DIVISION

[ GR No. 177728, Jul 31, 2009 ]

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ v. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA +

DECISION

612 Phil. 167

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then
19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino
and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005,
Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live
with Dominique's parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz
"Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the child's
birth, using Dominique's surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the child's Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of
the Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed
by Dominique's father Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the
lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity
had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY"
which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which
read:

AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I'M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS
COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED
JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER'S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO
AND MY MOTHER'S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT'S
ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenie's application for registration of the child's name in this wise:

7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the `Family
Code of the Philippines'"]) provides that:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the
father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the child:

1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 - Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity - or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was
raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the
child's name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity
in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was
declared in default. Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances
of her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during
his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.[11] She offered Dominique's handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief.[12] Dominique's lone brother,
Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie's declarations.[13]

By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as
the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father
may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:

2.2 Private handwritten instrument - an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly
signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same
does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal
issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED

FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF
PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID
MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER'S SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that
the private handwritten instrument containing the putative father's admission of paternity must be
signed by him. They add that the deceased's handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is
sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-
quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]

Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique's handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the child's paternity.[17]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent's position, as
affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominique's Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie's pregnancy
but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."[18]

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child's paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
necessary.[19]

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the child's paternity must be signed by the putative father. This
provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O.
No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of
Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to
hold that Dominique's Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement
of the law. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child's birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenie's testimony is corroborated by
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique's father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother
Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique's paternity of the child give life to
his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."

In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing
filiation, discoursing in relevant part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. -- The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to
be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts
by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and
the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on
various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique's
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts
extant herein - that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents' house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal;
she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his
death, Jenie gave birth to the child - they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique's.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."[24] Too, "(t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development."[25] In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname
of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births.

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro, and Peralta,* JJ., concur.
August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM,

JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and
CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN
VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as
represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR
JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued
by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John
Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare
the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas
City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled
"Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa
Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated
June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An
Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay
Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties
Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City,
through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City
Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an

association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the
protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities
exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students
with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or
impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to
pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no
reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes
Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of
the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable
means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government
can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty
for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the
dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort
to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which
up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that
were legally demandable and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court
"are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts'
expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to
be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground
that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to
travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which
prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-
judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of
legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners'
direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial
Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is
tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it]
is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is
the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which
'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other
words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's
exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by
merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case
given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances
impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against
the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from
the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which
perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for
adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued
the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not
merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those
assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct
injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest'
in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the
official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation
of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights,
namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary
right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to
raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the
petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b)
as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne
Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the
ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they
could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the
parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as
parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted
that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly
filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not
question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the
representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to

bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing
as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy.
More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right
to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal
standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court
may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the
inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed
under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the
right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a
relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their
children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out
their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on
their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the
child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that
they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its
vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due
process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural
due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due
process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for
adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly
integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there
is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in
the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to
what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances'
lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew
Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government
to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a
void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled
enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to
second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous
provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably
decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was
ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary
application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of
the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor
would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify
suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in
statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the
law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew
ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing
principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a
municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read and
implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to
be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age.
In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual
assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under
the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this
regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go
home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews
is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot
logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The
duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it
is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to
prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people
into mature, socially responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in
our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural,"
but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State
in the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over
their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over
children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these
rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to
parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens
patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live
up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances
further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral
well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during
this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are
not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them.
Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate
their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a
more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the
US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew
would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who
desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal
behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to
spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right
to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to
travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the
application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State
interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the
Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of
speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism
Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise
the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's
"very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the
speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free
speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that
claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges
can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial
challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of
expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there
being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of
liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of
citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where
they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such
as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of
the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v.
Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association
require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot
be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church,
their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting
hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the
sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply
limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First
Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation
"be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA
9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as
amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government
units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew
hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents
have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603
provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of
the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are
always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and
the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors'
exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel,
minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than
their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors'
activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the
well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even
though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the
minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...
sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations
on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions
by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation
in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened

dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints
and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the
crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms
arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late
now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police
power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate
contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even
in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in
work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel
rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification
either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies
when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by
our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights
of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court
teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of
those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long]
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a
greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential
analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a
juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a
compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than
adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on
minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances
of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve
their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the
strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or
the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This
Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so
as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors,
recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance,
education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or
private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming
around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various
infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children
during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a
restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully,
especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of
society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City
Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost
to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity
of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during
the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first
stated interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of
information from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey
of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime
reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are
entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make
for a safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome
character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or
aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to
these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials
with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its
curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was
directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila
presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes
involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to
their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate
concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if
the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive
means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny
test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary
to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as
they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social,
religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being
narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion
and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at
the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant
Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the
various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters
from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to
repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very
narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an
attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment
rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or
voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the
Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a)
minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running
lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency
purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are
required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes;
(b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a
specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running
errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority
over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the
curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's
day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy
Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are
inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be
fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from
school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater
extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected
liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging
in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities;
thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors'
social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the
Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such
as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion
is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political
rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably
assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside
curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate
activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to
protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of
criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the
State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance,
with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations,
are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by
the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required
or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to
circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the
city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized
by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning
home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is
more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of
these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to
attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of
other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are
also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic
or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance,
the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel,
the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth,
only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who
publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful
errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception
found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents
or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception
so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not
superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is
dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent
due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case
it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of
tender years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and
balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say,
these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful
exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in
this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss
the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8
thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires
the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine
imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed
various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person
exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days,
or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the
City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these
sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments

concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No
penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to
their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child
shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance
shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for
children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of
minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status
offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them
for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment

or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or
negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement,
or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor
in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention
program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an
ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors
an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without
the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal
orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society
and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and
57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the
minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or
warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
"gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases
explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly
not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and
for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment
imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a
"public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer
or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed,
to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including
the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS
and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus,
for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations,
portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear
language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the
impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to
the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing
reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must
be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046,
issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of
2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,
VALID in accordance with this Decision.
April 25, 2017

G.R. No. 199669

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision2 dated June 17, 2011, and Resolution3 dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102486, which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of1 Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) (now
National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of:
Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act
of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens
and persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.

The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of: drugstore operation in the
Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their
effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring1 establishments.

Factual Antecedents

On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," was enacted. Under
the said law, a senior citizen, who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual income of not
more than P60,000.00,4 may avail of the privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines. The said provision states:

Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. - x x x:

a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers
and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may
claim the cost as tax credit[.]

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior citizens, covered establishments can
claim an equal amount as tax credit which can be applied against the income tax due from them.

On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending
some provisions of R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines but removed the annual income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the
privileges under the law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to
senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost of
goods sold or services rendered. The pertinent provision, as amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as
follows:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

xxxx

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended. (Emphasis ours)

On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9257. Article 8 of Rule VI of the said IRR provides:

Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 - Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in
Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 -Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based
on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount
is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department
of Finance (DOF). (Emphasis ours)

The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior citizens did not sit well with some drug
store owners and corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their business. Thus, on January
13, 2005, I Carlos Superdrug Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other. corporation and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) I and/or Preliminary Injunction before this Court, entitled Carlos
Superdrug I Corporation v. DSWD,5docketed as G.R. No. 166494, assailing the constitutionality of
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of private property
without payment of just compensation. In a Decision dated June 29, 2007, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate exercise of police
power. The relevant portions of the decision read, thus:

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.

xxxx
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides
the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian
reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of
RA. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.6 (Citations omitted)

On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
Subsequently, the Court issued Resolution dated August 21, 2007, denying the said motion with
finality. 7

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons" was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007,
R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is
the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of
PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257,
covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross
income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Section 32 ofR.A. No. 9442 reads:

CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives

SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:

xxxx

(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;

xxxx

The establishments may claim the discounts granted in subsections (a), (b), (c), (e), (t) and (g)
as taxdeductions based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided,
however, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended. (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was promulgated by the DSWD, Department of
Education, DOF, Department of Tourism and the Department of Transportation and
Communications.8Sections 5 .1 and 6.1.d thereof provide:

Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules and Regulations, these terms are defined as
follows:

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of RA 7277, "An Act
Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as
amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes." This is
defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or
sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for
human being. Disability shall mean: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such
individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.

xxxx

6.1.d Purchase of Medicine - At least twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine
for the exclusive use and enjoyment of persons with disability. All drug stores, hospital, pharmacies,
clinics and other similar establishments selling medicines are required to provide at least twenty
percent (20%) discount subject to the guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.

On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the CA, seeking to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 9257, and (b) Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar as these
provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered as compensation to private establishments for the 20% discount that they are
required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs. Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be
permanently enjoined from implementing the assailed provisions.

Ruling of the CA

On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating the ruling of the Court in Carlos
Superdrug10particularly that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police power.
Moreover, the CA held that considering that the same question had been raised by parties similarly
situated and was resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood as a hindrance to any
further attempt to relitigate the same issue. It further noted that jurisdictional considerations also
compel the dismissal of the action. It particularly emphasized that it has no original or appellate
jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the assailed laws, 11 the same pertaining to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the
principle of hierarchy of courts mandates that the case be commenced and heard by the lower
court. 12 The CA further ruled that the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for
prohibition will not lie to restrain the actions of the respondents for the simple reason that they do not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation of the
questioned provisions. Also, the petition was wanting of the allegations of the specific acts committed
by the respondents that demonstrate the exercise of these powers which may be properly challenged
in a petition for prohibition.13

The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration 14 of the Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA,
but the same was denied in a Resolution 15 dated November 25, 2011.

Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED
WITH THE CA IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 20%,
SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs;

II
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING
IN CARLOS SUPERDRUG CONSTITUTES STARE DECISIS;

III
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
20%, SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONER AND
OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED DRUGSTORES;

IV
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
20°/o SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; and
V
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES AND PWDs ARE NOT VAGUE AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.16

Ruling of the Court

Prohibition may be filed to question

the constitutionality of a law

In the assailed decision, the CA noted that the action, although denominated as one for prohibition,
seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of
R.A. No.9442. It held that in such a case, the proper remedy is not a special civil 1 action but a
petition for declaratory relief, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in the first
instance, and of the Supreme Court, on appeal. 17
The Court clarifies. Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they
have not been vested by law. 18 This is, however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition.
In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., 19 prohibition was also recognized as a proper
remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative
authority. 20 And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail
the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,21therein petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006, or the "Fair Elections
Act," which prohibited the publication of surveys within 15 days before an election for national
candidates, and seven days for local candidates. Included in the petition is a prayer to prohibit the
Commission on Elections from enforcing the said provision. The Court granted the Petition and struck
down the assailed provision for being unconstitutional. 22
In Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al.,23 therein petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of paragraphs (c ), (d), (f) and (g) of Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," on the ground that they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power for granting unbridled discretion to schools and private employers in
determining the manner of drug 'testing of their employees, and that the law constitutes a violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It also sought to enjoin the Dangerous Drugs
Board and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency from enforcing the challenged provision.24 The
Court partially granted the petition by declaring Section 36(f) and (g) of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the concerned agencies from implementing them. 25

In another instance, consolidated petitions for prohibitions26 questioning the constitutionality of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund were deliberated upon by this Court which ultimately granted
the same.
Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to challenge the constitutionality of various
laws, rules, and regulations.
There is also no question regarding the jurisdiction of the CA to hear and decide a petition for
prohibition. By express provision of the law, particularly Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129,27 the CA was granted "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or I processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." This authority· the CA enjoys concurrently with RTCs and this Court.
In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the ·. hierarchy of courts does not pose
any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at hand. It is well to remember that "the judicial
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual
allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the
parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before
appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of
courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
legal questions."28
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons,
such as when dictated by public welfare and ' the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice.29 Thus, when based on the good judgment of the court, the urgency and
significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should not hesitate to exercise its duty
to resolve. The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically raises a legal
question on the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the breadth of its rightful beneficiaries.
More importantly, the resolution of the issues will redound to the benefit of the public as it will put to
rest the questions on the propriety of the granting of discounts to senior citizens and PWDs amid the
fervent insistence of affected establishments that the measure transgresses their property rights. The
Court, therefore, finds it to the best interest of justice that the instant petition be resolved.
The instant case is not barred by
stare decisis

The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug constitutes
as stare decisis or law of the case which bars the relitigation of the issues that had been resolved
therein and had been raised anew in the instant petition. It argues that there are substantial
differences between Carlos Superdrug and the circumstances in the instant case which take it out
from the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis. It cites that in Carlos Superdrug, the Court denied
the petition because the petitioner therein failed to prove the confiscatory effect of the tax deduction
scheme as no proof of actual loss was submitted. It believes that its submission of financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to prove the confiscatory effect of the law is a material fact
that distinguishes the instant case from that of Carlos Superdrug. 30 The Court agrees that the ruling
in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the instant case, not because of the
petitioner's submission of financial statements which were wanting in the first case, but because it
had the good sense of including questions that had not been raised or deliberated in the former case
of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of
the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal protection clause. Nonetheless, the Court
finds nothing in the instant case that merits a reversal of the earlier ruling of the Court in Carlos
Superdrug. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, there is a very slim difference between the issues
in Carlos Superdrug and the instant case with respect to the nature of the senior citizen discount. A
perfunctory reading of the circumstances of the two cases easily discloses marked similarities in the
issues and the arguments raised by the petitioners in both cases that semantics nor careful play of
words can hardly obscure. In both cases, it is apparent that what the petitioners are ultimately
questioning is not the grant of the senior citizen discount per se, but the manner by which they were
allowed to recoup the said discount. In particular, they are protesting the change in the tax treatment
of the senior citizen discount from tax credit to being merely a deduction from gross income which
they claimed to have significantly reduced their profits.

This question had been settled in Carlos Superdrug, where the Court ruled that the change in the tax
treatment of the discount was a valid exercise of police power, thus:

Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of
the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.

xxxx
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not
meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.

The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of
senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement
and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior
citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides:

SEC. 2. [R.A.] No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.- Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution,
it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of
social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development."
Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these constitutional principles the following
are the declared policies of this Act:

xxxx

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of
senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.

To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical
and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for
domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending
the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because proper rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. 31 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the
original) Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in
their lives when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not much
because of choice, they become needing of support from the society for whom they presumably spent
their productive days and for whose betterment they' exhausted their energy, know-how and
experience to make our days better to live. In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is
an equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society. 32This entails the creation of opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to
balance the playing field which had been unduly tilted against them because of their limitations. The
duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the community
and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens patriae which
holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially those
who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and refers to the
State in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those unable
to
care for themselves. 33 In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent
powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy,34the Court passed upon one of the inherent powers of the state,
the police power, where it emphasized, thus:
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the
three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons. 35 (Citations omitted) It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A.
Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior
citizens and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said
discount be claimed as tax deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments. The
petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is illegal as it
constitutes taking without just compensation. It even submitted financial statements for the years
2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when the change in the policy was
implemented. The Court is not swayed. To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no
relevance in the instant case as it had already been made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power
being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police
power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
In Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of the DSWD, et al., 36 the Court ruled that by
examining the nature and the effects of R.A. No. 9257, it becomes apparent that the challenged
governmental act was an exercise of police power. It was held, thus:

[W]e now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it constitutes an exercise
of police power or eminent domain. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior
citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to
mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive
years of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural
Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its nature and effects, the
20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and
services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject regulation affects the
pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment. However, it does not purport to
appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely
regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross
sales that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may
be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of 'return on
investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. x x x.37 (Citations
omitted) In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State."38 Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all,
the overriding purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and
safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the
point of interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order to advance common good. To
warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the! State; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.39 The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257
and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals whose well-being is a recognized public
duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care devolves upon the concerted efforts of the
State, the family and the community. In Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, the State is
mandated to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power1 for the common good. The more
apparent manifestation of these social inequities is the unequal distribution or access to healthcare
services. To: abet in alleviating this concern, the State is committed to adopt an integrated! and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with priority for the
needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.40 In the same manner, the
family and the community have equally significant duties to perform in reducing social inequality. The
family as the basic social institution has the foremost duty to care for its elderly members.41 On the
other hand, the community, which include the private sector, is recognized as an active partner of the
State in pursuing greater causes. The private sector, being recipients of the privilege to engage
business in our land, utilize our goods as well as the services of our people for proprietary purposes,
it is only fitting to expect their support in measures that contribute to common good. Moreover, their
right to own, establish and operate economic enterprises is always subject to the duty of the State to
promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.42 The Court also
entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to implement the declared
policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of
senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The
measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim that it was
confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must be taking of property without just
compensation. Illuminating on this point is the discussion of the Court on the concept of taking in City
of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,43 viz.:

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

xxxx

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. x x x. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings
is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property
in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner
acquired the land make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

xxxx

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.44 (Citations omitted) The petitioner herein attempts to
prove its claim that the pertinent provisions of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 amount to taking by
presenting financial statements purportedly showing financial losses incurred by them due to the
adoption of the tax deduction scheme. For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the
financial statement is not of compelling significance in justifying its claim for just compensation. What
is imperative is for it to establish that there was taking in the constitutional sense or that, in the
imposition of the mandatory discount, the power exercised by the state was eminent domain.
According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi,45five circumstances must be present in
order to qualify "taking" as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private
property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. 46 The first requirement speaks
of entry into a private property which clearly does not obtain in this case. There is no private property
that is; invaded or appropriated by the State. As it is, the petitioner precipitately deemed future profits
as private property and then proceeded to argue that the State took it away without full compensation.
This seemed preposterous considering that the subject of what the petitioner supposed as taking was
not even earned profits but merely an expectation of profits, which may not even occur. For obvious
reasons, there cannot be taking of a contingency or of a mere possibility because it lacks physical
existence that is necessary before there could be any taking. Further, it is impossible to quantify the
compensation for the loss of supposed profits before it is earned. The supposed taking also lacked
the characteristics of permanence 47 and consistency.1âwphi1 The presence of these characteristics
is significant because they can establish that the effect of the questioned provisions is the same on all
establishments and those losses are indeed its unavoidable consequence. But apparently these
indications are wanting in this case. The reason is that the impact on the establishments varies
depending on their response to the changes brought about by the subject provisions. To be clear,
establishments, are not prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the
granting of the discount and retain their profitability while being fully compliant to the laws. It follows
that losses are not inevitable because establishments are free to take business measures to
accommodate the contingency. Lacking in permanence and consistency, there can be no taking in
the constitutional sense. There cannot be taking in one establishment and none in another, such that
the former can claim compensation but the other may not. Simply told, there is no taking to justify
compensation; there is only poor business decision to blame. There is also no ousting of the owner or
deprivation of ownership. Establishments are neither divested of ownership of any of their properties
nor is anything forcibly taken from them. They remain the owner of their goods and their profit or loss
still depends on the performance of their sales. Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are
also provided with a mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts they grant the senior citizens and
PWDs. It is provided in Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 that
establishments may claim the discounts as "tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered." Basically, whatever amount was given as discount, covered establishments may
claim an equal amount as an expense or tax deduction. The trouble is that the petitioner, in protesting
the change in the tax treatment of the discounts, apparently seeks tax incentive and not merely a
return of the amount given as discounts. It premised its interpretation of financial losses in terms of
the effect of the change in the tax treatment of the discount on its tax liability; hence, the claim that
the measure was confiscatory. However, as mentioned earlier in the discussion, loss of profits is not
the inevitable result of the change in tax treatment of the discounts; it is more appropriately a
consequence of poor business decision. It bears emphasizing that the law does not place a cap on
the amount of mark up that covered establishments may impose on their items. This rests on the
discretion of the establishment which, of course, is expected to put in the price of the overhead costs,
expectation of profits and other considerations into the selling price of an item. In a simple illustration,
here is Drug A, with acquisition cost of ₱8.00, and selling price of ₱10.00. Then comes a law that
imposes 20% on senior citizens and PWDs, which affected Establishments 1, 2 and 3. Let us
suppose that the approximate number of patrons who purchases Drug A is 100, half of which are
senior citizens and PWDs. Before the passage of the law, all of the establishments are earning the
same amount from profit from the sale of Drug A, viz.:

Before the passage of the law:

Drug A
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ₱10.00
Number of patrons 100
Sales:
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Profit: ₱200

After the passage of the law, the three establishments reacted differently. Establishment 1 was
passive and maintained the price of Drug A at ₱8.00 which understandably resulted in diminution of
profits.

Establishment 1

Drug A
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ;₱10.00
Number of patrons 100
Senior Citizens/PWD 50
Sales
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Deduction: ₱100.00
Profit: ₱100.00
On the other hand, Establishment 2, mindful that the new law will affect the profitability of the
business, made
calculated decision by increasing the mark up of Drug A to ₱3.20, instead of only ₱2.00. This brought
a positive result to the earnings of the company.

Establishment 2

Drug A
Acquisition cost ;₱8.00
Selling price ₱11.20
Number of patron 100
Senior Citizens/PWDs 50
Sales
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Deduction: ₱112.00
Profit: ₱208.00

For its part, Establishment 3 raised the mark up on Drug A to only ₱3.00 just to even out the effect of
the law. This measure left a negligible effect on its profit, but Establishment 3 took it as a social duty:
to share in the cause being promoted by the government while still maintaining profitability.

Establishment 3

Drug A
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ₱11.20
Number of patrons 100
Senior Citizens/PWD 50
Sales
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Deduction: ₱110.00
Profit: ₱190.00

The foregoing demonstrates that it is not the law per se which occasioned the losses in the covered
establishments but bad business I judgment. One of the main considerations in making business
decisions is the law because its effect is widespread and inevitable. Literally, anything can be a
subject of legislation. It is therefore incumbent upon business managers to cover this contingency and
consider it in making business strategies. As shown in the illustration, the better responses were
exemplified by Establishments 2 and 3 which promptly put in the additional costs brought about by
the law into the price of Drug A. In doing so, they were able to maintain the profitability of the
business, even earning some more, while at the same time being fully compliant with the law. This is
not to mention that the illustration is even too simplistic and not' the most ideal since it dealt only with
a single drug being purchased by both regular patrons and senior citizens and PWDs. It did not
consider the accumulated profits from the other medical and non-medical products being sold by the
establishments which are expected to further curb the effect of the granting of the discounts in the
business. It is therefore unthinkable how the petitioner could have suffered losses due to the
mandated discounts in R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, when a fractional increase in the prices of items
could bring the business standing at a balance even with the introduction of the subject laws. A level
adjustment in the pricing of items is a reasonable business measure to take in order to adapt to the
contingency. This could even make establishments earn more, as shown in the illustration, since
every fractional increase in the price of covered items translates to a wider cushion to taper off the
effect of the granting of discounts and ultimately results to additional profits gained from the
purchases of the same items by regular patrons who are not entitled to the discount. Clearly, the
effect of the subject laws in the financial standing of covered companies depends largely on how they
respond and forge a balance between profitability and their sense of social responsibility. The
adaptation is entirely up to them and they are not powerless to make adjustments to accommodate
the subject legislations. Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the sense that the
State takes away a portion of its supposed profits which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it
for public purpose. The petitioner claims that the action of the State amounts to taking for which it
should be compensated. To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit,
and not earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a vested right or an
entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such that its invasion or deprivation warrants
compensation. Vested rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable."48 More extensively, they are
depicted as follows:

Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not
subject to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private person, and which it is right and
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and
settled according to the then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be deprived
arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be deprived otherwise than by the
established methods of procedure and for the public welfare. x x x A right is not 'vested' unless it is
more than a mere expectation based on the anticipated continuance of present laws; it must be an
established interest in property, not open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its accurate legal sense,
a right must be complete and consummated, and one of which the person to whom it belongs cannot
be divested without his consent.x x x.49 (Emphasis ours) Right to profits does not give the petitioner
the cause of action to ask for just compensation, it being only an inchoate right or one that has not
fully developed50 and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere
expectation, which may or may not come into existence. It is contingent as it only comes "into
existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event
may prevent their vesting."51 Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim confiscation or taking of something
that has yet to exist. It cannot claim deprivation of profit before the consummation of a sale and the
purchase by a senior citizen or PWD. Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute nor
indefeasible. It does not come into being until the occurrence or realization of a condition precedent. It
is a mere "contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It stands for a mere possibility of profit
but nothing might ever be payable under it."52 The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the
possibility of compensation because it lacks the quality or characteristic which is necessary before
any act of taking or expropriation can be effected. Moreover, there is no yardstick fitting to quantify a
contingency or to determine compensation for a mere possibility. Certainly, "taking" presupposes the
existence of a subject that has a quantifiable or determinable value, characteristics which a mere
contingency does not possess. Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction,
suffice it is to say that it is within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative
power. It has the authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline the effective measures to
achieve its declared policies and even impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole
discretion to decide which policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do
not interfere in this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. "In
performing this duty, the legislature has no guide but its judgment and discretion and the wisdom of
experience."53 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,54legislative discretion has been described as follows:
Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of means, and ends with the adoption of
methods and details to carry the delegated powers into effect. x x x [W]hile the powers are rigidly
limited to the enumerations of the Constitution, the means which may be employed to carry the
powers into effect are not restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end,
and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the Constitution. x x x. 55 (Emphasis
ours) Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or tax credit is a matter addressed to
the wisdom of the legislature. After all, it is within its prerogative to enact laws which it deems
sufficient to address a specific public concern. And, in the process of legislation, a bill goes through
rigorous tests of validity, necessity and sufficiency in both houses of Congress before enrolment. It
undergoes close scrutiny of the members of Congress and necessarily had to surpass the arguments
hurled against its passage. Thus, the presumption of validity that goes with every law as a form of
deference to the process it had gone through and also to the legislature's exercise of discretion. Thus,
in lchong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez) etc., and Sarmiento,56the Court emphasized, thus: It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of
any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to
implement the public policy or to achieve public interest.x x x.57 (Emphasis ours) The legislature
may also grant rights and impose additional burdens: It may also regulate industries, in the exercise
of police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are akin to regulatory laws,
the issuance of which is within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law, zoning ordinances,
price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours
to eight, and the like fall under this category. 58 Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of
police power measures from which affected persons or entities cannot claim exclusion or
compensation. For instance, private establishments cannot protest that the imposition of the minimum
wage is confiscatory since it eats up a considerable chunk of its profits or that the mandated
remuneration is not commensurate for the work done. The compulsory nature of the provision for
minimum wages underlies the effort of the State; as R.A. No. 672759 expresses it, to promote
productivity-improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the
workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production;
to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow
business and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth, and as the
Constitution expresses it, to affirm labor as a primary social economic force. 60 Similarly, the
imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 758161 is likewise a valid exercise of police
power and affected establishments cannot argue that the law was depriving them of supposed gains.
The law seeks to ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime commodities at reasonable
prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return on investment. It likewise aims to
provide effective and sufficient protection to consumers against hoarding, profiteering and cartels with
respect to the supply, distribution, marketing and pricing of said goods, especially during periods of
calamity, emergency, widespread illegal price manipulation and other similar situations.62 More
relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc.,63it was ruled that it is within the bounds of the police power
of the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits, such as in the
imposition of price control measures. There is no compensable taking but only a recognition of the
fact that they are subject to the regulation of the State and that all personal or private interests must
bow down to the more paramount interest of the State. This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of
the State does not authorize the destruction of the business. While a business may be regulated,
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. 64 After all,
regulation only signifies control or restraint, it does not mean suppression or absolute prohibition.
Thus, in Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 65 the Court emphasized:
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of
the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection of the laws. 66 (Citation omitted) Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos.
9257 and 9442, under the guise of regulation, allow undue interference in an otherwise legitimate
business.1avvphi1 On the contrary, it was shown that the questioned laws do not meddle in the
business or take anything from it but only regulate its realization of profits.

The subject laws do not violate the

equal protection clause

The petitioner argues that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are violative of the equal protection clause in that
it failed to distinguish between those who have the capacity to pay and those who do not, in granting
the 20% discount. R.A. No. 9257, in particular, removed the income qualification in R.A. No. 7432
of'₱60,000.00 per annum before a senior citizen may be entitled to the 20o/o discount. The
contention lacks merit. The petitioner's argument is dismissive of the reasonable qualification on
which the subject laws were based. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 67 the Court emphasized:

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.68 (Citations omitted) The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another."69 For a classification to
be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. 70 To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to
income, is a valid classification. The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own
and deemed it a priority to address their needs. When the Constitution declared its intention to
prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children,71 it did
not make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a
blanket privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their
class. R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities. 72 Specifically, it caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is
based on age and therefore qualifies all who have attained the age of 60. Senior citizens are a class
of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government support, and the fact that they
may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege. It is well to
consider that our senior citizens have already reached the age when work opportunities have
dwindled concurrently as their physical health.1âwphi1 They are no longer expected to work, but
there are still those who continue to work and contribute what they can to the country. Thus, to single
them out and take them out of the privileges of the law for continuing to strive and earn income to
fend for themselves is inimical to a welfare state that the Constitution envisions. It is tantamount to
penalizing them for their persistence. It is commending indolence rather than rewarding diligence. It
encourages them to become wards of the State rather than productive partners. Our senior citizens
were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract workers of the past. While some may be well
to do or may have the capacity to support their sustenance, the discretion to avail of the privileges of
the law is up to them. But to instantly tag them. as undeserving of the privilege would be the height of
ingratitude; it is an outright discrimination. The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of
PWDs as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in granting them discounts.1âwphi1 It needs no further
explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for most,' last their entire lifetime. They constitute a
class of their own, equally deserving of government support as our elderlies. While some of them
maybe willing to work and earn income for themselves, their disability deters them from living their full
potential. Thus, the need for assistance from the government to augment the reduced income or
productivity brought about by their physical or intellectual limitations. There is also no question that
the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to
adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development and make essential goods
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with special priority given to the
elderlies and the disabled, among others. The privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and
allow them to live more comfortably. The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the
government for the welfare of the senior citizens and PWDs. It is not some random predicament but
an actual, continuing and pressing concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the laws apply to
all senior citizens and PWDs, respectively, without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt,
all the elements for a valid classification were met.

The definitions of "disabilities" and

"PWDs" are clear and unequivocal

Undeterred, the petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9442 is ambiguous particularly in defining the terms
"disability" and "PWDs," such that it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning. It likewise bewails the futility of the given safeguards to prevent abuse
since government officials who are neither experts nor practitioners of medicine are given the
authority to issue identification cards that authorizes the granting of the privileges under the law. The
Court disagrees. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled
persons" as follows:

(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being[.]

On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An
Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as
amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined
as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for human
being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2)
a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. The foregoing
definitions have a striking conformity with the definition of "PWDs" in Article 1 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which reads:

Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation
in society on an equal basis with others. (Emphasis and italics ours) The seemingly broad definition of
the terms was not without good reasons. It recognizes that "disability is an evolving concept"73 and
appreciates the "diversity of PWDs."74 The terms were given comprehensive definitions so as to
accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not confine it to a particular case as this would
effectively exclude other forms of physical, intellectual or psychological impairments. Moreover,
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 75 it was declared, thus:

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act x x x.76 (Citation omitted) At any rate, the Court gathers no ambiguity
in the provisions of R.A. No. 9442. As regards the petitioner's claim that the law lacked reasonable
standards in determining the persons entitled to the discount, Section 32 thereof is on point as it
identifies who may avail of the privilege and the manner of its availment. It states:

Sec. 32. x x x
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino citizens
upon submission of any of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:

(I) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the place
where the persons with disability resides;
(II) The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or
(III) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
It is, however, the petitioner's contention that the foregoing authorizes government officials who had
no medical background to exercise discretion in issuing identification cards to those claiming to be
PWDs. It argues that the provision lends to the indiscriminate availment of the privileges even by
those who are not qualified. The petitioner's apprehension demonstrates a superficial understanding
of the law and its implementing rules. To be clear, the issuance of identification cards to PWDs does
not depend on the authority of the city or municipal mayor, the DSWD or officials of the NCDA
(formerly NCWDP). It is well to remember that what entitles a person to the privileges of the law is
his disability, the fact of which he must prove to qualify. Thus, in NCDA Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 001, series of 2008, 77 it is required that the person claiming disability must submit the following
requirements before he shall be issued a PWD Identification Card:
1. Two "1 x l" recent ID pictures with the names, and signatures or thumb marks at the back of the
picture.
2. One (1) Valid ID
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability condition 78

To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical certificate or assessment, as the case
maybe, issued by a licensed private or government physician, licensed teacher or head of a business
establishment attesting to his impairment. The issuing entity depends on whether the disability is
apparent or non-apparent. NCDAA.O. No. 001 further provides:79

DISABILITY DOCUMENT ISSUING ENTITY

Apparent Medical Licensed Private or

Disability Certificate Government Physician

School Licensed Teacher duly

Assessment signed by the School
Principal

Certificate of • Head of the

Disability Business

Establishment

• Head of Non-
Government
Organization

Non-Apparent Medical Licensed Private or

Disability Certificate Government Physician

To provide further safeguard, the Department of Health issued A.O. No. 2009-0011, providing
guidelines for the availment of the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by PWDs. In making a
purchase, the individual must present the documents enumerated in Section VI(4)(b ), to wit:

i. PWD identification card x x x

ii. Doctor's prescription stating the name of the PWD, age, sex, address, date, generic name of the
medicine, dosage form, dosage strength, quantity, signature over printed name of physician,
physician's address, contact number of physician or dentist, professional license number,
professional tax receipt number and narcotic license number, if applicable. To safeguard the health of
PWDs and to prevent abuse of [R.A. No.] 9257, a doctor's prescription is required in the purchase of
over-the-counter medicines. x x x.
iii. Purchase booklet issued by the local social/health office to PWDs for free containing the following
basic information:

a) PWD ID number
b) Booklet control number
c) Name of PWD
d) Sex
e) Address
f) Date of Birth
g) Picture
h) Signature of PWD
i) Information of medicine purchased:

i.1 Name of medicine

i.2 Quantity
i.3 Attending Physician
i.4 License Number
i.5 Servicing drug store name
i.6 Name of dispensing pharmacist

j) Authorization letter of the PWD x x x in case the medicine is bought by the representative or
caregiver of the PWD.

The PWD identification card also has a validity period of only three years which facilitate in the
monitoring of those who may need continued support and who have been relieved of their disability,
and therefore may be taken out of the coverage of the law. At any rate, the law has penal provisions
which give concerned establishments the option to file a case against those abusing the privilege
Section 46(b) of R.A. No. 9442 provides that "[a]ny person who abuses the privileges granted herein
shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than six months or a fine of not less than Five
Thousand pesos (₱5,000.00), but not more than Fifty Thousand pesos (₱50,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court." Thus, concerned establishments, together with the proper government
agencies, must actively participate in monitoring compliance with the law so that only the intended
beneficiaries of the law can avail of the privileges. Indubitably, the law is clear and unequivocal, and
the petitioner claim of vagueness to cast uncertainty in the validity of the law does not stand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013

CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and
September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which
affirmed with modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30 (RTC), finding petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 76104 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation
to Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
(Rules on Child Abuse Cases).

The Facts

On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include statements pertaining to the
delivery of private complainant AAA’s6 baby. The Amended Information7 reads:

That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of
Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:

That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent thereto, until June
1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA
who was only 17 years old at that time, having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing
the latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy and
delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her development, to the damage and
prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.

Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges.8 Based on the records, the
undisputed facts are as follows:

AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her
uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a
sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu
City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited
AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third
week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of
March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was
followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998, on
August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in
August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth on March
8, 1999.11 During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose
her virginity due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to
the use of the "withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the
news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s
advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s
mother confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would
marry her daughter.12 Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual
intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no
bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that
he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and
another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of
AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA
because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was
always rejected because she was still studying.13

The RTC’s Ruling

In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases.
Accordingly, it sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from
prision correccional, in its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum. It also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification
the RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. It ruled that
while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.16 On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
clearly showed that Caballo persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal
knowledge with him. Towards this end, Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on
to promise marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she would not get pregnant because he would
be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these repeated coaxing and assuring words that
AAA succumbed to Caballo’s evil desires which deflowered and got her pregnant. On this score, it
observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct and therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.17 It also found basis to sustain
the award of moral damages.18 Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
on September 26, 2011.19 Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "due to the
coercion or influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently, the
interpretation which the Court accords herein would determine whether or not the CA erred in finding
Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of the same proviso. In his petition, Caballo essentially
argues that his promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method" should not be considered as
"persuasion" or "inducement" sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense, asserting that
these should be coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse. He
further alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse
consensual. In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse"
within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon
Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it
points out that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of
the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.

Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing
offense are the following:

(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records disclose that
Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those
instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the second
element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA could not be considered as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or
"influence" on Caballo’s part. The argument is untenable. To put things in proper perspective, it must
be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of affording "special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their commission."23 It also
furthers the "best interests of children" and as such, its provisions are guided by this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same law in order to
penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of
who is considered a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As illumined in
Olivarez,25 citing People v. Larin26 and Amployo v. People,27 the final version of the aforesaid
provision was a product of various deliberations to expand its original coverage to cases where the
minor may have been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, viz:

The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b)
under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...

It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also
one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.

We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:

... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a
situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation...

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore,
it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3(b)
of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:

Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to
cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct,
not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in
this section. The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY
OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT,
SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.

The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no
longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who
is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover
is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for
sexual purposes, only for money or profit.

I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used
for profit or ...

The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is
profit.

Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the
President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.

The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the
amendment?

ANGARA AMENDMENT

Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER
MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et
cetera.

Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.

How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.

The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable ‘child abuse’?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As it is presently worded, Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious
conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to
quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial
as they are to their development. In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free
will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse
involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or

assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children. To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or
trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who
wields it."30 In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified
as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:

First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this
respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in
consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case. Based on
this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains
irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law
is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Unlike rape, therefore, consent is
immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having
sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law
should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner
will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.)
In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)Second,
coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The
age disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to
enable him to force his will upon the latter.

Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence.1âwphi1 Records
reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In
addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal
method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and
eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and
unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with
him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important factor is that
AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually
yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear
thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless,
remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the
law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the
same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the
second element of the subject offense exists.

In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and September 26, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED .
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose
S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante,
Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C.
Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey
C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred
R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael
Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian
Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-
General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National

President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M.
Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO
BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON.
SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY
PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For
Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education;
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive

Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-
GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH

MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO
AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."1 To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's
emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy
and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the
economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only
the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development
of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government,
endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the
reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon
to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its
solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine
society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution. Nothing has polarized the nation more
in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences
freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between
the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has
caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann
C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as
citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S.
Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and
several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and
Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty.
Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are
members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa,
Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political
party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates
the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are
believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.37 It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to
refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38 In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public
officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health
midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.40 It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue
that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest
test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro
bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms
of punishment.43 The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a
medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack
of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail
of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46 In this connection, it is claimed
that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people)
the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family
planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated
by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49 It is claimed that, by giving
absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide
on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed
that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to
determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention
in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano
was also granted leave to intervene.61 The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Meanwhile,
on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62 On May 30, 2013, the Court
held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed
in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were
heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the
Court.63 Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty
(60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted
R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65 In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative
to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or
preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to
any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician." On December 11, 1967, the
Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among
these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing
a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. "
The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and
effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced." To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing
pregnancies." Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's
right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to
the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of
the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and
the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH
Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education.
To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. Stated
differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence
of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to
the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners
find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas
of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest
extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of
family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.74
ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to
the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of
the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper
to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79 Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to
the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating
measure.80 In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power
and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85 In its
relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for
the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86 It has also long
been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address
this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch
done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of
separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights
and principles embodied in the Constitution. In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of
judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise.
The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review
their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the
Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied] As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the
Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona
v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied] In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To
him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention
- of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95 Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the
Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
premature. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100 Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102 In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to
pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate
the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or
act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not
necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.
As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.112 The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the
requisite locus standi. Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114 In relation to locus standi, the "as
applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116 In Coconut Oil Refiners
Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not
be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the
locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119 Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar,
the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and
other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate
court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her
child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1
), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being
one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.123 To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125 Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a
reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of
the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives
and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country. It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to
provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies,
which are all intended to prevent pregnancy. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention
that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled
birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128 Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin
E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied] In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. The one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act."129 Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1 - The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130 According to the petitioners, despite its
express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has
life. They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131 As it opposes the initiation
of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132 Finally, it is
contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for
abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the
Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care
services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass
judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135 For his part,
respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137 Even if not
formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any
authority or the laws of men. In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not
of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing
rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the
country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives
in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to
afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the
Court could express their own views on this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view
that life begins at fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on
the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend
that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144 One of
the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be
no departure. The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;
and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law
to prevail. In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization. Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming
pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of
developing into a being like its parents.145 Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146 Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child
has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written: Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads: "The State shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is
alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins
doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are
vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life. The
second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A
chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human. Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if
the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its
nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with
the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to
use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152 Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized
ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's
own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life
to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about
it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153 Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of
the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed
already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-
called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred,
the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be
banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins. Equally apparent, however, is that
the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient
is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. As emphasized by the Framers of the
Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I
would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the
world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised
some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner
Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer. I mentioned that if we
institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point
in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as
the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking
route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of
these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche: Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin: There is no life.
Atty. Noche: So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin: To be protected.
Atty. Noche: Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin: So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche: Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin: Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche: Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am
discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin: Alright.

Atty. Noche: And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing,
and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be
the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in
the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. Similarly, recent medical
research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte
(ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the
mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large
diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162 The authors of Human
Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the
embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity." In support of the RH Bill,
The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its
strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human
life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new
lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and
human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point
along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be
posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of
a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This
conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical,
moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. For the above reasons, the
Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages
in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO,
he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167 This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution. Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position. If such theory
would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate
religious-based divisiveness. It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or
any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169 A reading of the RH Law would show that
it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-
related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and
personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise
known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination
of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with
the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden
duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which
induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind). By expressly
declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only
begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection
will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that:
one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the
fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation. From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's
position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of
life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as
it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used
as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive
product or supply will be used.171 Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe,
legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as
worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent
with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other
forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis
supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172 This cannot be done. In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del
Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires. Evidently, with the addition of the
word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will
only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this definition of
"contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because
of their fail-safe mechanism.174 Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the
FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only
be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary
effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution."175 To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"
embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that
the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold
increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180 The OSG, however, points out that
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:

HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied) This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the
petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185 The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to
leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a
good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there
exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be dispensed and used without prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other
Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with
the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or
drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes,
the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH
shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement
and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the
current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH. Thus, in the
distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public
health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and
devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental
to their use.187 At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that,
at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself. At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress
cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-
abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction. Stated
differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.

3 - Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX
explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the
sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190 They further argue
that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient
seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures.
They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in
public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the
law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH
Law, are also not recognize.191 Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile,
contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling
them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and
1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use
of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192 Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of
religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin
under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the
acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It
does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable
human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194 Finally, the
petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim
that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode
or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any
religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by
providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the
Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others
of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against
his free will.199 The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be
allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the
same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize
only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201 With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -
and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely
exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202 Whatever burden is
placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203 Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to
have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without intervention of the State.204 For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion
that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy.
Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic
Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people
of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. The Filipino people in
"imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills
into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. The Framers, however,
felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in
Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally,
the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand,
the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to
a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the
State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in

Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. In short, the constitutional assurance of religious
freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The
establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious
freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of
one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct.
1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses
were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210 Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's
religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom
to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought.
So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212 The second part
however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same
case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217 In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of
religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state
interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first
case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and
present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent
cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious
freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case
mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state
interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni
Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible
Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and
immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in
cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that
religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however,
which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the
case. The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni
Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine,
aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the
most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with
just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially
the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest"
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the
paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will
not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief.
For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. At first blush, it
appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his
religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are
the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right
to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized
as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and
their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their
religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's

organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial
to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will
address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according
to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)]
(Emphases supplied) While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an
anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided
in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the
State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be
reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a
hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services
under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based
on religious or ethical beliefs. In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened
by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations
under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny. In
applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with
what the RH Law promotes. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH
Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.222 Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he
abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech,
it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not
to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits
any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224 In
case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and
the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Interestingly, on April
24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious
objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate,
supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House
stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227 While the said case did not
cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the
RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers
should be respected. In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."10 The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to
stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the
Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, that skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. This is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious
belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered
exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public
or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe
that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere,
to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid
views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then
are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.229 The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in
the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law
must prevail.

Justice Mendoza: I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52,
you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed
you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman: Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have
not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza: I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law.
But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their
office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman: I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza: In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can
be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman: Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the
subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that
the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the
curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro: Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro: ... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling
State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro: What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a
free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship
between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of
the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232 Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It
also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to
one's belief.233 Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether
or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters. Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to
justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed
to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being
contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other
means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners
who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation.
Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection
of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms. At any rate, there are other secular steps
already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The
pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of
women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services,
due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and
the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice
to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall
be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors
with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development
of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest
was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from
reputable sources. The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that
the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was
still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest. Granting that there are still deficiencies and
flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother
in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the
forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not
contemplate an emergency."237 In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate.
Atty. Noche explained: Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the
RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on
the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above
principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore,
unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child
may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning
methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they
find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention
of the State.

4 - The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240 The Court
cannot but agree. The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the
basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend: The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and The right of families or family
assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the
father from participating in the decision-making process regarding their common future progeny. It
likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is
already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the
wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the
Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3,
their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them
" is equally recognized. The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making.
By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife,
possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of
reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241 Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they
would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their
children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is
a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any
compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. As
highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242 The right to chart their own destiny
together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas
wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. Ironically, Griswold
invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in
Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246 At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the
parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth. It is
precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution. More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional
mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In
this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote: The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to
modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied] To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the
unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit
in forming the foundation of the family and society. The State cannot, without a compelling state
interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the
latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph
of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception
in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and
that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a
person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health,
access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has
already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack
of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching
of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted
in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown
of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251 At this point, suffice it to state that any
attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be
used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular
issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the
State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252 It is also the inherent right of the State to act as
parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes
mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health
education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH
Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical
and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under
the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children. Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory
reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes
apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254 While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section
14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care
service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution." The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and
modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from
giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2). Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in
a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but
also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256 As correctly noted
by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz: (n) Public
health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health
care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker
engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily
health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are
used synonymously. The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive
health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information
and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough
to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures. The same can be
said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health
programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means
with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that
health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health,
their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.

7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution
as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those
mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law. They add that the
exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional. In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus: One
of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause. "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification." For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him." The
classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It
should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health." Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to
have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care. With respect to the exclusion of
private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational
institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction
and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8 - Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of
pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262 The OSG counters that the rendition of pro
bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time
of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of
the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a
right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of
the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point
of revoking such right altogether.264 Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary
servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private
and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other
than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their
religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.

9 - Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also
the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products." In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as
amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be
under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards,
and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance
of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments
and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that
reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products,
whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and
desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due
process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable
the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of
the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say specific solutions.

10 - Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers
and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this
Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities
that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for
basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects
and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or
partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270 In this case, a
reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it
will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy
is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs
which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of
the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in
the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment
by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the
policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can,
in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279 At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life.
It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control
program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives
more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State. In conformity with the principle of separation of
Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the
society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other. As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape
the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as
the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few. At any rate, population control may not be
beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy.
These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing. And in this country, the economy is being propped up by
remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young
able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing
population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the
situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children
per woman.280 Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not
use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or
what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look
into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful
of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself
to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281 Be that as it may,
it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees
the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors
who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated
July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified
and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21
Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of
Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society
which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by
the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the
"rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482),
recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as
a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign
subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the
whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine,
set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819,
and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence
of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory,
must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907,
that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant;
that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise
of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said
government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague
Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and
other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the
enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen
residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject
of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may
commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he
receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on
one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand,
lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own
government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of
the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation
to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government
established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as
those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms,
which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised
Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable
as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless
adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not
responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said
Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government
and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of
the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the
control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed
by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules
of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the
laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of
a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but
only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort,
the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him;
because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it
is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the
former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity
and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter
incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in
their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer
the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory
would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a
party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and
penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was
made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of
the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . .
. shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not
absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution
of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to
Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards
the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all
the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases,
among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that
pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or
are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter
by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the
State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during
the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign
people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence,
the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated
in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and
Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there
is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may
actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-
preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency
arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its
enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to
the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be
enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is
advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during
the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which
was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the
person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2
Law. ed., 208.

"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a
subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct.,
461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who
enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It
is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the
government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It
may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen
or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least
until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another
government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance,
which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21
Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in
return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied,
is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary.
Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon
their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is
perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt
due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords
protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights
which they acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their
own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by
residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands,
he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with
that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to
foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but
citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the
government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state.
Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject;
the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the
protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation
of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which
he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he
receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations
between the government and the citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which arises by
nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act other than
birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply
within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising from oath, taken
usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every
one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)

Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government
under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140.
(Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state —
the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom
this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The
machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate this machinery
constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and
manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby,
Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of
International Law, p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This
principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of
Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the
member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being
a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)
Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the
government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the
protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius),
meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty.
18 L. Q. Rev., 47.

xxx xxx xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one;
the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly
renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance
continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426.
(1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the
revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities
above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides
somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible
that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their
minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules
whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est
moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and
in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may
be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation,
with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government
stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If
sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine
democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very
life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation
between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our
people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a
people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.

The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her
husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising
his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed
with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for
her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is

unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante)
that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of
independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the
United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not
change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United
States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such
act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the
Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been
sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same
Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption
of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic federal
constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all
mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the
sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress.
Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to
the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when
there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme
Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power,
authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason
which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of
suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the
Japanese occupation.

Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and
later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should
have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those
renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them
were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.

"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the
country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did
not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or
civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the
citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable.
Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the
social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be
dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens
are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty,
is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the
physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue,
irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal
protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet
government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in
several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot
imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people,
without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones
that could claim obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the
enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept
that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by
its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is
based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity,
understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our own
people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes
repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt,
spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people
and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside
from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the
morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and
officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further
slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change
human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking
man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology
remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on
hatred?

The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally
recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and
ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of
invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice
immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the
covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-
hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium
of the invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since
September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the
People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between
December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments
have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese
occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time
the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose
the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not
have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which
the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of
our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended
allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason
cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted
principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that
the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that
the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories,
urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions
of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the
theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There
is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted
reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory,
the offspring devours its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even
since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our
laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of
December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16,
1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in
effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President
"to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative,"
(section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give
emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that
Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and
occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the
necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for
treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed
without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal
technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing
the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having
betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due
process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as
such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese
occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain
other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the
allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was
not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty
here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:

I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.

(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in
World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as
International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and
inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages
which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential
excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least
under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account,
proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international
disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to
recognize its existence in history.

But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for
entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the
instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the
contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but
to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in
the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and
governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous
Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to
President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting
international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action
of governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through
decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations.

xxx xxx xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and
sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was
thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was
illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in
such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is
illegal and criminal.

The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most
significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with
the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of
national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and
condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes
close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State,
gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war between nations was renounced by
the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout
practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be
the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal
thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal
profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.

This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime.

Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments,
which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .

The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives
of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes
an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American
Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of aggression constitutes
an international crime against the human species."

xxx xxx xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate
business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. — An American
Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis
supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other
than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between
the just and the unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an
earlier paragraph of the same report.

In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson
says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally
declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the
paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the
view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense
of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same
viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring
that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations
in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-
American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression
constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an
attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.

It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and
later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly
unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack
against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in
support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods
of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the
others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.

Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war
which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first
week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument
of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by
pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and
principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to the
pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the
outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the
course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the
rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and
condemnation of the pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a

war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in
the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or
posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in
criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war,
could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only this sense should we speak here — with
respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house
pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the
person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on
the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same
as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing
the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute,
condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the
same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the
Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war
crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative
in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts
leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in
considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years
before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy
(Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg
Pact.

Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to
the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of
international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a
justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our
own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the
Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them
during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how
could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people
to their country and government?

(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when Japan occupied
the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still
the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a
notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to
the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to
take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The
restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of
some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family
honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or
residence in the occupied territory.

The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear
allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the
authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . .
(II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)

The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the
occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign.
This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more
essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work
above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no
temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them to take
an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate
commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that
said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of
obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an
oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the
inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them,
does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's
country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of
allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and
therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be
something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The
outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible
action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings,
and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible
pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them
to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them,
indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the
barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were
released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its
enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to
aggravate their crime.

II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and
after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth
sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that
sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said
Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty
of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the
Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical
government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be changed.

Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were
and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the
Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the
Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in
article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued,
along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional provision
further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials
under this Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the
Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty
resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from
that people — they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any
change in its respect.

If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to
be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the
Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the
commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the
Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that
the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence — that they
became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor
is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the
crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically
independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the
same — only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we
have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political
nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory."
(Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)

The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will
naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his
command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare,
1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason
under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior
to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States
necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction
followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to
our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its
Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military
operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely
disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the
district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February
20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines
shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders
provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations
of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of
"laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military
Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."

The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter
phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily
selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers
instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they
were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive
needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of
the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant
"takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of
sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to
endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology,
and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who
are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol.
III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and
order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in
the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations,
article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary
allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance
and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295),
citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II.
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied
territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we
would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:

To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the
Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet
governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed
them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile
governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the
one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth
Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.

The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and taken out of the
territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to
a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75
Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination.
And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is
merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal
sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to
be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious
that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority
in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the
absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to
believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the
guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that
"the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are
to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can
not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere
manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of
what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign, through
some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained
obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the
prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p.
1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the
inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the
control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which
prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be
prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of
the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.

In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning
of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution, because the
latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already
stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the
Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should operate
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a
retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case
quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already
terminated completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied
upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because,
under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so far
as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to
sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As
analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States — the court of highest human authority on that subject —
and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its
enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and
while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or
disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in
favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant
and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and
Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in
the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by
the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties
to the United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and
after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the
United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were
properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the
United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the
United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to
decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most
summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of
the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine
during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods
imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . .
. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of
the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants
who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon
them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be
deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only
as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the
Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine
had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported
there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American
duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not
distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if
there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from
authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed
belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so
decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished
Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay,
more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the
purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that
goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done
within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United
States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty
itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may
be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the
sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain
meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced
there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We
cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law,
hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control,
maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that
the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the
doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual
rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws
of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United
States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not
operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no
longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and,
being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and
obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)

The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to
argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it
is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate.
Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he
is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of
political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or
neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can
expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States
the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of
such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual
practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not
mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the
political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or
should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local
law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)

When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
"elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated.
This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the
delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to
obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14);
and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."

The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the
military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said
inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not
exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand
all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part
military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants
from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the
occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law
should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an
alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage,
Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese
commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been
liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight
as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, — they
would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's military strength at
the time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by America. In this
connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the
Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and
other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they
could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to
argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be
indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the Japanese
assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation,
"the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the
occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war
with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking
advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing
they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is
untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict
may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement."
(Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that
the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than three
years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and
mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese
garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to
be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second
Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)

Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of
traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen.
Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can
make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the
thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died
during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their
inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole,
passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they
preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese
barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-
Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers
faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military
operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties
injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning
sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may
be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili
or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or
property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our
eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury
to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives
than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies
and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or
political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed
in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed
by them upon the real traitors.

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the
obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete
control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and
pressure — and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government —
that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release
the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is
prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in
any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages
of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree,
of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his
family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines
ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation.
Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute
books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what
we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the
Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of
the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."

The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take
oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and
does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of
the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the
point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and
even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land
Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that
the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no
allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power
fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from
which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the
population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the
Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their
survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what
will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.

"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against
the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts,
just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of
policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to
execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that
are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he
got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough
laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far
better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea
of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the
editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.

If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the
Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the famous and significant words of
President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an
admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation
that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and
conscience to their country.

Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military
occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed
against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none other
than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of
sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion
and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by
the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty
resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people
sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was
subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition
to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear
that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The
framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document was
ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have
announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their
posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines
was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the
Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was
the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the exercise of
sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively,
constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is
desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental
agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is,
however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting
the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a
sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the
governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts
of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these
agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they
were originally created.

By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the
legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the
exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede
to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of
so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet,
so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded
to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of
those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a
later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to
the central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their
several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of
lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude
of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of
independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration
demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts.
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the
American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United
States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no
sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised
by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested.

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the
constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or
ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the
National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign
status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government
possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States
and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving
its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or
against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess,
sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of
the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the
Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines
Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases
pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby
insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative
under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that
said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for
treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines,
the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under
the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to
owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been
modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be
applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.

In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in
the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a
sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the
light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S.,
308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over
the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be interpreted to
refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United
States.

No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943,
that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government
of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since
said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of,
the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no
less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946,
withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was
General MacArthur, and not President Osmeña who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23,
1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official
participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the
Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the
Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial
because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against
the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.1

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be
ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under
the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on
the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the
same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day
their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts
occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military
Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and
judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public
officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive
Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief
of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman
thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative
organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said
Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and
municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity
with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in
Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942,
concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising
legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the
administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes,
orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."

On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial
change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned
during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur
issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority
of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General
MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established
as provided by law."

In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in
the present case may be reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the
court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October
23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which
he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and
proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been
invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the
same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the
Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were
reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of
international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be
determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the
Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of
those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal
sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as
the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the
war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United
States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second
and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called
also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is
maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil
matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent
and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example
of this sort of government is found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in
the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico,
occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9
Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular
governments at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899
on the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is
burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses
all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new
ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in
force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial
life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as,
among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to
travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course
as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue
administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the
authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the
supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant.
These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and
have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2,
p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its
military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation,
nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority
and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. .
. . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in
force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of
conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his
pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones."

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were
later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the
Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States
forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the
new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is,
so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials
connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States,
continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of
the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)

As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same
case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as
a de facto government. In that case, it was held that "the central government established for the
insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the
circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the
account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of
which these are examples. . . .

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States,
discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of
government, the same general laws for the administration of justice and protection of private rights,
which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards.
As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national
authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as
valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence
of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations
maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one,
that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their
purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other
cases."

And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured
or was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de
facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those
governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this,
because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve
those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the
bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws, and
because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory
although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful
government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to
have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and
legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called Confederate States should be
respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized
by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of
the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine,
or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an
enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war
to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of
little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is
the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the
laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws
alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine
Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of
Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a french official
(Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading
France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without
appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand,
when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in
every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a
government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of
the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority
was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress,
a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14,
1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government
of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,
before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and
permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of
nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the
Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to
swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does
not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is
during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead
of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9
Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines
was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent
magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the
hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure
the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States
and other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino
who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation
thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the
name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one
established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States.
And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate
states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United
States in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and
Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino
insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de
facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United
States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated
the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional government, and
shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the Islands
and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the
United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such
government was of the class of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest,
S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the government of a country
in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the
same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the
legitimate power.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy
(postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does
not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason
or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are
not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the
continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under
the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community
would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be
scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be
ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals
should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th
ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same
war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and
for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor,
International Law, p. 615.)

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political
complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant,
is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which
declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said
proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other
government" as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23,
1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to
annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the
well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a
political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good
and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the
titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only
reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than
judicial processes of court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction,
set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains."

It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his
government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied
territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation demand such action. But even
assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during
the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military
reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of
the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from
the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in
the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of
the Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines," should not only reverse the international policy and practice of his own government, but
also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which
provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and
great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged
would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set
aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already
disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines
have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of
statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or
great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is
to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers
of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)

The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who
reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or
proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order
to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social
life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would not
willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled,
and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they
may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.

That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice
during the Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of
law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency
legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which
have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of
General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have
been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore,
that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed
that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese
military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of
First Instance during the Japanese regime.

The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it
is said that an occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts
should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most
matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further
than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this
quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be
considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no
rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of
international law that denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the
matter, imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the
overthrown government."

There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the
occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government
established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words
"processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not necessary to
determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments
and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is
whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or
nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the
judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the
present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void.
But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of
the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent
conqueror.

Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public
of conscience, constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake,
International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or
Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the
occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions,
which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights
and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration preventing the
inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent
occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent
the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the
military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying
or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of
occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted,
for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and
action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes
without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower
another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the
United States Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is
obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive
authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S.,
139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international law and from fundamental
principles known wherever the American flag flies."

In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command
of the forces of the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a
decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared
void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19
of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of
the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have looked
carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental
powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest
language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts
should be so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be
imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are
not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where
the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.
(Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp.,
161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated,
we hold that the order was void."

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which
declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a
political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation,
and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after
the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same
as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue
now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government
was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of
War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said
that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of
government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary
will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local
laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.)
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese
Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under
martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the
time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on
faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order
No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive
Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively,
continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief
of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when
the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no
substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International
Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables
elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the
same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International
Public Law, p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the
Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and
continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the
courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending
therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws
they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they
had become the laws — and the courts had become the institutions — of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."

The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of
the country occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by
adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown,
belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the
sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in
the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued
remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the
Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which
prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile
power, "extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in
the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life of the occupied districts,
nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the courts of justice are
allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in
the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to
Wheaton, however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in
1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor
Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers
occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of
French people and government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused
to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the name of the Emperor or
a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established
continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change
of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing
Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict
on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time
the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the
final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when
changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create
and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are
not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until
repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not
necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of
the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had
legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts
of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued
in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same
jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government,
unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
repealed by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that
proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by
the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts
are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the
cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take
cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the
said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of
Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the
Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of
sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV
the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were
enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the
Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted
abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation
in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the
transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the
justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them
according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila
was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending
therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the
latter.

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime
and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already
quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive Order
provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as
amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been
duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . .
." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that
existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we
have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or
which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have
been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one which had been
functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese occupation,
it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2,
1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for
final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the
proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil
rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the
time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the court, having
refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that
court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking
into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this
particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the proceedings held in civil case No.
3012, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic,
during Japanese occupation; and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General
Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The decision of this question requires the application of
principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law in force in this country, before
and during Japanese occupation.

Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146
U.S., 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 224; 36 Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as,
under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law of
the land (Article II, section 3).

As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained and administered by this
Court, whenever questions of right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting as
an international as well as a domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552;
46 Law. Ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regulating their mutual
relations, the proof of the existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to abide by
that rule; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations, and to
ascertain what these usages and customs are, the universal practice is to turn to the writings of
publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The
Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320).

But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, great international treaties are a
later source of increasing importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declares
that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.

The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is established, and in a position to
assert itself.

ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the later shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32
Stat. II, 1821.)

The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the nations giving adherence
to them, among which is United States of America (32 Stat. II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental
authority, but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be
exercised upon principles of international Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387;
Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law
Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law, section 167).

There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military occupation, from January,
1942, up to the time of the reconquest by the armed forces of the United States of the Island of
Luzon, in February, 1945.

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue in force, in so far as they
do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory
continue usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, partly because it is
easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and partly because it is easier to
preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and partly because the latter are more
competent to administer the laws in force within the territory and the military occupant generally
keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under him,
subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities
appointed by him.(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509; 24
Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on
International Law, sections 576. 578; Wilson on International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on International
Law, 6th Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence on International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413;
Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332 335; Holland on International Law pp. 356,
357, 359; Westlake on International Law, 2d ed., pp. 121-23.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the so-called Philippine
Republic, during Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting the
local courts to function and administer such laws, as proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with
the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory under military occupation
governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of
justice, in accordance with the laws in force within territory it must necessarily follow that the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be considered
legal and valid, even after said government establish by the military occupant has been displaced by
the legitimate government of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely
settling the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal
rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion had
been declared valid and binding (Cock vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164;
Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176;
Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700;
Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in
November, 1861, for the purchase money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and
enforceable in 1871(French vs. Tumlin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America
were considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil
War, because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate
States were a de facto government in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the
government obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such
acts of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).
In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court held — "It is now settled law in
this court that during the late civil war the same general form of government, the same general law for
the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior
to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the States did
not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just and legal rights of the
citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding."
(William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 id.,
459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under
the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists, a government de facto, but
which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominateda government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories,
and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists
it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered
in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrong doers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual government of this sort are established over
districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military
authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military force. (Macleod vs. United States [1913] 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the so-called Philippine Republic, during
Japanese occupation, was and should be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts which had been established in this country, during said
Japanese occupation, are to be considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the liberation
of this country by the American forces, as long as the said judicial proceedings had been conducted,
under the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the settlement of
property rights, under the provisions of the Civil Code, in force in this country under the
Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, under the
provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as
said proclamation "nullifies all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government of the
Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."
In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce
judicial chaos and uncertainties.

When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others
destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former (U. S. vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed.,
1004; Board of Supervisors of Granada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5
Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina [1913], 24 Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil.,
385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of
its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy (Smith, Bell
& Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction.
General terms should be so limited in their application as not lead to injustice, oppression or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions
to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases
should prevail over its letter (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed., 278; Church of Holy
Trinity vs. U. S., 143 U. S. 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts,
197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty
of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that
which saves is constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a construction which raises grave and
doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (U. S. vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., U.S., 366; 29
Sup. Ct., 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the
judicial proceedings conducted before the courts of justice, established here during Japanese military
occupation, merely applying the municipal law of the territory, such as the provisions of our Civil
Code, which have no political or military significance, should be considered legal, valid and binding.

It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said rules and principles, as
International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that General
MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and principles of International Law, which have
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial
proceedings conducted before our courts, during Japanese occupation would lead to injustice and
absurd results, and would be highly detrimental to the public interests.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Law must be obeyed. To keep the bonds of society, it must not be evaded. On its supremacy
depends the stability of states and nations. No government can prevail without it. The preservation of
the human race itself hinges in law.

Since time immemorial, man has relied on law as an essential means of attaining his purposes, his
objectives, his mission in life. More than twenty-two centuries before the Christian Era, on orders of
the Assyrian King Hammurabi, the first code was engrave in black diorite with cunie form characters.
Nine centuries later Emperor Hung Wu, in the cradle of the most ancient civilization, compiled the
Code of the Great Ming. The laws of Manu were written in the verdic India. Moses received at Sinai
the ten commandments. Draco, Lycurgus, Solon made laws in Greece. Even ruthless Genghis Khan
used laws to keep discipline among the nomad hordes with which he conquered the greater part of
the European and Asiastic continents.

Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and other biological laws to
survive. Thanks to them, the chalk cliffs of the infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be
imperceptible to the naked eye creating a whole mountain. Even the inorganic world has to conform
the law. Planets and stars follow the laws discovered by Kepler, known as the law-maker of heavens.
If, endowed with rebellious spirit, they should happen to challenge the law of universal gravity, the
immediate result would be cosmic chaos. The tiny and twinkling points of light set above us on the
velvet darkness of the night will cease to inspire us with dreams of more beautiful and happier worlds.

Again we are called upon to do our duty. Here is a law that we must apply. Shall we shrink? Shall we
circumvent it ? Can we ignore it?

The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready to apply them. It is actual
application to real issues which gives laws the breath of life.

In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many things that might induce us
to forget the elementals. There are so many events, so many problem, so many preoccupations that
are pushing among themselves to attract our attention, and we might miss the nearest and most
familiar things, like the man who went around his house to look for a pencil perched on one of his
ears.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In October, 1944, the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed successfully in Leyte.

When victory in islands was accomplished, after the most amazing and spectacular war operations,
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a commander in Chief of the American Army, decided to
reestablish, in behalf of the United States, the Commonwealth Government.

Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in regards to the official acts of
the governments established in the Philippines by the Japanese regime. He might have thought of
recognizing the validity of some of said acts, but, certainly, there were acts which he should declare
null and void, whether against the policies of the American Government, whether inconsistent with
military strategy and operations, whether detrimental to the interests of the American or Filipino
peoples, whether for any other strong or valid reasons.

But, which to recognize, and which not? He was not in a position to gather enough information for a
safe basis to distinguished and classify which acts must be nullified, and which must validated. At the
same time he had to take immediate action. More pressing military matters were requiring his
immediate attention. He followed the safe course: to nullify all the legislative, executive, and judicial
acts and processes under the Japanese regime. After all, when the Commonwealth Government is
already functioning, with proper information, he will be in a position to declare by law, through its
Congress, which acts and processes must be revived and validated in the public interest.

So on October 23, 1944, the Commander in Chief issued the following proclamation:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PROCLAMATION

To the People of the Philippines:

WHEREAS, the military forces under my command have landed in the Philippines soil as a prelude to
the liberation of the entire territory of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has been re-
established in the Philippines under President Sergio Osmeña and the members of his cabinet; and

WHEREAS, under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines"
was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor
the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial
and Legislative powers of government over the people;

Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander in Chief of the
military forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority
of the Government of the United States, the sole and the only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. The laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free enemy
occupation and control; and

I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the people of the
Philippines the sacred right of government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted
Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas are liberated to the military
situation will otherwise permit;

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly
constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

October 23, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?

In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with extraordinary inherent powers, as a
natural result of the nature of the military operations aimed to achieve the purposes of his country in
the war, victory being paramount among them.

Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or reoccupied territory, under his control, a
complete system of government; he may appoint officers and employees to manage the affairs of
said government; he may issue proclamations, instructions, orders, all with the full force of laws
enacted by a duly constituted legislature; he may set policies that should be followed by the public
administration organized by him; he may abolish the said agencies. In fact, he is the supreme ruler
and law-maker of the territory under his control, with powers limited only by the receipts of the
fundamental laws of his country.

California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the arms of the United States as
early as 1846. Shortly afterward the United States had military possession of all upper California.
Early in 1847 the President, as constitutional commander in chief of the army and navy, authorized
the military and naval commander of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a
conqueror, and form a civil government for the conquered country, and to impose duties on imports
and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government, and of the army which has
the conquest in possession. . . Cross of Harrison, 16 Howard, 164, 189.)

In May, 1862, after the capture of New Orleans by the United States Army, General Butler, then in
command of the army at that place, issued a general order appointing Major J. M. Bell, volunteer
aide-de-camp, of the division staff, provost judge of the city, and directed that he should be obeyed
and respected accordingly. The same order appointed Capt. J. H. French provost marshal of the city,
the Capt. Stafford deputy provost marshal. A few days after this order the Union Bank lent to the
plaintiffs the sum of $130,000, and subsequently, the loan not having been repaid, brought suit before
the provost judge to recover the debt. The defense was taken that the judge had no jurisdiction over
the civil cases, but judgement was given against the borrowers, and they paid the money under
protest. To recover it back is the object of the present suit, and the contention of the plaintiffs is that
the judgement was illegal and void, because the Provost Court had no jurisdiction of the case. The
judgement of the District Court was against the plaintiffs, and this judgement was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the State. To this affirmance error is now assigned.

The argument of the plaintiffs in error is that the establishment of the Provost Court, the appointment
of the judge, and his action as such in the case brought by the Union Bank against them were invalid,
because in violation of the Constitution of the United States, which vests the judicial power of the
General government in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish, and under this constitutional provision they were entitled to immunity from
liability imposed by the judgment of the Provost Court. Thus, it is claimed, a Federal question is
presented, and the highest court of the State having decided against the immunity claimed, our
jurisdiction is invoked.
Assuming that the case is thus brought within our right to review it, the controlling question is whether
the commanding general of the army which captured New Orleans and held it in May 1862, had
authority after the capture of the city to establish a court and appoint a judge with power to try and
adjudicate civil causes. Did the Constitution of the United States prevent the creation of the civil
courts in captured districts during the war of the rebellion, and their creation by military authority?

This cannot be said to be an open question. The subject came under the consideration by this court
in The Grapeshot, where it was decided that when, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent
territory were occupied by the National forces, it was within the constitutional authority of the
President, as commander in chief, to establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and
determination of all causes arising under the laws of the States or of the United States, and it was
ruled that a court instituted by President Lincoln for the State of Louisiana, with authority to hear, try,
and determine civil causes, was lawfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. Its establishment by
the military authority was held to be no violation of the constitutional provision that "the judicial power
of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may form time to time ordain and establish." That clause of the Constitution has no
application to the abnormal condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering, army.
It refers only to courts of United States, which military courts are not. As was said in the opinion of the
court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase, in The Grapeshot, "It became the duty of the National
government, wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory which had been
dominated by it was occupied by the National forces, to provide, as far as possible, so long as the
war continued, for the security of the persons and property and for the administration of justice. The
duty of the National government in this respect was no other than that which devolves upon a regular
belligerent, occupying during war the territory of another belligerent. It was a military duty, to be
performed by the President, as Commander in Chief, and instructed as such with the direction of the
military force by which the occupation was held."

Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by military authority courts for the
administration of civil as well as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the
National forces, is precisely the same as that which exists when foreign territory has been conquered
and is occupied by the conquerors. What that power is has several times been considered. In
Leitensdorfer & Houghton vs. Webb, may be found a notable illustration. Upon the conquest of New
Mexico, in 1846, the commanding officer of the conquering army, in virtue of the power of conquest
and occupancy, and with the sanction and authority of the President, ordained a provisional
government for the country. The ordinance created courts, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. It
did not undertake to change the municipal laws of the territory, but it established a judicial system
with a superior or appellate court, and with circuit courts, the jurisdiction of which declared to
embrace, first, all criminal causes that should not otherwise provided for by law; and secondly,
original and exclusive cognizance of all civil cases not cognizable before the prefects and alcades.
But though these courts and this judicial system were established by the military authority of the
United States, without any legislation of Congress, this court ruled that they were lawfully established.
And there was no express order for their establishment emanating from the President or the
Commander in Chief. The ordinance was the act of the General Kearney the commanding officer of
the army occupying the conquered territory.

In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the Constitution did not prohibit the creation
by the military authority of court for the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered portions of
the insurgent States. The establishment of such courts is but the exercise of the ordinary rights of
conquest. The plaintiffs in error, therefore, had no constitutional immunity against subjection to the
judgements of such courts. They argue, however, that if this be conceded, still General Butler had no
authority to establish such a court; that the President alone, as a Commander in Chief, had such
authority. We do not concur in this view. General Butler was in command of the conquering and the
occupying army. He was commissioned to carry on the war in Louisina. He was, therefore, invested
with all the powers of making war, so far as they were denied to him by the Commander in Chief, and
among these powers, as we have seen, was of establishing courts in conquered territory. It must be
presumed that he acted under the orders of his superior officer, the President, and that his acts, in the
prosecution of the war, were the acts of his commander in chief. (Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union
Bank, 89 U. S. [22 Wall.], 276-298.)

There is no question, therefore, that when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued on October
Proclamation, he did it in the legitimate exercise of his powers. He did it as the official representative
of the supreme authority of the United States of America. Consequently, said proclamation is legal,
valid, and binding.

Said proclamation has the full force of a law. In fact, of a paramount law. Having been issued in the
exercise of the American sovereignty, in case of conflict, it can even supersede, not only the ordinary
laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, but also our Constitution itself while we remain under
the American flag.

"PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In the third section of the dispositive part of the October Proclamation, it is declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
Commonwealth, are null and void.
Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial processes?

In its broadest sense, process is synonymous with proceedings or procedures and embraces all the
steps and proceedings in a judicial cause from it commencement to its conclusion.

PROCESS. In Practice. — The means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out
the original writ, in civil, and after indictment, in criminal cases.

The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the original writ or command as of the court.

A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings; Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84 la., 567; 51 N. W.,
48; the means or method pointed out by a statute, or used to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants,
whether by writ or notice. Wilson vs. R. Co. (108 Mo., 588; 18 S. W., 286; 32 Am. St. Rep., 624). (3
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 2731.)

A. Process generally. 1. Definition. — As a legal term process is a generic word of every

comprehensive signification and many meanings. It is broadest sense it is equivalent to, or
synonymous with, "proceedings" or "procedure," and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a
cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the
means whereby a court compels a compliance with it demands. "Process" and "writ" or "writs" are
synonymous in the sense that every writ is a process, and in a narrow sense of the term "process" is
limited to judicial writs in an action, or at least to writs or writings issued from or out of court, under the
seal thereof, and returnable thereto; but it is not always necessary to construe the term so strictly as
to limit it to a writ issued by a court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction; the term is sometimes
defined as a writ or other formal writing issued by authority of law or by some court, body, or official
having authority to issue it; and it is frequently used to designate a means, by writ or otherwise , of
acquiring jurisdiction of defendant or his property, or of bringing defendant into, or compelling him to
appear in, court to answer.

As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word "process" varies according to the context,
subject matter, and spirit of the statute in which it occurs. In some jurisdictions codes or statutes
variously define "process" as signifying or including: A writ or summons issued in the course of
judicial proceedings; all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers;
or any writ, declaration, summons, order, or subpoena whereby any action, suit or proceeding shall
be commenced, or which shall be issued in or upon any action, suit or proceeding. (50 C. J., PP. 441,
442.)
The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke comprehends any lawful warrant, authority, or
proceeding by which a man may be arrested. He says: "Process of law is two fold, namely, by the
King's writ, or by proceeding and warrant, either in deed or in law, without writ." (People vs. Nevins
[N. Y.] Hill, 154, 169, 170; State vs. Shaw, 50 A., 869; 73 Vt., 149.)

Baron Comyn says that process, in a large acceptance, comprehends the whole proceedings after
the original and before judgement; but generally it imports the writs which issue out of any court to
bring the party to answer, or for doing execution, and all process out of the King's court ought to be in
the name of the King. It is called "process" because it proceeds or goes upon former matter, either
original or judicial. Gilmer, vs. Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition,
1940 edition, p. 147.)

In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a court compels the appearance of
the defendant before it, or a compliance with it demands, and any every writ, rule order, notice, or
decree, including any process of execution that may issue in or upon any action, suit, or legal
proceedings, and it is not restricted to mesne process. In a narrow or restricted sense it is means
those mandates of the court intending to bring parties into court or to require them to answer
proceedings there pending. (Colquitt Nat. Bank vs. Poitivint, 83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga. App., 329. (34
Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the name of the sovereign of a state and
issued out of a court of justice, or by a judge thereof, at the commencement of an action or at any
time during its progress or incident thereto, usually under seal of the court, duly attested and directed
to some municipal officer or to the party to be bound by it, commanding the commission of some act
at or within a specified time, or prohibiting the doing of some act. The cardinal requisites are that the
instrument issue from a court of justice, or a judge thereof; that it run in the name of the sovereign of
the state; that it be duly attested, but not necessarily by the judge, though usually, but not always,
under seal; and that it be directed to some one commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act.
Watson vs. Keystone Ironworks Co., 74 P., 272, 273; 70 Kan., 43. (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications: First, it is largely taken for all
proceedings in any action or prosecution, real or personal, civil or criminal, from the beginning to the
end; secondly, that is termed the "process" by which a man is called into any temporal court, because
the beginning or principal part thereof, by which the rest is directed or taken. Strictly, it is a
proceeding after the original, before the judgement. A policy of fire insurance contained the condition
that if the property shall be sold or transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession,
whether by legal process or judicial decree or voluntary transfer or convenience, then and in every
such case the policy shall be void. The term "legal process," as used in the policy, means what is
known as a writ; and, as attachment or execution on the writs are usually employed to effect a
change of title to property, they are or are amongst the processes contemplated by the policy. The
words "legal process" mean all the proceedings in an action or proceeding. They would necessarily
embrace the decree, which ordinarily includes the proceedings. Perry vs. Lorillard Fire Ins. Co., N. Y.,
6 Lans., 201, 204. See, also, Tipton vs. Cordova, 1 N. M., 383, 385. (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

"Process" in a large acceptation, is nearly synonymous with "proceedings," and means the entire
proceedings in an action, from the beginning to the end. In a stricter sense, it is applied to the several
judicial writs issued in an action. Hanna vs. Russell, 12 Minn., 80, 86 (Gil., 43, 45). (34 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition, 1940, edition 149.)

The term "process" as commonly applied, intends that proceeding by which a party is called into
court, but it has more enlarged signification, and covers all the proceedings in a court, from the
beginning to the end of the suit; and, in this view, all proceedings which may be had to bring
testimony into court, whether viva voce or in writing, may be considered the process of the court.
Rich vs. Trimple, Vt., 2 Tyler, 349, 350. Id.

"Process" in its broadest sense comprehends all proceedings to the accomplishment of an end,
including judicial proceedings. Frequently its signification is limited to the means of bringing a party in
court. In the Constitution process which at the common law would have run in the name of the king is
intended. In the Code process issued from a court is meant. McKenna vs. Cooper, 101 P., 662, 663;
79 Kan., 847, quoting Hanna vs. Russel, 12 Minn., 80. (Gil., 43 ); Black Com. 279; Bou vs. Law. Dict.
(34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 149.)

"Judicial process" includes the mandate of a court to its officers, and a means whereby courts compel
the appearance of parties, or compliance with its commands, and includes a summons. Ex parte Hill,
51 So., 786, 787; 165 Ala., 365.

"Judicial process" comprehends all the acts of then court from the beginning of the proceeding to its
end, and in a narrower sense is the means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing
out the original writ in civil case and after the indictment in criminal cases, and in every sense is the
act of the court and includes any means of acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment,
garnishment, or execution, and also a writ. Blair vs. Maxbass Security Bank of Maxbass, 176 N. W.,
98, 199; 44 N. D. 12 (23 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 328.)
There is no question that the word process, as used in the October Proclamation, includes all judicial
processes or proceedings.

The intention of the author of the proclamation of including judicial processes appears clearly in the
preamble of the document.

The second "Whereas," states that so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines,"
based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the
United States, and is purporting to the exercise Executive, Judicial, and Legislative powers of
government over the people."

It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of General MacArthur to declare
null and void all acts of government under the Japanese regime, and he used, in section 3 of he
dispositive part, the word laws, as pertaining to the legislative branch, the word regulations, as
pertaining to the executive branch, and lastly, the word processes, as pertaining to the judicial branch
of the government which functioned under the Japanese regime.

It is reasonable to assume that he might include in the word "process." besides those judicial
character, those of executive or administrative character. At any rate, judicial processes cannot be
excluded.

THE WORDS OF PROCLAMATION EXPRESS UNMISTAKABLY

THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHOR

The October Proclamation is written in such a way that it is impossible to make a mistake as to the
intention of its author.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the Supreme Court of the United
States, the following:

When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning, courts must be very cautious in allowing
their imagination to give them a different one. Guild vs. Walter, 182 Mass., 225, 226 (1902)

Upon questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is always more important to consider
the words and the circumstances than even strong analogies decisions. The successive neglect of a
series of small distinctions, in the effort to follow precedent, is very liable to end in perverting
instruments from their plain meaning. In no other branch of the law (trusts) is so much discretion
required in dealing with authority. . . . There is a strong presumption in favor of giving them words
their natural meaning, and against reading them as if they said something else, which they are not
fitted to express. (Merrill vs. Preston, 135 Mass., 451, 455 (1883).
When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and
distinctly the sense of the framer, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is
not allowable to interpret what needs no interpretation.

Very strong expression have been used by the courts to emphasize the principle that they are to
derive their knowledge of the legislative intention from the words or language of the statute itself
which the legislature has used to express it. The language of a statute is its most natural guide. We
are not liberty to imagine an intent and bind the letter to the intent.

The Supreme Court of the United States said: "The primary and general rule of statutory construction
is that the intent of the law-maker is to be found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to
know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no function of legislation,
and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator. It is true that there are cases in which the letter
of the statute is not deemed controlling, but the cases are few and exceptional and only arise where
there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent.
No mere ommission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise should
have specifically provided for will justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute." (United
States vs. Goldenberg, 168 U. S., 95, 102, 103; 18 S. C. Rep., 3; 42 Law. ed., 394.)

That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be the sole and only government
in our country; that our laws are in full force and effect and legally binding; that "all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government are null and void and without legal effect", are provisions
clearly, distinctly, unmistakably expressed in the October Proclamation, as to which there is no
possibility of error, and there is absolutely no reason in trying to find different meanings of the plain
words employed in the document.

As we have already seen, the annulled processes are precisely judicial processes, procedures and
proceedings, including the one which is under our consideration.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHES A CLEAR POLICY

Although, as we have already stated, there is no possible mistakes as to the meaning of the words
employed in the October Proclamation, and the text of the document expresses, in clear-cut
sentences, the true purposes of its author, it might not be amiss to state here what was the policy
intended to be established by said proclamation.

It is a matter of judicial knowledge that in the global war just ended on September 2, 1945, by the
signatures on the document of unconditional surrender affixed by representatives of the Japanese
government, the belligerents on both sides resorted to what may call war weapons of psychological
character.

So Japan, since its military forces occupied Manila, had waged an intensive campaign propaganda,
intended to destroy the faith of the Filipino people in America, to wipe out all manifestations of
American or occidental civilization, to create interest in all things Japanese, which the imperial officers
tried to present as the acme of oriental culture, and to arouse racial prejudice among orientals and
occidentals, to induce the Filipinos to rally to the cause of Japan, which she tried to make us believe
is the cause of the inhabitants of all East Asia.

It is, then, natural that General MacArthur should take counter-measures to neutralize or annul
completely all vestiges of Japanese influence, specially those which might jeopardize in any way his
military operations and his means of achieving the main objective of the campaign of the liberation,
that is, to restore in our country constitutional processes and the high ideals constitute the very
essence of democracy.

It was necessary to free, not only our territory, but also our spiritual patrimony. It was necessary, not
only to restore to us the opportunity of enjoying the physical treasures which a beneficent Providence
accumulated on this bountiful land, the true paradise in the western Pacific, but to restore the full play
of our ideology, that wonderful admixture of sensible principles of human conduct, bequeathed to us
by our Malayan ancestors, the moral principles of the Christianity assimilated by our people from
teachers of Spain, and the common-sense rules of the American democratic way of life.

It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity.

Undoubtedly, the author of the proclamation thought that the laws, regulations, and processes of all
the branches of the governments established under the Japanese regime, if allowed to continue and
to have effect, might be a means of keeping and spreading in our country the Japanese influence,
with the same deadly effects as the mines planted by the retreating enemy.

The government offices and agencies which functioned during the Japanese occupation represented
a sovereignty and ideology antagonistic to the sovereignty and ideology which MacArthur's forces
sought to restore in our country.

Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution, it is declared that Japan shall reigned and governed by
a line Emperors unbroken for ages eternal (Article 1); that the Emperor is sacred and inviolable
(Article 3); that he is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of the sovereignty (Article
4); that he exercises the legislative power (Article 5); that he gives sanction to laws, and orders to be
promulgated and executed (Article 6);that he has the supreme command of the Army and Navy
(Article 11); that he declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties (Article 13).

There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese ideology, the ideology of a people
which as confessed in a book we have at our desk, written by a Japanese, insists in doing many
things precisely in a way opposite to that followed by the rest of the world.

It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of self-delusion; that believes that
their Emperor is a direct descendant of gods and he himself is a god, and that the typhoon which
occured on August 14, 1281, which destroyed the fleet with which Kublai Khan tried to invade Japan
was the divine wind of Ise; that defies the heinous crime of the ronin, the 47 assassins who, in order
to avenge the death of their master Asano Naganori, on February 3, 1703, entered stealthily into the
house of Yoshinaka Kiro and killed him treacherously.

It is an ideology which dignifies harakiri or sepukku, the most bloody and repugnant from suicide, and
on September 13, 1912, on the occasion of the funeral of Emperor Meiji, induced General Maresuke
Nogi and his wife to practice the abhorrent "junshi", and example of which is offered to us in the
following words of a historian:

When the Emperor's brother Yamato Hiko, died in 2 B. C., we are told that, following the occasion, his
attendants were assembled to from the hito-bashira (pillar-men) to gird the grave. They were buried
alive in circle up to the neck around the thomb and "for several days they died not, but wept and
wailed day night. At last they died not, but wept and wailed day night. At last they did not rotted. Dogs
and cows gathered and ate them." (Gowen, an Outline of History of Japan, p. 50.)

The practice shows that the Japanese are the spiritual descendants of the Sumerians, the ferocious
inhabitants of Babylonia who, 3500 years B. C., appeared in history as the first human beings to
honor their patesis by killing and entombing with him his window, his ministers, and notable men and
women of his kingdom, selected by the priests to partake of such abominable honor. (Broduer, The
Pageant of Civilization, pp. 62-66.)

General MacArthur sought to annul completely the officials acts of the governments under the
Japanese occupation, because they were done at the shadow of the Japanese dictatorship, the same
which destroyed the independence of Korea, the "Empire of Morning Frehsness"; they violated the
territorial integrity of China, invaded Manchuria, and initiated therein the deceitful system of puppet
governments, by designating irresponsible Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo; they violated the
trusteeship granted by the Treaty of Versailles by usurping tha mandated islands in the Pacific; they
initiated that they call China Incident, without war declaration, and, therefore, in complete disregard of
an elemental international duty; they attacked Pearl Harbor treacherously, and committed a long
series of the flagrant violations of international law that have logically bestowed on Japan the title of
the bandit nation in the social world.

The conduct of the Japanese during the occupation shows a shocking an anchronism of a modern
world power which seems to be re-incarnation of one whose primitive social types of pre-history,
whose proper place must be found in an archeological collection. It represents a backward jump in
the evolution of ethical and juridical concepts, a reversion that, more than a simple pathological state,
represents a characteristics and well defined case of sociological teratology.

Since they entered the threshold of our capital, the Japanese had announced that for every one of
them killed they would kill ten prominent Filipinos. They promised to respect our rights by submitting
us to the wholesale and indiscriminate slapping, tortures, and atrocious massacres. Driving nails in
the cranium, extraction of teeth and eyes, burnings of organs, hangings, diabolical zonings, looting of
properties, establishments of redlight districts, machine gunning of women and children, interment of
alive persons, they are just mere preludes of the promised paradised that they called "Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to unite, against the religious
scruples and convictions of their members, in one group, and by profaning convents, seminaries,
churches, and other cult centers of the Catholics, utilizing them as military barracks, munitions
dumps, artillery base, deposits of bombs and gasoline, torture chambers and zone, and by compelling
the government officials and employees to face and to bow in adoration before that caricature of
divinity in the imperial palace of Tokyo.

The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by depriving us of the use of our schools
and colleges, by destroying our books and other means of culture, by falsifying the contents of school
texts, by eliminating free press, the radio, all elemental principles of civilized conduct, by establishing
classes of rudimentary Japanese so as to reduce the Filipinos to the mental level of the rude
Japanese guards, and by disseminating all kinds of historical, political, and cultural falsehoods.

Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity, they had the insolence of calling us their
brothers, without the prejuce of placing of us in the category of slaves, treating the most prominent
Filipinos in a much lower social and political category than that of the most ignorant and brutal subject
of the Emperor.

The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. Witnesses and litigants were slapped and tortured
during investigations. In the prosecuting attorney's offices, no one was safe. When the Japanese
arrested a person, the lawyer who dared to intercede was also placed under arrest. Even courts were
not free from their dispotic members. There were judges who had to trample laws and shock their
conscience in order not to disgust a Nipponese.

The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities of the world could not conceive of
higher honor that may be conferred than that of Doctor of Laws, became the most despised. It was
dangerous to practice the profession by which faith in the effectiveness of law is maintained; citizens
feel confident in the protection of their liberties, honor, and dignity; the weak may face the powerful;
the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official; civil equality becomes reality; justice is
admnistered with more efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system of government and the
best guaranty for the welfare and happiness of the individual human being. In fact, the profession of
law was annulled, and the best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago and other
centers of torture were the military police, concubines, procurers, and spies, the providers of war
materials and shameful pleasures, and the accomplices in fraudulent transactions, which were the
specialty of many naval and military Japanese officers.

The courts and Filipino government officials were completely helpless in the question of protecting the
constitutional liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens who happen to be unfortunate enough to
fall under the dragnet of the hated kempei. Even the highest government officials were not safe from
arrest and imprisonment in the dreaded military dungeons, where torture or horrible death were
always awaiting the defenseless victim of the Japanese brutality.

May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all the judicial processes?

The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be seen if we take into
consideration the following provisions of the Japanese Constitution:

ART. 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the
Emperor.

ART. 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures
of the executive authority .. shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.

Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in Chief who issued it.

Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, the Allied Supreme Commander, the military hero, the greatest American general, the
Liberator of the Philippines, the conqueror of Japan, the gallant soldier under whose authority the
Emperor of the Japan, who is supposed to rule supreme for ages as a descendant of gods, is
receiving orders with the humility of a prisoner of war.

No challenge has been hurled against the proclamation or the authority of the author to issue it,
because everybody acknowledges the full legality of its issuance.

But because the proclamation will affect the interest and the rights of a group of individuals, and to
protect the same, a way is being sought to neutralize the effect of the proclamation.

The way found is to invoke international law. The big and resounding word is considered as a
shibboleth powerful enough to shield the affected persons from the annulling impact.

Even then, international law is not invoked to challenge the legality or authority of the proclamation,
but only to construe it in a convenient way so that judicial processes during the Japanese occupation,
through an exceptional effort of the imagination, might to segregated from the processes mentioned
in the proclamation.

An author said that the law of nations, the "jus gentiun", is not a fixed nor immutable science. On the
country, it is developing incessantly, it is perpetually changing in forms. In each turn it advances or
recedes, according to the vicissitudes of history, and following the monotonous rythm of the ebb and
rise of the tide of the sea.

Le driot des gens, en effet, n'est point une science fixe est immuable: bein au contraire, il se
developpe sans cesse, il change eternellement de formes; tour il avance et il recule, selon less
vicissitudes de histoire et suivan un rhythm monotone qui est comme le flux et le reflux d'un mer. (M.
Revon, De l'existence du driot international sous la republique romain.)

Another author has this to say:

International law, if it is or can be a science at all, or can be, at most a regulative science, dealing with
the conduct of States, that is, human beings in a certain capacity; and its principles and prescriptions
are not, like those of science proper, final and unchanging. The substance of science proper is
already made for man; the substance of international is actually made by man, — and different ages
make differently." (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece of
Rome, Vol. I, p. 50.)

"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." (Pound, Interpretations of Legal History., p. 1. )
Justice Cardozo adds: "Here is the great antimony confronting us at every turn. Rest and motion,
unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to continue,
must find some path compromise." (The Growth of Law p. 2.) Law is just one of the manifestations of
human life, and "Life has relations not capable of division into inflexible compartments. The moulds
expand and shrink," (Glanzer vs. Shepard, 233 N.Y., 236, 241.)

The characteristic plasticity of law is very noticeable, much more than in any other department, in
international law.

In a certain matters it is clear we have made substantial progress, but in other points, he (M. Revon)
maintains, we have retrograded; for example, in the middle ages the oath was not always respected
as faithfully as in ancient Rome; and nearer our own times, in the seventeenth century, Grotius
proclaims the unquestioned right of the belligerents to massacre the women and the children of the
enemy; and in our more modern age the due declaration of war which Roman always conformed to
has not been invariably observed. (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and Custom of
Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. I, p. 209.)

Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the enforcement of the October
Proclamation.

In this study we should be cautioned not to allow ourselves to be deluded by generalities and
vagueness which are likely to lead us easily to error, in view of the absence of codification and
statutory provisions.

Our Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation. (Sec. 3, Art. II.)

There being no codified principles of international law, or enactments of its rules, we cannot rely on
merely legal precepts.

With the exception of international conventions and treaties and, just recently, the Charter of the
United Nations, adopted in San Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945, we have to rely on
unsystemized judicial pronouncements and reasonings and on theories, theses, and propositions that
we may find in the works of authors and publicists.

Due to that characteristic pliability and imprecision of international law, the drafters of our Constitution
had to content themselves with "generally accepted principles."

We must insists, therefore, that the principles should be specific and unmistakably defined and that
there is definite and conclusive evidence to the effect that they generally accepted among the
civilized nations of the world and that they belong to the current era and no other epochs of history.
The temptation of assuming the role of a legislator is greater in international law than in any other
department of law, since there are no parliaments, congresses, legislative assemblies which can
enact laws and specific statutes on the subject. It must be our concern to avoid falling in so a great
temptation, as its, dangers are incalculable. It would be like building castles in the thin air, or trying to
find an exit in the thick dark forest where we are irretrievably lost. We must also be very careful in our
logic. In so vast a field as international law, the fanciful wandering of the imagination often impair the
course of dialistics.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October Proclamation?

We tried in vain to find out in the majority opinion anything as to the existence of any principle of
international law under which the authority of General MacArthur to issue the proclamation can
effectively be challenged.

No principle of international law has been, or could be invoked as a basis for denying the author of
the document legal authority to issue the same or any part thereof.

We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the authority, under international law,
to declare null and void and without effect, not only the laws and regulations of the governments
under the Japanese regime, but all the processes of said governments, including judicial processes.

If General MacArthur, as commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces of Liberation, had
authority, full and legal, to issue the proclamation, the inescapable result will be the complete
viodance and nullity of all judicial processes, procedures, and proceedings of all courts under the
Japanese regime.

But those who are sponsoring the cause of said judicial processes try to achieve their aim, not by
direct means, but by following a tortuous side-road.

They accept and recognize the full authority of the author of the proclamation to issue it and all its
parts, but they maintain that General MacArthur did not and could not have in mind the idea of
nullifying the judicial processes during the Japanese occupation, because that will be in violation of
the principles of international law.

If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion we will have to reach the conlusion that the world
"processes" does not appear at all in the October Proclamation.

It is stated more than once, and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis, that under the principles of
international law the judicial processes under an army occupation cannot be invalidated.
But we waited in vain for the specific principle of international law, only one of those alluded to, to be
pointed out to us.

If the law exist, it can be pointed out. If the principle exists, it can stated specifically. The word is
being used very often in plural, principles, but we need only one to be convinced.

The imagined principles are so shrouded in a thick maze of strained analogies and reasoning, that we
confess our inability even to have a fleeting glimpse at them through their thick and invulnerable
wrappers.

At every turn international law, the blatant words, are haunting us with the deafening bray of a
trumpet, but after the transient sound has fled away, absorbed by the resiliency of the vast
atmosphere, the announced principles, which are the very soul of international law, would disappear
too with the lighting speed of a vanishing dream.

WEAKNESS OF THE MAJORITY POSITION

In the majority opinion three questions are propounded: first, whether judicial acts and proceedings
during the Japanese occupation are valid even after liberation; second whether the October
Proclamation had invalidated all judgement and judicial proceedings under the Japanese regime; and
third, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth may continue the judicial proceedings
pending at the time of liberation.

As regards the first question, it is stated that it is a legal tourism in political and international law that
all acts of a de facto government are good and valid, that the governments established during the
Japanese occupation. that is, the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines, were de facto governments, and that it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of those governments, "which are not of a political complexion," were good
and valid, and by virtue of the principle of postliminium, remain good and valid after the liberation.

In the above reasoning we will see right away how the alleged legal truism in political and
international law, stated as a premise in a sweeping way, as an absolute rule, is immediately qualified
by the exception as to judicial acts and proceedings which are of a "political complexion."

So it is the majority itself which destroys the validity of what it maintains as a legal truism in political
and international law, by stating from the beginning of the absolute proposition that all acts and
proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto governments are
good and valid.
It is be noted that no authority, absolutely no authority, has been cited to support the absolute and
sweeping character of the majority proposition as stated in their opinion.

No authority could be cited, because the majority itself loses faith in the validity of such absolute and
sweeping proposition, by establishing an unexplained exception as regards the judicial acts and
proceedings of a "political complexion."

Besides, it is useless to try to find in the arguments of the majority anything that may challenge the
power, the authority of a de jure government to annul the official acts of a de facto government, or the
legal and indisputable authority of the restored legitimate government to refuse to recognize the
official acts, legislative, executive and judicial, of the usurping government, once the same is ousted.

As to the second question, the majority argues that the judicial proceedings and judgments of the de
facto governments under the Japanese regime being good and valid, "it should be presumed that it
was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur to refer to judicial
processes, when he used the last word in the October Proclamation, and that it only refers to
government processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings."

The weakness and absolute ineffectiveness of the argument are self-evident.

It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of the governments under the
Japanese regime null and void, he could not refer to judicial processes, because the same are valid
and remained so under the legal truism announced by the majority to the effect that, under political
and international law, all official acts of a de facto government, legislative, executive or judicial, are
valid.

But we have seen already how the majority excepted from said legal truism the judicial processes of
"political complexion."

And now it is stated that in annulling the processes of the governments under Japanese occupation,
General MacArthur referred to "processes other than judicial processes."

That is, the legislative and executive processes.

But, did not the majority maintain that all acts and proceedings of legislative and executive
departments of a de facto governments are good and valid? Did it not maintain that they are so as a
"legal truism in political and international law?"

Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur could not refer to judicial
processes because they are good and valid in accordance with international law, why should the
same reasoning not apply to legislative and executive processes?
Why does the majority maintain that, notwithstanding the fact that, according that said legal truism,
legislative and executive official acts of de facto governments are good and valid, General MacArthur
referred to the latter in his annulling proclamation, but not to judicial processes?

If the argument is good so as to exclude judicial processes from the effect of the October
Proclamation, we can see no logic in considering it bad with respect to legislative and executive
processes.

If the argument is bad with respect to legislative and executive processes, there is no logic in holding
that it is not good with respect to judicial processes.

Therefore, if the argument of the majority opinion is good, the inevitable conclusion is that General
MacArthur did not declare null and void any processes, at all, whether legislative processes,
executive processes, or judicial processes, and that the word "processes" used by him in the October
Proclamation is a mere surplusage or an ornamental literary appendix.

The absurdity of the conclusion unmasks the utter futility of the position of the majority, which is but a
mere legal pretense that cannot stand the least analysis or the test of logic.

A great legal luminary admonished that we must have courage to unmasks pretense if we are to
reach a peace that will abide beyond the fleeting hour.

It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation as an agent of his
government, "may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied
territory if and when exigencies of the military occupation demand such action," but it is doubted
whether the commanding general of the army of the restored legitimate government can exercise the
same broad legislative powers.

We beg to disagree with a theory so unreasonable and subversive.

We cannot accept that the commanding general of an army of occupation, of a rebellious army, of an
invading army, or of a usurping army, should enjoy greater legal authority during the illegal, and in the
case of the Japanese, iniquitous and bestial occupation, than the official representative of the
legitimate government, once restored in the territory wrested from the brutal invaders and aggressors.
We cannot agree with such legal travesty.

Broad and unlimited powers are granted and recognized in the commanding general of an army of
invasion, but the shadow of the vanishing alleged principle of international law is being brandished to
gag, manacle, and make completely powerless the commander of an army of liberation to wipe out
the official acts of the government for usurpation, although said acts might impair the military
operation or neutralize the public policies of the restored legitimate government.

We are not unmindful of the interest of the persons who might be adversely affected by the
annulment of the judicial processes of the governments under the Japanese regime, but we cannot
help smiling when we hear that chaos will reign or that the world will sink.

It is possible that some criminals will be let loose unpunished, but nobody has ever been alarmed that
the President, in the exercise of his constitutional powers of pardon and amnesty, had in the past
released many criminals from imprisonment. And let us not forget that due to human limitations, in all
countries, under all governments, in peace or in war, there were, there are, and there will always be
unpunished criminals, and that situation never caused despair to any one.

We can conceive of inconveniences and hardships, but they are necessary contributions to great and
noble purposes. Untold sacrifices were always offered to attain high ideals and in behalf of worthy
causes.

We cannot refrain from feeling a paternal emotion for those who are trembling with all sincerity
because of the belief that the avoidance of judicial proceedings of the governments under the
Japanese regime "would paralyze the social life of the country." To allay such fear we must remind
them that the country that produced many great hereos and martyrs; that contributed some of highest
morals figures that humanity has ever produced in all history; which inhabited by a race which was
able to traverse in immemorial times the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific with
inadequate means of navigation, and to inhabit in many islands so distantly located, from
Madagascar to the eastern Pacific; which made possible the wonderful resistance of Bataan and
Corregidor, can not have a social life so frail as to be easily paralyzed by the annulment of some
judicial proceedings. The Japanese vandalisms during the last three years of nightmares and bestial
oppression, during the long period of our national slavery, and the wholesale massacres and
destructions in Manila and many other cities and municipalities and populated areas, were not able to
paralyze the social life of our people. Let us not loss faith so easily in the inherent vitality of the social
life of the people and country of Rizal and Mabini.

It is insinuated that because of the thought that the representative of the restored sovereign power
may set aside all judicial processes of the army of occupation, in the case to courts of a future
invasions, litigants will not summit their cases to courts whose judgement may afterwards be
annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing offenses in the expectancy that they
may escape penalty upon liberation of the country. We hope that Providence will never allow the
Philippines to fall again under the arms of an invading army, but if such misfortune will happen, let the
October Proclamation serve as a notice to the ruthless invaders that the official acts of the
government of occupation will not merit any recognition from the legitimate government, especially if
they should not conduct themselves, as exemplified by the Japanese, in accordance with the rules of
action of a civilized state.

One conclusive evidence of the untenableness of the majority position is the fact that it had to resort
to Executive Order No. 37, issued on March 10, 1945, providing "that all cases that have heretofore
been appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision."
The far-fetched theory is advanced that this provision impliedly recognizes the court processes during
the Japanese military occupation, on the false assumption that it refers to the Court of Appeals
existing during the Japanese regime. It is self-evident that the Executive Order could have referred
only to the Commonwealth Court of Appeals, which is the one declared abolished in said order.
Certainly no one will entertain the absurd idea that the President of the Philippines could have
thought of abolishing the Court of Appeals under the government during the Japanese occupation.
Said Court of Appeals disappeared with the ouster of the Japanese military administration from which
it derived its existence and powers. The Court of Appeals existing on March 10, 1945, at the time of
the issuance of Executive Order No. 37, was the Commonwealth Court of Appeals and it was the only
one that could be abolished.

Without discussing the correctness of principle stated the majority opinion quotes from Wheaton the
following: "Moreover when it is said that occupier's acts are valid and under international law should
not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that on crucial instances exist
to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does
happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the stored government, but the matter can hardly
be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245)

Then it says that there is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of
the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than the judicial of the
government established by the belligerent occupant.

It is evident that the statement just quoted is a complete diversion from the principle stated in the in
an unmistakable way by Wheaton, who says in definite terms that "it must be remembered that no
crucial instances exist to show that if his acts (the occupant's) should be reversed, any international
wrong would be committed."

It can be clearly seen that Wheaton does not make any distinction or point out any exception.
But in the majority opinion the principle is qualified, without stating any reason therefore, by limiting
the right of the restored government to annul "most of the acts of the occupier" and "processes other
than judicial."

The statement made by the respondent judge after quoting the above-mentioned principle, as stated
by Wheaton, to the effect that whether the acts of military occupant should be considered valid or not,
is a question that is up to the restored government to decide, and that there is no rule of international
law that denies to the restored government the right to exercise its discretion on the matter, is quoted
without discussion in the majority opinion.

As the statement is not disputed, wee are entitled to presume that it is concurred in and, therefore,
the qualifications made in the statement in the majority opinion seem to completely groundless.

THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON OCCUPANT ARMY ARE NOT LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT

The majority opinion is accumulating authorities to show the many duties imposed by international
law on the military occupant of an invaded country.

And from said duties it is deduced that the legitimate government, once restored in his own territory,
is bound to respect all the official acts of the government established by the usurping army, except
judicial processes political complexion.

The reasoning calls for immediate opposition. It is absolutely contrary to all principles of logic.

Between the duties imposed in the military occupant and the legal prerogatives of the legitimate
government there are no logical relationship or connection that might bind the ones with the others.

The military occupants is duty bound to protect the civil rights of the inhabitants, but why should the
legitimate government necessarily validate the measures adopted by the said occupant in the
performance of this duty, if the legitimate government believes his duty to annul them for weighty
reasons?

The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Why should the legitimate
government validate the acts of said courts, if it is convinced that said courts were absolutely
powerless, as was the case during the Japanese occupation, to stop the horrible abuses of the
military police, to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort Santiago tortures, to protect the
fundamental human rights of the Filipinos — life, property, and personal freedom?

The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul the official acts of the
ousted and supplanted legitimate government, a privilege which is inversely denied to the last. This
preference and predilection in favor of the military occupant, that is in favor of the invader and
usurper, and against the legitimate government, is simply disconcerting, if we have to say the least.

PRESUMPTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS AGAINST TRUTH AND FACTS

The invading military occupant is duty bound to establish and maintain courts of justice in the invaded
territory, for the protection of the inhabitants thereof. It is presumed that the restored legitimate
government will respect the acts of said courts of the army of occupation. Therefore, it is a principle of
international law that said acts are valid and should be respected by the legitimate government. It is
presumed that General MacArthur is acquainted with such principle, discovered or revealed through
presumptive operations, and it is presumed that he had not the intention of declaring null and void the
judicial processes of the government during the Japanese regime. Therefore, his October
Proclamation, declaring null and void and without effect "all processes" of said governments, in fact,
did not annul the Japanese regime judicial processes.

So run the logic of the majority.

They don't mind the that General MacArthur speaks in the October Proclamation as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief of

the military forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control. (emphasis supplied.)

