CHAPTER I

Introduction

“We will not stop until the last drug lord…and

the last pusher have surrendered or are put either

behind bars or below the ground, if they so wish…” -

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte(SONA 2016)

These promises were made on the 30th of June

2016 by then 71-year-old Rodrigo Roa Duterte when he

assumed the presidency of the Philippines, an

archipelago of more than 7,000 islands in the

Western pacific. The Philippine National Police

(PNP) issued an Anti-Illegal Drug Campaign called

‘Double Barrel’ the following

day(PNPCommission2016).

Oplan (DCPO) by then Police City Director

Police Senior Supt . Ronald DelaRosa was

intended to speed up drug-problem solution by

visiting houses of the illegal drug

personalities and asking them to stop the

illicitacts.

The system requires that barangay captains

will be at the forefront of combating the

illegal drugs by submitting a list of their

residents who are into drugs. The police

1
intelligence units will verify the list to

validate whether the names in the list are

really into drugs.Then the police officers will

visit the houses of the drugs suspects and

asked them to stop their activities.

Oplan Tokhang,or the Project Double Barrel

was implemented nationwide through the Command

Memorandum Circular 16 or CMC 2016-161. Since

July 1, 2016 a total of 7080 people were killed

of which 2,555 were due to police operations i.

Given this huge number, it seems that the

operation wenth ay wire (Tamayo,2016).

Hence, on January 30, 2017, Oplan Tokhang

was stopped with the aim of improving the anti-

illegal drugs operations.

The violence that has been attributed to the

Filipino War on Drugs is under scrutiny of the

International Criminal Court (ICC). In the beginning

of this year, the ICC opened a preliminary

investigation into allegations of Duterte and other

government officials having committed crimes against

humanity (Villamor2018b).

Duterte made it rather clear that his War on

Drugs would be ‘bloody’. He has repeatedly

2
threatened individuals who are involved in the drug

business and encouraged EJKs in his speeches

(Thompson 2016a). At one occasion, he for instance

threatened that“[a]ll of you who are into drugs,you

sons of bitches,I will really kill

you”(Iyengar2016).At another time, likening his drug

war to the Jewish genocide in Hitler-Germany,

president Duterte said, “I’d be happy to slaughter

them,” referring to drug addicts in the Philippines

(Villamor 2016). These statements stand in stark

contrast to Duterte’s promise to adhere to due

process and the rule of law that he made in his in

auguration speech. Duterte’s provocative the to

ricand violent promises resonated with many

Filipinos (Thompson 2016)that have been frustrated

with the failure of previous administrations to

counteract crime (Casiple 2016). Satisfaction with

the drug war has remained strong despite the

violence, but many have also come to fear that they,

or someone close to them, might die in a drug

operation (Boehringer 2017).

The campaign against illicit drugs is based on

a watch list that comprises the names of individuals

involved in drugs. The list has however been claimed

to be “based on hearsay”(Simangan2017:10).Criticism

3
against the methods of the War on Drugs has in the

Philippines almost exclusively come from the human

rights community that has been subject to violent

threats by their president (Human Rights Watch

2017b) and his supporters (Stansfield 2017). While

the public largely has accepted the occurrence of

EJKs, there have been two instances of major public

criticism that went beyond the human rights

community. The first instance followed the

allegations of police-involvement in the kidnapping

and killing of a South Korean businessman

( MallariJr.&Tubeza 2017). Duterte chose to withdraw

the PNP in late January 2017 following this

incident, but shortly after, he decided to bring

them back into the war and the campaign against

illicit drugs was renamed Oplan Double Barrel

Reloaded (Ibid.). In October 2017,Duterte once again

suspended the police from anti-drug operations due

to public outrage over the highly publicised

killings of three minors (Robins- Early 2017). This

marked the 15th month of the drug war which had

resulted in approximately 12,000 deaths

(HumanRightsWatch2018).A few months later,the PNP

was once again ordered back into the drug war which

4
has resulted in new police killings of drug suspects

(Villamor2018a).

Background of the Study

OplanTokhang is simply Operational Plan

"TutokHangyo" rolled out by the PNP after President

Duterte took spearheading the dreaded war on drugs

in the Philippines. This police operation originated

initially from the days when President Duterte was

still the mayor in Davao City and where the current

PNP chief used to command the entire city’s police

force. The word "Tokhang" comes from the combination

of visayan words tuktok (knock) and Hangyo

(pleading/persuade). The name is telling of the

operation in which the police come to the homes of

drug suspects to persuade them to surrender.

The PNP has claimed that the operation has

resulted in the surrender of one million

individuals (Mallari Jr. & Tubeza 2017), but it has

also resulted in numerous killings (Human Rights

Watch 2017a). The poor have been disproportionally

affected by the deadly violence

(AmnestyInternational2017:41)and children have

fallen victim to it as well (Villaroman2017).The

police and president Duterte have continuously

5
claimed that officers have acted in self-defence

(Human Rights Watch 2017a) even though witness

accounts suggest that officers have executed

suspects and planted evidence to justify their

lethal force (Amnesty International 2017; Human

Rights Watch 2017a). The PNP is furthermore believed

to have paid vigilantes for killings (Pazzibugan

2017) and some vigilantes allegedly are corrupt

police officers who want to silence those who know

about their involvement in the drug business

(Boehringer2017:234).

The effects of the operation in Davao City

resulted to either surrender of the suspects or

ultimately they leave the city to continue their

operation somewhere else away from Duterte’s hate of

illegal drugs. Since they have a option to leave and

continue elsewhere outside of Davao City there was

lesser violent resistant from organized groups.

Those who continue with their drug business ends up

dead in police operation while others who were a

little bit smarter got a bloody end from alleged the

"DDS" death squad of the city. (Lindley Y. Moreno,

CAD/BIM Technician)

Police personnels who will implement Tokhang

are called "Tokhangers". They were chosen by each

6
police chief to ensure that scalawags are kept out

of the operations. The "Tokhangers" underwent

orientation and re-training which includes exercises

and role playing to ensure they know what to do on

the ground.

During the conduct of tokhang, each team should

be accompanied by at least one member of the

barangay, municipality or city anti-drug abuse

council (ADACs), one representative from the PNP

human rights affairs office or any human rights

advocate and at least one from the church/religious

sector, members of the media or other prominent

personalities in the area. (THIRD ANNE PERALTA-

MALONZO)

Since his ascendancy to the presidency,

Duterte’s term has been marked by violence and

bloodshed with the intensified war on drugs. The

unrelenting perversion of justice and legal systems

and the complete disregard for the sanctity of human

life have been clothed with populism’s democracy

between good and bad citizens: “only criminals

should fear an iron-clad law and order regime”

(Juego 2016).

Even the human rights practice and discourse

have been distorted and thoroughly mangled. In the

7
war on drugs, human rights have been wrongly

associated with the defense of the criminals, rather

than the prosecution of the weak, the vulnerable,

and the victims against the capacity of the state

for abuse of power (Juego 2016).

They wanted to redefine or label the persons

extra judicially killed as “enemies” or its

equivalent, in order to create a category of

citizens for whom the ordinary laws no longer need

to apply and who may be killed without fear of

consequences or the prospect of effective

investigation. For Duterte, the drug pushers and

drug addicts are not human; hence. they do not have

any rights.

The government’s anti-drug campaign Operation

Tokhang (knock and plead) has killed off more than

14,000 alleged individuals since mid-last year. What

facilitated the identification of targets was when

about 950,000 drug pushers and addicts surrendered

to the local police by December 20, 2016, thinking

that they would be spared.

