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ANTI DEFECTION
LAWS
NAME: FAAREHA SHAHID
ROLL NO: 20
CLASS: SEM VII/ REGULAR
SUBJECT: ELECTION LAW
SUBMITTED TO: DR FAIZAN UR REHMAN

INDEX
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CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PROVISIONS

ON ANTI-DEFECTION LAW
2.1 ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM ‘DEFECTION’
2.2 TENTH SCHEDULE AND THE 52ND AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

2.3 THE WHIPS UNDER ANTI DEFECTION LAW

2.4 ANALYSIS OF THE POWERS OF SPEAKER UNDER THE
TENTH SCHEDULE

3. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE TENTH SCHEDULE

3.1 THE SUPREME COURT IN KIHOTA HOLLOHON’S CASE
3.2 DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO KIHOTA HOLLOHON’S CASE
3.3 THE EMERGING PRACTICES

4. CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION
 Page |2

India being a country which has one of the largest number of political parties representing the
interests and ideologies of various groups of people has so far been successful in its
endeavour to run a successful parliamentary and democratic form of government. But, the
recent developments have forced the legislature to rethink the functioning of modern
democracy in the light of defections by the legislators belonging to various political parties
which has resulted in government instability which is undemocratic as it negates the electoral
verdict. Thus in order to maintain the true spirit of democracy it is very much necessary for
the legislature to bring in such legislations as for instance the Anti-Defection Laws.

The phenomenon of defection is not something that is peculiar to India. It is prevalent in

democracies all over the world, which have adopted the party system. In India, the need for
tackling defection was felt after 1967. Before 1967, there were only about 500 cases of
defection, mostly at the level of state. These defections occurred mainly due to ideological
differences and not because of want of office. These defections further bound the fabric of
Indian democracy and restriction such defection would have led to undermining and eroding
the freedom required setup. With the passage of time, this practice started to happen so
rapidly that, after the fourth general election the defections took an alarming turn, many
legislators’ switched sides for the want of office and further abruptly switched back when the
promises were not fulfilled. Between 1967 and 1972 more than 50% of the legislators
switched sides at least once. This practice of switching sides to gain office came to be known
as 'Horse-Trading'. 1
Indian political system started to witness this problem at very rapid pace. Thus, it leads to the
enactment of Schedule X as a tool to protect and maintain the Indian political system. For this
purpose, the only countries to pass anti defection laws have been 4 countries in south Asia viz
India (1985), Pakistan (1997), srilanka (1978) and Nepal (1997) in all these four countries,
the anti-defection laws did not yield the results that were expected out of them.2
The first chapter gives an insight into the highlights of the study with regard to the research
problem, the hypothesis, the method adopted for the conduct of the study. It further gives a
brief description about the various chapters and their concerns in this study.

Under Chapter II which analyses the meaning and definition of the term “Defection” also an
attempt has been made to study the details of the various provisions under the Constitution of

1
Saurabh Sotwal & Tanmay Agrawal, ANTI DEFECTION LAWS IN INDIA, IRJA VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3,
(2014), (SEPT 04, 2016 AT 5:20AM), AVAILABLE AT HTTP:http://www.ijra.in/uploads/41649.9774727662.
2
Ibid
 Page |3

India relating to ‘Defections’. Provisions relating to ‘defection’ both at the Central and State
levels has been analysed.

After analysing the constitutional development, the judicial development with regard to the
same is understood in Chapter III. This chapter gives a detailed account of the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu3. It also gives
a detailed position of law as it existed before and subsequent to Kihota Hollohon’s case. An
attempt has been made in this chapter to analyse the stand point of the Judiciary on the Tenth
Schedule of the Constitution of India.