General MacArthur says categorically "all processes", but the majority insists on reading differently,
that, is: "NOT ALL processes." The majority presume, suppose, against the unequivocal meaning of
simple and well known words, that when General MacArthur said "all processes", in fact, he said "not
all processes", because it is necessary, by presumption, by supposition, to exclude judicial
processes.

If where General MacArthur says "all", the majority shall insist on reading "not all", it is impossible to
foresee the consequences of such so stubborn attitude, but it is possible to understand how they
reached the unacceptable possible conclusion which we cannot be avoid opposing and exposing.

Are we to adopt and follow the policy of deciding cases submitted to our consideration, by
presumption and suppositions putting aside truths and facts? Are we to place in the documents
presented to us, such as the October Proclamation, different words than what are written therein? Are
we to read "not all", where it is written "all"?

We are afraid to such procedure is not precisely the most appropriate to keep public confidence in the
effectiveness of the administration of justice.

That is why we must insists that in the October Proclamation should be read what General MacArthur
has written in it, that is, that, besides laws and regulations, he declared and proclaimed null and void
"ALL PROCESSES", including naturally judicial processes, of the governments under the Japanese
regime.

THE COMMONWEALTH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CONTINUE JAPANESE REGIME

JUDICIAL PROCESSES

Now we come to the third and last question propounded in the majority opinion.

The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth tribunals is defined, prescribed, and apportioned by legislative
act.

It is provided so in our Constitution. (Section 2, Article VIII.)

The Commonwealth courts of justice are continuations of the courts established before the
inauguration of the Commonwealth and before the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.
And their jurisdiction is the same as provided by existing laws at the time of inauguration of the
Commonwealth Government.

Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Organic Act of the courts of justice of the
Philippines, is the one that defines the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, Courts
of First Instance, and the Supreme Court. It is not necessary to mention here the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, because the same has been abolished by Executive Order No. 37.

No provision may be found in Act. No. 136, nor in any other law of the Philippines, conferring on the
Commonwealth tribunals jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes or proceedings of tribunals
belonging to other governments, such as the governments established during the Japanese
occupation.

The jurisdiction of our justice of the peace and municipal courts is provided in section 68, chapter V,
of Act No. 136. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance is provided in the
sections 56, 57, Chapter IV, of Act No. 136. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is provided in 17 and 18, Chapter II, of the same Act. The provisions of the above-cited do not
authorize, even implicitly, any of the decisions and judgements of tribunals of the governments, nor to
continue the processes or proceedings of said tribunals.

NECESSITY OF ENABLING ACT UNDER THE LEGAL DOCTRINE PREVAILING IN THE

PHILIPPINES AND IN THE UNITED STATES

Taking aside the question as to whether the judicial processes of the government established during
the Japanese occupation should be considered valid or not, in order that said processes could be
continued and the Commonwealth tribunals could exercise proper jurisdiction to continue them, under
the well- established legal doctrine, prevailing not only in the Philippines, but also in the proper
enabling law.

Almost a half a century ago, in the instructions given by President McKinley on April 7, 1900, for the
guidance of the Philippine Commission, it was stated that, in all the forms of the govenment and
administrative provisions which they were authorized to prescribed, the Commission should bear in
mind that the government which they were establishing was designed not for the satisfaction of the
Americans or for the expression of their of their theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and
prosperity of the people of the Philippines, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to
their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

Notwithstanding the policy so outlined, it was not enough for the Philippine Commission to create and
establish the courts of justice provided in Act No. 136, in order that said tribunals could take
cognizance and continue the judicial proceedings of the tribunals existing in the Philippines at the
time the American occupation.

It needed specific enabling provisions in order that the new tribunals might continue the processes
pending in the tribunals established by the Spaniards, and which continued to function until they were
substituted by the courts created by the Philippine Commission.

So it was done in regards to the transfer of the cases pending before the Spanish Audiencia to the
newly created Supreme Court, in sections 38 and 39 of Act No. 136 quoted as follows:

SEC. 38. Disposition of causes, actions, proceedings, appeals, records, papers, and so forth, pending
in the existing Supreme Court and in the "Contencioso Administravo." — All records, books, papers,
causes, actions, proceedings, and appeals logged, deposited, or pending in the existing Audiencia or
Supreme Court, or pending by appeal before the Spanish tribunal called "Contencioso Administravo,"
are transferred to the Supreme Court above provided for which, has the same power and jurisdiction
over them as if they had been in the first instance lodged, filed, or pending therein, or, in case of
appeal, appealed thereto.

SEC. 39. Abolition of existing Supreme Court. — The existing Audiencia or Supreme Court is hereby
abolished, and the Supreme Court provided by this Act is substituted in place thereof.

Sections 64 and 65 of the same Act allowed the same procedure as regards the transfer of cases and
processes pending in the abolished Spanish Courts of First Instance to the tribunals of the same
name established by the Philippine Commission.

SEC. 64. Disposition of records, papers, causes, and appeals, now pending in the existing Courts of
First Instance. — All records, books, papers, actions, proceedings, and appeals lodged, deposited, or
pending in the Court of First Instance as now constituted of or any province are transferred to the
Court of First Instance of such province hereby established, which shall have the same power and
jurisdiction over them as if they had been primarily lodged, deposited, filed, or commenced therein, or
in case of appeal, appealed thereto.

SEC. 65. Abolition of existing Courts of First Instance. — The existing Courts First Instance are
hereby abolished, and the Courts of First Instance provided by this Act are substituted in place
thereof.

The same procedure has been followed by the Philippine Commission eventhough the courts of origin
of the judicial processes to be transferred and continued belonged to the same government and
sovereignty of the courts which are empowered to continue said processes.

So section 78 of Act No. 136, after the repeal of all acts conferring upon American provost courts in
the Philippines jurisdiction over civil actions, expressly provided that said civil actions shall be
transferred to the newly created tribunals.

And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court, Courts of the First Instance and courts of the
justice of the peace established by this Act (No. 136) are authorized to try and determine the actions
so transferred to them respectively from the provost courts, in the same manner and with the same
legal effect as though such actions had originally been commenced in the courts created" by virtue of
said Act.

MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 183

On July 30, 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act of the City of Manila, No. 183.

Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said Act, one for the northern side of
Pasig River and the other for the southern side.
They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under the jurisdiction of the justices of
the peace then existing in Manila. Although both courts were of the same jurisdiction, in order that the
criminal cases belonging to the justice of the peace courts may be transferred to the municipal courts
just created, and the proceedings may be continued by the same, the Philippine Commission
considered it necessary to pas the proper enabling act.

So on August 5, 1901, it enacted Act No. 186, section 2 of which provides that all criminal cases and
proceedings pending in the justices of the peace of Manila are transferred to the municipal courts,
which are conferred the jurisdiction to continue said cases and proceedings.

THE CABANTAG CASE

On August 1, 1901, Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a military commission.

(Cabantag vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.) The decision was confirmed on December 10, 1901, and his
execution by hanging was set for January 12,1902. .

On December 26, 1901, he fled, but surrendered to the authorities on July 18, 1902. The Civil
Governor on December 2, 1903, commuted the death penalty to 20 years imprisonment. The
commutation was approved by the Secretary of War, following instructions of the President.

Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that, with the abolition of the military
commission which convicted him, there was no existing tribunal which could order the execution of
the penalty of imprisonment.

The Supreme Court denied the writ, but stated that, if the petitioner had filed the writ before the
enactment of Act No. 865, the question presented to the Supreme Court would have been different.

Act No. 865, enacted on September 3, 1903, is enabling law, wherein it is provided that decisions
rendered by the provost courts and military commission shall be ordered executed by the Courts of
First Instance in accordance with the procedure outlined in said Act.

It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has accepted and confirmed the doctrine of
the necessity of an enabling act in order that our Courts of First Instance could exercise jurisdiction to
execute the decision of the abolished provost courts and military commission.

It is evident that the doctrine is applicable, with more force, to the judicial processes coming from
governments deriving their authority from a foreign enemy state.

THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES

It is also evident that the Congress of the United States, by enacting the Bill of the Philippines on July
1, 1902, confirmed also the same doctrine.

In effect, in section 9 of said Act, the Congress approved what the Philippine Commission did as to
the jurisdiction of the courts established and transfer of cases and judicial processes, as provided in
Acts Nos. 136, 186, and 865.

The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government as part of its international policy, as
could be seen in Article XII of the Treaty concluded with Spain on December 10, 1898, in Paris.

Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same doctrine.

The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the libellant. From the decree an appeal was
taken to the Circuit Court, where the case was pending, when in 1861, the proceedings of the court
were interrupted by the civil war. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts and
officers of the United States were excluded from its limits. In 1862, however, the National authority
had been partially reestablished in the State, though still liable to the overthrown by the vicissitudes of
war. The troops of the Union occupied New Orleans, and held military possession of the city and such
other portions of the State as had submitted to the General Government. The nature of this
occupation and possession was fully explained in the case of The Vinice.

Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a
Provisional Court of the State of Louisiana, with authority, among other powers, to hear, try, and
determine all causes in admiralty. Subsequently, by consent of parties, this cause was transferred
into the Provisional Court thus, constituted, and was heard, and a decree was again rendered in favor
of the libellants. Upon the restoration of civil authority in the State, the Provincial Court, limited in
duration, according to the terms of the proclamation, by the event, ceased to exist.

On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes and proceedings in the Provisional
Court, proper for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, should be transferred to that court, and heard, and determined therein; and that all
judgements, orders, and decrees of the Provisional Court in causes transferred to the Circuit Court
should at once become the orders, judgements, and decrees of that court, and might be enforced,
pleaded, and proved accordingly.

It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the President of a Provisional Court
was warranted by the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was properly established by the President
in the exercise of this constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon the close
of the war, and the dissolution of the Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases pending in
that court, and of its judgement and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States. (U. S. Reports,
Wallace, Vol. 9, The Grapeshot, 131-133.)

JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE VALIDATED BY

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established their own government in
Louisiana.

When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and the de facto government was
replaced by the de jure government, to give effect to the judgments and other judicial acts of the rebel
government, from January 26, 1861, up to the date of the adoption of the State Constitution, a
provision to said effect was inserted in said document.

Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows:

All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and all laws in force at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, shall continue as if it had not been adopted; all
judgments and judicial sales, marriages, and executed contracts made in good faith and in
accordance with existing laws in this State rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of
January, 1861, and the date when this constitution shall be adopted, are hereby declared to be valid,
etc. (U. S. Report, Wallace, Vol. 22, Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 281.)

EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT
EXECUTORY

The member states of the United States of America belong to the same nation, to the country, and
are under the same sovereignty.

But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other states.

To give them effect in other states it is necessary to initiate an original judicial proceedings, and
therein the defendants in the domestic suit may plead bar the sister state judgement puis darrien
continuance. (Wharton, on the Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, p. 1411.)

Under the Constitution of the United States, when a judgement of one state in the Union is offered in
a court of a sister state as the basis of a suit nil debet cannot be pleaded. The only proper plea is nul
tiel record. (Id., p. 1413.).
It is competent for the defendant, however, to an action on a judgement of a sister state, as to an
action on a foreign judgement, to set up as a defense, want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgement; and, as indicating such want of jurisdiction, to aver by plea that the defendant was not an
inhabitant of the state rendering the judgement, and had not been served with process, and did not
enter his appearance; or that the attorney was without authority to appear. (Id., pp. 1414-1415.)

The inevitable consequence is that the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the
absence of an enabling act or of an express legislative grant, have no jurisdiction to take cognizance
and continue the judicial processes, procedures, and proceedings of the tribunals which were created
by the Japanese Military Administration and functioned under the Vargas Philippine Executive
Commission of the Laurel Republic of the Philippines, deriving their authority from the Emperor, the
absolute ruler of Japan, the invading enemy, and not from the Filipino people in whom, according to
the Constitution, sovereignty resides, and from whom all powers of government emanate.

The position of Honorable Asenio P. Dizon, the respondent judge of the Court of the First Instance of
Manila in declaring himself without jurisdiction nor authority to continue the proceedings which
provoked the present controversy, being a judicial process of a Japanese sponsored government, is
absolutely correct, under the legal doctrines established by the United States and the Philippine
Government, and consistently, invariably, and without exception, followed by the same.

If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the Commonwealth tribunals have
jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes left pending by the courts of the governments
established under the Japanese regime, the courts which disappeared and, automatically, ceased to
function with the ouster of the enemy, the position of the Judge Dizon, in declining to continue the
case, is still unassailable, because, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if the judicial processes in
said case were not taken at all, as inevitable result of the sweeping and absolute annulment declared
by the General MacArthur in the October Proclamation.

In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms that "ALL PROCESSES" of the
Japanese sponsored governments "ARE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and
they shall remain so until the Commonwealth, through its legislative power, decides otherwise in a
proper validating act.

The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in duty bound to establish courts of
justice during the occupation, although they made them completely powerless to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the citizens, and mere figureheads as regards the fundamental liberties of the
helpless men, women and children of our people, so much so that said courts could not offer even the
semblance of protection when the life, the liberty, the honor and dignity of our individual citizens were
wantonly trampled by any Japanese, military or civilian, does not change the situation. "ALL
PROCESSES" of said court are declared "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the
October proclamation, and we do not have any other alternative but to accept the law, as said
proclamation has the full force of a law.

The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored in their own territory,
condescended in many cases to recognize and to give effect to judgments rendered by courts under
the governments set up by an invading military occupant or by a rebel army, does not elevate such
condescension to the category of a principle, when Wheaton declares that no international wrong is
done if the acts of the invader are reversed.

Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed by the international law on
military occupants, but no authority has been cited to the effect that the representative of the restored
legitimate government is a bound to recognize and accept as valid the acts and processes of said
occupants. On the contrary, Wheaton says that if the occupant's acts are reversed "no international
wrong would be committed."

Following the authority of Wheaton, undisputed by the majority, General MacArthur thought, as the
wisest course, of declaring "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT," by official proclamation,
"ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime, that is legislative, executive and judicial processes,
which fall under the absolute adjective "ALL".

That declaration is a law. It is a law that everybody bound to accept and respect, as all laws must be
accepted and respected. It is a law that the tribunals are duty bound to give effect and apply.

We are not unmindful of the adverse consequences to some individuals of the annullment of all the
judicial processes under the Japanese regime, as provided in the October Proclamation, but the
tribunals are not guardians of the legislative authorities, either an army commander in chief, during
war, or a normal legislature, in peace time. The tribunals are not called upon to guide the legislative
authorities to the wisdom of the laws to be enacted. That is the legislative responsibility. Our duty and
our responsibility is to see to it that the law, once enacted, be applied and complied with.

No matter the consequences, no matter who might be adversely affected, a judge must have the firm
resolve and the courage to do his duty, as, in the present case, Judge Dizon did, without fear nor
favor. We cannot see any reason why we should not uphold him in his stand in upholding the law.

It is our official duty, national and international duty. Yes. Because this Supreme Court is sitting, not
only as a national court, but as an international court, as is correctly stated in the concurring opinion
of Justice De Joya, and we should feel the full weight of the corresponding responsibility, as the
American courts with admiralty jurisdiction and the Prize Courts of England did feel. In fact, it is in the
judiciary where, more than in any point of view is more pressing, more imperative, more unavoidable.
Justice has no country. It is of all countries. The horizon of justice cannot be limited by the scene
where our tribunals are functioning and moving. That horizon is boundless. That is why in our
constitution the bill of rights has been written not for Filipinos, but for all persons. They are rights that
belong to men, not as Filipinos, Americans, Russians, Chinese or Malayan, but as a members of
humanity. The international character of our duty to administer justice has become more specific by
the membership of our country in the United Nations. And let us not forget, as an elemental thing, that
our primary duty is to uphold and apply the law, as it is; that we must not replace the words of the law
with what we might be inclined to surmise; that what is clearly and definitely provided should not be
substituted with conjectures and suppositions; that we should not try to deduce a contrary intention to
that which is unequivocally stated in the law; that we should not hold valid what is conclusively
declared null and void.

The October Proclamation declared "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime "AND VOID
WITHOUT EFFECT", so they must stand. There is no possible way of evasion. "ALL PROCESSES",
in view of the meaning of the absolute adjective "ALL", include "JUDICIAL PROCESSES". Allegatio
contra factum non est admittenda.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons we conclude:

1. That General MacArthur had full legal authority to issue the October Proclamation, and that no
principle of the international law is violated by said proclamation, no international wrong being
committed by the reversal by the legitimate government of the acts of the military invader.

2. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official policies to which the United
States and Philippine Governments were committed, and the annulment of all the facts of the
governments under the Japanese regime, legislative, executive, and judicial, is legal, and justified by
the wrongs committed by the Japanese.

3. That when General MacArthur proclaimed and declared in the October Proclamation "That all laws,
regulations and processes" of the Japanese sponsored governments, during enemy occupation, "are
null and void and without effect", he meant exactly what he said.

4. That where General MacArthur said "all processes" we must read and understand precisely and
exactly "all processes", and not "some processes". "All" and "some" have incompatible meanings and
are not interchangeable.
5. That the word "processes" includes judicial procedures, proceedings, processes, and cases.
Therefore, "all processes" must include "all judicial processes.".

6. That we have no right to attribute General MacArthur an intention different from what he has
plainly, clearly, unmistakably expressed in unambiguous words with familiar meaning generally
understood by the common man.

7. That the judicial proceedings here in question are included among those adversely affected by the
October Proclamation.

8. That the Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of nor to continue the
judicial proceedings under the Japanese regime.

9. That to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is necessary.

10. That respondent Judge Dizon did not commit the error complained of in the petition, and that the
petition has no merits at all.

We refuse to follow the course of action taken by the majority in the present case. It is a course based
on a mistaken conception of the principles of international law and their interpretation and application,
and on a pinchbeck. It is a course based on misconstruction or misunderstanding of the October
Proclamation, in utter disregard of the most elemental principles of legal here meneutics. It is a
course that leads to nowhere, except to the brink of disaster, because it is following the dangerous
path of ignoring or disobeying the law.

Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived. The issue confronting us is not of passing importance. It is
an issue of awesome magnitude and transcendency. It goes to and reaches the very bottom. It is
simple. Lacking in complexities. But it may shake the very foundation of society, the cornerstone of
the state, the primary pillar of the nation. It may dry the very foundation of social life, the source of
vitalizing sap that nurtures the body politic. The issue is between the validity of one or more Japanese
regime processes and the sanctity of the law.

That is the question, reduced to its ultimate terms. it is a simple dilemma that is facing us. It is the
alpha and the omega of the whole issue. Either the processes, or the law. We have to select between
two, which to uphold. It is a dilemma that does not admit of middle terms, or of middle ways where we
can loiter with happy unconcern . We are in the cross road: which way shall we follow? The
processes and the law are placed in the opposite ends of the balance. Shall we inclined the balance
of justice to uphold the processes and defeat law, or vice versa?
We feel jittery because some judicial processes might be rescinded or annulled, but we do not
tremble with sincere alarm at the thought of putting the law under the axe, of sentencing law to be
executed by the guillotine. We feel uneasy, fancying chaos and paralyzation of social life, because
some litigants in cases during the Japanese regime will be affected in their private interests, with the
annulment of some judicial processes, but we adopt an attitude of complete nonchalance in throwing
law overboard. This baffling attitude is a judicial puzzle that nobody will understand. So it is better that
we should shift to a more understandable way, that which is conformable to the standard that the
world expects in judicial action.

No amount of arguments and lucubration's, no amount of speculative gymnastics, no amount of

juggling of immaterial principles of international law, no amount of presumptions and suppositions,
surmises and conjectures, no amount of dexterity in juridical exegesis can divert our attention from
the real, simple, looming, hypostasis of the issue before us: Law. It is Law with all its majestic
grandeur which we are defying and intending to overthrow from the sacred pedestal where the ages
had placed her as a goddess, to be enshrined, obeyed, and venerated by men, forever. Let us not
dare to lay our profaning hands on her vestal virginity, lest the oracle should fling at us the thunder of
his prophetic anathema.

We cannot therefore vote except for the denial of the petition.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the majority and, pursuant to the Constitution, proceed to state the
reason for my dissent.

The proceeding involved in the case at bar were commenced by a complaint filed by the instant
petitioner, as plaintiff, on November 18, 1944, in civil case No. 3012 of the so-called Court of First
Instance of Manila, the complaint bearing this heading and title: "The Republic of the Philippines — In
the Court of First Instance of Manila" (Annex X of Exhibit A of petition for mandamus). The farthest
that said proceedings had gone before the record was burned or destroyed during the battle for
Manila, was the filing by counsel for plaintiff therein of their opposition to a motion for dismissal filed
by opposing counsel.

It is, therefore, plain that the case had not been heard on the merits when the record was burned or
destroyed.

The respondent judge, in his order dated June 6, 1945, disposing of the petition dated May 25, 1945
filed by petitioner, as a plaintiff in said case, and of the petition filed by respondent Eusebio Valdez
Tan Keh, as defendant therein, on May 31, 19045, held: " first, that by virtue of the proclamation of
General MacArthur quoted above, all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the Commonwealth became null and void and without legal effect in Manila on
February 3, 1945 or, at the lates, on February 27 of the same year; second that the proceedings and
processes had in the present case having been before a court of the Republic of the Philippines and
in accordance with the laws and regulations of said Republic, the same are now void and without
legal effect; third, that this Court as one of the different courts of general jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, has no authority to take cognizance of and continue said
proceedings to final judgement, until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in the manner and form provided by law, shall have provided for the transfer of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the causes commenced
and left pending therein, to the courts created and organized by virtue of the provisions of Act No.
4007, as revived by Executive Order No. 36, or for the validation of all proceedings had in said
courts."

Petitioner prays that this Court declare that the respondent judge should not have ordered the
suspension of the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 and should continue and dispose of all the
incidents in said case till its complete termination. In my opinion, the petition should denied.

In stating the reasons for this dissent, we may divide the arguments under the following propositions:

1. The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army
MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148);

2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission "and later as the
Republic of the Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces or by his order was not a de-facto government — the so-called Court of First Instance of
Manila was not a de facto court, and the judge who presided it was not a de facto judge; (b) the rules
of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto Government in territory belonging to a
belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments
thus established here by Japan;

3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and
after the Japanese occupation;

4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be
bound by the acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments;

5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.

I
The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's
proclamation of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148).

In this proclamation, after reciting certain now historic facts, among which was that the so-called
government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943 "under
enemy duress, . . . based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the
Government of the United States," the great Commander-in-Chief proclaimed and declared:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control; and

xxx xxx xxx

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly
constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted is, I think, that as the different
areas of the Philippines were progressively liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained shall
attach to the laws, regulations and processes thus condemned in so far as said areas were
concerned. Mark that the proclamation did not provide that such laws, regulations and processes
shall be or are annulled, but that they are null and void. Annulment implies some degree of the
effectiveness in the act annulled previous to the annulment, but a declaration of nullity denotes that
the act is null and void ab initio — the nullity precedes the declaration. The proclamation speaks in
the present tense, not in the future. If so, the fact that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned
laws, regulations, and processes in areas not yet free from enemy occupation and control upon the
date of the proclamation, would attach thereto at a later date, is no argument for giving them validity
or effectiveness in the interregnum. By the very terms of the proclamation itself, that nullity had to
date back from the inception of such laws, regulations and processes; and to dispel any shadow of
doubt which may still remain, we need only consider the concluding paragraph of the proclamation
wherein the Commander in Chief of the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal citizens of
the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government. This is all-
inclusive — it comprises not only the loyal citizens in the liberated areas but also those in areas still
under enemy occupation and control. It will be noticed that the complaint in said civil case No. 3012
was filed twenty-six days after the above-quoted proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. If
the parties to said case were to consider the proceedings therein up to the date of the liberation of
Manila valid and binding, they would hardly be complying with the severe injunction to render full
respect for and obedience to our Constitution and the laws, regulations and other acts of our duly
constituted government from October 23, 1944, onwards. Indeed, to my mind, in choosing between
these two courses of action, they would be dangerously standing on the dividing line between loyalty
and disloyalty to this country and its government.

The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation of Manila, were unquestionably
"processes" of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines within the meaning of the
aforesaid proclamation of General of the Army MacArthur and, consequently, fall within the
condemnation of the proclamation. Being processes of a branch of a government which had been
established in the hostility to the Commonwealth Government, as well as the United States
Government, they could not very well be considered by the parties to be valid and binding, at least
after October 23, 1944, without said parties incurring in disobedience and contempt of the
proclamation which enjoins them to render full respect for the obedience to our Constitution and the
laws, regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government. Nine days after the inauguration
of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines," President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United
States declared in one of his most memorable pronouncements about the activities of the enemy in
the Philippines, as follows:

One of the fourtheenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Island with
Jose P. Laurel, formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as "president." Jorge Vargas,
formerly as a member of the Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member
of that cabinet, were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet
regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second act was a hyphocritical appeal for
American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed to confuse and mislead
the Filipino people.

I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor
the present "Philippine Republic " has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United
States. . . .

Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth —
that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.

October 23, 1943.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
President of the United States

(Form U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.).

It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippines was in
Washington, D.C., with his exiled government, he also repeatedly condemned both the "Philippine
Executive Commission" and the "Philippine Republic," as they had been established by or under
orders of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces. With these two heads of the
Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines condemning the "puppet
regime" from its very inception, it is beyond my comprehension to see how the proceedings in
question could be considered valid and binding without adopting an attitude incompatible with theirs.
As President Roosevelt said in his above quoted message, "Our symphaty goes out to those remain
loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority of the Filipino people who
have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.

The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of occupation was in control in the
Islands and their paramount military strength gave those of our people who were within their reach no
other alternative, these had to obey their orders and decrees, but the only reason for such obedience
would be that paramount military strength and not any intrinsic legal validity in the enemy's orders and
decrees. And once that paramount military strength disappeared, the reason for the obedience
vanished, and obedience should likewise cease.

As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S.,
176; 24 Law. ed., 719), "In the face of an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often
be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus made to the rightfulness of
the authority exercised." (Emphasis ours.) The court there refers to its own former decision in
Thorington vs. Smith, and makes it clear that the doctrine in the Thorington case, so far as the effects
of the acts of the provisional government maintained by the British in Casetine, from September,
1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the consideration of Tampico as United States territory,
were concerned, was limited to the period during which the British, in the first case, retained
possession of Castine, and the United States, in the second, retained possession of Tampico. In
referring to the Confederate Government during the Civil War, as mentioned in the Thorington case,
the court again says in effect that the actual supremacy of the Confederate Government over a
portion of the territory of the Union was the only reason for holding that its inhabitants could not but
obey its authority. But the court was careful to limit this to the time when that actual supremacy
existed, when it said: . . . individual resistance to its authority then would have been futile and,
therefore, unjustifiable." (Emphasis ours.)

Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following paragraph from that leading decision:

There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. Smith (supra), which conflicts with these
views. In that case, the Confederate Government is characterized as one of paramount force, and
classed among the governments of which the one maintained by great Britain in Castine, from
September 1814, to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the one maintained by the United States in
Tampico, during our War with Mexico, are examples. Whilst the British retained possession of
Castine, the inhabitants were held to be subject to such laws as the British Government chose to
recognize and impose. Whilst the United States retained possession of Tampico, it was held that it
must regarded and respected as their territory. The Confederate Government, the court observed,
differed from these temporary governments in the circumstance that its authority did not justifying acts
of hostility to the United States, "Made obedience to its authority in civil and local matters not only a
necessity, but a duty." All that was meant by this language was, that as the actual supremancy of the
Confederate Government existed over certain territory, individual resistance to its
authority then would have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable. In the face of an overwhelming
force, obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No
concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 24 Law
ed., 719; emphasis ours.)

The majority opinion, in considering valid the proceedings in question, invokes the rule that when a
belligerent army occupies a territory belonging to the enemy, the former through its Commander in
Chief, has the power to establish thereon what the decisions and treaties have variously denominated
provisional or military government, and the majority holds that the Japanese-sponsored government
in the Philippines was such a government. Without prejudice to later discussing the effects which the
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy contained in our Commonwealth Constitution,
as well as in the Briand-Kellog Pact, must have produced in this rule in so far as the Philippines is
concerned, let us set forth some considerations apropos of this conclusion of the majority. If the
power to establish here such a provisional government is recognized in the Commander in Chief of
the invasion army, why should we not recognize at least an equal power in the Commander in Chief
of the liberation army to overthrow that government will all of its acts, at least of those of an executory
nature upon the time of liberation? Considering the theory maintained by the majority, it would seem
that they would recognize in the Japanese Commander in Chief the power to overthrow the
Commonwealth Government, and all of its acts and institutions if he had choosen to. Why should at
least an equal power be denied the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to overthrow the
substitute government thus erected by the enemy with all of its acts and institutions which are still not
beyond retrieve? Hereafter we shall have occasion to discuss the aspects of this question from the
point of view of policy or the practical convenience of the inhabitants. If the Japanese Commander in
Chief represented sovereignty of Japan, the American Commander in Chief represented the
sovereignty of the United States, as well as the Government of the Commonwealth. If Japan had won
this war, her paramount military supremacy would have continued to be exerted upon the Filipino
people, and out of sheer physical compulsion this country would have had to bow to the continuance
of the puppet regime that she had set up here for an indefinite time. In such a case, we admit that, not
because the acts of that government would then have intrinsically been legal and valid, but simply
because of the paramount military force to which our people would then have continued to be
subjected, they would have had to recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the different
departments of that government. But fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire civilized world,
Japan was defeated. And I now ask: Now that Japan has been defeated, why should the Filipinos be
still bound to respect or recognize validity in the acts of the Japanese-sponsored government which
has been so severely condemned by both the heads of the United States and our Commonwealth
Government throughout the duration of the war? If we were to draw a parallel between that
government and that which was established by the Confederate States during the American Civil
War, we will find that both met with ultimate failure. And, in my opinion, the conclusion to be drawn
should be the same in both cases.

As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra), referring to the
Confederate Government, its failure carried with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking
down in pieces of the whole fabric of its government. The Court said among other things:

The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate States for nearly four years, the
territory over which it extended, the vast resources it wielded, and the millions who acknowledged its
authority, present an imposing spectacle well fitted to mislead the mind in considering the legal
character of that organization. It claimed to represent an independent nation and to posses sovereign
powers; as such to displace to jurisdiction and authority of the United States from nearly half of their
territory and, instead of their laws, to substitute and enforce those of its own enactment. Its
pretentions being resisted, they were submitted to the arbitrament of war. In that contest the
Confederacy failed; and in its failure its pretentions were dissipated, its armies scattered, and the
whole fabric of its government broken in pieces. (24 Law, ed., 719; emphasis ours.)
By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines had been lawful — which,
however, is not the case — and if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the government
that she established in the Philippines, which would have been the case had victory been hers, there
would be more reason for holding the acts of that government valid, but because Japan has lost the
war and, therefore, failed in giving permanence to that government, the contrary conclusion should
legitimately follow.

The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends not upon the existence of hostilities
but upon the ultimate success of the party which it is adopted" (emphasis ours). And, referring to the
overthrow of the of the Confederacy, the Court, said, "when its military forces were overthrown, it
utterly perished, and with it all its enactments" (emphasis ours)

The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the same case of
Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, which is a mere obiter dictum. The majority opinion says that in this
passage the Court was "discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States." In the first
place, an examination of the decision will reveal that the controversy dealt with an act of
the Confederate Government, not of the Confederate States individually; and in the second place, the
quoted passage refers to something which was not in issue in the case, namely, the acts of the
individual States composing the Confederacy. But even this passage clearly places the case at bar
apart from the Court's pronouncement therein. The quoted passage commences by stating that "The
same general form of government the same general laws for the administration of justice and the
protection of private rights, which has existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remanded during (its)
continuance and afterwards. "In the case at bar, the same general form of the Commonwealth
Government did not continue under the Japanese, for the simple reason that one of the first acts of
the invaders was to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution and, therefore, the constitutional
government which existed thereunder, as an effect of the following acts and decrees of the
Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces:

1. Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942 of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces
to the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission directed that, in the exercise of legislative,
executive and judicial powers in the Philippines, the "activities" of the "administrative organs and
judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing status, order, ordinances and the
Commonwealth Constitution (1 Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, page 34).
Under the frame of government existing in this Commonwealth upon the date of the Japanese
invasion, the Constitution was the very fountain-head of the validity and effects of all the "status,
orders, and ordinances" mentioned by the Japanese Commander in Chief, and in overthrowing the
Constitution he, in effect, overthrew all of them.

2. Instruction No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. 1, usages 36 et seq., Official
Gazette, edited at the Office of the Executive Commission) gave the "Detailed Instruction Based on
Guiding Principle of the Administration," and among other things required "The entire personnel shall
be required to pledge their loyalty to the Imperial Japanese Forces. . . ." (This, of course, was
repugnant to the frame of government existing here under the Commonwealth Constitution upon the
date of invasion.)

3. Proclamation dated January 3, 19452 of the Japanese Commander in Chief provided in paragraph
3 that "The Authorities and the People of the Commonwealth should sever their relations with the
U.S. o . . ." (This is, likewise, repugnant to the Commonwealth Constitution and the to the
Government of that Commonwealth Constitution and to the Government of that Commonwealth which
was expressly made subject to the supreme sovereignty of the United States until complete
independence is granted, not by the mere will of the United States, but by virtue of an agreement
between that Government and ours, under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.)

The individual States of the Confederate and their governments existed prior to the Civil War and had
received the sanction and recognition of the Union Government, for which the Federal Supreme Court
was speaking in the Williams-Bruffy case; while the Japanese-sponsored governments of the
"Philippine Executive Commission" and the Republic of the Philippines" neither existed here before
the war nor had received the recognition or sanction of either the United States or the Commonwealth
Government — nay, they had received the most vigorous condemnation of both.

The Court further says in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra):

No case has been cited in argument, and we think unsuccesfully attempting to establish a separate
revolutionary government have been sustained as a matter of legal right. As justly observed by the
late Chief Justice in the case of Shortridge vs. Macon, I Abb. U.S., 58, decided at the circuit, and, in
all material respects like the one at bar, "Those who engage in rebellion must consider the
consequences. If they succeed, rebellion becomes revolution, and the new government will justify is
founders. If they fail, all their acts hostile to the rightful government are violations of law, and originate
no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have
been alike assailed. S.C., Chase, Dec., 136. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716,
718.) (Emphasis ours.)
I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an unsuccessful rebellion should be
applied with greater force to the case of a belligerent who loss the war. And since the founding of the
Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was designed to supplant and did actually
supplant the rightful government and since all its acts could not but a hostile to the latter (however
blameless the officials who acted under enemy duress might be), and since Japan failed, all said
acts, particularly those of the Japanese-sponsored court in said civil case No. 3012, "are violations of
law, and originate no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and
existence have been alike assailed", quoting the language of the court in Shortridge vs. Macon, cited
by Mr. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy, supra (24 Law. ed., 718).

II

(a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission" and later as the Republic
of the Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or
by the his order was not a de facto government--the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was
not a de facto court and the who presided it was not a de facto judge;

(b) The rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto government in territory
belonging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the
governments thus established here by Japan.

Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, and the pertinent cases therein cited, the short-lived
provisional government thus established by the Japanese in the Philippines should be classified, at
best, as a government of paramount force. But this is not all. The Constitution of this Commonwealth
which has been expressly approved by the United States Government, in Article II, section 3, under
the heading "Declaration of Principles", renounces war as an instrument of national policy. This
renunciation of war as an instruments of national policy follows an equal renunciation in the Briand-
Kellog Pact. The rules of International Law , cited in support of the power or right of a belligerent army
of occupation to set up a provisional government on occupied enemy territory, were evolved prior to
the first World War, but the horrors and devastations of that war convinced, at least the governments
of the United States and France, that they should thereafter renounce war as an instrument of
national policy, and they consequently subscribed the Briand-Kellog Pact. Those horrors and
devastations were increased a hundred fold, if not more, in this second World War, but even before
this war occurred, our own people, through our Constitutional delegates, who framed the
Commonwealth Constitution also adopted the same doctrine, and embodied an express renunciation
of war as an instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted. It is true that in section 3,
Article II, above-cited, our Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law
as a part of the law of the Nation. But, of course, this adoption is exclusive of those principles of
International Law which might involve recognition of war as an instrument of national policy. It is plain
that on the side of the Allies, the present war is purely defensive. When Japan started said war,
treacherously and without previous declaration, and attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on
those two fateful days of December 7 and 8, 1941, she employed war as an instrument of the national
policy. Under the Briand-Kellog Pact and our Commonwealth Constitution, the United States and the
Commonwealth Government could not possibly have recognized in Japan any right, as against them,
to employ that war as an instrument of her national policy, and, consequently, they could not have
recognized in Japan power to set up in the Philippines the puppet government that she later set up,
because such power would be a mere incident or consequence of the war itself. The authorities agree
that such a power, under the cited rules, is said to a right derived from war. (67 C.J., p. 421, sec.
171.) There can be no question that the United States and the Commonwealth Governments were
free to refuse to be bound by those rules when they made their respective renunciations above
referred to. Indeed, all the United Nations have exercised this free right in their Charter recently
signed at San Francisco.

