New York, 1775-1776: A Revolution Foiled: Queens County

A Revolution Foiled: Queens County,
New York, 1775-1776
Joseph S. Tiedemann
Downloaded from http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/ at New York University on June 20, 2015

Although most colonial American governments collapsed quickly at the outset of
the Revolution, New York's was an exception. Its royal governor, William Tryon, re-
mained in the capital until October 1775, and the final elections for the General
Assembly of the Colony of New York took place the following January. Because its
residents were such "reluctant" revolutionaries, New York was the last of the thirteen
colonies to declare independence from Great Britain.l Moreover, in Queens County
on Long Island, in the critical years of 1775 and 1776, the Whigs never succeeded
in discrediting royal authority or establishing the legitimacy of their own extralegal
political institutions. As a result, Patriots from outside the county felt compelled
to attempt subduing the area by force.
Although Queens was not in the forefront of the Revolution, events there possess
significance. One school of historiography has emphasized the ideological origins
of the Revolution. Its approach works best in areas, like New England, where there
was an ideological consensus among inhabitants. 2 But where communities were
sharply divided, historians must, in the words of R. A. Ryerson, concern themselves
with "the process by which disaffected colonists were mobilized for resistance and
revolutionary endeavor."3 In Philadelphia, a city in which most of the established
Joseph S. Tiedemann is an associate professor of history at Loyola Marymount University. He wishes to thank
Timothy M. Barnes, Thomas Buckley, S. J., Angus Hawkins, Don Higginbotham, Jacob Judd, Sara Renehan, and
Neil L. York for their comments and suggestions.
1 Carl Lotus Becker, The History ofPolitical Parties in the Province ofNew York, 1760-1776 (1909; reprint,
Madison, 1960),225, 241-42; Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New
York, 1773-1777 (Lexington, Ky., 1966), 129-33. On reluctant revolutionaries, see Milton M. Klein, "New York's
Reluctant Road to Independence," in Politics ofDiversity: Essays in the History ofColonial New York, ed. Milton
M. Klein (New York, 1974), 209-11; Janice Potter, The Liberty we Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York
and Mtzssachusetts (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 1.
• For this school of interpretation, see the works cited in Robert E. Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early Amer·
ican Historiography;' William and Mtzry Quarterly, 39 (April 1982), 334-56. For studies that highlight the con·
sensus among New England farmers on the issues of the American Revolution, see Richard L. Bushman, "Mas·
sachusetts Farmers and the Revolution;' in Society, Freedom, and Conscience: The American Revolution in
Virginia, Mtzssachusetts, andNew York, ed. Richard M. Jellison (New York, 1976), 77-124; and Gregory H. Nobles,
Divisions throughout the Whole: Politics andSociety in Hampshire County, Massachusetts, 1740-1775 (New York,
1983).
3 R. A. Ryerson, "Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadel.
phia, 1765 to 1776;' William and Mtzry Quarterly, 31 (Oct. 1974),565-88, esp. 565. The issue he raises is critical,
even though his model has been questioned because it is based on]. P. Nettl, PoliticalMobilization: A Sociological
Analysis ofMethods and Concepts (London, 1967). For an alternative model, see Edward Countryman, A People
417
418 The Journal of American History
leadership opposed the Revolution, the Whigs prevailed only after "the painstaking
enlistment of a strong leadership core, the construction of new political institutions,
and the rapid mobilization of a majority of the community."4
To understand victories like the one in Philadelphia, it is imperative to scrutinize
situations, like that in Queens, where the Revolution was foiled. The county had
a population of eleven thousand and was situated on the western end ofLong Island,
just across the East River from New York City. Suffolk County lay to the east, the
Long Island Sound to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. Queens was
somewhat atypical. Aside from sparsely populated Staten Island, it was probably
the only county in southern New York where Loyalists outnumbered Whigs. 5 It also

had a solid core of Tory leaders ready to risk their lives and fortunes in the king's
behalf. Since the county was on an island, Britain could readily employ naval power
to protect and embolden local Loyalists. Still, the struggle in Queens demonstrates
not only how successful Tories could be under favorable circumstances; it also under-
scores how critical the process of mobilization was in areas where people were sharply
divided over the Revolution.
To examine affairs in Queens, especially the failure of Whig mobilization and
the triumph of the Loyalist countermobilization, this study will employ insights
suggested by twentieth-century insurgency warfare. Certainly, the American Whigs
struggling against Britain did not possess a fully elaborated doctrine of revolu-
tionary warfare to guide them, but many of their problems were comparable to
those confronting contemporary revolutionaries. Each, for example, had to be con-
cerned about propaganda, organization, the conversion of neutral and disaffected
residents, and the effective use offorce. Hence the experiences of the later period - if
employed, not as a rigid model, but as a flexible tool and source for ideas-can be
instructive for analyzing developments in Queens. 6
The Revolution in Queens was a small-scale civil war in the midst of an intercon-
in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-1790 (Baltimore, 1981), 133.
Although Countryman's approach offers important insights about revolutionary New York, ir is not applicable to
Queens: first, class conflict was not an issue in the coming of the Revolution there; and, second, left to itself, the
country would not have experienced revolution in 1775 or 1776.
4 Ryerson, "Political Mobilization," 584. On political mobilization during the American Revolution, see Richard
D. Brown, Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts: The Boston Committee of Correspondence and the Towns,
1772-1774 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: ColonialRPdicals andthe De-
velopment ofAmerican Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York, 1972); Richard Alan Ryerson, The Revolution
Is Now Begun: The RPdical Committees ofPhiladelphia, 1765-1776 (Philadelphia, 1978); and Richard Buel, Jr.,
Dear Liberty: Connecticut's Mobilization for the Revolutionary war (Middletown, 1980).
, For the argument that Kings County was also Loyalist, see Countryman, People in Revolution, 148; for a con-
trary view, see Philip RanIet, The New York Loyalists (Knoxville, 1986), 68.
6 See Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York, 1961); Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan
warfare (New York, 1962); Peter Paret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York, 1962); Peter Paret, French
Revolutionary warfare from Indochina to Algeria (Princeton, 1964); David Galula, Counterinsurgency warfare:
Theory and Practice (New York, 1964); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of
Malaya and Vietnam (New York, 1966); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion andAuthority: An Analytic
Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago, 1970); Baljit Singh and Ko-Wang Mei, Theory andPractice ofModern Guer-
rilla warfare (Bombay, 1971); and Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historicaland Critical Study (Toronto, 1976). John
Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in Essays on the Amer-
ican Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, 1973), 127.
Revolution Foiled 419
tinental, colonial struggle for independence. Ideology was not the principal deter-
minant impelling partisans to take sides. Individuals instead acted in response to
specific local disputes that had existed since the previous century and that now be-
came the basis for the revolutionary division within the county. New Yorkers were
a factious people, and their experience of bickering in Queens and elsewhere
affected their perception of the Revolution. 7 Indeed, the size of the Whig and Tory
factions in Queens reflected the strength of the contending groups in earlier con-
troversies. In western Queens-the towns of Flushing, Newtown, and ]amaica-
Patriots and Loyalists divided along religious lines. The quarrel had begun with the
establishment of the Anglican church in Queens in 1693, and partisans now saw

the Revolution as a new phase in that old but ongoing dispute. Presbyterians em-
braced independence and the Whig ideology as a path to disestablishment, and An-
glicans tendered their political loyalty to the Crown as a bulwark in defense of their
church's privileged position. Of course, members of those two religious bodies were
at odds elsewhere in New York and America. But the protracted nature of the
struggle in western Queens-an ordeal that had included violence, forcible occupa-
tions of a church, the destruction of ecclesiastical property, periodic civil suits in
provincial courts, and the levying of fines by more than one governor - had politi-
cized participants, provided them with a mentality and vocabulary geared to
conflict, and predisposed them to take sides in the American Revolution. 8
In eastern Queens, the American War for Independence split the town of Hemp-
stead in half. Patriots politically dominated the northern section of town; they
joined the Revolution to achieve home rule from Hempstead. The Loyalists, who
won power in south Hempstead, were antiseparatists who supported the status quo
in town and empire. Again, local issues were paramount in determining how par-
tisans reacted to the American Revolution. In Oyster Bay, located between Hemp-
stead and Suffolk County, there were fewer partisans than in most areas of Queens.
Not only was the population small, but the town also lacked a history of discord.
Unaccustomed to infighting within the neighborhood, few people took up a cudgel
for either the Whig or the Tory faction.
The most significant fact about Queens, however, was that only a minority of its
adult male residents became partisans. Patriots constituted a mere 12 percent of
such men and Loyalists 26.8 percent. A decisive majority, 60.3 percent, preferred
1 My argument in this and the next two paragraphs and definitions of Whigs, Tories, and neutrals throughout
the article is based on Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Communities in the Midst of the American Revolution: Queens
County, New York, 1774-1775;' Journal ofSocial History, 18 (Sept. 1984), 57-78. On New Yorkers, see Patricia
U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New Ytlrk (New York, 1971), 230; Alice P. Kenney,
"The Albany Dutch: Loyalists and Patriots;' New Ytlrk History, 42 (Oct. 1961),331-50; and Staughton Lynd, Anti-
Federalism in Dutchess County, New Ytlrk (Chicago, 1962), 4. On localism in the American Revolution, see Don
Higginbotham, "The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal;' William and Mary Quarterly,
44 (April 1987), 230-73, esp. 264-65.
8 On the reasons why the antagonists in earlier local conflicts became partisans in the struggle over Indepen-
dence, see Tiedemann, "Communities in the Midst of the American Revolution;' 68-69. New York City had also
witnessed sharp conflicts between Anglicans and Presbyterians, and there too religion was probably a factor in align-
ments during the Revolution. See Leopold S. Launitz-Schiirer, Jr., Loyal Whigs and Revolutionaries: The Making
of Revolution in New Ytlrk, 1765-1776 (New York, 1980), 178-79.
neutrality, and there is every indication that they were not only uncommitted but
also apolitical in outlook. 9 Traditional agricultural people, they were more con-
cerned with the soil, weather, and prospects for the next crop than with arguing
the merits of Britain's imperial administration or waging revolution. Their lives
revolved around family, farm, and community. To be uncommitted was to champion
the local and immediate world they knew and understood best. In short, they
preferred harmony and stability to partisanship, discord, or military strife. The
bitter heritage of dissension within the county predisposed such people to remain
on the sidelines during the Revolution. Undoubtedly, they read about the imperial
crisis in newspapers and discussed it at home and in taverns, but the very live possi-

