusion was reported by McGraw and
McCullers (1979). They made use of water-
jar problems in which subjects have to im-
76 Incentives and Motivation
agine pouring liquid from one jar to another
in order to finish up with a designated quan-
tity of liquid in one of the jars. The first nine
problems had the same three-jar solution,
thus leading the subjects to establish a men-
tal set. The ease with which this mental set
could be broken was assessed by using a
tenth and final problem which only had a
simple two-jar solution.
Monetary incentive did not affect solu-
tion speed on the first nine problems but in-
creased the mean time taken to solve the fi-
nal problem by approximately 60 %. Thus
once again we can see that incentive has had
the effect of reducing cognitive flexibility;
more specifically, it has produced a negative
transfer effect, in which previously acquired
skills were applied inappropriately to a new
situation.
More evidence that incentive can have a
disruptive effect on the performance of
cognitively demanding tasks was obtained
by Condry and Chambers (1978) in a series
of studies on concept attainment. They sum-
marized the disadvantages of incentive in
the following way: "Intrinsically motivated
subjects attend to and utilize a wider array
of information; they are focused on the way
to solve the problem rather than the solu-
tion. They are, in general, more careful, logi-
cal, and coherent in their problem-solving
strategies than comparable subjects offered
a reward to solve the same problems"
(p.69).
A different kind of cognitively demand-
ing task is the standard intelligence test. The
typical finding, perhaps surprisingly, is that
incentives of various kinds have little or no
effect on the results of most intelligence
tests. Monetary incentives were found to
have no effect on intelligence-test scores by
Ferguson (1937), Maller and Zubin (1932)
and Willis and Ehrlick (1975) with normal
groups and by Eysenck (1944) with neurotic
patients. Benton (1936) gave the Otis test to
seventh and eighth grade children in two
matched groups and found that even an am-
algam of incentives (including praise, strong
encouragement, knowledge of results and
the promise of a prize) was insufficient to
improve test performance above that of the
control group.
Some investigators (e.g. Nichols 1959,
Sarason and Minard 1962) have attempted
to motivate their subjects by means of ego-
involving or achievement-oriented instruc-
tions; once again, motivation had no overall
influence on test performance. In contrast,
knowledge of results in the form of feed-
back about the correctness of responses has
been found to improve performance (Bass
& Ninias 1974, Willis and Ehrlick 1975).
However, in view of the fact that incentive
per se had no effect on performance in eith-
er of these studies, it was probably the infor-
mative rather than the motivational compo-
nent of knowledge of results that produced
the observed improvement.
The various findings clearly support
Spearman's (1927) contention that perform-
ance on cognitive tests is relatively inde-
pendent of conation or motivation. How-
ever, Maller and Zubin (1932) obtained the
following findings: "The incentive of rivalry
failed to bring about a significant increase
in score on an intelligence test, although the
subjects worked faster when motivated by
rivalry. The increase in speed resulted only
in an increased number of items tried and a
corresponding increase in error, leaving the
final scores practically unchanged" (p. 149).
Maller and Zubin also found that motiva-
tion produced enhanced performance on a
speed test (Comparison of Numbers) but
impaired performance on a power test (An-
alogies). Related findings were obtained by
Dickstein and Ayers (1973). The found that
monetary incentive improved performance
on the performance sub-tests of the Wechs-
ler Adult Intelligence Scale; however, on
the Advanced Progessive Matrices, which
is an extremely difficult power test deve-
loped for people of high intelligence, there
was no incentive effect.
There is some evidence that the precise ef-
fects of motivational factors on intelligence-
test performance depend on individual dif-
ferences. Those high in ability are more like-
ly than those low in ability to benefit from
increased motivation (Maller and Zubin

1932), and those low in anxiety are more
likely to respond positively to incentives
than those high in anxiety (Sarason and Mi-
nard 1962).
In contrast to the predominantly negative
effects of incentive on cognitively demand-
ing tasks requiring flexibility of thought, in-
centive has fairly consistently been found to
enhance performance on tasks where the
emphasis is on speed of response. The su-
preme example of such a task is lever press-
ing for food, which is beloved of those inter-
ested in operant conditioning. A second ex-
ample is the reaction-time task, on which
knowledge of results (which has frequently
been regarded as an incentive) has been
found to produce faster reaction times (e.g.
Blowers and Ongley 1975).
In order to understand more clearly the
effects of incentive on reaction time, we
must consider the reaction-time task in
some detail. One of the major determinants
of reaction time is the interval between the
occurrence of a warning stimulus and the
signal requiring response; this is known as
the foreperiod. The optimal foreperiod for
fast reaction is typically between 0.5 and 2 s.
The function relating reaction time to the
length of the foreperiod depends import-
antly on the individual's state of prepara-
tion or alertness.
Gottsdanker (1975) proposed the follow-
ing hypothesis concerning this state: "Pre-
paration is an aversive. state and as such is
entered into only when profitable, but other-
wise avoided" (p. 34). He found that it took
approximately 300 ms to attain full prepara-
tion and that the state of high-level prepara-
tion was rarely maintained in full for more
than a relatively short period of time, presu-
mably because of its aversive nature.
Common sense suggests that incentive
would produce a prolonged state of prepar-
ation or alertness. However, this notion can
only be evaluated properly after considering
what is involved in preparation or alertness.
The occurrence of a warning stimulus is ty-
pically followed by a temporary blocking of
rhythmical alpha activity of the EEG and
then by fast, desynchronized activity (Lan-
Task Characteristics 77
sing et al. 1959). In addition, there is a slow
negative drift in the EEG which is known in
the trade as contingent negative variation
(CNV). This starts some 100-200 ms after
the warning stimulus and approaches its
maximum amplitude at a rate that is a func-
tion of the warning interval. The CNV ap-
pears to consist of two phases, the first of
which is an alertness to stimuli, and the sec-
ond of which is a motor pre-programming
phase (Posner 1978).
Posner (1978) argued that alertness or
preparation affected the processes involved
in reaction-time performance in the follow-
ing way: "The effects of alertness seem to be
best described as reducing the time for some
central mechanism to respond to the build-
up of information about the signal. The cen-
trals systems of an alert organism react more
quickly. If the task requires detection of a
transient signal, a warning may improve all
aspects of performance. If the signal is
steady-state, a speed-accuracy tradeoff is
usually found" (p. 131).
In many studies, the error rates at differ-
ent foreperiods are suggestive of a speed-ac-
curacy trade-off, but the overall number of
errors is so small that no significant differ-
ences in error rate were found. An exception
is an experiment reported by Posner et al.
(1973), in which the subjects were given in-
structions that emphasized the importance
of speed. There was clear evidence of a
speed-accuracy trade-off, with fast respond-
ing at foreperiods in the 100-400 ms range
being accompanied by high error rates.
If incentive leads to increased alertness or
preparation, then it follows that the major
characteristics of the alert state should be
produced by incentive. As a consequence,
we can make the following predictions:
1. Incentive should increase the amplitude
oftheCNV.
2. Since the alert state is difficult to sustain
over long periods of time, incentive mani-
pulations should have their maximal effect
with long foreperiods (i.e. when alertness
would usually be low). In other words,
there should be an interaction between in-
centive conditions and foreperiod length.
78 Incentives and Motivation
3. Provided that a reasonable number of er-
rors are made, incentive should lead to a
speed-accuracy trade-off.
Some support for the first prediction was
obtained by Blowers and Ongley (1975) in
an study already mentioned. Incentive in
the form of knowledge of results not only
produced faster responding; it also led to in-
creased CNV amplitude. Similarly, Otto
(1971) discovered that knowledge of results
in the form of red or green lights indicating
whether or not a given reaction-time criteri-
on had been exceeded led to a greater CNV
area than no feedback. In contrast, there
was no effect of knowledge of results on
CNV amplitude in a study carried out by
Rebert (1972). However, Rebert failed to ob-
tain any effect offeedback on reaction time,
so that it is possible that feedback simply
failed to incentivize his subjects.
There is limited evidence relevant to the
second prediction. Elliott et al. (1976) used
blocks of trials with preparatory intervals or
foreperiods of 4 and 8 s; incentive reduced
reaction times more at the longer interval.
They also observed that incentive led to
greater heart rate deceleration during the
foreperiod, which is consistent with the no-
tion that incentive increases alertness.
In an earlier study, Elliott (1970) had
found that reaction times were interactively
determined by incentive conditions and by
length of the foreperiod when blocks of tri-
als with constant length of foreperiod were
240
w 220
~
!-
Zu 200
Qw
!-I/I
u~ 180
~Z
0:-
Z 160
<{
w
~ 140
L I
2 3 4 5
LENGTH OF FOREPERIOD
(IN SECS)
used (see Fig. 5.5). On the other hand, there
was no interaction when the length of the
foreperiod varied randomly; instead, there
was simply a general improvement in speed
of reaction under incentive conditions.
The third prediction is that the increased
speed of responding by incentivized sub-
jects should be accompanied by a greater er-
ror rate. While this seems plausible in view
of the effects of incentive on other kinds of
tasks, no directly relevant evidence seems to
be available.
Another way of looking at the effects of
incentive on performance speed is to use the
five-choice serial reaction task or some var-
iant of it. The basic apparatus consists of
five lights with a response key immediately
below each one. When a light comes on, it is
switched off by pressing its corresponding
key, which simultaneously illuminates an-
other light at random. The task is usually
performed for relatively long periods of
time, and the detrimental effects of various
stressors are most pronounced towards the
end of the task period.
The effects of motivation on the serial
reaction task depend in large measure on
the strength of motivation which is created.
Very strong motivation produces a decre-
ment in performance, whereas less intense
motivation improves performance. In a
study by Willett (1964), unusually powerful
motivation was created by using as subjects
the candidates for a highly desirable ap-
LOW
INCENTIVE
HIGH
INCENTIVE
Fig. 5.5 Mean reaction time as a function
of monetary incentive and length of the
foreperiod in children between the ages of
11 and 13. (Elliott 1970)

prenticeship who thought that their per-
formance on the serial reaction task was
relevant to their chances of being accepted.
The control group consisted of those previ-
ously accepted for the apprenticeship who
knew that the data being collected had no
bearing on their standing in the training
school. The highly motivated subjects pro-
duced fewer correct responses and approxi-
mately twice as many errors on the five-
choice serial reaction task.
Motivation was manipulated in the same
fashion by Eysenck and Warwick (1964).
They used a very complicated multiple-
choice reaction task with responses being
produced by one finger, by one foot or by
the whole hand. In contrast to the serial
reaction task, this task was experimenter
paced rather than subject paced. High in-
centive motivation reduced the number of
correct responses by approximately 30%.
Very different results have been obtained
with less intense incentive manipulations.
Wilkinson et al. (1972) incentivized some of
their subjects by the fairly mild expedient of
offering payment by results and providing
information about errors and unduly long
response times. They used both an easy and
a difficult version of the serial reaction task
(four- and ten-choice, respectively). Speed
of responding was increased by incentive,
but there was no effect of incentive on accu-
racy of performance. The beneficial effects
of incentive were comparable on both ver-
sions of the task.
In earlier work with the five-choice serial
reaction task (Wilkinson 1963), knowledge
of results reduced the number of errors and
the number of gaps (i.e. unusually long re-
sponses) and did so to a greater extent in
quiet than in noise. Wilkinson and Colqu-
houn (1968) used the same task and dis-
covered that knowledge of results led to
more correct responses and to a reduction in
the number of errors and gaps; the overall
advantage of knowledge of results was re-
duced (but probably not eliminated) among
subjects who had consumed a large amount
of rum. Of course, unequivocal interpreta-
tion of the effects of knowledge of results is
Task Characteristics 79
difficult, because it may provide useful in-
formation over and above any incentive ef-
fect.
If incentive is regarded as an arouser
(Broadbent, 1971), then the pattern of re-
sults on the serial reaction task is in line with
the Yerkes-Dodson law (discussed in
Chap. 4). According to Yerkes and Dodson
(1908), there is a curvilinear relationship be-
tween arousal and performance, with inter-
mediate arousal levels being optimal for
performance. Unfortunately Yerkes and
Dodson described rather than explained
their data, so that the reasons for this curvili-
near relationship remain obscure.
The cancellation task seems conceptually
similar to the serial reaction task in that it re-
quires self-paced responses performed in a
continuous manner. The task involves cross-
ing out certain target stimuli (e.g. all the 'e's)
on a sheet of paper containing target and
non-target stimuli.
Dey and Kaur (1965) used a letter cancel-
lation task and found that subjects who
were assigned hard output goals performed
better than those who were assigned easy
output goals. Feldman (1964) compared the
performance of high-incentive subjects
(those seeking a desired apprenticeship)
and low-incentive subjects (those previous-
ly accepted) on a digit cancellation task,
which was given in both an easy and a diffi-
cult version. Incentive increased the number
of correct responses on the easy task but did
not affect correct responding on the difficult
task. Incentivized subjects made many more
errors than non-incentivized subjects, espe-
cially on the easy task.
Corcoran (1962b) found that incentive in
the form of fake feedback improved the
speed with which a letter cancellation task
was performed. Further analysis revealed
that this enhancement effect was almost en-
tirely attributable to the extraverted sub-
jects: their speed of performance increased
by approximately 80% under incentive con-
ditions, whereas that of introverts was unaf-
fected.
Another task on which the effects of in-
centive are usually positive is vigilance.
80 Incentives and Motivation
Systematic scientific investigation of vigi-
lance was initiated by Mackworth (1950),
who simulated the task of maintaining radar
watch for submarines by using a clock
pointer which moved on in a series of steps.
The subjects watched the pointer and re-
ported the relatively infrequent occasions
on which the pointer gave a double jump.
Most of the subsequent researchers in the vi-
gilance area have followed Mackworth's
lead and used tasks requiring the observer to
keep watch for inconspicuous signals (eith-
er visual or auditory) over long periods of
time of I h or more. The most important
finding is the so-called vigilance decrement,
i.e. the probability of signal detection tends
to decrease over time.
As Broadbent (1971) pointed out, it is not
sufficient merely to consider the detection
data, since information about false alarms
(i.e. the reported detections of signals when
none is presented) is of great importance.
Information about detections and false
alarms can be used by signal detection the-
orists (e.g. Swets 1977) to provide independ-
ent measures of observer sensitivity and of
his decision criterion (i.e. his bias towards
one or other of the response alternatives).
According to the theory, the decision criteri-
on is determined jointly by the probabilities
of the stimulus alternatives (signal present
versus signal absent) and by the payoff ma-
trix. The payoff matrix is determined by the
values or gains associated with correct deci-
sions ('yes' when the signal is present and
'no' when the signal is absent) and the costs
of errors ('no' when the signal is present and
'yes' when the signal is absent).
The vigilance decrement has occasionally
been found to be due to a decline in sensitiv-
ity, especially if there is a rapid rate of sti-
mulus presentation. However, the typical
finding is that it is primarily attributable to a
progressive rise in the strictness of the re-
sponse criterion.
There have been various attempts to elu-
cidate the effects of motivational factors on
vigilance performance. Nachreiner (1977)
produced high motivation by informing one
group of subjects that good performance on
the vigilance task might lead to the offer of a
desired part-time employment at the rate of
£4-an hour. The highly motivated group de-
tected more auditory signals; in addition,
there was a vigilance decrement for the non-
incentivized subjects, but not for the high-
motivation subjects. Related findings were
obtained by Lucaccini, Freedy and Lyman
(1968).
Nachreiner (1977) noted that the vigi-
lance decrement occurred far more fre-
quently in the laboratory than in 'real-life'
situations and suggested that this difference
was due to the much greater likelihood of
motivation diminishing over time in the la-
boratory.
When incentives are offered for correct
detections, the effect is to increase the gain
associated with correct detections and so
presumably to lower the response criterion.
In other words, it is conceivable that the en-
tire motivational effect is on the response
criterion rather than on sensitivity. In one
study of auditory vigilance (Levine 1966),
the financial gain associated with signal de-
tection and the financial cost associated
with a missed signal or a false alarm were
manipulated. Increased costs for either mis-
ses or false alarms led to poorer detection
performance, whereas changes in the gains
for detections failed to influence perform-
ance. Sensitivity was invariant across condi-
tions, so that the performance changes were
attributed to shifts in the response criterion.
Very similar results were obtained by
Davenport (1968) for an auditory vigilance
task and by Davenport (1969) for vibro-tac-
tile vigilance. The value placed on detec-
tions had little or no effect, whereas increa-
sing costs for missed signals and false
alarms produced poorer detection perform-
ance because of greater cautiousness about
responding.
It would not necessarily be appropriate to
conclude that incentive has no effect on sen-
sitivity or d'. The reason is that most of the
relevant studies failed to use a control group
receiving no incentive. When such a control
group has been used, the various incentive

conditions have been found to increase sen-
sitivity or d' in an auditory vigilance situa-
tion (Sostek 1978). A group encouraged to
be cautious (loss of 9 cents for each false
alarm) adopted a more stringent response
criterion than the control group, whereas
subjects threatened with loss of 9 cents for
every miss (i.e. failure of detection) chose a
rather low response criterion.
In his seminal research, Mackworth
(1950) discovered that the vigilance decre-
ment could be prevented by providing
knowledge of results when a signal was eith-
er missed or correctly detected. This result
has been obtained several times subsequent-
ly. The central interpretative problem is that
the effects of knowledge of results may be
mediated by anyone of several different me-
chanisms, including enhanced motivation,
increased arousal, information provision or
indications of signal schedules.
Some clarification of what is happening
has been obtained by considering the effects
of simulated or 'false' knowledge of results.
Several researchers, including Loeb and
Schmidt (1963), have discovered that false
knowledge of results improves vigilance
performance. Thus part of the effect of
knowledge of results on performance is not
due to any specific information which it pro-
vides. It is worth noting that Loeb and
Schmidt also found that genuine knowledge
of results was more effective than false
knowledge of results. However, the evi-
dence on this point is equivocal, since it has
sometimes been found (e.g. Warm et al.
1974) that genuine and false feedback or
knowledge of results produce comparable
enhancement of vigilance performance.
In an interesting study, Warm et al. (1972)
noted that simply asking their subjects to es-
timate their performance efficiency after
each response produced as great an im-
provement in performance of a visual vigi-
lance task as knowledge of results, despite
the fact that the accuracy of the estimates
did not exceed chance. They concluded that
the motivational effects of knowledge of re-
sults stem from the subject's self-evalua-
tions in relation to performance standards.
Task Characteristics 81
It is clear that incentives and knowledge
of results (which seems to act as an incen-
tive) both enhance vigilance performance,
but there have been relatively few attempts
to explain why this should be so. The most
promising lead is that motivational manipu-
lations sometimes affect the response crite-
rion or cautiousness of responding, but it
certainly cannot be assumed that there are
no effects on sensitivity. The vigilance para-
digm was originally devised because it
seemed to capture some of the salient char-
acteristics of certain work conditions, and it
is obviously useful in that context to know
that added incentives can prevent the vigi-
lance decrement. From a more academic
perspective, however, it is rather difficult to
conceptualize the psychological mechan-
isms and processes involved in vigilance
performance. This may help to account for
the relative lack of headway in explaining
exactly why motivation improves vigilance
performance.
In sum, we have seen that the effects of in-
centive depend greatly on the precise nature
of the task which is used. Incentive typically
has a positive effect on reaction time, can-
cellation, lever pressing and vigilance tasks
and no effect on intelligence test perform-
ance; it often has a negative effect on prob-
lem-solving and concept attainment tasks.
What is the meaning of this collection of
findings at the theoretical level? One at-
tempt to provide an answer was made by
McGraw (1978). He claimed in essence that
incentive would have a negative effect on
task performance only when two crucial
pre-conditions were met: (I) the task is suf-
ficiently intrinsically interesting that extrin-
sic incentive or reward provides a redun-
dant source of motivation and (2) the task
solution is relatively open ended, with the
necessary steps involved in that solution be-
ing non-obvious. McGraw elucidated the
second point by drawing a conceptual dis-
tinction between algorithmic and heuristic
tasks; in algorithmic tasks, the path to solu-
tion is clear and straightforward, whereas
the first essential requirement with heuristic
tasks is to develop an algorithm.
82 Incentives and Motivation
This theoretical analysis suggests that
tasks can be classified with respect to their
location on an attractive-aversive continu-
um and in terms of an algorithmic-heuristic
dimension. While this is a somewhat conjec-
tural exercise, it is nevertheless clear that the
tasks which have been used in incentive re-
search do not represent anything like a ran-
dom selection from within this two-dimen-
sional space. In fact, a disproportionate
number of the tasks used have been aversive
and algorithmic. Since the beneficial effects
of incentive are maximal with such tasks, it
is probable that this bias in task selection
has led many researchers into the erroneous
assumption that incentive nearly always
augments performance.
The studies by Glucksberg (1962, 1964)
can be used to illustrate the potential useful-
ness of the algorithmic-heuristic distinction.
In these terms, he discovered that incentive
disrupted problem-solving activities when
the problem was presented in a heuristic
form but failed to do so when the relevant
algorithm was made more obvious. Why
should incentive interfere with the cognitive
processes used on heuristic tasks? Accord-
ing to McGraw (1978) the answer can be
found in the fairly reliable finding (which is
discussed later) that incentive reduces inci-
dental learning. McGraw expressed the
point in the following way: "Reward sub-
jects might do less well on concept forma-
tion, problem solving, and those other tasks
on which we have seen reward subjects to be
inferior precisely because of their inferiority
at incidental learning ... The heuristic pro-
cess needed for some intentional-task solu-
tions can be said to feed on incidental
thoughts and perceptions" (p. 55).
While McGraw's suggestions are plausi-
ble, there are some problems with his posi-
tion. Incentive has sometimes harmed per-
formance on tasks which are neither intrin-
sically interesting nor heuristic (e.g. Willett
1964, discovered that performance on the
serial reaction task was impaired by incen-
tive). Willett used an extremely powerful in-
centive (i.e. a desired apprenticeship), and it
seems reasonable to assume that the number
of tasks adversely affected by incentive will
be greater with large rather than small in-
centives. It is strange that McGraw failed to
include amount of incentive as one of the
factors determining the behavioural effects
of incentive.
It has also been found that incentive
sometimes fails to harm performance on
tasks which are both interesting and heuris-
tic. The most obvious example of this is the
frequent finding that incentive has no effect
at all on intelligence test performance. A
more instructive example is the finding that
incentive did not affect performance speed
on the initial water jar problems in the study
by McGraw and McCullers (1979), in spite
of the non-obvious nature of the appro-
priate algorithm. However, incentive did
disrupt performance on the last problem in
the series, which required a different algo-
rithm to the preceding problems. This sug-
gests that the critical factor may be the pres-
ence of an accessible but inappropriate al-
gonthm rather than (as McGraw claimed)
merely the absence of obvious steps to task
solution.
It was surely right of McGraw to empha-
size task attractiveness, since it is impossible
to predict the effects of incentive without
some knowledge of the extent to which non-
incentivized subjects are intrinsically moti-
vated to perform the task. However, it is ac-
tually rather difficult to measure task attrac-
tiveness, which is interactively determined
by the personal characteristics of the subject
(e.g. intelligence, personality) and by the in-
trinsic characteristics of the task.
The greatest limitation of McGraw's the-
oretical stance may well be the implicit as-
sumption that incentive improves or impairs
performance efficiency in a readily deter-
minable way. A very common finding is that
incentive speeds up performance, but de-
creases the quality of that performance by
increasing the error rate. In such circum-
stances it is very difficult (or even impossi-
ble) to decide whether incentive has en-
hanced or reduced performance efficiency;
indeed, such findings make one wonder
whether the emphasis on assessing the over-

all efficiency of performance should be re-
placed by a stress on the patterning of per-
formance. This issue is explored at greater
length in the next section.
5.5 Performance Efficiency
There would presumably be almost com-
plete agreement that the use of two or more
measures of performance is likely to provide
a more complete picture of the conse-
quences of incentive than can be obtained
by using only a single dependent variable.
However, it is the norm rather than the ex-
ception for only one dependent measure to
be used. This not only reduces the amount
of information that is available; it can also
mislead researchers into erroneous conclu-
sions.
Locke (1968) discussed some research
that provides a case in point. The task used
was listing a specified number of objects
meeting various criteria (e.g. 'heavy, rough
and square'). The number of objects actual-
ly listed was largely determined by the goal
level (i.e. the specified number of objects),
leading Locke to the conclusion that per-
formance efficiency is a direct function of
goal level.
This conclusion was challenged by Bave-
las and Lee (1978) in a study in which they
replicated the finding that the number of ob-
jects written down is positively related to
goal level. When they evaluated the quality
of the responses in terms of the extent to
which they matched up with each of the
three criteria, they discovered that the quali-
ty of performance was inversely related to
goal level! In other words, high goal level
led to increased quantity but to reduced
quality of responding. With such findings
the notion of 'performance efficiency'
seems almost meaningless.
We have already discussed other studies
in which incentive produced a similar
speed-accuracy trade-off. Feldman (1964)
and Maller and Zubin (1932) found that in-
Performance Efficiency 83
centive increased speed of responding, but
reduced the accuracy of performance.
There is some evidence that incentive can
more readily affect the speed of perform-
ance than its quality. Adam (1972) used a
task that involved collating information
from data processing unit records cards.
The initial instructions emphasized either
quantity or quality of output, and incentive
was offered for following the instructions.
When there was an unannounced shift from
rewarding quantity to rewarding quality,
subjects did not alter their behaviour; how-
ever, a shift in the opposite direction led to
increased quantity and reduced quality.
Why is it that the quantitative aspects of
performance are more easily improved by
incentive than are the qualitative aspects?
Part of the answer may be that effort is more
directly related to performance quantity
than to its quality (Terborg and Miller
1978). A further point is that incentive is an
arouser (Broadbent 1971, Wilkinson et al.
1972), and high arousal tends to be associat-
ed with rapid, non-reflective responding.
At the theoretical level, the most interest-
ing example of incentive producing differ-
ential effects on two aspects of performance
occurs when two concurrent tasks are used.
There are at least 12 relevant studies; Bah-
rick 1954, Bahrick et al. 1952, Cohen et al.
1973, Davies and Jones 1975, Dixon and
Cameron 1976, Dornbush 1965, Johnson
and Thomson 1962, Kausler et al. 1963,
Kausler and Trapp 1962, McNamara and
Fisch 1964, Rubin et al. 1962, Wolk and Du-
Cette 1974. The main task used in several of
these studies involved intentional learning
of a list of items (words, nonsense syllables
or geometrical forms), with the subsidiary
task consisting of the incidental learning of
other stimuli (additional words or colours)
which were presented at the same time as
the main-task stimuli.
More than one experiment was reported
in some of the above studies, so that there
are 15 sets of relevant data altogeth·er. In-
centive improved main-task performance in
six experiments and had no effect in the
other nine. In contrast, incentive was found
84 Incentives and Motivation
to improve subsidiary-task performance in
only three of the experiments, it impaired
performance in five cases and it had no ef-
fect in the other seven. Incentive apparently
produces a re-allocation of attentional re-
sources, with extra resources being invested
in the main task (thus enhancing main-task
performance) and fewer resources being as-
signed to the subsidiary task (so impairing
subsidiary-task performance).
The notion that incentive increases atten-
tional selectivity provides a very attractive
explanation of these findings and may well
be the major reason why incentive often im-
proves performance. However, it must be
admitted that there are major methodologi-
cal deficiencies in the dual-task studies re-
viewed above. It is difficult to be sure that
incentive is affecting attentional processes
when the only data collected are based on
retention test performance. Strictly speak-
ing, we cannot conclusively attribute the dif-
ferential effects of incentive on main and
subsidiary tasks to task importance, since
rather different stimuli were used in the two
tasks in nearly all of the studies. Finally, the
use of incidental learning as the subsidiary
task provides an indication of what people
choose to do rather than what they are able
to do.
Easterbrook (1959) used the dual-task da-
ta to argue that high arousal, whether pro-
duced by incentive or in some other way,
leads to a narrowing of cue utilization. This
emphasis on attentional selectivity is ap-
propriate; however, Easterbrook argued
that the narrowing of cue utilization was a
fairly automatic consequence of the arousal
produced by incentive, whereas it seems
preferable to regard it as an active coping re-
sponse to an altered payoff matrix.
One way of attempting to distinguish be-
tween the two viewpoints is to consider sus-
ceptibility to distraction. According to Eas-
terbrook, incentive increases the degree of
concentration on the main task and thus
presumably reduces distractibility. In some
recent unpublished work, we have dis-
covered that the offer of large financial in-
centives for superior performance on a let-
ter transformation task actually increases
distractibility, at least when the distracting
stimuli are very similar to the task stimuli.
This result can be explained by assuming
that incentive reduces the spare attentional
capacity available for discriminating be-
tween task and non-task stimuli.
A simple generalization that describes
many of the results discussed above is that
incentive enhances performance on those
aspects of performance emphasized in the
task instructions at the cost of impaired per-
formance on other aspects. In other words,
incentivized subjects follow a 'minimax'
principle: they limit their performance to
those aspects minimally required for the de-
livery of maximal rewards.
5.6 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Most of the research discussed so far in this
chapter has been based on observing the ef-
fects of various external or extrinsic incen-
tives (e.g. food, money, praise) on perform-
ance. These incentives or rewards are extrin-
sic in the sense that they provide satisfaction
that is independent of the activity itself, and
they are controlled by someone other than
the subject. Deci (1975) has proposed a con-
ceptual distinction between extrinsic and in-
trinsic motivation, with the latter term being
aplied to activities for which there is no ap-
parent reward except the activity itself. The
intrinsic motivation to perform a task will be
present if engaging in that task enhances a
person's feelings of competence and self-de-
termination.
If there are any important differences be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation,
then a rather biased and fragmentary view
of motivation is bound to emerge if only ex-
trinsic sources of motivation such as finan-
cial incentives are considered. For example,
it has been suspected for some time that the
provision of extrinsic rewards mainly af-
fects behaviour during the time that such re-
wards are available but may have surpris-
ingly little long-term effect.

One of the main practical uses of extrinsic
rewards has been in token economies, in
which groups of various kinds (e.g. juvenile
delinquents, criminals or mental patients)
have been offered tokens for designated de-
sirable modes of behaviour; these tokens
can subsequently be exchanged for various
goods or privileges. These token economies
often suffer from one major drawback, as
was pointed out by Kazdin and Bootzin
(1972) in their review of the literature:
"There are numerous reports of token pro-
grammes showing behaviour change only
while contingent token reinforcement is be-
ing delivered. Generally, removal of token
reinforcement results in undesirable re-
sponses and a return to baseline or near
baseline levels of performance" (p. 359). It
is possible that the tokens produce a reduc-
tion in intrinsic motivation by causing a per-
son to lose his feelings of self-determina-
tion, which could help to explain the tran-
sient nature of the benefits of the token
economy.
It has typically been assumed that the ef-
fects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are independent and additive. This view was
challenged by Deci (1975). He claimed that
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are not in-
dependent, that they do not sum and that
one consequence of increasing extrinsic mo-
tivation may be to reduce intrinsic motiva-
tion. Since intrinsically motivated behav-
iour is behaviour which allows a person to
feel competent and self-determining (Deci
1975), it follows that there are two ways in
which extrinsic rewards can affect intrinsic
motivation: (1) a change in the perceived lo-
cus of causality and (2) a change in an indi-
vidual's feelings of competence.
When someone is intrinsically motivated,
the perceived locus of causality is within
that person. However, if people perceive
that they are engaging in a particular activi-
ty primarily for an extrinsic reward, then the
perceived locus of causality changes to the
external reward or incentive, leaving them
with reduced intrinsic motivation. Thus a
major reason why extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation are sometimes mutually antag-
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation 85
onistic is because they involve different per-
ceived loci of causality.
According to Deci, extrinsic rewards do
not only have a controlling function which
initiates the change in perceived locus of
causality; they also provide information
about competence and self-determination.
If incentive or reward strengthens these feel-
ings of competence, then it will enhance in-
trinsic motivation; if it weakenes these feel-
ings, then it decreases intrinsic motivation.
So much for theory - how much empirical
support is there for these various hypo-
theses? The notion that the introduction of
extrinsic rewards will reduce intrinsic moti-
vation has been investigated many times.
Two major measures of strength of intrinsic
motivation have been utilized: (1) the
amount of time spent working on a specific
activity in a free-choice situation in which
there are other things to do and no external
rewards are available and (2) task satisfac-
tion or willingness to volunteer for a similar
experiment as revealed by questionnaires.
Both measures of intrinsic motivation
were used in a classic study by Deci (1971).
He used a task called SOMA, which com-
prises a number of blocks that can be ar-
ranged to form a variety of patterns speci-
fied by the experimenter. The participants
in this study attended for three sessions and
received no payment for the first and third
sessions. For the second session, however,
one group of subjects was paid $ 1 for each
problem solved, and a second group re-
ceived no payment.
In the middle of each session, the experi-
menter went out of the room for 8 min, leav-
ing the subject alone with more puzzles as
well as recent magazines and other distrac-
tions. The effects of the extrinsic rewards on
intrinsic motivation were indexed by the
amount of time spent in problem-solving ac-
tivity during the middle of the third session.
As predicted, those who had received finan-
cial rewards in the second session showed
less intrinsic motivation than those who had
not. While it was also expected that extrinsic
rewards would affect attitudes towards the
task, the two groups did not differ in terms
86 Incentives and Motivation

of rated task satisfaction. The phenomenon
of extrinsic rewards reducing subsequent in-
trinsic motivation has been replicated sever-
al times (see Notz 1975).
The phenomenon can be accounted for in
other ways than that favoured by Deci
(1975). For example, extrinsic rewards may
lead subjects to set higher performance
goals, so that extra effort is exerted and the
probability of goal attainment is reduced. A
subsequent dimunition in intrinsic motiva-
tion as a consequence of fatigue and failure
experiences might be anticipated.
This alternative explanation was rejected
by Kruglanski et al. (1972). Children re-
ceived a reward after they had participated
in a series of games. They were erroneously
led to believe that they had been promised
the reward before they took part in the var-
ious games. In this case, extrinsic rewards
could not have affected their behaviour
while they were joining in the games. In
spite of this, their intrinsic motivation for
the games was reduced, presumably be-
cause they attributed their involvement in
the games to extrinsic motivation.
One of the few studies to look for an inter-
action between intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vation was reported by Calder and Staw
(1975). They manipulated both extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation, the former by contrast-
ing non-payment with a monetary incentive
that was not contingent on performance and
the latter by varying the interest value of the
task (jigsaw-type puzzles that were either
blank or consisted of interesting pictures
such as Playboy centrefolds). Performance
level was effectively controlled, since with
only five pieces per puzzle no errors were
made.
As can be seen in Fig. 5.6, there was an in-
teraction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation on a measure of task satisfac-
tion, and a similar pattern of results was ob-
tained for time volunteered by subjects for
future experiments of a similar nature. It
may well be that extrinsic rewards reduce in-
trinsic motivation for relatively interesting
tasks, such as those used by Deci or the pic-
ture puzzles used by Calder and Staw
(1975), but actually increase intrinsic moti-
vation for uninteresting tasks such as the
blank puzzles.
Extrinsic rewards do not always reduce
intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks,
however. When children unexpectedly re-
ceived an extrinsic reward (a good player
award consisting of a gold star and a red rib-
bon) after performing the interesting task of
playing with magic markers, their intrinsic
motivation increased (Lepper et al. 1973). It
may be that rewards only reduce intrinsic
motivation when they are conspicuous or
salient. Ross (1975) found that simply offer-
ing and giving a reward for task perform-
ance did not affect intrinsic motivation,

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Fig. 5.6. Ratings of the enjoyableness of
the task as a function of extrinsic motiva-
LOW(NOMONEY) HIGH(MONEY) tion and intrinsic motivation (blanks ver-
EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION sus pictures). (Calder and Staw 1975)

whereas having the anticipated reward visi-
ble in front of the subject while the experi-
mental task was being done led to reduced
intrinsic motivation.
We have so far concentrated on the no-
tion that the introduction of extrinsic re-
wards will reduce intrinsic motivation. The
general theoretical position adopted by Oe-
ci (1975) suggests the further prediction that
the motivation to perform a task undertaken
originally to obtain an extrinsic reward may
increase if the reward is subsequently with-
drawn. This paradoxical effect should occur
theoretically because the withdrawal of ex-
trinsic rewards changes the perceived locus
of causality from an external to an internal
locus. This sounds like an employer's pana-
cea for cash flow problems, but there must
be some doubts as to whether trade union
leaders would agree that pay cuts would
motivate their members to work harder!
Some support for the putative benefits of
reward with drawal was obtained by Weick
(1964). Students were invited to participate
in an experiment for which they would re-
ceive credit towards a course in psychology.
When the students arrived for the experi-
ment, some of them were told that they
would not receive the credit they had been
promised and were treated rather brusquely.
Ten different measures including expended
effort, task accomplishment, goal setting
and interest in the task aU indicated stronger
motivation for those subjects whose pro-
mised extrinsic reward had been withdrawn
than for those who received course credit.
There are obviously some interesting and
surprising interactions between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivational factors. However,
the proper interpretation of the data is in
some doubt. Oeci (1975) claimed that extrin-
sic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation by
changing the perceived locus of causality,
but he presented no empirical evidence to
support the proposed mechanism. A further
difficulty with Oeci's theoretical position is
that he seems to believe that extrinsic re-
wards decrease the perception of intrinsic
motivation, with this in turn decreasing ac-
tual intrinsic motivation. It is assumed that
A Theoretical Overview 87
the attributed cause of a pattern of beha-
viour is congruent with its objective cause;
this is an assumption requiring further in-
vestigation.
5.7 A Theoretical Overview
While no satisfactory theory of the effects
of incentive on performance is currently
available, we can at least identify some of
the major factors which are involved. As Ey-
senck (in press) argues, "The effects of in-
centive on task performance can usefuUy be
regarded as depending on four classes of
variables: (l) the nature of the incentive,
(2) the processes required by the task,
(3) the aspects of performance selected for
measurement and (4) individual differences
in mood or state and in semi-permanent per-
sonality characteristics." Such a statement is
so non-controversial as to be almost banal,
yet its implications have been almost totally
ignored. So far as the author is aware, there
has never been an empirical study in which
all four factors were manipulated simul-
taneously; in fact, it is usual for only one or
two of them to be considered within the con-
fines of a single experiment.
Let us consider each of these factors in
turn, beginning with the nature of the incen-
tive. Incentive conditions can obviously
vary as a function of incentive magnitude,
and it has often been assumed that an indi-
vidual's level of motivation will increase pa-
ri passu with the amount of incentive of-
fered for successful performance. However,
the subjective probability of performing the
task well enough to obtain the incentive also
plays a part in determining an individual's
level of motivation: very high incentive
combined with a near-zero probability of
success may lead to a rather low level of mo-
tivation. According to Revelle and Michaels
(1976), tasks with subjective probabilities of
success between .1 and .5 are highly moti-
vating ("When the going gets tough, the
tough get going"). In contrast, there is very
 88 Incentives and Motivation
low motivation when the probability of suc-
cess is less than .1, because "There is no
point in banging your head against a brick
wall."
It has usually been assumed that factors
such as the amount of incentive and the sub-
jective probability of success jointly deter-
mine some internal motivational state. For
Locke (1968), this internal state was repre-
sented by goal setting, with the term 'goal'
meaning "what the individual is consciously
trying to do'; (p. 159). Locke regarded goal-
setting intention as one of five sequential
stages involved in human action and per-
formance (see Fig. 5.7). Initially a specific
environmental event (e.g. monetary incen-
tive) produces cognitive and evaluative pro-
cesses which jointly determine the goal-set-
ting intention; the goal then determines per-
formance.
Locke claimed that a simple, linear rela-
tionship had been established between goal
difficulty and performance: "The results are
unequivocal: the harder the goal the higher
the level of performance" (p. 162). While
Locke did not discuss in any detail exactly
why harder goals should lead to enhanced
performance, he implied that there is greater
effort and utilization of resources when dif-
ficult goals are set. He referred to 12 studies
concerned with the relationship between
performance and the level or difficulty of
the subject's goal.
A large variety of tasks was used in these
studies, including uses for objects, complex
computation, addition, perceptual speed,
toy construction, reaction time and grade
achievement in college. Goal difficulty was
determined by the percentage of trials on
which subjects attained their goal, and the
overall rank-order correlation coefficient
between performance and goal difficulty
was a highly significant + .78.
ENVIRONMENTAL
EVENT COGNITION EVALUATION
(EG. INCENTIVE)
(1 ) ( 2) ( 3)
Fig. 5.7. The role of goal setting in a theory of action and performance. (Locke 1968)
Despite these findings, matters are not al-
ways as straightforward as Locke suggested.
Certainly very few professional sportsmen
would agree with the notion that their per-
formance always improves steadily as they
set themselves more and more challenging
performance goals. In a more experimental
context, adverse effects of very high motiva-
tion on performance have been reported in a
number of studies in which a desired ap-
prenticeship was believed to be at stake (e.g.
Eysenck and Warwick 1964, Willett 1964).
We have already seen that some of the
studies allegedly supporting Locke's theo-
retical position are suspect. Bavelas and Lee
(1978) replicated one of Locke's findings in
a study in which they found that the number
of objects listed which were 'hard, white and
edible' was directly related to goal level.
However, further analysis of their data re-
vealed a problem for Locke: the rated quali-
ty of the responses varied inversely with
goal level (see Fig. 5.8).
While it is clear that high goal setting is
not always followed by a superior level of
performance, it is still possible that high
goal setting is a necessary, if not sufficient,
pre-condition for performance enhance-
ment. A related hypothesis was applied to
incentives by Locke et al. (1968): "Incen-
tives such as money should affect action on-
ly if and to the extent that they affect the in-
dividual's goals and intentions" (p. 104). In
line with their hypothesis, they found that
monetary incentives did not affect either
goal setting or performance on a uses-for-
objects task. However, subjects who were
assigned goals set higher goals than subjects
who set their own goals and also produced
more responses.
It is possible that the monetary incentives
offered by Locke et al. (1968) were too low.
Farr (1976) used larger financial incentives
GOAL-SETTING
PERFORMANCI
INTENTION
(4) (5 )

