#126

[G.R. No. L-56441. July 25, 1983.]

CLEMENCIO C. RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts of the Case:

Clemencio C. Ramirez, a collection agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue at Bauang, La Union, was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan for malversation. The penalty for the offense is reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. There is a presence of two mitigating circumstances in his case: plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender to the authorities. So, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from
prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, or ten years and one day to seventeen years and four
months, and the minimum penalty should be taken from prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
medium, or four years, two months and one day to ten years.

Ramirez was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P68,057.97 and a similar indemnity with the additional penalty of perpetual special
disqualification.

Issue:

Whether or not Clemencio C. Ramirez’s sentence be reduced to four years, two months and one day to ten
years and one day.

Ruling:

Yes.

This matter rests in the discretion of the court according to paragraph 5 of article 64 of the RPC where it states
that“ When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
according to the number and nature of such circumstances”. That is allowed by law. But the maximum penalty
cannot be reduced to sir years. That is not authorized by law.
127

G.R. No. L-39483 November 29, 1974

FRANCISCO BASAN Y GOBOT, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Francisco Basan y Gobot was charged with two (2) homicides in Camarines Sur. Upon arraignment
Francisco Basan pleaded guilty in each case but invoked the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty. He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P15,000.00, and to pay the costs.

Issue:

Whether or not the sentence of Francisco Basan be reduced to a penalty the minimum of prision correccional
in its minimum period.

Ruling:

Yes.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Act (Act No. 4103, as amended), if the offense is punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the minimum penalty should be within any of the periods of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed by law, and the maximum thereof should be within the proper period of the penalty
that may be imposed were the sentence a straight penalty (People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109). In this case, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence that should have been imposed upon the petitioner for each of the two
offenses should be within the range of from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and the maximum
should have been within the range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, the medium period
of prision mayor, which should be the proper penalty, considering that the two mitigating circumstances have
already been taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree lower.
#128

[G.R. No. 76100. April 18, 1990.]

SALEM ALEX PALO y TOYUR, Petitioner, v. HON. FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XII, Respondent.

Facts of the case:

Salem Alex Palo was apprehended who was in possession of three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He was
subsequently charged with violation of the second paragraph of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, where he pleaded guilty.

A judgment of conviction was promulgated sentencing Salem Alex Palo to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day and to pay a fine of P6,000.00, together with the costs of suit. Immediately thereafter, he
aplied for probation and was denied by Hon. Francis Militante based on a memorandum circular by the
Probation Administration, dated July 15, 1986, which states, inter alia, that persons sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years are not entitled to probation.

Salem Alex Palo was re-arrested and committed to jail.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the plea of guilty Salem Alex Palo may still be withdraw his improvident plea of guilty; and

2. Whether or not Batas Pambansa Bilang 76 was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1990 so as to
disqualify petitioner from the benefits of probation.

Ruling:

No.

1. Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law of 1976, as amended, which in part
provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. In other words,
the judgment ipso facto attains finality, although it is not yet executory pending resolution of the application for
probation.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Thus, the judgment in the lower court having become final, the respondent judge is not vested with any
discretion to allow the alleged improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not
guilty.

2. "The original Probation Law of 1976, Presidential Decree No. 968 provided in its Section 9 that ‘(t)he
benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those: a) sentenced to serve a minimum term of imprisonment
of more than six years . . .’

"In 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 76 amended Section 9 of P.D. 968 by stating that the benefits of the Decree
shall not be extended to those ‘sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years
and one day.’

In 1985 Presidential Decree No. 1990 which amended BP 76 and returned to the earlier formulation in P.D. No.
968. The latest decree on the matter excludes from the benefits of the Probation Law any applicant who has
been ‘sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years.’
129

G.R. No. 81337               August 16, 1991

RICHARD V. PETRALBA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts of the Case:

Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu. Audit of his
cashbook balance found short of P28,107.00, theretofore, Petralba was charged with, and convicted of, 31
counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and "Falsification of Public Documents."
Petitioner was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from
December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15, 1981.

On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending before the Supreme Court Richard V. Petralba, had died.

Issue:

Whether or not hte death of Richard V. Petralba extinguishes his criminal liability.