bility that their farms would become battlefields only gave them further cause to
espouse neutrality. So long as they were left in peace, they would probably have ac-
cepted a government that was either British or American. The people of Queens
had a history of growing indifference to politics. Two recent s!udies of colonial
Queens have demonstrated that popular participation in government had indeed
declined in the eighteenth century.10 Town meetings had by the 1770s stopped
voting on provincial affairs, and even some matters of local administration had
passed beyond their purview. Jamaica, for instance, which held an average of 4.87
meetings per year before 1700, held only 1 per year between 1760 and 1776, and
the agenda was usually confined to electing town officials.
For county Patriots to take advantage of the situation, if a framework based on
twentieth-century insurgency warfare can serve as a guide, they had to accomplish
three related and mutually reinforcing objectives.ll First and foremost, they needed
to win the allegiance of the people, particularly the large number of neutral county
residents, in order to gather sufficient strength to challenge Britain politically and
militarily. Second, the Whigs had to develop a viable organizational structure that
was capable of self-maintenance and expansion: new followers had to be recruited
and trained, a base area established, and the necessary weapons and supplies ac-
quired. Third, Patriots had to crush the enemy's will to resist. If royal government,
on the other hand, was to surmount the Patriot onslaught, it needed to compete
successfully for the allegiance of county residents, check the growth of the enemy's
9 Countryman, not recognizing that most residents of Queens were neutral, did not capture the struggle to
mobilize the uncommitted. See Countryman, People in Revolution, 104-8.
10 New York City residents were likewise wary about provoking a military conflict. See Mason, Roadto Indepen-
dence, 103-5. My argument is based on the fact that their distaste for the British military occupation of Queens
measurably declined in 1781 when they thought civil government was about to be reestablished and that they ulti-
mately accepted an American government after the war; see Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots by Default: Queens
County, New York, and the British Army, 1776-1783;' William and Mary Quarterly, 43 Oan. 1986), 35-63; and
Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Loyalists and Conflict Resolution in Post-Revolutionary New York: Queens County as a Test
Case;' New lark History, 48 Oan. 1987), 27-43. On colonial Queens, see Jean B. Peyer, 'Jamaica, Long Island
1656-1776: A Study of the Roots of American Urbanism" (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1974),79-112;
Jessica Kross, The Evolution ofan American Town: Newtown, New lark, 1642-1775 (Philadelphia, 1983),68-70,
140-41, 198.
11 The argument presented here is based on a paradigm developed by Baljit Singh and Ko-Wang Md, which
is broad enough to allow for the inclusion of the insights of other scholars and elastic enough to be of service in
interpreting the evidence for revolutionary Queens County; see Singh and Md, Theory and Practice ofModern
Guerrilla Warfare, 28-91.
organizational infrastructure within Queens, and revitalize the organs of govern-

ment, particularly those touching the people most directlyP This study, therefore,
looks, first, at the ineffectual efforts of county Whigs to topple royal authority in
Queens; second, at the subsequent attempts by Patriots from outside the county
to use military force to achieve the same end; third, at the successful counterinsur-
gency operations conducted by local Loyalists; and, finally, at the conclusions that
can be drawn from studying the foiled revolution in Queens.

Revolutionary warfare is not primarily a military conflict between two opposing
armies but a triangular struggle in which the antagonists compete for the allegiance
of the people. Given the overarching need to cultivate popular support, insurgents
must carefully articulate a cause that can inspire the human spirit and rally diverse
people of differing outlooks behind a common banner.13 A cause needs to be chosen
with particular care, since it should do more than win approval as a noble aspiration.
It must satisfy a people's deepest yearning, thereby galvanizing them to action, per-
suading them to die, if necessary, for the revolution's success. Because an insurgent's
ultimate objective is to topple the existing regime, the cause should likewise be one
that the government cannot make its own.
Queens County Whigs were not without a cause. In their appeal to residents,
they championed liberty against the "tyrannical measures of the enemies to our
country" who would "reduce it to slavery" and "destroy that glorious constitution:'
that was "the badge of distinction" separating Britain from all the "nations of the
earth who groan in hopeless slavery without spirit to break their chains."14 Decrying
the corruption "predominant" in England, Whigs recited the list of illegalities al-
legedly committed against the colonists. Tyranny was threatening British America,
and county inhabitants must stand united in defense of their natural rights. Pas-
sivity would be "a neglect of duty, which will in its consequences, entail destruction
upon yourself and your offsprings." The Loyalists' counterplea for moderation was
but a ruse designed to "lull you by their singing, to rest upon your oars, in a tem-
pestuous ocean" at a time "when you might escape shipwreck and death."15 Every
peaceable method for obtaining redress had been endeavored, but "the return has
invariably been a repetition of injuries aggravated by the most intolerable insults."16
12 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 37; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 40-47. Infrastructure can
be defined as "the clandestine politico-military network of cells, activists, and sympathizers covering the country."
See Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 21.
13 This point has wide acceptance. See Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 34, 162; ChalmersJohnson, "Civilian loyal-
ties and Guerrilla Conflict;' World Politics, 14 (July 1962), 646-61; Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 10-11;
and Shy, '~merican Revolution;' 126. Singh and Mei, Theory and Practice ofModern Guerrilla Warfare, 30-33;
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 21; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 18-25.
14 "A Freeman of Newtown;' New-YorkJournal, March 9, 1775. Also pertinent are "A Freeholder of Hempstead,"
New-York Gazette andthe Weekly Mercury, May 8, 1775; and "A Lover ofLiberty;' New-YorkJournal, Feb. 9, 1775.
" "To the Free-Holders of New-Town;' April 3, 1775, Broadside Collection (New-York Historical Society, New
York, N.Y.).
16 "To the Inhabitants of Queens County, Long Island;' New York Constitutional Gazette, Dec. 6, 1775. Also
important on this point is "To the Inhabitants of Queens County, Long Island;' ibid:, Nov. 29, Dec. 2, 1775.
In spreading their message, however, county Whigs confronted obstacles they

only dimly perceived and never effectively surmounted. Patriot propaganda needed
to sway three specific audiences: it had to fortify the committed, confound the
enemy, and convert the neutral. The principal difficulty was that Britain's alleged
abuses, from the Stamp Act to the Intolerable Acts, had in Queens (as in other rural
areas) caused scarcely a protest. Imperial issues were too remote - economically, po-
litically, and psychologically-for the county's neutral, apolitical majority to feel
personally involved. In truth, these people remained unconvinced of British tyranny
even after the Declaration of Independence. A century of local conflicts had inured
them to the partisan outbursts of their neighbors. Moved more by who was speaking

than by what was being said, neutrals interpreted Whig pronouncements in terms
of Long Island history, not imperial relations. Their indifference likewise reflected
the fact that Whig propaganda was ill attuned to their temper and lacked the appro-
priate specificity. It condemned the "tyrannical and wicked designs of a corrupt and
arbitrary ministry" and denounced Tory leaders as "ministerial tools and enemies
of their country."17 But British oppression was not explicated so that people could
apprehend how it menaced the everday world they knew and cherished. Because
Whig propaganda bespoke the language of conflict rather than harmony, it did not
assuage neutrals' fears that the quest for liberty was more than another painful epi-
sode in the history of community discord. Moreover, by rousing in their minds the
dreaded specter of warfare, it made the Whig cause less appealing, not more com-
pelling. Already driven to apathy by local quarrels, neutrals were chary about even
listening to Whig arguments, never mind directly confronting the British army. As
a result, the Patriots failed to shake the apolitical out of their apathy or remake them
into political beings.
About 20 percent of the county's neutrals were Quakers who had a religious com-
mitment to pacifism. Unlike some other pacifist religious sects, Friends did not hold
a negative opinion of the state itself. Instead, Quakers were enjoined by their reli-
gious principles to give active obedience to the civil government except when its laws
demanded that a Friend commit an immoral act. Overthrowing a secular govern-
ment was the responsibility of God alone. As a result, Whig propaganda repelled,
rather than attracted, Quakers. In fact, the New York Meeting for Sufferings formu-
lated guidelines for proper behavior so that Friends did not give aid or comfort to
either antagonist. Only 4.5 percent of all county Quakers became Whigs, and only
9 percent became Loyalists. The Quakers also apparently influenced other county
residents: the larger the percentage of Friends in a community, the larger was the
proportion of neutrals in the population as a whole and in the non-Quaker segment
of it.I8 Whether or not Friends had a like influence in other New York communities
demands further study. Perhaps the evident disposition of the county's apolitical
17 "To the Free-Holders of New-Town," April 3, 1775, Broadside Collection; .~ Freeman of Newtown," New-York
Journal, March 9, 1775.
18 See Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Queens County, New York, Quakers in the American Revolution: Loyalists or
Neutrals?" Historical Magazine ofthe Protestant Episcopal Church, 52 (Sept. 1983), 215-27.

