The Unreasonable Richness of Mathematics

JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM

BART VAN KERKHOVE*

1. Introduction

With a wink to the famous essay Wigner [1960], we shall tackle in our paper some
facets of what we have called the ‘unreasonable richness’ of mathematics, when
looked at on a mainly descriptive level, i.e., as a human practice, say, e.g., through the
maximally unbiased eyes of an anthropologist. Wigner claimed that what strikes us as
mystical about the applicability of mathematics will become more straightforward if
only considered from a different angle. That is, if, as he suggested, we abandon the
assumption that mathematics came (or was brought) down to earth just like that, and
instead embrace the view that it was first created as an earthly science “of skilful
operations and concepts” to begin with, i.e., in order to be useful. Parallel to that, it is
our claim that the ample diversity of techniques and methods applied in day-to-day
mathematical practice does not come as a surprise, as long as these working practices
are considered primary or constitutive, i.c. over philosophical frameworks accounting
for them in a highly a priori and perfectibilist way.

Because this is hardly the place to engage in any of the (sometimes esoteric)
foundational matters surrounding mathematics, our main aim will here be restricted to
giving an impression of the multi-dimensional human activity of proving that ideally
has (the acceptance of) formal proof as its end result. We want to bring this
‘phenomenological’ exercise in a maximally systematic way. Therefore, we propose an

*
The authors are director and research assistant respectively of the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of
Science at Brussels University (VUB). Website: http://www.vub.ac.be/CLWF. The latter author
acknowledges support from the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (Belgium).
analytic tool in the vein of that offered by Kitcher [1984]. We shall gradually develop
it, that is extend and refine it, and at each of these stages clarify its working by fitting
in illustrations based on actual research. In the end, the framework is to serve as a
flexible tool for mutually structuring observations of mathematical practices, having
diverse scopes and performed at different levels, in a comprehensible way. That is,
without loosing an integrated picture or the sense that it is indeed genuine
‘mathematical’ practice one is dealing with.

2. A General Model of Mathematical Practice

Kitcher [1984] (ch.7) has captured the notion of a mathematical practice by a quintuple
of components <L, M, Q, R, S>, containing a language L, a set of accepted statements
S, a set of accepted reasonings R, a set of important questions Q, and a set of
philosophical or metamathematical views M. This approach was to explicitly serve the
systematic study of historical developments of mathematical practices as rational
changes, letting the components vary over time. Our approach will be similar, but we
shall try to refine Kitcher’s idea and thus extend its scope of application, yielding, at
least potentially, a ‘richer’ history of mathematical practice.

At first sight the issue raised here seems amazingly easy to address. If you want to
know what mathematical practice is, just look at what mathematicians do and report
what you have seen. However, as it is obvious that not all of the activities of
mathematicians are to be considered mathematical, what exactly are the practices we
should be looking into? The simplicity of the question is deceptive. E.g., on the face of
it, the sleeping mathematician might not seem such an interesting topic for inquiry,
that is until we come across a mathematician going to bed with an unsolved problem
on his mind and waking up the next morning with the solution staring him in the face,
for it can be argued that he has actually been doing mathematics over night! Clearly, a
well-considered selection of practices has to be made. But even if such a selection was
found to be possible as well as executable, the next problem would be to distinguish
important actions from less important ones.

2
No doubt a mathematician addressing some colleagues at the occasion of a conference
is to be considered a fact of utmost relevance, but what about the chit-chat in the lobby
of the hotel earlier that morning? If because of that chit-chat, say, that mathematician
finally gets appointed to a first-class university, a position which allows him to
establish a research group that will eventually dominate the field, then it is obvious
that it hás in fact been important, arguably more so than the talk itself. More dramatic
cases are situations of societal upheaval, such as revolutions, wars, and epidemics. It is
obvious that in such cases all human beings are affected, including therefore
mathematicians. A typical example would be that of mathematicians who joined the
resistance in the Second World War, were arrested and executed, such as Jean
Cavaillès.1 But history seems to be more curious than that. When Gödel published his
famous 1931 paper, there was a response from two Belgians: in 1936 by a philosopher-
logician, Chaïm Perelman, and in 1940 by a mathematician, Marcel Barzin.2 Both
claimed that Gödel had proved something else than the essential incompleteness of
mathematical logic, namely a straightforward contradiction. The story goes that
because of this bad reaction to his work Gödel no longer considered moving to
Belgium in the early phase of the Second World War, but was instead convinced to
settle directly in the United States, which, arguably, saved his life. Or just think of the
damage done to the mathematical community in Germany, especially its Jewish
members, in the same time period, because of the racist mathematical views of Ludwig
Bieberbach.3 There is clearly and unfortunately no need at all to restrict one’s attention
to the sorry fate of Archimedes.