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16
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z
goal level on the quali-
ty and quantity of per- l I
formance on an object- 5 10
listing task. (Bavelas
and Lee 1978)
and discovered that such incentives had a
substantial effect on goal setting on a task
involving sorting cards into eight categories.
Farr also found that incentives improved
sorting speed; this was not due to a trade-off
between speed and accuracy, because all er-
rors had to be rectified.
Pritchard and Curts (1973) obtained evi-
dence somewhat inconsistent with the posi-
tion of Locke et al. (1968). After practice on
a card-sorting task, subjects were asked to
set a goal representing a 30 per cent im-
provement in performance. All of the sub-
jects agreed to do this, with different groups
being offered nothing, 50 cents, or $ 3 for
goal attainment.
According to Locke et al. (1968), perform-
ance should have been comparable in all
three groups because they all adopted the
same goal. In fact, while all three groups
showed more improvement than a control
group which had no specific goal, the $ 3 in-
centive led to significantly more improve-
ment than any other condition. It could be
argued in a post hoc fashion that high-incen-
tive subjects actually adopted a higher goal
than the other subjects or perhaps that they
were more committed to the goal. However,
post-experimental questioning indicated
that the high-incentive subjects had been
slightly less committed to the goal than
those in the no-incentive condition.
A Theoretical Overview 89
6·32 1I
6·30
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6·28 >- ..
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6·26 ...J<
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-
U
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1
15 20
GOAL LEVEL
( RESPONSES)
Terborg (1976) also found that goal level
alone could not account for performance ef-
fects. In his study, monetary incentives af-
fected both goal setting and performance,
but incentives still improved performance
even with goal setting partialed out.
Since it has frequently been suggested
(e.g. Broadbent 1971) that knowledge of re-
sults or feedback operates as an incentive, it
is of interest to consider whether feedback
has the same effects on goal setting and per-
formance as incentive. Locke and Bryan
(1968) found that subjects given knowledge
of results set higher goals and produced bet-
ter performance than those not given feed-
back. Moreover, when the effects of goal
setting were partialed out statistically, there
was no residual relationship ~between
knowledge of results and performance. Un-
fortunately the goal-setting data were ob-
tained at the end of the experiment, so that it
is possible that performance affected goal
setting rather than goal setting affecting per-
formance. It was subsequently found that
performance level and knowledge of results
both playa part in determining goal setting
(Cummings et al. 1971).
One of the inadequacies with Locke's
(1968) theoretical approach is that he virtu-
ally ignored the important issue of the me-
chanism or process mediating the effects of
goal setting on performance. Terborg (1976)
90 Incentives and Motivation
made the reasonable suggestion that high
goal setting is likely to lead to a greater in-
vestment of effort and resources than low
goal setting. The participants in his study
spent 5 h a day for a week working on pro-
grammed texts designed to teach introduc-
tory principles of electricity. Effort was in-
dexed by the percentage of the available
time that they spent working at the material.
Goal setting was directly related both to ef-
fort expenditure and overall performance.
With effort partialed out, there was no effect
of goal setting on performance. Thus goal
setting may not reliably predict perform-
ance unless harder goals become translated
into increased effort.
Locke (1968) regarded goal level as equi-
valent to conscious intention; it is like a dial
which can be turned up or down to regulate
motivational intensity. However, there is no
good reason for supposing that motivation-
al forces are invariably accessible to con-
sciousness. A related difficulty is that goal
setting has typically been assessed by means
of post-experimental questioning, which
may provide a very imprecise measure.
In sum, Locke (1968) provided an ex-
tremely simple theoretical account of the
way in which incentive conditions influence
performance, according to which incentive
must affect goal level in order to affect per-
formance. More specifically, performance
was assumed to be a direct function of goal
level or motivational intensity. This view-
point can be contrasted with the notion
(Yerkes and Dodson 1908) that an interme-
diate level of motivation is optimal for per-
formance. It would be unwise to be dogmat-
ic on this issue, because relatively few stud-
ies have used more than two incentive con-
ditions. Furthermore, any given incentive
has widely varying effects on different tasks.
As an example, consider the research into
the impact on performance of the powerful
incentive of a desired apprenticeship dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. This incentive
worsened performance on the serial reac-
tion task and the Tsai-Partington Number
Tracing Test, had no effect on forward and
backward digit span or pursuit rotor learn-
ing and improved paired associate learning
and serial learning. In spite of the exiguous
nature of the evidence, the likelihood is that
incentive strength (determined by an inter-
action between incentive magnitude and the
probability of attaining it) is related to per-
formance by a curvilinear function, with the
point of inflexion depending on task re-
quirements. It may be necessary for incen-
tive to affect goal level if performance is to
be improved, but Locke's (1968) notion that
it is both necessary and sufficient must be
rejected.
It is a truism that the effects of incentive
on performance depend critically on the na-
ture of the task and its processing require-
ments. At the most general level, it is clear
that complex tasks are more likely than sim-
ple tasks to be adversely affected by incen-
tive. However, there have been remarkably
few systematic attempts to identify the cru-
cial aspects of task complexity. One tempt-
ing hypothesis is that incentive resembles
other arousers in reducing the extent to
which parallel or shared processing is possi-
ble (cf. Walley and Weiden 1973). This
would explain the findings, since we would
obviously expect complex tasks to necessi-
tate more parallel processing than easy
tasks.
As we saw earlier in this chapter, cogni-
tive flexibility is sometimes reduced by in-
centive. This is shown by the increased tend-
ency to persist with ways of thinking which
have proved successful either pre-experi-
mentally or during the initial stages of an ex-
periment, even when they are manifestly in-
appropriate to a new situation or problem.
What lies behind this cognitive inflexibility?
It is an intriguing idea that the reduction in
parallel processing under incentive condi-
tions that was discussed previously is in-
volved: perhaps it is essential for apparently
irrelevant aspects of the environment to be
attended to in order to break a mental set.
Those researchers who have examined
the effects of incentive on two or more
aspects of performance have typically
found that incentive does not have a uni-
form effect. It is the rule rather than the ex-

ception for incentive to improve certain
aspects of performance while at the same
time impairing other aspects. One important
implication of such findings is that we must
abandon over-simplified issues such as
whether or not incentive improves overall
performance efficiency.
If they are properly interpreted, the pat-
terns of performance improvement and im-
pairment produced by incentive can prove
to be of great importance in increasing our
understanding. Firstly, they indicate that in-
centive leads to a re-allocation of resources
in which some processing activities are fa-
voured at the expense of others. Secondly,
close examination of the positive and nega-
tive effects of incentive should provide us
with some idea of the characteristic shift in
the balance of processing resources induced
by incentive. Presumably the direction in
which task performance is affected by in-
centive depends in part on the extent of the
match between the requirements of that task
and the nature of the incentive effect.
The most ignored determinant of incen-
tive effects is the internal state of the indi-
vidual, which is affected by semi-permanent
personality characteristics and by situation-
al factors. What are the most crucial person-
ality characteristics in this connection? One
obvious contender is the extent to which an
individual is motivated by incentive. How-
ever, there is another side to incentive: the
incentivized subject has more to lose than
the non-incentivized subject ifhe or she per-
forms poorly and is thus more likely to expe-
rience frustration. Gray (1973) has argued
persuasively that the feeling of frustration
induced by non-reward resembles the anxie-
ty produced by punishment and is likely to
impair performance on many tasks.
Gray (1973) put forward a theoretical
model which extended these ideas. He sug-
gested that individual differences in suscep-
tibility to reward depend upon the personal-
ity dimension of impulsivity, with those low
in impulsivity (i.e. stable introverts) being
relatively unaffected by reward whereas
those high in impulsivity (i.e. neurotic extra-
verts) have great susceptibility to reward. In
A Theoretical Overview 91
contrast, Gray proposed that individual dif-
ferences in susceptibility to punishment are
related to the personality dimension of anx-
iety, with those low in anxiety (i.e. stable ex-
traverts) being considerably less susceptible
to punishment than those high in anxiety
(i.e., neurotic introverts).
It can be predicted from this theoretical
analysis that those individuals showing the
greatest improvement in performance when
incentives are available should be extraverts
(especially neurotic extraverts), whereas
those most likely to be adversely affected by
incentives are those high in anxiety.
There is some empirical support for both
of these predictions. Corcoran (1962b) used
a letter cancellation task under low or high
motivation conditions. With low motivation
there was an extremely high correlation of
+ .90 between introversion and the speed
with which the cancellation task was per-
formed; with high motivation, the correla-
tion became negative. High motivation
failed to affect introverts but improved the
performance of extraverts by approximately
80%.
Corcoran (1962b) also considered the
five-choice serial reaction task. He found
that improvement in performance speed
produced by knowledge of results correlat-
ed + .76 with extraversion. In a further ex-
periment using the same task, incentive was
provided by telling subjects that they could
stop doing the task when they obtained a
specified number of correct responses. Ex-
traverts were more affected than introverts
by the incentive; under sleep-deprived con-
ditions there was a correlation of +.59 be-
tween extraversion and the incentive effect.
A more detailed discussion of the differen-
tial effects of incentive on introverts and ex-
traverts can be found in Eysenck (1981).
In the next chapter we consider the pre-
diction that incentive is more likely to im-
pair performance for high-anxiety than for
low-anxiety individuals. It has typically
been found that motivational factors disrupt
the performance of those high in anxiety but
have no effect or even augment the perform-
ance of low-anxiety people. Not surprising-
92 Incentives and Motivation
ly, anxious individuals tend to be more sus-
ceptible to punishment than non-anxious
individuals; for example, they are much
more likely to be adversely affected by fake
failure feedback.
So far, we have seen that the effects of in-
centive on performance can only be accu-
rately predicted when some account is taken
of individual differences in personality. In
general terms, the likelihood of incentive
improving performance is greater among
extraverts than among introverts; more spe-
cifically, neurotic extraverts should be the
individuals most likely to benefit from the
introduction of incentive, whereas those
least likely to benefit from incentive should
be neurotic introverts.
It has also been established that relatively
transient states or moods help to determine
the exact impact of incentive on perform-
ance. In this connection, Broadbent (1971)
has argued that incentive is an arouser that
affects the same internal arousal mechanism
as other factors such as noise and sleepless-
ness. He cited as evidence for this conten-
tion the fact that incentive often interacts
with these other factors. For example, incen-
tive usually augments performance to a
greater extent for sleep-deprived than for
non-deprived individuals, presumably be-
cause sleep deprivation produces sub-opti-
mal arousal (see Chap. 7). On the other
hand, any improvement in performance
80
70
j 60
«
u ",.I:::.
~ 50 //
~
,/
~ 40 - /'" ,,0
u /' ",' -,.
a: fj,/ ",'"
~ 30 ",'"
",'"
c:J''''
20
I I
INCIDENTAL INTENTIONAL
LEARNING
produced by incentive is attenuated among
people exposed to intense noise, because
noise has an alerting and arousing function
(Broadbent 1971).
If incentive is, in fact, an arouser, then its
behavioural effects should be equivalent to
those of other arousers. Broadbent (1978)
claimed that such equivalence has been de-
monstrated: "One of the interesting aspects
of noise is the similarity of its effects to
those of other conditions, such as financial
incentives" (p. 1960). While it is reasonably
certain that noise and incentive both in-
crease attentional selectivity and lead to
rapid, inaccurate responding, their equiva-
lence is still a matter of controversy.
Davies and Jones (1975) considered the
immediate serial recall of eight words (in-
tentional learning) and recall of the spatial
location at which each word was presented
(incidentallearning). The results are shown in
Fig. 5.9. Intentionallearningwasimproved by
monetary incentives, but there was no effect
of white noise. In contrast, incidental learn-
ing was unaffected by incentives but was re-
duced by noise. Davies and Jones drew the
following conclusion from their data: "In-
centives permit increased selectivity to take
place without reducing attentional capacity,
whereas in noise increased selectivity takes
place as a result of reduced attentional ca-
pacity" (p. 67).
Fowler and Wilding (1979) found that in-
INCENTIVE
NOISE
CONTROL
Fig. 5.9. The effects of monetary incentive
and noise on intentional and incidental
learning. (Davies and Jones 1975)

centive improved incidental learning,
whereas white noise reduced it. This led
them to emphasize the dissimilarities be-
tween the effects of noise and incentive:
"Noise appears to reduce attentional capac-
ity whilst incentives appear to increase it ...
Distinctions between arousers exist and
general explanations in terms of 'arousal'
are not adequate" (p. 153). However, it is
rather dubious to assume that incidental
learning represents a direct measure of at-
tentional capacity, because incidental learn-
ing is more a reflection of what the subject
chooses to do than of what he or she can do.
A rather different approach to the same
issue was adopted by M. W. Eysenck and
M. C. Eysenck in unpublished work. They
used a letter transformation task in which
the requirement is to add a given number of
letters to each of between one and four let-
ters. Thus the answer to 'SEG + 2', is 'UGI',
and the answer to 'SNDG + 4' is 'WRHK'.
There appear to be three major factors in-
volved in the performance of this task:
(1) the time taken to access long-term mem-
ory and locate the appropriate part of the al-
phabet, (2) the speed of transformation and
(3) the time to store and organize the answer
A Theoretical Overview 93
which is accumulating in some short-term
storage system. There is some evidence that
performance on the one-letter task is pri-
marily affected by transformation speed,
whereas the efficiency of short-term storage
becomes more and more important as the
number of letters requiring transformation
increases.
The effects of white noise on this task
have been assessed (Hamilton et al. 1977) as
have the effects of monetary incentives
(M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck). The
very different effects of these two variables
can be seen in Fig. 5.10. White noise ap-
pears to increase the speed of letter transfor-
mation but to reduce the ability to hold in-
formation in short-term storage, whereas in-
centives increase both transformation speed
and the efficiency of short-term storage.
While some of these findings suggest that
incentive and noise do not have equivalent
effects on performance, an alternative ex-
planation is tenable. If there is a curvilinear
relationship between arousal and perform-
ance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), and if the
fairly small financial incentives typically
used were less arousing than the intense
noise, then equivalence might be demon-

120
0
0
J).------7), EXPERIMENTAL =
110
X " NOISE
w
~ 100 -----------7~~~-----------
t::r----- _..IX"
j:: W
...J ~ 90
i=
~
z ...J
W 0
0::
~ I-
80
0:: Z
W 0
Q.
X
U 70
~ -0-
W EXPERIMENTAL =
--V
60 INCENTIVE
0
I-
<l:
0:: L I I I
2 3 4
LETTERS REQUIRING TRANSFORMATION
Fig. 5.10. The effects of incentive and white noise senck unpublished, noise data from Hamilton et
on speed of performance of a letter transforma- al. 1977)
tion task. (Incentive data from Eysenck and Ey-
94 Incentives and Motivation
strable if incentive and noise were both vi-
gorously manipulated. Against that, we
have recently discovered that larger finan-
cial incentives (up to £ 50) enhance per-
formance on the four-letter version of the
letter transformation task.
In spite of some inconsistencies in the da-
ta, it is reasonable to argue that an incenti-
vized individual behaves as if he or she were
in a state of high arousal. Over and above
the behavioural findings, there are some in-
teresting physiological findings reported by
Wilkinson et al. (1972); they discovered that
incentive led to changes in respiration rate,
skin conductance level and pulse rate which
were indicative of increased arousal. This
does not necessarily mean that incentive op-
erates in precisely the same way as noise;
for example, noise increases physiological
arousal in a direct manner, whereas the
arousing effect of incentive is more indirect,
being mediated by alterations in processing
strategies.
According to the theoretical position tak-
en in this chapter, it is important to consider
the nature of the incentive, of the task, of the
dependent variable and of the subject's state
of arousal and personality in investigating
incentive effects. Indeed, one is almost cer-
tainly justified in drawing the rather strong-
er conclusion that task performance can on-
ly be predicted with accuracy when all of
these variables are considered jointly.
At present, we have relatively little idea of
the ways in which these different variables
interact with each other. However, certain
crucial effects of incentive do seem to pro-
vide the basis for a general understanding:
1. Incentive changes the priorities accorded
to environmental events, producing in-
creased attentional selectivity.
2. Incentive characteristically speeds up in-
ternal processing and external response
rate but does so at the cost of reduced per-
formance quality.
3. Incentive usually affects an internal moti-
vational state but can also produce frus-
tration and/ or anxiety.
4. Incentive often has adverse long-term ef-
fects on performance, because it reduces
or 'undermines' intrinsic motivation.
5. Powerful incentive reduces parallel or
shared processing.
6. Incentive increases arousal.
7. Incentive is related to performance by
means of a curvilinear relationship.
8. Incentive may increase distractibility.
It is obviously tempting to look for in-
terrelationships among these various ef-
fects, and perhaps it will do no harm to fol-
low Oscar Wilde in resisting everything but
temptation. Part of the reason why incentive
often reduces performance quality may be
because it restricts parallel processing and
thus limits the information available at any
given moment. The curvilinear function re-
lating incentive to performance may be ex-
plicable in the following way: (1) the initial
improvement in performance as incentive
increases may reflect increased attentional
selectivity and (2) the subsequent perform-
ance decrement with strong incentive may
be due to an increased likelihood of frustra-
tion and anxiety combined with reduced
parallel processing. These speculations may
not prove to be accurate; however, the for-
mulation of a coherent theoretical account
on the basis of these effects of incentive is an
important task for the future.
6 Anxiety and Performance
The concept of anxiety has been used in a
bewildering variety of ways by different the-
orists. While some regard anxiety as a moti-
vational state, others consider it to be an
emotion, and still others claim that it com-
bines motivational and emotional compo-
nents. In spite of these differences of opin-
ion, there would probably be reasonable
agreement with the following definition of
the anxiety state that was proposed by Spiel-
berger (1972): "Unpleasant, consciously-
perceived feelings of tension and apprehen-
sion, with associated activation or arousal
of the autonomic nervous system" (p. 29).
A major attempt to provide a relatively
precise analysis of all emotional states (in-
cluding anxiety) was made by Russell and
Mehrabian (1977). They used 200 emotion-
eliciting situations, each of which was de-
scribed in a short paragraph. For each situa-
tion, the subject was asked to imagine that
he was actually there and to rate his emo-
tional state on 42 verbal report emotion
scales. Analysis of the data indicated that
the three independent and bipolar dimen-
sions of pleasure-displeasure, degree of
arousal and dominance-submissiveness
were both necessary and sufficient to define
any emotion. In other words, all emotional
states can apparently be described as re-
gions within a three-dimensional space.
How does anxiety fit into this theoretical
framework? Russell and Mehrabian (1977),
on the basis of results obtained with six
scales measuring fear or anxiety, claimed
that easily the major component of anxiety
is displeasure, followed by high arousal and
submissiveness. The fact that self-reported
anxiety is far more closely associated with
displeasure than with high arousal may well
help to explain the relatively weak evidence
for increased physiological arousal in anx-
ious individuals (reviewed by Eysenck
1977).
It will come as a surprise to some readers
to learn that degree of arousal and pleasure-
)displeasure are independent factors. After
all, a number of investigators (e.g. Berlyne
1960) have suggested that pleasure is an in-
verted U shaped function of arousal level.
According to such a theoretical position, un-
pleasant emotional states such as anxiety
are regarded as an inevitable consequence
of high arousal. In fact, there was a small
but significant curvilinear relationship be-
tween pleasure and arousal, but it account-
ed for rather less than 5 % of the variance in
the pleasure-displeasure scores. The data
were more consistent with the notion that
high arousal has an augmentation or en-
hancement effect: for an unpleasant emo-
tion, high arousal tended to increase the ex-
'perienced displeasure, whereas it enhanced
the feelings of pleasure for a pleasant emo-
tion.
It seems reasonable to argue that the
strength of an individual's anxiety state de-
pends primarily on two factors: (I) the de-
gree of external threat or stress and (2) that
individual's susceptibility to anxiety, or
anxiety proneness. These two factors were
incorporated into a general theory of anxie-
ty by Spielberger (1966,1972). According to
Spielberger, there is a valid distinction be-
tween trait anxiety (defined by Spielberger
et al. 1970, p. 3, as "relatively stable individ-
ual differences in anxiety proneness") and
state anxiety (defined by Spielberger et al.
1970, p.3, as "characterized by subjective,
consciously perceived feelings of tension
96 Anxiety and Performance
and apprehension, and heightened auto-
nomic nervous system activity").
The basic interrelationships among trait
anxiety, state anxiety, environmental stres-
sors and performance are shown in Fig. 6.1.
It is assumed that the degree of anxiety ex-
perienced (state anxiety) is interactively de-
termined by the individual's susceptibility
to anxiety (trait anxiety) and by the amount
of stress in the situation.
According to this state-trait conceptuali-
zation, state anxiety is affected by the de-
gree of environmental stress, whereas trait
anxiety is not. It follows that trait anxiety
should be more consistent or stable than
state anxiety across situations of varied
stressfulness, and this appears to be the case
(Allen 1970, Martuza and Kallstrom 1974).
What accounts for the relative consisten-
cy of trait anxiety? The answer appears to be
that hereditary influences playa crucial role
(for a review see M. W. Eysenck and H. J.
Eysenck 1980). A major study by Shields
(1962) looked at hereditary effects on neu-
roticism, a personality dimension that corre-
lates approximately + .6- +.8 with trait
anxiety. He used a questionnaire resembling
the Maudsley Personality Inventory and ob-
tained intra-pair correlations of + .53 for
monozygotic or 'identical' twins reared
apart, of + .38 for monozygotic twins reared
togehter, and of only + .11 for dyzygotic
twins reared together. This pattern of results
is obviously indicative of some hereditary
determination of neuroticism or anxiety.
When Jinks and Fulker (1970) applied the
biometrical method of analysis to the corre-
lations obtained by Shields they emerged
with a heritability estimate of 54% for neu-
roticism.
ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROCESSING
STRESS ACTIVITIES
Fig. 6.1. State anxiety is determined jointly by en-
vironmental stress and trait anxiety, and it is state
Spielberger's state-trait conceptualiza-
tion leads to the additional prediction that
there should be only a small difference in
the level of state anxiety between those high
and low in trait anxiety under non-stressful
conditions but that there should be a much
greater difference under conditions of
stress. The anticipated interaction between
trait anxiety and degree of environmental
stress has been obtained several times (for a
review see Shedletsky and Endler 1974).
An important complicating factor was
discovered by Hodges (1968). As can be
seen in Fig. 6.2, he obtained the predicted
interaction when stress involved threat to
self-esteem via failure threat, but not when
stress involved physical danger via threat of
electric shock. A very similar pattern of re-
sults was obtained by Glanzmann and Laux
(1978). These findings suggest that most
questionnaire measures of trait anxiety are
primarily concerned with reactions to ego
threat rather than to physical danger.
Some relevant evidence was obtained by
Endler et al. (1976). They factor analysed
data from Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory, the Behavioural Reactions Ques-
tionnaire and the S-R Inventory of Anxious-
ness, obtaining two major factors which
they labelled interpersonal threat and physi-
cal danger. While the trait anxiety measure
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory loaded
approximately .80 on the interpersonal
threat factor, it only loaded .25 on the physi-
cal danger factor.
Several theorists have claimed that anxie-
ty should be thought of as comprising two or
more major components. For example, Lie-
bert and Morris (1967) suggested that test
anxiety is a complex amalgam of worry and
PERFORMANCE
anxiety rather than trait anxiety which has a di-
rect effect on processing activities
 Worry and Emotionality 97
14 (0) HIGH performance on tests and (2) apparent con-
,,",,'"
"I:)
TRAIT
ANXIETY sequences of this intense worry, including
,," SUBJECTS interference with effective cognitive func-
W
12 ,,"" tioning and a variety of physical and emo-
(f "
a:: tional consequences" (p. 6).
10 LOW
They interpreted their second factor as
~
0
TRAIT
U ANXIETY reflecting "a distinct, coherent set of atti-
til SUBJECTS
8 tudes and negative emotional reactions to
>- tests" (p. 7). Since Richardson et al. found
r-
W
1: I I
that worry and emotionality items both
NONE FAILURE loaded on the same factors, they concluded
X
STRESS that their results did not support the Libert
14
Z (b) and Morris two-factor conceptualization of
HIGH
« TRAIT test anxiety. However, the relevance of their
12 ANXIETY findings to the Liebert-Morris position is re-
w ............-0 SUBJECTS
duced by their failure to use marker var-

~
I-
LOW iables for either worry or emotionality.
« 10 TRAIT
I- ANXIETY In sum, there is evidence from the field of
SUBJECTS
til psychometrics to sustain a distinction be-
8 tween state and trait anxiety. There is also
support for a distinction between the worry
l' I I and emotionality components of anxiety. As
NONE SHOCK we will see, some of the work on the effects
STRESS
of anxiety on performance has utilized these
Fig. 6.2. a State anxiety as a function of trait anx- conceptual distinctions in an attempt to
iety and failure stress. b State anxiety as a func- clarify the processes involved.
tion of trait anxiety and shock stress. (Hodges
\968)

6.1 Worry and Emotionality

emotionality. Worry is "primarily cognitive
concern about the consequences of failure"
(p.975), whereas emotionality involves
changes in physiological functioning, and
accompanying unpleasant feeling states of
uneasiness, tension and nervousness.
The evidence supporting a distinction be-
tween the physiological (i.e. emotionality)
and the cognitive (i.e. worry) components of
anxiety was discussed by Morris et al.
(1977). They noted that several factor ana-
lyses of Mandler and Sarason's (1952) Test
Anxiety Questionnaire have produced con-
ceptually distinct worry and emotionality
factors. However, the findings are equivo-
cal. Richardson et al. (1977) factored the
Test Anxiety Scale and reported the results
of a two-factor solution. According to them,
"Factor I is clearly defined by (1) cognitive
concern and worry about oneself and one's
Anxiety typically impairs the performance
of most tasks. An interesting issue is wheth-
er this anxiety-induced decrement is attri-
butable primarily to the worry or to the emo-
tionality component of anxiety. The preva-
lent view (e.g. Morris et al. 1977, Wine 1971)
is that worry and other task-irrelevant cogni-
tive activities associated with high anxiety
are the most important factors involved.
This view was endorsed by Sarason (1975),
who expressed it in the following way: "The
highly test anxious person is one who is pro-
ne to emit selfcentred interfering responses
when confronted with evaluative condi-
tions. Two response components have been
emphasized by writers who espouse this
view. One is emotional and autonomic -
sweating, accelerated heart rate, etc. The
98 Anxiety and Performance
other concerns cognitive events - e.g., say-
ing to oneself while taking a test, 'I am stu-
pid', 'Maybe I won't pass'." (p. 175).
Doctor and Altman (1969) carried out one
of the earliest studies to evaluate the relative
importance of these major components of
anxiety in determining the level of perform-
ance. They asked students to answer worry
and emotionality items from the Test Anxie-
ty Questionnaire in terms of their feelings
immediately prior to an important examina-
tion. They found that both emotionality and
worry were negatively correlated with per-
formance on the examination, but worry
was the stronger determinant of poor per-
formance. In similar fashion, Morris and
Liebert (1970) found that correlations be-
tween worry scores and final examination
grades, with emotionality partialed out,
were negative and significant. In contrast,
correlations between emotionality scores
and grades, with worry partialed out, were
non-significant.
In a recent study, Spielberger et al. (1978)
related academic performance to scores on
the Test Anxiety Inventory, a test which
contains separate worry and emotionality
sub-scales. For male students, worry corre-
lated -.47 with grade point average (a mea-
sure of academic achievement), whereas
emotionality correlated only -.13 with the
same measure. For female students, the re-
spective correlations were -.35 and .00.
Further suggestive evidence that worry
plays a major role in producing anxiety-in-
duced decrements in examination perform-
ance was obtained by Houston (1977). He
discovered that high scorers on Debilitating
Anxiety as measured by the Achievement
Anxiety scale were inferior to those scoring
low on an examination. Close questioning
of the students revealed that the only signifi-
cant difference between the two groups in
the coping strategies used during the exami-
nation was that those high in Debilitating
Anxiety were more likely than low scorers to
have experienced worry symptoms.
It will not have escaped the eagle-eyed
reader's notice that none of these studies
really provides unequivocal support for the
notion that worry impairs performance. It is
probable that worry and performance exert
bi-directional influences on each other.
Thus the negative relationship between wor-
ry and performance might reflect the influ-
ence of anticipated or actual poor perform-
ance on worry rather than the effects ofwor-
ry on performance. Strictly speaking, of
course, the correlational data which have
been obtained do not even definitely esta-
blish that there is any causal relationship be-
tween worry and performance.
Deffenbacher (1978) argued that there
were three classes of distraction that should
be distinguished: in addition to worry, peo-
ple may direct attention away from the task
either to heightened autonomic arousal
(emotionality) or to competing response
tendencies generated by the task. In his
study, Deffenbacher asked high and low
scorers on the Test Anxiety Scale to solve
difficult anagrams under conditions of high
or low stress. The worst level of perform-
ance was shown by the high-anxiety sub-
jects run under high stress, and it was also in
this condition that self-reported anxiety was
greatest. According to post-test questioning,
this group of subjects experienced more in-
terference than any of the other groups dur-
ing anagram solution from emotionality,
worry and the task, with the effects being
greatest with respect to worry. These
stressed high-anxiety subjects claimed that,
as a result, they had spent only 60% of the
available time actually engaged in the task,
compared to approximately 80 per cent in
each of the other conditions.
We have already seen that there is plenty
of indirect evidence to support the notion
that anxious individuals tend to engage in
more task-irrelevant processing activities
(including worry) than non-anxious individ-
uals. There is somewhat more direct evi-
dence of a behavioural nature available in
the work of Ganzer (1968) and of Nottelman
and Hill (1977). Ganzer looked at the joint
effects of test anxiety and audience pres-
ence on serial learning, and at the same time
he recorded any task-irrelevant comments
made by the subjects while they were en-

gaged in the learning task. He found that
high scorers on the Test Anxiety Scale, espe-
cially if they performed the learning task in
the presence of an audience, emitted more
task-irrelevant comments than the other
groups of subjects; most of these comments
were pf an apologetic or self-evaluative na-
ture.
N ottelman and Hill (1977) used the direc-
tion of gaze as a measure of task-irrelevant
processing in a study of anagram solving
among children obtaining high and low
scores on the Test Anxiety Scale for Child-
ren. High-anxiety children did less well than
low-anxiety children on the anagram task;
this may have been due to task-irrelevant
processing, since they were observed to en-
gage in substantially more off-task glancing.
In spite of the fact that the empirical un-
derpinning for the hypothesis that anxiety
impairs performance because it leads to
task-irrelevant processing (e.g. worry) is
considerably less than overwhelming, it is
nevertheless the case that most of the data
are at least consistent with it. The issue of
the exact mechanism by which anxiety-in-
duced decrements in performance occur is
dealt with in the next section of the chapter.
However, it is highly probable at the most
general level that attentional processes are
implicated. It has been argued that anxious
individuals effectively divide their attention
between task requirements and various
task-irrelevant cognitive activities such as
worry and self-criticism. This theoretical po-
sition was expressed succinctly by Wine
(1971) in the following way: "The highly
test-anxious person responds to evaluative
testing conditions with ruminative, self-
evaluative worry, and, thus, cannot direct
adequate attention to task-relevant var-
iables" (p. 99).
6.2 Working Memory Capacity
According to the theoretical position adopt-
ed in this chapter, worry and other task-ir-
Working Memory Capacity 99
relevant cognitive activities associated with
anxiety always impair the quality of per-
formance because the task-irrelevant infor-
mation involved in worry and cognitive self-
concern competes with task-relevant infor-
mation for space in the processing system.
As a consequence, highly anxious subjects
are in effect in a dual-task or divided atten-
tion situation, in contrast to non-anxious
subjects who primarily process task-rele-
vant information.
M. W. Eysenck (1979a) assumed that the
part of the processing system most heavily
implicated in concurrent processing of task-
relevant and task-irrelevant information is
working memory. As was pointed out in
Chap. 3, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) argued
that working memory comprises a limited
capacity central processing space and a sup-
plementary articulatory rehearsal loop with
a capacity of approximately three items. Ac-
cording to M. W. Eysenck (l979a), "Since
task-irrelevant cognitive activities such as
worry preempt some of the limited capacity
of working memory, it is clear that they will
produce decrements in the quality of per-
formance. However, the extent to which
such decrements occur should depend on
the demands placed on the capacity of
working memmory by task-relevant infor-
mation" (p. 365).
It is of considerable theoretical signific-
ance to establish the relationship between
anxiety and the capacity limitations of
working memory. The reason for this is that
working memory is crucially involved in
the processing and temporary holding of in-
formation, so that any anxiety-induced re-
duction in its capacity would inevitably
have wide-ranging repercussions on the per-
formance of a great variety of cognitive
tasks. Since Baddeley and Hitch (1974) ar-
gued that working memory is involved in the
digit-span task, there are some grounds for
considering the effects of anxiety on digit-
span performance to be relevant.
The experimental evidence has been dis-
cussed in some detail by Eysenck (1979a,
1981). From the perspective of the state-trait
approach discussed earlier in the chapter,
100 Anxiety and Performance
there should be more pronounced effects of
state anxiety than of trait anxiety on per-
formance. In fact, most of the experimental
findings are consistent with this prediction.
It has typically been found that trait anxiety
has little or no effect on digit span, with a to-
tal of nine different studies obtaining a non-
significant effect. The picture that emerges
from studies obtaining significant results is
confusing, since digit span was negatively
related to trait anxiety in three studies but
was positively related in two further studies.
Rather more complex relationships be-
tween trait anxiety and digit-span perform-
ance were uncovered by Knox and Grippal-
di (1970) and by Hodges and Durham
(1972). Knox and Grippaldi obtained a cur-
vilinear relationship between anxiety and
digit span, with the level of performance be-
ing better among those of intermediate trait
anxiety than among those high or low in
anxiety. Hodges and Durham found that
anxiety was positively related to digit-span
performance among those of high intelli-
gence, but anxiety was negatively related to
performance among those of less intelli-
gence.
An alternative method of assessing the ef-
fects of trait anxiety on short-term storage
capacity has been used in a few studies. It is
based on the free recall paradigm and in-
volves the assumption that any item is re-
called from short-term store or working
memory provided that fewer than an arbit-
rary number of input-output events (e.g. se-
ven) intervene between presentation and re-
call. Mueller and Overcast (1976) employed
this method and discovered that highly anx-
ious subjects were able to recall more items
from short-term store than non-anxious sub-
jects. However, no effects of trait anxiety on
short-term capacity as indexed by this meth-
od were obtained in two additional studies
(Brower and Mueller 1978, Mueller 1976). A
difficulty with this method of measuring the
capacity of working memory is that the ap-
parent capacity is affected by the extent to
which subjects adopt the strategy of starting
their free recall with the most recently pre-
sented items.
The position is much clearer with respect
to the effects of situational stress and state
anxiety on digit-span performance. Eysenck
(l979a) discussed seven studies in which
stress was negatively related to perform-
ance, together with a further four studies in
which state anxiety reduced performance.
An interpretative difficulty with some of the
studies looking at the effects of state anxiety
on working memory capacity is that the sub-
jects were only asked after performing the
span task whether they had experienced
anxiety during testing; this raises the possi-
bility that poor performance caused anxie-
ty, rather than the reverse.
Eysenck (1979a) concluded his review of
this literature in the following words: "In
sum, II out of 12 studies reporting a signifi-
cant effect of state anxiety or situational
stress on working memory capacity found
that high anxiety reduced its capacity. In
view of the fact that working memory (espe-
cially the modality-free central processing
component) is vitally involved in many in-
formation-processing tasks, this is an im-
portant finding" (p. 370).
It is somewhat unfortunate that only very
limited experimental data are available in
this area. For example, while it would clear-
ly be useful to have information about the
effects of anxiety on each of the two princi-
pal components of the working memory sys-
tem (i.e. the modality-free central processor
and the articulatory loop), researchers in
this area have almost invariably used only
digit-span measures of short-term storage
capacity rather than any more refined index.
An exception is the recent unpublished
work carried out by one of my students
named Anna Eliatamby. She found that
high-anxiety subjects showed inferior digit
span to low-anxiety subjects under normal
testing conditions. However, there was no
effect of anxiety on digit span when subjects
were required to perform a simple articula-
tory suppression task (i.e. saying rapidly
'ABCDEF') during presentation of the di-
gits. Suppression tasks of this kind use the
resources of the articulatory loop but make
minimal demands on the central processor.

If these results can be replicated, the impli-
cation is that anxiety affects the articulatory
loop component of the working memory
system more than the central processor.
The theoretical assumption that anxiety
(or, more precisely, the worry component of
anxiety) reduces the capacity of working
memory can also be explored in a rather dif-
ferent way. We have assumed that worry
pre-empts some of the available capacity of
working memory, and so places the anxious
subject in a divided attention situation (i.e.
attention has to be shared between task sti-
muli and anxiety-related information such
as worry). This would appear to resemble
the state of affairs when a non-anxious sub-
ject is required to divide attention between a
main task and a concurrent attention-de-
manding subsidiary task (e.g. remembering
six random digits in the correct order).
In both cases, of course, the expectation is
that the additional task (Le. attending to
worry or to the subsidiary task) will worsen
performance. There is recent interesting
work suggesting that the resemblance is
even closer. Hitch and Baddeley (1976)
found that complexity of a reasoning task
interacted with the presence or absence of a
subsidiary task (Le. retaining six random di-
gits); the detrimental effects of concurrent
performance of the subsidiary task on rea-
soning speed were greater on the more com-
plex reasoning problems.
Anna Eliatamby used the same reasoning
task as Hitch and Baddeley (1976) and ob-
tained a very similar interaction; however,
she used anxiety as a factor rather than pres-
ence or absence of a subsidiary task and
found that high anxiety had a much greater
detrimental effect on the more difficult
problems. The implication is that anxiety
operates in a similar fashion to a subsidiary
task, utilizing some of the available atten-
tional resources. Not surprisingly, the detri-
mental effects of either anxiety or a subsidi-
ary task on main-task performance are
greater when the main task makes substan-
tial demands on processing resources (e.g.
complex versions of the reasoning task).
Very recently Anna Eliatamby has ob-
Spence and Spence (1966): Task Difficulty 101
tained even more striking evidence that anx-
iety pre-empts some of the available atten-
tional capacity. Subjects high and low in ax-
iety solved anagrams while counting back-
wards by threes (memory-load condition) or
while rehearsing over-learned material (arti-
culatory suppression condition); in the con-
trol condition, there was no additional task.
The results for those subjects who were in-
structed that their intellectual ability was be-
ing tested are shown in Fig. 6.3. Anxiety
produced a very large performance decre-
ment in the memory-load condition, presu-
mably because the attentional demands of
the digit task when combined with the re-
duced attentional capacity associated with
anxiety meant that very few resources were
available for the anagram task.
6.3 Spence and Spence (1966):
Task Difficulty
The notion that anxiety reduces the avail-
able capacity of working memory may be of
some relevance in accounting for the results
of a substantial body of research on paired
associate learning carried out mainly in the
1950s and 1960s. The fact that dozens of re-
searchers carried out experiments amazing-
ly similar to one another, busying them-
selves with comparing the effects of anxiety
on 'easy' and 'hard' paired associates, is ex-
plicable only as a tribute to the pre-emi-
nence at that time of the theoretical views of
Kenneth Spence. His theoretical position,
which reached its apotheosis in a chapter by
Spence and Spence in 1966, will be consid-
ered at length in order to provide some his-
torical perspective. An important additional
reason is the fact that Spence and Spence
(1966) made one of the very few attempts to
provide agenaral theory of anxiety and
learning. Those interested in a fuller analy-
sis of Spence's work are referred to Eysenck
(1977).
Spence and spence (1966) used as their
starting point the fundamental Hullian as-
102 Anxiety and Performance

VI
60
u 55 HIGH-ANXIETY
w 0 SUBJECTS
VI I
z 50 I
;::
45 /
w /
~ 40 I
l- I
z 35 I
0 30 I
l- I
::> 25 I
...J
0 I
VI 20 I
z 15 I
« LOW-ANXIETY
0 10 __ II
w SUBJECTS Fig. 6.3. The effects of trait
-_ I
~ 5 --0 anxiety and concurrent task
on speed of solution of five-
CONTROL ARTICULATORY MEMORY letter anagrams. (Eliatamby
SUPPRESSION unpublished)

sumption that habit strength (a measure of tioning and reported that 21 out of 25 exper·
the degree of learning) multiplied by drive imental comparisons of high and low scor·
(a motivational measure) produces excitato- ers on the Manifest Anxiety Scale supported
ry potential. It was assumed that the habit of the prediction.
greatest strength in any given situation The position is quite different with more
would manifest itself in performance, pro- complex tasks in which the correct response
vided only that the level of excitatory poten- has to be discriminated from other compet-
tial produced by that habit when mulitplied ing responses which are stronger than the
by drive exceeded the response threshold. correct response. When such tasks are used,
Anxiety entered the picture in two rather any increase in anxiety makes the incorrect
different ways: (1) an individual's emotion- responses still stronger relative to the cor-
al responsiveness (typically assessed by rect response, and this will produce a per-
means of the Manifest Anxiety Scale) par- formance decrement.
tially determines the level of drive and The various predictions of the Spence-
(2) the emotional response associated with Spence theory have typically been tested by
anxiety produces drive stimuli which often comparing the effects of anxiety on the
lead to task-irrelevant behaviour. learning of easy (non-competitive) and hard
This theory predicts that anxiety may (competitive) paired associates. Competi-
either facilitate or impair performance, de- tive paired associates can be formed in a
pending on the precise nature of the task variety of ways, but one popular method is
which is to be performed. It follows from to take highly associated pairs of words (e.g.
the postulated multiplicative relationship man-woman, day-night and gold-silver) and
between drive and habit strength that an in- to re-arrange them into new paired asso-
crease in drive produced by anxiety will in- ciates (e.g. man-night, day-silver, gold-
crease the difference in probability of two woman). This method guarantees that there
responses differing in habit strength. Anxie- is at least one strong incorrect competing re-
ty should thus cause the stronger of two sponse for each paired associate.
competing responses to become still strong- Spence and Spence (1966) predicted that
er, so that anxiety should lead to improved anxiety would facilitate the acquisition of
performance on tasks such as simple condi- non-competitive pairs but impair the learn-
tioning, in which the correct response has ing of competitive paired associates; this
no effective competitor. Spence (1964) re- implies that anxiety should interact with
viewed the literature on anxiety and condi- task difficulty as indexed by the presence or

I/)
w
a:
oU LOW-ANXIETY
I/) SUBJECTS
(!)
z
z
a: HIGH-ANXIETY
« SUBJECTS
w
..J
NON-COMPETITIVE COMPETITIVE
PAIRED ASSOCIATES
absence of strong competing responses (see
Fig. 6.4). However, there is an important
qualification that must be added to the pre-
diction that anxiety will reduce the speed
with which competitive pairs are learned.
As learning progresses and the correct re-
sponses begin to become stronger than the
competing incorrect responses, high-anxie-
ty subjects should start to learn faster than
low-anxiety subjects.
Kathy Cohen, one of my students, has
very kindly scoured the literature for studies
testing for an interaction between anxiety
and task difficulty. She uncovered a total of
54 relevant experiments; in 30 cases, the in-
teraction was non-significant, but in 22 the
predicted interaction between anxiety and
task difficulty was obtained. In the two re-
maining experiments (Weiner, 1966a, Wein-
er & Schneider, 1971), the reverse interac-
tion was obtained; these studies are dis-
cussed in more detail later. Of the 22 experi-
ments reporting the predicted interaction,
high anxiety significantly facilitated per-
formance on the 'easy' task in eight experi-
ments and significantly impaired it in three
experiments. On the 'hard' task, high anxie-
ty improved performance in two experi-
ments and worsened it in six.
In general terms, it is clear that the data
largely support the theoretical predictions
of Spence and Spence (1966). Furthermore,
their theory appears to provide a potential
underpinning for one of the key assump-
Spence and Spence (1966): Task Difficulty 103
Fig. 6.4. The predicated interaction be-
tween trait anxiety and competitive
versus non-competitive paired asso-
ciates on the basis of Spence's theory.
(Spence and Spence 1966).
tions of the Yerkes-Dodson Law, namely
that the optimal level of arousal (or anxiety)
is inversely related to task difficulty.
In spite of the apparent success of the the-
ory put forward by Spence and Spence
(1966), it suffers from a number of intrac-
table problems. For example, there are cir-
cumstances in which the theory must make
exactly the opposite predictions from those
discussed so far. If an easy task has a domi-
nant correct response and a weak competing
response, it may well be the case under low
anxiety that only the dominant response ex-
ceeds the response threshold. This ensures
that there will be perfect performance with
low anxiety. In contrast, the excitatory po-
tential of the weak competing response may
exceed the response threshold under condi-
tions of high anxiety, because the excitatory
potential of all responses is increased by
anxiety. As a consequence, the incorrect re-
sponse has at least a small probability of be-
ing produced, so that the theoretical expec-
tation must be that anxiety will reduce per-
formance on easy tasks of this type.
While Spence and Spence (1966) predict-
ed that anxiety would worsen performance
on difficult tasks where the correct response
was not dominant, exactly the opposite re-
sult has to be predicted if the correct re-
sponse is below the response threshold for
the low-anxiety subjects. In short, the
Spences can only make definite predictions
about the effects of anxiety on performance
104 Anxiety and Performance
provided that detailed information is avail-
able about the number and relative
strengths of all of the relevant responses and
about the location of the response thresh-
old. In practice, there is typically no way of
obtaining the necessary information.
Spence and Spence (1966) were careful to
point out that the effects of anxiety on per-
formance depended on the amount of intra-
task response competition rather than on
task difficulty per se. It is unfortunate that
these two conceptually distinct factors have
usually been confounded in experimental
studies, thus rendering any interpretation
equivocal.
One of the few attempts to unconfound
response competition and task difficulty
was made by Saltz and Hoehn (1957). In one
experiment, subjects engaged in serial learn-
ing of nonsense syllables; one list consisted
of familiar syllables with a high level of in-
tra-list competitiveness produced by letter
duplication, and a second list consisted of
relatively unfamiliar nonsense syllables
with a low level of intra-list competitive-
ness. While the two lists were of comparable
difficulty for low-anxiety subjects, the the-
ory put forward by Spence and Spence
(1966) would predict that high-anxiety sub-
jects should take longer to learn the com pet-
titive list than the non-competitive list. In
fact, the difference in learning times was
non-significantly in the opposite direction.
Saltz and Hoehn obtained rather more
convincing data in their second experiment.
They managed to produce a non-competi-
z 45
0 SUBJECTS
0::
IU
.... 40
0::
U
....0 35
V)
~ LOW-ANXIETY
-t 30
....0::
I I
EASY DIFFICULT
COMPETING NON-COMPETING
tive list that was actually rather more diffi-
cult than a competitive list. Anxiety had no
effect on the learning of the easy competi-
tive list but was inversely related to speed of
learning on the difficult non-competitive list
(see Fig. 6.5). The results from this study sug-
gest that the important interaction is between
anxiety and task difficulty rather than be-
tween anxiety and degree of response
competition.
There are even more crucial problems
with the views of Spence and Spence; for ex-
ample, their theory assumes that the effects
of anxiety are centred exclusively on retriev-
al processes and that anxiety does not affect
other aspects of information processing
such as encoding and attentional processes
or the response threshold.
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems al-
most incredible that there is practically no
serious attempt anywhere in the voluminous
literature based on the theories of Spence
(1958) and of Spence and Spence (1966) to
examine the major theoretical assumption
that anxiety affects retrieval but has no ef-
fect at all on learning and storage. Unfortu-
nately, most of the research in this area was
designed in such a way that it is quite impos-
sible to separate out the effects of anxiety on
storage and on retrieval.
One of the few exceptions is a study by
Straughan and Dufort (1969). High- and
low-anxiety subjects were given relaxation
instructions either shortly before learning a
list or just prior to recall. Analysis of the da-
ta on speed of correct responding indicated
HIGH-ANXIETY
SUBJECTS
Fig. 6.5. Speed of learning as a func-
tion of trait anxiety and type of list.
(Saltz and Hoehn 1957)
 Spence and Spence (1966): Task Difficulty 105
a significant interaction b~tween anxiety the area of anxiety and performance. Even
and relaxation in which low-anxiety sub- if their explanation of the interaction be-
jects were slowed by relaxation instructions, tween anxiety and task difficulty (or intra-
whereas high-anxiety subjects performed . task response competition) must be reject-
more rapidly when relaxed. As can be seen ed, the empirical data remain and have to be
in Fig. 6.6, relaxation prior to learning was accounted for. A useful starting point is to
more effective than relaxation prior to recall examine the concept of 'task difficulty'.
in altering the response speeds of the two While there are undoubtedly many ways in
anxiety groups. The implication is that the which one task can be more difficult than
effects on learning of anxiety manipulations another, it is typically the case that 'hard'
are as strong as, or even stronger than, those tasks make greater demands on working
on retrieval. memory capacity than do 'easy' tasks. We
It is possible to demonstrate very simply have already seen that high-anxiety subjects
that some of the theoretical assumptions have less available working memory capaci-
made by Spence and Spence (1966) are er- ty than low-anxiety subjects. It thus follows
roneous. They assumed that anxiety does that the detrimental effects of high anxiety
not affect the response threshold and that should be greater with difficult tasks than
high drive in the form of anxiety increases with easy ones, and the data are in line with
the excitatory potential of all responses, that expectation. Of course, additional ex-
thus raising additional responses above the planatory principles are needed to account
response threshold. The natural expectation for the finding that anxiety sometimes leads
from these two assumptions is that high- to improved performance on easy tasks.
anxiety subjects should recall more items Is it in fact justified to assume that the
than low-anxiety subjects on a test of free re- learning of competitive or difficult paired
call. In fact, the data do not support this ex- associates makes more substantial demands
pectation. Rogers and Battig (1972) and Mu- on working memory than does the learning
eller (1976) found that anxiety had no effect of non-competitive or easy paired asso-
on free recall, and Mueller (1977) actually ciates? An initial endeavour to answer this
discovered that high-anxiety subjects had question was made in unpublished work by
significantly inferior free recall to low-anx- M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck. They
iety subjects. formed easy paired associates by pairing
In spite of its manifold deficiencies, the strongly associated words and difficult
approach of Spence and Spence (1966) is paired associates by re-arranging the pairs
still one of the most impressive theories in so that the words within each pair were very

600

~iil'550
~1;1
<>-_-------0
HIGH-ANXIETY
D..1Il SUBJECTS
~ ~
a:~
'500 LOw-ANXIETY
SUBJECTS
...Jill
<l:W
guz ·450
a:
D..~
u<l:
~...J '400