As necessary consequence of this, those rules of International Law were no longer applicable to the
Philippines and to the United States at the time of the Japanese invasion as a corollary, it follows that
we have no legal foundation on which to base the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-
sponsored government in the Philippines were valid and binding. Moreover, I am of opinion, that
although at the time of the Japanese invasion and up to the present, the United States retains over
the Philippines, a certain measure of sovereignty, it is only for certain specified purposes enumerated
in the Tydings-McDufie Act of the Commonwealth Constitution. (Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.) And our territory was at the time of the Japanese invasion not a territory of the United
States, within the meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy territory. Our
territory is significantly called "The National Territory" in Article I of our Constitution and this bears the
stamps of express approval of the United States Government. The Philippines has been recognized
and admitted as a member of the United Nations. We, therefore, had our own national and territorial
identity previous to that invasion. Our nation was not at war with the Filipinos. And line with this, the
Japanese army, in time, released Filipino war prisoners captured in Bataan. Lt. Gen. Maeda, Chief of
Staff, Imperial Japanese Forces, in his speech of January 2, 1942, said:

. . . we had not the slighest intensions to make your people our enemy; rather we considered them as
our friends who will join us has hand-in-hand in the establishment of an orderly Greater East Asia. . .
., (Official Gazette, edited at the Office of the Executive Commission, Vol. I, p. 55.)
If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the Japanese, the following principles from
Lawrence, International Law (7th ed.), p. 603, are pertinent:

The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. — . . . To refrain from carrying on hostilities
within neutral territory. — We have already seen that, though this obligation was recognized in theory
during the infancy of International law, it was often very imperfectly observed in practice. But in
modern times it has been strickly enforced, and any State which knowingly ordered warlike
operations to be carried on in neutral territory . . . would bring down upon itself the reprobation of
civilized mankind. Hostilities may be carried on in the territory of either belligerent, on the high seas,
and in territory belonging to no one. Neutral land and neutral territorial waters are sacred. No acts of
warfare may lawfully take place within them. . . . (Emphasis ours.)

In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set up a provisional government, the
belligerent had the right to invade or occupy the territory in the first instance. Such was not the case
with the Philippines. President Roosevelt, in his message to the Filipino people, soon after the landing
of American Forces in Leyte, on October 20, 1944, characterized Japan's invasion and occupation of
the Philippines as "the barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines," and he
announced the American people's "firm determination to punish the guilty." (41 Off. Gaz., 149.)
(Emphasis ours.) The illustrious leader of the United Nations could not have in more unmistakable
terms the utter illegality of that invasion and occupation. If the establishment of a provinsional
government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere application or extension of the force by
which the invasion or occupation was effected" (67 C.J., p. 421, sec 171), the illegality of the invasion,
would necessarily permeate the government, which was its mere application or extention.

The fact that shortly before December 8, 1941, the date of the "barbarous, unprovoked and
treacherous attack," the meager and almost untrained forces of the Philippine Army had been
inducted into the American Army, did not change the neutral status of the Philippines. That military
measure had been adopted for purely defensive purposes. Nothing could be farther from the minds of
the government and military leaders of the United States and the Philippines in adopting it than to
embark upon any aggressive or warlike enterprise against any other nation. It is an old and honored
rule dating as far back as the 18th century that even solemn promises of assistance made before the
war by a neutral to a nation which later becomes a belligerent, would not change the status of the
neutral even if such promises were carried out, so long as they were made for purely defensive
purposes. In the words of Vattel "when a sovereign furnishes the succor due in virtue of a former
defensive alliance, he does not associate himself in the war. Therefore he may fulfill his engagements
and yet preserve an exact neutrality." (Lawrence, Principles of International Law [7th ed.], pp. 585,
586.)

If the Filipinos had, from contemptible cowardice and fear, allowed their shores to be invaded, and
their territory occupied by the Japanese without resistance, such invasion occupation would
undoubtedly have been considered in violation of International Law. Should the Filipinos be punished
for having had the patriotism, bravery, and heroism to fight in defense of the sacredness of their land,
the sanctity of their homes, and the honor and dignity of their government by giving validity, in
whatever limited measure, to the lawless acts of the ruthless enemy who thus overran their country,
and robbed them of the tranquility and happiness of their daily lives? And yet, to my mind, to give any
measure of validity or binding effect to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First
Instance of Manila, involved herein, would be to give that much validity or effect to the acts of those
same invaders. To equalize the consequences of a lawful and a wrongful invasion of occupation,
would be to equalize right and wrong, uphold the creed that might makes right, and adopt "the law of
the jungle."

If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto government, it would seem clearly to
follow that its "Court of First Instance of Manila" was not a de facto court. But it should additionally be
stated that for it be a de facto court, its judge had to be a de facto judge, which he could not be, as
presently demonstrated.

As said by President Osmeña, in replying to the speech of General of the Army MacArthur when the
latter turned over to him the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, on
February 27, 1945:

xxx xxx xxx

The time has come when the world should know that when our forces surrendered in Bataan and
Corregidor, resistance to the enemy was taken up by the people itself — resistance which was
inarticulate and disorganized in its inception but which grew from the day to day and from island until
it broke out into an open warfare against the enemy.

The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war because it counted with the wholehearted
support of the masses. From the humble peasant to the barrio school teacher, from the volunteer
guard to the women's auxilliary service units, from the loyal local official to the barrio folk — each and
every one of those contributed his share in the great crusade for liberation.
The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian population, they could not survive. Whole
town and villages dared enemy reprisal to oppose the hated invader openly or give assistance to the
underground movement. . . . (41 Off. Gaz., 88, 89.)

Under these facts, taken together with the General of the Army MacArthur's accurate statement that
the "Republic of the Philippines" had been established under enemy duress, it must be presumed —
to say the least — that the judge who presided over the proceedings in question during the Japanese
occupation, firstly, accepted his appointment under duress; and secondly, acted by virtue of that
appointment under the same duress. In such circumstances he could not have acted in the bona
fide belief that the new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japanese Military Commander
in chief had been legally created--among them the "Court of first Instance of Manila," — that the
Chairman of the "Philippine Executive Commission" or the President of the "Republic of the
Philippines", whoever appointed him, and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a legitimate
jurisdiction to act as such judge. Good faith is essential for the existence of a de facto judge
(Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 872). The very idea of enemy duress would necessarily imply
that but for the duress exerted upon him by the enemy he would have refused to accept the
appointment and to act thereunder. And why? Because he must be presumed to know that the office
to which he was thus appointed had been created by the enemy in open defiance of the
Commonwealth Constitution and the laws and regulation promulgated by our Commonwealth
Government, and that his acceptance of said office and his acting therein, if willfully done, would have
been no less than an open hostility to the very sovereignty of the United Sates and to the
Commonwealth Government, and a renunciation of his allegiance to both. There is no middle ground
here. Either the judge acted purely under duress, in which case his acts would be null and void; or
maliciously in defiance of said governments, in which case his acts would be null and void for more
serious reasons.

The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for the source of their supposed
authority to the orders of the Japanese Military Commander in chief and the so-called Constitution of
the "Republic of the Philippines," which had been adopted in a manner which would shock the
conscience of democratic peoples, and which was designed to supplant the Constitution which had
been duly adopted by the Filipino people in a Constitutional Convention of their duly elected
Constitutional Delegates. And it was decreed that the Commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces "shall exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts." (Vol. 1, p. 7, Official Journal of the Japanese
Military Administration, cited on pp. 2, 3, of the order of the respondent judge complained of and
marked Exhibit H of the petition for mandamus.) How can our present courts legitimately recognize
any efficacy in the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system, wherein the Commander in Chief of
the Imperial Japanese Forces possessed the highest judicial jurisdiction?

III

The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and
after the Japanese occupation.

Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines, dated March 10, 1945, in its very first
paragraph, states the prime concern of the government "to re-establish the courts as fast as
provinces are liberated from the Japanese occupation." If the courts under the Japanese-sponsored
government of the "Republic of the Philippines" were the same Commonwealth courts that existed
here under the Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion, President Osmeña would not be
speaking of re-establishing those courts in his aforesaid Executive Order. For soothe, how could
those courts under the "Republic of the Philippines" be the courts of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines when they were not functioning under the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws
enacted in pursuance of said Constitution? The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was defined
and conferred under the Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted
thereunder, that of the Japanese-sponsored courts was defined and conferred by the orders and
decrees of the Japanese Commander in Chief, and, perhaps, the decrees of the "Philippine Executive
Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislature under the Republic, which was not composed
of the elected representatives of the people. The Justices and Judges of the Commonwealth courts
had to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth with confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, pursuant to the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was appointed by the Commander in Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice
and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance and of all inferior courts
were appointed by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, at first, and later, by the President of
the Republic, of course, without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the
Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the
President and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and the Judges of First Instance and of all
inferior courts in the Commonwealth judicial system, had to swear to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution, while this was impossible under the Japanese-sponsored government.
In the Commonwealth judicial system, if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated to continue in
the discharge of his official duties, his successor was appointed by the Commonwealth President with
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and said successor had to swear to support and
defend the Commonwealth Constitution; in the exotic judicial system implanted here by the Japanese,
if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated, his successor would be appointed by the Japanese
Commander in Chief, if the dead or incapacitated incumbent should be the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or otherwise, by the Chairman of the "Executive Commission" or the President of the
"Republic", of course without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
Commonwealth Congress, and, of course, without the successor swearing to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution.

If, as we believe having conclusively shown, the Japanese-sponsored courts were not the same
Commonwealth courts, the conclusion is unavoidable that any jurisdiction possessed by the former
and any cases left pending therein, were not and could not be automatically transfered to the
Commonwealth courts which we re-established under Executive Order No. 36. For the purpose, a
special legislation was necessary.

Executive Order No. 37, in my humble opinion, does not, as held by the majority, imply that the
President recognized as valid the proceedings in all cases appealed to the Court of Appeals. Section
2 of that order simply provides that all cases which have been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. The adverb "duly" would indicate that the
President foresaw the possibility of appeals not having been duly taken. All cases appealed to the
Court of Appeals before the war and the otherwise duly appealed, would come under the phrase "duly
appealed" in this section of the Executive Order. But considering the determined and firm attitude of
the Commonwealth Government towards those Japanese-sponsored governments since the
beginning, it would seem inconceivable that the President Osmeña, in section 2 of Executive Order
No. 37, intended to include therein appeals taken to the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals, or
from the Japanese-sponsored inferior courts. It should be remembered that in the Executive Order
immediately preceeding and issued on the same date, the President speaks of re-establishing the
courts as fast as provinces were liberated from the Japanese occupation.

IV

The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound
by the acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.

In the last analysis, in deciding the question of validity or nullity of the proceedings involved herein,
we are confronted with the necessity to decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and this
Supreme Court, as re-established under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the entire
Commonwealth Government, are to be bound by the acts of the said Japanese-sponsored court and
government. To propound this question is, to my mind, to answer it most decidedly in the negative,
not only upon the ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of national dignity and
international decency. To answer the question in the affirmative would be nothing short for legalizing
the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines. Indeed, it would be virtual submission to the
dictation of an invader our people's just hatred of whom gave rise to the epic Philippine resistance
movement, which has won the admiration of the entire civilized world.

Even considerations of policy or practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.

In this connection, the respondent judge, in his order of June 6, 1945, complained of, has the
following to say:

It is contended, however, that the judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic was the same as that of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation; that the
laws administered and enforced by said courts during the existence of said regime were the same
laws on the statute books of Commonwealth before Japanese occupation, and that even the judges
who presided them were, in many instances, the same persons who held the position prior to the
Japanese occupation. All this may be true, but other facts are just as stubborn and pitiless. One of
them is that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws
they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they
had become the laws — and the Courts had become the institutions-of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Case No. 16,146), as they became later on the laws and institution of the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. No amount of argument or
legal fiction can obliterate this fact.

Besides, I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts in the "judicial system implanted
by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic "would not depend upon the laws that they
"administered and enforced", but upon the authority by virtue of which they acted. If the members of
this Court were to decide the instant case in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws of
the Commonwealth but not by the authority that they possess in their official capacity as the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, but merely as lawyers, their decision would surely be null and void. And yet, I
am firmly of opinion that whoever was the "judge" of the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance
of Manila who presided over the said court when the proceedings and processes in the dispute were
had, in acting by virtue of the supposed authority which he was supposed to have received from that
government, did so with no more legal power than if he had acted as a mere lawyer applying the
same laws to the case. If duplication of work or effort, or even if confussion, should be alleged to
possibly arise from a declaration of nullity or judicial proceedings had before those Japanese-
sponsored courts, it should suffice to answer that the party so complaining in voluntarily resorting to
such courts should be prepared to assume the consequences of his voluntary act. On the other hand,
his convenience should not be allowed to visit upon the majority of the inhabitants of this country, the
dire consequences of a sweeping and wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in those courts. Let
us set forth a few considerations apropos of this assertion. It is a fact of general knowledge that
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the overwhelming majority of our people and other
resident inhabitants were literally afraid to go any place where there were Japanese sentries, soldiers
or even civilians, and that these sentries were posted at the entrance into cities and towns and at
government offices; that the feared Japanese "M. P.'s" or Kempeitai's" were a constant terror to them;
and lastly, that the greater number who lived or had evacuated to places for from the Japanese, were
found precisely in the cities and towns where the courts were located; and as a consequence, the
great majority of the people were very strongly adverse to traveling any considerable distance from
their homes and were, one might say, in constant hiding. Add to these circumstances, the fact of the
practical absence of transportation facilities and the no less important fact of the economic structure
having been so dislocated as to have impoverished the many in exchange for the enrichment of the
few — and we shall have a fair picture of the practical difficulties which the ordinary litigant would in
those days have encountered in defending his rights against anyone of the favored few who would
bring him to court. It should be easy to realize how hard it was for instances, to procure the
attendance of witnesses, principally because of the fact that most of them were in hiding or, at least,
afraid to enter the cities and towns, and also because of then generally difficult and abnormal
conditions prevailing. Under such conditions, cases or denial of a party's day in court expected. Such
denial might arise from many a cause. It might be party's fear to appear before the court because in
doing so, he would have had to get near the feared Japanese. It might be because he did not
recognize any legal authority in that court, or it might be his down-right repugnance of the hated
enemy. And I dare say that among such people would be found more than seventeen million
Filipinos. These are but a few of countless cause. So that if some form of validation of such judicial
proceedings were to be attempted, all necessary safeguards should be provided to avoid that in any
particular case the validation should violate any litigant's constitutional right to his day in court, within
the full meaning of the phrase, or any other constitutional or statutory right of his. More people, I am
afraid, would be prejudiced than would be benefited by a wholesale validation of said proceedings.

Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might result from a decision
declaring null and void the acts processes of the Japanese-sponsored governments in the
Philippines. I think, this aspect of the question has been unduly stressed. The situation is not without
remedy, but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. As the courts cannot create a
new or special jurisdiction for themselves, which is a legislative function, and as the situation
demands such new or special jurisdiction, let the legislature act in the premises. For instance, the
Congress may enact a law conferring a special jurisdiction upon the courts of its selection, whereby
said courts may, after hearing all the parties interested, and taking all the necessary safeguards, so
that, a party's day in court or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwealth
Government should not be prejudiced by any of said acts, processes or proceedings, particullarly,
those in Japanese-sponsored courts, and subject to such other conditions as the special law may
provide, validate the corresponding acts, processes or proceedings. This, to my mind, would be more
conducive to a maximum of benefit and a minimum of prejudice to the inhabitants of this country,
rather than the procedure favored by the majority.

Finally, let us not equalize the conditions then prevailing in Manila to that prevailing in the provinces,
where the greater number of the people where then living outside the towns, in the farms and the
hills. These people constitute the great majority of the eighteen million Filipinos. To them the
semblance of an administration of justice which Japanese allowed, was practically unknown. But they
constituted the majority of loyal citizens to whom President Roosevelt's message of October 23, 1943
refers. They — the majority of our people — had an unshaken faith in the arrival of American aid here
and the final triumph of the Allied cause. They were willing to wait for the restoration of their rightful
government, with its courts and other institutions, for the settlement of their differences. May in their
common hardship and sufferings under yoke of foreign oppression, they had not much time to think of
such differences, if they did not utterly forget them. Their undoubted hatred of the invader was
enough to keep them away from the judicial system that said invader allowed to have. Those who
voluntarily went to the courts in those tragic days belong to the small minority.

As to the public order — why! any public order which then existed was not due to the courts or other
departments of the puppet government. It was maintained at the point of the bayonet by the
Japanese army, and in their own unique fashion.
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for
further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission
on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan
St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has
an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also
able to confiscate money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano
embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen
Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items
seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was
an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis
by the Board’s consultant. Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-
gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."3

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA
No. 1379") 4 against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG,
as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano
("Dimaano") as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February
1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to
the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu
City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of
Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-
typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for
trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the
hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x."8

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner
should proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or
properties subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform
to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take
under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had
no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner
60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner
that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held
in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without

pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned
to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the
evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S

EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING
OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND
BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE
OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY

THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v.
MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not
applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS
SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause
the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based
on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under
Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to
carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO
No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x
x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President
assigns their cases to the PCGG.18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG.
Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could
exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of
former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-
chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term
is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover
the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.’

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
[Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation
of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’

[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO
No. 2.
xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a
close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board
conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379.
Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of
the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."20

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without
any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income
without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The
resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on
PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent
behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3
of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under
Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-
over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive
Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other
duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis
supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while
the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.27 The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.28

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence
of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments
apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there
are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case
to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined
from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise
only the powers granted to it.

Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the
first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.
PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement
of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private
respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that
the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there
was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not
subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of
the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has
only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint
on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost
two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties
(which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case
has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of
the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses,
allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its
alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the
developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate
action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation
on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed
for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted
this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the
scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the
PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to
continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as
the status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its
evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the
court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish
the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner
ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong
even more the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence
against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against
private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these
items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
.45; communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that
a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the
same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international
law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power
by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during
the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno:42

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself."

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government
without regard to the existing constitution."

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which
was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased
to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders,
which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance
without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to
the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration
orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats
of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986."

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse
by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of
the present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything
the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also.
Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand,
almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal
niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another
word for niceties or exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection?
The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they
are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying
stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable
extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give
three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at
the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of
due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin
to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report
asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of
Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report
is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of
Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to
think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is
very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and
repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the
Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold.
"Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can
keep it in your private safe."

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is
the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is
something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest
bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it
would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond
monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section
8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is
deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument —
that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the
PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained,
however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what
another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More
said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the
devil benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process
under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would
clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost
the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of
individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under
the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it
repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant
or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant
since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to
the items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside
from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries,
land titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said
search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why
they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and
other jewelries were contained in attaché cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I
think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized
this money instead of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also
the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that
because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite
rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.

Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search
warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when…

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.50

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscal’s office who
charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscal’s office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt
in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also
these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these
were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attaché cases.1âwphi1 These attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or
other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So
the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the
money behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus
hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any
tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on whether or not private
respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the
exclusion of evidence resulting therefrom compels this humble opinion. The ponencia states that
"(t)he correct issue is whether the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from February
26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President) to March 24, 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution)."1 The majority holds that the Bill of Rights was not
operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was searched and her properties were seized during
the interregnum or on March 3, 1986. My disagreement is not with the ruling that the Bill of Rights
was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that the private respondent has lost and cannot
invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right. Using a different
lens in viewing the problem at hand, I respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is
whether she can invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution under the extraordinary
circumstances after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The question boggles the intellect, and is interesting,
to say the least, perhaps even to those not half-interested in the law. But the question of whether the
Filipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perplexing as
the question of whether the world was without a God in the three days that God the Son descended
into the dead before He rose to life. Nature abhors a vacuum and so does the law.

I. Prologue

The ponencia suggests that the Constitution, the Bill of Rights in particular, is the only source of
rights, hence in its absence, private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke her rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom. Pushing the
ponencia’s line of reasoning to the extreme will result in the conclusion that during the one month
interregnum, the people lost their constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and property and the
revolutionary government was not bound by the strictures of due process of law. Even before
appealing to history and philosophy, reason shouts otherwise.

The ponencia recognized the EDSA Revolution as a "successful revolution"2 that installed the Aquino
government. There is no right to revolt in the 1973 Constitution, in force prior to February 23-25,
1986. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that under natural law, the right of revolution is an inherent
right of the people. Thus, we justified the creation of a new legal order after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, viz:

"From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as ‘an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.’ (H. Black,
Handbook of American Constitutional Law II, 4th edition, 1927) It has been said that ‘the locus of
positive law-making power lies with the people of the state’ and from there is derived ‘the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.’ (‘Political Rights as Political Questions, The Paradox of Luther v. Borden’, 100 Harvard
Law Review 1125, 1133 [1987])"3

It is my considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent Dimaano has a right
against unreasonable search and seizure and to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence of
such illegal act. To explain my thesis, I will first lay down the relevant law before applying it to the
facts of the case at bar. Tracking down the elusive law that will govern the case at bar will take us to
the labyrinths of philosophy and history. To be sure, the difficulty of the case at bar lies less in the
application of the law, but more in finding the applicable law. I shall take up the challenge even if the
route takes negotiating, but without trespassing, on political and religious thickets.

II. Natural Law and Natural Rights

As early as the Greek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural standard or law to which a
state and its laws must conform. Sophocles unmistakably articulates this in his poignant literary piece,
Antigone. In this mid-fifth century Athenian tragedy, a civil war divided two brothers, one died
defending Thebes, and the other, Polyneices, died attacking it. The king forbade Polyneices’ burial,
commanding instead that his body be left to be devoured by beasts. But according to Greek religious
ideas, only a burial -even a token one with a handful of earth- could give repose to his soul. Moved by
piety, Polyneices’ sister, Antigone, disobeyed the command of the king and buried the body. She was
arrested. Brought before the king who asks her if she knew of his command and why she disobeyed,
Antigone replies:

". . .These laws were not ordained of Zeus,

And she who sits enthroned with gods below,
Justice, enacted not these human laws.
Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man,
Couldst by a breath annul and override
The immutable unwritten laws of heaven.
They were not born today nor yesterday;

They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang."4

Antigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order of the king.5
Aristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics: "Of political justice part is natural, part legal – natural,
that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that; legal,
that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a
prisoner’s ransom shall be mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all
the laws that are passed for particular cases, . . ."6 Aristotle states that "(p)articular law is that which
each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten.
Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural
justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant
with each other. It is this that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of
Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature."7

Later, the Roman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first century B.C. in this wise:

"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and
everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And
it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on
the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it
is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and
we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be one master and ruler,
that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.
Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this
very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered
punishment."8

This allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law continues from classical antiquity to this
day. The face of natural law, however, has changed throughout the classical, medieval, modern, and
contemporary periods of history.

In the medieval times, shortly after 1139, Gratian published the Decretum, a collection and
reconciliation of the canon laws in force, which distinguished between divine or natural law and
human law. Similar to the writings of the earliest Church Fathers, he related this natural law to the
Decalogue and to Christ’s commandment of love of one’s neighbor. "The law of nature is that which is
contained in the Law and the Gospel, by which everyone is commanded to do unto others as he
would wish to be done unto him, and is prohibited from doing unto others that which he would be
unwilling to be done unto himself."9 This natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that
statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if contrary to law, were to be held null and void.10

The following century saw a shift from a natural law concept that was revelation-centered to a
concept related to man’s reason and what was discoverable by it, under the influence of Aristotle’s
writings which were coming to be known in the West. William of Auxerre acknowledged the human
capacity to recognize good and evil and God’s will, and made reason the criterion of natural law.
Natural law was thus id quod naturalis ratio sine omni deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse
faciendum or "that which natural reason, without much or even any need of reflection, tells us what
we must do."11 Similarly, Alexander of Hales saw human reason as the basis for recognizing natural
law12 and St. Bonaventure wrote that what natural reason commands is called the natural law.13 By
the thirteenth century, natural law was understood as the law of right reason, coinciding with the
biblical law but not derived from it.14

Of all the medieval philosophers, the Italian St. Thomas Aquinas is indisputably regarded as the most
important proponent of traditional natural law theory. He created a comprehensive and organized
synthesis of the natural law theory which rests on both the classical (in particular, Aristotelian
philosophy) and Christian foundation, i.e., on reason and revelation.15 His version of the natural law
theory rests on his vision of the universe as governed by a single, self-consistent and overarching
system of law under the direction and authority of God as the supreme lawgiver and judge.16 Aquinas
defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community, and promulgated."17 There are four kinds of laws in his natural law theory: eternal,
natural, human, and divine.

First, eternal law. To Aquinas, a law is a dictate of practical reason (which provides practical
directions on how one ought to act as opposed to "speculative reason" which provides propositional
knowledge of the way things are) emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect
community.18 Presupposing that Divine Providence rules the universe, and Divine Providence
governs by divine reason, then the rational guidance of things in God the Ruler of the universe has
the nature of a law. And since the divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time but is
eternal, this kind of law is called eternal law.19 In other words, eternal law is that law which is a
"dictate" of God’s reason. It is the external aspect of God’s perfect wisdom, or His wisdom applied to
His creation.20 Eternal law consists of those principles of action that God implanted in creation to
enable each thing to perform its proper function in the overall order of the universe. The proper
function of a thing determines what is good and bad for it: the good consists of performing its function
while the bad consists of failing to perform it.21
Then, natural law. This consists of principles of eternal law which are specific to human beings as
rational creatures. Aquinas explains that law, as a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways:
in one way, it can be in him that rules and measures; and in another way, in that which is ruled and
measured since a thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Thus,
since all things governed by Divine Providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, then
all things partake of or participate to a certain extent in the eternal law; they receive from it certain
inclinations towards their proper actions and ends. Being rational, however, the participation of a
human being in the Divine Providence, is most excellent because he participates in providence itself,
providing for himself and others. He participates in eternal reason itself and through this, he
possesses a natural inclination to right action and right end. This participation of the rational creature
in the eternal law is called natural law. Hence, the psalmist says: "The light of Thy countenance, O
Lord, is signed upon us, thus implying that the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is
good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of
the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s
participation in the eternal law."22 In a few words, the "natural law is a rule of reason, promulgated by
God in man’s nature, whereby man can discern how he should act."23

Through natural reason, we are able to distinguish between right and wrong; through free will, we are
able to choose what is right. When we do so, we participate more fully in the eternal law rather than
being merely led blindly to our proper end. We are able to choose that end and make our compliance
with eternal law an act of self-direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a rule and measure
and no longer a rule and measure imposed from an external source.24 The question that comes to the
fore then is what is this end to which natural law directs rational creatures?

The first self-evident principle of natural law is that "good is to be pursued and done, and evil is to be
avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precept of the natural law as
something to be done or avoided."25 Because good is to be sought and evil avoided, and good is that
which is in accord with the nature of a given creature or the performance of a creature’s proper
function, then the important question to answer is what is human nature or the proper function of
man. Those to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good and
must thus be pursued, while their opposites are evil which must be avoided.26 Aquinas identifies the
basic inclinations of man as follows:

"1. To seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal happiness with God.27

2. To preserve himself in existence.

3. To preserve the species - that is, to unite sexually.

4. To live in community with other men.

5. To use his intellect and will - that is, to know the truth and to make his own decision."28

As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in procreation; and as

rational creatures, in living in society and exercising our intellectual and spiritual capacities in the
pursuit of knowledge."29 God put these inclinations in human nature to help man achieve his final end
of eternal happiness. With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature, we can
determine by practical reason what is good for us and what is bad.30 In this sense, natural law is an
ordinance of reason.31 Proceeding from these inclinations, we can apply the natural law by deduction,
thus: good should be done; this action is good; this action should therefore be done.32 Concretely, it is
good for humans to live peaceably with one another in society, thus this dictates the prohibition of
actions such as killing and stealing that harm society.33

From the precepts of natural law, human reason needs to proceed to the more particular
determinations or specialized regulations to declare what is required in particular cases considering
society’s specific circumstances. These particular determinations, arrived at by human reason, are
called human laws (Aquinas’ positive law). They are necessary to clarify the demands of natural law.
Aquinas identifies two ways by which something may be derived from natural law: first, like in
science, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from principles; and second, as in the arts, general
forms are particularized as to details like the craftsman determining the general form of a house to a
particular shape.34 Thus, according to Aquinas, some things are derived from natural law by way of
conclusion (such as "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one
should do harm to no man") while some are derived by way of determination (such as the law of
nature has it that the evildoer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is not
directly by natural law but is a derived determination of it).35 Aquinas says that both these modes of
derivation are found in the human law. But those things derived as a conclusion are contained in
human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but having some force also from the natural law.
But those things which are derived in the second manner have no other force than that of human
law.36

Finally, there is divine law which is given by God, i.e., the Old Testament and the New Testament.
This is necessary to direct human life for four reasons. First, through law, man is directed to proper
actions towards his proper end. This end, which is eternal happiness and salvation, is not
proportionate to his natural human power, making it necessary for him to be directed not just by
natural and human law but by divinely given law. Secondly, because of uncertainty in human
judgment, different people form different judgments on human acts, resulting in different and even
contrary laws. So that man may know for certain what he ought to do and avoid, it was necessary for
man to be directed in his proper acts by a God-given law for it is certain that such law cannot err.
Thirdly, human law can only judge the external actions of persons. However, perfection of virtue
consists in man conducting himself right in both his external acts and in his interior motives. The
divine law thus supervenes to see and judge both dimensions. Fourthly, because human law cannot
punish or forbid all evils, since in aiming to do away with all evils it would do away with many good
things and would hinder the advancement of the common good necessary for human development,
divine law is needed.37 For example, if human law forbade backbiting gossip, in order to enforce such
a law, privacy and trust that is necessary between spouses and friends would be severely restricted.
Because the price paid to enforce the law would outweigh the benefits, gossiping ought to be left to
God to be judged and punished. Thus, with divine law, no evil would remain unforbidden and
unpunished.38

Aquinas’ traditional natural law theory has been advocated, recast and restated by other scholars up
to the contemporary period.39 But clearly, what has had a pervading and lasting impact on the
Western philosophy of law and government, particularly on that of the United States of America which
heavily influenced the Philippine system of government and constitution, is the modern natural law
theory.

In the traditional natural law theory, among which was Aquinas’, the emphasis was placed on moral
duties of man -both rulers and subjects- rather than on rights of the individual citizen. Nevertheless,
from this medieval theoretical background developed modern natural law theories associated with the
gradual development in Europe of modern secular territorial state. These theories increasingly veered
away from medieval theological trappings40 and gave particular emphasis to the individual and his
natural rights.41

One far-reaching school of thought on natural rights emerged with the political philosophy of the
English man, John Locke. In the traditional natural law theory such as Aquinas’, the monarchy was
not altogether disfavored because as Aquinas says, "the rule of one man is more useful than the rule
of the many" to achieve "the unity of peace."42 Quite different from Aquinas, Locke emphasized that in
any form of government, "ultimate sovereignty rested in the people and all legitimate government was
based on the consent of the governed."43 His political theory was used to justify resistance to Charles
II over the right of succession to the English throne and the Whig Revolution of 1688-89 by which
James II was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary under terms which weakened the power
of the crown and strengthened the power of the Parliament.44
Locke explained his political theory in his major work, Second Treatise of Government, originally
published in 1690,45 where he adopted the modern view that human beings enjoyed natural rights in
the state of nature, before the formation of civil or political society. In this state of nature, it is self-
evident that all persons are naturally in a "state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose
of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man."46 Likewise, in the state of nature, it was
self-evident that all persons were in a state of equality, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of
the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection . .
."47 Locke quickly added, however, that though all persons are in a state of liberty, it is not a state of
license for the "state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his life health, liberty, or possessions. . ."48 Locke also alludes to an
"omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker" whose "workmanship they (mankind) are, made to last during
his (the maker’s) . . .pleasure."49 In other words, through reason, with which human beings arrive at
the law of nature prescribing certain moral conduct, each person can realize that he has a natural
right and duty to ensure his own survival and well-being in the world and a related duty to respect the
same right in others, and preserve mankind.50 Through reason, human beings are capable of
recognizing the need to treat others as free, independent and equal as all individuals are equally
concerned with ensuring their own lives, liberties and properties.51 In this state of nature, the
execution of the law of nature is placed in the hands of every individual who has a right to punish
transgressors of the law of nature to an extent that will hinder its violation.52 It may be gathered from
Locke’s political theory that the rights to life, health, liberty and property are natural rights, hence each
individual has a right to be free from violent death, from arbitrary restrictions of his person and from
theft of his property.53 In addition, every individual has a natural right to defend oneself from and
punish those who violate the law of nature.

But although the state of nature is somewhat of an Eden before the fall, there are two harsh
"inconveniences" in it, as Locke puts them, which adversely affect the exercise of natural rights. First,
natural law being an unwritten code of moral conduct, it might sometimes be ignored if the personal
interests of certain individuals are involved. Second, without any written laws, and without any
established judges or magistrates, persons may be judges in their own cases and self-love might
make them partial to their side. On the other hand, ill nature, passion and revenge might make them
too harsh to the other side. Hence, "nothing but confusion and disorder will follow."54 These
circumstances make it necessary to establish and enter a civil society by mutual agreement among
the people in the state of nature, i.e., based on a social contract founded on trust and consent. Locke
writes:

"The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil
society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe,
and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties (used in the
broad sense, referring to life, liberty and property) and a greater security against any, that are not of
it."55

This collective agreement then culminated in the establishment of a civil government.