1
For introductory purposes, there is available the beautiful booklet Canguilhem [1996], a compilation of
three speeches on the person of Cavaillès.
2
See Feferman et. al [1986] and [1990], i.e., Gödel’s Collected Works.
3
Bieberbach made a distinction between an Arian way and a Jewish way of doing mathematics. The
distinction was not only based on subject-matter (geometry, as earth-bound, versus algebra, abstract
symbolism) but on style and presentation as well. There was a difference in language use. In a sense, by
looking at a proof one could tell the identity of its author. The full details of this deplorable episode in the
history of mathematics are to be found in Lindner [1980].

3
The provisional conclusion must be that, contrary to the initial impression, the
providing with a full description of (relevant aspects of) mathematical activity will of
necessity be an intricate, i.e. multi-leveled and multi-faceted, endeavour. Given this
full story to be simply too complex to be spelled out, the next question is whether
approximate, less complicated, yet useful descriptions are possible. As a starting point,
let us take the activity of proving theorems as one of the core activities of
mathematicians. Does this perspective yield a sufficiently approximate description?
Not really. An obvious shortcoming of it is that crucial aspects of the proving activity
remain unattended to, such as the reason(s) for mathematicians to work on certain
problems. In other words, if a mathematician is working on a problem P, why indeed
problem P and not some (related) problem P’? For example, while the mathematical
community has shown a tremendous interest in Fermat’s Last Theorem, i.e., to prove
that for n ≥ 3, xn + yn ≠ zn, where x, y, z are positive integers,4 why has there not been
an equal interest in proving the related question of whether for n ≥ 3, xn + yn ≠ zn + p,
where p is a given prime number?5 Another shortcoming concerns the proof itself,
more particularly how it is found, or what considerations have led the
mathematician(s) towards a solution of the problem at hand. In short, more elements
than the bare construction of proof need to be added. In a first estimate, the following
elements should thus at least be included:

1) a mathematical community M of individual mathematicians m1, m2, …, mi,

…

4
Singh [1997] is an accessible introduction to this famous history, officially concluded with the proof
by Andrew Wiles in the mid nineteen nineties.
5
A possibility one should not ignore is that, although mathematicians find the problem itself quite
interesting, they nevertheless do not tackle it, simply for lack of means. In a way this problem, which
was ‘invented’ at the occasion of this paper, generalizes Fermat’s Last Theorem. As the latter is
immensely complicated, one would be inclined to think that so must be the former (but do take care, the
implication is not always valid). One argument for the importance of the question is that, if for every
prime p, there is a solution, then this means that any prime p can be written as a lineair combination of
powers of a certain degree. This sounds interesting for sure.

4
 2) a research program P within the framework of which specific problems p1,
p2, …, pj, … on which these mathematicians work are situated, explaining why
they are important, interesting, worthwhile pursuing, etc. A program P can be
very explicit about such metamathematical considerations, but need not be. It
could just as well be possible that the language used, e.g., set theoretical
language vs. category theoretical language, implies implicitly certain options
and choices.

3) a formal language F, including axioms, definitions, and a body of formal

proofs f1, f2, …, fk, …, as typical answers to the above problems. Here too
metamathematical considerations can play their part, as the simple example of
the formalist versus the intuitionist shows: the former has no problem using an
unrestricted form of the choice axiom, while for the latter this is not acceptable.

Are we there yet? Surely not. In practice, a proof is much more than the logician’s
ideal representation of it as a series of statements, starting with the premisses, ending
with the conclusion, and such that every step is either an axiom or the result of
applying an accepted logical rule. Mathematicians use various proof methods in order
to solve a problem. Without any claim to completeness, the following list may serve as
an illustration6 (these are all methods actually used by mathematicians and as such
referred to):

(a) the reductio proof method: to prove a statement p, start from non-p and derive a
contradiction,

(b) proof by infinite descent: to show that a solution in natural numbers of a

Diophantine equation is impossible, show that if there is a solution, then there
must be a solution that is strictly smaller, and this will lead to an impossible
regression ad infinitum;

6
See Van Bendegem [1999] for more details.

5
 (c) proof by cases: to prove a statement p, split it up in parts such that p ≡ (p1 & p2
& … & pn) and find a separate proof for every pi, then paste together;

(d) proof by induction: to prove a statement of the form (∀n)A(n), where the
variable n is quantified over the natural numbers, first prove A(0) and then
prove, given A(n), that A(n+1) follows;

(e) proof (partially) by computer: a variation on the theme of proof by cases, except
that the cases are checked by a computer instead of a human being, because it
would be require too much time for a human. (It is in this sense a different proof
method from proof by cases). Do note that in this case there is an on-going
discussion among mathematicians whether this method should be accepted as a
proof method or not. A specific case is the famous four-colour theorem (FCT)
which, to some, has now been proven, and which, to some, will turn out to be
correct, very likely, that is;7