Fig. 6.6. Speed of retrieval as a func- I i i

NO RELAXATION RELAXATION
tion of trait anxiety and relaxatior. con- RELAXATION AT AT RECALL
ditions. (Straughan and Dufort 1969) ACQUISITION
106 Anxiety and Performance
weakly associated and there was a strong
competing response from another pair. For
example, one pair might be 'good-radio'
and a second pair 'tower-bad', with 'bad'
acting as a strong competing response when
subjects were tested on the first pair (i.e.
'good- 1').
The easy and difficult lists were presented
for learning under three different condi-
tions: (I) no concurrent task, (2) the concur-
rent task of rapid overt rehearsal of the
digits I - 6 in order (to utilize the articulato-
ry loop) and (3) the concurrent task of rapid
overt rehearsal of six random digits in a
specified order (to utilize both the articula-
tory loop and the modality-free central pro-
cessor). On the assumption that the difficult
paired associates require more of the re-·
sources of working memory than do the
easy paired associates, it follows that the
concurrent rehearsal of six random digits
should be more disruptive of the learning of
the hard paired associates.
Reference to Fig. 6.7 indicates that the re-
sults were disappointingly ambiguous. The
percentage reduction in the number of pairs
recalled under the random digit concurrent
task was indeed greater for the hard paired
associates than for the easy ones. However,
exactly the opposite result was obtained
when the absolute reduction in the number
of pairs recalled was considered.
While easy and difficult tasks almost cer-
tainly differ in terms of the demands which
90
....J
75
....J
«
uw 60
cr
t- 45
z
w
U
cr 30
w
a.
15
NONE ARTICULATORY MEMORY
SUPPRESSION LOAD
CONCURRENT TASK
they make on working memory capacity,
they undoubtedly differ in other ways as
well. It seems intuitively reasonable that
people are more likely to experience feel-
ings of failure when attempting an extreme-
ly demanding task than when attempting a
straightforward task, because progress is
slower and the number of errors is greater
on the more demanding task.
The emotional reactions to different tasks
was investigated by Tennyson and Wooley
(1971), who used concept acquisition self-
instruction tasks with easy and difficult
problems. The average state-anxiety score
on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory was
much higher immediately after performing
the difficult task than after the easy task.
Spielberger et al. (1972) also found that dif-
ficult learning tasks produced a much great-
er increase than easy tasks in the level of
state anxiety, particularly during the early
stages of learning.
Weiner (1966a) argued that subjects may
find that easy tasks provide feelings of suc-
cess, whereas hard tasks provide feelings of
failure. The normal interaction between
anxiety and task difficulty can then be inter-
preted as indicating simply that high-anxie-
ty individuals learn poorly when they expe-
rience failure (i.e. on hard tasks) but learn
well when they experience success (i.e. on
easy tasks). This hypothesis was investigat-
ed by telling subjects who were learning a
list of difficult paired associates that they
EASY
ITEMS
HARD
ITEMS
Fig. 6.7. Recall as a function of task
difficulty and nature of the concurrent
task. (Eysenck unpublished)

were doing well relative to others, thus pro-
ducing a success experience on the difficult
task. In contrast, those learning a list of easy
paired associates were told that they were
performing poorly relative to others, in or-
der to create a failure experience.
The results obtained by Weiner were the
exact opposite of those typically obtained:
high-anxiety subjects learned the difficult
paired associates more rapidly than low-
anxiety subjects but took longer than low-
anxiety subjects to learn the easy paired as-
sociates. This suggests that high-anxiety in-
dividuals thrive on success but shrivel under
failure conditions. Weiner concluded by re-
lating his findings to Spence's drive theory:
"It is erroneous to cite prior research in this
area as validating evidence for drive theory.
The important determinants of behaviour in
this situation are the cognitive and motiva-
tional consequences resulting from success
or failure at the task, rather than the individ-
ual's drive level interacting with the struc-
ture of the task" (p. 342).
Boor and Harmon (1971) quite properly
pointed out that Weiner's (1966a) experi-
mental design was inadequate because it
does not permit one to disentangle the ef-
fects of task difficulty and feedback (success
SUCCESS FEEDBACK
36
z
o ,,l
f5
I-
30
I
a:: I
U I
224
Vl ///
Y
...J
<t:
ii:
I- 18
1" I I
EASY
000----0 HIGH RESULTANT ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION
___I LOW RESULTANT ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION
Fig. 6.8. Speed ofiearning as a function of task difficulty, success versus failure feedback and result-
ant achievement motivation. (Weiner and Schneider 1971)
Spence and Spence (1966): Task Difficulty 107
versus failure). However, the appropriate
design was used by Weiner and Schneider
(1971), and their findings are shown in Fig.
6.8. It should be noted that those subjects
classified as high in resultant achievement
scored high on need for achievement on
the Thematic Apperception Test and low on
anxiety on the Test Anxiety Questionnaire,
whereas those low in resultant achievement-
motivation scored low on need for achieve-
ment and high on anxiety.
It is interesting to see that high-anxiety
subjects actually showed faster learning
than low-anxiety subjects when success
feedback was given. It is rather doubtful
whether any of the subjects receiving suc-
cess feedback experienced much state anx-
iety, since one of the most reliable conse-
quences of success is to reduce the level of
state anxiety (Gaudry 1977). The results un-
der success feedback are similar to those of
Sarason (1972), who looked at serial learn-
ing under several different instructional
conditions: control, achievement orienta-
tion, reassurance, motivating task orienta-
tion and task orientation. The low-anxiety
subjects learned more rapidly than the high-
anxiety subjects with achievement orienta-
tion instructions, but the opposite pattern of
FAILURE FEEDBACK
I
I
I
I
DIFFICULT EASY DIFFICULT
LEARNING TASK
108 Anxiety and Performance
results was obtained under reassurance and
task orientation conditions.
Under failure feedback conditions, Wein-
er and Schneider (1971) found that there
was a non-significant interaction between
anxiety and task difficulty. The implication
is that the usual interaction between those
variables only occurs when there is no prop-
er control over subjects' feelings of success
and failure.
In this section, we have considered the
very robust finding that anxiety interacts
with task difficulty. Three main attempts
have been made to account for this interac-
tion, but the explanation offered by Spence
and Spence (1966) is not generally satisfac-
tory. It is likely that both of the remaining
theories have something to recommend
them, that is to say, that anxiety has a great-
er detrimental effect on difficult than on
easy tasks both because difficult tasks make
more substantial demands than easy tasks
on the capacity of working memory and be-
cause difficult tasks are more likely to be as-
sociated with failure experiences leading to
enhanced state anxiety.
6.4 Anxiety and Motivation
Several theorists (e.g. Sarason 1975, Wine
1971) have argued that the major way in
which anxiety affects performance is by
leading to task-irrelevant processing activi-
ties. If the further assumption is made that
these task-irrelevant activities pre-empt
some of the processing resources of working
memory, it follows that anxiety will produce
a performance decrement on all tasks de-
pendent on working memory. In actual fact,
anxiety has often been found to facilitate
performance on easy learning tasks, thus
suggesting that anxiety must also affect the
processing system in other ways.
Many theorists, including Miller (1948)
and Spence and Spence (1966), have argued
that anxiety produces an increase in drive or
motivation. At first glance, it seems strange
and counter-intuitive that anxiety which
usually reduces the quality of performance,
should be associated with increased effort
and motivation. Indeed, the simplest expla-
nation of anxiety-induced impairments of
performance is that anxiety leads to de-
creased motivation and to a withdrawal of
processing resources from task perform-
ance.
How can the notion that anxiety leads to
increased motivation be justified? Miller
(1948) argued that anxiety was an aversive
state having motivational properties and
that anxiety reduction was positively rein-
forcing. In a classic demonstration, he in-
itially administered electric shocks to rats in
the white compartment of a test apparatuse
and allowed them to escape through a door
into the adjacent black compartment. This
procedure paired the cues of the white com-
partment with the painful electric shocks
and presumably produced a conditoned
fear response.
Did this conditioned fear have drive or
motivational properties? Miller attempted
to show that it did by seeing whether the rats
would learn a new response in order to es-
cape from the white compartment in spite of
the fact that they did not receive any further
shocks. The argument was that if such a re-
sponse could be learned, it would have to be
on the basis of the motivational properties
of conditioned fear rather than of the pain
produced by shock. Miller was able to show
convincingly that rats could learn the new
response of turning a wheel when reinforce-
ment consisted of the fear reduction asso-
ciated with escape into the black compart-
ment.
A further reason why anxiety might lead
to enhanced use of resources is suggested by
the theoretical analysis offered by Kahne-
man (1973). One of his basic contentions
was that the most potent determinant of the
amount of effort expended by an individual
was the evaluation of task demands. It is
fairly clear that the effective processing de-
mands faced by anxious individuals are
greater than those faced by non-anxious in-
dividuals. This is because anxious people
engage in much task-irrelevant processing

(e.g. the retrieval and analysis of anxiety-re-
lated information and the preparation of
adequate cognitive coping strategies) over
and above the processing demanded by the
task itself. In essence, the anxious individu-
al attempts to compensate for the perform-
ance decrements produced by task-irrele-
vant processing (e.g. worry) by means of an
increase in attentional resources.
Does anxiety always lead to an increase
in motivation? Common sense suggests that
the answer to that question is no. For exam-
ple, if an anxious person believes that the
probability of reducing anxiety through suc-
cessful task performance is very low, then
anxiety will lead to a low investment of ef-
fort in the task.
This combination of high anxiety and
little effort is illustrated by the phenomenon
of learned helplessness. In a classic study,
Maier et al. (1969) placed dogs in a shuttle
box. A warning signal was presented for lOs
and was followed by 50 s of electric shock
unless the dog avoided or escaped the shock
by jumping over a hurdle. Naive dogs rapid-
ly learned to avoid the shock, but dogs
which had previously been subjected to a
series of brief but very intense inescapable
electric shocks showed learned helpless-
ness; in the words of Maier et aI., "A dog
which has experienced inescapable shocks
prior to avoidance training soon stops run-
ning and howling and remains silent until
shock terminates. The dog does not cross
the barrier and escape the shock. Rather it
seems to give up and passively accept the
shock. On succeeding trials, the dog conti-
nues to fail to make escape movements and
will take as much shock as the experimenter
chooses to give" (p. 311).
The phenomenon of learned helplessness
probably provides a good example of the
precipitous drop in motivation that can oc-
cur when the chances of success appear mi-
nimal. If, as seems likely, high-anxiety people
tend to be more pessimistic than low-anx-
iety people about the probability of perfor-
ming a task successfully, there could well
be circumstances in which motivational level
is actually inversely related to anxiety level.
Anxiety and Motivation 109
Revelle and Michaels (1976) have deve-
loped a theory about the ways in which mo-
tivation is affected by the subjective proba-
bility of task success. They proposed that
the following relationship exists between
these two variables: "Moderately difficult
problems or situations (with probalilities of
success ranging from .5 to .I) should be ex-
tremely motivating ('When the going gets
tough, the tough get going'). On the other
hand, very difficult or impossible tasks
(probabilities of success less than .1) should
lead to extremely low levels of motivation
('Wise people do not beat their heads
against brick walls')" (p. 402).
There is an further consideration which is
usually ignored but almost certainly plays
an important part in determining whether or
not anxiety is associated with a high level of
motivation. This is the perceived instrumen-
tality of effort expenditure in leading to a re-
duction in the level of anxiety. Anxiety
should lead to increased effort if the source
of the anxiety is intrinsic to the task, i.e.
caused by fear of the consequences of inade-
quate task performance. In contrast, there is
no particular reason to expect that anxiety
will be associated with increased effort if the
cause of the anxiety is extrinsic to the task,
i.e. originating in events unrelated to the
task.
A study by Capretta and Berkun (1962)
provides a clear example of task-extrinsic
anxiety. Their subjects performed a digit-
span task while walking across a swaying
rope bridge over a deep ravine. Since per-
formance on the digit-span task could not
be instrumental in reducing the anxiety
. caused by being in a dangerous environ-
ment, there is no good reason for supposing
that Capretta and Berkun's anxious subjects
were highly motivated to repeat the digits in
the correct order!
We have seen that any statement about
the motivational consequences of high lev-
els of anxiety must be hedged with qualifica-
tions. However, it is likely that task-intrinsic
anxiety typically produces increased moti-
vation. There are three kinds of data that
provide at least indirect evidence concern-
110 Anxiety and Performance
ing the effects of anxiety on use of re-
sources: (l) self-reports of perceived effort,
(2) motivational manipulations and (3) sub-
sidiary task performance in dual-task situa-
tions.
Dornic (1977) reported an interesting se-
ries of experiments in which effort was mea-
sured by means of self-report question-
naires. In one experiment, neurotic and nor-
mal subjects showed comparable levels of
performance on various versions of a high-
load task involving time stress and storage
load. On the more demanding versions of
the task, the neurotic subjects perceived the
task as more difficult than the normal con-
trols, perhaps because they exerted more ef-
fort than the normal subjects.
Rather more convincing evidence was ob-
tained by Dornic (1977) in a second experi-
ment. He compared stable extroverts and
neurotic introverts, who can reasonably be
considered as low-anxiety and high-anxiety
groups, respectively. Several versions of a
closed-system-thinking task were used, with
task difficulty being manipulated in two dif-
ferent ways: (1) alteration of the number of
information sources (task load) and (2) var-
iation in the distraction power of semi-ver-
bal extra-task stimulation (environmental
load).
The key findings are presented in Fig. 6.9.
The first point to note is that there were no
15 8
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l-
g6
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e
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10 -0
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0:
5
w
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U. 0:
w W 2
Q. Q.
LOW HIGH
TASK LOAD
0----0 STABLE EXTRAVERTS; LOW EXTRA-TASK LOAD
STABLE EXTRAVERTS; HIGH EXTRA-TASK LOAD
0-._._.-.<) NEUROTIC INTROVERTS; LOW EXTRA-TASK LOAD
----- NEUROTIC INTROVERTS; HIGH EXTRA-TASK LOAD
significant performance differences be-
tween the two personality groups. In con-
trast, there was a significant triple interac-
tion involving task load, environmental load
and anxiety when the perceived effort data
are considered. In this interaction, the high-
anxiety subjects (i.e. the neurotic introverts)
expended more effort than the low-anxiety
subjects (i.e. the stable extraverts), especial-
ly in the more demanding task conditions
(i.e. high task load and/or high environmen-
tal load).
A second method of ascertaining the ef-
fects of anxiety on effort expenditure in-
volves the rather more direct technique of
using instructions to manipulate the level of
motivation. On the assumption that high-
anxiety subjects are typically more motivat-
ed than low-anxiety subjects, it should be
more difficult to improve their performance
by means of instructions designed to in-
crease motivation. This should be reflected
in an interaction between anxiety and moti-
vational instructions.
The most popular strategy has been to
compare the effects of ego-involving (e.g.
"This is a test of intelligence") and of task-
involving (e.g. "I want to see how well the
apparatus works") instructions. It has usual-
ly been assumed that ego-involving instruc-
tions will produce a higher level of motiva-
tion than task-involving instructions. While
Fig. 6.9. The effects of
anxiety (stable extraver-
LOW HIGH sion versus neurotic in-
TASK LOAD troversion), task load
and extra-task load on
performance and per-
ceived effort. (Dornic
1977)

ego-involving instructions are generally mo-
tivating, they undoubtedly have other ef-
fects as well. For example, they may contain
information about task difficulty (e.g. "Few
people ever obtain high scores"), and they
may well cause anxiety by emphasizing the
importance of the task.
While the effects of this instructional ma-
nipulation have sometimes been disappoint-
ingly weak or inconsistent, the predicted in-
teraction between anxiety and instructional
conditions has been obtained in a number of
studies of learning (e.g. Nicholson 1958,
Sarason 1956, 1957a). Ego-involving or mo-
tivating instructions lead to improved per-
formance only for low-anxiety subjects; in-
deed, ego-involving instructions have fairly
consistently been found to impair the per-
formance of high-anxiety subjects.
The evidence from instructional manipu-
lations of motivation and from self-reports
of effort expenditure is consistent in indicat-
ing that high anxiety is associated with a
greater expenditure of effort. A third meth-
od of measuring effort expenditure is sug-
gested by the theoretical analysis offered by
Kahneman (1973) and discussed at greater
length in Chap. 4. Kahneman argued that
spare processing capacity is inversely relat-
ed to the amount of effort that an individual
devotes to a primary or main task. It is possi-
ble to measure this spare processing capaci-
ty by looking at performance on a secondary
or subsidiary task that is carried out at the
same time as the primary task. The general
expectation is that performance on the sub-
sidiary task will be inversely related to effort
expenditure on the primary task (together
with any task-irrelevant processing associat-
ed with worry).
As was pointed out in Chap. 4, the typical
finding is that anxiety is associated with re-
duced performance on the subsidiary or in-
cidental task. There are 20 experimental
comparisons in which the effects of anxiety
(either via experimental manipulation of,
e.g., shock or as a personality variable) have
been considered in dual-task situations. In
15 of these experiments, anxiety significant-
ly impaired performance on the subsidiary
Anxiety and Motivation 111
task; there was no experiment in which anx-
iety improved subsidiary task performance.
In terms of the theoretical position of
Kahneman (1973), the implication is that
anxious subjects invest more effort and re-
sources than non-anxious subjects in the
main task. However, this extra effort had
little or no impact on performance of the
main task: there was a non-significant effect
of anxiety on the main task in 16 experi-
ments and a beneficial effect in only one ex-
periment.
An unfortunate characteristic of most of
these dual-task studies is that the main task
was intentional learning and the subsidiary
task was incidental learning. There are as a
consequence at least two possible reasons
for the poor subsidiary task performance
shown in the high-anxiety conditions:
(1) high anxiety reduced the spare process-
ing capacity available for handling the sub-
sidiary task information or (2) high-anxiety
subjects simply decided not to process the
apparently irrelevant information from the
subsidiary task, although they could have
processed it if they chosen to.
The best evidence in favour of the first alt-
ernative was obtained by Hamilton (1978).
The main task was to retain up to seven di-
gits in the correct order for a few seconds,
and a subsidiary reaction time task was in-
terpolated between presentation of the digit
string and its subsequent recall. Perform-
ance on the reaction time task was consid-
ered only on those trials on which the digit
string was recalled correctly. When the digit
string task was maximally demanding (i.e.
seven digits), high-anxiety subjects had
significantly longer reaction times than low-
anxiety subjects. Since the subjects had
been instructed to devote all of their spare
processing capacity to the subsidiary task,
the implication is that more effort and pro-
cessing resources are expended on the main
task under high anxiety.
In sum, there is a gallimaufry of empirical
data indicating that high-anxiety subjects
are more motivated and exert more effort
than low-anxiety subjects. Since this extra
effort usually fails to translate itself into a
112 Anxiety and Performance
performance superiority for anxious sub-
jects, it is interesting to speculate on this ap-
parent disparity between effort investment
and performance level. A plausible explana-
tion is that much of the extra effort exerted
by anxious subjects is devoted to task-irrele-
vant processing activities such as worry and
cognitive self-concern.
6.5 Failure and Shock
Spence and Spence (1966) assumed that a
variety of stressors (e.g. ego-involving in-
structions, failure feedback and electric
shock) all produced broadly comparable ef-
fects on anxiety and performance. This intu-
itively reasonable assumption was contro-
verted by Saltz (1970), who contrasted the
effects of failure feedback and electric
shock on the learning displayed by high-
anxiety and low-anxiety subjects. He
claimed that the research literature showed
that high-anxiety subjects were more sus-
ceptible than low-anxiety subjects to disrup-
tion of learning under failure or threat of
failure but that low-anxiety subjects were
more susceptible than high-anxiety subjects
to impaired learning under shock or threat
of shock conditions. As a result, Saltz ar-
gued that it would make more sense to refer
to 'failure-disrupted' and 'pain-disrupted'
people instead of continuing to use the lab-
els 'high-anxiety' and 'low-anxiety'.
The empirical data certainly provide
some support for Saltz's position. People of
high anxiety fairly consistently show greater
adverse effects of failure feedback than
those of low anxiety across a wide range of
learning tasks. This differential sensitivity
has been reflected in significant interactions
between the level of anxiety and the type of
feedback (failure versus neutral) in a num-
ber of studies (Gordon and Berlyne 1954,
Krugman 1958, Lucas 1952, Sarason 1957b,
Walker 1961). In these studies, high-anxiety
subjects showed a consistent impairment of
performance as a result of failure feedback,
whereas low-anxiety subjects were either
unaffected by failure or actually improved
their level of performance.
The effects of electric shock, or the
threat of it, are quite different. Eysenck
(1979a) has summarized the data from
studies reporting a total of 14 experimental
comparisons of the effects of shock on the
speed of learning of people with different
levels of trait anxiety. The threat of shock
improved the performance of high-anxiety
subjects in nine cases and impaired it five
times; in contrast, shock only improved
learning for low-anxiety subjects in one ex-
periment and reduced it on the remaining 13
occasions. A more direct comparison of the
effects of shock on the performance of high-
and low-anxiety subjects revealed that in 13
out of 14 cases the performance of high-an x-
iety subjects was either less impaired or
more improved by the threat of shock.
Saltz (1970) argued that the differential
effects of failure and shock could be ex-
plained by assuming that failure is much
more likely to produce feelings of anxiety in
high-anxiety subjects than in low-anxiety
subjects, whereas shock produces greater
feelings of anxiety in low-anxiety subjects.
The evidence is only partially supportive of
this hypothesis. Reference back to Fig. 6.2
will remind the reader that Hodges (1968)
discovered that failure did produce a larger
increase in state anxiety for those high in
trait anxiety than for those of low trait anx-
iety, and this is in line with Saltz's position.
Furthermore, very similar effects of failure
on state anxiety were obtained by Glanz-
mann and Laux (1978).
In contrast, there is practically no evi-
dence to indicate that high- and low-anxiety
subjects are differentially sensitive to shock.
Hodges (1968) and Glanzmann and Laux
(1978) found that threat of shock produced
comparable increases in state anxiety for
both anxiety groups, and the latter authors
also reported that the same result had been
obtained in two unpublished Ph. D. theses.
Thus there is an apparent discrepancy be-
tween the state anxiety and performance da-
ta: threat of shock impairs the learning of

low-anxiety subjects much more than that
of high-anxiety subjects, in spite of the fact
that shock has no differential effect on the
state anxiety experienced by the two groups.
Both findings were obtained in the same ex-
periment by Glover and Cravens (1974).
They found that threat of shock only had a
detrimental effect on the learning perform-
ance of low-anxiety subjects, but the threat
of shock had no effect on the level of state
anxiety of either high- or low-anxiety sub-
jects.
It is abundantly clear by now that, while
failure feedback and electric shock may
both appropriately be described as stres-
sors, they do not influence the processing
system in comparable ways. However, it has
proved surprisingly difficult to account for
the differences between them. The most pro-
mising lead was discovered by Morris and
Liebert (1973). They compared the effects of
threat of failure and threat of shock on the
two major components of state anxiety (i.e.
emotionality and worry). Threat of failure
produced an increase in worry but not in
emotionality; on the other hand, threat of
shock increased emotionality but not worry.
These findings allow us to make sense of
some of the data. For example, failure feed-
back is usually more effective than shock in
reducing performance for high-anxiety sub-
jects, and failure is apparently more likely
than shock to produce worry. Since we have
argued that anxiety-produced decrements
in performance are largely attributable to
worry and other forms of task-irrelevant
processing, this set of results is in line with
expectation. We will have to leave it to some
Einstein of the future to account for the fact
that people of low anxiety produce exactly
the opposite behavioural pattern!
Table 6.1. The perceived causes of success and failure incorporated into a two-dimensional framework.
(Weiner 1972)
Stability Fixed
Variable
Failure and Success: A Cognitive Approach 113
6.6 Failure and Success: A Cognitive
Approach
A totally different approach to the effects of
failure on performance has been put for-
ward by Weiner (1972). Following the lead
to Heider (1958) and other attribution theo-
rists, Weiner claimed that the cognitively
perceived causes of failure (and of success)
vitally affect performance. Four major per-
ceived causes of success and failure on
achievement tasks were identified: ability,
effort, task difficulty and luck. According to
Weiner, these four factors can be considered
within a two-dimensional framework, with
the two dimensions being the locus of con-
trol (internal versus external) and stability
over time (fixed versus variable).
As can be seen in Table 6.1, ability and
effort are both internal determinants of per-
formance, whereas task difficulty and luck
are external determinants. In terms of the
stability dimension, which refers to relative
stability over time, perceptions of ability
and task difficulty are less subject to change
than effort and luck. Of course, as Weiner
(1972) himself admitted, this conceptualiza-
tion is inadequate in some respects. For ex-
ample, while effort is alleged to be an un-
stable factor, some people perceive them-
selves to be diligent. With respect to ability,
perceptions of one's general ability may be
stable, whereas perceptions of specific abili-
ties can be substantially modified by experi-
ence.
Most people seem to demonstrate self-
serving biases when attributing causality to
their own behaviour (for a review see Brad-
ley 1978). That is to say, they accept respon-
sibility for successful performance (e.g. by
Locus of control
Internal External
Ability Task difficulty
Effort Luck
114 Anxiety and Performance

attributing it to high ability) but deny re-
sponsibility for failure (e.g. by attributing it
to bad luck). Obviously, such self-serving bi-
ases can be useful in protecting or enhan-
cing an individual's self-esteem.
Are there any important individual differ-
ences in the perceived causes of success and
failure? Some of the research suggests that
there are and that low-anxiety individuals
are more likely than those of high anxiety to
manifest self-serving biases. In the litera-
ture, a frequently employed measure of indi-
vidual differences is resultant achievement
motivation, which is typically based on a
combination of scores on need for achieve-
ment (derived from the Thematic Appercep-
tion Test) and on anxiety (derived from the
Test Anxiety Questionnaire). If an individu-
al scores high on the Thematic Appercep-
tion Test and low on the Test Anxiety Ques-
tionnaire, he or she is classified as high in re-
sultant achievement motivation. Those scor-
ing low on the Thematic Apperception Test
and high on the Test Anxiety Questionnaire
are deemed to be low in resultant achieve-
ment motivation.
Weiner and Potekan (1970) investigated
the relationship between resultant achieve-
ment motivation and self-ascriptions of
causality on the Intellectual Achievement
Responsibility Scale. On this latter test, sub-
jects are asked to account for success and
failure outcomes (a sample question:
"When you do well at school, is it more like-
ly to be (a) because you studied for it or
(b) because the test was especially easy?").
Low-anxiety subjects (i.e. those of high re-
sultant achievement motivation) were more
inclined than high-anxiety subjects to
ascribe success to ability and to effort; high-
anxiety subjects were more likely than those
of low anxiety to attribute failure to low
ability and less likely to attribute failure to a
lack of effort.
Similar results were obtained by Meyer
(1970). His study has the advantage over
that of Weiner and Potekan (1970) ofinves-
tigating success and failure in an actual task
situation rather than in hypothetical situa-
tions. He gave children a series of I5-digit
progressions to solve, accompanied by fake
success or failure feedback. As can be seen
in Fig. 6.10, low-anxiety subjects (i.e. those
high in resultant achievement motivation)
tended to ascribe success to high ability and
failure to bad luck, whereas high-anxiety sub-
jects (i.e. those low in resultant achievement
motivation) attributed success to good luck
and failure to a lack of ability. In other
words, those low in anxiety felt personally
responsible for success but not for fai-
lure; those high in anxiety made them-

w 4
0:::":
OU
z l:3 3
0
I- >-w 2 SUCCESS
:;;) 1-0::
::::io FEEDBACK
~
0:: ail:
l- e(
l-
e( 0
1L. w>-
0 o::!: - 1
J: O..J
I- l:1!l
~ :..:e( -2
z uz
w
0:: :;;)e(
I- ..JJ: -3
Vl I-
FAILURE Fig. 6.10. Relative strengths
-4 FEEDBACK of attributions to luck and
ability as a function of type
of feedback (success versus
LOW HIGH failure) and resultant
RESULTANT ACHIEVEMENT achievement motivation.
MOTIVATION (Meyer 1970)

selves miserable by feeling responsible for
failure but not for success. Meyer also
found that the emotional reactions of pride
in success and shame in failure were usually
more intense when the performance out-
come was attributed to the internal factor of
ability rather than to the external factor of
luck.
In a further experiment, Meyer (1970) ex-
posed subjects to five repeated failures on a
digit-symbol substitution task. Mter each
trial, the subjects ascribed the failure feed-
back which they received to low ability, bad
luck, lack of effort or task difficulty and also
estimated the probability of performing suc-
cessfully on the next trial. Individuals high
in resultant achievement motivation (involv-
ing low anxiety) were more likely than those
low in resultant achievement motivation to
attribute failure to lack of effort and bad
luck and less likely to attribute failure to low
ability and high task difficulty.
Not surprisingly, there was a general re-
duction in the subjective estimates of the
probability of success with increasing num-
bers offailure trials, but the extent of this re-
duction was greatly affected by exactly
which causal factor was perceived as the
main determinant of failure. When failure
was attributed to either of the stable factors
(i.e. task difficulty or ability), there was a
much greater decline in the subjective prob-
ability of success than when failure was
ascribed to one of the variable factors (i.e.
effort and luck). As would be expected on
the basis of the data already presented, high
resultant achievement motivation (involv-
ing low anxiety) was associated with a much
smaller decrement over trials in the subjec-
tive probability of success than was low re-
sultant achievement motivation.
What are the consequences of a reduced
subjective probability of success for per-
formance? Zajonc and Brickman (1969)
answered this question in the context of a
study in which fake feedback was intro-
duced on a simple visual reaction time task.
They found that those who resisted lowering
their expectations concerning subsequent
performance after failure feedback im-
Depth and Elaboration of Processing 115
proved their speed of responding, whereas
those who reacted to failure by lowering
their expectations failed to show improved
performance.
In sum, it appears that failure experiences
have differential cognitive consequences for
individuals high and low in anxiety, and the
same is true of success experiences. Part of
the reason why high-anxiety individuals ex-
perience more state anxiety than low-anxie-
ty individuals after failure feedback is that
they are more inclined to feel personally re-
sponsible for the failure. In addition, high-
anxiety individuals seem to respond to fai-
lure by attributing it to factors which they
cannot readily control such as task difficulty
and ability. Since these are relatively un-
changing factors, failure is seen as being
predictive of subsequent failure, and so
high-anxiety individuals show a reduced
subjective probability of success after fai-
lure. This in tum may have a detrimental ef-
fect on performance (Zajonc and Brickman
1969).
Research on the perceived causes of fai-
lure seems to further our understanding of
the reasons why the task performance of
high-anxiety people is more detrimentally
affected than that of low-anxiety people by
failure feedback. However, this approach
has proved very limited in several ways, and
major questions have been ignored. For ex-
ample, what determines the selection of a
particular causal determinant of achieve-
ment behaviour? Is the selection of a causal
factor veridical? How exactly does the per-
ception that performance is determined by a
given causal factor affect subsequent behav-
iour? Are workers in this area investigating
epiphenomena rather than the true causes
of behaviour?
6.7 Depth and Elaboration of Processing
One of the most immediately obvious short-
comings of most of the work on anxiety and
performance has been the failure to capital-
116 Anxiety and Performance
ize on relevant theoretical advances that
have occurred in other areas. A partial ex-
ception to this is some of the recent research
on anxiety and memory which has been
based on the stimulating theoretical frame-
work for memory provided by Craik and
Lockhart (1972). Craik and Lockhart's basic
contentions were that the memory trace is a
residue of attentional processes and that
there are an almost limitless number of ways
in which a stimulus can be processed. Sti-
mulus encodings were seen as varying in
terms of the amount of meaningfulness ex-
tracted from the stimulus or, in their pre-
ferred terminology, the 'depth' of processing.
Craik and Lockhart (1972) regarded se-
mantic analysis as involving deep process-
ing, whereas physical or phonemic analysis
only necessitates shallow processing. The
crucial prediction that follows from this the-
oretical analysis is that retention should be
positively related to the depth of processing.
There is much empirical support for this
prediction (see Lockhart et al. 1976, for a re-
view). In the usual paradigm, subjects per-
form an orienting task on each of several
words and are then unexpectedly asked for
free recall. Depth of processing is manipu-
lated by means of a variety of orienting
tasks, ranging from the semantic (e.g. think
of an adjective to go with each word) to the
physical (e.g. decide whether each word is
printed in upper or lower case). The typical
finding is that free recall is much higher for
semantically processed words than for phy-
sically or phonemically encoded words.
This theoretical approach to memory has
been criticized in a variety of ways. An im-
portant inadequacy is the lack of any inde-
pendent measure of the depth of processing,
so that it is often difficult to know whether a
particular form of processing is shallow or
deep. Eysenck (1978) pointed out with refer-
ence to actual examples "the danger of us-
ing retention-test performance to provide
information about the depth of processing,
and then using the putative depth of pro-
cessing to 'explain' the retention-test per-
formance, a self-defeating exercise in circu-
larity" (p. 36).
An equally damaging attack on the Craik-
Lockhart formulation was made by Stein
(1978). A list of words was presented with a
single letter capitalized in each word (e.g.
'cHair'), and either a semantic or a shallow
task had to be performed on each \yord. The
semantic task involved deciding whether
each word fitted appropriately into a sen-
tence frame, whereas the shallow task re-
quired decisions about whether each word
had a particular word capitalized. An unex-
pected recognition test was subsequently
aqministered; this either required the sub-
ject to pick out the list word from among a
number of non-list words (normal test) or to
select the exact stimulus presented from a
set of stimuli that only differed from the pre-
sented stimulus in terms of the capitalized
letter (a sample of this case-oriented test is
as follows: Chair, cHair, chAir, chaIr).
The results are shown in Fig. 6.11. They
indicate very clearly that retention does not
depend exclusively on the depth of process-
ing at input; rather, it depends on the relev-
ance of the encoded information to the re-
quirements of the retention test. Thus the
only information that is relevant to selecting
the input stimulus from the set 'Chair cHair
chAir chaIr' is information about which let-
ter was capitalized: the shallow task led to
the storage of that information whereas the
semantic task did not, and so shallow pro-
cessing led to better retention than deep pro-
cessing.
A final difficulty with the position advo-
cated by Craik and Lockhart (1972) is that
they did not explain in any detail precisely
why deep encodings should be better re-
membered than shallow encodings. It has
been pointed out many times (e.g. Eysenck
1979b) that semantic encodings will tend to
be more elaborate or extensive than phon-
emic encodings due to the fact that the num-
ber of potentially encodable semantic fea-
tures of a word is considerably greater than
the potential phonemic word attributes.
In related work, Jacoby (1974) and Ey-
senck (1979b) have discovered that the se-
mantic encoding of a word tends to be more
distinctive or unique than the phonemic en-

z
0 80
....
z 70
(!)
0 60
u
w
Q:
....
z 40
w
u
Q:
W TEST
Q.
Fig. 6.11. Recognition performance as a
function of type of orienting task (case ver-
sus semantic) and the nature of the recog-
nition test (normal versus case-oriented).
(Stein 1978)
coding. The reason for the distinctiveness of
semantic encodings is that the semantic en-
coding of a word in a particular context is
different from the semantic encodings of
the same word when presented in other
contexts, so that one semantic encoding
of a word is discriminable from other se-
mantic encodings of the same word. Trace
discriminability is probably much lower in
the case of phonemic en co dings.
Since the depth of processing is frequently
confounded with the elaboration or distinc-
tiveness of encoding, it is important for re-
search to attempt to separate out the effects of
each ofthesefactors. In practice,studies ofthe
effects ofanxiety on memory have not usually
been responsive to the increasing theoreti-
cal complexity in this area of research.
The first major attempt to consider possi-
ble inter-relationships between personality
and depth of processing was made by
Schwartz (1975). On the basis of previous re-
search, he proposed the following hypothe-
sis: "Arousal facilitates recall of the actual
physical properties of verbal stimuli but ad-
versely affects memory for semantic fea-
tures" (p. 2). In the two experiments which
he reported, Schwartz assigned people to
the various arousal groups on the basis of
their neuroticism and extraversion scores on
the Eysenck Personality Inventory. The
highest arousal group consisted of neurotic
introverts and the lowest arousal group con-
sisted of stable extraverts; since neurotic in-
troverts are high in anxiety and stable extra-
Depth and Elaboration of Processing 117
100
NORMAL TEST
90
50
30
CASE-ORIENTED
20
1: I i
SHALLOW SEMANTIC
(CASE)
ORIENTING TASK
verts are low in anxiety (Gray 1973), we will
hereafter refer to the dimension investigated
by Schwartz as one of anxiety.
Schwartz's (1975) first experiment in-
volved a paired-associate learning task in
which the response words were either all
phonemically or semantically similar. Since
response similarity typically interferes with
learning, it would be auticipated that se-
mantic response similarity would impair
performance if the subjects processed the
words semantically; in similar fashion,
phonemic response similarity will interfere
with learning provided that phonemic pro-
cessing occurs.
The main feature of the data was a highly
significant three-way interaction among neu-
roticism, extraversion and list type (see Fig.
6.12. High-arousal (or high-anxiety) subjects
did not show any adverse effects of semantic
similarity, perhaps because they were focuss-
ing on the physical attributes of the present-
ed material, and low-arousal (or low-anxie-
ty) subjects were unaffected by phonemic si-
milarity because they concentrated on se-
mantic processing.
In a second experiment, Schwartz (1975)
considered the effects of arousal or anxiety
on free recall of a categorized word list pre-
sented in a random order. High-arousal (or
high-anxiety) subjects recalled the list in a
less semantically organized way than sub-
jects with lower levels of arousal or anxiety
and tended to recall the words in the order
in which they were presented. These results
118 Anxiety and Performance

15
(!)
z
Z PHONEM ICALLY
Q: SIMILAR
<{ 12
;:r------o LIST
w
..J /
(!) /
/
Z 9 /
Q:
:::> , /
/

""
0 SEMANTI CALLY
III
6 d SIMILAR
Q:
0 LIST
Q:
Q:
W
z 3
<{
w
~
Fig. 6.12. Learning errors on
STABLE
phonemically and semantically
EXTRAVERTS EXTRAVERTS similar lists as a function of
STABLE NEUROTIC introversion-extraversion and
INTROVERTS INTROVERTS neuroticism. (Schwartz 1975)

are consistent with the notion that high
arousal or anxiety leads to reduced semantic
processing but to increased physical pro-
cessing.
A failure to replicate some of Schwartz's
key findings was reported by Craig et al.
(1979). They considered paired-associate
learning with either semantically or phon-
emically similar stimuli; neurotic extraverts
showed better learning than any of the other
groups (i.e. stable extraverts, stable intro-
verts and neurotic introverts), which is in-
consistent with Schwartz's hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, when subjects were given the
learning task after the administration of caf-
feine (a known arousing agent), it was pri-
marily the low-arousal (stable extraverts)
and high-arousal (neurotic introverts)
groups that showed improved performance.
This pattern of results is rather mysterious
from the perspective of a simple arousal
model and suggests that the four personality
groups may not vary in arousal level in the
way proposed by Schwartz.
A rather more plausible hypothesis has
been proposed and tested by Mueller in a
series of publications. As Mueller (1979)
pointed out, if anxiety leads to reduced or
restricted processing, then the natural ex-
pectation is that fewer features or attributes
will be encoded under high anxiety. In the
terminology usually employed, anxiety will
reduce the extensiveness or elaboration of
encoding.
This elaboration hypothesis has been in-
vestigated in several studies by Mueller and
his associates (Miller et al. 1978; Mueller
1976, 1977, 1978, unpubl.; Mueller et al.
1978, Mueller et al. 1977). In the majority of
these studies, a free recall paradigm was
used in which the list words could be organ-
ized along shallow (physical) or semantic
lines.
Anxiety significantly impaired retention
test performance in 6 out of 11 experimental
comparisons and had no effect in the other
five comparisons. There was no support for
the notion that anxiety impairs semantic
processing more than shallow processing:
in eight out of nine comparisons, there were
equivalent effects of anxiety on retention of
semantic and shallow features or attributes.
In the remaining experiment (Mueller un-
published), anxiety significantly reduced
retention of phonemic information but had
no effect on retention of semantic informa-
tion; this result is the exact opposite of that
predicted by Schwartz (1975).
Further evidence that anxiety reduces ela-
boration of encoding was obtained by M. C.
Eysenck and M. W. Eysenck in unpublished
work. A list of to-be-remembered words was

followed by a test of cued recall. Each retrie-
val cue was either semantically related (e.g.
'BAT associated with -') or phonemically
related (e.g. 'HALL rhymes with -') to one
of the list words. In addition, the strength of
the relationship between the word used as
the retrieval cue and the list word was vari-
ed, on the assumption that more elaborate
encoding would be required for recall if
there were a weak relationship between the
two words rather than a strong one. As is
shown in Fig. 6.13, there was a highly signi-
ficant interaction between anxiety and cue
strength, with high anxiety greatly reducing
recall with the weak retrieval cues but hav-
ing little effect on recall with the strong re-
trieval cues. These findings were interpreted
as reflecting reduced elaboration of encod-
ing under high anxiety; it remains unclear
whether this narrowness of encoding occurs
at input, at output or at both output and in-
put.
The basic finding that retention is re-
duced under high anxiety can also be ex-
plained by Walker's (1958) action decre-
ment theory. This theory states that high
arousal leads to a longer lasting active mem-
ory trace than does low arousal, and this
produces superior long-term retention. It is
further assumed that there is an inhibition
of retrieval (or 'action decrement') during
the time that the memory trace remains ac-
tive. It follows from this assumption that
60
III 5·0
w
cr
0 CUES
U 4·0
III
...J
...J
<t 3·0
U
W
cr 20
z WEAK
<t
W
2 1·0
Fig. 6.13. Recall as function of strength
of the retrieval cues, introversion-ex-
traversion and neuroticism. (Eysenck
and Eysenck unpublished)
Depth and Elaboration of Processing 119
high arousal reduces short-term rentention.
Since states of high anxiety tend to be ac-
companied by high arousal (see Eysenck,
1977a, for a review), it can be predicted from
Walker's action decrement theory that the
anxiety-produced decrements in perform-
ance at the relatively short retention inter-
vals used in the majority of the published
studies should be reversed at longer renten-
tion intervals.
In fact, the available evidence does not in-
dicate that anxiety leads to superior long-
term retention. Pagano and Katahn (1967)
compared recall for high and low scorers on
the Test Anxiety Questionnaire. They con-
trolled for original learning and found that
anxiety had no effect on recall at retention
intervals of 24 hand 7 days. Mueller (1978
unpUblished) has consistently obtained a si-
milar pattern of results. Ray et al. (1971)
looked at memory for a complex verbal task
2 days after learning. Their results showed
that high-anxiety subjects had forgotten
more than low-anxiety subjects.
In essence, it has been discovered that
anxiety reduces retention test performance
for deep and shallow features or attributes
and at all retention intervals. While these
findings are inconsistent with the predic-
tions of Walker's (1958) action decrement
theory and of Schwartz's (1975) hypothesis,
they are reasonably in line with the expecta-
tions of the elaboration hypothesis favoured
STRONG
CUES
NEUROTIC
EXTRAVERTS
STABLE NEUROTIC
INTROVERTS INTROVERTS
( ANXIETY)
120 Anxiety and Performance
by M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck and
by Mueller (1979).
6.8 Theoretical Positions
A theoretical approach which can plausibly
account for many of the major effects of
anxiety is Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis,
which was discussed at some length in
Chap. 4. Easterbrook's fundamental con-
tention is that states of high emotionality,
arousal and anxiety all produce a restriction
in the range of cue utilization. In somewhat
more contemporary terminology, the basic
idea is that arousal and anxiety lead to a nar-
rowing of attention.
Evidence consistent with Easterbrook's
hypothesis has been obtained in dual-task
situations involving a main and a subsidiary
task. The key finding is that anxiety impairs
performance on the subsidiary task more
than on the main task, which suggests that
anxiety increases attentional selectivity.
If one assumes that difficult tasks tend to
involve more cues than easy tasks, then the
narrowing of attention under high anxiety
should have a greater detrimental effect on
the performance of difficult tasks. As we
saw earlier in the chapter, one of the more
robust findings in the area of anxiety and
performance is the interaction between anx-
iety and task difficulty, with high-anxiety
subjects performing much worse than low-
anxiety subjects on hard tasks, but not on
easy ones.
The least plausible assumption made by
Easterbrook (1959) was that anxiety impairs
performance on difficult tasks by producing
great concentration on only a few task ele-
ments. On this assumption, high-anxiety
subjects spend a greater proportion of the
time processing task-relevant information
than low-anxiety subjects, whose broader
range of cue utilization may well include
non-task elements. In fact, Deffenbacher
(1978) discovered that high-anxiety subjects
actually spent far less time than low-anxiety
subjects attending to task-relevant informa-
tion. Nottelman and Hill (1977) found that
high-anxiety children performing an ana-
gram task engaged in substantially more off-
task glancing than low-anxiety children,
which seems diametrically opposed to the
expectation from Easterbrook's hypothesis.
Easterbrook's hypothesis also appears to
generate the counter-intuitive prediction
that high anxiety is associated with a re-
duced susceptibility to distraction. This pre-
diction received some support in studies by
Bruning et al. (1968) and by Zaffy and Brun-
ing (1966). Learning occurred in the pres-
ence of no cues, task-relevant cues or task-
irrelevant cues; the beneficial effect of rele-
vant cues and the adverse effect of irrelevant
cues were smaller for high-anxiety than for
low-anxiety subjects, indicating a reduced
susceptibility to distraction under high anx-
iety.
On the other hand, the opposite pattern of
results has been obtained in other studies.
Pallak et al. (1975) looked at performance
on the Stroop test under conditions of high
and low conflict or distraction. Anxious
subjects performed the task better than non-
anxious subjects under conditions of low
distraction, but performed it worse under
conditions of high distraction. Dornic
(1977) also obtained evidence that distrac-
tibility was positively related to anxiety.
Some final inadequacies of Easterbrook's
formulation as it applies to anxiety remain
to be considered. The first problem is that
Easterbrook regarded anxiety as a unitary
construct, whereas there is fairly convincing
evidence that anxiety comprises the two
components of worry and emotionality. The
finding that worry and emotionality have
rather different effects on performance can-
not readily be accounted for by Easter-
brook. Related to this problem is the puzzle
of interpreting the differential effects on
performance of electric shock and failure
feedback, since Easterbrook's hypothesis
implies that both stressors should have
equivalent behavioural consequences.
Finally, even if attentional narrowing un-
der high anxiety does occur, there are alter-