Certain guide lines and suggestions in order to make the Tenth Schedule more practical and
effective in trying to protect the democratic polity is the conclusion to this study.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PROVISIONS

ON ANTI-DEFECTION LAW

2.1 Etymology of the term ‘defection’

The term defection appears to have been derived, as the dictionary meaning suggests,
from the Latin word ‘defectio’, indicating ‘an act of abandonment of a person or a cause to
which such person is bound by reason of allegiance or duty, or to which he has will fully
attached himself’. It, similarly, indicates revolt, dissent, and rebellion by a person or a party.
Defection thus connotes the process of abandoning a cause or withdrawing from it or from a
party or programme. It has thus an element, on the one hand, of giving up one and, on the
other, an element of joining another. When the process is complete by reason of a person
defecting from a cause or a party or a programme, he is termed as a defector. Defection thus
is a process by which a person abandons or withdraws his allegiance or duty. Traditionally,
this phenomenon is known as ‘floor crossing’ which had its origin in the British House of
Commons where a legislator changed his allegiance when he crossed the floor and moved
from the Government to the opposition side, or vice-versa.4

3
AIR 1993 SC 412
Malhotra G.C, Anti-Defection Law in India and the Commonwealth, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Page No. 03, 11th
4

Edition, 2005, Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd.

 Page |4

2.2 Tenth Schedule and the 52nd Amendment to the Constitution of India

The Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, popularly known as the Anti-Defection Law, introduced by
the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 as amended by the Constitution (Ninety-First
Amendment) Act, 2003 lays down the conditions regarding disqualification, on ground of defection.
The main provisions of the Tenth Schedule are summarized below:—

(i) An elected member of Parliament or a State Legislature, who has been elected as a candidate set up
by a political party and a nominated member of Parliament or a State Legislature who is a member of
political party at the time he takes his seat would be disqualified on the ground of defection if he
voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party or votes or abstains from voting in the
House contrary to any direction of such party.

(ii) An independent member of Parliament or a State Legislature will also be disqualified if he joins
any political party after his election.

(iii) A nominated member of Parliament or a State Legislature who is not a member of a political
party at the time of his nomination and who has not become a member of any political party before
the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat shall be disqualified if he joins any
political party after the expiry of the said period of six months.

(iv) Provisions have been made with respect to mergers of political parties. No disqualification would
be incurred when a legislature party decides to merge with another party and such decision is
supported by not less than two-thirds of its members.5

(v) Special provision has been made to enable a person who has been elected to the office of the
Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the House of People or of the Legislative Assembly of a State or to
the office of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of States or the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman
of Legislative Council of a State, to sever his connections with his political party without incurring
disqualifications.

(vi) The question as to whether a member of a House of Parliament or State Legislature has become
subject to the disqualification will be determined by the presiding officer of the House; where the
question is with reference to the presiding officer himself it will be decided by a member of the House
elected by the House on that behalf.

5
Instituted by: 91st Amendment Act, 2003.
 Page |5

(vii) The Chairman or the Speaker of a House has been empowered to make rules for giving effect to
the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. The rules shall be laid before the House and shall be subject to
modifications/disapproval by the House.

(viii) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 105 or as the case may be, Article 194 or any
other power they may have under the Constitution, the Chairmen or the Speaker of a House has been
empowered to direct that any wilful contravention by any person of the rules made under paragraph 8
of the Tenth Schedule may be dealt with in the same manner as a breach of privilege of the House.

2.3 The Whips Under Anti Defection Law

In its literal dictionary connotation, the word “the whip” means a lash with a stick or
handle used for punishing a person for an offence or in driving a horse-driven carriage for
thrashing or beating the horse to urge it to move forward faster. As a verb ‘to whip’ similarly
means to lash a person or animal or to strike by a whip.

In the context of political parties and parliamentary life, the office of the “Whip” is a
vital link in the relationship between the parties and their members. The “whip” acts as a two-
way channel for information flow between party leaders and members. The “Whip” is the
officer of the parliamentary party or group responsible for enforcing attendance of the
members, keeping them informed of the party line on various issues and from time to time
issuing necessary directives—or Whips—for adhering to party discipline in the matter of
voting on specific issues coming up on the floor of the House. On the other hand, the Whip
also collects information about the opinion among members on various issues and provides
valuable feedback to party leaders.