(f) probabilistic proof: a method that, to a certain extent, guarantees ‘the next best
thing’. Suppose you would like to show that a certain number n is prime.
Ideally, you want a straightforward answer: yes or no. However, if this does not
work, then there is a second best option: try to show (using proof methods listed
here) that the number n has the property of being p with a certain probability. A
typical format for such a theorem would be: “Given a test T and a choice of k
numbers < n, if the test is positive for n, then the number n is prime with
probability 1 – (1/4)k ”. There is no discussion about the methods used here, but
the result is sometimes questioned;8

(g) visual proofs, aka proofs ‘by looking’, aka ‘experimental’ proofs: a method that
is not generally accepted, but very often very successful. Instead of a lengthy

7
See Wilson [2003] for a recent introduction.
8
See, e.g., Fallis [1997] and [to appear].

6
 proof, a simple picture is shown, and, interpreting the picture, one “sees” the
proof. A nice example:9

Of course, the issue revolves around the question whether one ‘sees’ a specific
case or a generalization ‘through’ the special case. On the other hand, one can
claim that such drawings or pictures show the way to a ‘classic’ proof;

(h) proofs by automated reasoning: this method is to be distinguished from proofs

by computer. In this case the program itself looks for a proof – the core of these
programs is usually some form of resolution technique – that is unexpected in
human terms. A recent successful example is the solution of the Robbins algebra
problem. A Robbins algebra is characterized by the following two axioms:

(R1) (∀x)(∀y)(x + y = y + x),

(R2) (∀x)(∀y)(∀z))((x + y) + z = x + (y + z)),
(R3) (∀x)(∀y)(-(-(x + y) + -(x + -y)) = x).

9
Borrowed from Nelsen [1993], p.77.

7
 The aim is to show that every Robbins algebra, finite or infinite, is a Boolean
algebra. A proof was found that eventually could be transformed into a ‘human’
proof of about 20 lines.

From all this, it follows that for a description of mathematical practice we also need to
distinguish

4) a set PM of proof methods pm1, pm2, …, pmk, …

Apart from the proof methods, a conceptual apparatus is used. That is to say, if a
particular mathematical problem p is analysed, then concepts are introduced in order to
facilitate the analysis. Often such concepts are linked to particular proof methods. And
equally often, it is not the concepts that are mentioned in the statement to be proved,
but derived concepts that will actually feature in the proof. Two examples to illustrate
this idea:

(a) The Goldbach conjecture is the statement that (∀n > 1)(∃p1,p2)(2n = p1 + p2),
i.e., every even number is the sum of two primes.10 The statement itself talks
about natural numbers, prime numbers, and addition. In the still unfinished
search for a proof, one of the important concepts that came up is the G-function,
G(2n) = the number of ways that 2n can be written as a sum of two primes. E.g.,
G(10) = 2, because 10 = 3 + 7 = 5 + 5. If one can show that G(2(n+1)) ≥ G(2n),
then the proof is trivial, since G(4) = 1.

(b) The Collatz conjecture states that the function f(n), that is equal to n/2, if n is
even, and (3n+1)/2, if n is odd, when reiterated has to end in 1. Thus take n = 5,
then f(5) = 8, f(8) = 4, f(4) = 2, f(2) = 1. Or, ‘in shorthand’: 5 8 4 2
1. An important derived concept is the stopping time function σ(n). The
stopping time counts at what moment f(n) reaches its highest value, so, in the

10
See Echeverria [1996] for the initial part of the search for a proof of Goldbach’s conjecture.

8
 example above, σ(5) = 1 (after one application of f, one reaches the value 8). A
number of important results concerning this conjecture are all formulated in
terms of this function σ(n).11

Let us therefore also consider

5) a set C of concepts c1, c2, …, cn, …

Notice that the elements enumerated so far, leave open entirely how a proof is found,
that is, what roads mathematicians actually wander when looking for the elements that
they hope will constitute a proof in the end. It is rather amazing that these features
have not been studied in sufficient depth. We are referring here to such things as:12

(a) informal proofs (including proofs by analogy): the great all-time classic is
Euler’s informal proof of the sum of the inverses of the squares, i.e.,
∞
1/ n ² = π ² / 6 . It is not always mentioned that this was a powerful method
n =1

indeed as Euler used for a large set of similar problems as well, such as Σ 1/(2n)²
= π²/24, Σ 1/(2n+1)² = π²/8, and Σ 1/n4 = π4/90;

(b) career induction: this informal method has to be distinguished from proof by
cases. If one tries to prove a universal statement (∀n)A(n), where n ranges over
the natural numbers, then it is a somewhat strange strategy to check all cases up
to some finite limit N. Nevertheless, it has been done for Fermat’s Last
Theorem, Goldbach’s Conjecture, the Collatz Conjecture, …. To be precise:
very often professional mathematicians do it as well, to gain some insight into
the problem. Even Euler drew lists of the function π(n) that counts the number
of primes smaller or equal to n, to get some idea of the form of the function;