native ways of conceptualizing the process.
While Easterbrook regarded attentional
narrowing as a relatively passive and auto-
matic process, it may well prove more fruit-
ful to regard it as an active coping response
when the processing system is in danger of
becoming overloaded.
A interesting theoretical analysis was of-
fered by Hamilton (1975). He argued that
the major effect of anxiety was to give rise to
complex cognitive processing: "Anxiety can
be defined as internally generated cycles of
connotative signals elicited by external sti-
muli, which a central interpreting or apprai-
sal process codes as requiring avoidance,
and as indicating physical danger, injury to
self-esteem, rejection, and loss of affection
in valued social settings" (p. 50). Such task-
irrelevant processing competes with task-
relevant information in a processing system
having limited capacity.
According to Hamilton, the exact effects
of anxiety on task performance can be pre-
dicted only in the light of the available pro-
cessing capacity. The various theoretical
ideas were incorporated into a formula stat-
ing that a task will be performed successful-
ly when average processing capacity plus
spare processing capacity are equal to or
greater than internally generated task-irrele-
vant information (produced by anxiety)
plus internally generated task-relevant in-
formation plus externally generated task-
relevant information.
Any tendency for the available informa-
tion to exceed the available processing re-
sources will lead to a decrement in main-
task performance. This will frequently hap-
pen under conditions of high anxiety, be-
cause anxiety usually produces internally
generated task-irrelevant information.
When the total information-processing de-
mands cannot be handled by the available
processing capacity, a probable reaction is
to restrict attention voluntarily to a small
number of information sources. This will
lead to the attentional narrowing predicted
by Easterbrook (1959).
Hamilton's views certainly provide a
plausible explanation for the typical ad-
Theoretical Positions 121
verse effect of anxiety on performance.
However, it is unclear how he would explain
the existence of performance improvements
under high anxiety, and he largely ignores
the motivational implications of anxiety ma-
nipulations.
A theoretical conceptualization resem-
bling those of Easterbrook (1959) and Ham-
ilton (1975) has been put forward by Ey-
senck (1979a, 1981). One of the central
points which he made was that the level of
performance achieved by an individual only
provides an indirect and fallible indication
of the way in which the processing system is
functioning. A concrete example will make
this clear. If you went on a long run with an
outstanding athlete such as Sebastian Coe,
he might be kind enough to run at the same
speed as you, with the result that your per-
formance in terms of the number of seconds
taken to complete the run would be the
same. It would obviously be invalid to con-
clude that you were equally gifted runners.
While the run would leave you in a state of
collapse gasping for air, Sebastian Coe
would be breathing normally and would
scarcely have broken sweat. The relevance
of this analogy to the effects of anxiety is
that anxious individuals may perform as ef-
ficiently as non-anxious individuals but only
at greater 'subjective cost' to the system.
It may prove useful to distinguish be-
tween performance efficiency (which is sim-
ply a measure of the quality of performance)
and processing effectiveness (which refers
to the relationship between the quality of
performance and the effort or processing re-
sources invested in it). More specifically,
the relationship between processing effec-
tiveness and performance efficiency can be
expressed in terms of the following formula:
. . efficiency
processmg effectiveness = ff
e ort
The separate effects of anxiety on process-
ing effectiveness and on performance effi-
ciency were spelled out by Eysenck (1979a):
"Since a major component of anxiety is
task-irrelevant cognitive activity or worry,
which reduces the working memory capaci-
ty available for processing task information,
122 Anxiety and Performance
it follows that anxiety will reduce process-
ing effectiveness with respect to any task
making demands on working memory.
However, ... the extent to which anxiety
either facilitates or impairs performance is
determined by the extent to which high-anx-
iety subjects compensate for reduced pro-
cessing effectiveness by enhanced effort"
(p.365).
In other words, it is expected that anxiety
will influence processing effectiveness more
than performance efficiency. The great ma-
jority of studies have produced weak anxie-
ty effects, perhaps because they were de-
signed so that only information about per-
formance efficiency was obtained. Perform-
ance efficiency under high and low anxiety
can only be used as a direct indication of
processing effectiveness provided that one
assumes that effort or resource expenditure
is comparable under conditions of low and
high anxiety. However, as the evidence re-
viewed earlier in this chapter indicated, ef-
fort expenditure is usually greater under
high anxiety, so that the quality of perf9rm-
ance as a function of anxiety does not accu-
rately reflect the effects of anxiety on pro-
cessing effectiveness.
The clearest evidence that a distinction
between processing effectiveness and per-
formance efficiency is necessary is available
in the dual-task studies discussed earlier in
the chapter. It will be recalled that anxiety
had a non-significant effect on performance
of the main task in 16 out of 20 experimen-
tal comparisons; in other words, anxiety
characteristically had no effect on perform-
ance efficiency. It would be extremely mis-
leading, however, to conclude that anxiety
had no effect at all on the processing system.
The analysis of subsidiary task data for
those 16 experimental comparisons in
which there was no effect of anxiety on
main task performance is instructive in this
regard. Of the 16 subsidiary task comparis-
ons, five indicated a non-significant effect
of anxiety on performance, none revealed a
facilitatory effect of anxiety and II pro-
duced a significant impairment of perform-
ance as a function of anxiety. Overall, anxie-
ty has thus been found to be far more likely
to reduce than to enhance performance of a
subsidiary task (P < .001).
At the most general level, these results in-
dicate the advisability of using dual-task
paradigms to investigate the effects of anx-
iety on performance. More intriguingly,
they suggest that the typical non-significant
effect of anxiety on performance efficiency
of the main task masks the adverse effects of
anxiety on processing effectiveness, which
only becomes manifest when subsidiary
task performance is considered.
While Eysenck (1979a, 1981) emphasized
the importance of the conceptual distinc-
tion between processing effectiveness and
performance efficiency, he also made a var-
iety of theoretical assumptions. For exam-
ple, he assumed that the main reason that
anxiety reduced processing effectiveness
was because of additional task-irrelevant
processing necessitated by worry and cogni-
tive self-concern. This task-irrelevant pro-
cessing pre-empts some of the limited ca-
pacity of working memory, so that there is
reduced working memory capacity to pro-
cess task-relevant information.
Since anxious individuals have to process
both task-relevant and task-irrelevant infor-
mation, whereas non-anxious individuals
only need to process task-relevant informa-
tion, the effective task demands are greater
for anxious individuals. In line with Kahne-
man's (1973) theoretical analysis of effort, it
is hypothesized that anxious individuals
react to these increased task demands with
greater effort expenditure. These various
theoretical assumptions generate a number
of testable predictions, including the follow-
ing:
1. Performance is impaired by the worry
component of anxiety rather than by the
emotionality component.
2. The worry component of anxiety reduces
the working memory capacity available
for task processing.
3. Given that anxiety reduces working mem-
ory capacity, anxiety will interact with
task demands, with the detrimental ef-
fects of anxiety increasing directly with

the demands that tasks place on the ca-
pacity of working memory.
4. The reduced working memory capacity
associated with high anxiety means inter
alia that elaboration of encoding will vary
inversely with anxiety.
5. With certain qualifications, anxiety leads
to increased effort expenditure.
6. Anxiety will always reduce processing ef-
fectiveness but will not impair perform-
ance efficiency if there is sufficient effort
expenditure. This means that anxiety will
usually have a greater detrimental effect
on the subsidiary task than on the main
task in dual-task situations.
Theoretical Positions 123
7. If high- and low-anxiety subjects are in-
duced to utilize near maximal effort on a
task (e.g. via incentives or motivational
instructions), then the reduced processing
effectiveness under high anxiety will be
reflected directly in task performance.
There are numerous experimental studies
providing empirical support for each of
these seven predictions. However, as we
have indicated throughout the chapter,
much of the research in this area has been ill
conceived and methodologically unsound.
A satisfactory theory of anxiety and per-
formance still lies some way off in the
future.
7 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
In this chapter we consider a variety of inter-
nal or endogenous factors contributing to-
wards an individual's level of arousal. It has
been claimed that even in the absence of a
stimulating environment, some individuals
will characteristically be in a more aroused
state than others. The dimension of individ-
ual differences most frequently referred to
in this connection is introversion-extraver-
sion (H. J. Eysenck 1967), the usual assump-
tion being that introverts are chronically
more aroused than extraverts.
A second endogenous factor affecting the
level of arousal is the t; me of day. It has
been found that there are circadian rhythms
in a number of physiological and behaviour-
al measures, and some of the physiological
measures suggest that the level of arousal
fluctuates between its nadir during the mid-
dle of the night to its apogee at some point
between mid-day and the early evening.
There is an interesting link between time-of-
day effects and introversion-extraversion,
because there is accumulating evidence (e.g.
Blake 1967b, Revelle et al. 1980) that intro-
verts and extraverts differ with respect to the
timing of some of their circadian rhythms.
A third factor that relates to time-of-day
effects is sleep deprivation. Broadbent
(1971) has reviewed the research in this area
and concluded that one of the typical effects
of sleep deprivation is to lower the level of
arousal. A consideration of the physiologi-
cal and performance characteristics of the
sleep-deprived state, together with those of
introversion-extraversion and time of day,
constitutes the subject matter of this chap-
ter.
7. Introversion-Extraversion
7.1.1 Theoretical Background
The most complete theory of the personality
dimension of introversion-extraversion was
put forward by H. J. Eysenck (1967). He ar-
gued in favour of a three-dimensional per-
sonality space comprising the three ortho-
gonal dimensions of introversion-extraver-
sion, neuroticism and psychoticism. Each of
these personality dimensions was regarded
as having a substantial hereditary compo-
nent and as having an identifiable physio-
logical basis. Differences in introversion-ex-
traversion were thought to depend upon
cortical arousal stemming from the ascend-
ing reticular activating system, whereas dif-
ferences along the neuroticism-stability di-
mension are based on activation of the vis-
ceral brain, i.e. the hippocampus, amygdala,
cingulum, septum and hypothalamus.
The most crucial assertion of this theory
for present purposes is that introverts are
more cortically aroused than extraverts. In
this connection, H. J. Eysenck (1967) sug-
gested that "skin conductance and alpha ac-
tivity are measures of extraversion" (p. 170),
but the physiological evidence is equivocal.
Gale (1973) has provided an excellent re-
view of the EEG findings, following the
usual procedure of regarding low amplitude
and high frequency of alpha as indicative of
high arousal. Of the 16 studies discussed by
Gale, seven supported the hypothesis that
introverts are more aroused than extraverts,
three found that extraverts were more
aroused than introverts and the remaining
studies obtained non-significant EEG dif-

ferences between introverts and extraverts.
It should be noted that there is a methodo-
logical problem with some of the studies, in
that the subjects were simply instructed to
'do nothing': such instructions obviously
fail to provide adequate control over the
subject's cognitive processes and behaviour.
Gale attempted to reconcile the discrepant
findings in a post hoc manner by claiming
that most of the data were consistent with
the notion that extraverts are more aroused
than introverts when the experimental
procedure is either very interesting or un-
remittently tedious, with introverts being
more aroused than extraverts in moderately
arousing situations.
Somewhat more convincing evidence has
been obtained from drug studies. In particu-
lar, if introverts are chronically more
aroused than extraverts, then there are cer-
tain predictable consequences of adminis-
tering stimulant and depressant drugs. As
can be observed any night at the local pub,
the depressant drug alcohol frequently has
an extraverting effect, presumably because
it reduces the level of arousal. More formal
evidence was obtained by Laverty (1958).
He found that injections of sodium amytal
(a depressant) produced a significant shift
towards greater extraversion on a personali-
ty questionnaire as well as associated beha-
vioural changes (e.g. increased talkativeness
and sociability). In addition, the amount of
sodium amytal required to produce slurred
speech (the so-called sedation threshold)
was greater for introverts than for extra-
verts.
We have seen already that introverts are
only more aroused than extraverts under
certain circumstances. A potentially import-
ant example of this was discovered by Blake
(1967b), who found that the body tempera-
ture of introverts was higher than that of ex-
traverts during the morning and early after-
noon, whereas the opposite was the case
during the evening. To the extent that body
temperature reflects the prevailing level of
arousal, the implication is that there is a
phase difference in the circadian rhythm of
arousal, with introverts attaining peak
Introversion-Extraversion 125
arousal earlier in the day than extraverts.
There are additional physiological and be-
havioural data indicative of a phase differ-
ence, and it has recently been claimed that
this is attributable primarily to the impulsiv-
ity component of extraversion rather than to
the sociability component (Revelle et al.
1980).
H. J. Eysenck (1967) incorporated the as-
sumption that introverts are more cortically
aroused than extraverts into a broader theo-
retical framework. He argued that this grea-
ter cortical arousal of introverts made them
more conditionable than extraverts; as a
consequence, introverts show greater fear
conditioning than extraverts and are thus
more law abiding and also more likely to de-
velop dysthymic symptoms (phobias, obes-
sions, anxiety states and reactive depres-
sion). In contrast, extraverts condition poor-
ly, and their low level of fear conditioning
can lead to criminal and psychopathic be-
haviour.
Gray (1970, 1972, 1973) has proposed a
theory of introversion-extraversion that
bears a close resemblance to that of H. J. Ey-
senck (1967) but with a number of specific
differences. He disputed the notion that in-
troverts are, in general, more readily condi-
tioned than extraverts and pointed out that
the opposite is true under some circum-
stances (e.g. Eysenck & Levey 1972). If in-
troverts are only more conditionable than
extraverts under certain conditions, then it
is implausible to attribute the greater law-
abidingness of introverts to their superior
conditionability. Gray (1972) suggested a
simpler reason for the presence of more con-
ditioned fear in introverts than in extraverts:
"We may regard the dimension of introver-
sion-extraversion as a dimension of suscep-
tibility to punishment and non-reward: the
greater the degree of introversion, the grea-
ter is this susceptibility" (p. 194).
At the physiological level, Gray (1973)
argued that detailed examination of the
extraverting effects of barbiturate drugs
(especially sodium amytal) and of alcohol
suggested a modification of Eysenck's
hypothesis that differences in intro-
126 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal

version-extraversion represent differences orbitofrontal-septo-hippocampal stop sys-

solely in the activity of the ascending reticu- tem. Individual differences in susceptibility
lar activating system. As an alternative, Gray to reward, on the other hand, are primarily
proposed that physiological differences be- associated with the diagonal from stable in-
tween introverts and extraverts depend up- troversion to neurotic extraversion; this ap-
on a feedback loop comprising the ascend- proximates to the personality trait of impul-
ing reticular activating system, the frontal sivity and derives from the degree of activity
cortex, the septal area and the hippo- in a physiological approach system involv-
campus. ing the medial forebrain bundle and the la-
While Gray (1973) agreed with H. J. Ey- teral hypothalamus.
senck (1967) that the two-dimensional space Gray (1973) suggested that his anxiety
formed by the introversion-extraversion and impulsivity dimensions are located 45°
and neuroticism-stability dimensions was of away from Eysenck's dimensions of neurot-
major importance, he claimed that Eysenck icism and introversion-extraversion. How-
had not identified the primary lines of caus- ever, it may be preferable to locate anxiety
al influence. Work on animal learning and closer to the neuroticism dimension than to
physiology has uncovered two major sys- introversion-extraversion; the reason is that
tems characterized by the emotional reac- measures of anxiety such as the Manifest
tions to signals of reward or non-delivery of Anxiety Scale typically correlate approxi-
anticipated punishment, on the one hand, mately + 0.7 with neuroticism compared
and to signals of punishment or frustrative with only about -0.3 with extraversion. If
non-reward, on the other hand. Gray (1973) the anxiety dimension were re-located as
concluded that these dimensions of suscep- suggested, and the impulsivity dimension
tibility to reward and susceptibility to pun- remained orthogonal to it, then impulsivity
ishment could be located fairly precisely would be closer to the dimension of intro-
within Eysenckian two-dimensional space version-extraversion than to neuroticism.
(see Fig. 7.1). Questionnaire data reported by Eysenck
Individual differences in susceptibility to and Eysenck (1977) are consistent with this
punishment are represented by the diagonal expectation.
running from stable extraversion to neurotic The theoretical positions of H. J. Eysenck
introversion; this corresponds roughly to and Gray are sufficiently similar to make it
the anxiety dimension as measured by the difficult to adjudicate between them. For
Manifest Anxiety Scale and has as its phy- example, both theorists predict stronger
siological basis the degree of activity in the conditioning in introverts than extraverts

NEUROTICISM

ANXIETY IMPULSIVITY
(Dimension of, / (Dimension of
/ ...
susceptibility',
to punishment) " // s~~c~~~~:~t)y
" ,, //
/

,,
, /
/
/
/

/ ,,
INTROVERSION /
,, EXTRAVERSION
,
/
/
/
/

/
/
/ " ,,
" ,,,
/
/
/
/
/
,,
/
/
/
, Fig. 7.1. Gray's proposed re-Iocation of the major
/
" dimensions within H. 1. Eysenck's two-dimen-
STABILITY sional space. (Gray 1973)

when aversive unconditioned stimuli are
used (although for somewhat different rea-
sons). However, Eysenck's theory continues
to predict greater conditioning of introverts
when appetitive unconditioned stimuli are
used, but Gray's theory predicts the oppo-
site on the basis of the extravert's greater
susceptibility to reward. In general, the evi-
dence on this point is more in line with
Gray's prediction.
A pertinent question is whether the causal
lines of influence on behaviour correspond
more closely to the dimensions proposed by
Gray or to those put forward by Eysenck. As
yet, there is little relevant evidence. It has
been found that the salivary response to
lemon juice relates more strongly to intro-
version-extraversion than to impulsivity
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1969). However, eye-
blink conditioning (Eysenck and Levey
1972) and the behavioural effects of caffeine
(Revelle et al. 1980) both relate more closely
to impUlsivity than to introversion-extraver-
sion. It is, of course, entirely possible that
there are causal influences operating at
several different points within the two-di-
mensional personality space postulated by
Eysenck and Gray.
There are at least two additional attrac-
tive features of Gray's theory: (1) individual
differences are linked securely to well-re-
searched reward and punishment systems in
the brain; and (2) situations that will pro-
duce differential effects on introverts and
extraverts are easy to devise, since it is rela-
tively straightforward to manipulate reward
and/or punishment contingencies in the en-
vironment.
While Gray's assumption that introverts
are more sensitive than extraverts to signals
of punishment and non-reward presumably
has implications for individual differences
in arousal, his is not primarily an arousal
theory. In contrast, Eysenck has empha-
sized the higher cortical arousal of intro-
verts than of extraverts. This has the great ad-
vantages of relating together a diverse set of
findings and of readily generating testable
predictions.
Introversion-Extraversion 127
7.1.2 Reward and Punishment
A number of researchers have looked at the
effects ofreward and punishment on the be-
haviour of introverts and extraverts. Nichol-
son and Gray 1972) reported some encou-
raging early findings. They assumed that
non-delivery of anticipated reward (i.e. frus-
trative non-reward) was punishing and ar-
gued that high anxiety people (i.e. neurotic
introverts) should be more affected than low
anxiety people (i.e. stable extraverts) by
such punishment. In this context, they con-
sidered two phenomena that have been dis-
covered in operant conditioning situations:
behavioural contrast and peak shift. Both
phenomena refer to the impact of a negative
stimulus (signalling no reward or reduced
reward for responding) on responding to
other stimuli, and it was expected that this
impact would be greater for those high in
anxiety. In line with this expectation, there
was a greater peak shift among high-anxiety
subjects than low-anxiety subjects, and the
same was true (albeit non-significantly) for
measures of behavioural contrast. In addi-
tion, sensitivity to reward in the form of gen-
eralization of responding to stimuli resem-
bling previously rewarded stimuli was grea-
ter among high than low impulsives, which
was also in accord with theoretical expecta-
tion.
There is other evidence that extraverts are
more susceptible than introverts to reward.
Corcoran (l962b, 1965) has reported a num-
ber of studies on the effects of incentives on
tasks such as the five-choice serial reaction
task and a letter-cancellation task. The typi-
cal finding was that extraverts responded to
incentives with improved performance,
whereas the performance of introverts was
unaffected.
Gupta (1976) investigated Gray's theory
in a study of verbal operant conditioning in
which he used various conditions of positive
and negative reinforcement. Introverts con-
sistently conditioned better than extraverts
with negative reinforcement, but extraverts
were more affected than introverts by the
provision of reward.
128 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
Gupta and Nagpal (1978) essentially re-
plicated those findings and additionally car-
ried out separate analyses on the two major
components of extraversion (i.e. impulsivity
and sociability). Gray's theory implies that
the effects of positive reinforcement should
be greater for impulsivity than for sociabili-
ty (unsociability = high anxiety), whereas
the effects of negative reinforcement should
be greater for sociability than for impulsivi-
ty. In fact, the data indicated that the effects
of the various reinforcement conditions
were very similar on both components of ex-
traversion.
7.1.3 Attention: Selectivity and
Distractibility
Following from the work of Easterbrook
(1959), it has often been assumed that high
arousal leads to a reduced range of cue utili-
zation together with increased attentional
selectivity. The most direct method of test-
ing these assumptions is to use a dual-task
paradigm: high arousal should be more like-
ly to impair performance of the subsidiary
or secondary task than of the main or pri-
mary task.
There are a few studies relating Easter-
brook's theoretical ideas to the performance
of introverts and extraverts. In one of the
earliest studies, Imam (1974) presented his
subjects with nonsense syllables enclosed in
geometrical figures, having instructed them
to learn the syllables. The obvious predic-
tion that introverts would show less inciden-
tal learning than extraverts of which shapes
went with which syllables was not support-
ed, since there was no difference in inciden-
tal learning between introverts and extra-
verts.
Some indirectly relevant evidence was ob-
tained by Nideffer (1976), who used a self-
report inventory called the Test of Atten-
tional and Interpersonal Style. Extraverts
perceived themselves as being able to inte-
grate many stimuli, to use information or
ideas from several different areas effectively
and to process a great deal of information.
In contrast, introverts reported a tendency
to make mistakes and become confused as a
result of thinking about too much at once. If
these reports are veridical, then they are
consistent with the hypothesis that intro-
verts have a narrower range of cue utiliza-
tion than extraverts.
A rather more interesting study was carri-
ed out by Amelang et al. (1977). The main
task was to remember a string of eight con-
sonants for up to 25 seconds, and there was
a subsidiary visual reaction time task during
the retention interval. Introverts performed
worse than extraverts on the subsidiary task,
especially early in the retention interval.
However, it is not clear that this indicates
greater attentional selectivity on the part of
introverts, because they also showed poorer
memory performance at the shorter reten-
tion intervals.
M. W. Eysenck and M. C. Eysenck
(1979b) investigated the hypothesis that in-
troverts are less able than extraverts to en-
gage in parallel or shared processing. They
used the Sternberg paradigm, in which sub-
jects have to decide as rapidly as possible
whether or not a probe stimulus matches
any of the items in a short memorized list. In
the single task conditions, subjects either
had to look for an exact match between the
probe and one of the memorized items or for
a semantic match in which the probe exem-
plified one of the category names in the
memorized list. In the dual-task condition
subjects had to look for both kinds of match
at the same time. Broadly speaking, there
were only small effects of introversion-ex-
traversion on speed of responding in the
single-task conditions, but introverts were
slower than extraverts in the dual-task con-
dition in which parallel processing was re-
quired. The findings were generally consist-
ent with the hypothesis that high arousal re-
duces the capacity for parallel processing.
However, arousal was also manipulated in
this study by using conditions of quiet and
of 85 db. white noise, and this manipulation
had no effect on performance. This suggests
that an interpretation of the findings in
terms of arousal may not be valid.
Anderson and Revelle (unpublished) con-

sidered the effects of impulsivity (one of the
major components of introversion-extraver-
sion) and caffeine (a stimulant drug that in-
creases arousal) on proofreading of a pas-
sage. The passage containede non-contextual
errors (which could be detected by examin-
ing single words) and contextual errors
(which could only be detected by consider-
ing groups of words). On the assumption
that arousal leads to a reduction in the range
of cue utilization, they predicted that
aroused subjects should be less sensitive than
non-aroused subjects to contextual errors.
There was no effect of either impulsivity
or drug condition (caffeine versus placebo)
on detection of non-contextual errors. How-
ever, impulsivity interacted with drug condi-
tion with respect to detection of contextual
errors. As predicted, subjects in the highest
arousal condition (i.e. low impulsives given
caffeine) performed poorly and so did high
impulsives receiving the placebo.
It is unfortunate that most of the research
has failed to use the appropriate experimen-
tal design for testing the hypothesis that in-
troverts display greater attentional selectivi-
ty than extraverts. Such a design would in-
volve two concurrent tasks (one of which
was clearly designated as the primary task),
together with recording of the level of per-
formance on each task. These are necessary
requirements, because changes in attention-
al selectivity can only be assessed by com-
paring performance on at least two concur-
rent activities. Nevertheless, even in the ab-
sence of any convincing experimentation, it
still seems likely that introverts usually man-
ifest greater attentional selectivity than ex-
traverts.
At the very least, we can say that most of
the evidence reviewed so far in this section
is consistent with Easterbrook's (1959) hy-
pothesis. However, that hypothesis seems to
imply that high arousal (e.g. introversion) is
associated with intense concentration on a
few of the task-relevant stimuli and thus
presumably with low distractibility. What
are the effects of introversion-extraversion
on distractibility? In the first study on this
issue, Shanmugan and Santhanam (1964)
Introversion-Extraversion 129
discovered that the learning of extraverts
was less detrimentally affected than that of
introverts by the introduction of extraneous
visual interference or distraction. In a subse-
quent study (Howarth 1969), subjects were
asked to learn serial lists of numbers, with
distraction consisting of additional irrele-
vant numbers. There was no effect of intro-
version-extraversion on learning when there
was no distraction, but extraverts outper-
formed introverts under the distraction con-
ditions.
Some of the most convincing results were
obtained by Morgenstern et al. (1974). The
subjects' task was to learn auditorily pre-
sented words for recall; distraction consist-
ed of additional auditorily presented words,
a German prose passage or an English prose
passage. Recall was not affected by introver-
sion-extraversion in the absence of distrac-
tion, but distraction impaired the recall of
introverts much more than extraverts.
When we consider the various findings on
the effects of introversion-extraversion on
attentional selectivity and distractibility, we
are confronted by an apparent paradox. The
data on attentional selectivity indicate that
introverts have a more restricted range of
cue utilization than extraverts, and this nar-
rowed attention leads to poor processing of
stimuli that are not of direct relevance to the
primary task. If this is so, why should intro-
verts' performance suffer more from distrac-
tion caused by irrelevant stimulation?
One resolution of the paradox would be
to argue that introverts allocate a greater
proportion of their available attentional re-
sources than extraverts to the performance
of the primary task. This produces poor sub-
sidiary task performance by introverts and
also means that they have fewer processing
resources available to cope with the rejec-
tion demands posed by irrelevant environ-
mental stimuli, or to differentiate clearly be-
tween task and non-task stimuli.
7.1.4 Vigilance Task Performance
While the effects of introversion-extraver-
sion on dozens of performance tasks have
130 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
been considered over the years (see H. J. Ey-
senck 1967), most of the findings are rather
fragmentary and inconsistent. One of the
major exceptions is work on vigilance,
where there is a reasonably clear picture.
In a typical vigilance task, people are
asked to detect the occasional and unpredic-
table occurrence of an auditory or visual sig-
nal. The task often lasts for an hour or more,
and the most important single finding is that
performance usually declines over time (the
so-called vigilance decrement). Broadbent
(1971) has reviewed the literature on vigil-
ance and concluded that the primary reason
for the vigilance decrement is a progressive
increase in the cautiousness of responding
over time.
In those studies that have assessed the ef-
fects of introversion-extraversion on vigil-
ance performance, the modal finding (Ba-
kan 1959, Bakan et al. 1963, Davies and
Hockey 1966, Harkins and Geen 1975, Keis-
ter and McLaughlin 1972) is that introverts
show superior performance to extraverts. In
addition, extraverts show a more pro-
nounced vigilance decrement than intro-
verts (i.e. the superior performance of intro-
verts is more apparent late in the experimen-
tal session).
It is possible to arrive at a more precise
description of the effects of introversion-ex-
traversion by using the approach of signal
detection theory (e.g. Green and Swets
1966), which makes use of the two parame-
ters d' and beta. Beta is a measure of the
amount of information required for re-
sponse emission (i.e. it reflects the cautious-
ness of responding), whereas d' is a measure
of the subject's sensitivity to signals. In gen-
eral terms, the greater the tendency to say
that a signal has occurred when it has not
(i.e. the higher the false alarm rate), the low-
er will be the resultant value for beta (indi-
cating incautious responding).
Most of the available evidence suggests
that introverts adopt a more stringent re-
sponse criterion than extraverts. Krupski et
al. (1971) found that the positive correlation
between false alarms and extraversion on an
auditory vigilance task just failed to attain
statistical significance. Carr (1971) dis-
covered that introverts not only made fewer
false alarms than extraverts but also detect-
ed more signals. Tune (1966) used the mea-
sures of signal detection theory and found
that extraverts made many more false
alarms than introverts and thus had a lower
beta.
Perhaps the most thorough investigation
was by Harkins and Geen (1975). They used
a 40-min visual vigilance task and found
that introverts had much greater sensitivity
(d') than extraverts. They also found that in-
troverts set a higher criterion for reporting
signals than extraverts.
It is rather surprising that there have been
very few attempts to account for the greater
cautiousness in responding of introverts.
However, Eysenck (1981) pointed out that
the setting of the response criterion is
known to be affected by the subjective gains
associated with correct responding as well
as by the subjective costs associated with in-
correct responding (i.e. false alarms). If, as
Gray (1973) has claimed, introverts are
more susceptible to punishment than extra-
verts but are less susceptible to reward, then
it follows that introverts may attach relative-
ly more importance than extraverts to the
potential costs of false alarms, whereas ex-
traverts may ascribe more importance than
introverts to the potential gains of correct re-
sponding. As a consequence, introverts
would tend to set a higher criterion point for
their responses than extraverts.
How are we to account theoretically for
the crucial finding that extraverts exhibit a
more marked vigilance decrement than in-
troverts? As a starting point, it may well be
relevant that the deterioration of vigilance
performance over time is usually accompan-
ied by a progressive decrease in physiologi-
cal arousal (measured by EEG alpha, skin
conductance, etc.). If extraverts are chroni-
cally less cortically aroused than introverts
(H. J. Eysenck 1967), then their declining
performance may be due to the develop-
ment of a sub-optimal level of arousal in the
boring and monotonous conditions of the
typical vigilance task.

The most obvious way of testing this hy-
pothesis is to increase the level of arousal
experienced by extraverts while performing
a vigilance task; the prediction must be that
their performance decrement can thereby be
attenuated or eliminated. This research
strategy was first used by Davies and Hock-
Introversion-Extraversion 131
ey (1966), who observed the effects of in-
tense (95 db) white noise on performance of
a visual vigilance task. Their key finding
was that intense noise eliminated the vigil-
ance decrement in extraverts but had very
little effect on introverts (see Fig. 7.2 A).
A conceptually similar approach was

PANEL A PANEL B
12 65
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EXTRAVERTS; QUIET _ EXTRAVERTS; NO DRUG

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INTROVERTS;
f:r._.-f:, INTROVERTS;
NOISE
QUIET
NOISE
0----0 EXTRAVERTS, CAFFEINE
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tr·_·-t,. INTROVERTS; CAFFEINE

PANEL C. PANEL D.
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_ EXTRAVERTS, PRIMARY ONLY _ EXTRAVERTS, FREQUENT SIGNALS
0----0 EXTRAVERTS, TWO TASKS o--<l EXTRAVERTS; INFREQUENT SIGNALS
!:r._.-t,.INTROVERTS, PRIMARY ONLY . - - -.. INTROVERTS; FREQUENTS SIGNALS
. - - - . INTROVERTS; TWO TASKS !:r.-.~ INTROVERTS; I NFREQUENT SIGNALS

Fig. 7.2. A Vigilance performance as a function of
noise and introversion-extraversion. (Davies and
Hockey 1966) B Vigilance performace as a func-
tion of caffeine and introversion-extraversion.
(Keister and McLaughlin 1972) C Vigilance per-
formance as a function of presence versus ab-
sence of concurrent task and introversion-extra-
version. (Bakan 1959) D Vigilance performance
as a function of signal frequency and introver-
sion-extraversion. (Davies and Hockey 1966)
132 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
adopted by Keister and McLaughlin (1972).
They considered the effects of caffeine (a
drug increasing arousal) on auditory vigi-
lance. In essence, they found that caffeine
eliminated, and even reversed, the normally
inferior vigilance performance of extraverts,
whereas the performance of introverts was
unaffected (see Fig. 7.2 B). Further analysis
revealed that the only subjects producing a
vigilance decrement were the extraverts not
receiving caffeine. Keister and McLaughlin
drew the following conclusion: "It is theo-
rized that the effect of caffeine was to in-
crease the cortical arousal of the extraverts
and make them equal in performance to the
introverts who characteristically function at
a high arousal level" (p. 10).
The notion that extraverts perform poorly
on vigilance tasks because they are insuffi-
ciently aroused can also be applied to an
earlier study by Bakan (1959). He looked at
performance of a primary auditory vigi-
lance task, which was either performed on
its own or in conjunction with a secondary
task; Extraverts were more likely than intro-
verts to improve their performance of the
main task when the secondary task was in-
cluded (see Fig. 7.2 C); this may be due to
increased arousal produced by the greater
demands imposed on the system when two
tasks must be performed at the same time.
Fig. 7.2 D shows the differential effect of
time on task on the vigilance performance of
introverts and extraverts; the data are those
of Davies and Hockey (1966). The four pan-
els together reveal an interesting phenomen-
on: three arousing factors (i.e. white noise,
caffeine and additional task) and one de-
arousing factor (i.e. time on task) all pro-
duce substantial changes in the perform-
ance of extraverts, but have no effect on in-
troverts. In contrast, there is evidence (H. J.
Eysenck 1967) that introverts are more af-
fected physiologically than extraverts by a
stimulus of standard intensity. How do in-
troverts manage to maintain a relatively in-
variant level of performance when their le-
vel of physiological arousal changes sub-
stantially? One possibility, which is dis-
cussed at greater length later on, is that there
is some central control system that attempts
to compensate for the adverse effects of sup-
ra-optimal or sub-optimal levels of arousal
and that this control system is more exten-
sively used by introverts.
7.1.5 Learning and Memory
The literature on the effects of introversion-
extraversion on learning and memory has
been summarized in various places (Ey-
senck 1976b, 1977, 1981). Accordingly, the
emphasis here will be on the major conclu-
sions that can appropriately be drawn.
One of the most robust findings in the re-
search on arousal and memory is that high
arousal impairs short-term retention (up to
approximately 20 min after acquisition) but
facilitates long-term retention. This pattern
of performance has been found several
times when arousal has been manipulated
by means of white noise or time of day. It
has also been obtained when the effects of
retention interval on the memory of intro-
verts and extraverts have been assessed. The
modal finding is that extraverts have better
short-term recall than introverts but that this
is reversed at longer retention intervals. The
striking results obtained by Howarth and
Eysenck (1968) are shown in Fig. 7.3. It is
worth noting, however, that there are some
studies in which no interaction between in-
troversion-extraversion and retention inter-
val was obtained (Fuller 1978, McLaughlin
1968, McLaughlin and Kary 1972, Schneller
and Garske 1976).
The interaction between introversion-ex-
traversion and retention interval has usually
been explained in terms of Walker's (1958)
action decrement theory. According to this
theory, high arousal produces a longer last-
ing active memory trace, leading to en-
hanced consolidation and long-term memo-
ry. During the consolidation period, there is
a transient inhibition of retrieval (called 'ac-
tion decrement') which protects the trace
from disruption. This theory is unsatisfacto-
ry for a number of reasons, the main one be-
ing that some of the available data are in-

12
'\
11 \ INTROVERTS
o \\
ij 10
--J
<{
~
a::
(/)
9 b----_-o.
o 8
a::
o
3:
z 7
<{
w
~ 6
Fig. 7.3. Recall as a func-
tion of introversion-ex-
traversion and retention 1 I
interval. (Howarth and Omin
Eysenck 1968)
consistent with it. For example, while high
arousal does typically impair short-term re-
tention in paried associate learning, it actu-
ally enhances short-term free recall and re-
cognition (Eysenck 1976a). It must be con-
cluded that no satisfactory explanation of
the interaction between introversion-extra-
version and length of the retention interval
has as yet been offered.
Another factor which has received some
attention is task difficulty. It derives its the-
oretical relevance from the idea (Yerkes and
Dodson 1908) that the optimal level of
arousal is inversely related to task difficulty.
On the assumption that introverts are more
cortically aroused than extraverts, it follows
that introversion-extraversion should inter-
act with task difficulty and that extraverts
should cope relatively better than introverts
with very demanding tasks.
Jensen (1964) carried out a large-scale
factor-analytic study that involved some
consideration of task difficulty and came to
the following conclusion: "Extraverts per-
form better than introverts, especially in
serial learning, and extraversion had a load-
ing of + .41 on the general learning ability
factor. Extraversion seemed to correlate
mainly with resistance to response competi-
tion" (pp.7-8). The relevance of Jensen's
findings to the issue of the effects of intro-
version-extraversion on tasks of varying
Introversion-Extraversion 133
\
\
\
\
,
EXTRAVERTS
I I I
1min 5min 30min 1day
RETENTION INTERVAL
complexity is that tasks involving response
competition (e.g. certain retroactive inter-
ference paradigms) are more difficult and
demanding than those not involving re-
sponse competition. In other words, Jen-
sen's findings are consistent with the
Yerkes-Dodson law. In addition, there are
at least three other studies (reviewed by Ey-
senck 1981) in which extraverts were less af-
fected than introverts by response competi-
tion.
Of course, the Yerkes-Dodson law merely
describes the predicted relationship be-
tween arousal and task difficulty and does
not explain it. Eysenck (1975a) discovered
that the poor performance of introverts on
paired associate lists involving reponse
competition was largely attributable to their
slow retrieval of the relevant information.
He argued that high arousal increased the
tendency to retrieve readily accessible infor-
mation, which is counter-productive when
there are very accessible but incorrect re-
sponses available (e.g. in conditions of re-
sponse competition).
There is an interpretative problem with
much of the literature on introversion-extra-
version and memory, since it is usually un-
clear whether observed differences in reten-
tion are due to effects at the time of initial
perception, attention, rehearsal, consolida-
tion, retrieval or response emission. One of
134 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
my concerns in conducting research in this
area has been to utilize paradigms that per-
mit investigation of a single aspect of pro-
cessing. This can be achieved by, for exam-
ple, studying the effects of introversion-ex-
traversion on the retrieval of well-learned
information from permanent storage. Vo-
cabulary tests can be used to ensure that
there has been equivalent storage of rele-
vant information by introverts and extra-
verts, thus permitting the conclusion that
performance differences reflect the effects
of introversion-extraversion on the process
of retrieval itself.
The most popular task has been a test of
verbal fluency in which the subject must
write down as many words as possible with-
in a given time period fulfilling some speci-
fied criterion (e.g. words starting with the
letter R or animal names). The typical find-
ing is that extraverts think of more words
than introverts, indicating that they have a
more efficient retrieval process.
Similar results have been obtained with
tasks assumed to measure creativity or di-
vergent thinking ability. For example, White
(1968) found that extraverts produced many
more responses than introverts on two di-
vergent thinking tasks (the Alternate Uses
test and the Consequences test), and he cit-
ed other work in which similar findings had
been obtained.
Recent work has clarified some of the fac-
tors involved in the effects of introversion-
extraversion on retrieval. Eysenck (1974a)
obtained the usual retrieval advantage for
extraverts over introverts when self-report-
ed arousal or activation was high, but there
was no difference in retrieval between intro-
verts and extraverts who reported them-
selves to be low in arousal. This suggests
that the normal retrieval deficit in introverts
is due in some way to excessively high
arousal.
In the study by Eysenck (1974a), subjects
were asked to think of as many words as
possible belonging to five semantic catego-
ries. Detailed analysis of the data indicated
that differences in recall between introverts
and extraverts only became apparent after
some time on the task. Since more common
category exemplars tend to be emitted in-
itially, the retrieval difficulty of introverts
seemed to centre on retrieval of relatively
rare and non-dominant items.
This serendipitous finding was explored
in several subsequent studies (Eysenck
1974b, 1975a, b, c). It was consistently
found in a variety of paradigms that intro-
verts were primarily inferior to extraverts
when retrieving relatively inaccessible kinds
of information, with the opposite happen-
ing when accessible information had to be
retrieved. Eysenck (1976a) proposed the fol-
lowing hypothesis that was consistent with
most of the available data: "High arousal
has the effect of biasing the subject's search
process towards readily accessible, or func-
tionally dominant, stored information more
than is the case with lower levels of arousal"
(p. 461). While this hypothesis remains an
attractive one in some ways, it is rather un-
clear how the hypothesis can explain why
incentives (which are typically arousing) do
not produce impaired efficiency of retrieval
(see Chap. 5).
A related approach to the issue of the ef-
fects of introversion-extraversion on speed
of retrieval was taken by M. W. Eysenck and
M. C. Eysenck (1979b) in a study already
discussed. They used a modified version of
the Sternberg paradigm, with up to four
words (the memorized set) being followed
by a probe word. Subjects had to decide
either whether there was a physical match
between the probe and one of the memor-
ized words or whether there was a semantic
match. As is shown in Fig. 7.4, there was no
effect of introversion-extraversion on scan-
ning speed in the physical match condition,
but extraverts scanned faster than introverts
under semantic matching conditions. It is
interesting to note that the typical inferiority
of introverts to extraverts in the efficiency of
retrieval found in earlier research always in-
volved semantically based retrieval.
Schwartz (1979) presented two words si-
multaneously under one of three instruc-
tional conditions: physical identity, requir-
ing a decision based on whether or not the
 Introversion-Extraversion 135
1300
If) 1200
u
w 1100
If)
~
1000
~
900
w
~ 800
~
z 700
0
~ 600
u
-c{
w 500
a:.
l' I I i
2 3 4
Fig. 7.4. Reaction time as a function of MEMORY-SET SIZE
memory set size, introversion-extra- f:r..-.-t:. INTROVERTS; PHYSICAL MATCH CONDiTiON
version and type of match (physical ver- A---. INTROVERTS; SEMANTIC MATCH CONDITiON
sus semantic). (Eysenck and Eysenck ~ EXTRAVERTS; PHYSICAL MATCH CONDITION
1979b) - EXTRAVERTS; SEMANTIC MATCH CONDITION

two words were identical; homophone
identity, requiring a decision on identicality
of pronunciation (e.g. 'deer-dear'); and tax-
onomic category identity, involving a deci-
sion whether the two words belonged to the
same semantic category. While introverts
and extraverts responded at equivalent
speed on physical identity trials (801 versus
780 ms, respectively), introverts were much
slower than extraverts on homophone trials
(1095 versus 953 ms) and taxonomic catego-
ry trials (1205 versus 1058 ms).
These findings are mostly in line with the
notion that introverts experience greater dif-
ficulty than extraverts in accessing relatively
inaccessible deep or semantic information
from long-term store but that there is no ef-
fect of introversion-extraversion on the re-
trieval of shallow or physical information.
Unfortunately for this hypothesis, the find-
ing that introverts are slower than extraverts
at making phonemic decisions in the homo-
phone condition of Schwartz's study poses
problems for it.It may be preferable to sup-
pose that introverts take longer than extra-
verts to retrieve information from perma-
nent storage, whether that information is se-
mantic or phonemic in nature.
A further aspect of retrieval concerns the
response criterion or cautiousness of re-
sponding. We have already seen that intro-
verts adopt a more stringent response crite-
rion than extraverts in vigilance tasks, and
the same seems to be true of memory tasks.
McLaughlin and Kary (1972) found that ex-
traverts made more correct responses and
more errors or fals alarms than introverts in
a recognition test. Gillespie and Eysenck
(1980) analysed the data from a continuous
recognition memory task in terms of the
measures of signal detection theory and
found that introverts adopted a significantly
more stringent response criterion than ex-
traverts; there was no effect of introversion-
extraversion on sensitivity or d'.
In spite of the relatively small volume of
research on the effects of introversion-extra-
version on learning and memory, there are
various fairly robust findings, the more im-
portant of which are as follows:
1. The learning of introverts is more disrupt-
ed than that of extraverts by distracting
stimulation.
2. The learning of introverts is more disrupt-
ed than that of extraverts by response
competition.
3. Introverts take longer than extraverts to
retrieve information from long-term or
permanent storage, especially non-domi-
nant information.
4. Introverts typically adopt a more cautious
response criterion than extraverts.
136 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
5. Extraverts tend to show superior memory
to introverts at short retention intervals,
but the opposite occurs at long retention
intervals.
It is by no means clear that any simple
theoretical integration of these findings is
possible. However, it does seem to be the
case that, for whatever reason, introverts ty-
pically have fewer processing resources
available than extraverts. As a consequence,
introverts are less able than extraverts to
cope effectively with increased processing
demands (e.g. from distracting stimulation,
from response competition or from complex
retrieval tasks).
7.1.6 Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off
States of high arousal seem to be naturally
associated with fast and relatively inaccu-
rate performance. Much of the noise litera-
ture is consistent with that notion, and the
same is true of research on incentives. In
contrast, work on introversion-extraversion
seems to point to the opposite conclusion.
H. J. Eysenck (1967) summarized the find-
ings as follows: "The studies ... are remar-
kably unanimous in showing introverts to be
slower and more careful and accurate than
extraverts" (p. 162).
The theoretical ideas of Furneaux (1961)
have influenced research in this area. He
claimed that mental speed, accuracy (or er-
ror-checking mechanism), and persistence
were three independent determinants of
performance on tests of intelligence. Jensen
(1966) obtained a correlation of + .44 be-
tween extraversion and the speed of solu-
tion of the Matrices test of intelligence. Ex-
traverts made more errors than introverts,
but not significantly so. Farley (1966) gave
the Nufferno speed test to introverts and ex-
traverts; this test involves letter-series prob-
lems, in each of which a recurring pattern of
letters must be identified and the next letter
in the series written down. Introversion-ex-
traversion did not affect accuracy, but extra-
verts were much faster than introverts.
The most complete attempt to relate intro-
version-extraversion to Furneaux's three
factors was made by Goh and Farley (1977).
They investigated performance on the Nuf-
ferno tests under stressed conditions (sub-
jects told to work as rapidly as possible, with
their solution time per item being recorded)
or unstressed conditions (subjects instruct-
ed to work at their own rate). Introver-
sion-extraversion did not affect accuracy
or persistence, but extraverts performed
faster than introverts in the unstressed con-
dition.
In sum, extraverts consistently handle in-
telligence test items more rapidly than intro-
verts, but there is typically no effect of intro-
version-extraversion on accuracy. However,
somewhat different findings have been ob-
tained with different paradigms. For exam-
ple, Brebner and Flavel (1978) gave their
subjects a total of 700 reaction-time trials
and included large numbers of catch trials
on which the appropriate signal for re-
sponse was not presented. The performance
of extraverts was much less accurate than
that of introverts, with extraverts being
more likely to respond on catch trials and to
make anticipatory responses. In vigilance
and memory tasks, as we have seen, extra-
verts tend to be considerably more error
prone than introverts in terms of false
alarms (Carr 1971, Gillespie and Eysenck
1980, Harkins and Geen 1975, Krupski et al.
1971, Tune 1966).
While the findings discussed so far sug-
gest that introverts perform more slowly but
more accurately than extraverts, there are
numerous exceptions to this generalization.
One important factor is that while extra-
verts often respond more rapidly than intro-
verts at the beginning of an experimental
task, introverts often catch up and even sur-
pass the performance speed of extraverts.
This has been found with a tapping task
(Wilson et al. 1971), with a continuous serial
reaction task (Thackray et al. 1974) and with
a prolonged reaction-time task (Brebner
and Cooper 1974).
The findings of Corcoran (1972) make
matters still more confusing. He reported