Three important consequences of Locke’s theory on the origin of civil government and its significance
to the natural rights of individual subjects should be noted. First, since it was the precariousness of
the individual’s enjoyment of his natural and equal right to life, liberty, and property that justified the
establishment of civil government, then the "central, overriding purpose of civil government was to
protect and preserve the individual’s natural rights. For just as the formation by individuals of civil or
political society had arisen from their desire to ‘unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties and Estates, which I (Locke) call by the general name, Property,’56 so, too, did the same
motive underlie - in the second stage of the social contract - their collective decision to institute civil
government."57 Locke thus maintains, again using the term "property" in the broad sense, that, "(t)he
great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under
government, is the preservation of their property."58 Secondly, the central purpose that has brought a
civil government into existence, i.e., the protection of the individual’s natural rights, sets firm limits on
the political authority of the civil government. A government that violates the natural rights of its
subjects has betrayed their trust, vested in it when it was first established, thereby undermining its
own authority and losing its claim to the subjects’ obedience. Third and finally, individual subjects
have a right of last resort to collectively resist or rebel against and overthrow a government that has
failed to discharge its duty of protecting the people’s natural rights and has instead abused its powers
by acting in an arbitrary or tyrannical manner. The overthrow of government, however, does not lead
to dissolution of civil society which came into being before the establishment of civil government.59

Locke’s ideas, along with other modern natural law and natural rights theories, have had a profound
impact on American political and legal thought. American law professor Philip Hamburger observes
that American natural law scholars generally agree "that natural law consisted of reasoning about
humans in the state of nature (or absence of government)" and tend "to emphasize that they were
reasoning from the equal freedom of humans and the need of humans to preserve themselves."60 As
individuals are equally free, they did not have the right to infringe the equal rights of others; even self-
preservation typically required individuals to cooperate so as to avoid doing unto others what they
would not have others do unto them.61 With Locke’s theory of natural law as foundation, these
American scholars agree on the well-known analysis of how individuals preserved their liberty by
forming government, i.e., that in order to address the insecurity and precariousness of one’s life,
liberty and property in the state of nature, individuals, in accordance with the principle of self-
preservation, gave up a portion of their natural liberty to civil government to enable it "to preserve the
residue."62 "People must cede to [government] some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with
powers."63 That individuals "give up a part of their natural rights to secure the rest" in the modern
natural law sense is said to be "an old hackneyed and well known principle"64 thus:

"That Man, on entering into civil society, of necessity, sacrifices a part of his natural liberty, has been
pretty universally taken for granted by writers on government. They seem, in general, not to have
admitted a doubt of the truth of the proposition. One feels as though it was treading on forbidden
ground, to attempt a refutation of what has been advanced by a Locke, a Bacari[a], and some other
writers and statesmen."65

But, while Locke’s theory showed the necessity of civil society and government, it was careful to
assert and protect the individual’s rights against government invasion, thus implying a theory of
limited government that both restricted the role of the state to protect the individual’s fundamental
natural rights to life, liberty and property and prohibited the state, on moral grounds, from violating
those rights.66 The natural rights theory, which is the characteristic American interpretation of natural
law, serves as the foundation of the well-entrenched concept of limited government in the United
States. It provides the theoretical basis of the formulation of limits on political authority vis-à-vis the
superior right of the individual which the government should preserve.67

Locke’s ideas undoubtedly influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent statesman and "philosopher of
the (American) revolution and of the first constitutional order which free men were permitted to
establish."68 Jefferson espoused Locke’s theory that man is free in the state of nature. But while
Locke limited the authority of the state with the doctrine of natural rights, Jefferson’s originality was in
his use of this doctrine as basis for a fundamental law or constitution established by the people.69 To
obviate the danger that the government would limit natural liberty more than necessary to afford
protection to the governed, thereby becoming a threat to the very natural liberty it was designed to
protect, people had to stipulate in their constitution which natural rights they sacrificed and which not,
as it was important for them to retain those portions of their natural liberty that were inalienable, that
facilitated the preservation of freedom, or that simply did not need to be sacrificed.70 Two ideas are
therefore fundamental in the constitution: one is the regulation of the form of government and the
other, the securing of the liberties of the people.71 Thus, the American Constitution may be
understood as comprising three elements. First, it creates the structure and authority of a republican
form of government; second, it provides a division of powers among the different parts of the national
government and the checks and balances of these powers; and third, it inhibits government’s power
vis-à-vis the rights of individuals, rights existent and potential, patent and latent. These three parts
have one prime objective: to uphold the liberty of the people.72

But while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of the people, it should be
stressed that it does not create them. As held by many of the American Revolution patriots, "liberties
do not result from charters; charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing
rights."73 John Adams, one of the patriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the frame of
human nature, rooted in the constitution of the intellect and moral world."74 Thus, it is said of natural
rights vis-à-vis the constitution:

". . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions enumerate such rights
and provide against their deprivation or infringement, but do not create them. It is supposed that all
power, all rights, and all authority are vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. By
such an instrument, they create a government, and define and limit the powers which the constitution
is to secure and the government respect. But they do not thereby invest the citizens of the
commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not before possess."75 (emphasis supplied)

A constitution is described as follows:

"A Constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the
fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of
personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the
instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and
powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made, it is but the framework of the
political government, and necessarily based upon the preexisting condition of laws, rights, habits and
modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it; it is all derived from a known source. It presupposes
an organized society, law, order, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of
cultivated intelligence to know how to guard against the encroachments of tyranny."76 (emphasis
supplied)

That Locke’s modern natural law and rights theory was influential to those who framed and ratified the
United States constitution and served as its theoretical foundation is undeniable.77 In a letter in which
George Washington formally submitted the Constitution to Congress in September 1787, he spoke of
the difficulties of drafting the document in words borrowed from the standard eighteenth-century
natural rights analysis:

"Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude
of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It
is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered,
and those which may be reserved . . . ."78 (emphasis supplied)

Natural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of constitutional rights but instead, as
the reasoning that implied the necessity to sacrifice natural liberty to government in a written
constitution. Natural law and natural rights were concepts that explained and justified written
constitutions.79

With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there arises a conceptual distinction
between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and delineation. It has
been proposed that natural rights are those rights that "appertain to man in right of his
existence."80 These were fundamental rights endowed by God upon human beings, "all those rights of
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights
of others."81 On the other hand, civil rights are those that "appertain to man in right of his being a
member of society."82 These rights, however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since:

"Man did not enter into society to become worse off than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than
he had before, but to have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his
rights."83

Civil rights, in this sense, were those natural rights – particularly rights to security and protection –
which by themselves, individuals could not safeguard, rather requiring the collective support of civil
society and government. Thus, it is said:

"Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the
enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent."84

The distinction between natural and civil rights is "between that class of natural rights which man
retains after entering into society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of
society."85 The natural rights retained by the individuals after entering civil society were "all the
intellectual rights, or rights of the mind,"86 i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of religious
belief and to freedom of expression in its various forms. The individual could exercise these rights
without government assistance, but government has the role of protecting these natural rights from
interference by others and of desisting from itself infringing such rights. Government should also
enable individuals to exercise more effectively the natural rights they had exchanged for civil rights –
like the rights to security and protection - when they entered into civil society.87

American natural law scholars in the 1780s and early 1790s occasionally specified which rights were
natural and which were not. On the Lockean assumption that the state of nature was a condition in
which all humans were equally free from subjugation to one another and had no common superior,
American scholars tended to agree that natural liberty was the freedom of individuals in the state of
nature.88 Natural rights were understood to be simply a portion of this undifferentiated natural liberty
and were often broadly categorized as the rights to life, liberty, and property; or life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. More specifically, they identified as natural rights the free exercise of religion,
freedom of conscience,89 freedom of speech and press, right to self-defense, right to bear arms, right
to assemble and right to one’s reputation.90 In contrast, certain other rights, such as habeas corpus
and jury rights, do not exist in the state of nature, but exist only under the laws of civil government or
the constitution because they are essential for restraining government.91 They are called civil rights
not only in the sense that they are protected by constitutions or other laws, but also in the sense that
they are acquired rights which can only exist under civil government.92

In his Constitutional Law, Black states that natural rights may be used to describe those rights which
belong to man by virtue of his nature and depend upon his personality. "His existence as an individual
human being, clothed with certain attributes, invested with certain capacities, adapted to certain kind
of life, and possessing a certain moral and physical nature, entitles him, without the aid of law, to
such rights as are necessary to enable him to continue his existence, develop his faculties, pursue
and achieve his destiny."93 An example of a natural right is the right to life. In an organized society,
natural rights must be protected by law, "and although they owe to the law neither their existence nor
their sacredness, yet they are effective only when recognized and sanctioned by law."94 Civil rights
include natural rights as they are taken into the sphere of law. However, there are civil rights which
are not natural rights such as the right of trial by jury. This right is not founded in the nature of man,
nor does it depend on personality, but it falls under the definition of civil rights which are the rights
secured by the constitution to all its citizens or inhabitants not connected with the organization or
administration of government which belong to the domain of political rights. "Natural rights are the
same all the world over, though they may not be given the fullest recognition under all governments.
Civil rights which are not natural rights will vary in different states or countries."95

From the foregoing definitions and distinctions, we can gather that the inclusions in and exclusions
from the scope of natural rights and civil rights are not well-defined. This is understandable because
these definitions are derived from the nature of man which, in its profundity, depth, and fluidity, cannot
simply and completely be grasped and categorized. Thus, phrases such as "rights appertain(ing) to
man in right of his existence", or "rights which are a portion of man’s undifferentiated natural liberty,
broadly categorized as the rights to life, liberty, and property; or life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness", or "rights that belong to man by virtue of his nature and depend upon his personality"
serve as guideposts in identifying a natural right. Nevertheless, although the definitions of natural
right and civil right are not uniform and exact, we can derive from the foregoing definitions that natural
rights exist prior to constitutions, and may be contained in and guaranteed by them. Once these
natural rights enter the constitutional or statutory sphere, they likewise acquire the character of civil
rights in the broad sense (as opposed to civil rights distinguished from political rights), without being
stripped of their nature as natural rights. There are, however, civil rights which are not natural rights
but are merely created and protected by the constitution or other law such as the right to a jury trial.

Long after Locke conceived of his ideas of natural rights, civil society, and civil government, his
concept of natural rights continued to flourish in the modern and contemporary period. About a
hundred years after the Treatise of Government, Locke’s natural law and rights theory was restated
by the eighteenth-century political thinker and activist, Thomas Paine. He wrote his classic text, The
Rights of Man, Part 1 where he argued that the central purpose of all governments was to protect the
natural and imprescriptible rights of man. Citing the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of Citizens, Paine identified these rights as the right to liberty, property, security and resistance of
oppression. All other civil and political rights - such as to limits on government, to freedom to choose
a government, to freedom of speech, and to fair taxation - were derived from those fundamental
natural rights.96

Paine inspired and actively assisted the American Revolution and defended the French Revolution.
His views were echoed by the authors of the American and the French declarations that accompanied
these democratic revolutions.97 The American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, the
revolutionary manifesto of the thirteen newly-independent states of America that were formerly
colonies of Britain, reads:

"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."98 (emphasis supplied)
His phrase "rights of man" was used in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
Citizens, proclaimed by the French Constituent Assembly in August 1789, viz:

"The representatives of the French people, constituted in a National Assembly, considering that
ignorance, oblivion or contempt of the Rights of Man are the only causes of public misfortunes and of
the corruption of governments, have resolved to lay down in a solemn Declaration, the natural,
inalienable and sacred Rights of Man, in order that this Declaration, being always before all the
members of the Social Body, should constantly remind them of their Rights and their Duties. .
."99 (emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, the phrase "rights of man" gradually replaced "natural rights" in the latter period of the
eighteenth century, thus removing the theological assumptions of medieval natural law theories. After
the American and French Revolutions, the doctrine of the rights of man became embodied not only in
succinct declarations of rights, but also in new constitutions which emphasized the need to uphold the
natural rights of the individual citizen against other individuals and particularly against the state
itself.100

Considerable criticism was, however, hurled against natural law and natural rights theories, especially
by the logical positivist thinkers, as these theories were not empirically verifiable. Nevertheless, the
concept of natural rights or rights of man regained force and influence in the 1940s because of the
growing awareness of the wide scale violation of such rights perpetrated by the Nazi dictatorship in
Germany. The British leader Winston Churchill and the American leader Franklin Roosevelt stated in
the preface of their Atlantic Charter in 1942 that "complete victory over their enemies is essential to
decent life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice, in
their own land as well as in other lands." (emphasis supplied) This time, natural right was recast in the
idea of "human rights" which belong to every human being by virtue of his or her humanity. The idea
superseded the traditional concept of rights based on notions of God-given natural law and of social
contract. Instead, the refurbished idea of "human rights" was based on the assumption that each
individual person was entitled to an equal degree of respect as a human being.101

With this historical backdrop, the United Nations Organization published in 1948 its Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a systematic attempt to secure universal recognition of a
whole gamut of human rights. The Declaration affirmed the importance of civil and political rights such
as the rights to life, liberty, property; equality before the law; privacy; a fair trial; freedom of speech
and assembly, of movement, of religion, of participation in government directly or indirectly; the right
to political asylum, and the absolute right not to be tortured. Aside from these, but more
controversially, it affirmed the importance of social and economic rights.102 The UDHR is not a treaty
and its provisions are not binding law, but it is a compromise of conflicting ideological, philosophical,
political, economic, social and juridical ideas which resulted from the collective effort of 58 states on
matters generally considered desirable and imperative. It may be viewed as a "blending (of) the
deepest convictions and ideals of different civilizations into one universal expression of faith in the
rights of man."103

On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights providing for the
mechanism of checking state compliance to the international human rights instruments such as
through a reportorial requirement among governments. These treaties entered into force on March
23, 1976104 and are binding as international law upon governments subscribing to them. Although
admittedly, there will be differences in interpreting particular statements of rights and freedoms in
these United Nations instruments "in the light of varied cultures and historical traditions, the basis of
the covenants is a common agreement on the fundamental objective of the dignity and worth of the
human person. Such agreement is implied in adherence to the (United Nations) Charter and
corresponds to the universal urge for freedom and dignity which strives for expression, despite
varying degrees of culture and civilization and despite the countervailing forces of repression and
authoritarianism."105

Human rights and fundamental freedoms were affirmed by the United Nations Organization in the
different instruments embodying these rights not just as a solemn protest against the Nazi-fascist
method of government, but also as a recognition that the "security of individual rights, like the security
of national rights, was a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world order."106 Moskowitz
wrote:

"The legitimate concern of the world community with human rights and fundamental freedoms stems
in large part from the close relation they bear to the peace and stability of the world. World War II and
its antecedents, as well as contemporary events, clearly demonstrate the peril inherent in the doctrine
which accepts the state as the sole arbiter in questions pertaining to the rights and freedoms of the
citizen. The absolute power exercised by a government over its citizens is not only a source of
disorder in the international community; it can no longer be accepted as the only guaranty of orderly
social existence at home. But orderly social existence is ultimately a matter which rests in the hands
of the citizen. Unless the citizen can assert his human rights and fundamental freedoms against his
own government under the protection of the international community, he remains at the mercy of the
superior power."107
Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in the
1940s, eludes definition. The usual definition that it is the right which inheres in persons from the fact
of their humanity seemingly begs the question. Without doubt, there are certain rights and freedoms
so fundamental as to be inherent and natural such as the integrity of the person and equality of
persons before the law which should be guaranteed by all constitutions of all civilized countries and
effectively protected by their laws.108 It is nearly universally agreed that some of those rights are
religious toleration, a general right to dissent, and freedom from arbitrary punishment.109 It is not
necessarily the case, however, that what the law guarantees as a human right in one country should
also be guaranteed by law in all other countries. Some human rights might be considered
fundamental in some countries, but not in others. For example, trial by jury which we have earlier
cited as an example of a civil right which is not a natural right, is a basic human right in the United
States protected by its constitution, but not so in Philippine jurisdiction.110 Similar to natural rights, the
definition of human rights is derived from human nature, thus understandably not exact. The definition
that it is a "right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity", however, can serve as a
guideline to identify human rights. It seems though that the concept of human rights is broadest as it
encompasses a human person’s natural rights (e.g., religious freedom) and civil rights created by law
(e.g. right to trial by jury).

In sum, natural law and natural rights are not relic theories for academic discussion, but have had
considerable application and influence. Natural law and natural rights theories have played an
important role in the Declaration of Independence, the Abolition (anti-slavery) movement, and parts of
the modern Civil Rights movement.111 In charging Nazi and Japanese leaders with "crimes against
humanity" at the end of the Second World War, Allied tribunals in 1945 invoked the traditional concept
of natural law to override the defense that those charged had only been obeying the laws of the
regimes they served.112 Likewise, natural law, albeit called by another name such as "substantive due
process" which is grounded on reason and fairness, has served as legal standard for international
law, centuries of development in the English common law, and certain aspects of American
constitutional law.113 In controversies involving the Bill of Rights, the natural law standards of
"reasonableness" and "fairness" or "justified on balance" are used. Questions such as these are
common: "Does this form of government involvement with religion endanger religious liberty in a way
that seems unfair to some group? Does permitting this restriction on speech open the door to
government abuse of political opponents? Does this police investigative practice interfere with
citizens’ legitimate interests in privacy and security?"114 Undeniably, natural law and natural rights
theories have carved their niche in the legal and political arena.
III. Natural Law and Natural Rights
in Philippine Cases and the Constitution
A. Traces of Natural Law and
Natural Rights Theory in Supreme Court Cases

Although the natural law and natural rights foundation is not articulated, some Philippine cases have
made reference to natural law and rights without raising controversy. For example, in People v.
Asas,115 the Court admonished courts to consider cautiously an admission or confession of guilt
especially when it is alleged to have been obtained by intimidation and force. The Court said:
"(w)ithal, aversion of man against forced self-affliction is a matter of Natural Law."116 In People v.
Agbot,117 we did not uphold lack of instruction as an excuse for killing because we recognized the
"offense of taking one’s life being forbidden by natural law and therefore within instinctive knowledge
and feeling of every human being not deprived of reason."118 In Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Diocares,
et al.,119 Chief Justice Fernando acknowledged the influence of natural law in stressing that the
element of a promise is the basis of contracts. In Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,120 the Court invoked the doctrine of estoppel which we have repeatedly pronounced is
predicated on, and has its origin in equity, which broadly defined, is justice according to natural law.
In Yu Con v. Ipil, et al.,121 we recognized the application of natural law in maritime commerce.

The Court has also identified in several cases certain natural rights such as the right to liberty,122 the
right of expatriation,123 the right of parents over their children which provides basis for a parent’s
visitorial rights over his illegitimate children,124 and the right to the fruits of one’s industry.125

In Simon, Jr. et al. v. Commission on Human Rights,126 the Court defined human rights, civil rights,
and political rights. In doing so, we considered the United Nations instruments to which the
Philippines is a signatory, namely the UDHR which we have ruled in several cases as binding upon
the Philippines,127 the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Still, we observed that "human rights" is so generic a
term that at best, its definition is inconclusive. But the term "human rights" is closely identified to the
"universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to
be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life,"128 i.e., the individual’s
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations.129 On the other hand, we defined civil rights as
referring to:

". . . those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They
include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action."130

Guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and

seizures, and imprisonment for debt are also identified as civil rights.131 The Court’s definition of civil
rights was made in light of their distinction from political rights which refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the
right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-
a-vis the management of government.132

To distill whether or not the Court’s reference to natural law and natural rights finds basis in a natural
law tradition that has influenced Philippine law and government, we turn to Philippine constitutional
law history.

B. History of the Philippine Constitution

and the Bill of Rights

During the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, Filipinos ardently fought for their fundamental
rights. The Propaganda Movement spearheaded by our national hero Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del
Pilar, and Graciano Lopez-Jaena demanded assimilation of the Philippines by Spain, and the
extension to Filipinos of rights enjoyed by Spaniards under the Spanish Constitution such as the
inviolability of person and property, specifically freedom from arbitrary action by officialdom
particularly by the Guardia Civil and from arbitrary detention and banishment of citizens. They
clamored for their right to liberty of conscience, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
association, freedom of worship, freedom to choose a profession, the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances, and the right to an opportunity for education. They raised the roof for an
end to the abuses of religious corporations.133

With the Propaganda Movement having apparently failed to bring about effective reforms, Andres
Bonifacio founded in 1892 the secret society of the Katipunan to serve as the military arm of the
secessionist movement whose principal aim was to create an independent Filipino nation by armed
revolution.134 While preparing for separation from Spain, representatives of the movement engaged in
various constitutional projects that would reflect the longings and aspirations of the Filipino people.
On May 31, 1897, a republican government was established in Biak-na-Bato, followed on November
1, 1897 by the unanimous adoption of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
popularly known as the Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, by the revolution’s representatives. The
document was an almost exact copy of the Cuban Constitution of Jimaguayu,135 except for four
articles which its authors Felix Ferrer and Isabelo Artacho added. These four articles formed the
constitution’s Bill of Rights and protected, among others, religious liberty, the right of association,
freedom of the press, freedom from imprisonment except by virtue of an order issued by a competent
court, and freedom from deprivation of property or domicile except by virtue of judgment passed by a
competent court of authority.136

The Biak-na-Bato Constitution was projected to have a life-span of two years, after which a final
constitution would be drafted. Two months after it was adopted, however, the Pact of Biak-na-Bato
was signed whereby the Filipino military leaders agreed to cease fighting against the Spaniards and
guaranteed peace for at least three years, in exchange for monetary indemnity for the Filipino men in
arms and for promised reforms. Likewise, General Emilio Aguinaldo, who by then had become the
military leader after Bonifacio’s death, agreed to leave the Philippines with other Filipino leaders.
They left for Hongkong in December 1897.

A few months later, the Spanish-American war broke out in April 1898. Upon encouragement of
American officials, Aguinaldo came back to the Philippines and set up a temporary dictatorial
government with himself as dictator. In June 1898, the dictatorship was terminated and Aguinaldo
became the President of the Revolutionary Government.137 By this time, the relations between the
American troops and the Filipino forces had become precarious as it became more evident that the
Americans planned to stay. In September 1898, the Revolutionary Congress was inaugurated whose
primary goal was to formulate and promulgate a Constitution. The fruit of their efforts was the Malolos
Constitution which, as admitted by Felipe Calderon who drafted it, was based on the constitutions of
South American Republics138 while the Bill of Rights was substantially a copy of the Spanish
Constitution.139 The Bill of Rights included among others, freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary
arrests and imprisonment, security of the domicile and of papers and effects against arbitrary
searches and seizures, inviolability of correspondence, due process in criminal prosecutions, freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and right of peaceful petition for the redress of grievances. Its
Article 28 stated that "(t)he enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not imply the prohibition
of any others not expressly stated."140 This suggests that natural law was the source of these
rights.141 The Malolos Constitution was short-lived. It went into effect in January 1899, about two
months before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris transferring sovereignty over the Islands to the
United States. Within a month after the constitution’s promulgation, war with the United States began
and the Republic survived for only about ten months. On March 23, 1901, American forces captured
Aguinaldo and a week later, he took his oath of allegiance to the United States.142

In the early months of the war against the United States, American President McKinley sent the First
Philippine Commission headed by Jacob Gould Schurman to assess the Philippine situation. On
February 2, 1900, in its report to the President, the Commission stated that the Filipino people wanted
above all a "guarantee of those fundamental human rights which Americans hold to be the natural
and inalienable birthright of the individual but which under Spanish domination in the Philippines had
been shamefully invaded and ruthlessly trampled upon."143 (emphasis supplied) In response to this,
President McKinley, in his Instruction of April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission, provided
an authorization and guide for the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines and stated
that "(u)pon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines . . . must be imposed
these inviolable rules . . ." These "inviolable rules" were almost literal reproductions of the First to
Ninth and the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, with the addition of the
prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in Article 1, Section 9 of said Constitution. The
"inviolable rules" or Bill of Rights provided, among others, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense or be compelled to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition
the Government for redress of grievances. Scholars have characterized the Instruction as the "Magna
Charta of the Philippines" and as a "worthy rival of the Laws of the Indies."144

The "inviolable rules" of the Instruction were re-enacted almost exactly in the Philippine Bill of
1902,145 an act which temporarily provided for the administration of the affairs of the civil government
in the Philippine Islands,146 and in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,147 otherwise known as the
Jones Law, which was an act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the
future of the Philippine Islands and to provide an autonomous government for it.148 These three
organic acts - the Instruction, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the Jones Law - extended the
guarantees of the American Bill of Rights to the Philippines. In Kepner v. United States,149 Justice
Day prescribed the methodology for applying these "inviolable rules" to the Philippines, viz: "(t)hese
principles were not taken from the Spanish law; they were carefully collated from our own
Constitution, and embody almost verbatim the safeguards of that instrument for the protection of life
and liberty."150 Thus, the "inviolable rules" should be applied in the sense "which has been placed
upon them in construing the instrument from which they were taken."151 (emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, the Philippine Independence Law, popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934,
was enacted. It guaranteed independence to the Philippines and authorized the drafting of a
Philippine Constitution. The law provided that the government should be republican in form and the
Constitution to be drafted should contain a Bill of Rights.152 Thus, the Constitutional Convention of
1934 was convened. In drafting the Constitution, the Convention preferred to be generally
conservative on the belief that to be stable and permanent, the Constitution must be anchored on the
experience of the people, "providing for institutions which were the natural outgrowths of the national
life."153 As the people already had a political organization buttressed by national traditions, the
Constitution was to sanctify these institutions tested by time and the Filipino people’s experience and
to confirm the practical and substantial rights of the people. Thus, the institutions and philosophy
adopted in the Constitution drew substantially from the organic acts which had governed the Filipinos
for more than thirty years, more particularly the Jones Law of 1916. In the absence of Philippine
precedents, the Convention considered precedents of American origin that might be suitable to our
substantially American political system and to the Filipino psychology and traditions.154 Thus, in the
words of Claro M. Recto, President of the Constitutional Convention, the 1935 Constitution was
"frankly an imitation of the American charter."155

Aside from the heavy American influence, the Constitution also bore traces of the Malolos
Constitution, the German Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Spain, the Mexican
Constitution, and the Constitutions of several South American countries, and the English unwritten
constitution. Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution and the inclusion
of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have nevertheless been
republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their experience of a republican government; a
Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also included because the people had been accustomed
to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.156

The Bill of Rights in the 1935 Constitution was reproduced largely from the report of the Convention’s
committee on bill of rights. The report was mostly a copy of the Bill of Rights in the Jones Law, which
in turn was borrowed from the American constitution. Other provisions in the report drew from the
Malolos Constitution and the constitutions of the Republic of Spain, Italy and Japan. There was a
conscious effort to retain the phraseology of the well-known provisions of the Jones Law because of
the jurisprudence that had built around them. The Convention insistently avoided including provisions
in the Bill of Rights not tested in the Filipino experience.157 Thus, upon submission of its draft bill of
rights to the President of the Convention, the committee on bill of rights stated:

"Adoption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of your committee in the formulation of
a bill or declaration of rights to be incorporated in the Constitution of the Philippine Islands. No
attempt has been made to incorporate new or radical changes. . .

The enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law (Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902,
August 29, 1916) is considered ample, comprehensive and precise enough to safeguard the rights
and immunities of Filipino citizens against abuses or encroachments of the Government, its powers or
agents. . .

Modifications or changes in phraseology have been avoided, wherever possible. This is because the
principles must remain couched in a language expressive of their historical background,
nature, extent and limitations, as construed and expounded by the great statesmen and jurists
that have vitalized them."158 (emphasis supplied)

The 1935 Constitution was approved by the Convention on February 8, 1935 and signed on February
19, 1935. On March 23, 1935, United States President Roosevelt affixed his signature on the
Constitution. By an overwhelming majority, the Filipino voters ratified it on May 14, 1935.159

Then dawned the decade of the 60s. There grew a clamor to revise the 1935 charter for it to be more
responsive to the problems of the country, specifically in the socio-economic arena and to the
sources of threats to the security of the Republic identified by then President Marcos. In 1970,
delegates to the Constitution Convention were elected, and they convened on June 1, 1971. In their
deliberations, "the spirit of moderation prevailed, and the . . . Constitution was hardly notable for its
novelty, much less a radical departure from our constitutional tradition."160 Our rights in the 1935
Constitution were reaffirmed and the government to which we have been accustomed was instituted,
albeit taking on a parliamentary rather than presidential form.161

The Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution had minimal difference from its counterpart in the 1935
Constitution. Previously, there were 21 paragraphs in one section, now there were twenty-three. The
two rights added were the recognition of the people’s right to access to official records and
documents and the right to speedy disposition of cases. To the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, a second paragraph was added that evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.162

The 1973 Constitution went into effect on January 17, 1973 and remained the fundamental law until
President Corazon Aquino rose to power in defiance of the 1973 charter and upon the "direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people"163 in the EDSA Revolution of February 23-25, 1986. On February
25, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 1 recognizing that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" and that she and Vice President Salvador Laurel were
"taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people."164 The old legal order, constitution
and enactments alike, was overthrown by the new administration.165 A month thenceforth, President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, "Declaring National Policy to Implement the Reforms Mandated by
the People, Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a Provisional Constitution, and Providing for an
Orderly Transition to Government under a New Constitution." The Provisional Constitution, otherwise
known as the "Freedom Constitution" adopted certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution, including
the Bill of Rights which was adopted in toto, and provided for the adoption of a new constitution within
60 days from the date of Proclamation No. 3.166

Pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional Commission drafted the 1987
Constitution which was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.167 As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, it retained a republican system of government, but emphasized and created more
channels for the exercise of the sovereignty of the people through recall, initiative, referendum and
plebiscite.168 Because of the wide-scale violation of human rights during the dictatorship, the 1987
Constitution contains a Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the people’s "fundamental
liberties in the essence of a constitutional democracy", in the words of ConCom delegate Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J.169 It declares in its state policies that "(t)he state values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights."170 In addition, it has a separate Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, under which, the Commission on Human Rights was created.171

Considering the American model and origin of the Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that
Filipino jurists and legal scholars define and explain the nature of the Philippine constitution in similar
terms that American constitutional law scholars explain their constitution. Chief Justice Fernando,
citing Laski, wrote about the basic purpose of a civil society and government, viz:

"The basic purpose of a State, namely to assure the happiness and welfare of its citizens is kept
foremost in mind. To paraphrase Laski, it is not an end in itself but only a means to an end, the
individuals composing it in their separate and identifiable capacities having rights which must be
respected. It is their happiness then, and not its interest, that is the criterion by which its behavior is to
be judged; and it is their welfare, and not the force at its command, that sets the limits to the authority
it is entitled to exercise."172 (emphasis supplied)

Citing Hamilton, he also defines a constitution along the lines of the natural law theory as "a law for
the government, safeguarding (not creating) individual rights, set down in writing."173 (emphasis
supplied) This view is accepted by Tañada and Fernando who wrote that the constitution "is a written
instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the
people."174 Chief Justice Fernando also quoted Schwartz that "a constitution is seen as an organic
instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress
upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. ‘The office and purpose
of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity.’"175 Malcolm and Laurel
define it according to Justice Miller’s definition in his opus on the American Constitution176 published
in 1893 as "the written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established,
limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for
their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic."177 The constitution exists to assure
that in the government’s discharge of its functions, the "dignity that is the birthright of every human
being is duly safeguarded."178

Clearly then, at the core of constitutionalism is a strong concern for individual rights179 as in the
modern period natural law theories. Justice Laurel as delegate to the 1934 Constitutional Convention
declared in a major address before the Convention:

"There is no constitution, worthy of the name, without a bill or declaration of rights. (It is) the palladium
of the people’s liberties and immunities, so that their persons, homes, their peace, their livelihood,
their happiness and their freedom may be safe and secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious
neighbor, or a grasping state."180

As Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights, he stated:

"The history of the world is the history of man and his arduous struggle for liberty. . . . It is the history
of those brave and able souls who, in the ages that are past, have labored, fought and bled that the
government of the lash - that symbol of slavery and despotism - might endure no more. It is the
history of those great self-sacrificing men who lived and suffered in an age of cruelty, pain and
desolation, so that every man might stand, under the protection of great rights and privileges, the
equal of every other man."181

Being substantially a copy of the American Bill of Rights, the history of our Bill of Rights dates back to
the roots of the American Bill of Rights. The latter is a charter of the individual’s liberties and a
limitation upon the power of the state182 which traces its roots to the English Magna Carta of 1215, a
first in English history for a written instrument to be secured from a sovereign ruler by the bulk of the
politically articulate community that intended to lay down binding rules of law that the ruler himself
may not violate. "In Magna Carta is to be found the germ of the root principle that there are
fundamental individual rights that the State -sovereign though it is - may not infringe."183 (emphasis
supplied)

In Sales v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,184 quoting Allado v. Diokno,185 this Court ruled that the Bill of Rights
guarantees the preservation of our natural rights, viz:

"The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of
political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities."186 (emphasis supplied)
We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court, considering that certain rights in our
Bill of Rights, for example habeas corpus, have been identified not as a natural right, but a civil right
created by law. Likewise, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been identified in
Simon as a civil right, without expounding however what civil right meant therein - whether a natural
right existing before the constitution and protected by it, thus acquiring the status of a civil right; or a
right created merely by law and non-existent in the absence of law. To understand the nature of the
right against unreasonable search and seizure and the corollary right to exclusion of evidence
obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful eye on the history, concept and purpose of these guarantees.

IV. History of the Guarantee against

Unreasonable Search and Seizure and the
Right to Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence
in the United States and in the Philippines

The origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in the Philippine constitutions
can be traced back to hundreds of years ago in a land distant from the Philippines. Needless to say,
the right is well-entrenched in history.

The power to search in England was first used as an instrument to oppress objectionable
publications.187 Not too long after the printing press was developed, seditious and libelous
publications became a concern of the Crown, and a broad search and seizure power developed to
suppress these publications.188 General warrants were regularly issued that gave all kinds of people
the power to enter and seize at their discretion under the authority of the Crown to enforce publication
licensing statutes.189 In 1634, the ultimate ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the
early "great illuminary of the common law,"190 and most influential of the Crown’s opponents,191 Sir
Edward Coke, while on his death bed, was subjected to a ransacking search and the manuscripts of
his Institutes were seized and carried away as seditious and libelous publications.192

The power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew. They were also used to search for
and seize smuggled goods.193 The developing common law tried to impose limits on the broad power
to search to no avail. In his History of the Pleas of Crown, Chief Justice Hale stated unequivocally
that general warrants were void and that warrants must be used on "probable cause" and with
particularity.194 Member of Parliament, William Pitt, made his memorable and oft-quoted speech
against the unrestrained power to search:

"The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail - its
roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm may enter - the rain may enter; but the
King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."195
Nevertheless, legislation authorizing general warrants continued to be passed.196

In the 16th century, writs of assistance, called as such because they commanded all officers of the
Crown to participate in their execution,197 were also common. These writs authorized searches and
seizures for enforcement of import duty laws.198 The "same powers and authorities" and the "like
assistance" that officials had in England were given to American customs officers when parliament
extended the customs laws to the colonies. The abuse in the writs of assistance was not only that
they were general, but they were not returnable and once issued, lasted six months past the life of the
sovereign.199

These writs caused profound resentment in the colonies.200 They were predominantly used in
Massachusetts, the largest port in the colonies201 and the seat of the American revolution. When the
writs expired six months after the death of George II in October 1760,202 sixty-three Boston merchants
who were opposed to the writs retained James Otis, Jr. to petition the Superior Court for a hearing on
the question of whether new writs should be issued.203 Otis used the opportunity to denounce
England’s whole policy to the colonies and on general warrants.204 He pronounced the writs of
assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the
fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book" since they placed "the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."205 Otis was a visionary and apparently made
the first argument for judicial review and nullifying of a statute exceeding the legislature’s power under
the Constitution and "natural law."206 This famous debate in February 1761 in Boston was "perhaps
the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the
mother country. ‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was the first scene of the first act
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born.’"207 But the Superior Court nevertheless held that the writs could be issued.208

Once the customs officials had the writs, however, they had great difficulty enforcing the customs
laws owing to rampant smuggling and mob resistance from the citizenry.209 The revolution had begun.
The Declaration of Independence followed. The use of general warrants and writs of assistance in
enforcing customs and tax laws was one of the causes of the American Revolution.210

Back in England, shortly after the Boston debate, John Wilkes, a member of Parliament,
anonymously published the North Briton, a series of pamphlets criticizing the policies of the British
government.211 In 1763, one pamphlet was very bold in denouncing the government. Thus, the
Secretary of the State issued a general warrant to "search for the authors, printers, and publishers of
[the] seditious and treasonable paper."212 Pursuant to the warrant, Wilkes’ house was searched and
his papers were indiscriminately seized. He sued the perpetrators and obtained a judgment for
damages. The warrant was pronounced illegal "as totally subversive of the liberty" and "person and
property of every man in this kingdom."213

Seeing Wilkes’ success, John Entick filed an action for trespass for the search and seizure of his
papers under a warrant issued earlier than Wilkes’. This became the case of Entick v.
Carrington,214 considered a landmark of the law of search and seizure and called a familiar
"monument of English freedom".215 Lord Camden, the judge, held that the general warrant for Entick’s
papers was invalid. Having described the power claimed by the Secretary of the State for issuing
general search warrants, and the manner in which they were executed, Lord Camden spoke these
immortalized words, viz:

"Such is the power and therefore one would naturally expect that the law to warrant it should be clear
in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be found
there, it is not law.

The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved
sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some
public law for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by positive
law are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of this description, wherein
every man by common consent gives up that right for the sake of justice and the general good. By the
laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can
set his foot upon my ground without my license but he is liable to an action though the damage be
nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to
answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to
show by way of justification that some positive law has justified or excused him. . . If no such excuse
can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority against the defendant and the
plaintiff must have judgment. . ."216 (emphasis supplied)

The experience of the colonies on the writs of assistance which spurred the Boston debate and the
Entick case which was a "monument of freedom" that every American statesman knew during the
revolutionary and formative period of America, could be confidently asserted to have been "in the
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as
sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures."217

The American experience with the writs of assistance and the Entick case were considered by the
United States Supreme Court in the first major case to discuss the scope of the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure in the 1885 case of Boyd v. United States, supra,
where the court ruled, viz:
"The principles laid down in this opinion (Entick v. Carrington, supra) affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before
the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions, on the part of the
Government and its employees, of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense; it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s
judgment."218 (emphasis supplied)

In another landmark case of 1914, Weeks v. United States,219 the Court, citing Adams v. New
York,220 reiterated that the Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and
property against the unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under
legislative or judicial sanction.

With this genesis of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the jurisprudence that
had built around it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee was extended by the United States to the
Filipinos in succinct terms in President McKinley’s Instruction of April 7, 1900, viz:

". . . that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."221

This provision in the Instruction was re-enacted in Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, this time
with a provision on warrants, viz:

"That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.

xxx xxx xxx

That no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."222

The above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones Law of 1916.

Then came the 1935 Constitution which provides in Article IV, Section 1(3), viz:

"Section 1(3). The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Initially, the Constitutional Convention’s committee on bill of rights proposed an exact copy of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in their draft, viz:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."223

During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Vicente Francisco proposed to amend the
provision by inserting the phrase "to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce" in lieu of "supported by oath or
affirmation." His proposal was based on Section 98 of General Order No. 58 or the Code of Criminal
Procedure then in force in the Philippines which provided that: "(t)he judge or justice of the peace
must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witness he
may produce and take their deposition in writing."224 The amendment was accepted as it was a
remedy against the evils pointed out in the debates, brought about by the issuance of warrants, many
of which were in blank, upon mere affidavits on facts which were generally found afterwards to be
false.225

When the Convention patterned the 1935 Constitution’s guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures after the Fourth Amendment, the Convention made specific reference to the Boyd case
and traced the history of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure back to the
issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American colonies.226 From
the Boyd case, it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect
rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in one’s home and possessions.

Almost 40 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the provision on the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was amended in Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution,
viz:

"Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Noticeably, there were three modifications of the 1935 counterpart, namely: (1) the clause was made
applicable to searches and seizures "of whatever nature and for any purpose"; (2) the provision on
warrants was expressly made applicable to both "search warrant or warrant of arrest"; and (3)
probable cause was made determinable not only by a judge, but also by "such other officer as may be
authorized by law."227 But the concept and purpose of the right remained substantially the same.

As a corollary to the above provision on searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule made its
maiden appearance in Article IV, Section 4(2) of the Constitution, viz:

"Section 4 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."