11
See Lagarias [1996] for an excellent overview.
12
See Van Bendegem [to appear] for more details.

9
 (c) mathematical experiments: this method has to be distinguished from the proof-
by-looking method, mentioned above. Let us present a concrete example to
show what we have in mind. Ivars Peterson [1988] discusses the Plateau problem:
given a boundary curve B, what is the minimum surface S having B as its
boundary? Mathematically this is a profound and difficult problem. Analytical
methods are often insufficient. There is, however, a simple way to find solutions
“in an experimental way”, though not necessarily the set of all solutions. Construct
the boundary B in metal wire. Dip it in soapy water and a film will form having B
as its boundary. Physics tells us that this film is a minimum surface. Hence,
Peterson says: “They can explore shapes that are often too complicated to describe
mathematically in a precise way. They can solve by experiment numerous
mathematical problems associated with surfaces and contours.” (48);

(d) arguments that are to be considered mathematical but nevertheless involve non-
mathematical (e.g. philosophical) elements. A typical example would be: to
have doubts about a mathematical statement because of some implausible
consequences. More concretely, some mathematicians have doubts about the
axiom of choice, as it used in set theory, because of the Banach-Tarski paradox.
The paradox states that it is always possible to decompose in three-dimensional
Euclidean space a ball of volume V into two balls of volume V, using only rigid
motions (translations and rotations). There is no mathematical problem here, but
the paradoxical character of the result is what it is all about.

All similar features, constituting the toolkit of the mathematician, as it were, we

propose to call

6) a set AM of argumentative methods: am1, am2, …, ams, …

In the above paragraphs we have listed some of the ingredients that allow one to
successfully engage in the search for a mathematical proof, but as ingredients by
themselves do not make a good meal, strategies are required for handling the problem.
Here is a very simple example of a rule of conduct at this stage of proof construction:

10
“If the original problem p proves to difficult, then split up p in subproblems p1, p2, …
such that a proof of all subproblems generates a proof of p, but p1, p2, … are easier to
handle.” Obviously this related to the proof method by cases. However, the opposite
may happen as well: because of a property of the problem, the use of certain proof
methods is considered futile. Take once again, as an example, the Collatz Conjecture.
As the problem deals with natural numbers, one is tempted to try using mathematical
induction. The initial step is no problem, but, given that the statement holds for all i ≤
n, it is futile to try and show that it will hold for n+1, because the function f (in
general) rises above n. For induction one must somehow get below n in order to apply
the induction step.

Let us therefore in our model of mathematical practice finally introduce

7) a set PS of proof strategies ps1, ps2, …, pst, …

In sum, and bringing all the foregoing remarks together, when wanting to study
mathematical practice in its entirity, the vast structure one would have to look at
consists at least of the following seven elements:

MathPract = <M, P, F, PM, C, AM, PS, …>

(as a reminder: M = community of mathematicians, P = research program, F =

formal language, PM = proof methods, C = concepts, AM = argumentative
methods, PS = proof strategies)

How is one to approach this vast structure? Reduction or simplification are in order, as
a full description of MathPract, even when limited to a particular time-period, will be
hopelessly complicated a task. Available strategies for coping with this circumstance
will be the topic of the next section. Let us conclude this section by briefly comparing
our present proposal with that of Kitcher [1984] (p.163ff). It is clear that we have
opted to discern more, and also more subtly distinguished, components as constituting
a mathematical practice. Kitcher’s L-element, “a syntax coupled with a semantics

11
which includes a set of reference potentials” (170), largely corresponds to our C,13 and
his set S “of sentences, formulated in the mathematical language of the time, to which
an omnivorous and alert reader of the current texts, journals, and reseach papers would
assent” (178) is part and parcel of our more comprehensive F. His set R “of sequences
of statements mathematicians advance in support of the statements they assert” (180)
divides between F, for the formal part, and (largely) AM, for the informal aspects. His
corpus Q of important questions is embedded in our P, together with collectively held
philosophical views belonging to his M (for Metamathematics), including proof
standards and foundational issues, the individual dimensions of which will be attached
in our model to m’s in M (for Mathematical community at large). In addition to
Kitcher, we have distinguished categories of proof methods (PM) and strategies (PS).

From this brief comparison, we think, two things stand out. First, we have wished to
explicitly discern different levels of aggregation in mathematical practitioners: from
the entire mathematical community (M), to research programs, schools or groups (P),
to individuals (m). This stratification, which we certainly do not claim to be
categorical, but which is drawn for analytical purposes in the first place, does allow
one to pinpoint some particular cognitive constraints at work in mathematical practice,
as there are:
- at the ‘universal’ level of M: large-scale developments like
professionalization and internationalization;
- at the ‘individual’ level of m: increasing importance of specialization and
division of labour, both in time and place.
- at the intermediate level of P, establishing connections between both: the
rise of various research programs (Erlangen, Langlands, Hilbert).14
Second, we have not just separated the formal and informal (or, if you will, deductive
and inductive) realms. Being naturalists in epistemology, which roughly means we
take mathematical practice as essentially prior to and constitutive for mathematical

13
Kitcher himself has considered in this respect the initial introductions of symbols for transfinite
ordinals (late nineteenth century), by Cantor, and of expressions for the square root of negatives (late
sixteenth century), by Bombelli.
14
For a more detailed account of this stratification, see Van Kerkhove / Van Bendegem [to appear].