Police authorities are emboldened by Duterte’s

shoot-to-kill order against drug suspects who resist

arrest. Since then, the wholesale and gruesome

killings have punctuated the urban and suburban

8
areas of the country. The cardboard message on dead

bodies declaring: “I am a drug pusher, do not

emulate me,” is certainly a disturbing symbol on the

brutality of this ongoing battle in the Philippines.

Duterte caused even more alarm after making

controversial statements regarding executing drug

suspects. He initially admitted to killing them

while he was still the mayor of Davao City. “I used

to do it personally. Just to show to the [policemen]

that if I can do it, why can’t you?” (Macas 2016).

Police officers routinely bust down doors in the

middle of the night and then kill in cold blood

unarmed people suspected of using or selling drugs

(AI 2017). Witnesses described alleged drug

offenders yelling they would surrender, at times

while on their knees or in another compliant

position. They were still gunned down. To cover

their tracks, police officers appear often to plant

“evidence” and falsify incident reports (AI 2017).

A religious priest who has the reputation of

tracking the phenomenon of extrajudicial killings

(EJK) in Davao City during the past years to the

killings happening nationwide, uncovered frightening

similarities. The targets, tactics, and modes of

killings of the Davao Death Squad (DDS) of then

9
Mayor Duterte have since been copied all over the

country. The priest even accused Duterte of

transforming the long decadent and corruption-laden

Philippine National Police (PNP) force into his

Presidential Death Squads (PDS). The PNP has been

employing dual dreaded tactics (legitimate police

operations and vigilante killings) in the killings.

Data are slowly asserting that policemen have

resorted to vigilante-type killings apart from the

so-called legitimate police operations to evade

blame.

There have been more than 4100 drug-related

killings by unknown armed persons (AI 2017). By all

indications, the extrajudicial killings are state

inspired and even purportedly state sponsored.

As of the third quarter of 2017, over half of

the adult Filipinos, or about 6 of 10, believe only

the poor are killed in the brutal campaign against

illegal drugs (PDI 2017). A solid majority of 54% of

the citizenry aged 18 years and above agreed with

the statement that “rich drug pushers are not

killed; only the poor ones are killed (PDI 2017). A

recent study by researchers from Ateneo de Manila

University and De La Salle University came up with

the profile of the majority of the victims of the

10
bloody drug war: male, poor and shot dead in an

alleged exchange of fire with police during a drug

bust. The victims were tricycle drivers,

construction workers, vendors, and garbage haulers

(PDI 2018). The study focused on the 5021 drug-

related killings from May 10, 2016 to September 29,

2017 reported by various media organizations

(PDI 2018).

The Philippines abolished capital punishment in

June 2006. Taking the cue from Duterte, his House of

Representatives last March 7, 2017 has finally given

its nod to restore capital punishment in the country

by making offenses related to manufacturing and

trading in illegal drugs punishable by death

(Nicolas and Ilas 2017). The death penalty can be

carried out through lethal injection, firing squad,

and by hanging. The legislators considered death

penalty as a “vital tool” in Duterte’s campaign on

drugs.

The pernicious effect of the war on drugs on

the Filipino psyche is immediately felt. The

exponential increase of casualties together with the

culture of impunity has created a temporary

collective trauma. The sight of bodies on the street

11
has become commonplace; the fear of being or knowing

the next victim, pervasive (AI 2017).

For the families of the victims, hopelessness

is very evident.

Even those families whose members were killed

by a stray bullet or a victim of mistaken identity

were reduced to paralysis. Those who are suspected

of being drug pushers and addicts are forced by

their parents to go back to the provinces to evade

Oplan Tokhang. Fear has enveloped the nation.

Bayanihan is a Filipino tradition of people

going out of their way to help those in need

(Ealdama 2012). This community spirit of a typical

Filipino community has been one of the hallmarks of

the Filipino culture. It is almost instinctive for

every Filipino to extend sympathy, share his meager

resources in times when his neighbors or relatives

are in need, and accompany them during their period

of grief when a member of the family or a relative

dies. History has shown us that this social cohesion

at the community level facilitates and nurtures

helping processes for the affected individuals and

families.

12
 This laudable imprint on the Filipino culture

is slowly being undermined. Immediate families of

the EJK victims have experienced personally loading

the corpses of their loved ones into a vehicle that

would bring the dead bodies to funeral homes since

nobody in the community would help them. Wakes for

the dead are shortened with only a sprinkling of

community friends paying their respect and spending

time with the aggrieved family. The funeral is also

joined by only courageous individuals. The reason is

that no one wanted to be associated with the victim

lest they be suspected also of being a drug pusher

or addict.The actual killings left deep scars and

traumas on the families left behind.

The families of the victims exhibited the

following symptoms: (a) re-experiencing the incident

through bad dreams or flashbacks; (b) feelings of

strong guilt or depression; (c) staying away from

objects of places that are associated with the past

experience; (d) having difficulty of sleeping; (e)

angry outburst; and (f) feeling tensed

(NASWEI 2017). Such mental and psychological effects

are being aggravated by cases, wherein the victim

was the bread winner of the family. They now face

economic dislocation (NASWEI 2017).

13
 The violent campaign against drugs has had a

devastating impact on children, who have been killed

and otherwise harmed during operations (AI 2017).

Between 1st of July and early December 2016, there

were between 25 and 27 deaths of children as a

result of drug-related operations. Of these, two

were actual targets; the rest were killed “by

mistake” (AI 2017). On a much wider scale, many

children are experiencing severe trauma as a result

of losing a parent or sibling and often even

witnessing the killing; they also face deeper

poverty after a breadwinner’s death (AI 2017).

In addition to death, children are at times

subjected to other forms of violations. Several

local human rights activists said that children

arrested for drug-related offenses are often held in

adult detention facilities, in violation of the UN

Convention on the Rights of the Child to which the

Philippines is a state party (AI 2017).

Proposed changes to the Philippine Penal Code,

including the lowering of the age of criminal

responsibility, threaten to worsen the situation

(AI 2017). Even before the war on drugs took off the

ground, allies of Duterte in the House of

Representatives (lower legislative house) introduced

14
a bill that could allow children as young as nine to

be targeted in the crackdown (Baldwin and

Marshall 2017). The House Bill No. 922 proposed to

lower the minimum age of criminal responsibility

from 15 to 9 years old to prevent what it calls “the

pampering of youthful offenders who commit knowing

they can get away with it.” Duterte said in a speech

in Manila on December 12, 2017: “We produce a

generation of criminals. Young children were

becoming drug runners,

thieves, and rapists and must be taught to

understand responsibility” (Baldwin and

Marshall 2017).

Impunity means the impossibility of bringing

the perpetrators of violations to account, whether

in criminal, civil, administrative, or disciplinary

proceedings, since they are not subject to any

inquiry that might lead to their being accused,

arrested, and tried and if found guilty, sentenced

to appropriate penalties and to making reparations

to their victims (de Mesa 2011). Impunity arises

from a general failure by the states to meet their

obligations to investigate violations; to take

appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators,

particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring

15
that those suspected of criminal responsibility are

prosecuted, tried, and duly punished and to take

other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of

violations (de Mesa 2011).

This culture of impunity has been buttressed by

the recent official pronouncements that Duterte has

never sanctioned extrajudicial killings.

The culture of fear has also affected some

members of the human rights community. The fear has

also initially blunted the long-established

initiatives and softened the courage of some school

based, human rights non-government organizations and

institutions, and religious congregations and

institutions that have been in the forefront of

human rights work after the downfall of the Marcos

dictatorship in 1986.

Thus, this paper aimed to evaluate the

effectiveness of the Oplan Tokhang or Project Double

Barrel in Sta.Cruz,Zambales and the experiences of

individuals subjected to Oplan Tokhang since its

first implementation to determine effectiveness in

reducing the illegal drugs as well as determine

optimization of resources.