that introverts responded much more quick-
ly and made many more errors than extra-
verts on the five-choice serial reaction task.
On a letter cancellation task run under rela-
tively unmotivated conditions, introversion
correlated + .90 with speed of performance.
Finally, Corcoran considered performance
on a card-sorting task. After normal sleep,
introverts made many more errors than ex-
traverts. These various findings led Corcor-
an to a conclusion that is diametrically op-
posed to that of H. J. Eysenck (1967): "In-
troverts tend to be speedier and less accu-
rate than extraverts" (p. 277).
What are we to make of these apparently
inconsistent data? In general terms, extra-
verts tend to respond faster than introverts
under relatively arousing conditions, in-
volving tasks that are intrinsically interest-
ing and/or of relatively short duration. In
contrast, introverts perform faster than ex-
traverts under unstimulating conditions
(e.g. when long and monotonous tasks are
used). Perhaps as a result of greater cogni-
tive control of performance, the response
speed of introverts is relatively unaffected
by the prevailing level of arousal, whereas
that of extraverts varies directly with the
arousal level.
7.1. 7 Conclusions
Several of the effects of introversion-extra-
version on performance tasks can be ex-
plained straightforwardly by assuming that
introverts are chronically more aroused
than extraverts. That assumption, when
combined with the notion (Yerkes and Dod-
son 1908) that the optimal level of arousal is
inversely related to task difficulty, leads to
the prediction that extraverts should cope
relatively better than introverts with com-
plex tasks. This has, indeed, been found in a
number of memory studies in which task
complexity was manipulated by varying
either the degree of response competition or
the accessibility of the correct response.
The interpretation of behavioural differ-
ences between introverts and extraverts in
Introversion-Extraversion 137
terms of a simple unidimensional construct
of arousal is further supported by the var-
ious interactions that have been obtained
between introversion-extraversion and
arousing or de-arousing factors (e.g. white
noise, time of day, caffeine, time on task,
sleep deprivation and incentives). In addi-
tion, the differential effects of introversion-
extraversion on short- and long-term reten-
tion are very similar to the effects of other
arousing agents, and suggest the existence
of a common arousal system.
In spite of the obvious success of a simple
arousal-based explanation of the effects on
performance of introversion-extraversion, it
is becoming increasingly clear that rather
more complex formulations are needed.
One complicating factor is the accumulating
physiological and behavioural evidence
(e.g. Blake 1967b, Eysenck and Folkard
1980, Revelle et al. 1980) that introverts are
more aroused than extraverts at some times
of day, but less aroused at others. The notion
that introverts are chronically more aroused
than extraverts needs to be re-thought in or-
der to incorporate the time-of-day findings.
A second complicating factor stems from
the assumption that introverts are usually
more arousable than extraverts (i.e. they
produce a greater increment in physiologi-
cal arousal to a stimulus of standard intensi-
ty). Evidence supporting this assumption
was discussed by H. J. Eysenck (1967).
If it is correct that introverts are more af-
fected physiologically than extraverts by
arousing stimuli, and if the prevailing state
of arousal is an important determinant of
behaviour, then the most natural prediction
is that the arousing stimuli will affect the
task performance of introverts to a greater
extent than that of extraverts. However, as
our brief review of the literature has made
clear, there seems to be a partial dissocia-
tion between the effects of arousing stimuli
on physiological arousal and their effects on
performance. A variety of arousing factors,
including white noise, caffeine, time of day,
the presence of an additional task and
knowledge of results and other incentives,
all influence the performance of extraverts
138 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
to a greater extent than introverts. Indeed,
introverts often manifest no performance
change at all when one of these arousing
factors is introduced. Furthermore, there is
evidence that de-arousing factors such as
sleep deprivation and prolonged perform-
ance of a task also tend to influence the be-
haviour of extraverts rather more than intro-
verts.
While such empirical complexities clearly
indicate that some addition to a single
arousal mechanism needs to be postulated,
the nature of the appropriate conceptualiza-
tion is unclear. At a speCUlative level, it is
tempting to relate these findings to the two
arousal-related mechanisms postulated by
Broadbent (1971). He argued that high or
low arousal in the lower mechanism would
only impair performance provided that the
controlling upper mechanism was not func-
tioning efficiently. The basic findings can be
accounted for by assuming that the cogni-
tive control exerted by the upper mechan-
ism is much greater in introverts than in ex-
traverts. Thus the strongly functioning up-
per mechanism in introverts tends to pre-
vent changing levels of arousal from mani-
festing themselves in performance, whereas
the weakly functioning upper mechanism in
extraverts means that their performance is
fairly directly affected by the prevailing le-
vel of arousal in the lower mechanism.
A third complicating factor concerns the
effect of introversion-extraversion on
speed-accuracy trade-off. Since the typical
effect of high arousal is to produce fast, in-
accurate performance, a simple arousal the-
ory must predict that introverts will respond
more quickly and inaccurately than extra-
verts. In fact, the more usual finding is that
introverts are slower and more accurate
than extraverts, which may reflect intro-
verts' greater susceptibility to punishment.
A fourth complicating factor is that beha-
vioural differences between introverts and
extraverts cannot be adequately explained
in terms of the level of arousal per se; the
processes or mechanisms mediating the ef-
fects of arousal on performance must be
specified. We have seen at various points in
this book that the effects of arousing agents
on performance are often mediated by at-
tentional mechanisms. There are tantalizing
suggestions that this may also be true of the
behavioural effects of introversion-extraver-
sion. Introverts appear to show greater at-
tentional selectivity than extraverts, i.e. a
greater proportion of their total attentional
resources are allocated to the main or pri-
mary task. As a result, introverts have less
attentional capacity available for processing
additional stimuli than extraverts and so ex-
perience more difficulty in rejecting dis-
tracting stimuli which resemble task stimuli.
They also find more difficulty in performing
a secondary task at the same time as the
main task.
7.2 Time of Day
7.2.1 Basic Findings
It has been reasonably well established (see
Hockey and Colquhoun 1972, for a review)
that circadian (i.e. approximately 24 h
rhythms exist with respect to human per-
formance on a wide range of tasks. These
circadian rhythms are large enough to be of
practical and theoretical significance, often
amounting to a 10% variation in perform-
ance during the course of the waking day. In
addition, almost every physiological mea-
sure in man demonstrates a circadian rhyth-
micity. Both performance and physiological
rhythms will be discussed, since there is a
natural tendency to assume that the per-
formance variations at different times of
day are determined, at least in part, by the
physiological changes.
The most extensive body of research on
diurnal rhythms in performance was report-
ed by Blake (1967a, 1971). He asked naval
ratings to perform a wide range of tasks at
various times of day (0800, 1030, 1300, 1530
and 2100). He discovered that performance
on several of the tasks (including five-choice
serial reaction, auditory vigilance, card sort-

ing, letter cancellation and simple arithmet-
ic) manifested a fairly consistent improve-
ment over the day, with the best level of per-
formance being achieved at 2100.
Blake also recorded body temperature on
a number of occasions during the day. Intri-
guingly, there was a similar trend in the
body temperature and performance data,
with both increasing during the course of
the day. Body temperature reached a peak
between 2000 and 2100 and a nadir between
0400 and 0500. There was a rapid rise in
temperature between 0800 and 1100, fol-
lowed by a more gradual increase over
the subsequent several hours and a rapid
decline during the late evening and night
period.
There was one major exception to the par-
allel trends for performance and tempera-
ture: performance on a test of short-term
memory (digit span) tended to deteriorate
throughout most of the day. Largely on the
basis of Blake's findings, Hockey and Cal-
quhoun (1972) drew the following conclu-
sions from their survey of the literature:
"Tasks with a large memory load compo-
nent may perhaps be expected to show an
inverse relation to temperature, while those
demanding a more immediate processing
(or 'throughput') of information will follow
the more typical direct relationship" (p. 15).
How can we account theoretically for
these findings? A straightforward explana-
tion can be constructed based on the follow-
ing two assumptions: (1) body temperature
is an indicant of arousal level and (2) the
optimal level of arousal varies inversely as a
function of task difficulty (Yerkes & Dod-
son, 1908). From these assumptions, it fol-
lows that simple tasks such as those involv-
ing immediate processing should be better
performed as the day progresses. In con-
trast, the performance of difficult tasks such
as those imposing substantial demands on
memory might be expected to be disrupted
by the high arousal associated with the end
of the working day.
While this explanation has a beguiling
simplicity which has appealed to a number
of theorists, it suffers from the rather severe
Time of Day 139
handicap of being almost completely er-
roneous. The first difficulty is that it is by no
means certain that the level of arousal does
in fact increase throughout the waking day
up to the evening. In some studies, scores on
the general activation scale of Thayer's Acti-
vation-Deactivation Adjective Check List (a
measure of self-reported arousal) were ob-
tained at different times of day. Thayer
(1967) found that self-reported activation
reached a peak at approximately 1230, and
Thayer (l978a) and Clements et al. (1976)
confirmed that self-reported activation was
maximal in the late morning or very early af-
ternoon.
There are other kinds of data supporting
the conclusion that arousal level peaks
several hours earlier than is suggested by the
body temperature findings. Klein et al.
(1977) reported that adrenalin secretion
reached its peak at approximately midday,
and Akerstedt (1977) found that the urinary
excretion of both adrenalin and noradrenal-
in reached a maximum at about noon, as did
subjective ratings of 'alertness'.
The discrepancy between the diurnal
rhythm for temperature and those for the
catecholamines (adrenalin and noradrenal-
in) and self-reported arousal may simply
mean that body temperature is an unsatis-
factory measure of arousal. Alternatively,
there may be two or more arousal systems,
with each of the various physiological mea-
sures reflecting activity in one of those sys-
tems.
A further problem is that some of the ef-
fects of time of day on performance may not
be mediated by diurnal rhythms in arousal
at all. Barton and Cattell (1974) adminis-
tered the Seven-State Questionnaire to
school children either early in the morning
or in the afternoon. Self-reported arousal
was lower at the later testing time, but there
were also significant changes in anxiety,
stress, regression and depression. Thayer
(1978a) found that self-reported energy
and vigour were greatest at midday, and
there was a similar pattern for self-reported
tension.
All in all, it would be foolhardy to main-
140 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
tain the position that there is a single diurnal
rhythm for arousal which reaches a peak in
the middle of the evening. A more plausible
conclusion is that there is a major diurnal
rhythm for arousal that peaks at around
midday and that can be measured either by
self-reported arousal or by catecholamine
output. In addition, there may be a minor di-
urnal rhythm for arousal that is indexed by
body temperature; however, it is preferable
to regard body temperature as an indirect
measure of basic metabolic processes rather
than of arousal.
As all textbooks of statistics carefully
point out, one cannot properly infer a causal
relationship between two variables on the
basis of correlational data. Thus the similar
trends for performance and body tempera-
ture obtained by Blake (l967a, 1971) do not
provide definitive evidence that the arousal
(or other) system measured by body temper-
ature is instrumental in producing the diur-
nal rhythm in performance. Furthermore,
close inspection of Blake's data indicates
that performance and body temperature did
not always co-vary: at 1300, there was a
marked reduction in performance (the so-
called post-lunch dip) that was unaccompan-
ied by any reduction in temperature.
In spite of the difficulty of establishing a
causal relationship between the system mea-
sured by body temperature and perform-
ance, potentially relevant information can
be obtained from a study of shift work. Col-
quhoun et al. (1968) investigated shift work-
115
i\
~ 110 p \ ..d
Q b-
I-
~
I-
105
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o
tJ
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100
a::
g
u 95
f I I I I i I I
08·00 10·00 12·00 140016·00 18-00 2000 22·00
TIME OF DAY
ers who were required to work at irregular
times of day; as a consequence, they did not
shift their hours of sleeping to a new and
consistent period during the 24 h day. These
workers maintained the usual rhythm of
body temperature, and performance corre-
sponded to it. There was a rather different
pattern when these shift workers were as-
signed work which allowed them to sleep
during the same part of the 24 h cycle on
each successive day but at a time that dif-
fered from the conventional one. Under
these circumstances, their circadian rhythm
of body temperature shifted to the new cy-
cle, and the rhythm of their performance
shifted correspondingly. Such parallelism is
obviously suggestive of some kind of causal
relationship linking body temperature and
performance.
Evidence that is rather difficult to recon-
cile with the notion that performance and
body temperature are causally related was
obtained by Horne et al. (1980). They used a
self-assessment questionnaire to classify
their subjects as morning or evening types
and then gave them the task of sitting by a
conveyor belt attempting to reject faulty
items. The morning types ('larks') showed a
steeper rise in body temperature during the
morning than evening types ('owls') and
reached peak body temperature approxi-
mately I h earlier than evening types (1900
versus 2000). However, as is shown in
Fig. 7.5, there was a much more pronounced
difference between morning and evening
t~'O EVENING
/ TYPES
MORNING
TYPES
I
Fig. 7.5. Detection performance at
various times of day among those
classified as morning or evening
types. (Horne et al. 1980)

types in performance accuracy; evening
types showed an essentially continuous im-
provement throughout the day, whereas
morning types performed progressively
worse as the day proceeded.
More specifically, there was a high posi-
tive correlation coefficient of + 0.89 be-
tween body temperature and number of cor-
rect detections for the evening types but a
high negative correlation of -0.81 for the
morning types. Such findings obviously
make it hazardous to assume that tempera-
ture and performance are causally related.
Indeed, it is hard to disagree with the conclu-
sions arrived at by Horne et a.: "There may
well be no causal relationship between the
circadian rhythms of body temperature and
performance ... these rhythms are concom-
itant, being driven by independent oscilla-
tors, often influenced by the same zeitgeb-
ers" (p. 35).
Additional doubts about the assumption
that performance levels are determined by
sytems linked to body temperature were
raised by Rutenfranz et al. (1972). They
correlated body temperature with perform-
ance on a multiple-choice reaction-time
task, holding the two circadian rhythms
constant by statistical means. Reaction time
did not correlate with temperature, either
between or within subjects.
It has often been assumed that perform-
ance on tasks involving immediate process-
ing with little memory load shows an effec-
tively continuous improvement throughout
the day. This assumption relies heavily on
the data of Blake (1967a, 1971), who found
that peak performance on several perform-
ance tasks was achieved at the last testing
time used (i.e. 2100). The assumption of a
continuous through-the-day improvement
also implies that the second-best level of
performance should have been obtained at
the penultimate testing time. However, for
auditory vigilance, two- and eight-category
card sorting, letter cancellation and simple
arithmetical additions, the second-best level
of performance was reached at 1030 rather
than 1300 or 1530. In similar fashion, Kleit-
man (1963) found that peak performance on
Time of Day 141
a number of simple processing tasks such as
reaction time and card dealing occurred
around noon or the early afternoon. In con-
trast, Blake (l967a) found that performance
on the five-choice serial reaction task was
indicative of a continuous improvement
during the day, with the best performance at
2100 and the second-best performance at
1530.
A search through the literature reveals
that peak performance on most tasks is
reached around midday and that it is only
on tasks involving simple visual search
(such as letter cancellation tasks) that per-
formance definitely attains its maximal le-
vel in the early evening. The general superi-
ority of midday performance seems intui-
tively reasonable and may be related to the
fact that subjective ratings of alertness tend
to be highest at that time.
7.2.2 Short- Term and Long-Term
Memory
There has been considerable theoretical in-
terest in the effects of time of day on short-
term (up to approximately 20 minutes after
learning) and long-term retention. Much of
this interest stems from related work indi-
cating that high arousal has differential ef-
fects on short-term and long-term retention
(for a review, see Eysenck 1976a). In a clas-
sic experiment, Kleinsmith and Kaplan
(1963) compared recall of high-arousal and
low-arousal items as defined by recordings
of skin resistance at the time of presenta-
tion. Their results, which are shown in
Fig. 7.6, demonstrated a marked interaction
between item arousal and retention interval:
low-arousal items showed considerable for-
getting over time, whereas high-arousal
items exhibited a strong reminiscence effect.
Although these findings have been repli-
cated several times, their interpretation is
equivocal. It is obvious that items differing
in terms of the physiological responses
which they produce may also differ in mea-
ningfulness, familiarity or other important
characteristics. However, when this prob-
142 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
50
Q
,,
,,
40 \
\
,,
...J
...J
<{
u 30
w
!r
f-
Z
\
\ ,,
w 20
u
!r
W
[l.
10
2 20 45 1440
RETENTION INTERVAL (I N MINS)
lem is obviated by the expedient of assign-
ing items to high- and low-arousal catego-
ries by pairing some of them at random with
white noise on the presentation trial, the
same basic pattern of results continues to be
obtained (e.g. Berlyne et al. 1965).
Most researchers have assumed that there
is a progressive increase in physiological
arousal during most of the working day and
have accordingly predicted that short-term
memory is best relatively early in the day,
whereas long-term memory is greatest fol-
lowing late afternoon or early evening pres-
entation. There is some support for this pre-
diction in Blake's (1967a) finding that short-
term memory as measured by digit span be-
came progressively worse during the greater
part of the day. Many years previously,
Winch (1912a, b) had also found a small but
consistent advantage of the morning over
the afternoon in immediate memory.
A few studies have dealt with the effects
of time of day on both short-term and long-
term memory. Baddeley et al. (1970) used
the technique of surreptitiously repeating
the same sequence of digits on every third
trial in a memory test involving immediate
recall of sequences of nine random digits.
The superiority of recall on repeated over
non-repeated trials was assumed to reflect
long-term memory. There was the typical
morning superiority for short-term memory
(i.e. the non-repeated lists), whereas the
HIGH-AROUSAL
ITEMS
Fig. 7.6. Recall of high-
LOW-AROUSAL arousal and low-arousal
ITEMS
items at different re-
10080 tention intervals. (Klein-
smith and Kaplan 1963)
long-term memory measure indicated a
slight, but non-significant, afternoon superi-
ority. However, it should be noted that the
enhancement of long-term memory by
arousal has usually only been found after
delays of 20 min or more, which is much
longer than the time intervals considered by
Baddeley et al.
Folkard et al. (1977) presented children
with a story at either 0900 or 1500, followed
by recall either immediately or after 1 week.
As would be expected on a simple arousal
model, immediate recall was better in the
morning presentation, whereas delayed re-
call was superior following afternoon pres-
entation.
The long-term recall data indicate that
learning was in some sense better in the af-
ternoon than in the morning. Why then was
immediate recall worse with afternoon pres-
entation? Folkard (1980) provided an
answer to this question by re-analyzing
some of the data of Folkard et al. (1977). For
immediate recall, morning presentation led
to equivalent recall of important and trivial
story information, whereas afternoon pres-
entation was followed predominantly by re-
call of the important details. This finding
links up well with the notion (Easterbrook
1959) that attentional selectivity is greater
under high arousal (i.e. in the afternoon).
Alternatively, the morning subjects may not
have processed the meaning of the story and

thus could not be influenced by the import-
ance of the information. Since all subjects
tended to recall mainly the important details
at the delayed retention test, the implication
of the results is that the afternoon subjects
processed less of the passage than morning
subjects, but what they did process was
more thoroughly learned.
While it is tempting to explain the various
findings by means of a simple arousal mod-
el, the temptation should probably be resist-
ed. In the first place, the assumption that the
participants in these studies were more
aroused in the afternoon that in the morning
depends quite heavily on the circadian
rhythm of body temperature. If self-report-
ed arousal or adrenalin is preferred as an in-
dicant of arousal, then the picture becomes
much less clear. Secondly, some of the ef-
fects seem to be rather fragile. Folkard
(1979a) found that the normal superiority of
digit span in the morning to the evening dis-
appeared when the initial instructions in-
cluded suggestions about how to process the
digit string (e.g. group and rehearsal instruc-
tions).
Perhaps the strongest evidence against a
simple arousal-based theory of the memory
data was obtained by Folkard and Monk
(1978). They tested memory for the factual
details of a 10 min film presented at 0400 or
2030 both immediately and after 28 days.
The subjects were night nurses on either
their first or second night of a night shift,
and Folkard and Monk discovered that
short-term memory adjusted more rapidly
than long-term memory to the shift in the
sleep-wake cycle. If there were only a single
circadian rhythm of arousal underlying
time-of-day effects on short-term and long-
term memory, then it is difficult to account
for this differential rate of adjustment.
There may be some mileage in relating the
key findings to the theoretical position es-
poused by Craik and Lockhart (1972). They
argued that deep or semantic levels of pro-
cessing led to better retention than shallow
or non-semantic forms of processing. If one
considers the long-term retention data, the
implication is that there is deeper or more
Time of Day 143
semantic processing in the afternoon than in
the morning. Of course, the same explana-
tion will not readily account for the oppo-
site pattern of results for short-term reten-
tion. However, many of the demonstrations
of a morning superiority in short-term reten-
tion have involved serial recall of syntacti-
cally unstructured lists of words or digits,
which may well depend upon non-semantic
rote rehearsal for successful performance.
Folkard (1979b) tested some of these
ideas by comparing serial recall of unrelated
words with recall of phonemically similar or
semantically similar words. The impairment
of serial recall produced by using phonemi-
cally similar words was greater for those
tested in the morning than for those tested in
the evening, suggesting that the amount of
phonemic processing declines during the
day. The reduction in serial recall produced
by using semantically similar words was on-
ly significant when subjects were tested in
the evening, indicating increased semantic
processing later in the day. There thus ap-
pears to be a noticeable shift in processing
strategy as a function of time of day.
7.2.3 Interactions with Arousers
One of the more obvious strategies for eluci-
dating the factors underlying time-of-day
effects is to introduce experimental manipu-
lations at different times of day in an at-
tempt to eliminate or accentuate the effects
of time of day on performance. It is a matter
of some surprise that this strategy has been
used so rarely. However, Blake (1971) did so
in a study in which he looked at the effects
of knowledge of results on performance of a
letter-cancellation task. As is shown in Fig.
7.7, knowledge of results increased output
by 10.1 % at 0800 but by only 0.2 % at 2100;
of most theoretical importance, knowledge
of results completely eleminated the time-
of-day effect. This suggests that poor per-
formance early in the day is attributable to
insufficient motivation and effort or to sub-
optimal arousal.
Arousal-based interpretations of the ef-
144 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
1750
1700
~...
, ' - -..........'0""'.............
,0-----___--'""0
o NO KNOWLEDGE
w OF RESULTS
~ 1650
W
:t
U 1600
III
W
~ 1550
1550
I I I I I I
0&00 10-00 12-00 14·00 16·00 1600 20{)0 22·00
TIME OF DAY
fects oftime of day on performance have re-
ceived support in other studies in which
time of day has been found to interact with
white noise, a known arouser. Mullin and
Corcoran (1977) discovered that auditory vi-
gilance was much better at 2030 than at
0830. The introduction of intense white
noise eliminate the time-of-day effect, large-
ly by improving performance at 0830. Blake
(1971) compared performance of a letter
cancellation task at 0800 and 1030 under
conditions of 70-db or 100-db noise. The
more intense noise produced a 6 % increase
in output at 0800, but had no effect at 1030.
Of especial significance in the light of other
findings to be discussed shortly, the benefi-
cial effects of intense noise on early morn-
ing performance were much greater for ex-
traverts than for introverts.
So far we have concentrated very largely
on general trends in time-of-day effects.
However, individual differences are import-
ant, and there appears to be a valid distinc-
tion between people who prefer to work in
the morning ('morning types') and people
who work better in the evening ('evening
types'). The personality dimension that has
most frequently been explored in this con-
text is that of introversion-extraversion. In-
terest in the relationship of this personality
dimension to time-of-day effects was
sparked off by Colquhoun (1960). He ana-
lysed the results from 17 vigilance studies
carried out at various times of day and dis-
covered that the morning experiments gave
------ OF
KNOWLEDGE
RESULTS
Fig. 7.7. Performance on a letter
cancellation task at various times
I I of day as a function of the presence
or absence of knowledge of results.
(Blake 1971)
a positive correlation between introversion
and efficiency, whereas the afternoon ex-
periments gave a negative correlation. This
suggests that introverts tend to be morning
types and extraverts evening types.
Blake (1967b, 1971) provided an explana-
tion for these findings. He discovered that
introverts' rapid rise in temperature oc-
curred a little earlier in the day than that of
extraverts. This finding that introverts were
phase advanced with respect to the circadi-
an rhythm of arousal suggests that extra-
verts may be sub-optimally aroused in the
morning, with introverts being supra-opti-
mally aroused in the afternoon. However, it
is somewhat implausible to claim that rather
small differences in body temperature be-
tween introverts and extraverts are responsi-
ble (even indirectly) for large performance
differences.
Revelle et al. (1980) argued that extraver-
sion should be divided into its two main
components (i.e. impulsivity and sociabili-
ty). They discovered in several experiments
that interactions between introversion-ex-
traversion and time of day were due to im-
pUlsivity rather than to sociability. Fairly
demanding tasks (e.g. analogies, antonyms
and sentence completions) were performed
either in the morning (0900 or 1000) or in the
evening (1900) and after ingestion of caf-
feine (an arousing drug) or a placebo.
The averaged results across a total of se-
ven experiments are shown in Fig. 7.8. Caf-
feine had its greatest beneficial effect on

MORNING
+3
lLI~ ,./J
u lll
zlLl
<0::
+2
,.,."
~O
o::~
+1
,.,."
0 ~--------
fro
0::0::
-1
lLI<
0.0
Zz -2
<:!
0 111 -3
lLIZ
~:: -4
LOW HIGH
IMPULSIVITY
Fig.7.8. Performance on relatively demanding
verbal tasks as a function of time of day, caffeine
high impulsives (i.e. extraverts) tested in the
morning, indicating that extraverts are sub-
optimally aroused at that time of day. In
contrast, the modest effect of caffeine on
low impulsives (i.e. introverts) tested in the
morning suggests that they are close to the
optimal arousal level at that time. The oppo-
site pattern of results was obtained at the
evening testing session, but the interaction
between drug conditions and impulsivity is
weak. These data suggest that high impul-
sives are over-aroused in the evening,
whereas low impulsives are under-aroused.
Revelle et al. (1980) argued that low im-
pulsives were more aroused than high im-
pulsives in the morning but that the oppo-
site was true in the evening, and they
claimed that this was due to a phase differ-
ence of several hours between introverts and
extraverts in the circadian rhythm of arous-
al. Eysenck and Folkard (1980) pointed out
that there was no evidence in the literature
to support the notion of such a large phase
difference in the circadian rhythm of arous-
al. However, they reported some new body
temperature data suggesting that as Revelle
et al. claimed, the phase difference between
introverts and extraverts was due more to
the impulsivity component of extraversion
than to the sociability component. However,
the phase difference which Eysenck and
Folkard obtained was by no means as pro-
Time of Day 145
EVENING
___o..~~~
______ _
......
"",
- PLACEBO
0---0 CAFFEINE
LOW HIGH
IMPULSIVITY
and impulsivity. (Revelle, Humphreys et al. 1980)
nounced as Revelle et al. claimed it should
have been.
Revelle et al. (1980) argued that introver-
sion-extraversion, time of day, and caffeine
all affected the same arousal system, but this
is rather simplistic. For example, it may be
misleading to claim that introversion-extra-
version and time of day affect the same un-
derlying process. The ability to retrieve in-
formation from long-term or semantic mem-
ory is affected by introversion-extraversion
(Eysenck 1974a, 1975a) but is not affected
by time of day (Folkard and Monk 1980).
Blake (1971) found that digit span declined
throughout most of the day (i.e. was appar-
ently inversely related to arousal level). He
also found that introverts had a greater digit
span than extraverts at 0800, at which time
they appear to be more aroused than extra-
verts. These performance data indicate the
need for a more complex conceptualization
involving a number of qualitatively distinct
activation states.
Humphreys et al. (1980) agreed with Ey-
senck and Folkard (1980) that a more com-
plex formulation was required and pro-
posed a model incorporating two different
activation states (on-task effort and arous-
al), together with two information-process-
ing constructs (attention and short-term
memory). Their model is shown in Fig. 7.9.
It assumes that arousal and on-task effort
146 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
ANXIETY ~------------.
L..-_ _----'
IMPULSIVITY
Fig. 7.9. An arousal model postulating two activa-
tion states (on-task effort and arousal). Solid lines
imply monotonic increasing relations and dashed
both have a positive effect on attention,
whereas arousal has a negative effect on
short-term memory. Humphreys et al. also
assumed that performance was a positive
function of both short-term memory and at-
tention. According to this formulation, sub-
optimal arousal impairs performance be-
cause insufficient attention is paid to the
task, whereas supra-optimal arousal leads
to a performance decrement via reduced
short-term memory capacity.
It is unfortunate that Humphreys et al.
failed to discuss the concepts of short-term
memory and attention at greater length. In
normal usage, they would be regarded as in-
terdependent constructs rather than as be-
ing totally separate. In any case, the model
could only be tested by looking at the effects
of arousal and anxiety on tasks varying
systematically in their attentional and short-
term memory demands, and this has not as
yet been done.
7.2.4 Conclusions
It seems clear that there are systematic
changes in arousal level during the course of
the waking day. This has been demonstrated
by the fact that several arousers such as
knowledge of results, white noise, introver-
sion-extraversion (or its impulsivity compo-
nent) and caffeine all have different effects
on performance at different points during
the day. However, more precise statements
are difficult to make because various phy-
siological and self-report measures of arous-
ATTENTION
PERFORMANCE
lines imply monotonic decreasing functions.
(Humphreys et al. 1980)
al place the time of peak arousal anywhere
between approximately 1100 and 2100
hours. It is probably best to assume that
there is more than one diurnal rhythm for
arousal.
It is interesting that many tasks are best
performed at approximately midday, and
this is the time at which self-reported alert-
ness and arousal are usually greatest. Re-
cent data suggest that the earlier view that
peak performance of most tasks occurs in
the middle of the evening (always rather
counter-intuitive) is not correct. A compli-
cating factor concerns the differential ef-
fects of time of day on short-term and long-
term memory: short-term memory is best in
the morning and long-term memory in the
late afternoon. This appears to be due to a
shift away from maintenance processing
and towards semantic processing as the day
proceeds.
7.3 Sleep Deprivation
There are various kinds of sleep depriva-
tion. While the most common procedure has
been to deprive subjects of all sleep on one
or more successive nights, partial sleep de-
privation probably has more social rele-
vance. When people are only deprived of
some of their normal sleep, it is important to
ascertain whether it is predominantly REM
or non-REM sleep that has been lost. The
former is characterized by rapid eye move-

ments, with the EEG manifesting a pattern
of fast asynchronous low voltage changes.
In contrast, non-REM sleep typically pro-
duces an EEG showing rather more pro-
nounced changes from the waking pattern.
However, the best known difference is that
subjects awakened from REM sleep are
considerably more likely than those awak-
ened from non-REM sleep to report that
they have just been dreaming.
It is already clear that the behavioural
consequences of REM and non-REM sleep
loss are rather different. For example, it ap-
pears that REM sleep is more important
than non-REM sleep in stimulating flexible
divergent thinking (e.g. Glaubman 1978).
Even though the precise functional signifi-
cance of the major kinds of sleep remains
unclear, it is likely that the behavioural con-
sequences of total sleep loss represent an
amalgam of relatively specific effects.
Many theorists have ignored the above
caveat and assumed with some justification
that the major effect of sleep loss is to pro-
duce a general lowering of arousal. Much of
the relevant experimental evidence has been
reviewed by Kjellberg (1977a). While the ef-
fects of sleep deprivation on measures of au-
tonomic activation are rather inconsistent,
sleep loss generally produces decreased al-
pha abundance and/or a lowering of alpha
amplitude. Both of these effects on the EEG
are conventionally regarded as indicative of
de-arousal.
Subjective measures also indicate that a
major effect of sleep deprivation is to lower
the level of arousal. The most common find-
ing is both earth shattering and mind bog-
gling: people who are deprived of sleep re-
port increased sleepiness! However, irrita-
tion is reported almost as frequently as slee-
piness, and anxiety reactions are also expe-
rienced some of the time.
In spite of the accumulating evidence that
sleep loss lowers the level of arousal, Mal-
mo and Surwillo (1960) proposed an alter-
native formulation. According to them,
"Depriving an organism of sleep appears to
be like depriving it of other basic needs. Un-
der conditions of sufficient environmental
Sleep Deprivation 147
stimulation this deprivation leads to in-
creased activation" (p. 17). Unfortunately
the precise meaning of 'sufficient stimula-
tion' was not made clear by Malmo and Sur-
willo, but they did report data apparently
supporting their hypothesis. They deprived
three subjects of sleep for approximately
55 h and took physiological recordings from
them during the performance of a tracking
task. Strong environmental stimulation was
provided by exposing the subjects to painful
heat when their performance fell below a
certain level. While there were some incon-
sistencies in the data, Malmo and Surwillo
(1960) concluded that "sleep deprivation
had the effect of increasing the level of acti-
vation" (p. 22).
As a rule of thumb, it appears to be the
case that sleep deprivation leads to reduced
arousal when the environment is relatively
unstimulating or monotonous, whereas
more inconsistent effects are observed when
the situation is demanding or stressful. This
means that we cannot accurately predict
someone's arousal level solely on the basis
of knowing that he has been deprived of
sleep. Arousal level is determined interac-
tively by sleep deprivation and environmen-
tal stimulation.
There is reasonable evidence that sleep
deprivation potentiates the de-arousing in-
fluence of monotonous environments, but it
is less clear what mechanism mediates this
effect. A promising lead was provided by
Bohlin (1971). She presented a series of
identical tones and found that habituation
of the orienting response occurred more
rapidly when the tones were presented in
fairly quick succession. Since sleep onset
was also faster with more frequent tone
presentations, it seems possible that sleep
loss increases the rate of habituation. How-
ever, Bohlin (1973) discovered that sleep-
deprived subjects did not show faster habi-
tuation than non-deprived subjects, al-
though they did fall asleep faster when ex-
posed to the habituation procedure. In spite
of these disappointing results, it may still be
worth exploring the notion that sleep loss af-
fects some aspect of habituation to stimuli.
148 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
7.3.1 Performance Effects
It has been found, with very few exceptions,
that any effects of sleep loss on a task are in
the direction of impaired performance. Al-
though there has been some disagreement
on the details, it has been accepted almost
universally that such performance decre-
ments are attributable to a sub-optimal level
of arousal in the sleep-deprived state. The
most direct method of testing this hypothe-
sis is to observe the effects on performance
of increasing the arousal level of sleep-de-
prived subjects in some way; the prediction
is that adverse effects of sleep deprivation
per se on performance should be attenuated
by arousal manipulations.
Most of the available evidence supports
the above prediction. In some early work,
Wilkinson (1961) found that sleep depriva-
tion produced widespread impairment on
the five-choice serial reaction task, includ-
ing slower overall responding, more gaps
and more errors. Incentive in the form of
knowledge of results largely eliminated
these effects. In similar vein, Wilkinson
(1963) found that the adverse effects of
sleep loss on the five-choice serial reaction
task were much reduced by the administra-
tion of white noise.
Corcoran (1962a) found that noise had a
modestly beneficial effect on the visual vig-
ilance performance of sleep-deprived sub-
jects, and the same was true for perform-
ance of the five-choice serial reaction task.
The findings led Corcoran to the following
conclusion: "The effect of noise in these ex-
periments was clearly to reduce the decline
during the test which is normally associated
with loss of sleep. This result is in accord-
ance with a simple arousal theory, which
would maintain that noise is arousing and
loss of sleep de-arousing, so that their com-
bination results in levels of arousal between
these extremes" (p. 181).
In more recent work, the effects of other
arousers on the performance of sleep-de-
prived subjects have been assessed.
Bergstrom, Gillberg and Amberg (1973)
found that two nights of sleep loss produced
a substantial deterioration on performance
of a 40-min radar-watching task. The ad-
ministration of painful electric shocks at
irregular intervals improved the detection
performance of sleep-deprived subjects, but
most of the improvement occurred during
the first 15 min of the task. An arousal-
based interpretation is supported by their
finding that sleep loss reduced heart rate,
whereas the stress produced by the shocks
increased it.
Collins (1977) investigated the effects of
administration of d-amphetamine on per-
formance of a visual tracking task. He found
that this arousing drug produced a substan-
tial improvement in tracking accuracy
among subjects who had been deprived of
sleep for 55 h; however, their performance
was still lower than that of subjects who had
slept normally.
In sum, it has been clearly established
that each of a large variety of arousing
agents (including electric shocks, noise,
knowledge of results and d-amphetamine) is
able to counteract the adverse effects of
sleep loss on performance. The notion that
sleep loss leads to a level of arousal below
that which is optimal for the performance of
most tasks can also be tested by considering
task performance in more detail. For exam-
ple, it has often been found that arousal lev-
el declines over time when subjects have to
perform relatively monotonous tasks for a
prolonged period. If the arousal level of
sleep-deprived subjects is sub-optimal even
at the start of task performance, then this de-
arousal over time might be expected to lead
to progressively poorer performance under
sleep deprivation as the time on-task in-
creases.
By and large, it does seem that tasks re-
vealing effects of sleep deprivation on per-
formance do so to a greater extent after the
task has been performed for some time. Wil-
kinson (1960) found that sleep loss impair-
ed performance on a 40-min visual vigi-
lance task, with most of the impairment ocur-
ring during the last 20 min (see Fig. 7.1 0). Sim-
ilar results have also been obtained with
the five-choice serial reaction task (Wilkin-

100
o
w
~
U .............
~ 75
w ......
o "'-0....
I/)
...J
~ 50
(!)
I/)
~
z NO SLEEP
w 25
U
Q:
W
Il.
Fig.. 7.10. Visual vigilance perform-
ance after sleep or no sleep. (Wil-
kinson 1960)
son 1961). There were 6 weeks of testing,
and the adverse effects of sleep were greater
towards the end of each session, especially
in the later weeks. Most striking of all are
the data obtained by Wilkinson (1964) with
a 30-min visual vigilance task. On the 3rd
day without sleep, the sleep-deprived sub-
jects performed at approximately 60 % of
the level of non-deprived subjects during
the first half of the task; subsequently, their
performance declined catastrophically to
only 5 % of that of the control subjects.
Another way of testing the notion that
sleep loss characteristically produces de-
arousal is to manipulate the intrinsic inter-
est or stimulation provided by the experi-
mental task: the expectation is that the more
interesting and stimulating a task is, the
more resistant it will be to the effects of
sleep loss. The most thorough investigation
of this issue was by Wilkinson (1964), who
compared the effects of sleep loss on eight
different tasks. Sleep loss severely disrupted
performance on the choice serial reaction
task and visual vigilance, reduced the speed
of sorting cards into both four and ten cate-
gories, reduced the ability to play chess, but
did not have any effect on rote serial learn-
ing, table tennis or darts.
Any interpretation of this pattern of re-
sults is greatly complicated by the heteroge-
neous nature of the tasks used. However,
Wilkinson asked the subjects which tasks
Sleep Deprivation 149
_ SLEEP
o..............
~
~
"'...
"'...' ...
'0.,
' .........
......"'0
2 3 4
10-MIN PERIODS OF TEST
they had liked best and found that vigilance
was the least popular, followed in order by
serial choice reaction, rote learning, card
sorting and then the games. A comparison
of the performance and preference data led
Wilkinson to the following conclusion:
"The least attractive types of work are those
most likely to suffer a loss of efficiency
when sleep has been lost" (p. 180).
It is probable, of course, that the various
tasks differed in important ways other than
merely attractiveness. In general, one might
expect attractive tasks to provide more vari-
ety, novelty and unpredictability and to be
more complex. However, there is some indi-
cation in the literature that complexity per
se increases rather than decreases the ad-
verse effects of sleeplessness. For example,
Williams and Lubin (1967) considered per-
formance on two experimenter-paced tasks;
the less complex task simply required ad-
ding two pairs of digits, whereas the more
complex task also involved adding eight to
each sum. The more complex task was more
detrimentally affected by sleep loss. Similar
results with a different task were obtained
by Williams et al. (1965). They discovered
that sleep loss produced a larger increase in
errors of omission on a visual vigilance task
when signals were unpredictable (high com-
plexity) than when they were totally predict-
able (low complexity).
At least some of the above studies have
150 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
obtained an interaction between sleep loss
and task difficulty or complexity in which
performance on a difficult task is more im-
paired by sleep loss than is performance on
an easy task. This appears to be inconsistent
with the assumption of Yerkes and Dodson
(1908) that the optimal level of arousal is in-
versely related to task difficulty. Beyond
that, it is clear that the crucial task charac-
teristics mediating the effects of sleep loss
are still only partially understood. However,
an interesting speculation was offered by
Kjellberg (1977b): "The influence of sleep
deprivation appears to be accentuated as a
function of how optimal the conditions are
for habituation to occur" (p. 146).
A further aspect of the effects of sleepless-
ness on performance deserves mention at
this point. When subjects are at liberty to
perform a task at their chosen rate, there are
very characteristic effects of sleep loss a-
cross a wide variety of tasks: the sleep-
deprived subject performs relatively slowly
but maintains a high level of accuracy. Pos-
sible explanations for the differential effects
of sleeplessness on speed and accuracy will
be discussed later.
7.3.2 Short-Term and Long-Term
Memory
A well-established finding in the arousal lit-
erature (see Eysenck, 1976a, for a review) is
that high arousal has differential effects on
short-term and long-term memory: it im-
pairs or has no effect on short-term memory
but enhances long-term memory. If we may
assume that sleep loss typically reduces the
level of arousal, then the presumption must
be that sleep loss will improve short-term
memory but impair long-term memory.
The prediction that sleep loss should en-
hance short-term memory is of interest part-
ly because it is counter-intuitive. Hamilton
et al. (1972) found that partial sleep loss did
indeed improve performance on running
digit span. This task involves the presenta-
tion of an unpredictable number of digits;
when the series ends, the subject attempts to
produce ordered recall of the most recently
presented items. The running memory scan
task seems to require a rather unusual strate-
gy. As one of the subjects put it, "To learn to
do this test one must learn not to listen"
(p. 109). In other words, behaving passively
may be more successful than active process-
ing of each digit when performing this task.
Very different results were obtained by
Gieseking et al. (1957). They found that im-
mediate recall of general information items
was impaired by sleeplessness, and the same
was true of delayed recall after 24 h. How-
ever, relative to immediate recall, long-term
recall showed no significant sleep-loss de-
crement up to 50 h of wakefulness. Similar
results were obtained by Williams et al.
(1959).
Williams et al. (1966) wondered whether
their previous findings might have been due
to a failure on the part of sleep-deprived
subjects to perceive some of the to-be-re-
membered words. Accordingly, they present-
ed word lists in which the subjects were re-
quired to write down each word immediate-
ly after it had been presented. In spite of
this, one night of sleep loss was still associat-
ed with reduced immediate recall. In a sec-
ond experiment, Williams et al. found that
long-term retention of pictorial information
was impaired when pictures were presented
to sleep-deprived subjects and the sub-
sequent recognition test was given after a re-
covery sleep. Since there was no impairment
when presentation was given in the non-de-
prived state but the retention test was given
in the sleep-deprived state, sleep loss may
affect initial encoding rather than subse-
quent retrieval. .
More evidence that sleep loss can reduce
short-term memory was collected by Polzel-
la (1975). Up to 13 items were presented, fol-
lowed by a probe. Subjects had to decide
whether or not the probe item corresponded
to any of the items presented initially. Sleep
loss significantly impaired performance on
this recognition test; since there were com-
parable effects of sleep loss at all retention
intervals, the performance impairment un-
der sleep loss probably reflects inefficient

encoding (perhaps due to attentional
lapses) rather than an increased speed of
forgetting or decay of trace information.
In sum, sleep loss disrupts both short-
term and long-term memory. While a com-
parison of the findings obtained with other
arousal manipulations indicates that sleep
loss should reduce long-term retention, the
fact that sleep deprivation impairs short-
term memory is somewhat inconsistent with
the expectations of a simple arousal model.
The most straightforward explanation of the
data is that sleeplessness produces greater
difficulty in focussing attention on the to-
be-remembered stimuli; such attentional
problems would presumably impair both
short-term and long-term memory.
7.3.3 The Lapse Hypothesis
The first thorough theoretical account of the
effects of sleep loss was put forward by Wil-
liams et al. (1959). In essence, they claimed
that sleep deprivation leads to an increased
frequency of short periods of unresponsive-
ness or reduced sensitivity to stimulation;
such periods they referred to as 'lapses'.
Lapses were regarded as instances of low-
ered arousal level, and it was predicted that
the performance of any task would be dis-
rupted during a lapse. They appear to have
been influenced by the work of Bjerner
(1949), who defined a lapse as "a transient
condition of the same nature as sleep"
(p.73).
The most fundamental prediction of the
lapse hypothesis is that sleeplessness leads
to more uneven performance rather than to
a general deterioration. In order to make
more specific predictions, they distin-
guished between subject-paced and experi-
menter-paced tasks. In subject-paced tasks,
it was assumed that lapses would lead the
sleep-deprived subject to proceed more
slowly but without sacrificing accuracy. In
contrast, on experimenter-paced tasks they
anticipated that lapses would lead to errors
of omission, i.e. the subject would simply
fail to respond to some of the critical sig-
Sleep Deprivation 151
nals. However, if the stimulus was long and
complex, then a lapse might coincide with
only part of the stimulus, leading to an inac-
curate rather than an omitted response.
Williams et al. (1959) began their search
for evidence of lapses by considering per-
formance on a reaction-time task. After 78 h
of sleep deprivation, mean reaction time
was twice as long as under non-deprived
conditions. Of more interest, this deteriora-
tion of performance was largely attributable
to the fact that the slowest 14% of responses
averaged approximately 2.50 s after three
nights' sleep loss compared to only 0.50 s
under control conditions. In contrast, the
fastest 14% of responses were only slightly
affected by sleep loss. It was assumed that
the incidence of lapses increased as sleep
loss continued and that such lapses led to
unusually slow response latencies.
A potential problem with this analysis is
that it is likely that response speed was fas-
ter at the beginning of each session, so that
there is some confounding between reaction
time and time on-task. Lisper and Kjellberg
(1972) overcame this problem by calculating
the reaction times falling at the 25th and
75th percentiles in each period of 1 min dur-
ing a 10-min task. Sleep deprivation primar-
ily lengthened the slowest reactions but also
had a discernible effect on the fastest re-
sponses. Similar results were obtained by
Tharp (1978); he also found that sleep de-
privation slowed the fastest responses more
when there was stimUlus-response incompa-
tibility, suggesting that sleep loss increases the
duration of the response selection process.
With respect to a further prediction of the
lapse hypothesis that sleeplessness leads to
slow but accurate performance on subject-
paced tasks, there is no doubt at all that
most of the available data provide strong
support (for a review, see Kjellberg
1977a, b, c). However, this differential ef-
fect of sleep loss on speed and accuracy can
equally well be explained in other ways. For
example, if sleeplessness produces a general
reduction in processing efficiency, then sub-
jects may simply adopt the strategy of sacri-
ficing speed in order to maintain accuracy.
152 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
There is also experimental support for the
prediction that sleeplessness produces er-
rors of omission on experimenter-paced
tasks. Williams et al. (1959) performed a
series of vigilance experiments using visual,
auditory or tactile signals and discovered
that omission errors were more affected
than commission errors by sleep loss irre-
spective of signal modality. In subsequent
work, they recorded the EEG during per-
formance of an auditory vigilance task. Of
especial interest, errors of omission consist-
ently exhibited less alpha activity than cor-
rect omissions, correct responses or com-
mission errors during sleep loss. This find-
ing provides support for the notion that the
increased omission errors in the sleepless
state reflect a greater frequency of sleep-like
lapses.
It is probably true, as the lapse hypothesis
assumes, that part ofthe performance decre-
ment in the sleepless state is due to transient
periods of unusually low arousal. However,
there is also some more pervasive impair-
ment which occurs with sleep deprivation,
and this may involve the generally sub-opti-
mal arousal characteristic of sleep loss. At
the theoretical level, there is a danger of de-
fining a 'lapse' solely in terms of perform-
ance; in other words, using it as a purely de-
scriptive term and ignoring its nature and
causes. More specifically, since lapses are
used to explain performance decrements,
and lapses are in effect defined as perform-
ance decrements, we have a rather nasty
case of circularity. What is needed is some
independent measure of the occurrence of a
lapse, and psychophysiological recordings
may help to provide such a measure. Fi-
nally, it seems important to decide whether
lapses represent an attentional deficit or a
lack of responsiveness.
7.3.4 Attentional Mechanisms
We have seen in previous chapters of this
book that as predicted by Easterbrook
(1959), high arousal typically leads to great-
er attentional selectivity. Although the em-
phasis in research designed to evaluate
Easterbrook's hypothesis has been on the
effects of high arousal on attentional pro-
cesses, the hypothesis implies that lowered
arousal should lead to decreased attentional
selectivity.
Hockey (1970c) investigated the effects of
sleep loss on attention in a situation in
which subjects had to perform a tracking
task while at the same time responding to
light signals. To begin with, both sleep-de-
prived and non-deprived subjects re-
sponded much more rapidly to centrally lo-
cated than to peripherally located light sig-
nals. Later on in the task, sleep-deprived
subjects showed a decreasing difference in
response times to signals from the two
sources, whereas non-deprived subjects
maintained the initial difference. This pro-
vides at least indirect support for the notion
that sleep deprivation reduces attentional
selectivity. However, it is not clear from this
study whether sleep loss affects attentional
selectivity or response selection.
Less equivocal data were obtained by
Hockey (1973). There were three light
sources and three buttons, and pressing one
of the buttons enabled the state of the corre-
sponding light source to be checked. The
subject's task was to attempt to detect the
occurrence of 'faults' at any of the light
sources; faults were distributed over the
three sources in the ratio 6:3: I. Sleep loss re-
sulted in a reduction of sampling of the
source associated with the highest fault
probability, especially towards the end of
the experimental session. In other words,
sleep-deprived subjects appeared to show
less evidence of attentional selectivity. An
interpretation of these data in terms of low-
ered arousal was strengthened by a further
finding reported by Hockey (1973): noise
had the opposite effect to sleep loss, lead-
ing to increased sampling of the high prob-
ability source, i.e. greater attentional selec-
tivity.
Norton (1970) used a task in which packs
of cards had to be sorted according to a sim-
ple principle. The packs used in the experi-
ment varied in the number of irrelevant sti-