12
theory, we have ‘embodied’ the centrality or primacy of the informal by refining its
structure into PM, AM and PS, elements of MathPract which, importantly, are fully
acknowledged, that is, considerations of a philosophical-normative kind put aside.

As already said, using this model, we claim one should be able to account for a ‘richer’
diversity of (possible) routes this practice has (or could have) taken. Although our
primary scope is an institutional or social one, by explicitly incorporating an
identification of mathematicians m1, m2, …, mi that belong to a mathematical
community M, it is facilitated that explorative exercises into the richness of
mathematical practice can be carried out at the collective or cultural level as well as on
the individual or cognitive level. As we see it, one first becomes a mathematician by
joining a community. This means that one’s practice is and will be constituted in the
first place by that community. That is not to say however, that mathematicians cannot
be distinguished on the basis of personal characteristics (what a collectivist fallacy that
would be). One becomes an individual in the community, by appropriating oneself, in
a more or less pronounced ideosyncratic way, the other elements of MathPract
generally associated with that particular community. E.g., depending on personal traits,
one might contribute to its research program in a very formal style, or rather sketchy
(and indeed, by doing one or the other, possibly get driven away from that
community). While accepting interdependencies between both levels, we strongly
decline reducing mathematical activity to cognitive one, and seeing the community as
a mere accidental vehicle for mathematical progress essentially depending on cognitive
structure. As we see it, this carries the risk of leading away from a truly naturalist, i.e.,
descriptive, focus, into the justificatory realm. A sorry switch like this is made in the
course of Lakoff/Núñez [2000], an ambitious attempt at providing a (‘the’) cognitive
foundation of mathematics. In the next section, we describe a number of alternative
ways in which our model can be put at work, including a suggestion for micro-focus.

3. Studying Mathematical Practice: The Model at Work

13
Basically, we see two fundamentally different ways of entering and exploring the
MathPract labyrinth depicted by us in the previous section.

The first strategy will be to select one of its particular elements, to keep it ‘fixed’ and
trace its historical development, ignoring (variations in) some of the other elements.
One could tell the history of a mathematical community Ma together with their
research program Pb. A nice example is the history of the Bourbaki school in France.
Here we have a group of mathematicians who rewrote the foundations of mathematics
and in doing so created a language as well as a way of thinking that future
mathematicians would use, which in its turn was to serve as the ‘identity card’ for
belonging to the community.15 The history of a mathematical problem pc is perhaps the
more ‘familiar’ type of historical writing: Fermat’s Last Theorem, Riemann’s
Hypothesis, Bieberbach conjecture, Goldbach’s conjecture, Pick’s Theorem… are all
cases in point.16 Another possibility is to trace the history of a particular concept cn or
set of concepts Co. That is, irrespective of what mathematician did what, no matter
what the problems and proof methods were, one inquires how cn or Co did come about.
The birth of specific numbers has been the focus of many such a historical treatment:
zero, e, i, π, infinity, the golden ratio ϕ, γ or Euler’s constant, ….17 And somewhat
stretching a narrow conception of ‘mathematical concept’, the range can here be very
well extended to cover, alternatively or additionally, the obvious centrality of

15
There are, of course, the numerous works of Jean Dieudonné, himself a core member of Bourbaki. But
instead the works of Jacques Roubaud seem to be more intriguing, because he situates the mathematical
developments within a broader cultural context. See Roubaud [1997].
16
Riemann’s hypothesis, the most famous and important of open problems in mathematics overall
(concerning the distribution of the prime numbers), has recently been the subject of remarkable interest
in terrms of expository books: Derbyshire [2003], Sabbagh [2003] and du Sautoy [2003], while the
classic one is Edwards [2001]. The case of Pick’s Theorem has been scrutinized in Sandborg [1997].
See also footnotes 4 and 10. For Bieberbach’s Conjecture, see Baernstein et al. [1986].
17
Here are some suggestions for further exploration: Barrow [2001], Beckmann [1971], Havil [2003],
Herz-Fischler [1998], Kaplan [2000], Lavine [1994], Maor [1994], Seife [2000].