16
 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND RELATED STUDIES

Related Literature

Foreign

Scholarly works on the War on Drugs have been

prevalent in the fields of sociology, anthropology,

public health, human rights, economy, and political

science. It has also been of scholarly interest

among criminologists, humanitarians, historians, and

legal scholars. The literature on the drug war

phenomenon has largely focused on its in

effectiveness, its detrimental consequences for the

societies in which it wages, and its

disproportionate effects on marginalized groups. The

literature is dominated by studies on the War on

Drugs in Mexico(seee.g.Campos2010;GalenCarpenter

2015; Shirk 2011) and the United States (see e.g.

Bertram et. al. 1996; Lassiter 2015;Patten2016).This

comes not as a surprise considering that they were

“among the first countries to raise the flags of the

war on drugs” (Polomarkakis2017:397).

Inequality is a central theme within the

literature. Scholars have for instance highlighted

that the War on Drugs disproportionally targets and

affects already disadvantaged and marginalised

17
communities and individuals such as the poor (Abadie

et al. 2018), racial minorities (Lassiter 2015) –

especially members of racial minorities who are poor

(Bertram et. al. 1996; Lassiter 2015; Mohamed &

Fritsvold 2011; Rudovsky 1994) – and young people

(Simatupang 2016; Stuart 2011). Other scholars have

argued that the War on Drugs foremost targets those

who are at the bottom of the drug business

(Abadieetal.2018;Fleetwood&Torres 2011).

Research shows that the rise In drug-related

Incarcerations and over crowded prisons (Gray 2001)

– that falls back on the “tough-on-crime rhetoric”

(Patten 2016:85) the phenomenon is interlinked with

– has affected people differently. In Why our drug

laws have failed and what we can do about it: a

judicial indictment of the War on Drugs, Judge

JamesP.Gray (2001) for instance notes that

celebrities and other wealthy people in the US tend

to get fined and sentenced to probation for the

possession of drugs, while those without the means

are going behind bars for years. The above-mentioned

literature shows that the War on Drugs has, as

Gerber and Jensen (2011:1) rightly have noted, “a

relatively powerless target population” and that it

18
views and treats people differently depending on

their status insociety.

Findings from previous studies show that a

“militaristic rhetoric” (Stuart 2011:3) has been

used to portray drug use as a matter of security

by which war like methods are easily justified

(Mohammad & Fulkerson 2015). The rhetoric draws on

“crime and fear narratives” (Polomarkakis 2017:398)

and it is used to create a “moral panic” (Mohammad &

Fulkerson 2015:237), a “culture of fear” (Prieto

Mora 2018:122)in society. When those in power

repeatedly make claims about the threat of drugs,

those claims become the legitimation of the war

(Gerber & Jensen2011). Previous research shows that

there is often some truth to these claims, but they

overall

distortreality(seee.g.Barrett2011;Carrier&Klantschni

g2012;Gerber& Jensen 2011). Some scholars have

argued that the “drug war rhetoric” (Carrier &

Klantschnig 2012:6) involves a process of othering

(see e.g. Barrett 2011; Gray 2011), for the targets

are portrayed as “enemies” (Prieto Mora 2018:122;

Simatupang 2016:10; Stuart 2011:3), a threat to

society, and the counterpart to “decent people” who

do not engage in drugs (Gray 2001:125). Prieto Mora

19
(2018:122)poignantly states that the Dehumanization

of individuals who use or sell drugs makes it

possible to justify more easily “any act” taken

against them.

Another central theme within research on the

phenomenon is its failure to fulfill its aim to

depress “the production, distribution and

consumption of illicit drugs” (Ibanez & Klasen

2017:1650). Scholars largely agree that the War on

Drugs has failed and has had devastating

consequences (see e.g. Abadie et al. 2018;

Bertramet. al. 1996; Malinowska-Sempruch & Gallagher

2004; Mohammad & Fulkerson 2015; Stuart 2011;

Thompson 2014). Scholars who emphasize the

inefficiency of the War on Drugs argue for the need

for novel drug policies. Abadie et. al. (2018:122)

for instance argue for a shift “from repression to

treatment and rehabilitation.”Mohammad and

Fulkerson(2015:243)argue that any new approach will

need to consider "the underlying economic, social,

and cultural conditions” of the drug problem. In

line with this, Horwitz (2015) writes that it is

important that new policies acknowledge the

20
peculiarities of the drug issue in distinct

countries.

Previous literature also emphasizes the “human

costs of the War on Drugs” (Sandvik & Hoelscher

2017:170) such as grave human rights abuses (see

e.g. Carrier & Klantschnig 2012; Rosen 2015; Sandvik

& Hoelscher 2017; Wolfesberger 2017). The prevalence

of human rights violations has for instance been

linked to the preference among many states to

implement drug war policies though law enforcement

agencies (Mohammad & Fulkerson 2015; Polomarkakis

2017). In his socio-legal study Drug Law Enforcement

Revisited: The “War” Against the War on Drugs,

Polomarkakis (2017) discusses the use of law

enforcement for drug control in the light of the

principle of proportionality. Polomarkakis

(2017:401) concludes that the use of law enforcement

for drug control has far more down sides than

advantages since it “exacerbates and increases harms

to users, worsens public health levels, and

reproduces social exclusion and division, through

patterns of race disadvantage.”The first aspects he

highlights has been voiced by other scholars as

well. Research has for instance found that the War

on Drugs has resulted in the spread of HIV among

21
persons who inject drugs because drug war policies

have been found to pressure drug users into risk-

behaviour (Abadie et al. 2018; Dombrowski, Dorabjee

& Strathdee 2017) and restrict their opportunities

to seek help due to fear of prosecution (Gray2001).

Relevance to the Sociology of Law

The Sociology of Law, a like Sociology, is

interested in the study of society. While the

sociological tradition is interested in society in

it sentirety, the Sociology of Law holds a focus on

society as far as law is concerned (Deflem 2008).

Put differently, the Sociology of Law explores how

the law and society interact. The Sociology of Law

draws heavily on sociological theories (Banakar

2015) and “shares much intellectual common ground

with jurisprudence” (Treviño 2008:7). Research from

this discipline for instance studies how law

influences people’s behaviour (Timasheff 1937).

Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) The common place of law

provides a fine example of the interest within the

discipline to explore how people experience and

understand the law. It is important to note that

sociologists of law differ significantly in their

conception and study of the law (Banakar2015:43).

What they however largely have in common is that

22
their sociological approach to the law enables them

to go beyond an analysis of what the law aims to do,

and instead to explore “the actual workings and

consequences of law” in society (Deflem2008:7).

Martin Krygier (2013:7) has emphasized this view and

highlights the reciprocal impact law and society

have on each other:

… law is in society, so to understand how it does

what it does, and why it doesn’t always do what we

might like it to do, among other things effectively

constrain the exercise of power, we need to

understand the workings of law in society and of

society in law.

These questions are part of what makes up the

essence of research within the Sociology of Law. The

complexity of these questions and the discipline’s

overall openness enables the use of distinct

perspectives and topics. The field’s “theoretical

diversity” (Deflem 2008:117) enables me to study the

rule of law – which mostly has been explored as a

legal or political issue – from a sociological

perspective. This study for instance emphasizes the

view that “law never really rules unless it rules in

the world around it” (Krygier 2011:89). From this

perspective, it would not tell us much about the

23
well-being of the rule of law in the Philippines if

I was to analyze which legal institutions exist in

the country and what the law in the books says. In

line with the essence of the Sociology of Law, this

study instead looks at how law is received in the

Filipino society, among ordinary citizens as well as

the powerful, to explore the ‘well-being’ of the

rule of law.

The Sociology of Law is further more concerned

with the study of power which also is a central

undertaking within the present study. The works of

Eugen Ehrlich, Nicholas Timasheff and Max Weber have

been highly influential within the Sociology of Law.

