SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
SAUDIA hired Milagros Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Sometime in 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Thamer attempted to rape Morada.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.
When Morada returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. A SAUDIA Legal Officer negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained
crew members but did not succeed because Morada refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined
to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return
to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
The Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually,
they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. Morada, on the other hand, was transferred to Manila (what
the fuck).

More than a year after, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before her flight to Manila, Morada was
prevented from boarding the plane and was instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where
she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah.
As it turned out, Morada signed a notice to her to appear before the court. Eventually a SAUDIA legal
officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then
did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic
laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, she sought the help of her employer, SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. The Prince
of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

Morada then filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its country
manager. SAUDIA filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. SAUDIA filed its petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA. CA rendered a decision ruling that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering
that the complaint’s basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WoN the lower court was correct in taking cognizance of the case.
RULING:
YES. After a careful study of Morada’s complaint, the Court believes that she aptly predicated her cause
of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the RTC possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Republic Act No. 7691:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxxxxx
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the
RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing Morada to seek remedial
action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines, no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have
been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be
upheld.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the dismissal of Morada's
complaint. SAUDIA also filed an answer. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
The petition is dismissed.

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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

ADDITIONAL NOTES: (“conflicts” cases, defined) A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected
by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element".
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.
(on the choice of applicable law) Our
starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point
of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place
of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Considering that the complaint is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the Court finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, et al., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife,
Mary Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three illegitimate children.
Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that his distributable estate should be
divided in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives.
Subsequently, Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein.
2 of the illegitimate children filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Hence, this present appeal.

3
 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

ISSUE:
What law should apply—the Texas law or the Philippine law?

RULING:
Texas law should apply. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills—one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate—arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
The order of the probate court is affirmed in totality.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: (on the applicability of the “renvoi” doctrine) the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss,
the doctrine of renvoi. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that
the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, in the United States, the defendant entered into a
contract with the Government of the Philippine Islands for a period of two years as a stenographer. It is also
stipulated that travel expenses are to paid him apart from his salary.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he
should become liable for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from
Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.
The defendant violated the terms of the contract, which prompted plaintiff to commence an action in the
CFI of Manila for recovery of sum of money. The defendant raised the defense of minority.

4
 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

The lower court found for the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
WoN Frank’s defense of minority holds water.
RULING:
NO. The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not
be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of
Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by
reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in
said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. His argument is misplaced.
It is not disputed that, at the time and place of the making of the contract in question, the defendant had
full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is
made.Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance.
Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
The judgment of the lower is affirmed.
G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint for collection of a sum of money was filed by Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
against Jack Robert Sherman and DeodatoReloj before the RTC.
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility with interest at
3%. As a security,Sherman, Reloj and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of the Eastern
Book Supply at the time, executed a guarantee in favor of HSBC.
The Joint and Several Guarantee providesthat:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore…
Eastern Book Supply failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation from
private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the guarantee. The lower court upheld jurisdiction over

5
 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

the case. Private respondents then filed before the IAC a petition for prohibition, which was granted. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WoN Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.
RULING:
YES. While it is true that the transaction took place in Singaporean setting and that the Joint and Several
Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that this stipulation be
liberally construed.
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have
jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem,quasi in
rem, or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, as pointed-out by HSBC, the instant case
presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a
foreign tribunal. However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not
disputed by them), would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the process
incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve
the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or
at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based
merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause
them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that HSBC filed the
action here just to harass private respondents.
In addition, the parties did not stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the
rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction.
In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and
things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of
sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any
judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
before them.
The assailed decision is reversed.
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of EngracioPalancaTanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
FACTS:

6
 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

This action was instituted by El Banco Espanol-Filipino to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of
real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question was executed by the original
defendantEngracioPalancaTanquinyeng, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. After the execution of
this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he
there diedwithout again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for
the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to the Code of
Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in
due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the
post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place
of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China.Whether the clerk complied with this order does
not affirmatively appear.
The CFI rendered judgment declaring the defendant in default.
About seven years after the public sale, a motion was filed by Vicente Palanca as administrator of the
estate of the original defendant, EngracioPalanca, to set aside the order of default. The basis of this application is
the lack of jurisdiction over the defendant and over the subject matter. The motion was denied. Hence, this
present appeal.
ISSUE:
WoN the lower court had jurisdiction over the defendant.
RULING:
YES. The SC notes that in a foreclosure case, some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident
owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is essential. To answer this necessity, the
statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the
defendant, if his residence is known. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such
steps as he sees fit to protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in
fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where
notice is sent by mail, the probability of his receiving itis dependent upon the correctness of the address to
which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted,
furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing
of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In
the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the
law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