Interior, Flushing Meeting House, before mid-twentieth century.
Flushing Monthly Meeting, Religious Society ofFriends.
residents to shun conflict gave added force to Quaker arguments about the wisdom
of strict neutrality. Moreover, individual Friends furnished examples of stalwart
courage against the pressures Whigs and Tories could bring to bear on neutrals.
Patriot propaganda instead appealed primarily to partisans already alienated
from the status quo and angered by alleged injustices. It attracted Presbyterians in
western Queens who seethed at the Anglican church's privileged status within the
county and inhabitants of Hempstead's north shore who resented the town's polit-
ical domination by residents living in the south. Because these people believed
themselves abused at home, they could readily perceive a relationship between the
rights they sought in their own communities and the liberties Whigs throughout
America were fighting to protect. Presbyterians, for example, easily persuaded
themselves that they were not engaged in a nasty dispute with neighbors but in a
noble struggle to establish "a country ofperfect freedom."19 Yet if such local malcon-
tents were, because of past experiences, quickly convinced by Patriot tirades against
19 "To the Inhabitants of Queens County, Long Island;' Constitutional Gazette, Dec. 6, 1775. On these disputes
and the relationship of the religious quarrels to politics in the city and province of New York, see Tiedemann,
"Communities in Revolution;' 63.
oppression, very little in Whig propaganda was directed at calming the apprehen-
sions of those county partisans who fell on the opposite side of local disputes and
who perforce were drawn to the Loyalist cause.
Perhaps the history of conflict in Queens made it unlikely that either antagonist
would ever genuinely understand the other's point of view. What was tyranny to a
Presbyterian Whig was a blessing to an Anglican Loyalist. Not only did the connec-
tion between church and state protect the Anglicans' privileged status in Queens,
but the Church of England's Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign
Parts had for decades nurtured their religious life, blessed their marriages, and bap-
tized their children. Whig propaganda redivided partisans along the old lines of

cleavage and made conversion of the Loyalists unlikely. In addition, Patriots
responded ineffectually to Tory whisper campaigns that sought to exacerbate the
preexisting tensions and thereby to stop residents from uniting against Great
Britain. For example, when a rumor spread that the Patriots would destroy religious
(that is, Anglican) freedom, Whigs categorically denied the charge but did not re-
fute it or give Anglicans cause to overcome their fears. 2o If an objective of revolu-
tionary propaganda is to destroy an opponent's will before attacking his armies,
patriots failed dismally; the resolve of local Tories waxed, rather than waned, with
time.
The inefficacy of Whig propaganda mirrored the corresponding inability of the
Patriot insurgents to establish a viable organizational structure in Queens. A cause
and an organization are inseparable components of successful revolutionary warfare.
The first affords an organization purpose and coherence but requires the latter for
support if the insurgency is to flourish. An effective organization provides leader-
ship, intelligence, communication, propaganda, training, and military support. It
promotes the cause among the uninitiated, guards against backsliding by the
faithful, and maintains surveillance over the enemy. At best, there should be both
vertical and horizontal subdivisions of the organization, crisscrossing over the popu-
lation and binding people to the cause in diverse ways and sundry contexts. Being
ubiquitous, the movement can variously tempt, prod, and coerce neutrals into ac-
tions that will in the end make them believers. Organization is also necessary before
a rebel can impose himself on an opponent and thereby destroy the latter's will to
resist. 21
The attempt to organize a political infrastructure in Queens began at the behest
of New York City Whigs in December 1774, after the meeting of the First Con-
20 In the Hackensack Valley ofNewJersey cwo factions of the Dutch church rook opposite sides in the Revolution.
Although the Whigs were a majority and the British did not give the same aid as in Queens. the Patriots had
difficulty mobilizing their forces, and a savage civil war ensued. Adrian C. Leiby, The Revolutionary IfrIr in the
HfJ&kensfJ&k Valley: The Jersey Dutch and the Neutral Ground (New Brunswick, 1962). In Chatham, New Jersey,
the people were predominantly Presbyterian, and only one resident became a Tory. Donald Wallace White, A Vil-
IiZge at IfrIr: Chatham, NewJersey, andthe American Revolution (Rutherford. 1979). 50. For a divisive Whig effort.
see "To the Inhabitanrs of Queens County, Long Island," Constitutional Gazette, Dec. 6, 1775.
21 Paret, French RevolutioniZry IfrIrfare. 12-13; Singh and Mei. Theory and PrfJ&tice ofModern Gue"illiZlfrlr-
fare. 33-39.

The Schenck House, Manhasset, North Hempstead.
Courtesy Nassau County Museum Reference Library, Hofstra
University Library, Hempstead, New 'York.
tinental Congress. Initially, county Patriots endeavored to gain control over the
regular town governments by calling special town meetings to pass resolutions sup-
porting the Continental Congress and appointing local committees of correspon-
dence. Victories at the special meetings would signify people's complicity and clothe
the cause with legal sanction. But the effort miscarried. In only one of the county's
five towns, Newtown, did Patriots win a decisive victory.22 Almost everywhere else
the Tories adroitly outmaneuvered their adversaries, and the cause is not difficult
to discover. Because Loyalists outnumbered their opponents in just about every com-
22 For a modern approach to the problem, see Kenneth L. Wilson and Anthony M. Orum, "Mobilizing People
for Collective Political Action;' Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology, 4 (Fall 1976), 187-202, esp. 196, 199.
Committees of correspondence were also established in Jamaica and Flushing. In Jamaica Tories argued correctly
that the committee did not have majority support; in Flushing the committee refrained from acting for want of
support.
munity, success demanded only that they convince the uncommitted to remain
uninvolved. Whigs, on the other hand, to gain the support necessary for victory,
had to persuade neutrals to break with their past, become partisans, and put their
families and farms at risk. In hindsight it is evident that the Patriots did not succeed
and consequently did not gain the momentum necessary to establish a viable or-
ganizational structure within Queens. The low turnout at a number of the meetings
underscored not only the paucity of county Whigs but also the inability of Patriot
leaders even to persuade others to hear their arguments. Because skeptical
townsmen remained convinced that the present controversy was but an extension
of the local disputes that had divided their communities for decades, residents-

partisans and neutrals alike-lined up once again as they had so often in the past.
The Whigs thus went down to defeat in all but Newtown. In addition, unlike the
Tories, county Patriots did not establish a clandestine leadership nucleus to set
strategy or determine tactics. Acting in the open, they were more easily outwitted. 23
In March 1775 the Patriot committee in New York requested that each town elect
deputies to a newly established Provincial Congress to meet on April 20. As before,
and for the same reasons, the Whigs failed to galvanize their local communities in
support of the American cause. The Whigs did win again in Newtown, and they
also savored an unexpected (but temporary) victory in adjacent Flushing. But those
were the smallest county communities. Elsewhere the proposed candidates were
defeated, and the largest town, Hempstead, refused even to debate the question.
Undaunted, two ofthe rejected candidates appeared before the Provincial Congress,
which permitted them to sit and speak but not to vote. In May, when it was necessary
to elect delegates to a new Provincial Congress, Patriots organized an extralegal
meeting of county residents to be held at Jamaica. Although unprecedented, that
strategy provided Patriots with an alternative to facing fresh defeats at the town
level. The Whigs also endeavored to provide the meeting and their cause with
greater appeal and legitimacy by having one prominent Tory, Daniel Kissam, chair
the meeting and by choosing another, Joseph French, as a delegate to Congress.
Moreover, Loyalist leaders blundered by urging all to boycott the meeting, thereby
allowing those Whigs who did attend a free hand in electing a slate of delegates.
Nonetheless, the Tories still embarrassed their opponents. The meeting had appar-
ently proceeded as expected until three "gentlemen" informed those assembled that
Hempstead had met a few days earlier and resolved that no one should be elected
in its name. Again, there was the embarrassment of delegates without a constitu-
ency. The people pressed around the three, and after much cajoling, one of them,
Thomas Hicks, reluctantly consented to his own election if he could subsequently
win the approval of Hempstead townsmen. Tensions eased, and the prearranged
slate of candidates was elected. But Hempstead Loyalists were incensed, and a few
town leaders quickly dissuaded Hicks from attending Congress. 24
2~ Singh and Mei, Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare, 34-35.
24 New-York]ournal, March 23, 1775; New-York Gazette, May 8, 1775; Peter Force, comp., American Acrhilles,
4th ser. (6 vols., Washington, 1837-1853), II,.251, 428, 838-39, 1114; Henry Onderdonk, Jr., comp., Documents
Hempstead Tories, however, did not have the last word. The town's Patriots were
upset by their adversaries' control over community affairs. The April 1775 town
meeting, for example, had not only denied Whigs an opportunity to present their
case but had also ousted them from important town offices. Most Patriots lived on
the north side of town, and their chance for revenge came when the Provincial Con-
gress in August 1775 directed "every county, city, manor, town, precinct, and dis-
trict" to form its own militia company. Residents of the town's northern necks met
in September and declared their inability to support the "common safety" as long
as they remained part of Hempstead. They resolved that for the controversy's dura-
tion they would consider themselves a separate political entity and, as such, estab-

lished their own committee and militia company. Yet victory in north Hempstead
did not presage a reversal of Whig fortunes or the establishment of a secure base
area. 25 It was, instead, a modest triumph that quietly conceded the more populous
part of town to the opposition camp.
Moreover, at about the same time, the Whigs suffered another serious reversal.
In April 1773 men who later became Whigs constituted 46.2 percent of the major
town officeholders in Queens, but by April 1775 the proportion of Whigs holding
such offices had declined to 32.3 percent. By way of contrast, 30.8 percent of the
major officeholders in 1773 were future Tories, but in 1775, 48.4 percent were
Tories. 26 Unable to garner even the passive acquiescence of residents, the Whig
movement would have soon collapsed. It lacked sufficient strength by itself to main-
tain its own base of support or destroy the enemy's will to resist. The victories in
Newtown and north Hempstead had had little favorable impact beyond their
borders and did not engender the momentum necessary to achieve self-maintenance
or expansion.
At that juncture, developments elsewhere in New York began to intrude forcibly on