muli per card, which ranged between zero
and eight. The magnitude of the adverse ef-
fect of sleep loss on sorting speed increased
with the number of irrelevant cues on the
cards, presumably because sleeplessness
leads to greater distractibility. The findings
can also be construed as indicating reduced
attentional selectivity following sleep depri-
vation.
A major effect of sleep loss is to reduce an
individual's capacity to maintain attention-
al focus on the critical aspects of stimula-
tion. This in turn increases the distracting ef-
fect of irrelevant stimuli. It is tempting to
apply this theoretical account to several of
the findings hitherto subsumed under the
lapse hypothesis. In particular, it may be the
case that the transient periods of non-re-
sponse often regarded as attributable to
lapses (i.e. non-responsiveness of the sys-
tem) may actually be due to lack of focussed
attention.
7.3.5 Motivation
It has frequently (and plausibly) been as-
sumed that one of the main problems expe-
rienced by the sleep-deprived person is mo-
tivational in nature. This point of view was
favoured by Wilkinson (1969), who claimed
that it is "difficult for us to assess the 'real'
effect oflost sleep upon subjects' capacity as
opposed to their willingness to perform"
(p.39). The finding (e.g. Wilkinson 1961)
that motivational factors such as knowledge
of results can largely eliminate the adverse
effects of sleep loss is obviously consistent
with a motivational theory of sleep loss.
However, as we saw earlier in the chapter,
several other arousing manipulations (e.g.
noise, electric shocks and d-amphetamine)
have also been found to attentuate the detri-
mental effects of sleeplessness. According-
ly, it is not clear that the beneficial effects of
motivational variables on sleep-deprived
subjects should be interpreted in motiva-
tional rather than arousal terms.
A motivational interpretation of sleep-
loss phenomena is also suggested by a con-
Sleep Deprivation 153
sideration of those tasks that are especially
susceptible to the effects of sleeplessness.
Such tasks (e.g. vigilance and reaction time)
tend to be relatively monotonous and unin-
teresting, i.e. they are not intrinsically moti-
vating. The longer the period of time over
which such tasks need to be performed, the
greater is the difficulty of maintaining an
adequate level of motivation. In this con-
nection, it is worth remembering that sleep
loss often interacts with time on-task, with
the adverse effects of sleeplessness increas-
ing over time.
In contrast, sleep loss has been found to
have negligible effects on the performance
of many complex but intrinsically interest-
ing tasks. For example, performance ofvar-
ious intelligence tests is essentially unaffect-
ed by sleep deprivation. Wilkinson (1964)
found that performance of a rather compli-
cated and challenging task called the Battle
Game was, if anything, improved by a 30-h
loss of sleep; this was true throughout the
l-h period of work. Even at 0500 on the 3rd
day of sleeplessness, performance was com-
parable to that obtained under non-de-
prived conditions.
Part of the reason for the lack of impair-
ment on the Battle Game may have been
that there was almost immediate knowledge
of results: successful and abortive attempts
at interception were signalled as hits or mis-
ses by means of flashing lights. When Wil-
kinson (1964) used a similar task (Coded
Decision Taking) but in a highly coded form
with delayed knowledge of success and fail-
ure, sleep loss caused subjects to neglect
their primary instructions to make intercep-
tions at all costs.
Why exactly is knowledge of results so
successful in reducing the negative effects
of sleeplessness on performance? While in
general terms it seems probable that knowl-
edge of results increases the motivational
level of sleep-deprived subjects, Kjellberg
(1975) put forward a more specific reason.
He suggested that knowledge of results
helps to prevent sleep-deprived subjects
from lowering their standard of perform-
ance, because it makes failure more obvious
 154 Endogenous Determinants of Arousal
and less acceptable. Subjects were given
number series of the form '24681', with
some of the problems being insoluble. Fail-
ures to solve were made less obvious and
more acceptable for some of the subjects by
informing them that some of the problems
were insoluble. Among these informed sub-
jects, sleep deprivation led to less time being
spent on the task and more items being left
unsolved. There were no effects of sleep de-
privation for those subjects who were not in-
formed that some of the problems had no
solution. Thus the significance attaching to
knowledge of results clearly depends upon
the context in which the feedback is pro-
vided.
A rather different approach was taken by
Wilkinson (1962). He discovered that sleep
loss reduced the speed of performance on a
test of mental arithmetic. However, concur-
rent recording of the electromyograph
(EMG) revealed an interesting qualifica-
tion: sleep loss primarily led to performance
impairment for those subjects whose EMG
measure of muscle tension showed only a
small increase over the normal level. Wilkin-
son suggested that the high level of perform-
ance attained by those subjects whose mus-
cle tension increased the most was attribut-
able to compensatory effort or motivation.
Muscle tension was seen as reflecting effort
rather than arousal per se.
7.3.6 Summary
It has been found, with relatively few excep-
tions, that sleep loss either impairs perform-
ance or has no effect. Performance decre-
ments are especially likely to occur under
the following circumstances: (I) prolonged
sleep loss, (2) use of a monotonous and un-
stimulating task, (3) long task duration and
(4) minimal feedback. In contrast, sleep loss
often has no effect on performance when
short, interesting tasks are used and/or fair-
I ly complete knowledge of results is avail-
able. In general terms, the more the task is
conducive to de-arousal, the more sleepless-
ness is detrimental for performance.
The above findings suggest that sleep de-
privation may affect the level of arousal.
Physiological evidence reveals that sleep de-
privation is usually associated with re-
duced arousal level, but the precise findings
are somewhat situation specific. At the be-
havioural level, the notion that sleep loss
tends to produce sub-optimal arousal is
strongly supported by the fact that a galli-
maufry of arousers has been found to elimi-
nate, or greatly reduce, the negative effects
of sleep deprivation.
While it is true that a simple arousal ex-
planation ofsleep-loss phenomena is surpris-
ingly succesful in predicting the behaviour-
al consequences of sleeplessness, there are
still grounds for claiming that sleep loss af-
fects two separate arousal systems. The in-
itial effect of sleep loss is to reduce the activ-
ity in a relatively non-specific, passive
arousal system; the 'natural' result of this
de-arousal is to impair performance on most
tasks. However, sleep loss can also indirect-
ly affect a second, more active arousal sys-
tem, especially when motivational factors
(e.g. knowledge of results or shock for poor
performance) are introduced into the exper-
imental situation. In other words, if sleep-
deprived subjects are induced to monitor
their task performance fairly closely, then
the naturally detrimental effects of sleep
loss can often be reduced by an active com-
pensatory process. An important implication
of this viewpoint is that when sleep-de-
prived subjects perform a task as well as
non-deprived subjects, they are achieving
this performance comparability at greater
'cost' in terms of the involvement of process-
ing resources. This was shown by Wilkinson
(1962), who found that sleep-deprived sub-
jects who managed to perform a mental
arithmetic task successfully did so at the ex-
pense of very high levels of muscle tension.
The de-aroused sleepless state produces a
mode of behaviour in which responding is
rather slow and deliberate, but in which ac-
curacy is maintained at a high level. There
are grounds for believing that there is a posi-
tive relationship between arousal level and
the internal speed of processing, although

this relationship can undoubtedly be
severed by varying the instructional empha-
sis on speed or accuracy. When the experi-
mental task is experimenter paced, and the
subject is thus not free to perform at his
chosen rate, then the characteristic effect of
sleeplessness is to increase the number of
failures to respond, i.e. errors of omission.
The precise effects of sleep loss on the
processing system have not as yet been esta-
blished. However, it is reasonable to claim
that the following effects have been demon-
Sleep Deprivation 155
strated: (1) reduced rate of mental process-
ing, (2) decreased capacity to focus atten-
tion on crucial stimuli, (3) increased distrac-
tibility and (4) momentary lapses of atten-
tion. However, perhaps the most important
and surprising finding of all is the large
number of tasks and conditions under
which sleep deprivation has no discernible
effect on the quality of performance. This
suggests that any adequate theory of sleep
deprivation must incorporate some kind of
compensatory mechanism.
8 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
A relatively straightforward method of
studying the effects of arousal on perform-
ance is to manipulate the level of arousal by
means of exogenous or external stimulation.
Ideally, such stimulation should be intense
but non-informative, so that it produces a
state of elevated arousal without at the same
time attracting attention. In practice, white
noise (i.e. a noise consisting of all sound fre-
quencies and resembling hissing) has been
far and away the most used exogenous de-
terminant of arousal. There is fairly general
agreement that intense white noise produces
heightened physiological arousal, and di-
rect evidence in support of this contention
was obtained by Berlyne and Lewis (1963),
who discovered that moderate intensity
white noise produced a significant drop in
skin resistance.
It is worth noting at the outset that it
would be erroneous to assume that all kinds
of noise have equivalent effects on behav-
iour. Of especial importance is the distinc-
tion between predictable and unpredictable
noise, with impaired performance being
more likely to occur with unpredictable
noise. Other characteristics of noise, such
as its intensity, meaningfulness and appar-
ent controllability, also need to be consid-
ered.
One of the more crucial aspects of noise
in determining its effects on performance
may well be the extent to which it is de-
manding of attention. Berlyne (1960) found
that stimuli that were novel, surprising or in-
congruous were attention demanding, and
he explained this by suggesting that the
common characteristic of these stimuli is
that they produce a discrepancy between
what is expected and what is in fact present-
ed. In terms of this analysis, unpredictable
bursts of noise are more 'surprising' than
predictable bursts, and thus attract more at-
tention.
An additional factor of some importance
is whether or not people feel that they have
control over the duration of the noise.
Blechman and Dannemiller (1976) exposed
two groups of subjects to the same pattern
of noise while proofreading and solving an-
agrams, but they led one group to believe
that rapid and continuous button pressing
would turn off the noise. The group with
perceived control over noise did better than
the group with no perceived control on the
relatively simple proofreading task, but not
on the anagram task.
In this chapter, we initially consider the
effects of noise on a number of standard
performance tasks. Thereafter, there is more
emphasis on the theoretical interpretation
of such effects, with special stress being laid
on attentional mechanisms.
8.1 Vigilance Task Performance
Vigilance task performance is undoubtedly
affected by many factors, including the rate
of signal presentation, the predictability of
signals and the discriminability of signals.
However, the prevailing state of arousal of
subjects performing a vigilance task is cer-
tainly one of the more important determi-
nants of performance: as we saw in Chap. 7,
it seems to be broadly true that poor vigil-
ance performance and a pronounced vigil-
ance decrement are most likely to occur in
 Continuous Tasks: Serial Reaction and Tracking
states of low arousal and lack of alertness.
Perhaps the first demonstration of the im-
portance of arousal in affecting vigilance
performance was that of Mackworth (1950).
He found that the characteristic decline or
decrement in vigilance performance that oc-
curs during the course of a long session
could be reduced, or even eliminated, by the
administration of the arousing drug am-
phetamine or by a telephone call half-way
through the task.
Since several reviews of the literature are
available (e.g. Broadbent 1978, Hockey
1979), no detailed examination of the find-
ings seems necessary here. In general terms,
noise tends to impair vigilance performance
when the task is relatively complex due to a
high signal rate or to the presence of more
than one signal source. On the other hand,
detection performance on simple vigilance
tasks is often improved under noise condi-
tions. The importance of task complexity
was demonstrated by Jerison (1957, 1959),
using the Mackworth clock task in which oc-
casional double jumps of the second hand
must be detected. Noise had no effect on
performance when one clock was used, but
did impair performance when three clocks
were used.
The question of what effects noise has on
performance depends to quite an extent on
the level of arousal of the subjects in the
control group who receive either no noise or
low intensity noise. Mullin and Corcoran
(1977) compared the effects of noise on vi-
gilance performance of subjects doing the
task at 0800 and 2000. They discovered that
intense noise produced a substantial im-
provement in performance in the morning,
but had no discernible effect in the evening.
In view of the time of-day research dis-
cussed in Chap. 7, it is reasonable to assume
that the subjects were less aroused in the
morning than in the evening; their under-
aroused morning state enabled noise to fa-
cilitate performance.
The evidence suggests that the length of
the vigilance session is a relevant factor. By
and large, there are usually more pro-
nounced effects of noise on performance
157
towards the end of the session. While the
reasons for this are not altogether clear, it is
likely that noise produces progressively less
arousal, stress and distraction over time as
habituation occurs.
Early work in this area focussed on the ef-
fects of noise on the number of signals de-
tected. However, it is obvious that valuable
information is lost if the number of occa-
sions on which a signal is reported in its ab-
sence (i.e. the false alarm rate) is ignored.
An appropriate method of combining infor-
mation about signal detections and false
alarms was proposed several years ago by
signal detection theorists, who distin-
guished between sensitivity to external stim-
uli and the response criterion. Broadbent
and Gregory (1965) found that noise re-
duced the number of detections associated
with a high false alarm rate (i.e. a risky crite-
rion of report), the state of affairs usually
found in vigilance tasks having high signal
rates. In contrast, noise did not reduce (or
even increased) the detection rate with low
signal rates, which are associated with low
levels of false alarms (i.e. a cautious criteri-
on). Broadbent and Gregory attributed
these effects to a change in the decision
mechanism rather than the sensitivity to sig-
nals; basically, in a noisy environment, sub-
jects make less use of intermediate catego-
ries of confidence in reporting whether or
not a signal is present.
8.2 Continuous Tasks: Serial Reaction
and Tracking
One of the prevalent assumptions about
noise is that it increases the propensity to
momentary attentional lapses. As a result,
there has been considerable interest in ob-
serving the effects of noise on tasks placing
continuous processing demands on the sub-
ject. Probably the best known of such tasks
is the five-choice serial reaction task devel-
oped by Leonard (1959) in an explicit at-
tempt to provide a sensitive method of ex-
158 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
amining stress effects. A new stimulus ap-
pears as soon as the correct response has
been made to the previous stimulus, and the
task lasts for 30 min or so. When the task is
used under normal conditions there are
three major effects over time: (I) the num-
ber of errors increases progressively, (2) the
number of very long response times (usually
known as 'gaps') goes up and (3) the average
rate of work remains unchanged. Since gaps
and errors can both be regarded as reflect-
ing a transient inefficiency in processing, we
may simply conclude that the task is per-
formed less efficiently over time.
There is a characteristic pattern of the ef-
fects of intense noise on performance of the
five-choice serial reaction task. Noise typi-
cally has no effect on the rate of work but
does produce increased errors, especially
towards the end of the experimental session.
These results have been obtained several
times (e.g. Broadbent 1953, 1957; Hartley
and Carpenter 1974, Wilkinson 1963). In ad-
dition, it has sometimes been found that
white noise increases the number of gaps
towards the end of the session.
Hartley (1973) argued that there were two
possible reasons why noise has its greatest
detrimental effect at the end of the experi-
ment. The first is that prolonged perform-
ance of the task makes subjects more sus-
ceptible to the effects of noise, and the sec-
ond is that it is simply the exposure to noise
that produces adverse effects on subjects'
internal states. These factors can be disen-
tangled by initially exposing subjects either
to the serial reaction task alone or to noise
alone. When this was done, Hartley found
that prior task performance and previous
exposure to noise both contributed inde-
pendently to the subsequent impairment of
performance in noise.
In general terms, it has been established
fairly conclusively that many of the effects
of noise on performance of the serial reac-
tion task are mediated by the arousal sys-
tem. Important confirmation of this posi-
tion comes from studies showing that the ef-
fects of noise and of sleep deprivation (basi-
cally a state of low arousal) typically cancel
each other out when they are applied togeth-
er. Corcoran (I 962a) found that white noise
reduced the number of gaps in sleep-de-
prived subjects, whereas Wilkinson (1963)
discovered that sleep-deprived subjects
were less prone to errors when exposed to
noise. A further finding that is consistent
with an arousal-based explanation of noise
effects was also obtained by Wilkinson
(1963), who observed that incentives im-
proved performance to a greater extent
in conditions of quiet than in noisy con-
ditions.
Such findings led Hockey (1979) to the
following conclusion: "Sleep loss impairs
efficiency by reducing the level of arousal
below that which is required by the task; in-
centive increases arousal level from a point
below the optimal level to the optimum;
while noise decreases efficiency by produc-
ing too high an arousal level in the subject"
(p. 151). There is some merit in this view-
point, but it has difficulty in explaining the
fact that while the effects of noise and sleep
loss on arousal are opposite, both stressors
are similar in that their adverse effects on
performance typically occur towards the
end of long sessions. As Broadbent (1971)
pointed out, such findings suggest the exist-
ence of two arousal systems. Sub-or supra-
optimal arousal in the first arousal system
can be compensated for by efficient func-
tioning of the second system, but this sec-
ond system becomes progressively less effi-
cient as time on task increases.
Whereas Broadbent's formulation clearly
explains why noise impairs performance
late on in a task, Hockey's ideas seem to
lead to the prediction that noise-related per-
formance decrements should be most likely
when noise has the greatest impact on
arousal level. This is at the beginning of the
task session, before adaptation to the noise
stimulus has occurred.
Research with the continuous serial reac-
tion task has apparently demonstrated that
noise can increase the number of instants of
inefficiency. However, Poulton (1977) has
claimed that the detrimental effects of noise
on this task are due to the fact that noise

masks auditory cues and thus provides rela-
tively impoverished feedback to subjects in
the noise condition. This is a meretricious
proposal, which has been convincingly re-
futed by Broadbent (1978). In any case,
there are findings using different paradigms
that also point to the existence of increased
transient inefficiency under intense noise
conditions. Broadbent (1978) observed that
visual tracking tasks place essentially con-
tinuous demands on the subject and dis-
cussed four studies in which noise produced
inferior levels of performance.
8.3 Learning and Memory
The most celebrated study on the relation-
ship between arousal and memory was car-
ried out by Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1963).
They asked their subjects to concentrate
carefully on a list of paired associates, and
they recorded skin resistance during list
presentation so that each subject's items
could be assigned to a high- or low-arousal
category. There was a dramatic interaction
between arousal and retention interval, with
low-arousal items being much better re-
called than high-arousal items at short re-
tention intervals (up to several minutes),
with the reverse occurring at the long reten-
tion intervals.
Research on the effects of noise on mem-
ory has typically produced a broadly similar
interaction between arousal and length of
the retention interval. It has definitely
been established that intense noise at input
improves long-term retention but rather less
consistent findings have emerged from a
consideration of short-term retention. Ber-
lyne et al. (1965) found inferior immediate
recall of paired associates presented in
white noise, but recall after 24 h was better
for those items. Somewhat different results
were obtained by Berlyne et al. (1966); they
found no effect of white noise at immediate
recall, but there was a facilitatory effect of
noise on recall 1 day later. These results re-
Learning and Memory 159
fer to the condition in which bursts of white
noise were presented concurrently with the
paired associates; Berlyne et al. (1966) also
found that there was no effect of white noise
on long-term recall when the noise bursts
were presented slightly after each paired as-
sociate. This suggests that noise affects
long-term retention by virtue of its effects
on attentional processes at the time of input.
In other work, McLean (1969) found that
noise impaired immediate recall, but im-
proved long-term recall; the significant in-
teraction between noise conditions and
length of the retention interval was due
largely to the superior performance under
low-noise conditions at immediate recall.
Berlyne and Carey (1968) did not measure
immediate retention, but white noise at in-
put resulted in superior retention a day
later. In a free recall study, Haveman and
Farley (1969) obtained a significant interac-
tion between noise conditions and retention
interval, with better recall of noise than of
control items after one day but not immedi-
ately.
In view of the inconsistent effects of noise
on short-term retention, it is instructive to
consider the data of Hamilton et al. (1972).
They pointed out that the order in which
paired associates are tested usually differs
randomly from the order in which they are
presented for learning. When they arranged
matters so that the pairs were tested in the
same order as they had been presented, the
usual adverse effect of noise on immediate
recall was replaced by a substantial im-
provement (see Fig. 8.1). This implies that
the typically poor immediate recall of
paired associates learned in noise is due to
competing responses based on order infor-
mation.
Despite various inconsistencies in the da-
ta, a significant interaction between noise
conditions and length of the retention inter-
val has generally been obtained. The most
celebrated account of this interaction was
offered by Walker (1958), whose action de-
crement theory was discussed at some
length earlier in this book. For present pur-
poses, his key assumption was that high
160 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
12
....I
....I 11
<{
U
w 10 ,""
a:
/ ""
I- 9
u ,'"
w 8
a: r:I'
a:
0
U
7
~RANDOM
z 6
<{
w 5
~ rather paradoxical situation.
l' I I
QUIET
Fig. 8.1. Recall of paired associates in quiet and
in noise as a function of the order of testing.
(Hamilton et al. 1972)
arousal leads to a longer lasting active mem-
ory trace; this results in greater long-term
memory via enhanced consolidation, but re-
trieval is inhibited while the trace remains
active.
Walker's theory can certainly account for
the typical interaction between arousal con-
ditions and retention interval, but there are
many findings it cannot explain. Eysenck
(l976a) pointed out that there were at least
six free recall and three recognition studies
in which high arousal facilitated immediate
retention, a result which is inconsistent with
Walker's hypothesis. Furthermore, action
decrement theory argues that the effects of
arousal on the consolidation process are
non-specific, so that the introduction of
bursts of loud noise after the presentation of
the to-be-learned material should produce
effects comparable to those obtained when
the bursts accompany stimulus presenta-
tion. We have already seen that the evidence
does not support this prediction (e.g. Ber-
lyne et al. 1966).
The failure of Walker's theory means that
we must consider alternative hypotheses.
Hockey (1979) has argued for an attentional
interpretation: "An arousing stimulus, or an
increase in the tonic level of arousal, is asso-
ciated with greater attention at the time of
presentation. This would certainly result in
stronger registration and make items more
resistant to decay or interference over time.
As I have indicated, effects on immediate re-
,D FIXED call are ambiguous" (p. 156). While an at-
,," ORDER tentional account is reasonable, Hockey
went on to argue that noise leads to en-
hanced physical processing and reduced se-
mantic processing. Since long-term reten-
tion is typically much better after semantic
processing than non-semantic processing
ORDER
(Craik and Lockhart 1972), we are left with a
An alternative theoretical approach
would be to emphasize the fact that the en-
NOISE
codings formed under noise conditions
seem to contain less contextual information
than those formed in quiet conditions
(Hockey and Hamilton 1970, Davies and
Jones, 1975). In other words, encodings pro-
duced in noise conditions may be simple
and based primarily on the to-be-learned
stimulus material, whereas encodings pro-
duced in quiet may be more complex and
may include much more contextual infor-
mation that is only tangentially related to
the to-be-learned material. According to the
encoding specificity principle (Tulving
1979), the probability of successful retrieval
of a stored item "is a monotonically increas-
ing function of informational overlap be-
tween the information present at retrieval
and the information stored in memory"
(p. 408). Especially at long retention inter-
vals, it is plausible to assume that the infor-
mation present at retrieval will relate direct-
ly to the stimulus material presented for
learning rather than to purely contextual in-
formation. Thus the overlap between stored
and retrieval information will be greater for
noise encodings, producing enhanced long-
term retention.
Memory theorists who have drawn a dis-
tinction between short-term and long-term
processes or stores have usually envisaged
short-term storage as lasting for a matter of
a few seconds and involving attentional and
rehearsal processes (e.g. Aktkinson and
Shiffrin 1968). A re-conceptualization of the
construct of the 'short-term store' was of-
fered by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Ac-
cording to their model (discussed in
Chap. 3), the concept of the 'short-term

store' should be replaced by that of 'work-
ing memory'; the working memory system
comprises a central work space of limited
capacity together with a peripheral articula-
tory loop.
Most of the available evidence suggests
that intense white noise reduces the capacity
of the short-term store or working memory.
In unpublished work, Wilkinson compared
immediate serial recall of digit strings pre-
sented under 70-db or 90-db noise condi-
tions. He found that recall was inversely re-
lated to noise intensity. Hamilton et al.
(1977) tested the running memory span. The
technique they used involved presenting a
set of items of indeterminate length; when
the sequence is interrupted, the subject at-
tempts to recall as many of the most recently
presented items as possible in their correct
order. Noise was found to reduce running
memory span.
Hamilton et al. (1977) obtained addition-
al relevant information in a further experi-
ment. They used a letter transformation task
in which two factors were manipulated: the
amount of transformation and the number
of letters (between one and four) requiring
transformation. It is plausible to assume
that the demands on working memory inten-
sify progressively as the number ofletters re-
quiring transformation increases. In line
with the research already discussed, intense
noise improved performance when the de-
mands on working memory were minimal
but impaired performance considerably
when several letters had to be transformed.
We have seen that noise characteristically
reduces the capacity of working memory. It
is still necessary to answer the question as to
whether the adverse effect of noise is pri-
marily on the central processor or the articu-
latory loop. A related question is whether or
not the effects of noise on working memory
are typical of all arousers. Poulton (1977,
1978, 1979) has argued that noise has rather
specific effects due to the fact that it pro-
vides an auditory input. He claimed that the
short-term retention data can be accounted
for in terms of acoustic masking slowing
down the rate of rehearsal. While this notion
Learning and Memory 161
has a certain degree of plausibility, Broad-
bent (1978) quite properly pointed out that
rehearsal seems to involve an articulatory
rather than an acoustic code, and so there is
no reason why noise should disrupt rehear-
sal in a direct manner. However, it remains
an attractive possibility that people exposed
to white noise literally 'cannot hear them-
selves think'. As a consequence, they may
sub-articulate to an increased extent in or-
der to compensate for the acoustic impair-
ment produced by the noise. In other words,
the acoustic nature of noise exerts an indi-
rect influence on the process of rehearsal by
increasing its importance as a storage mech-
anism.
Some interesting findings were obtained
by Dornic (1975), who postulated a lower
storage mechanism relying mainly on physi-
cal features and a higher storage mechanism
involving identification of stimuli according
to their names or meaning. He discovered
that white noise was associated with reason-
able retention of order information but with
poor item retention. He interpreted these
findings by suggesting that noise led to in-
creased use of the lower, more rudimentary
storing mechanism; in other words, noise
led to 'parrotting back'.
A further experiment by Dornic (1975)
may provide some insight into what is hap-
pening here. Short strings of items were pre-
sented for immediate recall either on their
own or while subjects were concurrently
performing a visual task making demands
on the capacity of the central processor. Re-
call of item information, but not of order in-
formation, was reduced in the presence of
the visual task, indicating that retention of
order information makes relatively small
demands on central processing capacity.
With respect to the noise data, the implica-
tion is that noise reduces the capacity of the
central processor that is available for task
performance, and this leads to increased re-
liance on the relatively undemanding articu-
latory loop.
If retention of information in the correct
order depends mainly on use of the articula-
tory loop, then there are other studies sup-
162 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
porting the notion that there is greater utili-
zation of the articulatory loop in the noise
state. Several investigators, including Hock-
ey and Hamilton (1970), Hamilton et al.
(1972), Daee and Wilding (1977) and Millar
(1979), have found that noise facilitates or-
dered recall.
The hypothesis that noise increases use of
the articulatory loop can be tested by em-
ploying articulatory suppression (e.g. rapid
repetition of a monosyllabic word such as
'the') in order to prevent the articulatory
loop being used to process to-be-Iearned in-
formation. Wilding and Mohindra (unpub-
lished) compared ordered recall of a fixed
set of letters presented in several different
orders under two levels of white noise.
When phonemically confusable letters were
used, the more intense level of white noise
improved recall under normal non-suppres-
sion conditions. Under suppression condi-
tions, however, there was no effect of noise
intensity, presumably because greater use of
the articulatory loop with intense white
noise was no longer possible. The picture is
complicated by the results of Millar (1979),
who found that the advantage of intense
white noise on ordered recall was actually
greater under suppression than non-sup-
pression conditions.
While there is plenty of evidence suggest-
ing that the articulatory loop is more exten-
sively used under noise conditions, closer
examination indicates that some qualifica-
tions are in order. It seems to be the case that
the articulatory loop is used in conditions of
intense noise irrespective of whether or not
the initial learning instructions emphasize
serial recall; in contrast, the articulatory
loop is mainly used in quiet conditions
when the task conditions indicate that order
information must be retained.
In general terms, noise usually leads to in-
creased reliance on the articulatory loop.
What about the effects of noise on the cen-
tral work space component of working
memory? Noise may sometimes alter the
balance with respect to the two components
of working memory, increasing the use of
the articulatory loop and decreasing the use
of the central processor. If so, it might be ex-
pected that noise would reduce the amount
of complex processing of, for example, a se-
mantic nature.
In one well-known study, Hormann and
Osterkamp (1966) found that white noise in-
terfered with spontaneous word categoriza-
tion in memory and thus could be said to
have reduced semantic processing. How-
ever, since the noise bursts only occurred
when the subjects were responding vocally,
it is possible that the reason why noise im-
paired semantic organization was simply
because it masked auditory feedback.
Other studies have also indicated that
noise can affect semantic analysis. Daee
and Wilding (1977) looked at free recall of
categorized word lists, and found less cate-
gorical clustering with moderate intensity
noise than with very intense noise or with
quiet. Hockey (unpublished) considered re-
tention of information from a visually pre-
sented factual passage which was accom-
panied by white noise. While immediate re-
call of names from the passage was better
following the more intense white noise, the
opposite was the case with a more semanti-
cally oriented comprehension test.
In sum, a number of studies indicate that
noise biases the system towards relatively
low-level processing (especially order inf()r-
mation and articulatory features) and away
from more complex and demanding forms
of processing (e.g. semantic). It is unfortu-
nate that the natural prediction based on
this conclusion is that noise should impair
long-term retention, whereas it actually
tends to improve it, but we have already dis-
cussed possible ways of resolving the para-
dox.
Of course, it would be rather simplistic to
assume that noise inevitably leads to more
primitive and less semantic forms of pro-
cessing. This may tend to occur when there
are relatively few constraints on processing,
but there is little evidence to support this as-
sumption when subjects are given specific
processing activities to perform. Smith and
Broadbent (1981) found that noise in-
creased free recall, but there was no interac-

tion between noise and the type of process-
ing (case, rhyme or semantic) which had to
be performed on the list words. In other ex-
periments they used the Posner task in
which subject had to decide whether two let-
ters had the same name; on positive trials
there was sometimes a physical and name
match (e.g. 'AA') and sometimes only a
name match (e.g. 'aA'). If noise led to in-
creased physical processing, it should have
facilitated performance on physical match
trials, but not on name match trials. In fact,
there was no interaction between noise and
type of trial.
What ought one to conclude about the ef-
fects of noise on processing? Smith and
Broadbent (1981) drew the following con-
clusion from the various apparently incon-
sistent findings: "The preferred strategy
may depend on the task requirements; and
if noise were to accentuate preference, this
would sometimes favour semantic and
sometimes physical encoding" (p. 140).
Such a formulation is clearly preferable to
the notion that there is a passive noise-in-
duced shift in the level of processing or use
of the articulatory loop. However, it is still
possible that the earlier generalizations of
Eysenck (1977), Broadbent (1978) and
others may have some merit when subjects
are free to select their own processing strate-
gy. Smith and broadbent's emphasis on the
effects of noise on strategy clearly allows for
fairly variable effects of noise on perform-
ance but suffers from the disadvantage that
we often have no way of predicting what
processing strategies will be selected in
noise.
III
w
u~
~~
f-Il: 0-50
«0
-ilJ..
III
wz
~ ~ 040
lrf-
Ill\!)
l\! g
z~
Fig. 8.2. Speed of recall as a func-
tion of activation level white noise ~
and response dominance. (Eysenck
1975)
Learning and Memory 163
There are a few studies which have con-
sidered whether noise affects the retrieval
process. Both Uehling and Sprinkle (1968)
and Baumeister and Kistler (1975) dis-
covered that noise bursts presented shortly
before a retention test improved perform-
ance. While this presumably reflects an
alerting function of noise, it is somewhat
perplexing that incentives have proved so
much less successful in enhancing retention
(see Chap. 5).
Eysenck (1975c) argued that the effects of
noise in focussing attention upon conceptu-
ally dominant or high-priority features of
the external environment (Broadbent 1971)
might also apply to the internal environ-
ment or memory. In broad agreement with
the notion that noise increases attentional
selectivity, he found that noise did not affect
recall speed for highly dominant or accessi-
ble information, but did reduce speed of re-
call for relatively inaccessible information,
especially among subjects who were highly
aroused prior to noise administration (see
Fig. 8.2).
Related findings were reported by Millar
(1979), who found that intense noise
speeded up high-dominance word recogni-
tion, but had no effect on low-dominance
word recognition. He concluded as follows:
"Facilitated retrieval of high-dominance
material permits a loose analogy between
noise influence upon stimulus selection
from the external environment where simi-
lar, highly dominant or high-priority stimu-
lus features have enhanced probability of
selection in the stressor's presence. The data
also support Eysenck's point that the retrie-
060
..- .... HIGH ACTIVATION:
NO NOISE
- HIGH ACTIVATION
NOISE
0-0 LOW ACTIVATION:
NO NOISE
0-·-0 LOW ACTIVATION:
030 NOISE
f~__,,________~,___
HIGH LOW
DOMINANCE
164 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
val process may be vulnerable to changes in
arousal and that the probability of such in-
fluence should be accounted for in other
aspects of memory research" (p. 236).
Smith and Broadbent (unpublished) have
recently discovered that the precise effects
of noise on retrieval depend on such factors
as the immediately previous experiences of
the subjects and the procedural details.
Their data suggested that noise affected the
selection of a retrieval strategy in various
complex ways.
8.4 Attentional Selectivity
Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis, which was
discussed in Chap. 4, can be construed as
claiming that high arousal leads to in-
creased attentional selectivity. This hypo-
thesis can most readily be evaluated by us-
ing a dual-task paradigm in which subjects
perform a main or high-priority task and a
secondary or low-priority task during the
same period of time. Two main variants of
this basic paradigm have been used in noise
studies: (I) the main task involves intention-
allearning, whereas the subsidiary task in-
volves incidental learning and (2) the main
task is visual tracking and the subsidiary
task is a simple visual or auditory task.
There is a fundamental difference between
these two experimental approaches: in the
first, the subjects are not aware that there is
a subsidiary task on which their perform-
ance will be assessed, whereas they are in-
formed in the second approach.
Work on the effects of noise on concur-
rent intentional and incidental learning was
initiated by Hockey and Hamilton (1970).
They found that intense noise did not affect
ordered recall of words (main task) but did
have a detrimental effect on incidental re-
tention of the spatial locations at which the
words had appeared (subsidiary task).
These findings were subsequently replicat-
ed by Davies and Jones (1975). O'MaUey
and Poplawsky (1971) gave their subjects a
serial learning task under no noise, 75-db
85-db or 100-db noise conditions, and inci-
dental learning involved additional words
in small, light print presented in the peri-
phery of vision. There was no effect of noise
on serial learning (main task), but incidental
recall was less than half as high under 85-db
or 100-db compared to no noise or 75-db.
In more recent work, Hockey et al.
(unpublished) asked subjects to read and
memorize one passage of prose that was in-
terleaved with a second, irrelevant passage.
When the passage was read in intense noise,
recognition memory for the attended mes-
sage (i.e. main task) improved, but there was
no effect of noise on recognition memory
for the rejected passage (i.e. subsidiary
task). Cohen and Lezak (1977) presented
nonsense syllables and slides of people en-
gaged in various activities at the same time
in quiet or with intermittent indistinguish-
able sounds presented at 95-db. Subjects
were simply told to learn the nonsense syl-
lables for free recall. There was no effect of
noise on the primary free recall task, but
noise reduced recognition memory for the
slides (subsidiary task).
There is an impressive consistency about
the results from these five studies. The mo-
dal pattern (which was obtained in four of
the studies) is of noise having no effect on
the main task but impairing performance on
the subsidiary task. This pattern of results
can be interpreted by arguing that noise in-
creases the cost in terms of attentional re-
sources associated with adequate perform-
ance of the primary task. However, since the
task instructions did not refer to the inciden-
tal learning task, poor incidental learning
does not necessarily reflect reduced spare
processing capacity.
Research in which a visual tracking main
task was used has produced somewhat in-
consistent findings. In one such study
(Hockey 1970a), subjects performed a pri-
mary pursuit-tracking task while concur-
rently monitoring an array of six lights for
flashes. Intense white noise improved per-
formance of the main task but had no effect
on the subsidiary task.

In further work, Hockey (1970b) used the
same pursuit-tracking and light-monitoring
tasks but manipulated the distribution of
signals across light sources. When the lights
were unbiased (i.e. there was an equal prob-
ability of each light being illuminated),
noise led to improved tracking but to a de-
crement in monitoring. When the lights
were biased, noise improved tracking but
had no effect on monitoring. Unfortunately
Forster and Grierson (1978) were unable to
replicate these results in a series of four ex-
periments, but they used less intense noise
than Hockey had done.
Hartley (1981) attempted to replicate the
findings of Hockey (1970b) using a biased
distribution of lights. Hartley found that
noise reduced tracking performance, al-
though the adverse effect of noise did di-
minish over time. The findings with respect
to the light-monitoring task were very simi-
lar to those of Hockey: there was no overall
effect of noise, but the advantage in terms of
speed of responding to central rather than
peripheral lights was enhanced under noise
conditions.
Bell (1978) also used a pursuit-tracking
task as the main task, but the secondary task
required the subject to indicate whether
each in a series of two-digit numbers was
less than or greater than the preceding num-
ber.White noise at 95-db did not alter the
amount of time on target in the tracking task
but produced more errors on the number
task.
A similar task was conducted by Finkel-
man and Glass (1970), in which the main
task was tracking a visual input and the sub-
sidiary task involved short-term memory.
Unpredictable noise bursts at 80-db had no
effect on the main task but impaired per-
formance on the subsidiary task. In con-
trast, predictable bursts did not affect either
task. Perhaps unpredictable bursts make
greater demands on the processing system
than predictable bursts, as Finkelman and
Glass concluded : "The use of a subsidiary
task measure of reserve mental capacity pro-
vided support for the hypothesized reduc-
tion in information processing load asso-
Attentional Selectivity 165
ciated with the occurrence of unpredictable
noise in contrast to predictable noise ...
The effort involved in noise habituation
contributes to the loading of the organism's
channel capacity, so that he is less able to
cope with other environmental demands
and expectations, for example, a subsidiary
task" (p. 213).
These tracking studies indicate that in-
tense noise produces a re-allocation of at-
tentional resources, so that performance on
the main task is more likely than perform-
ance on the subsidiary task to be maintained
or improved. However, some inconsisten-
cies emerge when a more detailed analysis
of the findings is carried out. Tracking per-
formance was sometimes unaffected by
noise and sometimes improved; a task of
relatively long duration is usually required
in order to demonstrate an enhancement ef-
fect of noise.
An unusually thorough dual-task study
was conducted by Boggs and Simon (1968).
Their primary task was a reaction-time task
that was either simple or complex, and the
subsidiary task was listening for odd-even-
odd sequences of digits. Unpredictable
bursts of white noise had no discernible ef-
fect on speed of responding on the main
task but produced a very substantial in-
crease in errors on the subsidiary task. Of
most interest, there was an interaction be-
tween noise and complexity of the primary
task (see Fig. 8.3) in which the detrimental
effect of noise on the secondary task was
greater when the primary task was complex
and thus relatively attention demanding.
The crucial finding from these studies
that requires explanation is that intense
white noise is far more likely to impair per-
formance of the less important of two tasks
than of the more important. The simplest in-
terpretation is based on attentional selectivi-
ty in noise, and an account along these lines
was put forward by Hockey (1970b): "The
increase in selectivity with noise... thus
seems best described as an enhancement of
.attention paid to sources already being giv-
en priority with a resulting withdrawal of at-
tention from low priority sources" (p. 41).
166 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
20
:.::
If) If) 15
o::<!
01-
0::>-
~~ 10
z-
<!e
WIf)
2~ 5
If)
QUIET NOISE
Reasonable evidence that noise induces a
shift in the allocation of attention was ob-
tained by Hockey (1973) using a three-
source monitoring task. The task involved
detecting faults in any of the sources, with
faults being distributed over the three
sources in the ratio 6:3: 1. The state of any
source could be checked by pressing the ap-
propriate button. Under paced conditions,
there was an increase in the selectivity of
sampling in intense noise, i.e. the tendency
to sample the information source most like-
ly to be faulty was increased by noise.
The notion that noise produces increased
attentional selectivity but has no effect on
attentional capacity leads naturally to the
prediction that performance of the main
task should improve under intense noise,
whereas subsidiary task performance
should be impaired. In fact, noise has only
been found to improve performance on the
more important of two tasks in 5 out of a to-
tal of 17 experimental comparisons, and
even then the superiority took 30 min or
more to manifest itself.
Hockey (1978) returned to the fray with a
more general version of an attentional selec-
tivity hypothesis, according to which at least
three different patterns of results are all in-
dicative of increased selectivity: improved
main task performance combined with eith-
er no effect on, or impairment of, subsidiary
task performance, or no effect on main task
performance combined with impairment of
subsidiary task performance. However, is it
reasonable to claim that all of these patterns
COMPLEX
TASK
SIMPLE
TASK
Fig. 8.3. Errors on the subsidiary task
in quiet and in noise as a function of
the complexity of the primary task.
(Boggs and Simon 1968)
of performance are produced by the same
process of attentional selectivity? In parti-
cular, if noise merely leads to an increased
selectivity of attention, it is by no means
clear why noise sometimes impairs subsidi-
ary task performance without any compen-
satory improvement in main task perform-
ance.
A further difficulty is that it is not clear
why noise produces increased attentional se-
lectivity. Easterbrook (1959) assumed that
high arousal led to a narrowing of attention
in a rather automatic fashion. However, this
explanation leads quite directly to what one
might refer to as 'Easterbrook's paradox':
since subjects attend more and more exclu-
sively to task cues as arousal increases, it fol-
lows necessarily that the more intense white
noise becomes, the less it is attended to! This
does not seem very plausible.
An alternative and preferable way of ac-
counting for the data is to argue that intense
noise reduces attentional capacity in addi-
tion to increasing attentional selectivity.
The basic assumption is that the reduced at-
tentional capacity under intense noise leads
to a voluntary shift in the allocation of the
remaining attentional resources in an at-
tempt to maintain a reasonable level of per-
formance on the main task. More specifical-
ly, some of the spare processing capacity
normally used to monitor the enviroment is
re-allocated to the main task.
This theoretical account has at least two
important advantages over the simpler at-
tentional selectivity hypothesis: (1) it pre-