The Chief Whip of the Government party in Lok Sabha/ Rajya Sabha is the Minister
of Parliamentary Affairs and he is directly responsible to the Leader of the House. It is a part
of his duties to advise the Government on parliamentary business. The Chief Whip acts as the
eyes and ears of the Leader of the Party so far as the members are concerned. During
sessions, in his capacity as adviser to the Leader, he has to be in constant touch with the
Prime Minister. The Chief Whip is assisted by two Ministers of State. This responsibility of
keeping everybody at his post and keeping his party united, strong and well-knit falls on him.
 Page |6

The Whips of the ruling party and of parties in opposition come into contact with each
other to sort out matters of common interest and to understand and accommodate each other
on many crucial occasions. Whips of the ruling party as well as those in opposition thus play
a very significant role in the smooth and efficient functioning of parliamentary democracy.

It is thus obvious that after coming into force of the Constitution (Fifty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1985 and the Anti-Defection Rules framed there under, political parties
came to have constitutional recognition and legitimacy and the directives issued by party
leadership came to have relevance in law. Disobedience of party directives or Whips
thereafter could result in disqualifying a member and losing his membership. It is, however,
to be noted that in order to incur disqualification a member had to vote or abstain from
“voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party”. It did not apply
to acts other than voting, i.e. it did not interfere with a member’s right of freedom of speech
in the House.6

The roles and the corresponding role perceptions are so different in the two contexts
that one may well wonder if it is proper to use the term party for both systems.7

They do not stand up in the House to call right as right or wrong as wrong. Having been
confined to their own interests they have no hesitation in pulling down Government without
rhyme or reason.8

2.4 Analysis of the Powers of Speaker under the Tenth Schedule

A complete harmony between judicial review and parliamentary supremacy is an

outstanding achievement by the architects of the Indian Constitution. The doctrine of an
absolute balance of powers between the different wings of the Government is not feasible.
Practically, someone must be empowered with having the final say in the matter of disputes.
This is the reason that the system of separation of powers in the Constitution of America has
failed in real practice. The judiciary in America has its dominance over other organs of the
Government under the power of interpretation of the Constitution. Due to this domineering
tendency, it is known as ‘safety valve’ or the ‘balance wheel’ of the Constitution. Chief
6
Kashyap C. Subhash, Anti-Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges, Pg: 100, Ed: 2, Universal Law
Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2003
7
Ibid
8
Supra Note 6.
 Page |7

Justice Hughes has aptly remarked, “The Constitution of the USA is what the Supreme Court
says it is”. It has power to declare a law null and void passed by the legislature even on the
ground that it is not consistent with the general principles of the Constitution. Thus, the
American judiciary can poke its nose into the legislative policy like a third chamber or super-
chamber of the legislature.9

In England, Parliament is supreme. It is free to do what it pleases. Every wing of the

Government has to heed what parliament says or does. Blackstone has rightly described the
might and majesty of the British Parliament, “it can do everything that is not naturally
impossible”. That is why the British judges refuse having any power “to sit as a court of
appeal against Parliament.”10

With a view to avoiding either extreme, the Indian Constitution has adopted a golden
mean between supremacy of American judiciary and the supremacy of British parliament. If
the judiciary rides the high horse and behaves arrogantly, the Parliament can bring an
amendment in the Constitution. Pandit Nehru has rightly described this unique feature of the
Indian Constitution, “No Supreme Court, no judiciary, can stand in judgment over the sole
will of Parliament, representing the will of the entire community. It can pull up that sovereign
will if it goes wrong, but, in the ultimate analysis, when the future of the community is
concerned, no judiciary can come in the way. Ultimately, the fact remains that the legislature
must be supreme and must not be interfered with by the Court of Law in such measures as
social reforms.”11