county affairs. By May 1775 the provincial Patriot movement had reached the point
of self-maintenance and expansion. As a result, the Provincial Congress intervened
and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents ofQueens County (New York, 1846), 25-26; John
Cox, Jr., ed., Oyster Bay Town Records (8 vols., New York, 1916-1940), VII, 53, VIII, 341; Calendar ofNew York
Historical Manuscripts, Relating to the I¥tzr ofthe Revolution in the Office ofthe Secretary ofState, Albany, New
York (2 vols., Albany, 1868), I, 3-4, 38-41, 90; Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Com-
mittee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1776-1777 (2 vols., Albany, 1842), I, 4;
Henry Onderdonk, Jr., ed., Queens County in Olden Times: Being a Supplement to the Several Histories Thereof
(Jamaica, 1865), 39, 48-49.
" "A Freeholder of Hempstead," New-York Gazette, May 8, 1775; Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 114,
173; New-YorkJournal, Oct. 26, 1775. Of the 382 known adult male residents of north Hempstead, only 15.2%
were Patriots while 13.9% were Loyalists; Tiedemann, "Communities in the Midst of the American Revolution;' 60.
• 6 Information on office holding was derived from the town records: Cox, ed., Oyster Bay Town Records, VII;
Benjamin D. Hicks, ed., Records ofthe Town of North and South Hempstead, Long Island, New York (8 vols.,
Jamaica, 1896-1904), IV, V, VI; Leland Fielder, ed., Records 0/ the Town o/Jamaica (7 vols., Jamaica, 1939), IV;
and "Records of the Town of Newtown, 289;' Historical Documents Collection (Benjamin Rosenthal Library,
Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.). There were twenty-six known important officeholders in 1773 and thirty-one in
1775.
in Queens and attempted coercion as a form of persuasion. In June it requested

the elected county deputies who had not attended Congress to justify their absence.
Hicks recounted his misunderstanding with Hempstead freeholders, and French ex-
cused himself because his constituents opposed participation. After the other county
representatives reported on the recalcitrance of the population, Congress directed
the absentee members to be seated. Then on September 16 it ordered the disarming
of every New Yorker who had not signed the Continental Association, an agreement
adopted by the Continental Congress to boycott British goods. But on September
25 Abraham Skinner notified the provincial Committee of Safety, which directed
affairs when the Provincial Congress was not in session, that those collecting

weapons inJamaica were in danger. Several Tories had been mustering in arms, and
a clash seemed inevitable. The committee dispatched Egbert Benson to investigate
and ordered Col. John Lasher to follow at once with troops. Benson reported back
that a strong display ofmilitary force would be required to disarm those who refused
to subscribe to the association. People were concealing their weapons and refusing
to obey an extralegal congress. Some were even parading in military formation, and
the lieutenant governor was urging resistance. The situation was most perilous in
Hempstead where a defiant Capt. Richard Hewlett, a militia officer, was boasting
that he was prepared to do battle. Confronted by so direct a challenge, the commit-
tee backed down. 27 Busily preparing for Britain's expected invasion of New York,
it could not spare the manpower needed to disarm county Tories.
The efforts at forceful persuasion by the Provincial Congress had had decidedly
mixed results. They did avert the insurgency's complete collapse within Queens,
where local Tories had mobilized sufficiently to rout their opponents. County Whigs,
after all, had never been more than a splinter group that Loyalists outnumbered
two to one. But there was a heavy price to pay. Congress's inability to disarm county
Loyalists painfully underscored its own impotence and thereby undermined its
legitimacy. Furthermore, outside intervention only heightened neutrals' fears that
their neighborhoods might soon be devastated by war. Ironically, military interven-
tion by outside Patriots was making it impossible for local Patriots to reverse their
declining fortunes. As a result, the Whigs suffered defeat again in November when
residents voted 778 to 221 against electing deputies to the Provincial Congress. The
loss not only highlighted the Patriots' unpopularity but also demonstrated that
Loyalists had been emboldened, rather than intimidated, by Congress's recent
efforts at coercion. On December 6, 1775, a Declaration of the Inhabitants of
Queens gave notice that "if, in exercising the essential Privileges of Freeman, we
unfortunately differed with our Brethren, as to the mode of bringing the present
Troubles to a happy Conclusion, we have carefully avoided every ostentatious Dis-
27 Mason, Roadto Independence, 62-99. On the risks ofcoercion, seeJohnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla
Conflict;' 650-52; and Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," Journal of
Conftici Resolution, 16 (Sept. 1972), 383-96. On Capt. Richard Hewlett, see Force, comp., American Archives,
4th ser., II, 1114, 1312, III, 795,896,911; Onderdonk, comp., Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the
Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 31-32; Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 58.
play of that Difference." Residents wished only to live in peace and had done
nothing "to interrupt the Quiet of others." Yet Congress was disarming residents
and treating them "as Enemies of our Country." County inhabitants as a result had
armed themselves and were prepared to resist any "Acts ofViolence" directed against
them. Written by Loyalists who had recently received firearms from the British war-
ship ASIa, the declaration was a direct challenge to the Patriot cause. 28
New York's Provincial Congress reacted by ordering the suspected conspirators
to appear before it, but on the appointed day not one attended. It then declared
residents who had voted in November against electing deputies to be "guilty of a
breach of the General Association." Powerless to do more, it notified the Con-

tinental Congress. That body acted swiftly to establish its authority in Queens by
ordering a military force into the county to disarm those proscribed by the Provincial
Congress and to compel them to swear they would remain unarmed. The immediate
objective was to check the growth of Loyalist power in Queens. Yet despite the need
for popular support, coercion was fast becoming a substitute for, rather than a
weapon of, persuasion. Pressed on all sides, the Continental Congress was in effect
forsaking the political struggle for public opinion and pushing instead for military
supremacy. 29
In January 1776 American troops led by Col. Nathaniel Heard marched into
Queens and began arresting Tories. He had initially expected stiff opposition in
Hempstead, but instead six hundred residents voluntarily brought in about a thou-
sand weapons. Despite outward appearances, the expedition was not fully suc-
cessful. In the first place, some of Heard's troops unwisely mistreated inhabitants
and had to be quickly withdrawn before residents were even further alienated.
Moreover, when the collected weapons were later inventoried, many proved unus-
able. Hempstead residents had apparently not turned over the arms received from
the ASIa but had deliberately deceived Heard by their seeming cooperation. Armed
and uncowed, they remained a dangerous threat to the Whigs. The Loyalist
prisoners likewise posed a problem. Uncertain how best to handle them, the Con-
tinental Congress turned them over to the Provincial Congress, which tried unsuc-
cessfully to collect evidence against them. 30 AJamaica Patriot, when asked for infor-
mation, wrote that since his "letter [would] be read publicly;' he could not,
"consistent with my safety, publicly name persons who would be proper evidence."
The north Hempstead committee similarly provided scant information. Knowledge
about the opposition was something local Whigs never had in abundance, even
28 Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., III, 1389-92; New-YorkJournal, Dec. 14, 1775; Bernice Schultz
Marshall, Colonial Hempstead: Long Island Life under the Dutch and English (Port Washington, 1962), 275-76.
29 Force, comp, American Archives, 4th ser., Ill, 1389-92, IV, 405-6, 434-35, esp. 434. W. C. Ford and Gaillard
Hunt, eds., Journals ofthe Continental Congress (34 vols., Washington, 1904-1937), IV, 5-28. There are risks for
either side in adopting a purely military approach. See Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 10-11; Thompson,
Defeating Communist Insurgency, 55-57; and Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 89-90.
30 Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 764, 851, 857, 858-62, 923; Ford and Hunt, eds.,}ournals
ofthe Continental Congress, IV, 114, 150; Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 289, 300. For twentieth-century
criticisms of that approach, see Mao TIe-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Griffith, 92; andJohnson, "Civilian Loyal-
ties and Guerrilla Conflict," 655.
though good intelligence is imperative for military victory. The Provincial Congress,
therefore, reluctantly permitted the prisoners to return home. The decision was an
unfortunate one. Heard's expedition should have aimed to destroy the Tory leader-
ship. Instead, those leaders remained in Queens to vie for popular support and to
resist the Revolution. Their very presence undermined the legitimacy Patriots had
sought to acquire by using military force.31
Patriot harassment of county Tories, however, persisted. Before Heard had even
arrived in Queens, Gen; Charles Lee had already won George Washington's permis-
sion to disarm county Loyalists. Convinced that most Long Islanders planned to join
the British when they landed, Lee ordered Isaac Sears to administer yet another oath