These prominent scholars have in distinct ways

acknowledged that law can be used for domination and

that power is decisive regarding who can and who

cannot reflect their interests in the law

(Johnson1979).Ehrlich,Timasheff, and Weber further

believed that power is important to consider for

they regarded conformity to the law as based on

coercion or the threat of coercion instead of

consensus (Ibid.). The present study sets out to

explore, as I mentioned earlier (see Chapter 1.2.),

if and in what ways the Duterte administration has

exercised its power arbitrarily in its War on Drugs.

24
The rule of law vs. the rule of men

Professor of Law and Social Theory Martin Krygier

has in several of his works outlined a sociological

perspective to the rule of law (see e.g. 2009; 2012;

2016). The rule of law has been widely studied from

legal and political perspectives, but as Krygier

(2009) notes, sociological approaches to the topic

remain scarce. It is a fact, which Krygier (2009:45)

argues, is rather puzzling, “[f]or if the rule of

law matters legally and politically, it certainly

matters socially.” Philip Selznick (1968:52 in

Krygier 2016:222) had already stressed fifty years

ago that the rule of law should be treated as “a

chief preoccupation of legal sociology.” Krygier’s

(2009) approach goes beyond simply listing legal

institutions and practices that make up the rule of

law, as so many lawyers tend to do. Krygier

(2009:52) stresses the need to consider the local

particularities of a context, for legal institutions

“always need supporting circumstances, social and

political structures and cultural supports, which

are not always available and are difficult to

engineer.” His approach thus argues that there is no

one unitary ‘version’ of the rule of law.

25
 There exists no consensus among scholars on

what the rule of law is but, as Tamanaha (2012:233)

rightly notes, most scholars agree that it “means

that government officials and citizens are bound by

and abide by the law.” The rule of law thus “stands

for the principle that law is above men” (Ingram

1984:359). As Dicey (1924:184 in Grant 2017:383) has

famously stated, the rule of law stands in contrast

to "the exercise by persons in authority of wide,

arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint."

This is a common view within the literature on the

rule of law. The rule of law can be understood as a

protection against people becoming “subject to the

unpredictable vagaries of other individuals”

(Tamanaha 2012:243). The rule of law is widely

contrasted against “the rule of men” (Ingram

1985:359) which is a “rule of persons” (Grant

2017:383). The law is often understood to be

governed by “reason” and objectivity, while man is

governed by “passion” and subjectivity (Tamanaha

2012:243). Apart from passion, humans also hold

biases, impulses, and prejudices that have been

argued to speak against the rule of men

(Ibid.,243).Ingram(1985:359)has very well captured

26
the contrast between he rule of law and the rule of

men:

27
 Simply, there is an opposition between the idea of

actions which are an expression of the agent’s will and

therefore also, too often, an expression of his

partiality, irrationality or liability to error, and

the idea of actions that, although they are still a

person’s actions, are guided and even determined by law

as a secure system of rules representing abiding

general standards and not immediately embodying the

particular desires of individuals.

Krygier(2009:47)argues that the “telos” of the

rule of law its purpose and goal– is non arbitrary

power. How arbitrary power can be limited has been “a

perennial struggle for societies as long as they have

existed ”(Tamanaha2012:237)and it has been a central

question for intellectuals for centuries (Krygier

2016). A ruler acts arbitrarily if he solely acts upon

his or her “own will or pleasure” without any kind of

accountability to the law or regard to the “legitimate

interests, expectations, and opinions” of the subjects

of power (Krygier 2016:203). The exercise of arbitrary

power thus takes away predictability and certainty, but

it also holds positive values such as “flexibility” and

“creativity” which stand in contrast to the rule of law

which is rather rigid and mechanical (Spader 1984:385).

27
It is therefore important to remember that this is not

a clear-cut issue where one can easily claim that

arbitrariness is pure evil and that the rule of law is

always the best option. It is however also important to

remember that there is a lot of evidence that suggests

that arbitrary rule is dangerous. There is for instance

a common notion within literature on the rule of law,

as for instance emphasized by Aristotle and Plato, that

it is favourable over the rule of man “because the

power to rule over others has the potential for abuse

and can corrupt even the best among

us”(Tamanaha2012:244).

The distinction between the rule of law and the

rule of men can easily provide a false picture of law

and arbitrariness being dichotomies. Such a rigid

distinction does however not exist, for there are many

ways in which law and arbitrariness mix. Davis

(1975:33 in Spader 1984:380) has for instance

rightfully claimed that “no government has ever been a

government of laws and not of men in the sense of

eliminating all discretionary power. ”This is because

“laws are not self-interpreting or self-applying”

(Tamanaha 2012:244) and we therefore cannot fully take

away human influence from the rule of law (Ingram

28
1984). It is lastly important to note that the rule of

law, the rule of men and arbitrariness are complex

concepts and can thus be interpreted in varying ways.

The following chapter further the understanding of how

the present study uses these concepts.

Studying arbitrary power and if the rule of law matters

Krygier (2016:203) has outlined three “sources and

sorts” of arbitrariness. The theoretical framework of

the present study uses these three forms to explore the

sub-questions that ask if members of the human rights

community in the Philippines perceive the exercise of

power in the War on Drugs by the Duterte administration

as arbitrary and if so, in what ways. These are

important questions, for they tell us a lot about if

the rule of law can be interpreted as succeeding in or

failing at preventing the exercise of arbitrary power –

and ultimately its ‘well-being’. There might be more

ways in which power comes to be exercised in arbitrary

ways, but Krygier’s (2016) three sorts capture the

essence of arbitrariness and thus provide a relevant

analytical tool for the present study. They are defined

as follows:

29
 Power is exercised in an arbitrary way “where

power-wielders are not subject to routine, regular

control or limit, or accountability to anything other

than their own will or pleasure”(Ibid.,203).

Arbitrary power occurs “when those it affects

cannot know, predict, understand, or comply with the

ways power comes to be wielded” (Ibid.,204).

Power is exercised arbitrarily “where there is no

space or means made available for its targets to be

heard, to question, to inform, or to affect the

exercise of power over them and no requirement that

their voices and interests be taken into account in the

exercise of power”(Ibid.,204).

The first form of arbitrary power implies that

arbitrariness occurs when those in power are not being

held to account by anything; not even by the restraints

of the law nor by the interests of the people over

which they rule. The only thing that matters is their

own interests (Krygier 2016). Krygier (2009:60) has

therefore argued that for the rule of law to be strong,

institutions need “to be able to reach those who

matter.” To answer the sub-questions of this study, I

analyze if the legal system In the Philippines reaches

30
those who are in power in the War on Drugs, such as

president Duterte and the PNP.

These conform of arbitrary power argues that

arbitrariness occurs when social co- ordination is

absent in society. Krygier (2009) therefore states that

if legal institutions want to limit the possibility for

the exercise of arbitrary power, they need to encourage

people to understand and follow the law. If this

undertaking is successful, even those who are strangers

can “feel some security and predictability in their

dealings with each other” (Ibid.,58). This also applies

to the relationship between citizens and the state.

Even if one knows the law because legal institutions

have facilitated its understanding in society,

arbitrary power can still pose a threat when there is a

discrepancy between the law in the books and how the

law is applied in practice. The theoretical framework

in this study adopts the view that even if the legal

system succeeds in creating a strong social co-

ordination in society, this can be weakened “by more

immediate, urgent, extralegal, often anti-legal

messages” (Ibid.,67). Why people in the Philippines do

or do not obey the law has thus not only to do with the

law itself but also with the societal context and

31
distinct notions in society such as “norms” and

“attitudes” (Krygier2011:87).