14
particular equations in large portions of mathematical practice,18 or the interesting and
semantically important evolution of notational conventions.19

In contrast to the former strategy, the second one will aspire to take into account all
elements (or as many as possible), but on a reduced level, e.g. by focussing on one
particular mathematician md working on a particular problem pe, using a specific range
of concepts Cf. The task one sets oneself here could for example be to write the
biography of a mathematician, such as Fermat or Gauss, or to write the genesis of a
particular mathematical idea, say a set of concepts Cf, involving two or perhaps three
mathematicians. One ends up in a kind of micro-history, because on that level it is a
reasonable undertaking to try and let all the elements belonging to the MathPract play
their part. An example: the recent work done by Pesic [2003] on the proof of the
impossibility for an analytic solution to equations of fifth degree, on the one hand,
shows Abel having the ‘right’ ideas, yet still thinking within a more traditional
geometrical framework, and, on the other hand, Galois, with similar ideas, but
exploring a more abstract universe. The story that Pesic tells also involves the
difficulties for Abel to find a position at university level allowing him to continue his
mathematical research, his weak health, and, of course, the untimely death of Galois in
a duel.

As has become clear from the above example, given the elements that minimally
constitute a shared mathematical practice, at the same time, each individual
mathematician appropriates himself all of these elements, into what one might call a
personal style. Either the mathematician emphasizes one or another aspect of
MathPract, or he succeeds in putting together different elements into a unique
combination, up to the point that it even becomes possible to identify a mathematician
by his work. As perhaps this claim might sound a bit outrageous, let us briefly present
a modest case study.

18
See Farmelo [2002]. Note that very often equations, just like concepts, bring together different fields
or subdomains of the mathematical world. The famous equation eiπ+1 = 0 brings together complex
numbers on the one hand and trigonometric notions, such as sinα and cosα.
19
See Cajori [1993].

15
It is generally accepted that Bernhard Riemann’s paper Uber die Anzahl der
Primzahlen unter einer gegebenen Grösse (1859, On the Number of Prime Numbers
less than a Given Quantity) marked the beginning of the famous Riemann Hypothesis,
∞
i.e., for s a complex number, given the function (s) = 1 , all the non-trivial zeros
n =1 ns

are of the form 1/2 + i.x (in other words, they are all on the line Re(s) = 1/2). However,
apart from the fact that this statement only appears as a side remark, the paper itself
does something entirely different. If one evaluates the eight-page paper from the proof
perspective, then one must conclude that is below level. Some proofs are not correct,
others are mere outlines, where it is not clear at all how the details should be filled in.
But the strength of the paper lies elsewhere: the amazing capability of Riemann to
introduce new concepts and to indicate how these concepts could do future work.
Basically what he does is take well-known concepts, such as the gamma-function,
∞
Γ * ( n ) = e − x x n dx , and relate these to new concepts, such as the famous zeta-function
0

sπ
, i.e., ζ ( s ) = Γ * ( − s ). 2π s −1
. 2 sin .ζ (1 − s ) , which enables him to suggest other
2
formulas using old and new concepts.

We suggest that this kind of approach, viz., to generate a network of concepts where
old and well-known concepts are linked to new ones, suggesting future research, can
be interpreted as defining a personal style, in this case of Riemann. It reflects at the
same time the strengths and the weaknesses of a particular individual mathematician. It
would be an extremely nice exercise and/or experiment to try to identify a “great”
mathematician’s style and to rewrite other existing papers in that style and then to
check whether mathematicians would attribute the paper to that particular
mathematician.

There is also the possibility of a combined strategy, focusing on one of the elements in
the structure and introducing various other elements rather ad hoc, or in as far as this is
relevant or necessary in order to proceed with the selected line of inquiry. For

16
example, Hilbert’s agenda of twenty-three problems, presented at the Paris ICM in
1900, is a typical example of a research project Pg, but if one wants to tell the story of
how Hilbert arrived at formulating these problems and/or of how they were coped with
afterwards, additional elements have to be introduced, dealing with what
mathematicians mx proved or set out to prove what problems py, using what methods
pmz etc. In semi-formal terms one gets a combination of full sets and particular
elements, such as for example <mh, pi, pmj, C, AM, PS>, which would correspond to a
particular mathematician working on a particular problem using a particular proof
method, but making use of all sorts of available concepts, argumentative methods and
proof strategies. Similarly for properly following up the receival of recently proposed
general problem agendas, such as Smale [1998], Griffiths [2000], or Devlin [2002].20

An important consequence of the approach we are proposing here, is that these

different kinds of looking at the development of mathematics can co-exist peacefully.
We need just as well the detailed, as complete as possible micro-histories where we are
looking over the shoulder of the mathematician as he is doodling on the paper, and we
need just as well in-between stories that tell the rise and fall of a problem, of a research
program, of a school of mathematicians, of a concept or family of concepts, and we
need just as well ‘large’ histories that provide a broad framework wherein the ‘other’
histories can be situated. In this sense, we defend a pluralist view of how to describe
the development of mathematics, or, if you like, we propose that many ‘alternative’
histories are possible.