to Tories and to arrest those refusing to take it. Lee also directed Col. Andrew Ward,
commander of a Connecticut regiment, "to secure the whole body of professed
Tories in Long Island." However, those efforts had an effect opposite to the intended
one; coercion must be applied with purposeful discrimination, not unthinking
abandon. Committeemen from Hempstead were soon protesting vigorously about
the abusive behavior of those acting under Lee's authority, for their conduct was con-
verting Whigs into Tories. Sears, for example, had arbitrarily arrested a former Loy-
alist who had signed the association and been restored to full liberty by Congress. 32
In truth, the Whigs were confronting a dilemma they never resolved: How could
the Loyalist military threat be crushed and an expected invasion repelled without
forsaking the political struggle for the allegiance of Queens County residents?
The Continental Congress transferred Lee and forbade military officers from im-
posing their own test oaths. But continued recalcitrance by county Loyalists and the
imminent arrival of the British soon impelled the Provincial and Continental Con-
gresses down the path Lee had trod. Apparently, the Whigs now saw as their task,
not winning over the as yet unconvinced, but subduing the irreconcilable. If resi-
dents could not be converted, they must be cowed and their military usefulness to
the British ended. Thought was even given to taking some leading county Loyalists
hostage to assure residents' good behavior. "Tory Hunting parties" became daily,
rather than periodic, disturbances. A Continental unit under Col. Ezekiel Cornell
of Rhode Island, was stationed at Hempstead. With parties working under the
auspices of the province and county, Cornell scoured the countryside, alarming in-
habitants and wreaking havoc on community life. By July 1776 New York City jails
were crowded with prisoners from Queens. Although no charges had been brought
against the prisoners in August Washington ordered them sent to Connecticut and
31 Journals o/the Provincial Congress, II, 125; Calendar o/New York Historical Manuscripts, I, 258. On intelli-
gence, see Paret, French Revolutionary Warjizre, 35-36; Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," 654.
On the impact of the release of prisoners on county residents, see Marshall, Colonial Hempstead, 281-83.
32 Charles Lee ro George Washington, Jan. 5, 1776, Collections 0/ the New York Historical Society, 4 (1871),
234-36; Washington to Lee, Jan. 8, 1776, ibid., 236-37; Lee to Provincial Congress of New York, March 6, 1776,
ibid., 350-52; Journals 0/ the Provincial Congress, I, 354, 355; and Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser.,
V, 75. For the significance of oaths, see Michael Kammen, "The American Revolution as a Crise de Conscience:
The Case o/New York," in Society, Freedom, and Conscience, ed. Jellison, 125-89. For the importance of using
force with discrimination, see Singh and Md, Theory and Practice 0/ Modern Guerrilla Warjizre, 43.
placed under the custody of Gov. Jonathan Trumbulp3 But the success of Congress
in intimidating Tories may have been more illusory than real. OnJanuary 11, 1776,
Maj. Gen. Sir William Howe, the commander in chief of the British army in
America, wrote the royal governor of New York stating that Loyalists in southern
New York should remain passive in order to lull the Whigs into a false sense of secu-
rity before British forces invaded the province. It may, therefore, have been Howe,
rather than Whig military power, that induced Loyalists during 1776 to remain
under cover and not resist the Continental Congress. Under the circumstances, coer-
cion did not win the allegiance of neutrals or destroy Loyalist military power within
Queens. As long as the uncommitted remained convinced that the British would

soon successfully invade Long Island, force was more likely to alienate, than to con-
vert, them.
The presence of Continental military forces was advantageous in other, albeit less
important, ways. At the April 1776 town elections the Tories lost or gave up their
dominance over local government. In 1775 they had constituted 48.4 percent of
those holding significant town offices, but in 1776 their proportion decreased to 30
percent. Prudence obviously dictated that voters, pro-British and neutral alike, not
elect candidates who might antagonize the Continental army officers sent to subdue
the area. But county Patriots were not the principal beneficiaries; their representa-
tion increased only from 32.3 to 36.7 percent. Instead, residents who were not Whig
in sympathy asserted themselves, as best they could, by electing neutrals, who had
constituted only 19.4 percent of the major officeholders in 1775 but who constituted
33.3 percent in 1776. And in May, after a six-month hiatus, the Whigs were able
to elect delegates to the Provincial Congress. It was not that the Patriot cause had
become more popular. Residents were simply not foolhardy enough to vote down
the proposed slate of Whig delegates in public. The presence of the Continental
army likewise permitted local Whig committees to become more assertive. In De-
cember 1774, county Patriots had succeeded in naming committees of correspon-
dence in Newtown, Jamaica, and Flushing. 34 But by May 1775, when the Provincial
Congress had directed every county to form a committee system, those three com-
mittees had apparently ceased functioning. If the May resolution had any initial
effect, nothing substantive or permanent survived. North Hempstead residents did
establish a committee in September 1775, but after November it, too, existed pri-
H Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., V, 131,213-15, 1365, 1367-70, 1~1-92, VI, 1152, 1365-67, 1369,
1706; Lee to John Hancock, March 21, 1776, Collections of the New York Historical Society, 4 (1871), 360-61;
Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 459-60; Memorial of George Folliot, March 24, 1784, Transcript of the Manu-
script Books and Papers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists Held
under Acts of Parliament of 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 of George III 1783-1790, vol. XLV, 495-97 (New York Public Library,
New York, N.Y.); Onderdonk, comp., Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents
of Queens County, 71, 72, 75, 81-82, 86; Force, comp., American Archives, 5th ser. (6 vols., Washington,
1848-1853), I, 334, 351,621,887,896,898, II, 593; and Nathanael Greene to Washington, Aug. 10, 1776, George
Washington Papers (Library of Congress).
34 William Howe to William Tryon, Jan. 11, 1776, England and America, 1620-1782, XIV, Bancroft Collection
(New York Public Library, New York, N.Y.); Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 449, 456. Only the Newtown
committee, however, could claim support from a majority of townsmen.
marily on paper. On March 7, 1776, Congress again ordered towns and counties to
establish committees. By that date the north Hempstead committee was again ac-
tive, and by April 16 a county committee was also at work. The Jamaica committee
reestablished itself on April 26, and by May the organizational structure for the en-
tire county, except south Hempstead, was complete. Those committees continued
functioning until the Battle of Long Island in August. 35
Since the committee system was the stepchild of external force, rather than the
offspring of community influence, it never became an effective instrument of revolu-
tionary warfare. Committees could be resolute in harassing an individual Tory, but
they sometimes suffered as much discomfort as their victim. One episode in partic-

ular underscored their impotence. Thomas Wooley, a felt maker of north Hemp-
stead, twice refused to appear at muster, so the Whig militia captain John Sands
fined him. Undaunted, Wooley appealed to a justice of the peace to recover his fine
and attended the next training session but refused to obey orders. When he spoke,
he abused the captain and challenged him to a duel. Sands advised the felt maker
to appeal his case to the local committee, but Wooley replied that he would again
see a magistrate. The next militia meeting was a repetition of the previous one, and
Sands had the Hempstead committee issue a warrant for Wooley's arrest. When the
company's second lieutenant brought Wooley to the county jail, the keeper, Hope
Mills, insisted that he was not a jailer for Congress and refused the prisoner. Mills
then notified the sheriff, who released the felt maker. The committee next dragged
Wooley before Congress, where he expressed a willingness to bear arms if Congress
allowed; but he was among those proscribed by Congress in December 1775 and
therefore could not bear arms. Congress remanded him to the county jail, but he
was freed after petitioning that there was "in him that virtue that can distinguish
him as a friend to his native country."36 Even though the irascible felt maker at last
recanted, he had still single-handedly exposed the weakness of the Patriot organiza-
tional infrastructure in Queens County and thereby challenged the inevitability of
a Whig victory.
As Wooley's case also indicates, the presence of Continental military forces per-
mitted the Patriots to organize a county militia-albeit at the point of a gun. The
goal was not only to train viable fighting units, but also to establish Patriot
dominion over county residents and to snare them into committing pro-Whig acts.
Two regiments were set up-one for the eastern towns of Hempstead and Oyster
Bay and the other forthe western towns ofNewtown,]amaica, and Flushing. A total
of 1,770 county residents were obliged to bear arms, and the extant records suggest
that about 90 percent of those required to do so did muster. 37 Despite the county
3' Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 410; journals of the Provincial Congress, I, 173, II, 155;
CaiendarofNew lOrk HistoricalMJZnuscripts, I, 304; Onderdonk, comp., Documents andLetters Intendedto Illus-
trate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 29-30, 56-57.
36 This episode can be traced injournals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 432, 438, II, 113. The quotation is from
Calendar ofNew lOrk Historical Manuscripts, 1,319.
37 A militia cadre has several responsibilities: providing political and military education for militiamen, gener-
ating propaganda throughout the population, using coercion against enemies, and waging war. Paret, French Revo-
militia's doubtful military value, the Provincial Congress drafted one-half of the mi-
litia to fight against the British when they landed on Long Island. However, the
Battle of Long Island in August 1776 only made manifest the tenuousness of the
Continental Congress's sway over Queens. A few county residents did fight and flee
with the American army, but most quietly deserted Patriot lines. Several weeks later
the militia reformed again, this time under the king's authority.38
In sum, Congress had succeeded in occupying the county militarily and foisting
a committee system and militia on the people. But the result was an imposed solu-
tion incapable of winning popular support or permitting the movement to achieve
self-maintenance and expansion. Coercion had silenced the opposition, but it had