That evidence obtained in violation of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
inadmissible was an adoption of the Court’s ruling in the 1967 case of Stonehill v. Diokno.228

Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution were adopted in toto in Article I, Section 1 of the Freedom
Constitution which took effect on March 25, 1986, viz:

"Section 1. The provision of . . . ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) . . . of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
remain in force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional Constitution."229

Thereafter, pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1987 Constitution was drafted and ratified on
February 2, 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Article III thereof provide:

"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The significant modification of Section 2 is that probable cause may be determined only by a judge
and no longer by "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." This was a reversion
to the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution.

Parenthetically, in the international arena, the UDHR provides a similar protection in Article 12, viz:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."

The ICCPR similarly protects this human right in Article 17, viz:

"1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

In the United States, jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment continued to grow from the Boyd case.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the focal concern of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect the individual from arbitrary and oppressive official conduct.230 It also protects the privacies of
life and the sanctity of the person from such interference.231 In later cases, there has been a shift in
focus: it has been held that the principal purpose of the guarantee is the protection of privacy rather
than property, "[f]or the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."232 The tests that have more
recently been formulated in interpeting the provision focus on privacy rather than intrusion of property
such as the "constitutionally protected area" test in the 1961 case of Silverman v. United
States233 and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard in Katz v. United States234 which held
that the privacy of communication in a public telephone booth comes under the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.

Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American jurisdiction, the essence of this right
in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as respect for one’s personality, property,
home, and privacy. Chief Justice Fernando explains, viz:

"It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon
as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home, but not necessarily
excluding an office or a hotel room. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to
be regarded is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry in his residence, for him to retreat
from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world, where he can
truly be himself with his family. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the
choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. (Cf. Cooley: ‘Near in importance to
exemption from any arbitrary control of the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to
the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and protection in person,
property, and papers against even the process of the law, except in specified cases. The maxim that
‘every man’s house is his castle,’ is made part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the
citizen.’ (1 Constitutional Limitations, pp. 610-611 [1927]) In the language of Justice Laurel, this
provision is ‘intended to bulwark individual security, home, and legitimate possessions’ (Rodriquez v.
Vollamiel, 65 Phil. 230, 239 (1937). Laurel con.) Thus is protected ‘his personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.’ There is to be no invasion ‘on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’ (Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616, 630 [1886])"235 (emphasis supplied)

As early as 1904, the Court has affirmed the sanctity and privacy of the home in United States v.
Arceo,236 viz:

"The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and
recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another
without the consent of its owners or occupants.

The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place where man with his family may dwell in
peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the
king, except in rare cases - has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most
sacred personal rights to whom men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed
to man the right to absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was
clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject
might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that
privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. . .

‘A man’s house is his castle,’ has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His
protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain,
as well as in other countries.

xxx xxx xxx

So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the privacy of their
houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also the
sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: ‘Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam
domus uniuscu jusque civium.’ "237 (emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterated this in the 1911 case of United States v. De Los Reyes, et al.,238 to demonstrate
the uncompromising regard placed upon the privacy of the home that cannot be violated by
unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:

"In the case of McClurg vs. Brenton (123 Iowa, 368), the court, speaking of the right of an officer to
enter a private house to search for the stolen goods, said:

‘The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however mean or humble, free from arbitrary
invasion and search, has for centuries been protected with the most solicitous care by every court in
the English-speaking world, from Magna Charta down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of
rights defining the limits of governmental power in our own republic.

‘The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no more right than is
possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject its
occupants to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for
that purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of such
warrant. At the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood-hounds must wait till the
law, by authoritative process, bids it open. . .’"239 (emphasis supplied)

It is not only respect for personality, privacy and property, but to the very dignity of the human being
that lies at the heart of the provision.

There is also public interest involved in the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. The
respect that government accords its people helps it elicit allegiance and loyalty of its citizens. Chief
Justice Fernando writes about the right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as to
privacy of communication in this wise:

"These rights, on their face, impart meaning and vitality to that liberty which in a constitutional regime
is a man’s birth-right. There is the recognition of the area of privacy normally beyond the power of
government to intrude. Full and unimpaired respect to that extent is accorded his personality. He is
free from the prying eyes of public officials. He is let alone, a prerogative even more valued when the
agencies of publicity manifest less and less diffidence in impertinent and unwelcome inquiry into
one’s person, his home, wherever he may be minded to stay, his possessions, his communication.
Moreover, in addition to the individual interest, there is a public interest that is likewise served by
these constitutional safeguards. They make it easier for state authority to enlist the loyalty and
allegiance of its citizens, with the unimpaired deference to one’s dignity and standing as a human
being, not only to his person as such but to things that may be considered necessary appurtenances
to a decent existence. A government that thus recognizes such limits and is careful not to trespass on
what is the domain subject to his sole control is likely to prove more stable and
enduring."240 (emphasis supplied)

In the 1967 case of Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno,241 this Court affirmed the sanctity of the home and the
privacy of communication and correspondence, viz:

"To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means."242 (emphasis supplied)

Even after the 1961 Silverman and 1967 Katz cases in the United States, which emphasized
protection of privacy rather than property as the principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment, this
Court declared the avowed purposes of the guarantee in the 1981 case of People v. CFI of Rizal,
Branch IX, Quezon City,243 viz:

"The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give
remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of
persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man’s soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best causes and reasons."244 (emphasis supplied)

Even if it were conceded that privacy and not property is the focus of the guarantee as shown by the
growing American jurisprudence, this Court has upheld the right to privacy and its central place in a
limited government such as the Philippines’, viz:
"The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: ‘The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector - protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual- has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of technological age - industrialization, urbanization,
and organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion to it. In modern times,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society.’"245 (emphasis supplied)

The right to privacy discussed in Justice Douglas’ dissent in the Hayden case is illuminating. We
quote it at length, viz:

"Judge Learned Hand stated a part of the philosophy of the Fourth Amendment in United States v.
Poller, 43 F2d 911, 914: ‘[I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth
Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man’s privacy which consists in rummaging about
among his effects to secure evidence against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not
make so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily not be interested in
what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what does.

xxx xxx xxx

The constitutional philosophy is, I think, clear. The personal effects and possessions of the
individual (all contraband and the like excepted) are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the
long arm of the law, from any rummaging by police. Privacy involves the choice of the
individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. The
article may be nondescript work of art, a manuscript of a book, a personal account book, a diary,
invoices, personal clothing, jewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that
every individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself.
That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select for
himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the
extent of the sharing (footnote omitted). This is his prerogative not the States’. The Framers,
who were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant and how the practice of
rummaging through one’s personal effects could destroy freedom.

xxx xxx xxx

I would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects (apart from
contraband and the like) to the police and keeping their contents as secret and their integrity
inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very essence of the right of privacy.’"246 (emphasis
supplied)

Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut,247 the United States Supreme Court upheld the right to marital
privacy and ruled that lawmakers could not make the use of contraceptives a crime and sanction the
search of marital bedrooms, viz:

"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."248 (emphasis supplied)

In relation to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, private respondent Dimaano
likewise claims a right to the exclusionary rule, i.e., that evidence obtained from an unreasonable
search cannot be used in evidence against her. To determine whether this right is available to her, we
again examine the history, concept, and purpose of this right in both the American and Philippine
jurisdictions.

The exclusionary rule has had an uneven history in both the United States and Philippine
jurisdictions. In common law, the illegal seizure of evidence did not affect its admissibility because of
the view that physical evidence was the same however it was obtained. As distinguished from a
coerced confession, the illegal seizure did not impeach the authenticity or reliability of physical
evidence. This view prevailed in American jurisdiction until the Supreme Court ruled in the 1914
Weeks case that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal
court as it amounted to theft by agents of the government. This came to be known as the
exclusionary rule and was believed to deter federal law enforcers from violating the Fourth
Amendment. In 1949, the Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the Due Process Clause under
the Fourteenth Amendment249 and made applicable in the state system in Wolf v. Colorado,250 but the
Court rejected to incorporate the exclusionary rule. At the time Wolf was decided, 17 states followed
the Weeks doctrine while 30 states did not.251 The Court reasoned:

"We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such conduct by the
police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding
the relevant rules of evidence. There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably
obtained by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local
authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive
conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion,
sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the
country."252

This difference in treatment on the federal and state level of evidence obtained illegally resulted in the
"silver platter" doctrine. State law enforcement agents would provide federal officers with illegally
seized evidence, which was then admissible in federal court because, as with illegally seized
evidence by private citizens, federal officers were not implicated in obtaining it. Thus, it was said that
state law enforcers served up the evidence in federal cases in "silver platter." This pernicious practice
was stopped with the United States Supreme Court’s 1960 decision, Elkins v. United
States.253 Twelve years after Wolf, the United States Supreme Court reversed Wolf and incorporated
the exclusionary rule in the state system in Mapp v. Ohio254 because other means of controlling illegal
police behavior had failed.255 We quote at length the Mapp ruling as it had a significant influence in
the exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisdiction, viz:

". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. . .

Since the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be
a ‘form of words’, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court’s high regard as freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’ At that time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation
of its provisions. Even Wolf ‘stoutly adhered’ to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the
Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due
process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an essential part of the right to privacy - be
also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short,
the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule ‘is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only available
way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ (Elkins v. United States, 364 US at 217)

xxx xxx xxx

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. (Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant of
Property, 6 L ed 2d post, p. 1127) Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that
right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as
other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice."256 (emphasis supplied)

It is said that the exclusionary rule has three purposes. The major and most often invoked is the
deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Elkins v. United States257 and quoted
in Mapp: "(t)he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter – to compel respect for
constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way – by removing the incentive to disregard
it."258 Second is the "imperative of judicial integrity", i.e., that the courts do not become "accomplices
in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold . . . by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . .
has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur."259 Third is the more
recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United States Supreme Court which is that "of
assuring the people – all potential victims of unlawful government conduct – that the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular
trust in government."260 The focus of concern here is not the police but the public. This third purpose
is implicit in the Mapp declaration that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence."261

In Philippine jurisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one position to the other on the
exclusionary rule. In the 1920 case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal,262 the Court citing Boyd, ruled that
"seizure or compulsory production of a man’s private papers to be used against him" was tantamount
to self-incrimination and was therefore "unreasonable search and seizure." This was a proscription
against "fishing expeditions." The Court restrained the prosecution from using the books as evidence.
Five years later or in 1925, we held in People v. Carlos263 that although the Boyd and Silverthorne
Lumber Co. and Silverthorne v. United States264 cases are authorities for the doctrine that documents
obtained by illegal searches were inadmissible in evidence in criminal cases, Weeks modified this
doctrine by adding that the illegality of the search and seizure should have initially been directly
litigated and established by a pre-trial motion for the return of the things seized. As this condition was
not met, the illegality of the seizure was not deemed an obstacle to admissibility. The subject
evidence was nevertheless excluded, however, for being hearsay. Thereafter, in 1932, the Court did
not uphold the defense of self-incrimination when "fraudulent books, invoices and records" that had
been seized were presented in evidence in People v. Rubio.265 The Court gave three reasons: (1) the
public has an interest in the proper regulation of the party’s books; (2) the books belonged to a
corporation of which the party was merely a manager; and (3) the warrants were not issued to fish for
evidence but to seize "instruments used in the violation of [internal revenue] laws" and "to further
prevent the perpetration of fraud."266

The exclusionary rule applied in Uy Kheytin was reaffirmed seventeen years thence in the 1937 case
of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance267 decided under the 1935 Constitution. The Court ruled that the
seizure of books and documents for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against
the possessor thereof is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable and the
presentation of evidence offensive of the provision against self-incrimination. At the close of the
Second World War, however, the Court, in Alvero v. Dizon,268 again admitted in evidence documents
seized by United States military officers without a search warrant in a prosecution by the Philippine
Government for treason. The Court reasoned that this was in accord with the Laws and Customs of
War and that the seizure was incidental to an arrest and thus legal. The issue of self-incrimination
was not addressed at all and instead, the Court pronounced that even if the seizure had been illegal,
the evidence would nevertheless be admissible following jurisprudence in the United States that
evidence illegally obtained by state officers or private persons may be used by federal officers.269

Then came Moncado v. People’s Court270 in 1948. The Court made a categorical declaration that "it is
established doctrine in the Philippines that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality
of the means used for obtaining it." It condemned the "pernicious influence" of Boyd and totally
rejected the doctrine in Weeks as "subversive of evidentiary rules in Philippine jurisdiction." The
ponencia declared that the prosecution of those guilty of violating the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures was adequate protection for the people. Thus it became settled jurisprudence
that illegally obtained evidence was admissible if found to be relevant to the case271 until the 1967
landmark decision of Stonehill v. Diokno272 which overturned the Moncado rule. The Court held in
Stonehill, viz:

". . . Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in
the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule,
that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely ‘because the constable has blundered,’
(People v. Defore, 140 NE 585) upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained (Wolf v. Colorado, 93 L.Ed. 1782), such as common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."273

The Court then quoted the portion of the Mapp case which we have quoted at length above in
affirming that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Stonehill ruling was incorporated in Article 4, Section 4(2) of the 1973 Constitution and
carried over to Article 3, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
V. Application of the Natural Law
Culled from History and Philosophy:
Are the Rights Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
and to the Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence Natural Rights
which Private Respondent Dimaano Can Invoke?

In answering this question, Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in the Griswold case serves as a
helpful guidepost to determine whether a right is so fundamental that the people cannot be deprived
of it without undermining the tenets of civil society and government, viz:

"In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of
their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the ‘traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people’ to determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as
fundamental.’ (Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The inquiry is whether a
right involved ‘is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’ . . . Powell
v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)"274 (emphasis supplied)

In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the judge’s personal preference, invites
criticism that the decision is a performative contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would point
out that while the decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted
with what it abhors as it stands on the judge’s subjective and arbitrary choice of a school of legal
thought. Just as one judge will fight tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosophy, another judge
will match his fervor in defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking natural law
because the history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an
altogether different story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the people are the source of
all government authority, and the courts are their creation. While it may be argued that the choice of a
school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact against which one cannot argue - and it
would not be turning somersault with history to say that the American Declaration of Independence
and the consequent adoption of a constitution stood on a modern natural law theory foundation as
this is "universally taken for granted by writers on government."275 It is also well-settled in Philippine
history that the American system of government and constitution were adopted by our 1935
Constitutional Convention as a model of our own republican system of government and constitution.
In the words of Claro M. Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution is "frankly an
imitation of the American Constitution." Undeniably therefore, modern natural law theory, specifically
Locke’s natural rights theory, was used by the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional
democracy and later also used by the Filipinos.276 Although the 1935 Constitution was revised in
1973, minimal modifications were introduced in the 1973 Constitution which was in force prior to the
EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935
Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of Rights were concerned, still
prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution ratified less than a year
from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the
system of government and the Bill of Rights, with the significant difference that it emphasized respect
for and protection of human rights and stressed that sovereignty resided in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional history. First, the Filipinos are a freedom-
loving race with high regard for their fundamental and natural rights. No amount of subjugation or
suppression, by rulers with the same color as the Filipinos’ skin or otherwise, could obliterate their
longing and aspiration to enjoy these rights. Without the people’s consent to submit their natural
rights to the ruler,277 these rights cannot forever be quelled, for like water seeking its own course and
level, they will find their place in the life of the individual and of the nation; natural right, as part of
nature, will take its own course. Thus, the Filipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the
Spanish and American colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an authoritarian ruler. They wrote
these rights in stone in every constitution they crafted starting from the 1899 Malolos Constitution.
Second, although Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino face, it is undeniable that our
political and legal institutions are American in origin. The Filipinos adopted the republican form of
government that the Americans introduced and the Bill of Rights they extended to our islands, and
were the keystones that kept the body politic intact. These institutions sat well with the Filipinos who
had long yearned for participation in government and were jealous of their fundamental and natural
rights. Undergirding these institutions was the modern natural law theory which stressed natural rights
in free, independent and equal individuals who banded together to form government for the protection
of their natural rights to life, liberty and property. The sole purpose of government is to promote,
protect and preserve these rights. And when government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates
the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the
governed and could be replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people exercised
this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.

I will not endeavor to identify every natural right that the Filipinos fought for in EDSA. The case at bar
merely calls us to determine whether two particular rights - the rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom - have the force and effect of natural
rights which private respondent Dimaano can invoke against the government.
I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and seizure. On February 25, 1986, the
new president, Corazon Aquino, issued Proclamation No. 1 where she declared that she and the vice
president were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people and pledged "to do
justice to the numerous victims of human rights violations."278 It is implicit from this pledge that the
new government recognized and respected human rights. Thus, at the time of the search on March 3,
1986, it may be asserted that the government had the duty, by its own pledge, to uphold human
rights. This presidential issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights
without enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a positive law granting private
respondent Dimaano the right against unreasonable search and seizure at the time her house was
raided, I respectfully submit that she can invoke her natural right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life,
liberty and property. Our well-settled jurisprudence that the right against unreasonable search and
seizure protects the people’s rights to security of person and property, to the sanctity of the home,
and to privacy is a recognition of this proposition. The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it
is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property dates back even earlier
than the modern philosophers and the American and French revolutions, but pervades the whole
history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence, thus it has been described, viz:

"The right to personal security emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life,
his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual."279

The individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his undifferentiated liberty and agreed to
the establishment of a government to guarantee his natural rights, including the right to security of
person and property, which he could not guarantee by himself. Similarly, the natural right to liberty
includes the right of a person to decide whether to express himself and communicate to the public or
to keep his affairs to himself and enjoy his privacy. Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensability
of privacy in the Hayden case, thus: "Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual
needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself." A natural right to liberty
indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part
of his being and the extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to express himself, the natural right
to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to be truly himself with his family in his home,
his haven of refuge where he can "retreat from the cares and pressures, even at times the
oppressiveness of the outside world," to borrow the memorable words of Chief Justice Fernando. For
truly, the drapes of a man’s castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body that cover the
essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the
government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep to himself and to act
undisturbed within his zone of privacy. Finally, indispensable to the natural right to property is the
right to one’s possessions. Property is a product of one’s toil and might be considered an expression
and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessary to the enjoyment of his life. With
unreasonable searches and seizures, one’s property stands in danger of being rummaged through
and taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los Reyes, persons are subjected to indignity by an
unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it is a violation of a person’s natural right to life,
liberty and property. It is this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives him
the dignity of a human being.

It is understandable why Filipinos demanded that every organic law in their history guarantee the
protection of their natural right against unreasonable search and seizure and why the UDHR treated
this right as a human right. It is a right inherent in the right to life, liberty and property; it is a right
"appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence", a right that "belongs to man by virtue of his nature
and depends upon his personality", and not merely a civil right created and protected by positive law.
The right to protect oneself against unreasonable search and seizure, being a right indispensable to
the right to life, liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion from what Aquinas identifies as
man’s natural inclination to self-preservation and self-actualization. Man preserves himself by leading
a secure life enjoying his liberty and actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to
freely express himself and associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing himself. For
after all, a reflective grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about performing the
functions proper to his human nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines
of his private space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life knowing that an
unexamined life is not worth living.

Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions) and
embraced (the Instruction, Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones Law) in the last century included a
provision guaranteeing the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure because the
people ranked this right as fundamental and natural. Indeed, so fundamental and natural is this right
that the demand for it spurred the American revolution against the English Crown. It resulted in the
Declaration of Independence and the subsequent establishment of the American Constitution about
200 years ago in 1789. A revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasons - such as the
violation of fundamental and natural rights - for prudence dictates that "governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient reasons."280

Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government
cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the reason alone that
there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was conducted. This right of the
private respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It is part of
natural rights. A violation of this right along with other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the
restoration of the Filipinos’ natural rights that justified the establishment of the Aquino government
and the writing of the 1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution, private
respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure
under natural law.

We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp,
we can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the right to privacy" that
the Constitution protects. If the exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to "grant the right
(against unreasonable search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."
Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that private
respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right.

To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by philosophy and
deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments have been raised on the constitutional status
of the exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v. Calandra,281 that it is only a
"judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."282 Along the same
line, others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires some
effective remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it could replace it
with other remedies of a comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit
only if it is conceded that the exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of
deterrence.283
Those who defend the constitutional status of the exclusionary right, however, assert that there is
nothing in Weeks that says that it is a remedy284 or a manner of deterring police officers.285 In Mapp,
while the court discredited other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment cited in Wolf, the thrust of
the opinion was broader. Justice Clarke opined that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence"286 and held that "the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."287

Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the exclusionary right is the
first kind of human law which may be derived as a conclusion from the natural law precept that one
should do no harm to another man, in the same way that conclusions are derived from scientific
principles, in which case the exclusionary right has force from natural law and does not depend on
positive law for its creation; or if it is the second kind of human law which is derived by way of
determination of natural law, in the same way that a carpenter determines the shape of a house, such
that it is merely a judicially or legislatively chosen remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only
has force insofar as positive law creates and protects it.

In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and natural right,
we were aided by philosophy and history. In the case of the exclusionary right, philosophy can also
come to the exclusionary right’s aid, along the lines of Justice Clarke’s proposition in the Mapp case
that no man shall be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the government shall not be
allowed to convict a man on evidence obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) for the protection of which, government and the law were established. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to act
with more temerity than a thief in the night for they can disturb one’s privacy, trespass one’s abode,
and steal one’s property with impunity. This, in turn, would erode the people’s trust in government.

Unlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure, however, history cannot come to the aid
of the exclusionary right. Compared to the right against unreasonable search and seizure, the
exclusionary right is still in its infancy stage in Philippine jurisdiction, having been etched only in the
1973 Constitution after the 1967 Stonehill ruling which finally laid to rest the debate on whether
illegally seized evidence should be excluded. In the United States, the exclusionary right’s genesis
dates back only to the 1885 Boyd case on the federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp case in the state
level. The long period of non-recognition of the exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much
less a revolution, in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions. Likewise, the UDHR, a response
to violation of human rights in a particular period in world history, did not include the exclusionary
right. It cannot confidently be asserted therefore that history can attest to its natural right status.
Without the strength of history and with philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary
right’s status as a fundamental and natural right stands on unstable ground. Thus, the conclusion that
it can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution also rests on shifting sands.

Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent Dimaano as she invoked it
when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP
Board issued its resolution on Ramas’ unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG’s
petition for forfeiture against Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the
Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant.
Following the petitioner’s stance upheld by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the
Constitution, then it could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom Constitution
took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987.

VI. Epilogue

The Filipino people have fought revolutions, by the power of the pen, the strength of the sword and
the might of prayer to claim and reclaim their fundamental rights. They set these rights in stone in
every constitution they established. I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during that one
month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights, including their
natural rights as human beings. With the extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the
EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not
without fundamental rights. In that brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and enjoyed them in
their rawest essence, having just been freed from the claws of an authoritarian regime. They walked
through history with bare feet, unshod by a constitution, but with an armor of rights guaranteed by the
philosophy and history of their constitutional tradition. Those natural rights inhere in man and need
not be granted by a piece of paper.

To reiterate, the right against unreasonable search and seizure which private respondent Dimaano
invokes is among the sacred rights fought for by the Filipinos in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. It will be
a profanity to deny her the right after the fight had been won. It does not matter whether she believed
in the righteousness of the EDSA Revolution or she contributed to its cause as an alleged ally of the
dictator, for as a human being, she has a natural right to life, liberty and property which she can
exercise regardless of existing or non-existing laws and irrespective of the will or lack of will of
governments.

I wish to stress that I am not making the duty of the Court unbearably difficult by taking it to task every
time a right is claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right which the government cannot
diminish or defeat by any kind of positive law or action. The Court need not always twice measure a
law or action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law as a yardstick. However, the
1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that borders the miraculous. It was the first revolution
of its kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate
opinion is the first of its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are invoked not as aids in the
interpretation of a positive law, but to recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as
man. The unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA revolution cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of
man, rights that antedate constitutions, rights that have been the beacon lights of the law since the
Greek civilization. Without respect for natural rights, man cannot rise to the full height of his humanity.

I concur in the result.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The unprecedented 1986 People Power Revolution at EDSA remains to be such an enigma, still
confounding political scientists on its origins and repercussions, to so many. Now, before the Court is
yet another puzzle: Whether or not the Bill of Rights may be considered operative during
the interregnum from 26 February 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath to the Presidency)
to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution). Indeed, there are
differing views on the other related question of whether or not the 1973 Constitution has meanwhile
been rendered, ipso facto, without force and effect by the "successful revolution."

The government under President Corazon C. Aquino was described as revolutionary for having been
so installed through a "direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people" in disregard of the
"provisions of the 1973 Constitution."1 It was said to be revolutionary in the sense that it came into
existence in defiance of existing legal processes, and President Aquino assumed the reigns of
government through the extra-legal action taken by the people.2

A revolution is defined by Western political scholars as being a "rapid fundamental and violent
domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society in its political institutions, social
structure, leadership, and government activity and policies."3 A revolution results in a complete
overthrow of established government and of the existing legal order.4 Notable examples would be the
French, Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Cuban revolutions. Revolution, it is pointed out, is to be
distinguished from rebellion, insurrection, revolt, coup, and war of independence.5 A rebellion or
insurrection may change policies, leadership, and the political institution, but not the social structure
and prevailing values. A coup d’etat in itself changes leadership and perhaps policies but not
necessarily more extensive and intensive than that. A war of independence is a struggle of one
community against the rule by an alien community and does not have to involve changes in the social
structure of either community.6

The 1986 People Power Revolution is a uniquely Philippine experience. Much of its effects may not
be compared in good substance with those of the "great revolutions". While a revolution may be
accomplished by peaceful means,7 it is essential, however, that there be an accompanying basic
transformation in political and social structures. The "revolution" at Edsa has not resulted in such
radical change though it concededly could have. The offices of the executive branch have
been retained, the judiciary has been allowed to function, the military, as well as the
constitutional commissions and local governments, have remained intact.8 It is observed by
some analysts that there has only been a change of personalities in the government but not a
change of structures9 that can imply the consequent abrogation of the fundamental law. The
efficacy of a legal order must be distinguished from the question of its existence10 for it may be that
the efficacy of a legal order comes to a low point which may, nevertheless, continue to be operative
and functioning.11

The proclamations issued, as well as the Provisional Constitution enacted by the Aquino
administration shortly after being installed, have revealed the new government’s recognition
of and its intention to preserve the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on individual
rights. Proclamation No. 1,12 dated 25 February 1986, has maintained that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them." It has expressed that the government
would be "dedicated to uphold justice, morality and decency in government, freedom and
democracy." In lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the
Philippines, for, among other reasons, the "Filipino people have established a new government bound
to the ideals of genuine liberty and freedom for all," Proclamation No. 2 of March 1986, has declared:

"Now, therefore, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution and the Filipino people, do hereby x x x lift the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus x x x."

What Constitution could the proclamation have been referring to? It could not have been the
Provisional Constitution, adopted only later on 25 March 1986 under Proclamation No. 3 which, in
fact, contains and attests to the new government’s commitment to the "restoration of democracy" and
"protection of basic rights," announcing that the "the provisions of Article I (National Territory), Article
III (Citizenship), Article IV (Bill of Rights), Article V (Duties and Obligations of Citizens), and Article
VI (Suffrage) of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, (shall) remain in force and effect," (emphasis
supplied),13 superseding only the articles on "The Batasang Pambansa", "The Prime Minister and the
Cabinet", "Amendments", and "Transitory Provisions."14 Verily, Proclamation No. 3 is an
acknowledgment by the Aquino government of the continued existence, subject to its exclusions, of
the 1973 Charter.

The new government has done wisely. The Philippines, a member of the community of nations and
among the original members of the United Nations (UN) organized in 1941, has had the clear
obligation to observe human rights and the duty to promote universal respect for and observance of
all fundamental freedoms for all individuals without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion.15 In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaiming that basic rights and freedoms are inherent and inalienable to every
member of the human family. One of these rights is the right against arbitrary deprivation of one’s
property.16 Even when considered by other jurisdictions as being a mere statement of aspirations and
not of law, the Philippines Supreme Court has, as early as 1951, acknowledged the binding
force of the Universal Declaration in Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Borovsky vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, 18 Chirskoff vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 19 and Andreu vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.20 In subsequent cases, 21 the Supreme Court has adverted to the enumeration in the
Universal Declaration in upholding various fundamental rights and freedoms. The Court, in invoking
the articles in the Universal Declaration has relied both on the Constitutional provision stating that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as being part of the law of the
nation22 and, in no little degree, on the tenet that the acceptance of these generally recognized
principles of international law are deemed part of the law of the land not only as a condition for, but as
a consequence of, the country’s admission in the society of nations.23 The Universal Declaration
"constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years
become a part of customary international law."24 It "spells out in considerable detail the meaning of
the phrase ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ which Member States have agreed to observe.
The Universal Declaration has joined the Charter x x x as part of the constitutional structure of the
world community. The Declaration, as an authoritative listing of human rights, has become a
basic component of international customary law, indeed binding all states and not only
members of the United Nations."25

It might then be asked whether an individual is a proper subject of international law and whether he
can invoke a provision of international law against his own nation state. International law, also often
referred to as the law of nations, has in recent times been defined as that law which is applicable to
states in their mutual relations and to individuals in their relations with states.26 The individual as
the end of the community of nations is a member of the community, and a member has status and is
not a mere object.27 It is no longer correct to state that the State could only be the medium between
international law and its own nationals, for the law has often fractured this link as and when it fails in
its purpose. Thus, in the areas of black and white slavery, human rights and protection of minorities,
and a score of other concerns over individuals, international law has seen such individuals, being
members of the international community, as capable of invoking rights and duties even against the
nation State.28

At bottom, the Bill of Rights (under the 1973 Constitution), during the interregnum from 26
February to 24 March 1986 remained in force and in effect not only because it was so
recognized by the 1986 People Power but also because the new government was bound by
International law to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

There would appear to be nothing irregular in the issuance of the warrant in question; it was its
implementation that failed to accord with that warrant. The warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court
of Batangas, Branch 1, only listed the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five
(5) boxes of ammunition. The raiding team, however, seized the following items: one (1) baby
armalite rifle with two (2) magazines; forty (40) rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one (1) .45 caliber pistol;
communications equipment; cash in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and US $ 50,000.00; as well as
jewelry and land titles. The Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a petition for
forfeiture of all the items seized under Republic Act No. 1397, otherwise also known as an "Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property," against private respondents Elizabeth Dimaano and
Josephus Q. Ramas. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on 18 November 1991 dismissing the
complaint, directing the return of the illegally seized items, and ordering the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action. The resolution should be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, I concur in the results.

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

In a little less than a fortnight, I find myself privileged with my involvement in the final deliberation of
quite a few significant public interest cases. Among them is the present case.

With the well-studied and exhaustive main opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the scholarly treatise
that the separate opinion of Justice Reynato Puno is, and the equally incisive separate opinion of
Justice Jose Vitug, any other opinion may appear unnecessary. But the questions posed are so
challenging and the implications so far-reaching that I feel it is my duty to offer my modest views.

To begin with, there is unanimity as regards the nullity of the questioned seizure of items which are
not listed in the search warrant. The disagreement relates to the juridical basis for voiding the
confiscation. At the core of the controversy is the question of whether the Bill of Rights was in force
and effect during the time gap between the establishment of the revolutionary government as a result
of the People Power Revolution in February 1986, and the promulgation of the Provisional or
Freedom Constitution by then President Corazon C. Aquino a month thereafter.

According to the majority, during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
auspices of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration") and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("International Covenant"), practically the same rights under the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution although the said Constitution itself was no longer operative
then. Justice Puno posits that during that period, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
still held sway, this time under the aegis of natural law. Justice Vitug is of the view that the Bill of
Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained in force and effect mainly because the revolutionary
government was bound to respect the Universal Declaration.

Interestingly, the case has necessitated a debate on jurisprudential thought.

Apparently, the majority adheres to the legal positivist theory championed by nineteenth century
philosopher John Austin, who defined the essence of law as a distinct branch of morality or
justice.1 He and the English positivists believed that the essence of law is the simple idea of an order
backed by threats.2

On the other side is Justice Puno’s espousal of the natural law doctrine, which, despite its numerous
forms and varied disguises, is still relevant in modern times as an important tool in political and legal
thinking. Essentially, it has afforded a potent justification of the existing legal order and the social and
economic system it embodies, for by regarding positive law as based on a higher law ordained by
divine or natural reason, the actual legal system thus acquires stability or even sanctity it would not
otherwise possess.3

While the two philosophies are poles apart in content, yet they are somehow cognate.4 To illustrate,
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution has its origins from natural law. Likewise a natural law document
is the Universal Declaration.5

A professor of Jurisprudence notes the inexorable trend to codify fundamental rights:

The emphasis on individual liberty and freedom has been a distinctive feature of western political and
legal philosophy since the seventeenth century, associated particularly with the doctrine of natural
rights. In the twentieth century this doctrine has resulted in the widespread acceptance of the
existence of fundamental rights built into the constitutional framework as a bill of rights, as well as
receiving recognition internationally by means of Covenants of Human Rights agreed upon between
states.

As such bill of rights—whether proffered as a statement of the inalienable and immutable rights of
man vested in him by natural law, or as no more than a set of social and economic rights which the
prevailing consensus and the climate of the times acknowledge to be necessary and fundamental in a
just society—will inevitably take the form of a catalogue of those rights, which experience has taught
modern western society to be crucial for the adequate protection of the individual and the integrity of
his personality. We may therefore expect, in one form or another, the inclusion of a variety of
freedoms, such as freedom of association, of religion, of free speech and of a free press.6

In the case at bar, in the ultimate analysis both jurisprudential doctrines have found application in the
denouement of the case. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the Universal Declaration and the
International Covenant, great documents of liberty and human rights all, are founded on natural law.

Going back to the specific question as to the juridical basis for the nullification of the questioned
confiscation, I respectfully maintain that it is no less than the Freedom Constitution since it
made the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution operable from the incipiency of the Aquino
government.

In the well-publicised so-called "OIC cases,"7 this Court issued an en banc resolution8 dismissing the
petitions and upholding the validity of the removal of the petitioners who were all elected and whose
terms of office under the 1973 Constitution were to expire on June 30, 1986, on the basis of Article III,
Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986.

This Court perforce extended retroactive effect to the above-quoted provision as the petitions except
one9 were filed before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution on March 25, 1986. That being the
case, with greater reason should the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution be accorded retroactive
application pursuant to the Freedom Constitution.

But the more precise statement is that it was the unmistakable thrust of the Freedom
Constitution to bestow uninterrupted operability to the Bill of Rights in the 1973
Constitution. For one thing, the title10 itself of Proclamation No. 3 which ordained the Freedom
Constitution, as well as one of the vital premises or whereas clauses11 thereof, adverts to the
"protection of the basic rights" of the people. For another, the Freedom Constitution in Article 1,
Section 1 mandates that the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Freedom Constitution specified
therein "remain in force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional
Constitution."

Of course, even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution had no retroactive effect or it did not
extend the effectivity of the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution, still there would be no void in the
municipal or domestic law at the time as far as the observance of fundamental rights is concerned.
The Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in force, independently of the Freedom
Constitution, or at least the provisions thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure12 and
excluding evidence in violation of the proscription.13

Markedly departing from the typical, the revolutionary government installed by President Aquino was
a benign government. It had chosen to observe prevailing constitutional restraints. An eloquent proof
was the fact that through the defunct Philippine Constabulary, it applied for a search warrant and
conducted the questioned search and seizure only after obtaining the warrant. Furthermore,
President Aquino definitely pledged in her oath of office to uphold and defend the Constitution, which
undoubtedly was the 1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights thereof.

True, the Aquino government reorganized the government, including the judiciary and the local
officialdom. It did so to protect and stabilize the revolutionary government and not for the purpose of
trampling upon the fundamental rights of the people.

While arguably the due process clause was not observed in the case of the sequestration orders
issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the fact remains that by and large, the
Aquino Government elected and managed to uphold and honor the Bill of Rights.

In light of the foregoing, I concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945

ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on
the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent
Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime
of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to
an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to
three years, nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became
final on September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the
sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by
Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the
majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of
said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944,
which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No.
L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called
Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines
during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the
judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court
held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the
same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by
Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals,
and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called
Republic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the
belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court,
like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid
and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the
Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its
decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in
accordance with the authorities therein cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged
with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified
by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied
territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than
private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed
against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against
national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the
Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of the judicial proceedings
held, during the Japanese occupation, in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which herein
petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, in which,
on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from four moths and twenty-one days
of arresto mayor to three years, and nine months and three days of prison correccional; and the effect
on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 24 1944. The
decision of this questions requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with
the municipal law of this country.

Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is part of the
Fundamental law of the land (Article II, sec. 3). As International Law is an integral part of our law, it
must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever question of right depending upon it
are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146; 22 Sup. Ct., 552; 46 Law.
ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the
proof of their existence is to be found in the consent of the nations to abide by them; and this consent
is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nation, as found in the writings of publicist and in
the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U. S., 677;
20 Sup. Ct., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320.).