A good test for our approach would of course be to systematically describe existing
work on mathematical practice in terms of the above structure. To give one additional
example, Imre Lakatos’ famous study Proofs and Refutations is a typical instance of
strategy one, i.c. following the history of the proof of Euler’s polygon conjecture V – E
+ F = 2. If mathematicians appear in this story, it is mainly as the authors of a
particular proof or counterexample. There is no sense of a community at all, which is
reflected in the fact that all pupils (Lakatos reconstructs the history as a classroom

20
As for Hilbert’s problem agenda, Yandell [2002] is an excellent survey of solvers and their solutions.
We remind that all but one, Riemann’s conjecture (see footnote 16), have in fact been solved by now.

17
session) are put together in conversation without any of their historical or societal
distinctions being allowed to enter the story. Let us note also that our proposal for what
MathPract should contain, is not meant to be exhaustive or complete. It is perhaps
unncessary to mention this explicitly, but practices tend to change over time, hence we
cannot claim to have any ideas about how mathematics will be practized within a
century, or even half a century from now.21 For sure, this raises the complex question
about mathematical necessity (in whatever sense one wants to fill in this term). Are we
not suggesting that mathematics is a far more contingent business than we are used to
believe? Although we have made clear from the outset that our task in this paper is a
descriptive one, it is equally clear that we are implying something; viz. that we take
contingency as the starting point and that it remains to be shown that some form of
necessity is indeed present.22

4. On the Embeddedness of Mathematical Practice

Let us in this final section return to a comment at the beginning of the paper, namely
that one of the hard questions to tackle is where to draw boundaries. Do we have to
take into account the personal eccentricities of a particular mathematician as relevant
to his or her research? Do we have to take into account the historical time period? Just
think of the fierce debate between Brouwer and Hilbert that surely must have had a
tremendous impact on the promotion of intuitionism. The ‘row’ between them was, in
first instance, a political problem. So, yes, inevitably, we have to introduce society at
large, the basic problem being of course: how?

21
We were left with the same impression after having gone through Ian Stewart’s contribution on
mathematics to Brockman’s reader The Next Fifty Years. (Stewart [2002])
22
Instead of the reverse, in case of which, because one believes that mathematical knowledge is
necessary, then, if a mathematical practice is observed to be quite different, the task is to reinterpret this
practice so that it fits the necessary pattern nevertheless. In concrete terms: if, e.g., at a particular
moment, mathematicians note that a certain research program is not worth persuing and abandon it, then
one will conclude that this program was a ‘deviation’ from the ‘right’ track, so, yes, they hád to abandon
it, as they were ‘erring’. It is against this teleological view that we propose our alternative here.

18
A first observation is that the mathematical community interacts with society on quite
different levels, and in quite different ways. Let us list just a few cases:

(a) Mathematics and the (other) sciences. It is fairly obvious that the relations
between mathematics and the sciences, the natural sciences such as physics, but
equally well the human sciences (psychology) or the social sciences (sociology,
economy) go in both directions. Nevertheless it is tempting to see the relation as
going just one way, arguing roughly along the following lines. Mathematics is a,
if not ‘the’, free creation of human minds utterly unworried about applications.
Afterwards, scientists in search of a mathematical presentation for their theories,
find out that mathematicians have already prepared the ground, have developed
exactly (or roughly) what they have been looking for. This of course gives rise
to an overwhelming feeling of unreasonable effectiveness, as referred to at the
outset (and in the title) of this paper. One famous counter-example to this line of
reasoning: Georg Cantor did not develop set theory out of a philosophical-
foundational concern. He was actually working on a physical problem, trying to
determine the conditions under which a unique solution to the problem could be
guaranteed.23

(b) Mathematics and education. Without any doubt one of the most important areas
where mathematics and society interact in two particular ways: on the one hand,
the problem of educating people to the level of having the kind of mathematical
knowledge enabling them to properly function and participate in society, and, on
the other hand, educating people to the level of being capable of ‘creating’
future mathematics and mathematicians. The questions that can be raised here
are far more complicated than is usually assumed. For example: do we learn
young people theories, or ideas, or concepts, or skills, or practices, or …?
Meanwhile, are we paying attention to a reflection on the subject itself, viz.,
what is mathematics? Is it a cultural product? If so, what do other cultures do?24

23
See Dauben [1992] for the full story.
24
This introduces the topic of ethnomathematics. See, e.g., Livingston [1986].

19
 (c) Mathematics and economic reality (‘where does the money come from?’). Since
mathematical activity as an activity is no different from other activities, the
financial means have to be found to facilitate it. How do these relate to one
another? Why is a particular part of mathematics heavily funded and other parts
absolutely not? Understandably, at the present moment, number theory is a ‘hot’
topic, since it has become intimately connected with secure communication,
coding and decoding. But what about other branches?