The third way in which power is exercised

arbitrarily according to Krygier (2016) applies in a

context in which criticism is not being heard and the

interests of the subjects of power are not considered

by those in power. Such a situation would imply that

the people are not given any opportunity to impact the

exercise of power over them. For the rule of law to be

able to efficiently limit the exercise of arbitrary

power, it is there for highly important that those in

power provide opportunities for dissidents to utter

criticism and that they consider and act upon valid and

extensive criticism. The present study therefore also

sets out to explore how the Duterte administration has

treated critics of the drug war.

Lastly, the theoretical perspective of this study

claims that for the rule of law to be strong,

“institutionalized norms need to count as a source of

restraint and a normative resource, usable and with

some routine confidence used in social life” (Krygier’s

2009:60). This implies that for the law to matter,

ordinary Filipinos as well as those in power must

32
principally obey the law. For Krygier (2009:60), this

condition is of upmost importance “since unless the

norms do count nothing else much matters.”The essence

of this perspective is elegantly captured in a

Bulgarian saying Krygier (2009:60) refers to, that

states “that law is like a door in the middle of an

open field. Of course, you could go through the door,

but only a fool would bother.”Hear gues that where this

saying resonates, the rule of law does not (Ibid.).

This understanding is central to the theoretical

framework of this study. Tamanaha (2012:247)similarly

emphasizes this view; noting that“[f]or the rule of law

to exist, people must believe in and be committed to

the rule of law, ”and if they are not, the rule of law

will be weakened or even eroded.

The concept of arbitrary power in the three-fold

understanding presented above enables me to analyze if

and in which ways the Duterte administration has

exercised its power arbitrarily in the War on Drugs. If

the conditions discussed above are being upheld in a

society does largely depend on “the social reach and

weight of law” (Krygier 2009:61). The theoretical

perspective of the present study enables me to explore

how the interviewees perceive how people rely on the

33
law and how much bearing the law has on how people –

those with and without power – act in the Filipino

society. This provides the starting point for answering

the central research question that ask show members of

the human rights community in the Philippines perceive

the impact of the Duterte administration’s War on Drugs

on the state of the rule of law.

Related Studies

The War on Drugs in the Philippines

The Duterte administration’s War on Drugs has made

headlines in the Filipino and international media.

Academic research of the drug war is, at least what

concerns English publications, however scarce. The few

studies that exist nevertheless provide important

insights into the drug war and its implications for the

Filipino society. These studies come from a broad

spectrum of research fields such as sociology,

political science, studies of democracy, legal studies,

public health, criminology, and anthropology. The

literature on the War on Drugs in the Philippines

voices some of the themes highlighted in previous

research on the drug war phenomenon discussed earlier

(see Chapter 2.1.), as for instance its disproportional

34
effects on the most vulnerable and marginalized groups

in society. Numerous scholars (Bautista 2017;

Boehringer 2017; Lasco 2018; Macalalad & Rayco 2018;

Reyes 2016; Simangan 2017; Tigno 2018), as well as the

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights(2016)and Amnesty International(2017), have

emphasized that the poor have been the primary victims

of Duterte’s drug war.

Dehumanization and othering

The literature has further highlighted a process

of othering and dehumanization in the Filipino War on

Drugs which again resonates with previous research of

the drug war phenomenon discussed in the preceding

chapter. Scholars have argued that the dehumanization

of drug personalities in the Philippines is mirrored in

their portrayal as

“expendable”(Boehringer2017:234),“scum of

society”(Bautista2017:para.4), and the

“enemy”(Barrera2017:350). The target soft he drug war

have further been depicted as a threat to the security

of ordinary citizens and the well-being of the nation

(Reyes2016). Reyes (2016:117)argues that the drug war

35
sends the message to society that drug users and

dealers are of lesser worth than “law-abiding and god-

fearing” Filipinos and he thus concludes that it

“declare[s] whose life has and does not have value.”

Simangan (2017) also emphasizes this view (see Chapter

2.2.2.). This process of othering has made it possible

for Duterte to portray the drug problem as a matter of

national security (Bautista2017) and a matter of either

‘them’ or ‘us’ getting harmed which justifies the war

against ‘the other’ as an act of self-defence (Simangan

2017).

Violence

Reyes (2016:128) rightly notes that the EJKs of

drug suspects symbolize a new form “of political

violence” in the Philippines where the primary targets

of such killings, as I discussed in chapter 1.4.,

historically have been leftist activists. It is however

also important to note, as Filipino medical

anthropologist Gideon Lasco (2018) recently has done,

that drug users in the Philippines have been subject to

violent drug busts, inhumane treatment, and even deadly

force by the police before the drug war. Tendencies to

treat drug suspects violently are not new to the

36
country but are part of a development towards

increasingly harsh drug policies (Ibid.). Drawing on

Foucault’s (1979) prominent Discipline and Punish: The

Birth of the Prison, Reyes (2016:117) argues that the

public character of the EJKs makes them into a

“spectacle of violence.” Reyes (2016) argues that the

practice to publicly shame and mark the dead bodies as

drug users or dealers transforms the body into an

object that voices a political message. The message is

a justification for the killings and a promise to keep

ordinary Filipinos safe which ultimately enables

Duterte to strengthen his support (Ibid.).

Simangan (2017) provides a rather different

understanding of the violence, for she draws parallels

between the drug war to cases of genocide where groups

similarly have been blamed for society’s ills,

dehumanized, and killed. Simangan’s (2017) study argues

that the public display of the dead bodies of drug

suspects classifies as a form of symbolization, for the

bodies become symbols for who is and who is not worthy

of life. Duterte’s drug war does not fit the legal

definition of genocide since drug users and dealers do

not constitute “a national, ethnic, racial, or

religious grouping” (Ibid.,75). Simangan’s (2017) study

37
however shows that the drug war encompasses many of the

processes inherent in a genocide, which reveals the

gravity of what has been happening in the Philippines.

Supporters and critics

Previous literature provides an understanding of the

rather strong domestic support for the deadly violence

in Duterte’s War on Drugs. Scholars have argued that a

widespread frustration with drug-related crimes and an

inefficient criminal justice system as well as a desire

for security are significant reasons behind the support

(Curato 2016; Reyes 2016; Simangan 2017; Stansfield

2017). Filipino sociologist Nicole Curato (2016:101)

has tellingly noted that many Filipinos accept that the

process is being set aside in the campaign against

illicit drugs because theyalready see an absence of it

“in the slow and inefficient process of the criminal

justice system.” Serafica’s (2018) study of the media

coverage of the police killing of 17- year old student

Kian de los Santos shows in contrast that the support

for the drug war has not been absolute. Kian’s killing

was followed by major public outrage and Serafica’s

(2018) study concludes that even pro-Duterte newspapers

38
blamed the police for misconduct and argued for an

investigation into the killing.

Research that explores how the drug war has

affected domestic critics in the Philippines is scarce.

Lauren Stansfield’s (2017:64) ethnographic study

provides some answers. In her master thesis, Stansfield

(2017:65) writes that since Duterte has launched his

drug war, human rights organisations who challenge him

and the war are experiencing, as she writes, violent

threats by the president and his supports, “the loss of

public support” and their portrayal as “criminal-

sympathizers.” Stansfield's (2017) thesis indicates

that the perception of human rights and its advocates

is becoming increasingly negative in Filipino society

due to Duterte and his War on Drugs. The present study

also analyses how the human rights community in the

Philippines has been affected by the drug war because

its theoretical perspective argues that power is

exercised arbitrarily if people who are subject to it

are not getting their voices heard by the powerful.

Theoretical Framework

39
 The study utilized the IV-DV Model or known as the

Independent Variable and Dependent Variable Model

Approach.