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE TENTH SCHEDULE

The first challenge to the anti-defection law was made in the Punjab and Haryana high court
in Parkash Singh Badal and others v. Union of India and others 12. One of the grounds on
which the law was challenged was that paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution violated Article 105 of the Constitution, wherein the court held: “So far as the
right of a member under Article 105 is concerned, it is not an absolute one and has been made
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating the
9
Supra note 5.
10
Ibid
11
DD Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India; Prentice Hall of India P. (Ltd.) also Delhi, 1994, Pg: 39
12
AIR 1987 P H 263
 Page |8

procedure of Parliament. The framers of the Constitution, therefore, never intended to confer
any absolute right of freedom of speech on a member of the Parliament and the same can be
regulated or curtailed by making any constitutional provision, such as the 52nd Amendment.
The provisions of Para 2(b) cannot, therefore, be termed as violative of the provisions of
Article 105 of the Constitution.

The following table gives some understanding of the view of the judiciary regarding various
issues on the Anti-Defection Law.

Main Issue(s) in the case Judgement of the Court and the name of
the case

Whether the right to freedom of speech and The provisions do not subvert the democratic
expression is curtailed by the Tenth rights of elected members in Parliament and
Schedule. state legislatures. It does not violate their
conscience. The provisions do not violate any
right or freedom under Articles 105 and 194
of the Constitution. [Kihota Hollohon vs.
Zachilhu and Others]13

Whether only resignation constitutes The words “voluntarily giving up

voluntarily giving up membership of a membership” have a wider meaning. An
political party. inference can also be drawn from the conduct
of the member that he has voluntarily given
up the membership of his party. [Ravi S
Naik v. Union of India]14

Whether a member can be said to voluntarily Once a member is expelled, he is treated as

give up his membership of a party if he joins an ‘unattached’ member in the house.
another party after being expelled by his old However, he continues to be a member of the
political party. old party as per the Tenth Schedule. So if he
joins a new party after being expelled, he can
be said to have voluntarily given up
membership of his old party. [G.
Vishwanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu

13
AIR 1993 SC 412
14
AIR 1994 SC 1558
 Page |9

Legislative Assembly]15

Whether paragraph 7 of the Schedule barring The paragraph seeks to change the operation
the jurisdiction of courts in cases of and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the
disqualification is constitutional. Constitution which give the High Courts and
Supreme Court jurisdiction in such cases.
Any such provision is required to be ratified
by state legislatures as per Article 368(2).
The paragraph was therefore held invalid as it
had not been ratified. [Kihota Hollohon vs.
Zachilhu and Others]16

Whether paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule To the extent that the provisions grant finality
granting finality to the decision of the to the orders of the Speaker, the provision is
Speaker/ Chairman is valid. valid. However, the High Courts and the
Supreme Court can exercise judicial review
under the Constitution. Judicial review
should not cover any stage prior to the
making of a decision by the Speakers/
Chairmen. [Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu
and Others]17

Whether a Speaker can review his own The Speaker of a House does not have the
decision to disqualify a member under the power to review his own decisions to
Tenth Schedule. disqualify a candidate. Such power is not
provided for under the Schedule, and is not
implicit in the provisions either. [Dr.
Kashinath G Jhalmi v. Speaker, Goa
Legislative Assembly]18

Whether the Speaker of a legislature is bound The Court cited the case of Kihota Hollohon
by the directions of a Court. where it had been said that the Speaker while
passing an order under the Tenth Schedule
functions as a Tribunal. The order passed by

15
(1996) 2 SCC 353
16
Supra Note 5.
17
Supra Note 5.
18
(1993) 2 SCC 703
 P a g e | 10

him would therefore be subject to judicial

review. [Ravi S Naik v. Union of India]19

Whether judicial review by courts extends to Rules under the Tenth Schedule are
rules framed under the Tenth Schedule. procedural in nature. Any violation of those
would be a procedural irregularity.
Procedural irregularity is immune from
judicial scrutiny. [Ravi S Naik v. Union of
India]20