not broken its will.
The Whigs failed in the end not solely because their efforts were flawed and some-
times feeble, but also because they were opposed by a highly motivated and well-
disciplined group of local Tories who were adept at propaganda and organization. 39
By combining British assistance with an effective use of psychological warfare, the
Tories convinced residents that the Patriots could not win and that British rule over
the colonies would endure. By competing adroitly with the Patriots for the alle-
giance of county residents, they effectively checked the growth of the enemy's orga-
nizational infrastructure. In short, county Loyalists were better at conducting coun-
terinsurgency operations than their opponents were at waging revolution.
To begin, local Loyalists had few difficulties enunciating a countercause or fash-
ioning an effective propaganda offensive to vie for popular support. They were able,
as partisans in a revolutionary war should be, to put themselves in the shoes of the
uncommitted and project an image compatible with that group's yearning to remain
at peace, undisturbed by military combat. Loyalists portrayed themselves, not as an-
tagonists in a bitter dispute that could lead only to bloodshed, but as men of moder-
ation who sought a peaceful resolution to a conflict forced upon them and their
communities. 40 Admittedly, the Loyalists had an easier task than the Whigs. The
latter, engaged in rebellion, had to ensure that their movement had at least the ap-
lutionary Warfare, 17. Evidence about the Whig militia is scattered throughout the records. See Journals ofthe
Provincial Congress, I, 21, 388, 437, 485, 495, 499, 550, 568, 572, 583, II, 239, 244, 304, 308, 334, 467, 501;
Calendar ofNew York Historical Manuscripts, I, 186-87,251,325; Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., III,
646,777, V, 352, VI, 1031; Force, comp., American Archives, 5th ser., I, 257-58; and Onderdonk, comp., Docu-
ments andLetters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents ofQueens County, 54, 60-61, 75, 79, 86-88.
3BJournais ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 533, 568,605, II, 291; Maj. [Richard] Thorne to Capt. Richard)ackson,
Aug. IS, 1776,)ackson Manuscript (New-York Historical Society, New York, N.Y.); Marshall, Colonial Hempstead,
306-7.
39 Since the Tory leadership was clandestine, it is impossible to discover all its members. Fifty-six individuals
have been identified. Of the forty-one people in this group whose religion is known, thirty-six (87.8%) were An-
glican.
40 On Loyalist ideas, see Potter, Liberty we Seek, 15-61. The theme of Loyalists' moderation is prominent in
"Declaration of the Inhabitants of Queens County;' New-YorkJournal, Dec. 14, 1775; and "Hempstead Resolves;'
Rivington's New York Gazetteer, April 6, 1775.
pearance of mass support: petitions had to be signed, committees formed, and

armies raised. Indecision or temporizing by any segment of the population was
anathema. Each individual had to be canvassed, and if his response was unsatisfac-
tory, he had to be coerced by threats or actual physical harm. In contrast, Tories had
only to advise inaction and wait for the rebellion to collapse through indifference.
Tory propaganda did not in the end convert neutrals or persuade them to embrace
the Loyalist creed. Indeed, success demanded only that it counterbalance Whig pro-
paganda and fortify the uncommitted (Quakers and non-Quakers alike) in their re-
solve not to become partisans. To neutrals who would say, as did one when asked
what side he was on, "I am for peace;' Tory propaganda professed solicitude and

counseled caution. Joining a Whig committee was not, as Whigs pretended, taking
a stand in favor of the rights of Englishmen; those who joined were undermining
the constitution and thereby bringing on the county the government's just retribu-
tion. Loyalists conceded that there were grievances requiring rectification; but the
real controversy, they argued, was over the means of seeking redress. The existing
political system, through the right of petition, provided the proper constitutional
remedy.41 That peaceful approach to resolving the crisis, Tories claimed, was
preferred by "a great majority of the people" but opposed by "a set of violent Spirits
... who lay hold of every occasion to rouse Mob and excite Sedition." If such mal-
contents prevailed and war came, the Tories predicted that Britain would win and
warned residents about the consequences.
County Tories also turned Whig propaganda against itself.42 Residents, theyar-
gued, were suffering oppression, but it was a Whig, not a royal, tyranny. Patriots
had abused the county representatives elected to the Assembly and had foisted
illegal committees on the people. The undeniable right of each town to vote against
the measures of the various congresses had been abridged, and unelected delegates
were presuming to speak for residents. Armed bands were confiscating the property
ofloyal subjects, while self-appointed enthusiasts were denying farmers access to the
New York market. Because neutrals could personally experience the outrages being
described and because they were convinced that the British army would soon occupy
New York, they refused to be persuaded by the rhetoric of rebellion and heeded
the Tory admonition to remain quiet. In addition, by repeatedly challenging the
legality of Whig activities, the Tories deftly succeeded in altering the debate from
a substantive one to one over procedures. 43 So depicted, the Whig cause lost its
luster and was shorn of its idealism.
41 Examination ofJacobus Lawrence, June 23, 1776, Minutes ofa Conspiracy against the Liberties ofAmerica
(1865; reprint, New York, 1969), 14; "Hempstead Resolves," Rivington's New York Gazetteer, April 6, 1775; "To
Mr. W. P.:' ibid., Dec. 22, 1774; ':Jamaica, New York, Declaration," New-York Gazette, Jan. 30, 1775; "Letter from
the Inhabitants of Newtown to Rivington," Rivington's New York Gazetteer, Jan. 19, 1775.
42 Cadwallader Colden to Samuel Graves, Feb. 20, 1775, Naval Documents ofthe American Revolution, ed.
William Bell Clark andJames W. Morgan (9 vols., Washingron, 1964-1986), I, 100-101; Galula, Counterinsurgency
Warfare, 102.
43 These arguments are advanced effectively in "Declaration of the Inhabitants of Queens County:' New-York
Journal, Dec. 14, 1775; ':Jamaica, New York, Declaration," New-York Gazette, Jan. 30, 1775. For a Whig reply,
see '~ Lover of Liberty;' New·YorkJournal, Feb. 9, 1775. See also Potter, Liberty we Seek, 15", 28-29.
Even though neutrals scarred by the county's factious history remained too wary
to become Loyalist partisans, Tory propaganda successfully addressed the specific
concerns of the audiences it most needed to reach. In particular, Loyalists shrewdly
cultivated the support of the activist minorities who could best spearhead the assault
against the Patriots. To Anglicans, for whom the king was also the head of their
church, the Loyalists argued that they stood emphatically for the traditional values
of Crown, constitution, and church and against innovations that might bring dis-
aster. They hammered away, again and again, on the idea that Whig attacks on
ministerial tyranny were but disguised assaults on the king himself. Tory propagan-
dists likewise emphasized that the Patriots were but the Anglicans' century-old

enemy, the Presbyterians, disguised in new garb. By thus fueling the fires of religious
discord, county loyalism won its most important natural constituency. It also
redefined the nature of the struggle, for a dispute over liberty became a new chapter
in the long history of religious controversy within Queens. 44
Propaganda was not the Loyalists' only strong suit, for they also excelled at organi-
zation. During 177 5 they had suffered some reversals in their efforts against the
Whigs. Still, they succeeded in preventing Patriots from gaining control for long
over any town government except that of Newtown; in electing Loyalists in April
1775 to almost a majority of the significant town offices; and in stopping the election
of delegates in November 1775 to the Provincial Congress. Yet those triumphs were
only part of the story. Unlike their opponents, county Tories created a covert leader-
ship network that set strategy, prepared propaganda, cultivated popular support,
and organized the communication system needed to outmaneuver the Whigs. Com-
pelled for the most part to fall back on their own resources, the Tories employed
what might now be considered a good counterrevolutionary strategy and began
operating as if they were the insurgents. Patriots knew what was happening, but
they were powerless to counteract it. Once, when the Provincial Congress requested
information on Loyalist activities, a local committee, apologizing for the paucity of
material collected, explained that "their meetings were confined to their own party,
their conclusions kept as secret as possible."45
Although county Whigs were never able to penetrate the Loyalists' covert net-
work, it is now possible to outline the scope of Loyalist operations in Queens. The
impetus behind the movement came from Lt. Gov. Cadwallader Colden, who lived
44 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 75-77; "Hempstead Resolves," Rivington's New York Gazetteer, April
6, 1775; "To the Inhabitants of Queens County, Long Island," New York Constitutional Gazette, Dec. 6, 1775.
ThomasJones, a resident of Queens, argued that three Presbyterians-William Smith, Jr., John Morin Scott, and
William Livingston - joined together "to pull down Church and State, to raise their own Government and religion
upon its ruins" and thereby caused the American Revolution. ThomasJones, History ofNew York during the Revo-
lutionary War, and ofthe Leading Events in Other Colonies at That Period, ed. Edward Floyd de Lancey (2 vols.,
New York, 1879), I, 5.
4' On the importance of organization to a counterinsurgency, see Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur-
gency, 5, 123-24. On counterrevolutionary strategy, see Singh and Md, Theory and Practice ofModern Guerrilla
Warfare, 69-70; Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 57-58; and Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 100-101.
However, see Paret and Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's, 71-72; and Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 73-74.
Calendar of New York Historical MIInuscripts, I, 258.
in Flushing and who presided over the province during the governor's absence be-
tween April 1774 and June 1775. Persuaded that few New Yorkers espoused the
American cause, Colden was convinced that politically and militarily the province
was the most crucial spot on the continent and the place where the British must
concentrate their energies. If New York remained loyal, the province would geo-
graphically sever the rebellion and cause its defeat. The lieutenant governor, of
course, was not alone in his estimation of New York's significance, and the British
government did encourage him to organize local Loyalists so the Revolution could
be checked in the province and throughout the colonies. 46 In the end, he never real-
ized his dream, but he did experience considerable success in Queens.