Independent Variable Dependent Variable

Profile of the Explore the Effects

respondents and Experiences of
Individuals
subjected to
Subjected To
Operation Tokhang
Operation Tokhang
as enforced by
as Enforced by Sta.
Sta. Cruz Police
Cruz Police Station
Station in Sta.
in Sta.
Cruz Zambales
Cruz,Zambales
 Age
 Effectiveness
 Gender of Operation
 Address  Policy
 Years of Development
Residency Program
 Highest  Rehabilita-
Educational tion
Attainment

Figure1. The Paradigm of the Study

Figure 1 shows the paradigm of the study the IV-DV

Model scheme. The independent frame dealt with profile

of the respondents subjected to Operation Tokhang as

enforced by Sta. Cruz Police Station in Sta. Cruz

Zambales as to age, gender, address, years of residency

and highest educational attainment.

40
 For the Dependent frame, it dealt with the final

objective of exploring the effects and experiences of

individuals subjected to Operation Tokhang as enforced

by Sta. Cruz Police Station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales as

to effectiveness of the operation, policy development

program and rehabilitation.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The present study aims to determine the

effects and experiences of individuals subjected to

operation tokhang as enforced by Sta. Cruz police

station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

Specially, it aims the following questions:

1. How may the demographic profile of the respondents

be described in terms of:

a. Gender;

b. Age;

c. Address;

d. Years of Residency;

e. Educational Attainment?

2. When did you start to use illegal drugs?

41
3. If you remember, what is/are the reason/s why you

started using it?

4. What is/are the effect/s on you?

5. What is your initial reaction when policemen went to

your house or the police came to your home to

persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

6. What is/are your experiences when police came to

your home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

7. After the operation, what steps you have taken to

clear your name?

8. What was the reaction of your family when police

came to your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

9. How they treated you in prison when police came to

your home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

42
10. Are there any good causes when police came to your

home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

11. Have you taught to resist when police came to your

home to visit you?

HYPHOTHESIS

1. Operation tokhang helps a lot to the community and

most of all to the individuals who are involved in

the O.T.

2. Operation tokhang changed individuals who are

involved in the O.T.

3. Operation Tokhang gave trauma to the individuals who

are involved in the O.T.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This study is limited only in Sta.Cruz, Zambales

wherein the implementation of Oplan Tokhang is being

observed. The results of the study is only applicable

in Sta. Cruz, Zambales and cannot be applicable to

other places in the country. Santa Cruz, officially the

Municipality of Santa Cruz, is a 1st class municipality

43
in the province of Zambales, Philippines. According to

the 2015 census, it has a population of 58,151 people.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is very beneficial to the researchers

in able for them to know the effects and experiences of

individuals subjected to Operation Tokhang as enforced

by Sta. Cruz police station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. To

the students in able for them to have knowledge on what

will be the consequences they might encounter when they

use drugs. To the future researchers for the reference

in their study. To the Municipality of Santa Cruz, for

them to be able to draft a policy development program

in their area of jurisdiction. To the community in

general in order for them to have a safe and a drug

free community and lastly to the drug users and pushers

who wants to change their lives because the government

have a program for them in order to rehabilitate them

and make them a well reformed person.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

44
 This chapter present the research methodology, the

research design used, the research locale, the

respondents, sampling technique used, the instrument

and validation of the instrument, data gathering and

retrieval procedure and the statistical treatment for

the data used.

Research Design

The study utilized descriptive approach to

determine the effects and experiences of individuals

subjected to operation tokhang as enforced by Sta. Cruz

police station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Descriptive

research involves collecting data in order to test

hypothesis or answer questions concerning the current

status of the subject of the study. Data is collected

through questionnaire, survey, an interview or

observation (Jefferson,2004).

Respondents

Because of confidentiality, the respondents of

this study are composed of 20 individuals only from

different barangays of Municipality of Sta.Cruz

subjected to operation tokhang as enforced by Sta. Cruz

police station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. All the

information is gathered with the help of Barangay

45
Chairman whom we asked for assistance to conduct an

interview with one of their constituents who was

subjected in Tokhang Operation.

Research Locale

The study conducted in Municipality of Sta.Cruz.

Sta. Cruz, Zambales is the home of the sweetest mango

in the world (Guinness Book of World Record, 1993).

At the beginning of the 17th century, in the year

1612, the town of “Sigayan”, now Sta. Cruz, was founded

in the Sitio of Tambobong, which is now within the

jurisdiction of the municipality of Dasol, Pangasinan.

It is said that when the first Spanish

missionaries arrived in the Sitio, they asked the

natives the name of the place, but the latter, thinking

that the strangers were asking for the name of the

shells that were found in abundance on the seashore,

answered “Sigayan”. Hence the name.

The Catholics of the town later built a church

which was placed under the charge of Fr. Alonzo de San

Agustin. One day, many years later, a Negrito by the

name of Ytahat killed the priest whose sermon on the

46
church’s pulpit was mistaken for insults directed at

the natives.

This incident forced the founders of the town to

transfer the town sitio to another place, the sitio of

“Salasa “, which is now within the jurisdiction of the

barrio of Bayto, perhaps because they feared of further

depredations by the savage Negritoes.

This town was named “Alinsaog”, founded at the

beginning of the 18th century, whose ruins could still

be seen up to the present. The town site remained in

this place until the later part of the 19th century

when it was abandoned by the natives because of the

overflowing of the Bayto River which brought death and

destruction to the inhabitants. The natives moved to

another town site, the present location of the

municipality.

Years later, the people of this town found the

image of St. Michael, from among the debris carried by

the floodwaters of the Bayto River years back. They

forthwith placed a cross on the spot where they found

the Holy image on which they built the present church

and named the town Santa Cruz.

47
 Below is the satellite image of Zambales and

neighboring areas showing the exact location of the

research locale.

Figure 2. The Locale of the Study

Research Instrument

48
 An interview was use to gather data from

individuals subjected to operation tokhang as enforced

by Sta. Cruz police station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

Statistical Treatment of Data

In order to answer the problems stated in Chapter

1, the researcher had used different statistical tools.

These tools helped the researchers to easily analyze,

interpret and generalize the result. These tools

include:

1. Frequency Count. This is the most straight

forward approach to working with the

quantitative data. Items are classified

according to a particular scheme and an

arithmetical count is made of the number of

items within the text which belong to each

classification in the scheme. The frequency

count is the most basic statistical tools used

by the researchers.

2. Percentage. A percentage is a number or ratio

expressed as a fraction of 100.

49
 n
Formula: %= X 100
N

Where:

% is the percent symbol

n is the frequency of the observed value

in a particular scheme

N is the total observe value

Percentage was utilized together with the

frequency count in profiling and tallying of responses.

3. Narrative analysis

This approach is becoming increasingly

popular, especially in social sciences. As

the name suggests, it is about making sense

of stories.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION, AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

50
 This chapter presents the gathered and processed

data using tabular form so as to provide a better and

clear understanding on the problems stated in Chapter 1

of this study.

1. Profile of the Individuals Subjected to Operation

Tokhang- Respondents

Table 1

Frequency and Percentage Distribution of the Respondents in

terms of Profile Variables
N=20

Frequenc
Profile Variables y Percentage
20 and below 2 10
21-25 6 30
Age 26-30 7 35
Mean=27.35 31-35 2 10
36-40 3 15
Sex Male 18 90
Female 2 10
Highest HS GRADUATE 9 45
Educationa VOCATIONAL 8 40
l
COLLEGE
Attainment GRADUATE 3 15

51
 Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage

distribution of the individuals subjected to operation

tokhang- respondents profile variables.