But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law, great international
treaties are a latter source of increasing importance, such as The Hogue Conventions of 1899 and
1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declare that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.

The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to
assert itself.

ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country. (32 Stat., II, 1821.).

The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving adherence
to them, among which is the United States of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental
authority, but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be
exercised upon principles of International Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall., 387;
Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. United States 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57
Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on International Law, sec. 167).

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far as they do
not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory
continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation, and is not usual for the invader to take
the whole administration into his own hands, because it is easier to preserve order through the
agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws
of the territory; and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and
administrative officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the
military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U.S.
39; 24 Law. ed 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. United
States, 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578;
Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475,
476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3d ed., pp.
330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake, International Law, Part II, 2d
ed., pp. 121-123).

In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman, accused of the
murder of a Catalan in that province, was tried and convicted by the assize Court of the Department
of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal to the French Court of Cassation, the conviction
was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the territory within which the crime had been
committed had exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French
troops and its government by the French authorities had not communicated to its inhabitants the
character of French citizens, nor to their territory the character of French territory, and that such
character could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through."
(Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the Philippine
Executive Commission, or the so-called Philippine Republic, afterwards, during Japanese occupation,
respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting our courts to function and administer said
laws, as proclaim in the City of Manila, by the commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces,
on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military occupation
governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of
justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding
conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid,
even after said government established by the military occupant had been displaced by the legitimate
government of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely
setting the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not only tending to defeat the legal
rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion, had
been declared valid and binding (Cook vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164;
Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509;24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176;
Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall.,
700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in
November, 1861, for the purchase money slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and
enforceable in 1871 (French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the America were
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War,
because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate States
were a de facto government, in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government
obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such act of
obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.] 9; 19 Law ed., 361).

In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Supreme Court of the
United States held-- "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same general
law for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the
States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the
States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of the
citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding."
(Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall.,
459; Texas vs. White 7 Wall., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under
the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government de facto, called also by publicists a government de
facto, but which might, perhaps, he more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that
while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for
those acts though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this
sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority,
supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission or under
the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should, therefor, be
considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts
has been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, and are should be considered
as legal and valid enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as a
long a said judicial proceedings had been conducted, in accordance with the law of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the prosecution of
the petitioner in this case, for the crime of frustrated murder, which was reduced to illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries, under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, in force
in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and that the
accused should be immediately released from the custody, under the provisions of the proclamation
issued by General Douglas McArthur dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation nullifies all the
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by the General
Douglas McArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce
judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of
which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will always adopt the former (United
States vs. Coombs [1838]], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Grenada
County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guariña [1913],
24 Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47
Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the
scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy
(Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible
construction as not to lead it injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore,
be presumed that the legislature intended exception to its language, which would avoid results of this
character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (United States vs. Kirby, 7
Wall [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States, 143 U.S., 461; 12 Sup.
Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U.S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law.
ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute,
which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves its constitutionality,
includes the duty of a avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional
questions, if it can be avoided (United States vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct.
527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the
judicial proceedings conducted before the court of the justice, established here during Japanese
military occupation, merely applying the provisions of the municipal law of the territory, as the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case which have no political or military
significance, are and should be considered legal, valid and binding. It is to be presumed that General
Douglas McArthur knows said rules and principles of International Law, as International Law is an
integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur has acted, in
accordance with said principles of International Law, which have been sanction by the Supreme Court
of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during
the Japanese occupation would be highly detrimental to public interests.

For the forgoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas corpus filed in
this case should, therefore, be denied.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Following our opinions in this cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 153, ante),
and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 334, ante), G.R. No. L-5 and G.R. No. L-49 respectively, the
proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial processes declared null and void in the
proclamation issued by General McArthur on October 23, 1944, and therefore, we vote the granting of
the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Upon the grounds stated my main dissenting opinion, in G.R. No. L-5 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon (p. 199, ante), and in my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49, Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (p. 355, ante), I dissent from the opinion of the majority herein. The writ of habeas
corpus sought by petitioner should be granted because the nullity of the judgment and proceedings
under which he has been imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. As stated in the majority opinion,
the sentence against him became final on September 122, 1944, and had been pronounced by the
Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a judgment of conviction
by the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

Placido C. Ramos for petitioners.

Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General
Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court
Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the
defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the
conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-
named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari,
with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered
certified to this court for review.

The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the
offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have
raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.

An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine
Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will presently be made. This outline is based on
allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the parties'
memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral argument and admitted without
objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials who had them in custody in
their official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no doubt they are.

It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial
Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the
Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese
forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the
enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat team
of Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian joined
Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of 1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano
Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its members some time in 1943..

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Army,
also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military District, one of the districts into
which the Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About November, 1942, Colonel Peralta
succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters of General MacArthur in Australia as the result of
which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by the Headquarters of the
Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command.

Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had extended
its sphere of operation to comprise Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January 2, 1943, named
Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding Officer of the 3rd
Battalion, 66 Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition, 2d Lieut. Prudente M.
Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and signed by Enrique L.
Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo Area. Major, later Lieut. Col.,
Jurado, it should be noted, had been dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to assume
operational control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make and direct the necessary report to
the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40 of the
6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant (Brevet),
effective April 15, 1944, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines, and was re-assigned
to the Bolo Area. As to Andres Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d
lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th Military District, as per
Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944.

According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 1943, and
signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador Adeva were
appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was promoted to the rank of
captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82, issued in the field, 6th Military
District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath before Captain
Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 61st
Division, 6th Military District.

As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding
Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of Military character.
Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned Major Ruffy as
Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M.
Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders
No. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date
25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut.
Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company.

A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major
Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P.
Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the
petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th
Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now
being contested.

On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military order the pertinent paragraph of
which stated: ". . . as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby call
and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army, for the period of the existing
emergency, and place under the command of the general officer, United States Army, to be
designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the
Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Roosevelt's order General
Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in the
Far East.

It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation
of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the
existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance
during such belligerent occupation."

The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents
and the subsequent paragraph which has been omitted furnish a complete answer to petitioner's
contention of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not
cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure,' only in a measure, they were not subject to the
military jurisdiction, if they were not active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of
absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of the
command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial
therefor; but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense
of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military
jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held by the enemy, to the
discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not exempt from liability for such
offenses as criminal acts or injuriuos conduct committed during his captivity against other officers or
soldiers in the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, pp. 91, 92.)

The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of
the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in
arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should
readily manifest itself. Under the petitioner's theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied
territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the
very life-blood of an army, the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the
organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.

The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioner's who
were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more than does the rule of war or
international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not, legally or
otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from organizing a new
army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who had refused to surrender or
who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other diverse means and methods.
The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just marked the beginning of the gigantic preparation for the
gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of General
MacArthur's classic promise, "I shall return." The heroic role which the guerrillas played in that
preparation and in the subsequent liberation of the Philippines is now history.

Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary,
Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were subject
to military jurisdiction.

The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the
Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty;
all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to
obey the same;

(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;

(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines
in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these
articles;

(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.

It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph
(a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." By
their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the
6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War.
The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contigent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been
pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States
Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its
officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th
Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed
commanders of the United States Army.

The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of
guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders refused to look
upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas who had been
inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component parts thereof, bound to obey
military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the army of the country for which
they fought.

The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject
to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the
court martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made by the
Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it violates
Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that "the
National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."

We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts
martial and the sources of the authority for their creation.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of
courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d
Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the
United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the
government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the
President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the
power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and
now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection
between it and the 3d Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other."

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power,
provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding
the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of
equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight
of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and
government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d
Edition.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs.
It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

We agree with the rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered in
abeyance during enemy military occupation, although we maintain that the rule must be restricted to
laws which are exclusively political in nature. We agree with the theory that the rule is not intended for
and does not bind the enemies in arms, but we do not agree with the theory that the rule is intended
for the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory without exception. We are of opinion that the rule
does not apply to civil government of the occupied territory. Enemy occupation does not relieve them
from their sworn official duties. Government officers wield powers and enjoy privileges denied to
private citizens. The wielding of powers and enjoyment of privileges impose corresponding
responsibilities, and even dangers that must be faced during emergency.
The petitioners assailed the constitutionally of the 93rd Article of War, providing that "any person
subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life,
as the court-martial may direct," because no review is provided by said law to be made by the
Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death, such
omission being a violation of section 2 (4) , Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines.

Petitioners are mistaken. The silence of the law as to the power of the Supreme Court to review the
decisions and proceedings of courts-martial, especially when the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment, should not be understood as negating such power, much more when it is recognized
and guaranteed by specific provisions of the fundamental law. At any rate, any doubt in interpreting
the silence of the law must be resolved in favor of a construction that will make the law constitutional.

Furthermore, it may not be amiss to recall the fact that the National Assembly, in approving the
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), had never intended to deny or diminish the power of
the Supreme Court to review, revise, reverse or modify final judgments and decrees of courts martial
created and organized under the Articles of War. On the contrary, it was clearly understood that the
decrees and the decisions of said courts-martial are subject to review by the Supreme Court. The last
Committee report on the Articles of War was rendered to the National Assembly by its Committee on
Third Reading, commonly known as the "Little Senate," which submitted the bill printed in final form.
As chairman of the committee and in behalf of the same, we submitted the report recommending the
approval of the bill on third reading with the express statement and understanding that it would not
deprive the Supreme Court of its constitutional revisionary power on final judgments and decrees of
courts-martial proposed to be created, which were and are to be considered as part of the judicial
system, being included in the denomination of inferior courts mentioned in section 1, Article VIII, of
the constitution. With the said statement and understanding, the National Assembly, without any
dissenting vote, approved the Articles of War as recommended by the Committee on third Reading.

Consequently, petitioners' contention is untenable, the premise upon which they assailed the
constitutionality of the 93rd Article of War being groundless in view of the actuation of the national
Assembly.

The majority appear to concur in petitioners' premise that, by the silence of the Articles of War, the
Supreme Court is deprived of its constitutional power to review final decisions of courts-martial. The
majority even go as far as to justify the constitutionality of such deprivation on the theory that courts
martial belong, not to the judicial branch of the government, but to the executive department, citing as
authority therefor Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents. The majority are in error.
In our opinion in Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) and in Homma vs. Styer (L-244), we
have shown that this Supreme Court enjoys the power to revise the actuations and decisions of
military commissions, especially if they act without jurisdiction or violate the law, military commissions
being included within the denomination of inferior courts under the provisions of our Constitution.
Courts-martial are, likely military commissions, inferior courts. The fact that they are military tribunals
does not change their essence as veritable tribunals or courts of justice, as agencies of the
government in the administration of justice. Their functions are essentially judicial. Except in cases
where judicial functions are specifically entrusted by the Constitution to other agencies — such as
impeachment to Congress, legislative electoral contests to the Electoral Tribunals — all judicial
functions are vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
Courts-martial are inferior courts established by law.

The majority's theory is based on an authority which has no bearing or application under the
Constitution of the Philippines. Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents has in mind the Constitution of
the United States of America, the provisions of which regarding the judicial department are essentially
different from those contained in our own Constitution.

Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America is as follows:

SECTION 1. The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of
the Supreme Court and Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at
stated times, received for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.

SEC. 2. The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; — to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; — to all cases of
admirality and maritime jurisdiction; — to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; —
to controversies between two or more States; — between a States and citizens of another State; —
between citizens of another State; — between citizens of different States, — between citizens of the
same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be jury; and such trial shall be held in
the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State,
the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

SEC. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attached.

A comparison of the above provision with that of the Constitution of the Philippines will readily show
that the former does not have the negative provision contained in the latter to the effect that our
Supreme Court may not be deprived of certain specific judicial functions.

Section 2 of Articles VIII of our Constitution is as follows:

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify of affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in —

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order
or regulations is in question.

(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial courts is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

It is our considered opinion that the theory maintained in Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents and
in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited therein to the effect that the trial and
punishment of military and naval offenses by courts-martial are executive functions because the only
legitimate object of military tribunals "is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of
the Army," as applied in the Philippine, is basically wrong, being rooted in the English monarchial
ideology.
Military tribunals are tribunals whose functions are judicial in character and in nature. No amount of
logodaedaly may change the nature of such functions. The trial and punishment of offenses, whether
civil or military naval or aerial, since time immemorial, have always been considered as judicial
functions. The fact that such trial and punishment are entrusted to "tribunals or courts-martial" shows
the nuclear idea of the nature of the function. Tribunals and courts are the agencies employed by
government to administer justice.

The very fact that in this case the Supreme Court has given due course to the petition, required
respondents to answer, set the case for hearing and, in fact, heard it, instead of ordering the outright
dismissal of the petition as soon as it was filed, thus following the same procedure in
Reyes vs. Crisologo, (L-54, 41 Off. Gaz., 1096) and in Yamashita vs. Styer (supra), is a conclusive
evidence of the fact of that this Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and power to review the
proceedings and decision of military tribunals, such as courts-martials, military commissions, and
other similar bodies exercising judicial functions limited to military personnel.

It appearing that petitioners impugning the jurisdiction of the court-martial which has tried and
convicted them, we are of opinion that the petition must be granted in the sense that the records of
the court-martial in question should, be elevated to the Supreme Court for revision, so that we may
decide the question on the court-martial's jurisdiction and give petitioners the justice they are claiming
for.
G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority . . .," is still in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered
that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine
Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the
guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La
Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records
which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the
slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.

To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in
charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their
undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.

After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it,
does not surprise us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was
committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of
mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have,
perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and
robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its
committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference
to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution
authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and
corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor,
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila
by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged
that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio
Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the
defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal
Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George
R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection
of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by
Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much
more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This
provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when
under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or
insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers
of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude,"
but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256
is the law of the land to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until
otherwise determined by proper authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little
importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and are
usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative
body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this
court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed.
Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes
punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority."
The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in
the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that
this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the
United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would
appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor,
until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise
determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the
information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one
day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both
instances.

The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and
eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to
the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule
announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the
accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to
that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of
the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the
constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no
longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the
Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-
examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and
ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a
trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been
elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view
of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case
and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there
was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new
point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto
case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as
was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question
before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A
majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of
repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult,
and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256
of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be
acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article
156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated
completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is
inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the
two main points just mentioned.

1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The
Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this
legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or
natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule."
Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in
conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that
the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of
Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly
affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1.
Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on
the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel
Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that
those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of
writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p.
842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance
article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may
have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine
Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel,
as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable
when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be
recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art.
267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel
charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the
range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal
Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person
who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of
statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression
in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication.
(1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No.
277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically
pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force
because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by
the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II
punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes
against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes
of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers,
crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and worship.
Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition,
assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats
against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public
officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the
offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or
threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article condemning
challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads
as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of
the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by
reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be
not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or
insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the
Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such
subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of
ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of
whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a
municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States
and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating
the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter
[1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542;
Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme
Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and
regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government
are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the
latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to
that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the
King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives;
and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every
nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its
own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845],
3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military

Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of
crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of
things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first
effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation
of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily
it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To
paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910],
217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a
careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded
with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of
our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has
been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic
institutions and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18;
U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty
was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the
Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe,
the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not
for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to
conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same
time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of
our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by
us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to
the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules
of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they
are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates
the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.

The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in
the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the
government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for
the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and
prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal
protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of
Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was
in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on
the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in
authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal
rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence
as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely
enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and
character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do what
he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually
sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are
derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be
actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or
of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of England,
unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors
Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete,
while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the
American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the
Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval,
that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a
person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous
words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges,
seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a
senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151
Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which
inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a
democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by implication as
soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature
of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against
executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment
for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles.
Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is
an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and
obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American
system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and
obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official
position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris.
Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different
reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio. So ordered.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused,
for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256
of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by
deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside of
his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult
committed against an authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either
under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.

I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of
the Crown," whom we do not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or
printing, committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, which
portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias
B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice
Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to
whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla
Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a)
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal
heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of
Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all
the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired
by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal
properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which
is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his
two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence,

finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by
the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa
R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her
mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2)
of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of
Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996
in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the
total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New
Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties,
within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a
project of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as
the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration
the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the
proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1)
Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project
of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that
the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for
convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot
shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot
shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under
item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot
No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made in
accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project
of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and
the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the
Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves
the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were
adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the
respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such
other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of
giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh.
U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with
an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property
of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz,
Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of
partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five
lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F,
F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of
around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At
the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia
Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles
of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6,
1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was
one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated
Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he
was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador
Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in
fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent
Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on
October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case
to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27,
1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the
first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should
be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third
and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant
herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that
some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed,
having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no
longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of
Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on
August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla
and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed
with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two
Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals
upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the
New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is
the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519
[1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E,
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because
none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question
was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11,
1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision,
had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31,
1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or
more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife
who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and
his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and
of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of
partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the
subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from
Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963.
Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change
or affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one
year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the
project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph
5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal
the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of
the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of
respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses
and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to
show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife.
(See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio
Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr.
Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him
when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the
Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394,
rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project
of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the
Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh.
A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral
Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of
title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered
and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola
on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition
dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963,
several days after the preparation of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot
1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of
Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was
the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the
whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh.
A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than
that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A
and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-
examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn
p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of
the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated
to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct
and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real
properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind,
the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the
record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father
(pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly
observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his
court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at
the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and
responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only
must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he
cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to
suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in
litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the
litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct
of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and
the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts
of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge
or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature
of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers
and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that
political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the
law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more
of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took
effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they
are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives
of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen.,
July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do
not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are
not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if
the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by
Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the
case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed.
242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants
with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and
new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The
same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law
which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created
power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction
in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited
by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business
of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his
judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes
part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers
against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official
duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary
that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the
official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit
this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;
Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage
in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation
benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there
was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to
recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No.
4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having
disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting
members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of
1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law,
municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after
office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is,
as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties,
cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the
finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of
partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however,
may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any
public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is,
engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the
Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court,
which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of
Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds
and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ...
violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the
interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in
rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six
months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against
civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to
the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not
the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section
89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme
Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges
because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds
for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service
who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive
service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal,
separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the
administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not
covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of
Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to
the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service"
(Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of
the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments
previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss.
It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would
normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and
it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against
it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up
to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31,
1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the
corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized
that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent
Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm
after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty
of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of
the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of
action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear
in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all
the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for
disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa
Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his
name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural
for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at
baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence
his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing
proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that
the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used
his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador
Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in
itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did
not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote with Justice Aquino.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.

Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.

Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated
March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and
its modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid
decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified
to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in
the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven
officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden
by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City
along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo
were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later
transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of
the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular
driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-
spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting
from the aforestated accident.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:

. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to
the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the
parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco
Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)

Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.

Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-
delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Petitioners allege:

1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the
New Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of
petitioners-spouses individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of
intensity of the same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation
Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to
the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to
exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.

3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had been
sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23, 1979.

4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower court upon
which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and
not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration,
contends thus:

1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent National
Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The
focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the question as to whether
or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle.
It thus becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be
resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In
this regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically contain
such finding.

2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated
December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the
respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit admission of
said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because
while petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions
of law before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts.

3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident
involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and
for this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the
shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent National
Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an
agency of the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver
of the vehicle, not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence,
the liability for the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver
Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act.

6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation
Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the matter
of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular
driver of the vehicle.

The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176
and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable
as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts
done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual
governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform
non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held
liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and
Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary

functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:

Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the
National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of
Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.

Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-

Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:

(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be
necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period not
less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and

(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of
the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes
liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In
this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it
becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in
determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency
performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which,
under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it
has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo
was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion
of the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]

The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes
force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact,
the impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation
report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the
city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters
away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high
speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as
above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early
as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their
normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling
at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution
and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation,
such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking
whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.

Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection
and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies
the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion
vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).

Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be
using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio- Herrera (Chairperson,), J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993

CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the Civil Service Commission.

Domingo A. Santiago, Jr. for Philippine National Bank.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing Resolution No.
92-201 of the respondent Civil Service Commission, which upheld the petitioner's separation from the
Philippine National Bank(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department pursuant
to a reorganization under Executive Order No. 80, dated 3 December 1986.

Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank on 20
September 1972 as special assistant with the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the
office of the PNB President. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 Senior Vice
President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department.

Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave of absence
(due to medical reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80
(Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized
the restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the
Fund Transfer Department was abolished and its functions transferred to the International
Department.

Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service in a letter dated 30 January
1987, thus:

Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986 Revised Charter of the Bank, please be informed
that Management has approved your separation from the service effective February 16, 1986. You
shall be entitled to the regular benefits allowed under existing law. (emphasis supplied)
Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the Bank's 1986 Revised Charter, any officer or
employee who feels aggrieved by any matter treated above may submit his case to the Civil Service
Commission.1

This letter was received by petitioner's secretary at the PNB head office on 16 February 1987.

Petitioner's first recorded appeal to the Civil Service Commission questioning her separation is a
letter dated 4 August 1989. Then CSC Chairman Samilo N. Barlongay upheld the validity of her
separation from the service in a letter/opinion dated 30 August 1989 (this was allegedly received by
petitioner only on 26 February 1990) stating thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It may be mentioned in this connection, that inasmuch as you did not avail of the
ERIP/Supplementary Retirement Plans adopted by the PNB in 1986, you have therefore lost your
right thereto. Moreover, since you lack the required number of years of service to entitle you to
retirement benefits under existing laws, you may be entitled to the return of your GSIS personal
contributions. Considering further that you have exhausted all your accumulated leave credits as you
went on leave of absence for the period from April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987, there is no legal or
valid basis to entitle you to payment of terminal leave.

Finally, pursuant to Section 16, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, you may be entitled to payment of separation subject to auditing rules and regulations.2

In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning
Chairman Barlongay's ruling, petitioner claimed:

1. The opinion/ruling was not fully supported by the evidence on record;

2. Errors of law prejudicial to the interest of the movant have been committed. She argued:

. . . that her separation from the service was illegal and was done in bad faith considering that her
termination on February 16, 1986 was made effective prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80
on December 3, 1986, which law authorized the reorganization of the PNB, and even before February
25, 1986, when President Corazon C. Aquino came into power. She further claims that although the
notice of termination was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon her on February 16, 1987
when the new Constitution which guarantees security of tenure to public employees was already in
effect.3

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the bad faith in her separation from the service in 1987 was evident from the recent restoration of
the Fund Transfer Department as a separate and distinct unit from the International Department . . . 4

Denying the motion for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission in its aforecited Resolution No.
92-201, dated 30 January, 1992, ruled:

Sec. 33 of EO 80 (1986 Revised Charter of the PNB) provides:

Sec. 33. Authority to Reorganize. — In view of reduced operations contemplated under this charter in
pursuance of the national policy expressed in the "Whereas" clause hereof, a reorganization of the
Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to achieve greater efficiency and economy in
operations, including the adoption of a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced operations envisioned.
The program of reorganization shall begin immediately after the approval of this Order, and shall be
completed within six (6) months and shall be fully implemented within eighteen (18) months
thereafter." Clearly; as aforequoted, PNB was authorized to undergo reorganization and to effect a
reduction in force to "achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations". It cannot, be disputed
that reduction in force necessitates, among others, the abolition of positions/offices. The records
show that prior to its reorganization, PNB originally had 7,537 positions which were reduced to 5,405
after the reorganization. Indeed, 2,132 positions were abolished, that is, the original positions in PNB
were reduced by 28%. This reduction in force likewise included the senior officer positions, in PNB,
which were reduced, thus:

Positions Incumbents Proposed Position

President 1 1 1
Sr. Exec. VP 1 1 0
Exec. VP 3 2 2
Senior VP 12 11 7
Vice Pres. 33 27 15

The position of movant Yap (SVP) was one among the original twelve (12) SVP positions. It was one
among the five (5) SVP positions which were abolished. In fact, the FTD of which she was then the
incumbent SVP, was merged with the International Department to which its functions were closedly
related.

It should be noted that as ruled by the Supreme Court in Dario vs. Mison (G.R. NO. 81954):

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation actually
occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese Wall. . . . .

. . . Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime is judged from the
facts of each case.

In the instant case, therefore, this Commission is inclined to believe that the reorganization of PNB
was done in good faith. For indeed, the reorganization was pursued to achieve economy. It undertook
reduction in force as a means to streamline the numbers of the workforce. It was incidental that
movant Yap's position was one among those abolished. Movant Yap failed to substantiate her claim
by clear and convincing evidence that the abolition of her position was a result of her close
identification with the previous regime, being a sister of former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
This being so, and pursuant to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions,
the abolition of movant Yap's position should be upheld. PNB, in the instant case, has clearly proved
by substantial evidence that its act in terminating the services of some of its employees was done in
good faith. 5

Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her separation was illegal because it took effect on 16
February 1986 or even before the promulgation of EO No. 80 on 3 December 1986, the CSC noted
that the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error.
PNB submitted documents (p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting its stand that the separation
actually took effect on 16 February 1987.

On the issue of bad faith as related to the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, the
subject CSC resolution adds:

xxx xxx xxx

It may be mentioned that the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, actually was a
merger of the Fund Transfer Group, the Foreign Remittance Development and Coordinating Unit
based on board Resolution No. 60 of March 12, 1991, or after the lapse of over four (4) years from
the date it was abolished in 1987. Moreover, the restoration of the Fund Transfer Department and
other offices in the PNB was primarily caused by the improved financial capability and present needs
of the Bank. This improved financial condition of the PNB is evident from the 1990 Annual Report it
submitted. It may be further stated that the re-established FTD is headed by a Vice President, a
position much lower in rank than the former department headed by a Senior Vice President.

Furthermore, it should be noted that granting arguendo that movant Yap's termination from the
service was tainted with bad faith, she however, is now barred from assailing the same as she did not
seasonably assert her right thereto. Records show that she was separated from PNB on February 16,
1987 and it was only in 1989 or about 2 years thereafter when she brought this matter to this
Commission. By her inaction in questioning her termination within a period of one year, she is
considered to have acquiesced to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to the
position.6

In the present petition before the Court, the following issues are raised:

1. Existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the Philippine National Bank resulting in the
separation from the service of petitioner.

2. Erroneous application of the Dario v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB's reorganization.

3. Erroneous application of the one (1) year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in
petitioner's case.

Dario v. Mison7 laid down the requirement of good faith in the reorganization of a government bureau
wherein offices are abolished. It says:

. . . Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void
ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed
that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence,
imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is
still removal "not for cause" if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary
action. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case.

In Petitioner's case, the following instances are cited by her as indicia of bad faith:

1. The abolished department was later restored and the number of senior vice presidents was
increased.
2. PNB did not follow the prescribed sequence of separation of employees from the service contained
in Rep. Act No. 6656 which is:

Sec. 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal shall
be followed:

(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;

(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and

(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the same category as
enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid off first,
length of service notwithstanding.

3. Petitioner was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new staffing pattern
as mandated by Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 6656, her qualification and fitness for new positions were never
evaluated or considered in violation of Sec. 27 of P.D. 807 which was incorporated as Sec. 29 Ch. 5
Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

4. Lack of notice and bearing before separation from the service.

5. Petitioner was forced to take a leave of absence and prevented from reporting for work.

6. There is a discrepancy in the date of her separation from the service and the effectivity thereof.

7. PNB employees in the Fund Transfer Department identified with her were reassigned or frozen.

8. She is listed as having resigned instead of being separated or dismissed which was what actually
happened.

9. The dismissal was politically motivated, she being a sister of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, wife
of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to reorganize. The order was issued by
then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the powers vested in the
President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to
be done was the implementation of the reorganization. There is no doubt as to the legal basis for
PNB's reorganization. The real question is: was it done in good faith, tested by the Dario
v. Mison doctrine?
To start with it is almost absurd for petitioner to insist that her termination from the service was
antedated to 16 February 1986. At that time, the reorganization of PNB had not even been conceived.
In most of PNB's pleadings, it has documented and supported its stand that the year of petitioner's
separation is 1987 not 1986. The antedating of the termination date, aside from being clearly a
typographical error, is a periphernal issue. The real issue is existence of bad faith consisting of
tangible bureaucratic/management pressures exerted to ease her out of office. Bad faith has been
defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self
interest or ill will or for an ulterior purpose.8 It is the performance of an act with the knowledge that the
actor is violating the fundamental law or right, even without willful intent to injure or purposive malice
to perpetrate a damnifying harm.9

PNB's reorganization, to repeat, was by virtue of a valid law. At the time of reorganization, due to the
critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or merged.
The abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This, to the Court's
mind, was a management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this point, a
distinction can be made in ruling on the validity of a reorganization between a government bureau or
office performing constituent functions (like the Customs) and a government-owned or controlled
corporation performing ministrant functions (like the PNB).

Constituent function are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but
a private sector, endeavor. It is an optional function of government.

. . . The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital
would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very,
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group
of individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20)

From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is
required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are
exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those
corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life
of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned
or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with
powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation under the Corporation Law. (Bacani vs.
Nacoco, No, L-9657, November 29, 1956, 100 Phil. 468)

But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing constituent functions or in a

government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common
test, the test of good faith. In this connection, the philosophy behind PNB's reorganization is spelled
out in the whereas clauses of Executive Order No. 80:

WHEREAS, within the context of the general policy there nevertheless exists a clear role for direct
government-participation in the banking system, particularly in servicing the requirements of
agriculture, small and medium scale industry, export development, and the government sector.

WHEREAS, in pursuit of this national policy there is need to restructure the government financial
institutions, particularly the Philippine National Bank, to achieve a more efficient and effective use of
available scarce resources, to improve its viability, and to avoid unfair competition with the private
sector, and

WHEREAS, the reorganization and rehabilitation of the Philippine National Bank into a similar but
stronger and more operationally viable bank is an important component of the nationalization
programs for both the financial system and the government corporation sector; . . . .

Whether there was a hidden political agenda to persecute petitioner due to her consanguinial relation
to Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the widow of former President Marcos, is not clearly shown. On
the other hand, it is entirely possible that, precisely because of such consanguinial relation, petitioner
may have been the object of deferential, if not special treatment under the Marcos regime. It is part of
the Filipino culture to extend such deferential, if not special treatment to close relatives of persons in
power. Many times this is carried to unwholesome extremes. But a discontinuance of such deferential
or special treatment in the wake of a change in government or administration is not bad faith per se. It
may be merely putting things in their proper places.

Due to the restructuring — and this is empirically verifiable — PNB became once more a viable
banking institution. The restoration of the FTD four years after it was abolished and its functions
transferred to the International Department, can be attributed to the bank's growth after
reorganizations, thereby negating malice or bad faith in that reorganization. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right.10 It consists of an honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another, its absence should be established
by convincing evidence. 11
The records also clearly indicate that starting April 1986 to February 1987, petitioner went on leave of
absence for medical reasons. While she was not reporting to the office, the bank's reorganization got
underway. She continued, however, receiving her salaries, allowances, emoluments, honoraria and
fees up to March 1987. Employees who were affected by the reorganization had the option to avail of
the bank's Separation Benefits Plan/Early Retirement Plan (SBP/ERIP). Petitioner opted not to avail
of such plan and instead submitted to the result of the bank's ongoing reorganization and
management's discretion. If petitioner had the desire for continued employment with the bank, she
could have asserted it for management's consideration. There is no proof on record that she
affirmatively expressed willingness to be employed. Since she cannot rebut the CSC finding that her
earliest appeal was made on 4 August 1989, there is no reason for this Court to hold that she did not
sleep on her rights. On the contrary, her present argument that bad faith existed at the time of the
abolition of the FTD because it was restored four years later is a little too late. Who could have
predicted in 1986 or 1987 that PNB would be able to rise from its financial crisis and become a viable
commercial bank again? The decision to abolish the FTD at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was
a business judgment made in good faith.

PNB for its part submits that its reorganization was effected in good faith
because —

a) There was not only a perceptible but substantial restructuring of the PNB hierarchy showing
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices and abolition of positions.

b) Two thousand one hundred thirty two (2,132) positions were abolished during the period from
February 16, 1986 to January 14, 1987 leaving a lean workforce of five thousand four hundred five
(5,405) as of latter date per B.R. No. 34 hereto attached as Annex "R".

c) The number of senior officers, including Senior Vice Presidents, was accordingly reduced.

Another issue raised by petitioner is PNB's alleged non-compliance with the mandate of Sections 2
and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656. These Sections provide:

Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving to a
claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party.
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent, appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new position in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions
or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been appointed,
including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification requirements,
among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the
approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.

In the first place, Rep. Act No. 6656 cannot be invoked by petitioner because it took effect on 15 June
1987, or after PNB's reorganization had already been implemented. But assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it is applicable here and petitioner must be accorded preferential right to appointment
in the bank, PNB in its rejoinder impressively asserts:

Needless to say, there were various committees that were created in the implementation of the
organizational restructuring of the Bank based on the foregoing policy guidelines. Each personnel to
be retained was evaluated in terms of relative fitness and merit along with the other personnel of the
Bank. Thus, when then SVP Federico Pascual was chosen to head the International Department from
among other officers of the Bank, including Ms. Yap, his qualifications far exceeded those of the other
candidates for the position.

We attach hereto as Annexes "G-1" and "G-2" the service records of Mr. Federico Pascual and
Petitioner Ms. Yap, respectively, which clearly show that the qualifications of Mr. Pascual far exceed
those of Petitioner Yap. Aside from being a lawyer having been a law graduate from the University of
the Philippines, he is also a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from Ateneo de Manila and a Master of
Laws graduate o Columbia Law School. He had studied Masteral Arts in Public Administration at the
London School of Economics and had undergone extensive seminars since 1974 at the International
Department and had been assigned in several foreign branches of the Bank. Before he resigned from
the Bank, he held the second highest position of Executive Vice President and served as Acting
President of the Bank before the incumbent president, President Gabriel Singson assumed his
position.

On the other hand, the service record of Petitioner Yap will show that she only holds a Bachelor of
Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and has undergone only one seminar on
Management and Leadersbip Training Program. She entered the Bank service in 1972. (Rollo at pp.
312 to 313)

xxx xxx xxx

The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner's immediate reinstatement to her former position as
senior vice president and head of the Fund Transfer Department, or reappointment to a position of
comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights and pay, etc., under the bank's new
staffing pattern.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another may bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner
therein must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. 12

An action for quo warranto should be brought within one (1) year after ouster from office;13 the failure
to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its
dismissal14 since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subjected to continued
uncertainty . . . 15 An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be
attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed employee.16

Measured by the above jurisprudence, petitioner's action may be said to be one for quo warranto,
seeking reinstatement to her former position which at present is occupied by another. She cannot
invoke De Tavera v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., et. al. 17 and contend that there is no claim of
usurpation of office, and that quo warranto may be availed of to assert one's right to an office in the
situation obtaining in the case at bar.

Santos v. CA, et. al. 18 and Magno v. PNNC Corp. 19 are invoked by petitioner to illustrate that this
action is one for separation without just cause, hence, the prescriptive period is allegedly four (4)
years in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code. 20 We do not agree. Petitioner's separation
from the service was due to the abolition of her office in implementation of a valid reorganization. This
is not the unjustifiable cause which results in injury to the rights of a person contemplated by Article
1146. The abolition of the office was not a whimsical, thoughtless move. It was a thoroughly
evaluated action for streamlining functions based on a rehabilitation plan. 21 At the time of the
abolition of the Fund Transfer Department in 1986, foreign exchange losses of the bank amounted to
P81.1 Million. 22 The head of office was a Senior Vice President. At the time of restoration of the
department in 1991, it was headed by a vice president (lower in rank) and showed earnings of
P2,620.0 Million. 23 Other departments abolished in 1986 were also subsequently restored.

Restoring petitioner to her previous position with backwages would be unjust enrichment to her,
considering that she had abandoned or showed lack of interest in reclaiming the same position when
the bank was not yet fully rehabilitated and she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or two
(2) years after her alleged unjustified separation.

To those who feel that their unjustified separation from the service is for a cause beyond their control,
the aforecited Magno case teaches:

. . . while We fully recognize the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws, and social
legislation accord the workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the law on prescription to
relieve him of the consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws
come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping). His explanation that he could not have
filed the complaint earlier because "he was prevented to do so beyond his control for the simple
reason that private respondent have (sic) tried to circumvent the law by merely floating" him is very
flimsy and does not even evoke sympathetic consideration, if at all it is proper and necessary. We
note that petitioner herein is not an unlettered man; he seems to be educated and assertive of his
rights and appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed a motion for extension of time to file
the petition and the petition itself without the assistance of counsel. We cannot believe that if indeed
he had a valid grievance against PNCC he would not have taken immediate positive steps for its
redress.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the
questioned resolution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.