Yes.

Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal liability. In view of the
fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is personal. Actio personalis moritur cum persona;
actio peonalis in haeredem non datur nisi forte ex damno locupletior haeres factus sit. (A personal right of
action dies with the person. A penal action is not given against an heir, unless, indeed, such heir is benefited
by the wrong.)

Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties but it also
includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art. 89(l), Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar,
petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of
Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities.

Though the death of Richard V. Petralba is during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his criminal liability,
his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil liability is also
extinguished.

Supreme Court ruled that only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is pecuniary but not civil) of the
accused is extinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil
liability survives Petralba but only if the offense can be proved.
#130

G.R. No. L-60151 June 24, 1983

SALVADOR L. BUDLONG, in his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal, City of
Tagbilaran, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE AQUILES T. APALISOK, in his capacity as Acting City Judge, City Court, Branch II, City
of Tagbilaran, and CAMILIO PUYO Y GALAGAR, respondents.

Facts of the Case:

Salvador L. Budlong filed an information before the respondent court charging Camilo Puyon y Galagar with
the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence where he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged. He was sentenced to suffer thirty (30) days of imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability
was imposed. He was release on recognizance to the custody of a police officer of the Tagbilaran City
Integrated National Police after manifesting his intention to apply for Prabation.

Salvador Budlong filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Set Case for Hearing for the reception of evidence to prove the
civil liability of the accused.

City court of Tagbilaran denied the motion of Salvador Budlong. Thus this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not an application for Probation prohibits the hearing for the determination of civil liability.

No.

Probation is defined by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law as "a disposition under
which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to
the supervision of a probation officer."

The "conviction and sentence" clause of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case.

Under Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues notwithstanding
service of sentence or non-service due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason we
fail to see what led the respondent judge to rule that an application for probation should have an opposite effect
insofar as determination of civil liability is concerned. It could not have been delay because the motion was
filed on the day after the judgment of conviction was rendered in open court right after the plea of guilty and the
manifestation that the accused was applying for probation.

Probation Law clearly provides only for the suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of his
application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is no legal basis for the respondent
court's conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused under the circumstances of the case,
"... would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the
Probation Law." The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action.

The admission of evidence on civil liability, in this case, will not certainly defeat the end and purpose of the
probation law. Its denial would on the other hand, violate the complainant's right to due process. (Rollo, pp. 42-
43)
#131

G.R. No. 179044               December 6, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGUEZ LUCERO y PAW-AS alias "Kikit," Appellant.

Facts of the Case:

On October 20, 1998, an Information3 was filed charging appellant with the crime of murder committed as
follows:

Rodriguez Lucero was charged with the crime of murder. With treachery and evident premeditation and with
intent to kill, did then and there Lucero wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Edgar
Aydaon, a Barangay Kagawad, with the use of a bolo, thereby hitting the victim[']s head, which wound and
injury caused the instantaneous death of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Aydaon.

The trial court found appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code
i.e. indemnity, exemplary damages, actual daamages, and moral damages. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Rodriguez Lucero is gulity of murder and be criminally and civilly liablle.

Yes.

Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords
great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed
by the CA, as in this case. That both the trial court and the CA did not overlook or misunderstand any
substance or fact which would have materially affected the outcome of the case.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
murder.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Thus,
when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. In cases of murder and homicide,
civil indemnity of PhP75,000.00 and moral damages of PhP50,000.00 are awarded automatically. Indeed, such
awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact
of the commission of murder or homicide."

"Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved."  "The award of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in x x x murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court."
132

G.R. No. 172707               October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA,
RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN
AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Facts of the Case:

Halil Gamboa et. Al., was charged for Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659, for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force
and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away
and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other
amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.

The RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom.

The appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court finding appellants, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death and is ordered
to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of civil liability may increased beyond the prevailing jurisprudence.

2. Whether or not the civil liability be apportioned equally among the accussed or conspirator.

Ruling:

1. Yes

As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping
for ransom is death. Persons convicted of Article 267 were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

However, these amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted
by the facts but is not imposable under present law.

1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and

3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

2. No.

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros  is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among
all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total
amount of ₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each)
and Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity,
₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil
indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.