For age profile, out of twenty individuals

subjected to operation tokhang- respondents, there

where (2) or 10 percent belong to age bracket of 20 and

below, six(6) or 30 percent belong to age bracket of

21-25, seven(7) or 35 percent belong to age bracket of

26-30, two(2) or 10 percent belong to age bracket of

31-35, three(3) or 15 percent belong to age bracket of

36-40. The computed mean age of the subjected to

operation tokhang- respondents was 27.35 years old.

This implies that majority of the subjected to

operation tokhang-operation respondents are in their

early adulthood age.

For sex profile, there where

eighteen(18) or 90 percent of the subjected to

operation tohkang- respondents are males, while two(2)

or 10 percent are females. The dominance of males

implies that men are more subjected to operation

tokhang than women.

For Highest

educational attainment, there were nine(9) or 45

percent are high school graduate, eight(8) or 40

52
percent are vocational graduate, three(3) or 15 percent

are college graduate. Majority of the subjected to

operation tokhang- respondents are high school

graduate.

1. Individuals Subjected to Operation Tokhang-

Respondents’ Perception in terms of the following

questions:

Table 2

Question No.1 Answers Frequency Percentage

When did you start *Work 11 55
to use illegal *Friends 9 45
drugs?

Table 2 shows that for Question No.1 (When did you

start to use illegal drugs?), there were eleven (11) or

55 percent answered work and nine (9) percent answered

friends.

Table 3

Question No.2 Answers Freque Percentage

ncy
If you *Influence 11 55
remember,what of friends
is/are the *Influence 8 40
reason/s why of co-
you started workers
using it? *Broken 1 5
Family

53
 Table 3 shows that for Question No.2 (If you remember,

what is/are the reason/s why you started using it?), there

where eleven (11) or 55 percent answered influence of

friends, eight (8) or 40 percent answered influence of co-

workers and one (1) or 5 percent answered broken family.

Table 4

Table 4 shows that for Question No.3 (What is/are the

Question Answers Frequency Percentage
No.3
What *Anxiety 2 10
is/are *Always 3 15
the awake at
effect/s night
on you? *Always 3 15
awake
*Always 4 20
awake at
work
*None 5 25
*Anxiety and 1 5
awake
*Stared at 2 10
something
and annoying

effect/s on you?), there were two (2) or 10 percent answered

anxiety, three (3) or 15 percent answered always awake at

night, three (3) or 15 percent answered always awake, four

(4) or 20 percent answered always awake at work, five (5) or

54
25 percent answered none, one (1) or 5 percent answered

anxiety and awake and two (2) or 10 percent answered stared

at something and annoying.

Table 5

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.4

What is your *Scared 1 5

initial *Surrendered 4 20
reaction *None and 9 45
when Surrendered
policemen *Shocked and 6 30
went to your Scared
house or the
police come
to your home
to persuade
you to
surrender
(natokhang)?

Table 5 shows that for Question No.4 (What is your

initial reaction when policemen went to your house or

the police come to your home to persuade you to

surrender (natokhang)?), There were one (1) or 5

percent answered scared, four (4) or 20 percent

answered surrendered, nine (9) or 45 percent answered

none and surrendered and six (6) or 30 percent answered

shocked and scared.

55
 Table 6

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.5
What is/are *None 17 85
your *Scared 2 10
experiences *Experienced 1 5
when police struggles
come to your inside the
home to jail
persuade you
to surrender
(natokhang)?

Table 6 shows that for Question No.5 (What is/are

your experiences when police come to your home to

persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?), There were

seventeen (17) or 85 percent answered none, two (2) or

56
10 percent answered scared and one (1) or 5 percent

answered experienced struggles inside the jail.

Table 7

Question No.6 Answers Frequency Percentage

After the *Changed 1 5
operation,what and sur-
steps you have rendered
taken to clear *None and 4 20
your name? Changed
*Changed 5 25
only
*Changed 5 25
and get
to work
*None 4 20
*Changed 1 5
because
of my
parents

57
Table 7 shows that for Question No.6 (After the

operation, what steps you have taken to clear your

name?), There were one (1) or 5 percent answered

changed and surrendered, four (4) or 20 percent

answered none and changed, five (5) or 25 percent

answered change only, five (5) or 25 percent answered

changed and get to work, four (4) or 20 percent

answered none and one(1) or 5 percent answered changed

because of my parents.

Table 8

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.7
What was the *Shocked 1 5
reaction of and worried
your family *None 8 40
when police *Scared 6 30
come to your *Ashamed 1 5
home to and angry
persuade you *Shocked 2 10
to surrender and Scared
(natokhang)? *Shocked 2 10

58
 Table 8 shows that for Question No.7 (What was

the reaction of your family when police come to your

home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?) There

were one (1) or 5 percent answered shocked and worried,

eight (8) or 40 percent answered none, six (6) or 30

percent answered scared, one (1) or 5 percent answered

ashamed and angry, two (2) or 10 percent answered

shocked and scared and two (2) or 10 percent answered

shocked.

Table 9

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.8
How they *None 11 55
treated you *Not jailed 3 15
in prison *Servant 1 5
when police inside the
come to your jail
home to *Fine 5 25
persuade you
to surrender
(natokhang)?

59
 Table 9 shows that for Question No.8 (How

they treated you in prison when police come to your

home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?), There

were eleven (11) or 55 percent answered none, three (3)

or 15 percent answered not jailed, one (1) or 5 percent

answered servant inside the jail and five (5) or 25

percent answered fine.

Table 10

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.9
Are there *Surrendered 8 40
any good *None 5 25
causes when *Yes,and I 7 35
police come changed
to your home
to persuade
you to
surrender
(natokhang)?
Tab

l e

10 shows that for Question No.9 (Are there any good

60
 causes when police come to your home to persuade you to

surrender (natokhang)?), There were eight (8) or 40

percent answered surrendered, five (5) or 25 percent

answered none and seven (7) or 35 percent answered Yes,

they changed.

Table 11

Question Answers Frequency Percentage

No.10
Have you *No,because 6 30 Tab
taught to I
le resist surrendered 11
when *No 11 55
police *No,because 3 15
come to I was
your home scared
to visit
you?

shows that for Question No.10 (Have you taught to resist

61
when police come to your home to visit you?), There

were six (6) or 30 percent answered No, because they

surrendered, eleven (11) or 55 percent answered No and

three (3) or 15 percent answered No, because they was

scared.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Based on the profile of the individuals subjected

to operation tokhang (respondents), out of 20

respondents there were 7 individuals which is 26-30

years old or 35 percent are most likely involve in O.T.

For sex profile, there where eighteen(18) or 90

percent of the subjected to operation tohkang-

respondents are males which shows that the dominance of

males implies that men are more subjected to operation

tokhang than women. For

Highest educational attainment, majority of the

subjected to operation tokhang- respondents are high

school graduate which is nine(9) out of twenty

respondents or 45 percent.

After the interview we conducted, out of twenty

respondents, there were eleven (11) or 55 percent

respondents started to use illegal drugs on their work.

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Eleven (11) or 55 percent of the respondents started to

use it because of the influence of their friends.

According to them, five (5) or 25 percent of the

respondents said that there is no effect on them,

however, four (4) or 20 percent answered they were

always awake at work every time they use illegal drugs.

Most of them, their initial reaction when

policemen went to their house or the police come to

their home to persuade them to surrender (natokhang)

was none and they just surrendered based on nine (9) or

45 percent of the respondents, however, six (6) or 30

percent of them were shocked and scared when policemen

came to their house.

Majority of the respondents which covers seventeen

(17) or 85 percent answered that they have no

experiences when police come to their home to persuade

them to surrender (natokhang.

After the operation, five (5) or 25 percent

answered that they change only and have nothing to do

after operation. On the other hand, there were also

five (5) or 25 percent answered that they changed and

find some job to clear their name on the list.