Colden and his son David were the acknowledged heads of the Tory faction in
Queens, and together they infused the counterrevolutionary movement with pur-
pose and vitality. If observers can be believed, the two were primarily responsible
for preventing Whigs from establishing a viable political infrastructure in 1775, for
organizing the resistance that year against sending delegates to the Provincial Con-
gress, and for blocking schemes by local and provincial Whigs to subdue Queens.
In September 1775, for example, when the Provincial Congress was making its
efforts to disarm county Loyalists, the lieutenant governor urged resistance and gal-
vanized his followers to action. 47 The Coldens' task was made less arduous by the
assistance they received from royal officeholders who resided in Queens. On many
occasions those officials quietly yet effectively sabotaged Whig efforts by en-
couraging residents to disobey the commands of Patriot committees and congresses.
George D. Ludlow, a justice of the Supreme Court ofJudicature of New York who
lived in Hempstead, served as a contact during the crisis, relaying information be-
tween local Loyalists and British military forces. His brother Gabriel G. Ludlow,
colonel of the Queens County militia, was one of those ubiquitous local "gentle-
men" who at key moments appeared before gatherings of inhabitants urging them
to resist Whig proposals; he also participated in preparing Tory resolutions opposing
the actions of Congress. 48
Richard Hewlett, an officer in the French and Indian War and second in com-
mand of the county's militia, organized local Tories into a credible military force
that Whigs more than once declined to fight. In effect, he turned south Hempstead
46 Frederick Haldimand to Earl of Dartmouth. May 4, May 15, 1774, 5/91, Colonial Office Papers (Public Record
Office, London); Colden to Dartmouth, May 4, July 6, Aug. 2, 1774, 5/1105, ibid.; Dartmouth to Colden, July
6, 1774, ibid.; Colden to Dartmouth, Dec. 7, 1774, 5/1106, ibid.; Dartmouth to Colden, Feb. I, 1775, ibid.;
Colden to Thomas Gage, June 5, 1774, Military Papers of General Thomas Gage (William 1. Clements Library,
Ann Arbor, Michigan); Gage to Colden, Feb. 26, May 23, 1775, Collections ofthe New York Historical Society,
56 (1923), 267; Tryon to Colden, Jan. 2, 1775, Van Schaack Family Papers (Rare Book and Manuscript library,
Buder library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.). See also Mason, Road to Independence, 50-51.
47 Tryon to Dartmouth, Dec. 6, 1775, 5/1107, Colonial Office Papers; Evidence on the Claim of David Colden,
Feb. 14, 1787, Transcript of the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission ofInquiry, XLV, 437, 449-50;
andJournals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 157.
48 Memorial of Gabriel G. Ludlow, n.d., Transcript of the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission
of Inquiry, XIX, 405; Evidence on the Claim of Gabriel G. Ludlow, Feb. 13, 1787, ibid., 411; Memorial of George
Duncan Ludlow, Sept. 10, 1783, ibid., XLI, 499, 505; Memorial of Gabriel G. Ludlow,Jan. 29, 1784, 13/65, Audit
Office Papers (Public Record Office, London).
Cadwallader Colden, lieutenant governor of New York and

leader of the Loyalist faction in Queens County.
Courtesy the New-York Historical Society, New York City.
into a counterinsurgency base area that Whigs were never able to destroy. When
Patriot forces did appear in strength, his Tory militia was nowhere in evidence and
all the arms were usually concealed. Daniel Kissam, a north Hempstead resident
and a member of New York's last colonial assembly, was principally responsible for
writing Loyalist propaganda. A popular politician respected by both Whigs and

Tories, he understood the temper of the different groups within Queens and could
appeal directly to each of them. Thomas Jones, another justice of the Supreme
Court, lived in Oyster Bay. His extensive landholdings on the town's south shore
served as a hiding place for Loyalists during Whig incursions into the county. His
residence became a Loyalist rendezvous, and small boats, presumably from British
ships, frequently landed near his home at night. 49
After Governor Tryon fled New York in October 1775, he set up headquarters at
sea aboard a British vessel. There is ample evidence to support his boast that "Friends
of Government freely come to me."50 One resident, for example, wrote Tryon for

Loyalist literature; another volunteered to help provision beleaguered Boston. In-
habitants also furnished supplies to British naval vessels stationed off the coast. And
still other residents slipped off to the British fleet where they provided information
on the nature and extent of Patriot defense preparations. When the British landed,
soldiers knew not only whom to arrest but also where those people might be found.
Although Whigs strove to sever the connection uniting county Tories with the
British and at one point collected every boat along a seven-mile stretch of the beach,
their efforts were in vain. Unfortunately for the American cause, that intelligence
network kept Loyalists posted about Patriot plans and activities and by so doing un-
dermined Whig efforts at coercion. 51
OnJuly 14, 1776, for example, General Howe and his brother, Admiral Richard
Lord Howe, the naval commander, issued a proclamation announcing their appoint-
ment as peace commissioners with power to grant pardons to all who would renew
their allegiance to the Crown. Posters to that effect immediately appeared through-
out Queens. With a British landing expected imminently, the Patriots arrested the
local sheriff, Thomas Willett, who had distributed the signs. But the Provincial
Congress could not determine how the document had gotten from a British vessel
into the sheriffs possession. Only after Congress threatened to jail Elizabeth Hicks,
one of those implicated, did the full story come out. Tryon had given the proclama-
tion to Josiah Martin who had passed it to her, requesting that she forward it to
Nathaniel Mills; she gave it to Joshua Mills, who entrusted it to Caleb Mills; Caleb
49 Force, comp., American Archives, 4th ser., I, 1290; journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 590; Marshall,
Colonial Hempstead, 267, 274-75, 284, 287-88; Calendar ofNew York Historical Manuscripts, I, 258; Evidence
on the Memorial of ThomasJones, May 12, 1787, Transcript of the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission
of Inquiry, XLV, 355; Jones, History of New York during the Revolutionary war, ed. de Lancey, I, 39-41; Israel
Putnam to Washington, May 31, 1776, Washington Papers.
50 Joseph French of Queens, whom the Provincial Congress had forced to take his seat in that body, first in-
formed William Tryon that he was in danger. See Testimony of William Tryon, March 22, 1782, 13/90, Audit Office
Papers; and Testimony by Tryon, Jan. 8, 1785, 13/114, ibid.; Tryon to Dartmouth, Nov. 11, 1775, 5/1106, Colonial
Office Papers.
51 See journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 418, 590, 601, II, 280, 334; Lord Stirling to Colonel Ward, March
8, 1776, Alexander Papers (New·York Historical Society); Testimony of Gilbert Jones, [May 1776], Washington
Papers; Examination of Three Men from a Sloop in Oyster Bay, [May 1776], ibid.; Examination of Daniel Redfold
of Killingsworth, Aug. 29, 1776, ibid.; Force, comp., American Archives, 5th ser., I, 1506; Howe to George Ger-
main,July 7,1776,5/93, Colonial Office Papers; Tryon to Germain, Aug. 29, 1776,5/1107, ibid. Petition ofSamuel
Hallett, n.d., 13/13, Audit Office Papers; and Marshall, Colonial Hempstead, 273.
ThomasJones, justice of the Supreme Court ofJudicature and

Loyalist historian of revolutionary New York.
Courtesy Nassau County Museum Reference Library, Hofstra
University Library, Hempstead. New iOrk.
then gave the letter to Nathaniel, who already knew that it was for the sheriff. The
local schoolmaster acted as scribe, and before long neutral inhabitants were aware
that they did not have to fear British retribution after the Patriots were defeated.
This message was obviously important, but so was the act of communication itself,
for the posters were a conspicuous reminder in the game of psychological warfare
that Whig rule over Long Island was tenuous at best. 52
The most significant of the Tory exploits was the Asta affair. In response to re-
quests made by Tryon to British officials for assistance in protecting supporters of
the Crown, Capt. George Vandeput of the Asta provided arms to county Loyalists.
How many shipments were made is unknown, but there were probably more than

one. In November 1775 Samuel Nostran and Isaac Lossie advised the Provincial
Congress that naval officers from the Asta had supplied Captain Hewlett with pow-
der, ball, small arms, a cannon, and a gunner to work it. When those arms were
distributed, Loyalists were told that five thousand British regulars would soon land
at Rockaway, on the county's south shore. Farmers even stopped marketing their
cattle in expectation of a rise in prices once the British appeared. Then, on De-
cember 18, Vandeput wrote that he had at Tryon's request furnished county resi-
dents with "two Barrels of Powder, some Flints, and 300 Weight of Musquet balls."53
Tryon also sent arms to Dow Ditmas for apportionment among Loyalists living in
western Queens. Ditmas likewise provided recipients with instructions about prepa-
rations to be made in advance of a British landing.
The distribution of war materials had a profound effect. On several occasions
Loyalists had threatened to do battle with the Whigs; British arms now made that
threat credible. Although full-scale fighting never broke out, the Whigs were com-
pelled to divide their forces and to commit more troops to Queens than they could
spare. The presence of the Whig soldiers, in turn, alienated those inhabitants who
resented outside interference, making it more difficult for Whigs to win the alle-
giance ofcounty residents. The weapons were also a key element in the psychological
campaign that Tories were waging for the allegiance of county residents, for the arms
provided visible evidence of Britain's resolve to retake New York. In addition, the
arms shipments and the Loyalist December declaration together signified that
county Tories were entering into a new phase of organization. Captain Hewlett had
in effect established a counterinsurgency base area for operations in south Hemp-
stead, and British weapons were now being used to defend it and bolster the morale
of his supporters. 54 Although Hewlett did not in the end convince (or coerce) many
south shore neutrals into joining his cause, he did at least win their toleration.
Arming county Loyalists also fit into overall British strategy for the campaign of
52 Journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 561-62, 572, 558, II, 287. On the significance of psychological warfare,
see Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 90-102.
53 Marshall, ColonialHempstead, 274-76;journals ofthe Provincial Congress, I, 215; Vandeput to Parker, Dec.
18, 1775, 5/123, Colonial Office Papers; Memorial of Dow Ditrnas, n.d., 13/24, Audit Office Papers.
'4 The British and Capt. Richard Hewlett needed to protect area residents if they were to win the battle for
the people's allegiance. Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 146, 153.
1776. General Howe had initially planned to begin his assault on New York by at-
tacking Long Island. Hewlett's men were apparently being readied by local royal
officials to act as a paramilitary force to aid the British once they landed. It was only
at the last minute that Howe altered his plans and landed on Staten Island instead. 55
Nonetheless, in August 1776 British forces did finally cross over to Long Island. A
confrontation between Patriot Continentals and county Tories would probably have
taken place then if Howe had not achieved victory so quickly on August 27 in the
Battle of Long Island. The Ludlows were reportedly leading about seven hundred
county residents to the battlefield when they were met on August 28 by an advanced
detachment of British regulars who had just reached Jamaica. Washington did not