When can a court review the Speaker’s If the Speaker fails to act on a complaint, or
decision making process under the Tenth accepts claims of splits or mergers without
Schedule. making a finding, he fails to act as per the
Tenth Schedule. The Court said that ignoring
a petition for disqualification is not merely an
irregularity but a violation of constitutional
duties. [Rajendra Singh Rana and Ors. vs.
Swami Prasad Maurya and Ors.]21

3.1 The Supreme Court in Kihota Hollohon’s Case:

The case of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachillhu22, is the landmark decision in this regard.
The Constitutional Bench headed by Justice VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. gave an elaborate,
lucid and dynamic judgment. The constitutional questions considered, the principles propounded and
the interpretation of the various provision of the Constitution of India, the extracts of the same from
the judgment are produced below.

HELD:
(i) Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution in terms and in effect excludes
the jurisdiction of all Courts including the Supreme Court and High courts, and brings
about a change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the
19
AIR 1558 1994 SCR (1) 754
20
Id.
21
(2007) 4 SCC 270
22
Ibid
 P a g e | 11

Constitution of India, and therefore, the amendment would require ratification in

accordance with the proviso to Articles 368(2) of the Constitution of India.

(ii) The finality clause in Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is not
decisive. Such finality, being for the statute alone, does not exclude extraordinary
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 and of the High Courts under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

(iii) The legal fiction in para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule brings a proceeding under para
6(1) within the ambit of clause (1) of Article 122/212 of the Constitution, and,
therefore, makes it justiciable on the ground of illegality or perversity in spite of the
immunity it enjoys to a challenge on the ground of "irregularity of procedure”.

3.2 Developments subsequent to Kihota Hollohon’s Case:

The rule of precedence is well incorporated in the Indian legal system, according to Art 144
of the Indian Constitution, the judgment of the Supreme Court are binding on the lower
Courts. The researcher tries to analyze this application of Art 144 of the Indian Constitution
in the case of judgment delivered in the Kihota Hollhon’s case. In this exercise, the
researcher examines the various judicial interpretations, in the wake of Kihota Hollohon’s
decision.

In Manilal Singh v. Dr H. Borobabu Singh23, the respondent, Speaker of a House was

charged with contempt proceedings. It was observed that in spite of the clear decision of this
Court that an order made under the Tenth Schedule by the Speaker relating to the
disqualification of a Member of the Legislative Assembly is subject to judicial review and
the Speaker while making an order under the Tenth Schedule acts merely as a statutory
authority amenable to the court's jurisdiction in that capacity, the contemnor continued to
resist the implementation of such orders made by this Court.

23
AIR 1994 SC 505
 P a g e | 12

Further the Supreme Court held that it is the constitutional duty which requires us to make
this order, to uphold the majesty of law and justify the confidence of the people, that no one
in this country above the law and governance is not of men but of the 'rule of law'. The
Supreme Court while reiterating the principle as laid down in Kihota Hollohon’s case
observed:

“the Speaker while deciding the question of disqualification of a Member of

the Legislative Assembly under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution acts as a
statutory authority, in which capacity the Speaker's decision is subject to
judicial review by the High Court and this Court”.

Again, in the year 1998, the Supreme Court while deciding the matter between
Mayawati v. Markandeya chand,24 it was observed by this Court that Paragraph 6 of the X
Schedule renders the decision of the Speaker final. The Constitution Bench considered its
validity in Kihoto Hollohan case. In the majority judgment: it was held that the finality clause
in Paragraph 6 does not completely exclude the jurisdiction of the court under Articles
136,226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, the Bench held that the scope of judicial
scrutiny is limited to ascertain whether the decision of the Speaker is vitiated by jurisdictional
errors viz. "infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate malafides, non-
compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity."

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana25, the Supreme Court relying on the decision and
principles laid down in Kihota Hollohon’s case as observed as follows:

The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify members acts as a Tribunal

and though validity of the orders, thus, passed can be questioned in the writ
jurisdiction of this Court or High Courts, the scope of judicial review is limited. The
orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or malafides or having been
made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant
considerations. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated.