dicts that noise will typically have no effect
on main task performance but will impair
secondary task performance, which is, be-
yond peradventure, the modal pattern and
(2) it suggests a reason for the increased at-
tentional selectivity found in the noise state.
According to the theoretical position ad-
vocated here, people exposed to intense
noise are only able to maintain an adequate
level of performance on most primary tasks
by utilizing more of their available process-
ing resources than would be needed in quiet
conditions. Some intriguing evidence that
any given level of performance may be
achieved at greater 'cost' to the noise-
aroused system was obtained by Dornic
(1977). He found that there was no effect of
noise on the performance of a moderately
complex closed-system-thinking task; how-
ever, self-reported effort was greater when
the task was performed in noise rather than
quiet. A more complex version of the same
task was performed less well in noise than in
quiet, but self-reported effort was the same
in both conditions. It may well be that such
results will only be obtained when attention-
ally-demanding tasks are used.
8.5 Theoretical Formulations
In recent years, there have been a number of
attempts to provide some theoretical inte-
gration for the numerous effects of noise on
performance which have been reported in
the literature. In this connection, the views
of Poulton (1977, 1978, 1979), Broadbent
(1978), and Hockey (1979) are of particular
interest and importance. These three theo-
retical positions will be considered in the re-
mainder of this chapter.
8.5.1 Poulton (1977,1978,1979)
While Poulton has put forward his ideas
concerning the effects of noise on perform-
ance in several different publications, the
Theoretical Formulations 167
emphasis here will be on the detailed theory
which he suggested in 1979. He began by ar-
guing that any satisfactory theory must be
able to explain the fact that continuous
noise can either improve or degrade per-
formance. Quintessentially, Poulton (1979)
claimed that there are two major effects of
noise: (1) there is masking of acoustic feed-
back and inner speech and (2) there is an in-
crease in the level of arousal. The masking
effect of intense noise will produce a per-
formance decrement on any task in which
acoustic information is necessary for suc-
cessful performance, whereas the arousing
effect of intense noise always enhances per-
formance. However, as a result of adapta-
tion, the arousal produced by noise de-
creases gradually, and there is a concomit-
ant reduction in the beneficial effect of
noise on task performance.
The main thrust of the theory was pithily
expressed by Poulton (1979) in the follow-
ing words: "An experimenter who wishes to
find a reliable deterioration in continuous
noise should select a task that is susceptible
to masking ... An experimenter who wishes
to find a reliable improvement in continu-
ous noise should select a task that responds
well to arousal but is not susceptible to
masking" (p. 363).
Before considering in more detail the way
in which noise allegedly affects perform-
ance on specific tasks, it is worth noting that
Poulton attached s,ome importance to the
notion of asymmetrical negative transfer,
which he claimed explains why noise does
not always have a detrimental effect on per-
formance when it is expected to do so. The
idea is that subjects may be forced to use a
relatively inefficient task strategy in noise
conditions and may then inappropriately
transfer that strategy when performing the
task in quiet.
Poulton suggested that the detrimental ef-
fects of noise on tasks such as the five-
choice continuous serial reaction task, visu-
al tracking and vigilance could all be ex-
plained quite straightforwardly. The appar-
atus commonly used with all of these tasks is
of such a type that responding by the subject
168 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
produces an audible click or other sound.
This acoustic feedback provides useful in-
formation to the subject but is unavailable
under conditions of intense noise because of
masking. The adverse effects of masking on
performance are counteracted initially by
the state of high arousal created by the
noise. After the subject has spent more time
on the task, however, the level of arousal
falls back towards the resting level, and then
the negative effects of masking become ap-
parent.
Poulton explained the detrimental effects
of noise on the storage of words in working
memory along similar lines. He drew a dis-
tinction between a relatively long-lasting
sensory or echoic form of storage and a
shorter lasting articulatory form of storage
requiring more frequent rehearsal. He ar-
gued that noise interferes with sensory stor-
age and thus forces the subject to resort to
articulatory storage. This necessary shift in
processing strategy under noise conditions
means that less capacity is available for ad-
ditional processing.
The assumption that high arousal always
tends to enhance performance is supported
by some of the work of Frankenhaeuser and
her associates (Frankenhaeuser 1975), ac-
cording to Poulton (1979). Frankenhaeuser
observed a consistent relationship between
good performance and excretion of adrenal-
in (an arouser) at above the median rate.
This relationship was obtained with such di-
verse tasks as learning nonsense syllables,
the Stroop test, mental arithmetic and visual
vigilance. However, elevated levels of
adrenalin excretion in these circumstances
presumably reflect high motivation and ef-
fort expenditure, and arousal produced in
this way may well differ importantly from
arousal produced by noise administration.
The theoretical position of Poulton (1979)
has now been described in some detail. How
adequately does he account for the major ef-
fects of noise on performance? That ques-
tion can best be answered by considering
Poulton's main theoretical assumptions one
at a time. The assumption that noise has a
masking effect is undoubtedly true, but it is
extremely doubtful whether all of the detri-
mental effects of noise on performance can
be explained in such simple terms. As
Broadbent (1978) has pointed out, practical-
ly all of the major studies incorporate var-
ious controls and checks against artefacts
such as masking effects. For example, the
usual practice has been to use a low level of
masking noise in the quiet or control condi-
tion, so that acoustic cues from the appara-
tus would not be available even to subjects
in the control condition.
In many cases, it is not clear how acoustic
feedback could prove useful to subjects run
in quiet. Consider as an example the consist-
ent finding that noise increases the inci-
dence of errors on the five-choice continu-
ous serial reaction task. It is undeniable that
each response makes a sound and thus pro-
vides acoustic feedback; however, since er-
ror responses make the same sound as cor-
rect responses, it is difficult to see how such
feedback could be used to improve perform-
ance.
Perhaps the strongest evidence against
the notion that virtually all of the adverse ef-
fects of noise on performance can be
ascribed to masking comes from several
studies in which deterioration of perform-
ance on one part of a task is accompanied by
improvement on another part, in spite of
the fact that acoustic cues are the same in
both cases. For example, Boggs and Simon
(1968) found that noise worsened perform-
ance of an auditory task when it was per-
formed in conjunction with a difficult visual
choice reaction task, but not when it was
performed with an easy choice reaction
task. Since any acoustic masking in noise
should have applied equally to both ver-
sions of the choice reaction task, the ob-
tained pattern of results is difficult for Poul-
ton to explain. Broadbent (1978) considers
several more studies in which an interpreta-
tion of the basic findings in terms of acous-
tic masking is untenable.
One of Poulton's (1979) other major the-
oretical assumptions was expressed by him
in the following way: "While performing a
task, increased physiological arousal is as-

sociated with improvements in perform-
ance" (p. 367). In view of the overwhelming
evidence that arousers such as heat, incen-
tives and stimulant drugs all impair per-
formance under some circumstances, this is
a very dubious assumption. Consider as an
example the effects of arousal on the five-
choice continuous serial reaction task. Ac-
cording to Poulton (1979), noise degrades
performance on this task by means of acous-
tic masking. However, heat has also been
found to increase errors on this task (e.g.
Poulton and Edwards 1974), and similar re-
sults have been obtained under conditions
of very high incentive (Willett 1964b). Since
heat and incentives obviously do not pro-
duce acoustic masking, common sense indi-
cates that the equivalent effects of noise,
heat and incentives on this task are mediat-
ed by supra-optimal levels of arousal.
Another unequivocal refutation of the as-
sumption that high arousal always enhances
performance is available in studies using the
dual-task paradigm. The less important of
the two concurrent tasks is nearly always
detrimentally affected by high arousal (Eas-
terbrook 1959).
All in all, Poulton's theory must be reject-
ed. Noise does produce acoustic masking,
but very few of the available findings can be
explained properly in terms of masking.
Noise does produce elevated arousal, but
the further assumption that all of the effects
of high arousal on performance are benefi-
cial is erroneous. Since the two major theo-
retical assumptions are erroneous, the the-
ory as a whole cannot be adequate.
8.5.2 Broadbent (1978)
Broadbent (1978) argued that three import-
ant harmful effects of noise on skilled per-
formance have been clearly identified. The
first of these is a reduction in the detection
of visual signals that are reported with risky
cirteria of judgement; this finding has
emerged from studies of vigilance. The sec-
ond detrimental effect of noise is an in-
crease in the number of brief moments of in-
Theoretical Formulations 169
efficiency; the evidence for this comes from
studies using the five-choice continuous
serial reaction task, in which noise increases
the number of errors and gaps but has no ef-
fect on the speed of working. The third ad-
verse effect of noise is to produce concentra-
tion on some parts of a complex display at
the expense of others; perhaps the most di-
rect support for this contention comes from
studies using the dual-task methodology, in
which performance on a low-priority or sub-
sidiary task is much more likely to be wors-
ened in noise than performance on a high-
priority task.
At a more speculative level, Broadbent
(1978) wondered whether these three sepa-
rate effects of noise might in fact be dynami-
cally interrelated. For example, the prepo-
tent effect of the state of high arousal in-
duced by noise may be that information
from a smaller area of the environment is se-
lected and attended to. As a consequence of
this funnel vision effect, environmental in-
formation may be selected or rejected in a
more emphatic manner in the noise state,
and this might reduce the number of quali-
fied or doubtful decisions made by the sub-
ject. If the amount of information processed
at any moment is very small in noise condi-
tions, then an attentional shift away from
task stimuli would produce unequivocal evi-
dence of inefficiency of any task requiring
continuous performance (e.g. visual track-
ing or continuous serial reaction).
Broadbent also considered the detrimen-
tal effects of noise on verbal memory. He re-
jected the idea that these effects were due to
masking of internal speech (Poulton 1977),
pointing out that there is good evidence in-
dicating that visually presented verbal mate-
rial is not recoded into a form in which it
would be susceptible to acoustic masking.
In Broadbent's (1978) own words, "Internal
speech is not masked by noise; it is a motor
pattern, not a senSJry one" (p. 1062).
As an alternative, Broadbent speculated
that the articulatory loop component of
working memory might be extensively used
when subjects were in the noise state. This
increased use of rehearsal can be seen as a
170 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
matter of "talking to oneself at all costs"
(p. 1062). We saw earlier in the chapter that
for whatever reason, noise often produces
greater reliance on the articulatory loop in
verbal memory tasks.
Broadbent has undoubtedly identified
many of the major effects of intense noise
on performance. However, it seems likely
that a further effect of noise that was not
stressed by him is to produce a reduction in
the total processing resources available. As
we argued previously, if there is simply a
funnel vision effect (i.e. increased attention-
al selectivity), then noise should typically
improve performance on the main task at
the expense of the subsidiary task. Since the
modal result is that noise impairs subsidiary
task performance but has no effect on pri-
mary task performance, the obvious inter-
pretation is that equivalent primary task
performance in noise and in quiet has been
achieved at greater 'cost' in the noise state.
In other words, it may be preferable to ac-
count for the dual-task findings in terms of
an active re-allocation of reduced resources
rather than in terms of a relatively automatic
increase in attentional selectivity.
8.5.3 Hockey (1979)
Hamilton et al. (1977) and Hockey (1979)
have recently proposed an interesting theo-
retical framework for noise research. While
they make several important points, their
most crucial theoretical assumption con-
cerns the balance between speed of process-
ing and the capacity of a transient short-
term store or working memory. More speci-
fically, they argued that speeded operations
and rapid action are most readily achieved
when the short-term store is not overloaded
with information, and conversely short-term
storage capacity is maximal when there is no
great impulsion to action. In other words,
there may be a trade-off or inverse relation-
ship between the ability to process at high
speed and the capacity to store information
transiently.
According to Hockey (1979), many of the
effects of arousers on performance can be
incorporated within this conceptualization.
Largely on the basis of noise research, he
suggested the following hypothesis: "Low
arousal is a suitable state for using storage
and a poor one for speed; high arousal is
poor for storage and good for speed. The
Yerkes-Dodson Law is but a gross over-sim-
plification of this shift in the balance of ef-
fectiveness of the different processing re-
sources to the person" (p. 168). In this con-
text, 'storage' means working or operational
memory.
The ideal method of testing this hypothe-
sis is obviously to construct a series of relat-
ed tasks that differ in terms of the demands
they make on processing speed and storage
capacity. This was done by Hamilton et al.
(1977) who devised a total of 16 versions of a
letter transformation task. In the simplest
version of the task, subjects only had to indi-
cate the letter immediately following a given
letter (e.g. 'F + 1 = G'). The task can be
changed by varying the number of letters re-
quiring transformation between one and
four (e.g. 'MWER + 1 = NXFS'), and ~ot
allowing the subject to respond until all of the
letters have been transformed. The task can
also be changed by varying the size of the
required transformation (1, 2, 3 or 4 letters).
The results conform to the Yerkes-Dod-
son Law, in that high arousal in the form of
noise tended to improve performance on the
simpler version of the task but to worsen
performance on the more difficult versions.
However, it is much more revealing to note
that noise enhanced performance by ap-
proximately 10% on those tasks where the
primary emphasis was on processing speed
(i.e. one-letter tasks), but it slowed down
performance speed by almost 20% on tasks
making substantial demands on working
memory (i.e. three- and four-letter tasks).
Hockey (personal communication) has
recently used the same letter transformation
task but this time under conditions requir-
ing the subject to transform each letter out
loud. In addition, the letters are presented
sequentially, and the subject presses a but-
ton after he or she has processed a letter in

order to see the next letter. The total pro-
cessing time per letter can be divided into
three separate successive stages: (1) be-
tween presentation of the letter and the on-
set of transformation (2) transformation
time and (3) storage time between the end of
the transformation and the presentation of
the next letter. Noise speeds up the rate of
transformation but slows down the subse-
quent storage time. In some unspecified
way, noise appears to disrupt some of the or-
ganizational skills involved in task perform-
ance.
The general notion that noise reduces
short-term holding capacity receives sup-
port from studies on digit span (Wilkinson
unpublished) and running memory span
(Hamilton et al. 1977). However, while the
additional assumption that noise increases
the speed of processing is intuitively reason-
able, the evidence in its favour is less than
compelling. The five-choice continuous
serial reaction task places the emphasis very
much on performance speed, and yet noise
typically has no discernible effect on the
speed of working on that task. It may be that
subjects run in quiet conditions allocate ex-
tra resources in order to comply with the ex-
plicit or implicit requirement to perform as
rapidly as possible.
The typical failure of noise to alter pro-
cessing rate can also be interpreted in terms
of the distinction between resource-limited
and data-limited processes (Norman and
Bobrow 1975). A task is resource limited if
an increase in allocated processing re-
sources enhances performance, and it is da-
ta limited when performance is independent
of changes in allocated resources. Since sub-
jects usually seem to operate at the boun-
dary between these two conditions, per-
formance speed in noise may be restricted
by data limitations. One way of attempting
to make a task resource-limied is to prolong
the work period. When Hamilton et al.
(1977) did this by requiring subjects to per-
form the one-letter transformation task with
randomly varying transformation size for
40 min, speed of performance in noise be-
came progressively faster than in quiet.
Theoretical Formulations 171
An alternative method of ascertaining the
characteristic speed of processing in the
noise state would be to require subjects to
perform a simple task (e.g. reciting the al-
phabet) at their own preferred speed. The
tempo of such processing might be much
faster in noise than in quiet.
Hockey (1979) argued that noise had ef-
fects over and above increasing the speed of
processing and reducing short-term storage
capacity. These include increased attention-
al selectivity, increased response selectivity
and a reduced use of intermediate catego-
ries of confidence. Most of these effects are
reasonably well established and have al-
ready been discussed in detail earlier in the
chapter.
In conclusion, Hockey emphasizes the
fact that the state induced by noise should
be regarded as producing only a predisposi-
tion towards certain form of mental activity
and away from others. In practical terms,
the noise-induced state will typically only
impose modest limitations on what an indi-
vidual can achive in terms of cognitive pro-
cessing. As we have stressed a number of
times in this book, an individual who dis-
covers that noise, fatigue or anxiety is im-
pairing his performance will often attempt
to rectify matters by utilizing compensatory
mechanisms. The implication for noise re-
search is that the 'natural' effects of noise on
performance will often be masked by these
compensatory mechanisms. However, the
extent to which such compensation is
needed depends upon the compatibility be-
tween the state of arousal created by noise
and the demands of task performance: the
greater the degree of compatibility, the less
effort is required of the compensatory sys-
tem.
In sum, the most interesting contribution
of Hamilton et al. (1977) and Hockey (1979)
is the idea that noise makes some kinds of
resources more available (e.g. those con-
cerned with processing speed) but makes
other kinds of resources less available (e.g.
those concerned with temporary storage of
information). While their specific sugges-
tions do not have overwhelming support,
172 Exogenous Determinants of Arousal: Noise
the basic notion that noise has differential
effects on the various component processes
involved in cognitive functioning is un-
doubtedly fruitful.
8.6 Summary
It is probably true to say that we have a
clearer picture of the effects of noise on per-
formance than of any other arouser. There
are good grounds for rejecting Poulton's in-
terpretation of noise-induced changes in
performance, but both Broadbent (1978)
and Hockey (1979) have drawn reasonable
conclusions from the available evidence.
One major issue does merit further con-
sideration, however. The notion that noise
increases attentional selectivity is often
treated as a deus ex machina, that is to say as
an unexplained and possibly inexplicable
phenomenon. However, if noise reduces the
available processing resources, then its ef-
fects on attentional selectivity could result
simply from a prudent re-allocation of the
remaining resources. This interpretation al-
so explains why noise usually degrades per-
formance of a subsidiary task without any
compensatory improvement in main task
performance.
It is interesting to compare the kinds of re-
search carried out using different arousers.
There is reasonable evidence that some of
the adverse effects of introversion and of
anxiety are attributable to increased distrac-
tibility, and yet nothing appears to be
known about distractibility in the noise
state. It may well be that some of the in-
creased error making in noise is due to high
distractibility, and the issue could easily be
investigated.
As with most other arousers, noise affects
performance largely via attentional me-
chanisms. Both the reduced attentional ca-
pacity in noise and the increased selectivity
of attention seem to play fundamental roles
in determining the behavioural conse-
quences of noise-induced arousal.
9 Conclusions and Speculations
9.1 The Yerkes-Dodson Law
In this book we have considered some of the
major effects which such variegated arous-
ers such as anxiety, introversion-extraver-
sion, incen.tives, time of day, white noise
and sleep deprivation have on performance.
To what extent are there any general themes
running through this gallimaufry of re-
search? One such theme is formed by the
Yerkes-Dodson law, which seems to have
served as the basis for much of the research
endeavour in this area. While we have been
at pains to point out that one of the law's
disadvantages is its ability to encompass
many different patterns of results with no
apparent difficulty, it is nonetheless of inter-
est that it does describe reasonably ade-
quately findings involving extremely heter-
ogenous arousers.
How can we transform the Yerkes-Dod-
son law with its purely descriptive formula-
tion of the interrelationships among several
different factors into a more explanatory
theory? One obvious strategy (and the one
followed here) is to consider in turn each of
the key constructs enshrined in the Yerkes-
Dodson law and to re-evaluate them in the
light of recent theoretical and empirical ad-
vances.
According to the Yerkes-Dodson law,
'arousal' can be regarded as a uni-dimen-
sional construct. The notion that different
levels of arousal merely represent quantita-
tive variation along some internal continu-
um has been popular for many years but is
undoubtedly erroneous. One way of assess-
ing this notion is to consider whether or not
physiological work indicates the existence
of a single arousal based system. Lacey
(1967) reviewed the evidence available at
that time and concluded that it was neces-
sary to distinguish among behavioural, au-
tonomic and cortical arousal. The main rea-
son for this was that measures of each of
these three varieties of arousal are frequent-
ly poorly related to each other.
Lacey (1967) also discussed the well-
known fact that even different measures of
the same kind of arousal often fail to agree
with each other. This seems to be especially
true of autonomic arousal or activation.
More specifically, Lacey claimed that dif-
ferent patterns of autonomic activity are
found in different task situations. All of the
major measures of autonomic activation
tend to show increased levels of activity
when the task requires active manipUlation
of information as occurs in reasoning, prob-
lem solving or mental arithmetic. In con-
trast, when the task requires attention to an
external source of information (e.g. the fore-
period of a reaction-time experiment), the
characteristic pattern is one of directional
fractionation in which heart rate decelerates
while other measures reflect enhanced auto-
nomic activity.
It seems plausible to assume that heart
rate deceleration during the foreperiod of
reaction-time tasks is related to the marked
reduction in motor activity and increased
steadiness of gaze that occur at the same
time. However, Elliott (1969) found that
heart rate decelerated on the Stroop task, in
spite of the fact that subjects were verbaliz-
ing throughout the task, and there was also
considerable evidence of motor activity.
A related conceptualization was favoured
by Pribram and McGuinness (1975). They
argued for the existence of three separate
174 Conclusions and Speculations
neural systems. The first of these systems
controls arousal; it is based in the amygdala
and is associated with phasic physiological
responses to environmental stimuli. The sec-
ond system controls activation and is de-
fined in terms of tonic physiological readi-
ness to respond; its locus is the basal ganglia
of the forebrain. The third and final system
is centred on the hippocampus and reflects
effort in the sense of activity co-ordinating
arousal and activation processes.
A clear implication of these physiological
formulations is that two or more qualitative-
ly different activation or arousal states must
be distinguished. In that case, a simple uni-
dimensional arousal construct would seem
to be doomed. However, it is worth noting
that most of the different specific arousal or
activation states which have been identified
seem to reflect fairly closely the processing
requirements of particular kinds of task.
Thus it may be reasonable to assume that
the arousal (or effort) produced by the de-
mands of some tasks differs qualitatively
from the arousal produced by the demands
of other tasks. On the other hand, arousal
produced in other ways (e.g. by intense
noise, threat of shock or stimulant drugs)
may prove to be of a general and undifferen-
tiated nature.
As we saw in Chap. 4, recent factor ana-
lytic studies of self-reported arousal have al-
so suggested that there are two or more sep-
arate arousal dimensions. At the very least,
it is clear that a purely intensive arousal di-
mension must be supplemented by a dimen-
sion reflecting hedonic tone or pleasant-
ness-unpleasantness. Thayer (1978a) argued
that there were two major independent di-
mensions within this two-dimensional
space; he referred to them as Activation Di-
mension A (ranging from energetic and vi-
gorous to sleepy and tired) and Activation
Dimension B (ranging from tense to placid
and still). Of particular importance, Thayer
discovered that time of day and physical ex-
ercise both affected Activation Dimen-
sion A more than Activation Dimension B,
whereas anxiety stress and white noise pre-
dominantly affected Activation Dimen-
sion B. It would clearly be unwise to assume
that all arousers produce broadly compar-
able effects on arousal, whether arousal is
indexed in terms of self-reported arousal or
in terms of physiological measures.
We must therefore conclude that the sim-
plistic notion of a single arousal system
must be rejected and replaced by a more
complex conceptualization. Perhaps the
most obvious division between different
varieties of arousal is that between arousal
produced as a result of the active investment
of processing resources in a performance
task and arousal produced in a more passive
way by the manipulation of non-task arous-
ers (e.g. white noise or stimulant drugs).
This distinction will be developed later in
the chapter.
The first major assumption of the Yerkes-
Dodson law is that there is an inverted-U re-
lationship between arousal and the efficien-
cy of performance, with increasing levels of
arousal first improving and then impairing
performance. A moment's reflection will in-
dicate that the notion of a single, global as-
sessment of performance efficiency is inade-
quate. Perhaps the clearest illustration is
contained in findings obtained by Hockey
(personal communication). He found that
white noise produced a substantial slowing
down of performance in that condition of
the letter transformation task in which four
letters have to be added to each of four let-
ters. In conventional terms, this simply
means that high arousal in the form of in-
tense noise reduced performance efficiency.
However, a fine-grain analysis of perform-
ance revealed a more complicated state of
affairs: noise reduced the speed with which
each letter was stored after transformation
but actually increased the speed with which
each letter was transformed.
Such findings indicate the dangers of re-
lying on an overall assessment of processing
efficiency. When only a global measure is
used, the presumption must be that arousal
has comparable effects on all of the compo-
nent processes involved in performing the
task. Since it is probable that differential ef-
fects of arousal on each task process are the

norm rather than the exception, it is mani-
fest that performance must be analyzed in
sufficient detail to permit measurement of
each of the separate stages or processes of
information processing.
There is a further, largely unrecognized,
problem that can result from paying too
much attention to a global measure of per-
formance efficiency. It is fatally easy to as-
sume that, if an arouser does not produce a
significant effect on overall task perform-
ance, this means that arousal has had no ef-
fect on internal processing of task informa-
tion. In fact, of course, any particular level
of task performance can be achieved in a
number of different ways, depending on fac-
tors such as the amount of on-task effort
and the efficiency of the various component
task processes. At the empirical level, the
clearest examples of the inadequacy of rely-
ing on a single measure of performance oc-
cur in dual-task studies (Easterbrook 1959).
The modal finding is that arousal has no
significant effect on the main or high-priori-
ty task, which suggests that arousal has min-
imal effects on processing. However, exami-
nation of subsidiary or low-priority task per-
formance typically reveals a substantial ad-
verse effect of high arousal. Whatever the
most appropriate explanation of this pat-
tern of results, it is crystal clear that the
usual procedure of evaluating the overall
impact of high arousal on a single task has
very little to recommend it.
We have seen that two of the constructs
involved in the Yerkes-Dodson law (i.e.
'arousal' and 'performance efficiency')
must be re-conceptualized in order to ac-
count for more recent findings. The third
major construct used by Yerkes and Dod-
son (1908) was 'task difficulty'; they
claimed that the optimal level of arousal
was inversely related to task difficulty. How
should we define 'task difficulty'? In their
original study, Yerkes and Dodson defined
task difficulty solely in terms of ease of dis-
crimination along a brightness dimension,
but probably no one today would subscribe
to such a narrow definition.
As a first step towards a fuller under-
The Yerkes-Dodson Law 175
standing of the notion of task difficulty, we
may distinguish between objective task dif-
ficulty and subjective task difficulty. The
difference between these two kinds of task
difficulty can be seen quite clearly if we con-
sider the effects of practice on performance
of a cognitive task: while the objective diffi-
culty of any particular task remains constant
over time, the subjective difficulty of the
task will often be markedly reduced as sub-
jects become more familiar with the skills re-
quired for successful task performance.
Task difficulty has typically been construed
as an objective characteristic of tasks, but it
seems more sensible to regard it as involving
an interaction between an individual and a
task. In other words, subjective task diffi-
culty is more psychologically relevant than
objective task difficulty.
While there are undoubtedly many rea-
sons why some tasks are regarded as more
difficult than others, it seems probable that
one major factor is the amount of attention-
al capacity required by any given task. As a
first approximation, we could argue that a
task which severely disrupts almost any
other concurrent activity is more attention-
ally demanding and thus more difficult than
another task which produces little or no dis-
ruption of concurrent processing. Of course,
one task may interfere with a second task be-
cause both tasks use the same specific pro-
cessing mechanisms (e.g. if two visual tasks
are used, the subject cannot look in two dif-
ferent directions at once), so that assessment
of the attentional demands of any given task
requires a number of dual-task experiments
in which that task is paired with each of a
disparate collection of concurrent tasks.
Perhaps the single most important de-
terminant of the attentional demands of a
task is the extent to which the task requires
temporary storage of information. Thus
within the field of mental arithmetic, it is
easier to calculate the answer to a multipli-
cation problem such as '8 x 4 = l' than to
do the same for a problem such as
'81 x 42 = 1'. Of course, the latter problem
involves more stages of processing in arriv-
ing at a solution, but the major reason that it
176 Conclusions and Speculations
is a difficult problem is that it requires sto-
rage of the products of initial processing at
the same time as active processing of the la-
ter stages of the problem. As Kahneman
(1973) pointed out, it is not strictly accurate
to assume that the attentional demands of a
task such as mental arithmetic remain con-
stant throughout task processing. While
multiplying two two-digit numbers together
is demanding, it is probable that the de-
mands only become substantial relatively
late in the course of problem solution.
In the light of our discussion so far, we
can now return to the task of attempting to
provide a theoretical underpinning for the
two assumptions incorporated into the
Yerkes-Dodson law. Why does task per-
formance characteristically improve as the
level of arousal begins to increase but wors-
en as the arousal level continues to in-
crease? The initial improvement is most
readily explained by assuming that the pro-
portion of the available processing re-
sources invested in the task increases as
arousal goes up from its basal level. This is
in essence the classic Easterbrook (1959) ex-
planation based on the notion of greater at-
tentional selectivity under high arousal.
However, there is an important difference
between the viewpoint espoused here and
that of Easterbrook. It is intuitively appeal-
ing to assume that this increased focussing
of attention on the task at moderate levels of
arousal is more probable when arousal re-
sults from incentive conditions than when it
results from stress.
In addition to increased on-task atten-
tion, moderate levels of arousal may also
speed up the rate with which simple mental
and response operations occur, especially if
people are asked to respond at their 'natu-
ral' rate or tempo rather than in conformity
with speed instructions. Kahneman (1973)
has claimed a third advantage for a moder-
ate level of arousal over the normal, resting
arousal level, namely that attentional capac-
ity is greater. While this is an intuitively ap-
pealing notion, it must be said that no com-
pelling evidence in favour of fluctuating at-
tentional capacity is as yet available.
The detrimental effects of supra-optimal
levels of arousal on performance have
usually been accounted for in a rather sim-
plistic way. Most theorists have emphasized
a single mechanism, ranging from an exces-
sive narrowing of attention (Easterbrook
1959) to attention to the arousal state rather
than to the task (Mandler 1975). Probably
the main reason for performance decre-
ments under high arousal is a reduced abili-
ty to engage in parallel or shared processing.
As a consequence, adverse effects of high
arousal on performance are most pro-
nounced on tasks requiring concurrent oper-
ations of various kinds (e.g. accessing long-
term memory, temporarily holding informa-
tion and actively processing task stimuli).
Why does this reduced ability to process
in parallel occur? There appear to be two
main possible answers: (1) there is a reduc-
tion in total attentional capacity in high
arousal, or (2) total attentional capacity is
not reduced, but a smaller proportion of at-
tentional capacity is available for task pro~
cessing. The experimental evidence is less
clear than one would like, but it does tend to
favour the latter answer. This is certainly
true when anxiety manipulations are used
but may not apply to all arousers. The fact
that distractibility tends to increase in states
of high arousal is, of course, consistent with
the idea that there is more of-task process-
ing under high than moderate levels of
arousal.
Off-task processing can involve either en-
vironmental or internal sources of informa-
tion. As Broadbent (1971) has demonstrat-
ed, some non-task environmental process-
ing under high arousal is attributable to re-
duced ability to discriminate perceptually
between task and non-task stimuli. Indeed,
it is possible that the greater distractibility
observed in states of high arousal only oc-
curs when the distracting stimuli resemble
task stimuli fairly closely.
Off-task processing of internal informa-
tion has been assumed by many theorists to
account for most, or even all, of the adverse
effects of anxiety on performance. In spite
of its popularity, this assumption has never

been properly tested, and thus remains
somewhat speculative. What needs to be
done is to find some environmental manipu-
lation that will control the incidence of ir-
relevant internal processing (e.g. worry, self-
concern, self-consciousness). One possibili-
ty would be to provide feedback indicative
offailure at certain pre-specified points dur-
ing the performance of a task. The expecta-
tion is that anxious subjects would contem-
plate the implications of their poor perform-
ance over a longer period of time after the
feedback was provided than would non-
anxious subjects, and this would be reflect-
ed in a longer performance decrement after
each feedback presentation. Furthermore, if
anxious subjects did, in fact, process the fai-
lure feedback more thoroughly than non-
anxious subjects, then they would presu-
mably subsequently remember the details of
the feedback provided better than non-anx-
ious subjects.
In sum, it is most unlikely that the curvili-
near relationship between arousal and per-
formance can be accounted for in terms of a
single mechanism or process. The beneficial
effects of moderate arousal are primarily at-
tributable to increased attentional selectivi-
ty, which leads to a greater proportion of the
available processing resources being allo-
cated to task performance. In addition, the
natural speed of processing is enhanced as
arousal increases above its resting level, and
there may be an increase in total attentional
capacity. The detrimental effects of high
arousal largely revolve around a reduced
ability to engage in shared or parallel pro-
cessing. High arousal also leads to increased
distractibility to both external and internal
informational sources and an impaired abil-
ity to make perceptual discriminations. Fi-
nally, but more speculatively, high arousal
may reduce attentional capacity.
It is now time to turn to the second as-
sumption of the Yerkes-Dodson law, name-
ly that the optimal level of arousal is inverse-
ly related to task difficulty. We have already
argued that task difficulty should be as-
sessed in terms of the demands on attention,
which in turn depend jointly on the task and
The Yerkes-Dodson Law 177
the individual subject's skills and knowl-
edge. However, it is rather complicated to
interpret the interaction between arousal
and task difficulty. The basic reason for this
is that the task itself provides a source of
arousal. The work of Kahneman and others
has shown clearly that the level of arousal is
usually higher when subjects are perform-
ing a difficult task than when they are carry-
ing out a relatively simple task. This appears
to be mainly due to the application of in-
creased effort on harder tasks, presumably
because of the greater attentional demands
which they impose.
A second complicating factor was dis-
cussed in Chap. 6. The amount of anxiety
experienced during the performance of a
task tends to be greater for difficult rather
than easy tasks. The reason for this is prob-
ably that subjects are more likely to receive
feedback indicative of failure (e.g. error
making, slow responding) when engaging in
a difficult task. Since it is known that failure
feedback produces anxiety (especially the
worry component) in a fairly direct fashion,
it is easy to see why there is a direct relation-
ship between task difficulty and experi-
enced anxiety.
The upshot of the discussion so far is that
we cannot take interactions between arousal
and task difficulty at face value. Subjects
performing difficult tasks are more aroused
and anxious than subjects performing easy
tasks, even in the absence of any arouser
such as white noise or a stimulant drug. The
conventional assumption is that subjects
performing easy and hard tasks who are ex-
posed to, for example, identical levels of
white noise are equivalently aroused. This is
probably erroneous, since task-induced
arousal increases in line with task difficulty.
Indeed, the simplest explanation of the in-
teraction between arousal and task diffi-
culty is to argue that the optimal level of
arousal is actually not lower for difficult
than for easy tasks: it merely appears so be-
cause the actual arousal level is underesti-
mated for difficult tasks.
In fact, while there is undoubtedly some
merit in the argument adumbrated in the
178 Conclusions and Speculations
last paragraph, it is still likely that there are
genuine differential effects of arousal on
tasks of varying complexity. If, as we have
assumed, arousal level is inversely related to
the capacity to engage in parallel process-
ing, then it follows that the detrimental ef-
fects of arousal should be especially severe
on tasks requiring parallel or shared pro-
cessing. In general terms, it is obvious that
tasks necessitating multiple concurrent pro-
cessing operations would usually be re-
garded as more difficult or complex than
tasks not requiring parallel processing.
Why are simple tasks so well performed
under high levels of arousal? A major rea-
son is that the natural processing rate in-
creases in line with arousal, and the empha-
sis in most simple tasks is on speed of per-
formance (Hockey 1979). On the other
hand, it could very well be argued, high
arousal leads to increased distractibility,
and so high arousal ought to disrupt the per-
formance even of simple tasks. A potentially
important finding in this connection was ob-
tained very recently by one of my students
(Jan Graydon). She used the letter transfor-
mation task (Hamilton et al. 1977) and pro-
duced distraction by presenting random let-
ters over headphones. The simple versions
of the task (Le. only one or two letters requir-
ing transformation) were virtually unaffect-
ed by distraction, whereas the more difficult
versions (i.e. three- and four-letter prob-
lems) showed a 25 % performance impair-
ment with distraction. While this finding
needs to be replicated, it is certainly intui-
tively reasonable that complex tasks involv-
ing multiple component processes operat-
ing in parallel should be more readily dis-
rupted by distraction than simple tasks in-
volving a very small number of well-learned
speeded operations.
9.2 Stages of Processing
If one is interested in the effects of arousal
on the performance of various tasks, then it
is obviously of limited interest to focus sole-
lyon the issue of whether arousal facilitates
or impairs performance. A more fruitful ap-
proach is to attempt to 'decompose' a task
into its constituent processing operations,
followed by an assessment of the effects of
arousal on each of the identifiable process-
ing operations. While few researchers work-
ing on stress and arousal have adopted this
strategy, there are various methods avail-
able for separating out the various compo-
nent processes within a task.
9.2.1 Donders' Subtraction Method
Historically, the first major attack on this
problem was the subtraction method of
Donders (1868), which can be used when
the performance of a task requires a number
of sequential processing operations. In e's-
sence, the method is based on the assump-
tion that the duration of any single process-
ing operation can be assessed by comparing
the reaction time on a version of the task re-
quiring that processing operation with a sec-
ond version of the task differing from the
first only by the deletion of the processing
operation of interest. The claim is that the
difference in total processing time in the two
conditions is equal to the duration of the
isolated processing operation. It follows
that the use of several different versions of
the task should permit the processing time
for the complete task to be sub-divided
among its constituent processes.
While the subtraction method is poten-
tially powerful, it cannot always be applied
successfully. With many tasks it is simply
not possible to reduce the processing re-
quirements in such a way that only one pro-
cessing operation is deleted. In other cases
one processing operation cannot be deleted
from an experimental task without changing
the nature of the other constituent mental
operations. Indeed, the most prevalent criti-
cism of the subtraction method is that it of-
ten produces a qualitative change in the na-
ture of the task, rather than the intended
quantitative change. However, this criticism

can sometimes be rebutted, especially if a
mathematical model of task performance is
available. If such a model assumes that sub-
traction of an operation does not change the
remaining processing operations, then it
will presumably provide a poor fit to the da-
ta if the assumption is erroneous. A final dif-
ficulty is that the subtraction method as-
sumes that processing occurs by means of a
series of sequential processing operations.
This assumption is often made even when
there is no adequate reason for rejecting the
notion that some of the processes overlap in
time.
9.2.2 S. Sternberg's Additive-Factor
Method
A more recent strategy for uncovering the
processing stages involved in a task is the
additive-factor method proposed by S.
Sternberg (1969), which resembles the sub-
traction method more than is usually recog-
nized. The additive-factor method assumes
that task processing comprises a sequence
of independent processing stages, that each
stage receives an input from the preceding
stage, transforms it and passes it on to the
next stage and, of crucial importance, that
the transformation which occurs at each
stage is independent of the duration of any
previous stage of processing. It is further as-
sumed that if an experimental manipulation
affects the speed with which a task can be
performed, then it does so only by altering
the temporal duration of one or more of the
processing stages. Finally, if two different
experimental manipulations affect two sep-
arate stages, then they will produce inde-
pendent effects on total processing time; in
other words, their effects will be additive. In
contrast, if two experimental factors exert
an interactive effect on the speed of per-
forming a task, then the implication is that
they are both affecting some common stage
of processing.
An excellent concrete example of addi-
tive-factor logic was provided by S. Stern-
berg (1969), who used a situation in which a
Stages of Processing 179
small number of items to be memorized (the
positive set) was followed by a probe; the
subject's task was to decide as rapidly as
possible whether or not the probe corre-
sponded to any of the items in the positive
set. Four experimental factors were manipu-
lated: stimulus quality, size of the positive
set, response type (positive or negative), and
relative frequency of the two response types.
Sternberg discovered that the effects of
these various factors on response time ap-
peared to be additive, thus suggesting that
all four factors were affecting different pro-
cessing stages. More specifically, he con-
cluded that stimulus quality affected the sti-
mulus-encoding stage, size of the positive
set affected the serial comparison stage, re-
sponse type affected the binary decision
stage and relative frequency affected the
stage of translation and response organiza-
tion.
While the additive-factor method has
been used extensively, it suffers from a num-
ber of inherent limitations. It does not indi-
cate the duration of any stage, it provides no
direct indication of the order in which the
processing stages occur and it also fails to
offer appropriate information for the sub-
stantive interpretation of any stage. A fur-
ther problem is that it is entirely possible for
two experimental factors to affect the same
stage and have additive effects on total pro-
cessing time, or for two factors to affect dif-
ferent processing stages and to interact;
both of these possibilities are inconsistent
with the basic logic of the additive factor
method. The assumption that two factors af-
fecting separate stages of processing have
additive effects is especially dubious if a
factor affects not only the duration of a
stage but also its output; under those cir-
cumstances, an experimental factor would
exert indirect effects on one or more stages
of processing occurring after the stage di-
rectly affected by that factor.
The subtraction method and the additive
factor method are both used in the develop-
ment of linear sequential stage models; such
models refer to what are known in contem-
porary jargon as 'bottom-up' or 'data-driv-
180 Conclusions and Speculations
en' processing systems. Models of that type
may be contrasted with those which empha-
size the individual's active control of his mo-
ment-by-moment allocation of resources
('top-down' or 'resource-driven' models).
Since subjects typically exert a flexible and
continuous control over their processing ac-
tivities, any methods or theories that do not
allow for such control must be inadequate.
It is probable that the processing system can
be either largely 'data-driven' or 'resource-
driven', depending on the precise nature of
task demands. Some theorists (e.g. Neisser
1976) have assumed quite plausibly that
processing typically represents an amalgam
of bottom-up and top-down components.
9.2.3 R. Sternberg's Componential
Method
Fairly recently a new approach to the prob-
lem of teasing out the stages of processing
within a task was proposed by R. Sternberg
(1977). While his method of componential
analysis shares some of the inadequacies of
the subtraction and additive factor methods
(e.g. a bottom-up processing system is as-
sumed), it is more sophisticated than either
of those methods. In essence, the compon-
ential method involves three distinct stages of
analysis, each of which is described below.
The first stage in a componential analysis
is to form what are called 'interval scores'
from the breakdown of a task into a number
of sub-tasks. Consider as an example a true-
false analogical reasoning task of the form
A:B::C :D. Under normal circumstances,
subjects are given all parts of the problem
together, and time to solve the problem is
measured. However, it is also possible to
give the subject the 'A' term initially and to
see how long he takes to process that term
before asking to see the rest of the problem.
In that way, we would be able to sub-divide
the total time into two stages: time to pro-
cess 'A', and time to process 'B::C:D' and
work out the answer. The method can be ex-
tended so that we present 'A:B' initially, fol-
lowed by 'C:D', or 'A:B::C', followed by
'D'. The general strategy is to present the
subjects with progressively greater amounts
of information in the first part of the trial, so
that progressively less processing is re-
quired in the second part of the trial. It is as-
sumed that this method of assessing the time
to perform parts of the problem (Le. the col-
lection of interval scores) does not alter the
nature of the task. This assumption can be
tested and does appear to hold for the ana-
logical reasoning task.
The second stage in a componential anal-
ysis is the formulation and testing of a com-
ponent model expressed in mathematical
terms. The fundamental unit in such a mod-
el is the component, which is "an elemen-
tary information process that operates upon
internal representations of objects or sym-
bols" (p. 65). It should be noted that the in-
terval scores obtained from the breakdown
of the task into sub-tasks provide valuable
information when testing the model, but do
not necessarily correspond to distinct stages
of processing. However, the model specifies
the interval or intervals within which each
componential process occurs. Componen-
tial models are expressed in information-
processing terms and can usually be repre-
sented by flow charts which describe in de-
tail the processes involved in task solution.
The third stage of a componential analy-
sis is used if the model appears to be suc-
cessful in accounting for the data. Parame-
ters are estimated for the individual compo-
nent processes postulated by the model, and
these are then correlated with a factor-ana-
lysed battery of reference ability tests (e.g.,
verbal or spatial ability measures). The ar-
gument is that this procedure is of value in
distinguishing between component pro-
cesses that are of general importance and
those that are highly task specific. Broadly
speaking, only components of the former
type should correlate highly and meaning-
fully with the appropriate reference abili-
ties. As Sternberg so pertinently pointed
out, information-processing theorists have
usually failed to provide any evidence that
the processes which they postulate have any
general significance.