evacuate Long Island until the night of August 29. 56 With his departure, the battle
that had raged between Whigs and Tories for the allegiance of county residents was
over at last.
County residents at the outset of the American War of Independence had at best
minimal familiarity with insurgency warfare. Yet using a paradigm based on con-
temporary revolutionary experience has made it possible to view their experience
from an altered and enhanced perspective-to scrutinize the behavior of inhabi-
tants, to analyze the interactions taking place among the different groups within
Queens, and to evaluate the paths pursued by the antagonists in order to mobilize
the population. What stands out most dramatically is the success of local Loyalists.
American Tories have typically been described as apathetic, leaderless, isolated, dis-
trustful of innovation, and "simply unable to cultivate public opinion, to form it
or inform it."57 Queens County Loyalists, however, not only routed their local oppo-
nents; they also kept the Provincial and Continental Congresses at bay and defeated
their plans for winning the support of residents. Working doggedly to organize their
followers and spread their cause, county Loyalists were able at almost every turn to
overpower their adversaries by taking advantage of Whig errors and weaknesses. As
a result, Patriots were unable to galvanize popular support or organize an effective
55 Howe to Germain, June 7, 1776, 5/93, Colonial Office Papers; Charles Stuart to Lord Bute, July 9, 1776,
in A Prime Minister and His Son: From the Correspondence of the 3rd Earl of Bute and the Han. Sir Charles
Stuart, ed. E. Stuart-Wordey (London, 1925),81-83; Milton M. Klein and Ronald W. Howard, eds., The Twilight
of British Rule in Revolutionary America: The New York Letterbook of GeneralJames Robertson, 1780-1783
(Cooperstown, 1983), 33-34.
'6 Distributing arms to local militia units and encouraging use of them in battle are important counterinsur-
gency techniques that can be used to secure the loyalty of those who bear the arms. See Paret and Shy, Guerrillas
in the 1960's, 49. Evidence on the Claim of Gabriel G. Ludlow; Force, comp., American Archives, 5th ser., I, 622;
Onderdonk, ed., Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County,
52; Allen French, ed., Diary ofFrederick Mackenzie, Giving a Daily Narrative ofHis Military Service as an Officer
ofthe Regiment ofRoyal Welsh Fusiliers during the Years 1775-1781, in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New
Thrk (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1930), I, 37.
57 William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), 19. Although Nelson's comments refer to loyalism
before 1774, they can be applied to Tories after that date. See Wallace Brown, The GoodAmericans: The Loyalists
in the American Revolution (New York, 1969), 58-59,81, 116, 122,222-24. For the reasons why New York Tories
living outside Queens were so ineffectual and uninfluential, see Potter, Liberty We Seek, 147-52.
organizational infrastructure. Instead, the Loyalists adopted the tactics the Whigs
should have employed and thereby went far toward securing their own base of sup-
port. They had not yet given attention to revitalizing government at either the local
or provincial level, but with the British in control of Long Island, that critical phase
of the war could be addressed with deliberateness and determination. 58 Having
foiled the Revolution in Queens, the Loyalists and the British now had the opportu-
nity to solidify their previous gains and capture the support of county residents.
The county was in some respects unique. It not only had a solid core of Tory
leaders prepared to exert themselves on the Crown's behalf; it also had groups, like
the Anglicans of western Queens and the residents of south Hempstead, who were

predisposed to become Loyalists and around whom a movement could be organized.
Because Queens was on an island, the British could employ the navy to protect and
embolden local Loyalists. Most important, the county was adjacent to New York
City, and few doubted that the British army would soon recapture the area.
Nonetheless, there is need for further in-depth research to determine how excep-
tional developments in Queens were. There probably were Loyalists elsewhere in
America who were, or could have been, as successful as those in Queens. How much
aid did they receive from the British?59 How important might they have become
if Britain had been able to overcome a mind-set that favored conventional warfare?
What makes the situation in Queens so intriguing is that there were so many neu-
tral residents whom partisans sought to influence and convert. Again, special cir-
cumstances were present, but events in Queens demonstrate that when neutrals re-
fused to be moved or persuaded, Patriots could be as unsuccessful in establishing
control as were the British in many areas dominated by the Whigs. Many Americans
in the eighteenth century wanted only to be left alone by government, and they
resented any intrusion upon their lives by the military forces of either side. 60
Moreover, local Whigs were constrained by their claim that they were building a
polity based on the consent of the governed - physical coercion exposed them to
the charge of hypocrisy. They were caught between their urgent need to mobilize
the population and the requisite that they do so without alienating it. That the
Whigs stumbled in this early stage of the war and antagonized county neutrals is
not surprising. George Washington, according to E. Wayne Carp, "grasped the cen-
tral principle of modern revolutionary warfare: the necessity of maintaining a posi-
tive relationship between the army and the people." But it was a belief easier to state
in theory than to implement in practice. For example, the American army's occa-
58 To secure this victory, the British also needed to reform the government. On events in New York between
1776 and 1783, see Milton M. Klein, "An Experiment That Failed: General)ames Robertson and Civil Government
in British New York, 1779-1783," New YtJrk History, 61 Guly 1980), 229-54; Milton M. Klein, "Why Did the British
Fail to Win the Hearts and Minds of New Yorkers?" New YtJrk History, 64 (Oct. 1983),357-75; and Tiedemann,
"Patriots by Default," 35-63.
59 The British navy influenced allegiance on the islands around New York, and apparently also in other coastal
areas. Eugene R. Fingerhut, Survivor: Cadwallader Colden II in Revolutionary America (Washington, 1983), 51.
For British efforts during 1774-1775 to curry support and forestall the Revolution in the province and city of New
York, see Mason, Road to Independence, 42-61.
60 Higginbotham, "Early American Way of War," 264.
sional need to impress supplies "eroded respect for authority" and "added to the
instability of the new regimes by increasing the number of disaffected people." The
British faced a similar situation in Queens between 1776 and 1783 and as a result
transformed Loyalists and neutrals into "patriots by default."61
If using force to mobilize residents had its dangers, it also played a role in
securing the eventual triumph of the Revolution. John Shy, for one, has argued that
probably a majority of the American people were neutral: "dubious, afraid, uncer-
tain, indecisive, . . . [and convinced] that there was nothing at stake that could
justify involving themselves and their families in extreme hazard and suffering." It
was the military conflict that afforded them a "political education" and transformed

them from an "apathetic majority" into "knowing, skeptical, wary citizens of the
United States."62 In short, armies and military force, rather than ideology, explain
why many Americans took sides and fought. But how was it that the Whigs could
not successfully apply coercion in 1776 to mobilize Queens County neutrals? British
victories in NewJersey in 1776, for example, quickly persuaded many residents there
to renew their allegiance to the Crown. The American triumphs at Trenton and
Princeton, in turn, seriously impaired the morale of Tories, and New Jersey quickly
came under Patriot domination. These two examples make it evident that the British
and American armies were "politico-military machines" that needed both to "fight
the enemy and win over the people."63 To accomplish the latter objective each had
to persuade inhabitants by whatever means possible that its presence in a particular
locale was advantageous to the population. Most important, its ability to shield in-
habitants from the enemy's military forces acted to justify its own cause and to win
over new supporters to its side. In sum, force does, under proper circumstances, vin-
dicate ideology and make believers of the unbelieving.
The Whigs failed to convert the apolitical majority in Queens because the British
provided local Loyalists with tangible support and convinced neutrals that an attack
against New York by the king's army was imminent. Given what inhabitants be-
lieved the ultimate outcome would be, the force employed by the Patriots alienated,
rather than converted, the uncommitted. It is likely that in other American commu-
nities where neutrals were numerous Britain's inability (or failure) to act as a coun-
tervailing power allowed Whigs to make force an effective instrument of persuasion.
That inability would explain, at least in part, the swift victory that Whigs scored
over most of the colonial American governments. The coercive power of those
governments had always been very weak, and the situation now redounded to the
benefit of the Patriots. Britain's efforts, beginning in the 1740s, to strengthen im-
perial authority in America had simply come too late and had been too ineffectual
to stop the Revolution. 64
6. E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political
Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill, 1984), 83, 98, 81; Tiedemann, "Patriots by Default;' 35-63.
6. Shy, "American Revolution;' 147.
63 Singh and Mei, Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla warfare, 37.
64 Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution;' in
Essays on the Revolution, ed. Kurtz and Hutson, 68-74.
John Adams wrote years later that the Revolution had taken place in the minds
and hearts of the people long before war had broken out. But the American Revolu-
tion in Queens was not an inevitable event, nor was the Revolution over after Lex-
ington and Concord. In fact, it had just begun, and the political and military con-
test that followed helped shape what people thought about the Revolution and how
it unfolded.

New York, 1775-1776: A Revolution Foiled: Queens County

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New York, 1775-1776: A Revolution Foiled: Queens County

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A Revolution Foiled: Queens County,

New York, 1775-1776

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organizational infrastructure within Queens, and revitalize the organs of govern-

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In spreading their message, however, county Whigs confronted obstacles they

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At that juncture, developments elsewhere in New York began to intrude forcibly on

in Queens and attempted coercion as a form of persuasion. In June it requested

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pearance of mass support: petitions had to be signed, committees formed, and

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Cadwallader Colden, lieutenant governor of New York and

writing Loyalist propaganda. A popular politician respected by both Whigs and

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ThomasJones, justice of the Supreme Court ofJudicature and

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