The question whether reasonable opportunity has been provided or not cannot be put
in a strait-jacket and would depend on the fact situation of each case. While considering the
plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to bear in mind that the

24
AIR 1998 SC 3340
25
AIR 2007 SC 590
 P a g e | 13

proceedings, under the Tenth Schedule, are not comparable to either a trial in a court of law
or departmental proceedings for disciplinary action against an employee.

In Utkal Keshari Parida vs. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly26 wherein four MLAs of
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) of Odissa assembly joined the ruling Biju Janata Dal. But,
the Speaker rejected a petition by state NCP president Utkal Keshari Parida, who had sought
disqualification of the four defected MLAs, on the ground that the petitioner was not a
member of the assembly. Justice Kabir, who authored the judgment for the bench, said,

"If the provisions of the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) are interpreted to
exclude the right of any person interested to bring to the notice of the Speaker of
the House the fact that any or some of its members have incurred disqualification
from the membership of the House on any of the eventualities, it would render the
inclusion of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution otiose and defeat the objects and
intents of the 52nd amendment to the Constitution." 

CONCLUSION
The 52nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution with regard to anti-defection law has
been hailed as a bold step to clean public life in India, but, in course of time, certain defects
therein have become apparent which have very much compromised the effectiveness of the
law to achieve its objectives. Defections and splits in parties have always been a feature of
Indian Politics.

In the 25 years of this law, complaints have been made against 62 Lok Sabha MPs. Of
these, 26 were disqualified. It is pertinent to note that ten of these disqualifications were after
the trust vote of July 2008 (over India-US civil nuclear co-operation). Four cases were made
against Rajya Sabha MPs (two in 1989 and two in 2008) and all were upheld. In state
legislatures, up to 2004, out of 268 complaints, 113 were upheld.

26
WP(CIVIL)14868-71/2012
 P a g e | 14

It is possible, however, to suggest from what is enacted in the Tenth Schedule that the
party structure is now being pre-empted and treated as basic and fundamental, for upon
breach of the party mandate in the matters of vote or abstaining from voting or resignation,
the representative loses his seat itself. Party supremacy, thus, is accepted as a principle
throughout, in the Tenth Schedule, which has wide ranging ramifications which do not appear
to have been kept in view while enacting amendment to the Constitution. With all these
laudable objects, which are not very much explicitly in the text of the Schedule, inherently
the scheme is in conflict with the initial scheme of our Constitution pattern that relies upon
individual representative and confers unimpeded freedom upon him.

It is well agreed that this portion of the Constitution of India is enacted in order to
protect the privileges of the House, however as every other law is not static and require
changes, the Tenth Schedule in the wake of securing the privileges of House and to ensure
smooth conduct of Parliamentary affairs has slightly touched upon the corners of democracy
and if it is properly amended to suit the changing circumstances it may assist in living the
dreams of our Constitution drafters and the deciders of the faith of this great nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES
1. Saurabh Sotwal & Tanmay Agraw, ANTI DEFECTION LAWS IN INDIA, IRJA
VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3, (2014)

2. Anirudh Burman ,PRS Legislative Research The Anti-Defection Law – Intent and
Impact

3. Kartik Khanna & Dhvani Shah, ANTI-DEFECTION LAW: A DEATH KNELL FOR
PARLIAMENTARY DISSENT, NUJS L.Rev 2012
 P a g e | 15

BOOKS REFERRED:
1. Kashyap C. Subhash, Anti-defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges., 3 rd Edition,
2011, Universal Law publishing Co., New Delhi

2. Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition, 2011, Wadhwa Publications,
Nagpur

INTERNET SOURCE:
1. http://www.legalindia.com/anti-defection-law/

2. http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/abstract/disqualification_on_ground_of_de.htm

3. http://www.jstor.com