One of the advantages of the componen-
tial analysis method over the subtraction
and additive-factor methods is that its ap-
proach to identification of a task's compo-
nent stages seems less likely to produce un-
wanted alterations in either the nature or the
sequence of the underlying processes. How-
ever, there may be many tasks that cannot
readily be broken down into sub-tasks in the
way required for a componential analysis.
9.2.4 Arousal and Processing Stages
It is unfortunate that very few attempts have
been made to investigate the effects of
arousal on performance in terms of any of
the three methods just described. One ex-
ception is some recent work by Hockey (un-
published) using an approach resembling in
some ways the method of componential
analysis. The task used was the letter trans-
formation task, in which the subject is re-
quired to transform each letter in a sequence
by counting through the alphabet according
to a fixed rule such as 'add 4' (e.g.
'HeOU + 4', for which the answer is
'LGSY'). The number of letters requiring
transformation varies between one and
four, and response is not permitted until all
of the letters have been transformed.
One of the findings with this task (Hamil-
ton et ai., 1977) is that intense noise slows
down performance on the four-letter ver-
sion. Although this is a potentially interest-
ing finding, it would be desirable to ascer-
tain more precisely the locus of the noise ef-
fect. This was done (Hockey unpublished)
by having the subject control the length of
presentation of each letter by pressing a but-
ton; the processing time for each letter was
inferred from the time between successive
button presses. In addition, the subject was
required to perform the transformation out
loud, and the length of the resulting speech
phase was timed by computer. As a conse-
quence of this wealth of data collection, it
was possible to measure the duration of
three separate processing components for
each letter: (1) speed of access to long-term
Stages of Processing 181
memory of the alphabet sequence, (2) the
transformation time and (3) the speed of
storage-updating operations.
Much valuable information was gained
by this technique of obtaining time mea-
sures of each of the 12 constituent sub-tasks
involved in solving a four-letter problem. In
particular, it transpired that in spite of the
overall slowing effect of noise, each letter
was actually transformed fast in noise. This
is exactly the kind of finding that would not
be expected on the basis of the limited infor-
mation provided by solution time. The pri-
mary locus of the slowing down observed in
noise was the task component concerned
with storage and updating operations.
One of the earliest attempts to use multi-
ple behavioural measures to elucidate the
effects of arousal on different stages of pro-
cessing was made by Broadbent (1971). He
assumed that there were at least three suc-
cessive, independent information-process-
ing stages: perceptual encoding, a transla-
tion process and response selection and ex-
ecution. Some indication of the effects of
arousal on these various stages was avail-
able from work carried out on the five-
choice serial reaction task, from which three
measures have typically been obtained: av-
erage response rate, number of errors and
number of unusually slow responses
('gaps'). The first point of interest is that if
only the most obvious performance measure
were available (i.e. average response rate), it
would be concluded that noise has no effect
at all on performance. In fact, noise typical-
ly increases the number of errors, and this
differential pattern of effects on work rate
and error rate constitutes important evi-
dence.
In his interpretation of these noise data,
Broadbent (1971) argued that, since errors
occurred independently of average re-
sponse rate and gaps, the factors producing
errors were independent of the factors con-
trolling speed of response selection and eX-
ecution. He concluded that errors were due
to interference with perceptual analysis, and
thus the performance impairment under
noise was due to momentary diversions of
182 Conclusions and Speculations
attention. In contrast, sleep loss has more
widespread effects on performance of the
five-choice serial reaction task, reducing the
rate of work and increasing the number of
gaps and errors. This led Broadbent to su-
spect that sleep loss affected the stage of re-
sponse selection and execution as well as
perceptual selection and processing.
It is clear that enhanced understanding of
the effects of arousal on performance has
been achieved by the strategy of using var-
ious methods to examine the stage-by-stage
processing involved in several complex
tasks. In general terms, an increase in the
number of measures of performance can be
expected to produce a commensurate in-
crease in our understanding of what arousal
is doing to the processing system. However,
as we have already pointed out, this entire
approach is based on the rather unlikely as-
sumption that all tasks are processed in a se-
quence of non-overlapping processing
stages.
9.3 Two Arousal Systems
While detailed analysis of the effects of
arousal on the component stages of task per-
formance is certainly of value, it may well
prove necessary to recognize that arousal
can have two very different kinds of conse-
quences for information processing. In the
first place, there is a relatively passive effect
on performance which is due to the appro-
priateness or otherwise of the induced
arousal state for the task that needs to be
performed. In the second place, there is a
more active and effortful response to the
naturally occurring effects of arousal on
performance; as a first approximation, the
more detrimental are the apparent effects of
raised or lowered arousal on performance,
the greater will be the compensatory active,
effortful response. This compensatory sys-
tem is assumed to operate when the highly
aroused or de-aroused subject perceives
that his level of performance is falling below
a satisfactory level. In addition, extra effort
and resources may be allocated to the task
simply because subjects who are, for exam-
ple, sleep-deprived are well aware that their
ability to process information is reduced by
tiredness.
The distinction between a relatively pas-
sive arousal system and an active, cognitive
control system that monitors the operations
of the first arousal system is similar to that
proposed by Broadbent (1971) between a
lower mechanism and an upper mechanism.
Broadbent suggested that activity in the low-
er mechanism was increased by noise and
amphetamine and decreased by sleepless-
ness and chlorpromazine. In contrast, in-
volvement of the upper mechanism is en-
hanced by short tasks and introversion and
is greater in the afternoon; it is decreased by
long tasks, extraversion, alcohol and morn-
ing performance. While Broadbent has not
done so, it seems reasonable to include in-
centive as a factor primarily affecting the
upper mechanism.
What evidence did Broadbent (1971) pro-
vide for his proposed distinction? Perhaps
the single most important piece of evidence
is the fact that interactive effects on per-
formance are more frequently obtained
when two arousers primarily affect the same
arousal mechanism than when one affects
the lower mechanism and the other the up-
per mechanism. Some of the other argu-
ments adduced by Broadbent are discussed
in Chap. 4.
Of course, there are other possible expla-
nations. One tempting hypothesis is that
each arouser has two kinds of effects on per-
formance: (1) a general arousing effect and
(2) specific or idiosyncratic effects. For ex-
ample, while intense white noise increases
arousal, some of its effects may be due to the
fact that it is an auditory stimulus or that it is
a source of distraction. This hypothesis is
superficially parsimonious, in that only one
arousal mechanism is proposed; however,
an excessive number of idiosyncratic effects
may need to be postulated to account for the
data. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true
that at least some arousers do have idiosyn-

cratic effects, and any satisfactory theory
must take account of this fact.
We have argued that there are two arousal
systems. One of the most striking findings
supporting such a theoretical position is
that manipulations designed to produce
substantial increases or decreases in the le-
vel of arousal typically have rather modest
(or even non-existent) effects on perform-
ance, especially if tasks of relatively short
duration are used. For example, until com-
paratively recently it was believed that the
loss of one or two nights' sleep did not im-
pair performance on most tasks. In similar
fashion, the typical effects of intense noise
on performance are much less marked than
intuition would suggest. The apparently
great flexibility with which the human pro-
cessing system copes with very low or very
high levels of arousal is rather perplexing
for advocates of a uni-dimensional arousal
theory; from our present perspective, these
results simply attest to the involvement of
the active compensatory system. In other
words, arousal usually does not exert a di-
rect effect on behaviour; rather, its effects
are indirect and are mediated by a central
control system.
It is often rather difficult to distinguish
satisfactorily between the passive arousal
state and the compensatory effort response.
One of the reasons for this is that passively
induced arousal and active compensatory
processes both increase the level of arousal
as indexed by conventional physiological
measures. However, it seems reasonable to
assume that the arousal state induced by, for
example, white noise or caffeine will be rela-
tively general and undifferentiated, whereas
the arousal state produced as a by-product
of active processing of the task will usually
be fairly specific. An example of the kinds
of specific arousal patterns that can occur in
response to varying task demands was men-
tioned earlier in the chapter: heart rate ac-
celerates when a task involves active manip-
ulation of information, but decelerates
when a task calls for attention to an external
source of information.
Some of the clearest physiological evi-
Two Arousal Systems 183
dence for the two arousal systems proposed
here has been obtained from work on sleep
deprivation. As we saw in Chap. 7, one of
the main effects of sleep deprivation is to
produce an overall decrease in the level of
arousal. However, this reduction in arousal
is typically found only when the sleep-de-
prived person is sitting passively or engaged
in performing a relatively unstimulating
task. If sleep-deprived subjects are giveri a
stimulating or stressful task, the sleep depri-
vation is often associated with enhanced
arousal. For example, Malmo and Surwillo
(1960) found raised autonomic activity in
sleep-deprived subjects when they were re-
quired to remain upright and alert in order
to avoid a painful forehead bum. Such find-
ings clearly suggest that the 'natural' conse-
quence of sleep deprivation is lowered
arousal, but this arousal reduction can be
eliminated or even reversed by compensato-
ry effort if motivation is sufficiently high.
One of the most striking pieces of evi-
dence in this connection was obtained by
Wilkinson (1962a), in a study in which
sleep-deprived and non-deprived subjects
had to perform a test of addition for 20 min.
Those sleep-deprived subjects who did the
task fastest and most accurately were the
ones who showed the greatest rise in the
electromyogram (EMG) or muscle tension
during the performance of the task. The sim-
plest interpretation of these data is that mus-
cle tension in this case provides a measure
of compensatory effort. As Wilkinson
(1962a) concluded, "Sleep deprivation may
cause inefficiency even in subjects who
maintain performance if their raised EMG
reflects greater effort or energy expendi-
ture; this may be the cost of maintaining
normal levels of arousal and performance in
the face of the depressing influence of sleep
deprivation per se" (p. 570).
In similar fashion, it may be reasonable to
assume that individual differences in arous-
al level while performing a non-stressful
task reflect at least approximately variations
in expended effort. Frankenhaeuser (1975)
has found a fairly consistent positive rela-
tionship between good performance at a
184 Conclusions and Speculations
task and high levels of excretion of adrena-
line and noradrenaline. She obtained this
relationship across tasks as variegated as vi-
gilance, arithmetic, choice reaction time and
verbal learning, and summarized her find-
ings in the following way: "Among normal,
healthy individuals those who have relative-
ly higher catecholamine excretion levels
tend to perform better in terms of speed, ac-
curacy, and endurance than those who have
lower levels. This relationship is particular-
ly marked in the case of adrenaline excre-
tion, but seems to hold also for noradrena-
line" (pp. 83-84). At a more theoretical le-
vel, adrenaline output in these studies may
reflect active processing effort rather than a
more global arousal state.
In sum, there is at least some physiologi-
cal support for the two proposed arousal
systems. What about the behavioural evi-
dence? One of the major predictions follow-
ing from the theoretical position espoused
here is that the behavioural consequences of
manipulations designed to increase or de-
crease the level of arousal will frequently be
much smaller than would be expected on
the basis of a uni-dimensional arousal the-
ory. The most striking results have been ob-
tained in work on into version-extraversion.
Several rigorous manipulations of arousal
level have been found to alter the perform-
ance of extraverts to a great extent but to
have minimal effects on introverts' perform-
ance. This lack of correspondence between
arousal and performance levels in introverts
is embarrassing to a simple arousal theory,
but is easily explained in terms of a greater
willingness by introverts than by extraverts
to utilize the compensatory effort system.
The basic notion that the natural effects
of arousal manipulations on performance
can be greatly reduced by compensatory ef-
fort is also supported by much of the work
using knowledge of results as an incentive.
In an early study, Wilkinson (l96Ia) dis-
covered that performance on the five-choice
serial reaction task among sleep-deprived
subjects could be dramatically improved up
to non-sleep-deprived levels simply by pro-
viding knowledge of results. In similar fash-
ion, the typical 10% variation in perform-
ance occurring during the course of the wak-
ing day is often completely eleminated by
knowledge of results (see Chap. 7). At the
very least, such findings indicate that people
exposed to arousing or de-arousing condi-
tions can cope with the resultant stress in a
more active and flexible manner than has
usually been assumed.
One of the more straightforward predic-
tions from the theoretical framework pro-
posed here is that a reasonable level of per-
formance can be achieved in at least two dif-
ferent ways: (1) near-optimal arousal with
little need for compensatory effort or
(2) sub- or supra-optimal arousal combined
with much compensatory effort (i.e. at high
'cost' to the system). A relatively ignored im-
plication of the original Yerkes-Dodson law
is that any given level of performance (other
than the very best) can be achieved at two
different levels of arousal. Thus it is wrong
(if tempting) to conclude from the existence
of a non-significant effect of arousal on task
performance that arousal has no effect at all
on internal processing. On the contrary,
comparable performance efficiency on the
part of control and highly aroused subjects
is often achieved at greater 'subjective cost'
to the more aroused subjects (i.e. reduced
processing effectiveness). This is especially
true when cognitively demanding tasks are
used.
How do we know that high-arousal sub-
jects achieve performance levels compar-
able to less aroused subjects at greater cost
to themselves? If we assume that high-
arousal subjects invest more of their avail-
able resources in task performance, then
they have less spare processing capacity
than less aroused subjects. As a conse-
quence, subjects in a state of high arousal
are less able to handle any additional pro-
cessing requirements (e.g. rejecting informa-
tion contained in extra-task stimulation or
processing a second task at the same time as
the first). There is overwhelming evidence
that high arousal reduces the ability to cope
with a concurrent secondary task (cf. Easter-
brook 1959), in spite of the fact that primary

task performance rarely suffers. There is al-
so accumulating evidence (e.g. Dornic 1977,
Howarth 1969, Morgenstern et al. 1974,
Pallak et al. 1975) that the ability to resist at
least some kinds of environmental distrac-
tion is noticeably reduced in states of high
arousal.
While we have identified two separate
arousal systems, it is important to note that
they are often interdependent in their func-
tioning. Each arousal system has definite ef-
fects on the other arousal system. When
arousal in the passive arousal system is non-
optimal for the task in hand, there will typi-
cally be enhanced activity of the compensa-
tory system. The compensatory system re-
sponds to task demands and attempts to
maintain task performance at a satisfactory
level. If the attempt to do so is unsuccessful
(as, for example, when high incentives lead
to the setting of unrealistic goals), then this
produces arousal in the passive arousal sys-
tem.
Broadbent (1971) emphasized the notion
that different arousers affect one or the
other arousal system. It has been one of the
major themes of this book that it is prefer-
able to claim only that any arouser affects
one arousal system relatively more than the
other. Perhaps the clearest example con-
cerns incentive. The primary effect of incen-
tive is on the cognitive control system which
is responsive to task demands; however, it
seems clear that high levels of incentive typi-
cally also increase activity in the passive
arousal system.
A second example concerns the effects of
sleeplessness on arousal. The primary effect
of sleeplessness is to reduce activity in the
passive arousal system; however, the fact
that it is rather difficult to demonstrate ad-
verse effects of one night's loss of sleep on
most performance tasks indicates that sleep-
lessness indirectly involves the compensato-
ry cognitive control system.
One of the dangers associated with the
postulation of two interdependent arousal
systems is that it is difficult to specify their
separate contributions to performance.
Ideally one should be able to identify ma-
Two Arousal Systems 185
nipulations that affect only one of the two
arousal systems. The most obvious candi-
date for a manipulation that affects the
compensatory cognitive control system but
not the passive arousal system is incentive
of relatively small magnitude. Such a ma-
nipulation changes the effective task de-
mands and leads the cognitive control sys-
tem to re-allocate resources without affect-
ing activity in the passive arousal system. A
manipulation that affects the passive arous-
al system but has minimal impact on the
cognitive control system is non-contingent
electric shock, i.e. shock administered irre-
spective of performance level.
Our preferred solution to the complexi-
ties of the research literature is to move from
a unitary concept of arousal to a theoretical
position that postulates two arousal sys-
tems. An alternative way of accounting for
the complexity and apparent inconsisten-
cies in the data would be to abandon the no-
tion of arousal altogether and to move to-
wards separate theories of anxiety, incen-
tive, noise, time of day, sleeplessness and so
on.
Such fractionation certainly has some ap-
peal when one looks at the data at a relative-
ly fine-grain level. Consider for example
one of the most robust findings in the entire
literature on arousal and performance,
namely that high arousal enhances long-
term retention. While that finding seems to
support a unitary arousal concept, detailed
examination of the evidence points in the
opposite direction. The available evidence
suggests that long-term retention is better in
the afternoon than in the morning because
high arousal leads to deeper or more seman-
tic processing. On the other hand, intense
white noise enhances long-term retention in
spite of the fact that the arousal produced
by noise leads to shallower or less semantic
processing. Incentive seems to improve
long-term retention by producing increased
elaboration of processing without any dis-
cernible effect on the depth of processing.
In contrast, anxiety reduces the elaboration
of processing rather than the depth of pro-
cessing; furthermore, the arousal produced
186 Conclusions and Speculations
by anxiety reduces long-term retention rath-
er than enhances it.
In sum, there is a complete schism be-
tween the effects of various arousers at the
molar and molecular levels in studies of
long-term retention. Unfortunately it is un~
clear whether these performance differ-
ences are due to each arouser affecting dif-
ferent internal mechanisms or whether they
are more simply explicable in terms of vary-
ing task demands.
There are other examples of arousers af-
fecting memorial functioning in rather dif-
ferent ways. While there are some excep-
tions, it has usually been found that intro-
version and anxiety both impair the efficien-
cy of retrieval. In contrast, noise seems to
improve retrieval efficiency rather than to
impair it, and incentive nearly always has no
effect on retrieval. On the other hand, at-
tempts to reduce arousal by means ofrelax-
ation instructions have usually facilitated
retrieval. On the basis of such evidence it
would be extremely difficult to claim that
there is any consistent effect of arousal on
retrieval.
Since it is the rule rather than the excep-
tion to discover that arousers have different
influences on behaviour at a fine-grain level
of analysis, the entire notion that the effects
of arousers are mediated by one or two in-
ternal arousal systems loses some of its ap-
peal. However, it is of crucial importance
that any two arousers used together typical-
ly interact with each other in determining
performance. It is rather difficult to explain
the presence of interaction rather than addi-
tivity if each arouser were affecting a sepa-
rate system or mechanism. Furthermore,
most (if not all) arousers appear to affect at-
tentional mechanisms in similar ways; more
specifically, high arousal produced in sever-
al different ways leads to greater attentional
selectivity and increased distractibility. In
other words, there is sufficient similarity in
the behavioural effects of different arousers
to warrant continued adherence to an arous-
al model. In addition, the ways in which
different arousers interact can frequent-
ly be predicted in a fairly precise way on
the basis of an extremely simple arousal
model.
Why is it that two arousers will usually in-
teract in a predictable fashion in determin-
ing performance of a particular task, where-
as the same two arousers applied separately
to two similar tasks will often produce very
different patterns of behaviour? The sim-
plest answer is that there are, in fact, one or
two arousal systems, but these systems are
greatly affected by apparently trivial task
variations. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the effects of any single arouser
on task performance can be greatly affected
by small alterations in task parameters. The
implication is that our understanding of the
effects of any single arouser on task per-
formance will be increased only when we
can identify more precisely the ways in
which tasks affect processing activities. It is
the interactions between qualitatively dif-
ferent arousal states and task demands that
determine specific processing strategies; as
yet, the nature of those interactions is poorly
understood.
What does the future hold? Prophecy is
always a hazardous business, but it is prob-
able that there will be an increasing aware-
ness among cognitive psychologists that
there are important bi-directional influ-
ences between arousal and information-pro-
cessing operations and that the attempt to
decouple cognition from other systems (e.g.
motivational, emotional) is fundamentally
ill-judged. If, as the author naturally hopes,
these predictions are proved correct, then
this book has dealt with an embryo rather
than an empty shell.
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Author Index

AdamEE 83 80, 83, 89, 92, 124, 130, 138, Deffenbacher JL 54,98, 120
AgnewM 65 157-159, 161-163, 167-170, Demetrescu M 50
Agnew N 65 172,176,181,182,185 Dutsch D8, 11,22,27,35-37,
Akerstedt T 139 Broadhurst PL 4, 5 59
Allen GJ 96 Brower PE 100 Deutsch JA 8, 11,22,27,
Allport DA 10,42 Bruning JL 120 35-37,59
Altman F 98 Bryan IF 89 DeyMK 79
Ame1ang M 128 Dickstein LS 76
Antos SI 18 Dixon PN 52, 83
Atkinson RC 19, 22, 28, 31, Calder BJ 86 Doctor RM 98
68-;-72,74, 160 CaJlaway E 65 Dodson JD 4,5,47-49,56,59,
Ayers 1 76 Cameron AE 52, 83 79,90,93, 133, 137, 139, 150,
Capretta PI 109 175
Carey D 62 Donders FC 178
Bacon SI 50, 51 Carey ST 159 Dornbush RL 52, 83
Baddeley AD 22, 28-33, 39, Carpenter A 158 Dornic S 54, 59,60, 110, 120,
44,64,99,101,142,160 Carr G 130, 136 161,167,185
Bahrick HP 52, 83 CatteJl RB 5, 139 DostJA 51
Bakan P 130-132 Chambers J 76 DuCette 1 52, 83
Barton K 139 Cherry EC 9,10 Duffy E 3
Bass B 76 Child D 5 Dufort WH 104, 105
Battig WF 105 Clements PR 139 Duncan 1 40, 42
Baumeister AA 163 Cohen IS 52, 83 Durham RL 100
Bave1as J 83, 88, 89 Cohen S 52,164
Beatty J 58 Collins WE 148
Bell PA 52,165 Colquhoun WP 54,79, Easterbrook lA 1, 3, 49-55,
Benton Al 76 138-140, 144 65,84,120,121,128,129,142,
Bergstrom B 148 Condry J 7fJ,76 152, 164, 166, 169, 175, 176,
Bergum BO 51 Cooper C 136 184
Berkum M 109 Corballis MC 32 Edwards RS 169
Ber1yne DE 95, 112, 142, 156, Corcoran DWJ 79, 91, 127, Egstrom GH 52
159, 160 136,144,148,157,158 Ehrlick S 76
Bindra D 68 Craig MJ 118 Elliott R 78, 173
Bjerner B 151 Craik FIM 71, 116, 143, 160 Endler NS 96
Blake MJF 124, 125, 137, 138, Cravens RW 113 Eysenck HJ 55, 76, 79, 88, 96,
140-145 Cummings LL 89 124-127, 130, 132, 133, 136,
Blechman EA 156 Cunitz AR 31 137
Blitz B 51 Curts MI 89 Eysenck MC 37-39, 71, 128,
Blowers GH 77,78 Cutting JE 72 134, 135
Bobrow DG 33-35, 39, 40, Cuvo AJ 70, 71 Eysenck MW 4,37-39,64,66,
171 71,73,91,95,96,99-101,112,
Boggs DH 52, 165, 168 116, 119, 121, 122, 128, 130,
Bohlin G 147 Daee S 162 132-137, 141 145, 150, 160,
Boor M 107 Dannemiller EA 156 163
Bootzin RR 85 Davenport WG 80 Eys~nck SBG 126,127
Brebner J 136 Davies A 41,42,44
Brickman P 115 Davies DR 52, 83,92,
Broadbent DE 3, 8, 10,27, 35, 130-132, 160, 164 Farley FH 136,159
36, 54-56, 59, 62, 66, 70, 79, Deci EL 84-87 Farr JL 88
202 Author Index

Feldman MP 79, 83 Hirst W 13 Lee ES 83,88, 89

Ferguson HH 76 Hitch GJ 22,28-33,39,44,64, Leonhard JA 157
Finkelman JM 52,165 99,101,160 Lepper MR 86
Fisch RI 51,52,83 Hockey GRJ 53,130-132, Levey A 125,127
Fischler I IS 138, 139, 152, 157, 158, 160, Levine JM 80
Flavel R 136 162,164-167,170-172,178 Lewis J 17,26
Folkard S 65, 137, 142, 143, Hodges WF 96,100,112 Lewis JL 156
145 Hoehn AJ 104 Lezak A 52,164
Forster PM 53, 165 Hormann H 64,162 Liebert RM 96, 98, 113
Fowler CJH 92 Horne JA 140, 141 Lisper HO 151
Frankenhaueser M 168, 183 Houston BK 65, 98 Locke EA 83, 88-90
FulkerDW 96 Howarth E 129, 132, 133, 185 LockhartRS 71,116,143,160
Fuller AR 132 Humphreys MS 5, 145, 146 Loeb M 81
Furneaux WD 136 Loftus GR 70-72
Fusella V 41,42,44 Logan GO 23,24,34
ImamA 128 Lopes LL 62
Lubin A 149
Gale A 124 Jacoby LL 116 Lucaccini LF 80
Ganzer VJ 98 James W 8, 14,28 Lucas JD 112
Garske JP 132 Jensen AR 133,136
Gaudry E 107 Jerison HJ 157
Geen RG 130, 136 Jinks JL 96 Macfarlane DA 68
Geffen G 11,38 Johnson R 52, 83 Mackay C 61
Gelade G 23-27 Johnston WA 35-39,43,44 Mackworth NH 80,81,157
Gieseking CF ISO Jones OM 52,83,92, 160, 164 Maier SF 109
Gillespie CR 135, 136 Jones TM 65 Maller JB 76,83
Glanzer M 31 Malmo RB 147, 183
Glanzmann P 96, 112 Mandler G 56,97,176
Glass DC 52, 165 Kahneman 0 4, 6, 35, 39, 40, Markowitz A 51
Glaubmann H 147 46, 48, 57-60, 63, 108, 111, Martin M 44
Glover CB 113 122,176 Martuza VR 96
Glucksberg S 74,75,82 Kallstrom OW 96 McCullers JC 75,82
Goh OS 136 Kaplan S 141,142,159 McDougall W 67
Goodman GO IS Kary SK 132, 135 McGraw KO 75,81,82
Gopher 0 28, 39-44 Katahn M 119 McGuinness 0 173
Gordon VM 112 Katz L 72 McLaughlin RJ 130-132,135
Gootsdanker R 77 KaurG 79 McLean PO 159
Gray JA 11,91, 117, 125-127, Kausler DH 51,52,83 McLeod P 59
130 Kazdin AE 85 McNamara HJ 51,52,83
Greeman AL 65 Keister ME 130-132 Mehrabian A 61,95
Green OM 130 KernoffP 73 MeyerWU 114,115
Gregory M 56,157 Kerr B 13,14 Michaels EJ 87,109
Grierson AT 53,165 Kistler 0 163 Millar K 162, 163
Grippaldi R 100 KjellbergA 147,150,151,153 Miller OJ 118
Gupta BS 127,128 Klein KE 139 Miller HE 83
Kleinsmith LJ 141,142,159 Miller ME 51
Kleitman N 141 Miller NE 108
Hamilton P 49, 53, 64, 65, 93, Knox WJ 100 Minard J 76,77
150, 159-162, 164, 170, 171, Kohn H 51 Mirsky AF 55
178,181 Kroll NEA 10 Monk TH 143,145
HamiltonV 111,121 Kruglanski AW 86 Moore LE 62, 63
Harkins S 130, 136 Krugman AD 112 Moray N 9,12
Harley WF 69,70 Krupski A 130, 136 Morgenstern FS 129,185
Harman J 107 Morris LW 96-98, 113
Hartley LR 53,158,165 Mowbray GH 23
Hasher L 63-66 LaBerge 0 33 Mueller JH 100,105,118-120
Haveman JE 159 Lacey 11 4, 173 Mullin J 144, 157
Hepp DO 32 Lansing RW 77
Heider F 113 Laux L 96, 112
Heinz SP 35-39,43,44 Laverty SG 125 Niiiitlinen R 56, 57
Hill KT 54,98,99, 120 Lawson EA 38 Nachreiner F 80
 Author Index 203
Nagpal M 128 Sarason IG 76, 77, 97, 107, Tulving E 160
Navon D 28,39-44 108,111,112 Tune GS 130,136
Neely JH 16,18 Sarason SB 97
Neill WT 18 Schachter S 3
Neisser U 180 Schmidt EA 81 Uehling BS 163
Nelson TO 69,70 Schneider K 103, 107, 108 Underwood G 9
Nichols R 76 Schneider W 18-20,23,24,26,
Nicholson IN 127 27,36,37,44,45,63
Nicholson WM III Schneller WF 132
Nideffer RM 128 Schwartz S 64,117-119, Voici C 64
Ninias P 76 134 Von WrightJM 10,17
Norman DA 28,31,33-35,39, SegalSJ 41,42,44 Vranceanu M 64
40,171 Shanmugan TE 129
Norton R 152 Shedletsky R 96
Nottelman ED 54,98,99, 120 Shields J 96 Wachtel PL 51,52
Notz WW 86 Shiffrin RM 18-20, 22-24, Wagoner BL 58
26-28, 31, 36, 37, 44, 45, 63, Walker EL 73, 119, 132, 159
68,69,160 Walker RE 112
O'Malley JJ 53, 164 Shiner S 30 Walley RE 49,90
Ongley GC 77, 78 Silverman RE 51 Wanner E 30
Osgood GE 8 Simon HA 1 Wardlow K 10
Osterkamp U 64,162 Simon JR 52,165,168 WarmJS 81
Otto DA 78 Simpson CK 72,74 Warwick KM 79, 88
Overcast TD 10 Singer JE 3 Wasserman EA 72
Smith AP 162,163 Watkins MJ 29,43
Snyder CRR 13-19,24,27,45, Waugh NC 28,31
PaganoDF 119 63 Wedderburn AA 11
Palfai T 68 Sostek AJ 81 Weick KE 87
Pallak MS 54, 120, 185 Spearman CE 76 Weiden TD 49,90
Patterson J 62 Spelke ES 12 Weiner B 72,73,103,
Peavler WS 58 Spence JT 101-108,112 106-108,113,114
Polzella DJ 150 Spence KW 101-108, 112 WeistRM 71
Poplawsky A 53,164 Spielberger CD 95,98, 106 WelchJ 43
Posner MI 13-19, 24, 44, 45, Sprinkle R 163 Weltman G 52
58,63,77 Staw BM 86 White K 134
Potekan PA 114 Stein BS 116, 117 Wickens DD 72,74
Poulton EC 158,161,167-169 Steriade M 50 Wickens TD 68-72, 74
Powell GD 51 Sternberg RJ 180,181 Wilding J 92,162
Pribram KH 173 Sternberg S 19,179,180 Wilkinson RT 48, 54, 79, 83,
Pritchard RD 89 Stone G 65 94, 148, 149, 153, 154, 158,
Straughan JH 104,105 183, 184
Sullivan L 39 Willett RA 48,78,82,88, 169
Ray WJ 119 Surwillo WW 147,183 Williams HL 149-152
Rebert CS 78 Swets JA 80, 130 Willis J 76
Reeves FB 51 Wilson GD 136
Reitman JS 29 Winch WH 142
Revelle W 87, 109, 124, 125, WineJ 97,99,108
127, 137, 144, 145 Tarpy RM 74 Wolk S 52,83
Rhoades MV 23 Tarnell M 51 Wooley FR 106
Richardson FC 97 Tecce 51
Riley JGA 11,38,39 Tennyson RD 106
Rogers JL 105 Terborg JR 83,89
Ross M 55,86 Thackray RI 136 Yerkes RM 4,5,47-49,56,59,
Rosvold HE 55 Tharp VK 151 79,90,93, 133, 137, 139, 150,
Rubin BM 52, 83 Thayer RE 60-63,139,174 175
Russell JA 61,95 Thomson C 52, 83
Rutenfranz J 141 Thorndike EL 67
Thornton JW 51 Zacks RT 63-66
Trapp EP 52, 83 Taffy DJ 120
Saltz E 104, 112 TreismanAM 8,11,17,23-27, Zajonc RB 115
Santhanam MC 129 35,38,39,41,42,44,46 Zubin J 76,83
Subject Index
Academic achievement and worry 98
Action-decrement theory 73
- and anxiety 119
- and introversion-extraversion 132, 133
-, problems with 73,74
- and white noise 159,160
Activation Deactivation Adjective Check
List 60-62
- and introversion-extraversion 134
- and time of day 139
Additive-factor method 179, 180
Alcohol 55,182
- and serial reaction 54
Alertness and reaction time 77
Amphetamine and arousal 182
Anagram task 98
- and anxiety 99,101,102
- and white noise 156
Analogical reasoning 180
Anxiety 95-123
- and attentional selectivity 120
- and attribution theory 113-115
- and concentration 54, 176, 177
- and conditioning 102
-, definition of 95,97
- and distractibility 54,98
- anddual-taskperformancce 51,52
- and ego-involving instructions 110, III
- and failure 106-108, 112, 113
- and free recall 105
- and heredity 96
- and incentive 77,91
- and length of retention interval 119
- and level of processing 115-119
- and motivation 108-112
- and paired-associate learning 101-108
- and performance 5
- and punishment susceptibility 91,92, 126
- and response competition 101-108
- and retrieval 104, 105
- and self-reported arousal 62, 174
- and shock 112,113
-, state vs. trait 95,96
-, and task difficulty 48, 103, 106, 107, 110,
120,177
-, theoretical positions on 120-123
- and working memory 99-101
Arousal 145,146
- and categorical clustering 64
- and cognitive masking 50
-, definition of 3,4
- and distraction 56, 176
- and incentive 90, 92-94
-,measurementof 4,6,173
- and narrowing of attention 49-54,84
-, optimal level of 4,5,47-49,56,57
-, patterning of 57
- and performance 168,169
-, physiology of 174
- and processing capacity 35,40,138,154
-, self-reported dimensions of 60-63,95, 134,
174
- and short-term memory 146
- and sleep deprivation 147,154
- and time of day 139
-, two-mechanism theory of 55, 66, 158,
182-186
- and white noise 156,167
Attention 8-27
- and arousal 7, 66, 146, 160
-, bottleneck theories of 8-13, 59
- and collative variables 156
-, divided vs. focussed 22
- and expectancy 14,16
- and feature detection 25,26
- and incentive 69,70
- and introversion-extraversion 128,129
-, narrowing of 2,49-53
- and parallel processing 8-10,12,13
-, problems with 39-43
- and selective interference 44
- and short-term memory 28
- and spare capacity I
- vs. automatic processing 13-27,63-66
Attentional selectivity 49-53
- and anxiety 120
- and arousal 55,56,63--66,176,186
- and incentive 69,70,84,92
- and introversion-extraversion 128, 129
- and neuropsychology 49,50
- and sleep deprivation 152, 153
- and time of day 142
- and white noise 92,164-167,169,172
Attribution theory 113-115
Automatic processing 13-27
- and arousal 63--66
-, definition of 13
-, inflexibility of 21
206 Subject Index
- of meaning 10,15,16
- and parallel processing 9,10,20,21,23,26
- and practice 26
-, sped of 15
Awareness and sematic processing 10
Behavioural contrast and anxiety 127
Behaviourism and attention concept 8
Body temperature 125
- and reaction time 141
- andtimeofday 139,144
Caffeine 118
- and arousal 183
- and impulsivity 129,144,145
- and introversion-extraversion 127
- and paired-associate learning 118
- and vigilance 132
Cancellation task 79
- and incentive 79, 127
- and introversion-extraversion 79,91,127
- and knowledge of results 143,114
- and time of day 139,141,143,144
Card sorting 89
- and goal setting 89
- and incentive 89
- and sleep deprivation 149,152,153
- andtimeofday 138,139,141
Catecholamines 139
- and performance 168,183,184
- and sleep deprivation 148
- and time of day 139
Chlorpromazine and arousal 182
Cocktail party problem 9
Cognition and self-reported arousal 63
Componential method 180, 181
Conditioning and anxiety 102
Controlled processing 18-24
Cued recall 71, 72
- and anxiety 118,119
- and incentive 71,72
Data-limited processes vs. resource-limited
processes 33-35,171
Depression and self-reported arousal 63
Dichotic listening task 10, II
Discrimination learning and arousal 4,5,47
Distinctiveness of encoding 116, 117
Distractibility 185, 186
- and anxiety 54,98,110,120
- and arousal 176, 185, 186
- and incentive 84
- and introversion-extraversion 129
- and sleep deprivation 152, 153
Divergent thinking 134
- and introversion-extraversion 134
- and REM sleep 147
Dual-task performance 50-53
- and anxiety 51,52,101,111,122
- and arousal 50-53,169,175,184
- and attention 17, 18,23
- and capacity 39,40,43
- and data-limited processes 33-35
- and effort 57,58
- and expended processing capacity 36-38
- and incentive 52,83
- and introversion-extraversion 128,129
- and narrowing of attention 50-53
- and resource-limited processes 33-35
- and selective interference 41,42,44,59
- and serial recall 161
- and white noise 164-168
- and working memory 29
EEG 77
- and introversion-extraversion 124, 125
- and reaction time 77
- and sleep deprivation 147,152
Effort 57-60
- and anxiety 108,110,111,122,123
- and arousal and attention 57-60
- and extrinsic motivation 87
- and goal setting 90
- and incentive 57,58
-, on-task 5,6,145,146
- and performance 182
- and pupil dilation 58
-, self-reported 58,59,167
- and sleep deprivation 183
- and task difficulty 48,49, 177
Ego-involving instructions 110
- and anxiety 110, III
- and intelligence-test performance 76
Elaboration of encoding 71
- and anxiety 118,119
- and incentive 71,72
Electric shock 50, 51
- and anxiety 96, 112, 113
- and arousal 185
- and dual-task performance 50,51
- and learning 108
- and short-term memory 73,74
- and vigilance 148
EMGandsleepdeprivation 154,183
Emotion 61
- and anxiety 95
- and arousal 61
- and interrupt system 2
-, three-dimensional theory of 61
Emotionality 97
- and failure 113
- and performance 97-99,122
Encoding specificity principle 160
Examination performance and worry 98
Eye fixations and incentive 70
Failure 96,97

- and anxiety 97,106-108,112,113,177
- and attribution theory 113-115
Feature perception 25
Filter theory of attention 8-13
Free recall 31
- and anxiety 100, lOS, 117, 118
- and arousal 133,160
-, categorical clustering in 64
- and incentive 69,70,72
-, primacy and recency in 31
- and white noise 159,162,163
- and working memory 29,32
Frustration 91
- and anxiety 127
- and incentive 91
Functional fixedness and incentive 75,76
Goal level 88-90
- and incentive 83
Habituation and sleep deprivation 147
Heat and serial reaction 169
Imagery 41
- and arousal 64
Impulsivity 126,127
- and caffeine 129,144,145
- and reward susceptibility 91,128
Incentive 67-94
- and arousal 70,92-94,182,185
- and cancellation task 79
- and dual-task performance 52,83
- and goal setting 88-90
- and incidental learning 82
- and intelligence 76,77
- and memory 68-74
- and motivation 87
- and performance efficiency 82-84
- and problem solving 75,76
- and reaction time 77, 78
- and reinforcement 68
- and self-reported arousal dimensions 62
- and serial reaction 54, 78, 79, 82, 169
- and task characteristics 48,74-83
- and vigilance 80, 81
- and white noise 92
Incidentallearning 51-53
- and arousal 51-53,92,93
- and introversion-extraversion 128
- and white noise 164
Instinct 67
Intelligence 4
- and incentive 76,77
- and introversion-extraversion 136
Intentionallearning 51-53
- and arousal 51-53,92,93
- and introversion-extraversion 128
- and white noise 164
Subject Index 207
Intrinsic motivation 84-87
Introversion-extraversion 124-138
- and arousal 124,125,137,138,182,184
- and attention 128,129
- and cancellation task 91
- and conditinablility 125,127
- and cortical arousal 55
- and imagery 64
- and incentive 91
- and level of processing 117, 118
- and memory 132-136
- and other arousers 55
- and performance speed 136,137
- and reward and punishment 127, 128
- and serial reaction 91
-, theories of 137,138
- and thinking task 110
Inverted-U relation between arousal and
performance 4,5,47-49,56,57,93
- and anxiety 103
-, explanation of 59, 173-178
- and incentive 79,80
- and introversion-extraversion 133
- and narrowing of attention 49
- and sleep deprivation ISO
- and white noise 170
Knowledge of results 77,78
- and reaction time 77,78
- and serial reaction task 79, 184
- and sleep deprivation 153, 154
- and vigilance 81
Law of Effect 67
Learned helplessness 109
Letter-transformation task 93
- and distraction 178
- and incentive 93
- and processing stages 181
- and white noise 49,65,93,170,171,181
Levels of processing 116
- and anxiety 115-119
- and incentive 71, 72
- and introversion-extraversion 134, 135
-, problems with 116
- and processing demands 37-39
- and time of day 143
- and white noise 160-163
Lexical decision 16
- and automatic processing IS
Locus of control 113
Long-term memory 69
- and anxiety 119
- and arousal 66,185
- and free recall 31
- and introversion-extraversion 132,133
-, retrieval from 37, 38, 145
- and sleep deprivation 150
-, theoretical view of 22
208 Subject Index
- and time of day 141-143
- and white noise 142,159,160,162
Memory span 29,30
- and anxiety 99,100,109
- and incentive 90
- and time of day 139,142,143
- and white noise 161
- and working memory 29,30,32
Mental set and incentive 75,76
Morning types and evening types 140
Motivation 5
- and anxiety 108-112
- and incentive 67,84-87
- and multiple goals 1,2
- and probablility of success 109
Multiple-resource theory 39-43
Multi-store memory model 22,160
- and incentive 68,69
-, problems with 28,29
- vs. working memory 31,161
Muscle tension and the Stroop effect 65
Neuroticism 126
- and heredity 96
- and level of processing 117, 118
- and thinking task 11 0
Paired-associate learning 101-103
- and anxiety 101-108,117
- and arousal 133,141,142,159
- and caffeine 118
- and incentive 72,90
- and white noise 159,160
Peak shift and anxiety 127
Physical exercise and self-reported arousal 62
Physilogy 4
- and arousal 60, 174
- and evoked potential 18
- and introversion-extraversion 125,126
- and pupillometry 6,58
Posner task 58
- and pupil dilation 58
- and white noise 163
Practice 45
- and anxiety 103
- and automatic processing 9, 10,20,21,23,
26
- andprarallelprocessing 9,10,12,13
- and resource allocation 33
Principle of complementarity 34,35,40,41
Problem solving and incentive 75,76,82
Processing capacity 63-66
- and anxiety 121
- and arousal 35,40,43,59,63-66, 176
-, hierarchical model of 46
- and incentive 92,93
- and task difficulty 175
- and type of processing 36-38
- and white noise 92,93,166
Psychological refractory period 40
Pupil dilation and processing demands 6
Reaction time 77
- and arousal 56,57, 173
- and body temperature 141
- and failure liS
- and incentive 77,79
- and introversion-extraversion 128, 136
- and practice 23,34
- and sleep deprivation 151, 152
- and stimulus-response mapping 40
-, subsidiary task 36-38, 51,52
- and white noise 165
Recognition memory 70
- and arousal 133, 160
- and incentive 70
- and introversion-extraversion 135
- and sleep deprivation ISO
Rehearsal 69
- and arousal 64
- and incentive 69-72,74
-, maintenance vs. elaboration 71,72
- and verbal reasoning 22
- and white noise 161,169,170
Reinforcement 67
- and anxiety reduction 108
- and incentive 68
- and intrinsic motivation 85-87
- and performance 74
Relaxation and anxiety 104
Resultant achievement motivation 114, liS
Retrieval 134,135
- and anxiety 104, 105
- and arousal 186
- and incentive 69,72,74
- and introversion-extraversion 134, 135
- and level of processing 116
Serial learning 133
- and anxiety 107
- and incentive 90,92
- and introversion-extraversion 133
- and sleep deprivation 149
- andtimeofday 143
- and white noise 92,161
Serial reaction task 157,158
- and alcohol 54
- and heat 169
- and incentive 78,79,90,127,148
- and introversion-extraversion 91, 127, 136,
137
- and knowledge of results 184
- and sleep deprivation 148,149,158,184
- and time of day 138,139,141
- and white noise 148,157-159,167-169,181
Shadowing 9
 Subject Index 209
- and discriminability 37 - and memory 141-143
- and target detection ll, 12,38,39 - and self-reported arousal 62,139,174
Short-term memory 69 - and shift work 140, 143
- and anxiety 99, 100 - and short-term memory 139
- and arousal 6, 146 - and vigilance 144, 157
- and attention 19 Token economy 85
- and incentive 72-74 Tsai-Partington Number Tracing Test and
-, retrieval from 19, 20, 29, 37, 38, 128, 134, incentive 90
179
- and sleep deprivation 150 Verbal fluency and introversion-extraversion
-, theoretical view of 22 134
- andtimeofday 142 Verbal reasoning and anxiety 101
- and white noise 52, 165, 170 Vigilance 80
- and working memory 28 - and adrenalin 168
Signal detection measures 80,81 - and incentive 80, 81
- and dual-task performance 50 - and introversion-extraversion 129-132
- and expectancy 14,15 - and signal-detection theory 80,81
- and recognition memory 135 - and sleep deprivation 148,149,152
- and vigilance 80,81,130,157 - and time of day 138,139,141, 144
Sleep deprivation 146-155 - and white noise 131, 144, 148, 156, 157,
- and arousal 55,147,154,155,183,185 167,168
- and attention 152, 153 Visual search 19
- and incentive 92 -, effect oftarget definition on 25
- andlapses 151,152 - and illusory conjunctions 26
- and memory 150, 151 -, parallel vs. serial 25,26
- and motivation 153,154 Visual tracking and white noise 164,165
-, REM 146,147
- and self-reported arousal 62 White noise 156-172
- and serial reaction 91, 148, 149, 158, 182, - and arousal 55,156,182,183
184 - andattentionalselectivity 164-167,172
- and time on task 54,55 - and dual-task performance 52
- and vigilance 148,152 - and incentive 92
- and visual tracking 148 - and long-term memory 142,159,160,162
Sodium amytal and introversion-extraversion - and masking 159,161,167-169
125 - and paired-associate learning 64, 142
Speed-accuracy trade-off and incentive 76,83 - and perceptual selection 56
Spoonerisms 32 - and resources 171
Stress 95,96 - and retrieval 128,163,164
- and distractibility 98 - and self-reported arousal 62, 174
- andfailureandshock 1I2, 1I3 - and serial reaction 79, 157-159, 171, 181,
- and memory span 100 182
- and self-reported arousal 174 - and serial recall 64,161,162
Stroop effect 16,17,40 - and short-term memory 159-162,171
- and adrenalin 168 - and the letter-transformation task 49, 65,
- and anxiety 120 161,170,171
- and heart rate 173 - and time on task 54,55,157,158
- and muscle tension 65 - and vigilance 13 I, 144, 156, 157
- and white noise 65 - and working memory 161,162,169,170
Subtraction method 178, 179 Working memory 28-33
Success 113 - and anxiety 99-101,121-123
- and anxiety 107 - and arousal 50
- and attribution theory 113 -, articulatory component of 28-30, 32, 44, 45
-, capacity of 32
-, definition of 28
Timeofday 138-146 - and free recall 29,32
- and arousal 145,146 - and mental arithmetic 30, 31
- and body temperature 125,139-141,144 - and rehearsal 64, 65
- and caffeine 144, 145 - and white noise 16 I, 162
- and impulsivity 144, 145 Worry 96,97
- and introversion-extraversion 144,145 - and failure 1I3
- and levels of processing 143 - and performance 97-99, 122
 C. S. Carver, M. F. Scheier

Attention and
Self-Regulation
A Control-Theory Approach to Human Behavior

1981. XVI, 403 pages

(Springer Series in Social Psychology)
ISBN 3-540-90553-7

Contents: Background. - Information and the Use of Recog-

nitory Schemas. - Attention and Motivation. - Interruption,
Expectancy and the Reassertion-Withdrawal Decision. -
Implications for Specific Problems in Social and Personality
Psychology. - Conclusion. - References. - Author Index. -
Subject Index.

In a stimulating approach to the study of human behavior,

this new volume in the Springer Series in Social Psycho-
logy applies the concepts of control theory - cybernetics -
to behavioral self-regulation.
After defining cybernetic concepts, which have had a signifi-
cant impact on many scientific disciplines, the authors clearly
demonstrate how control theory can be used to bridge the
gap between information-processing models ofcognition and
the motivated actions that are generally ignored by the infor-
mation-processing approach. Carver and Scheier construct
a highly integrated model of human behavior that departs
considerably from traditional paradigms. The integrative
potential of the Carver-Scheier model is reflected in the wide
range of topics discussed in this volume, including schema
formation and use, achievement motivation, egotism, social
facilitation, helplessness, anxiety-based behavior, and
impression management.
Springer-Verlag Intertwining recent research and theory in social, personality,
Berlin and cognitive psychology, Attention and Self-Regulation
has a comprehensive perspective that cuts across existing
Heidelberg boundaries in the field. As a theoretical break-through,
Attention and Self-Regulation promises to be a milestone
NewYork in a burgeoning area of psychological inquiry.
Children's Logical and
Mathematical Cognition
Progress in Cognitive Development Research
Editor: C. 1. Brainerd
1982. Approx. 16 figures. Approx. 200 pages
(Springer Series in Cognitive Development)
ISBN 3-540-90635-5
H.1. Eysenck
The Structure and Measurement
of Intelligence
With contributions by D. W Fulker
1979.69 figures, 38 tables. V, 253 pages
ISBN 3-540-09028-2
WH.Gaddes
Learning Disabilities and
Brain Function
A Neuropsychological Approach
Foreword: W Cruickshank
1980.45 figures, 4 tables .. XVI, 403 pages
ISBN 3-540-90486-7
W W Henton, 1. H. Iversen
Classical Conditioning and
Operant Conditioning
A Response Pattern Analysis
1978. 106 figures, 16 tables. XVII, 355 pages
ISBN 3-540-90326-7
V. A Kovalevsky
Image Pattern Recognition
Translated from the Russian by A Brown
1980.54 figures, 9 tables. Xl, 241 pages
ISBN 3-540-90440-9
A Model for Personality
Editor: H. 1. Eysenck
With contributions by numerous experts
1981. 75 figures. XII, 287 pages
ISBN 3-540-10318-X
D.WPfafT
Estrogens and Brain Function
Neural Analysis of a Hormone-Controlled
Mammalian Reproductive Behavior
1980. 109 figures, 1 in color, 20 tables.
X, 281 pages
ISBN 3-540-90487-5
E.Szekely
Functional Laws of Psycho-
dynamics
1979.63 figures, 10 tables. VIII, 353 pages
ISBN 3-540-90371-2
Verbal Processes in Children
Progress in Cognitive Development Research
Editors: C. 1. Brainerd, M. Pressley
1982. Approx. 10 figures. Approx. 320 pages
(Springer Series in Cognitive Development)
ISBN 3-540-90648-7

Improving the Human Condition:

Quality and Stability
in Social Systems
Proceedings of the Silver Anniversary Inter-
national Meeting, London, England, Springer-Verlag
August 20-24,1979
Editor: R F. Ericson Berlin
1979.253 figures, 61 tables.
XXVIII, 1051 pages
Heidelberg
ISBN 3-540-90442-5 NewYork