(d) Mathematics and popularisation. Apart from the educational framework,

mathematics is also perceived in society and culture through vulgarisation and
popularisation. It is an intriguing problem to find out what kinds or forms of
mathematical ‘entertainment’ are best suited.25

(e) Mathematics and politics. We already mentioned the curious case of Bieberbach
and his Nazi sympathies, but here too a lot of work remains to be done. There is
the pathbreaking work of, e.g., Booss-Bavnek and Høyrup [1984] on
mathematics and war, showing the (unfortunately) intimate connection between
both. Just think about code making and breaking, ballistics, or positioning
systems. A most notable case would be John von Neumann, who participated in
the Manhattan Project developing the A-bomb at Los Alamos, was one of the
respected advisors of the US government, and also in the early stages of the
Cold War developed game theory with on his mind, among other things, a
rational justification for a tougher behavior towards Moscou, possibly up to and
including a first strike on Russia.26

(f) Mathematics and religion. It might perhaps seem a bit strange to suggest a
connection between both, but a history of western culture does show intimate
connections between them. The successful rise of the notion of infinity in

25
See Van Bendegem [1996] for a general presentation and some first steps.
26
See, e.g., Strathern [2002], or else von Neumann’s biography MacRae [1999].

20
 western mathematics has definitely been inspired and guided by the drawing of
parallels with considerations about the nature of God. A different road to
explore is, of course, via the sciences. Mathematics is used in astronomy and
there is little to no discussion about the connection between that specific branch
of science and religion.

No doubt the list can be extended, but the first point has hereby been established,
namely that relations exist between mathematics and society at large, and that these are
quite diverse. This leads us straight towards our second observation. Given this
diversity, it is conceivable that a general framework could be devised in which all
these scattered elements could be brought together? A direction for the answer, in our
view, lies in an extension of the concept of ‘practice’. We have defined in a rather
implicit manner, that is used, the notion of mathematical practice, MathPract, as an
instrument for giving a description sufficiently flexible to capture the apparent richness
of mathematics. So why not, next to it, and corresponding to the above cases of
interaction, ‘define’ ScientPract, EducPract, EconPract, etc. When suggesting this,
are we doing more than playing around with words and bold typefaces? For a couple
of reasons, we believe we do.

The idea to phrase human activity in terms of practices is well-established within

sociology and philosophy of science. The ‘school’ of the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge (SSK), involving people such as Harry Collins, David Bloor, Andrew
Pickering, Barry Barnes, and others, has developed a theory of scientific practice that
is immediately connectable to mathematics. As a matter of fact, on several occasions
they have explored the mathematical world.27 So at least the relation between
mathematics and the sciences can be formulated within one and the same framework.
An additional indication that talk in terms of practices seems promising, is that
practices have a very wide range of interaction with one another. Suppose we have a
similar n-tuple for ScientPract as for MathPract, then we can imagine an interaction
on the level of people, on the level of shared concepts, or shared proof ideas, or a

27
For example, Bloor [1991] (ch.5) or Pickering [1995] (ch.4).

21
mixture of these elements. Exemplary scholars that present themselves in this respect
are James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein, who both were moving across the
conceptual borders between mathematics and physics. That is, devising their
revolutionary electromagnetic and relativity theories respectively, in order to formulate
the core mathematical formulas, simultanuously, they had to develop the proper
conceptual apparatus. Although, obviously, natural science is the most evident
candidate, this kind of interaction can be spotted at the fringes with other branches as
well. In economics for example, a science that has been wavering between the exact
and social sciences for a number decades now, an equilibrium theorist like E. Roy
Weintraub would spring to mind.

In sum, the framework definitely seems rich enough to capture the relevant elements
we would like to capture. However, we repeat that lots of work has already been done
in these areas, but, what seems to be lacking is a unifying framework that not only
could bring together these diverse approaches, but at the same time makes it possible
to compare, integrate and elaborate, precisely because we have a common language,
viz. the language of practices.

5. Conclusion

We suggest that, starting from a concrete mathematical practice at whatever level, and
then focusing on its respective components, as discernable within our framework, i.e.,
‘freezing’ them one after another, and telling their stories by looking at how the (or a
number of) other components have evolved in relation to them, will (and does) reveal
numerous interesting perspectives, and as many alternative histories to that of the great
men, schools, periods or nations. Moreover, the structural nature of the framework
gives the opportunity to go into detail, discern several levels and units of analysis in a
controlled way, but at the same time guaranteeing that the more global picture and
connections will not be lost out of sight just that easy. We think this point deserves
repeated emphasis, as it should be understood that our main purpose is an integrative
one. That is, while warmly inviting partial and detailed studies of mathematical

22
practice from the different reflective branches (history, sociology, psychology), what
we want to be avoided at all cost is that mathematical studies end up as the mere
collection of these. Therefore, the very spirit of our tentative proposal for an overall
framework is one of coherence over diversity. Finally, the language we propose, i.e.,
roughly, the ‘language of practices’, allows for a smooth integration of mathematical
and non-mathematical practices, simultanuously respecting both differences and
similarities between mathematics in research, educational, societal, etc., contexts,
while emphasizing the fact that mathematics is first and foremost a human cultural
product.

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