63
 Eight (8) or 40 percent of the respondents said

that their family has no reaction when police came to

their home. However, six (6) or 30 percent out of

twenty said that their family were scared during the

operation.

There were eleven (11) or 55 percent answered that

they have no such experience like treating badly while

their are in prison.

There were eight (8) or 40 percent answered there are

no any good causes when police came to their home to

persuade them to surrender.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the narrative analysis of

data gathered, the conclusions arrived at and the

recommendations offered by the researchers.

The main objective of this research is to

determine the effects and experiences of individuals

subjected to operation tokhang as enforced by Sta. Cruz

police station in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

Specially, it aims the following questions:

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12. How may the demographic profile of the respondents

be described in terms of:

f. Gender;

g. Age;

h. Address;

i. Years of Residency;

j. Educational Attainment?

13. When did you start to use illegal drugs?

14. If you remember,what is/are the reason/s why you

started using it?

15. What is/are the effect/s on you?

16. What is your initial reaction when policemen went

to your house or the police come to your home to

persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

17. What is/are your experiences when police come to

your home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

18. After the operation, what steps you have taken to

clear your name?

19. What was the reaction of your family when police

came to your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

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20. How they treated you in prison when police came to

your home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

21. Are there any good causes when police came to your

home to persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

22. Have you taught to resist when police came to your

home to visit you?

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

2. Profile of the Individuals Subjected to Operation

Tokhang- Respondents

a. Age. Out of twenty individuals subjected to

operation tokhang- respondents, there where (2)

or 10 percent belong to age bracket of 20 and

below, six(6) or 30 percent belong to age bracket

of 21-25, seven(7) or 35 percent belong to age

bracket of 26-30, two(2) or 10 percent belong to

age bracket of 31-35, three(3) or 15 percent

belong to age bracket of 36-40. The computed mean

age of the subjected to operation tokhang-

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 respondents was 27.35 years old. This implies

that majority of the subjected to operation

tokhang-operation respondents are in their early

adulthood age.

b. Sex. Out of twenty, there where eighteen(18) or

90 percent of the subjected to operation tohkang-

respondents are males, while two(2) or 10 percent

are females. The dominance of males implies that

men are more subjected to operation tokhang than

women.

c. Highest Educational Attainment. Out of twenty,

there were nine (9) or 45 percent are high school

graduate, eight (8) or 40 percent are vocational

graduate, three (3) or 15 percent are college

graduate. Majority of the subjected to operation

tokhang- respondents are high school graduate.

3. Individuals Subjected to Operation Tokhang-

Respondents’ Perception in terms of the following

questions:

a. When did you start to use illegal drugs? There

were eleven (11) or 55 percent

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 answered work and nine (9) percent answered

friends.

b. If you remember, what is/are the reason/s why you

started using it?

There where eleven (11) or 55 percent answered

influence of friends, eight (8) or 40 percent

answered influence of co-workers and one (1) or 5

percent answered broken family.

c. What is/are the effect/s on you?

There were two (2) or 10 percent answered

anxiety, three (3) or 15 percent answered always

awake at night, three (3) or 15 percent answered

always awake, four (4) or 20 percent answered

always awake at work, five (5) or 25 percent

answered none, one (1) or 5 percent answered

anxiety and awake and two (2) or 10 percent

answered stared at something and annoying.

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d. What is your initial reaction when policemen went

to your house or the police come to your home to

persuade you to surrender (natokhang)?

There were one (1) or 5 percent answered scared,

four (4) or 20 percent answered surrendered, nine

(9) or 45 percent answered none and surrendered

and six (6) or 30 percent answered shocked and

scared.

e. What is/are your experiences when police come to

your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

There were seventeen (17) or 85 percent answered

none, two (2) or 10 percent answered scared and

one (1) or 5 percent answered experienced

struggles inside the jail.

f. After the operation, what steps you have taken to

clear your name?

There were one (1) or 5 percent answered changed

and surrendered, four (4) or 20 percent answered

none and changed, five (5) or 25 percent answered

change only, five (5) or 25 percent answered

changed and get to work, four (4) or 20 percent

69
 answered none and one(1) or 5 percent answered

changed because of my parents.

g. What was the reaction of your family when police

come to your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

There were one (1) or 5 percent answered shocked

and worried, eight (8) or 40 percent answered

none, six (6) or 30 percent answered scared, one

(1) or 5 percent answered ashamed and angry, two

(2) or 10 percent answered shocked and scared and

two (2) or 10 percent answered shocked.

h. How they treated you in prison when police come

to your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

There were eleven (11) or 55 percent answered

none, three (3) or 15 percent answered not

jailed, one (1) or 5 percent answered servant

inside the jail and five (5) or 25 percent

answered fine.

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i. Are there any good causes when police come to

your home to persuade you to surrender

(natokhang)?

There were eight (8) or 40 percent answered

surrendered, five (5) or 25 percent answered none

and seven (7) or 35 percent answered Yes, they

changed.

j. Have you taught to resist when police come to

your home to visit you?

There were six (6) or 30 percent answered No,

because they surrendered, eleven (11) or 55

percent answered No and three (3) or 15 percent

answered No, because they was scared.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the profile of the individuals subjected

to operation tokhang (respondents), out of 20

respondents there were 7 individuals which is 26-30

years old or 35 percent are most likely involve in O.T.

For sex profile, there where eighteen(18) or 90

percent of the subjected to operation tohkang-

respondents are males which shows that the dominance of

71
males implies that men are more subjected to operation

tokhang than women. For

Highest educational attainment, majority of the

subjected to operation tokhang- respondents are high

school graduate which is nine(9) out of twenty

respondents or 45 percent.

After the interview we conducted, out of twenty

respondents, there were eleven (11) or 55 percent

respondents started to use illegal drugs on their work.

Eleven (11) or 55 percent of the respondents started to

use it because of the influence of their friends.

According to them, five (5) or 25 percent of the

respondents said that there is no effect on them,

however, four (4) or 20 percent answered they were

always awake at work every time they use illegal drugs.

Most of them, their initial reaction when

policemen went to their house or the police come to

their home to persuade them to surrender (natokhang)

was none and they just surrendered based on nine (9) or

45 percent of the respondents, however, six (6) or 30

percent of them were shocked and scared when policemen

came to their house.

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 Majority of the respondents which covers seventeen

(17) or 85 percent answered that they have no

experiences when police come to their home to persuade

them to surrender (natokhang.

After the operation, five (5) or 25 percent

answered that they change only and have nothing to do

after operation. On the other hand, there were also

five (5) or 25 percent answered that they changed and

find some job to clear their name on the list.

Eight (8) or 40 percent of the respondents said

that their family has no reaction when police came to

their home. However, six (6) or 30 percent out of

twenty said that their family were scared during the

operation.

There were eleven (11) or 55 percent answered that

they have no such experience like treating badly while

their are in prison.

There were eight (8) or 40 percent answered there

are no any good causes when police came to their home

to persuade them to surrender (natokhang) because

according to them they are surrenderer. However, seven

(7) or 35 percent said that they are good cause because

they have changed.

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 The good thing of the respondents eleven (11) or

55 percent of them don’t resist when police came to

their home to visit them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the summary of findings and conclusions,

the researchers have offered the following

recommendations to wit:

1. Beef up police personnel in the Sta.Cruz, Zambales

Police Station to carry out more anti-illegal

drugs operations;

2. Intensify the anti-drug operations done in

Sta.Cruz in order to eliminate potential of

entry of illegal drugs.

3. Share and model the expertise developed by

Sta.Cruz Police Station in the implementation

of the double barrel operations.

4. Intensify monitoring and surveillance, with the

idea in mind, that the market of illegal drugs is

Sta.Cruz.

5. Have more activities that will help them for

rehabilitate so that they will be more productive

after the rehabilitation.

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75