7
 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

Therefore, the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an
irregularityas amounts to a denial of due process of law; and that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which
the law unconditionally requires.
The judgment appealed from is without error.
G.R. No. L-5675 April 27, 1953
ANTONIO CARBALLO,petitioner,
vs.
DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION in his capacity as Judge of First Instance of Manila and MARIANO
ANG,respondents.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
Mariano Ang filed a complaint against Antonio Carballo for the collection of sum of money. The
corresponding summons was served upon defendant Carballo. As counsel for him, Atty. J. Gonzales entered his
written appearance. However, on the same day, said counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearing for
one month on the ground that he was sick. The hearing was postponed two more times for the same reason.
At the request of plaintiff's counsel, Carballo was declared in default and judgment was rendered against
him. Carballo’s counsel moved for the case to be tried anew, which was denied. An appeal was interposed before
the CFI which was also denied, on the ground that the decision is final and unappealable because it had been
rendered by default, and that the only jurisdiction left to it was to order the execution of said decision.
Hence, this present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WoN Carballo defaulted in the municipal court of Manila.
RULING:
NO. In the case of Flores vs. Zurbito, this Court held that an appearance in whatever form without
expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner Carballo made an appearance in the municipal court.
Could he then be declared in default just because he filed no answer? The answer must be in the negative. In the
case of Quinzan vs. Arellano, the SC said that in the justice of the peace court, failure to appear, not failure
to answer, is the sole ground for default. What really happened in the municipal court was that the defendant,
even though he filed no answer to the complaint, nevertheless, made his appearance (when his counsel filed a
written manifestation asking for postponement). The judgment, therefore, was not by default. Antonio Carballo
had a right to appeal as in fact he appealed, and the CFI should not have declared the decision appealed from
final and executory under the theory that it was not appealable.
The present petition is granted.

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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967

WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her husband, defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C. J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker— acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker—filed
with the CFI a complaint against William Gemperle for the enforcement of Paul Schenker's alleged initial
subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-
emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation, as well as for an accounting and
damages.
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Spouses Schenkers for damages he incurred when
Helen, in connection with the complaint, caused to be published, allegations which were false and derogatory for
the sole purpose of “attackinghis honesty, integrity and reputation” and of bringing him “into public hatredas a
man and a businessman".
The CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker and for want of
cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WoNthe lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.
RULING:
YES. The lower court had acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Schenker, through the service of the summons
addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-
in-fact of her husband in the civil case, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned
representative capacity.
In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband,
so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the
of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn
therefore from is, likewise, untenable.

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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

The decision appealed from is reversed.

G.R. No. L-1403 October 29, 1948

VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA petitioners,
vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON and ANGEL H. MOJICA, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and
LEON ALEJO, respondents.
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners on the ground that the respondent
judge acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution which declared the
petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or performing the order of the court, requiring the
petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WoN the contempt charge against the petitioners is without merit.
RULING:
YES. The contempt supposed to have been committed by the petitioners is not a direct contempt under
section 1, Rule 64, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. It is an indirect contempt or disobedience of a lawful order of the court, under section 3,
Rule 64, of the Rules of Court.
According to sections 4 and 5 of said rule, where a contempt under section 3 has been committed against
a superior court or judge, the charge may be filed with such superior court, and the accused put under custody;
but if the hearing is ordered to be had forthwith, the accused may be released from custody upon filing a bond in
an amount to be fixed by the court for his appearance to answer the charge. From the record it appears that no
charge for contempt was filed against the petitioners nor was a trial held.
It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than the
general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to which the
particular case belongs. It is not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and decide the class of litigations
to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called into activity, by the filing
of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading.
The resolution of the court ordering the confinement of the petitioners is set aside.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: (on the issue of confinement) The respondent judge has no power under the law to order the
confinement of the petitioners until they have compiled with the order of the court. Section 9, Rule 39 is
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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

applicable only to specific acts which the party or person must personally do, because his personal qualification
and circumstances have been taken into consideration in accordance with the provision of Article 1161 of the
Civil Code. But if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other
documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some other way
provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies;
and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party.
G.R. No. 47517 June 27, 1941
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,
vs.
MAMERTO ROXAS, et al., respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Eugene Arthur Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
for the recovery of sum of money consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on 52,874
shares of stock registered in his name, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said
shares.
The company filed its answer, alleging that the withholding of E.A. Perkins' right to the disposal and
control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by Idonah Slade Perkins and
George Engelhard.
Resultantly, I.S. Perkins and Engelhard were impleaded in the case.
Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, I.S. Perkins and
Engelhard. I.S. Perkins sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against E.A. Perkins from the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
possession and control of the shares of stock in question.
For his part, E.A. Perkins questions the enforcement in this jurisdiction of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York. I.S. Perkins, in return, filed a demurrer on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York is res judicata. The demurrer was overruled, hence, this present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WoN the CFI has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES. E.A. Perkins' action calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction
of the CFI.
Likewise, I.S. Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against E.A. Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and
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 SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon.
This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39,
Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI, to adjudicate, settle and determine.
The petition is denied.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: I.S. Perkins expresses the fear that the judge may render decision annulling the final
judgment rendered in her favor by the courts of the State of New York.
Whether or not the judge, in the course of the proceedings, will give validity and efficacy to the New York
judgment set up by I.S. Perkins in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and
relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test
of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the
course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its
determination of the question is the exercise by that court of its jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First
Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased.
Fleumer alleged that the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia in accordance with the laws therein.
To prove this, he submitted the laws of West Verginia Code as found in a textbook in the National Library.
ISSUE:
WoN compliance with the laws of Virginia was properly proven.
RULING:
NO. What Fleumer did was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not
prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union.
Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or
published text under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as required by Section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, as
provided in Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract
from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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SUBJECT: CONFLICT OF LAWS

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