FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVlOR

DOUGLAS HUFF

A g r e a t d e a l h a s been w r i t t e n about W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f e r e n c e t o

"family resemblances" i n r e c e n t y e a r s , and much of this w r i t i n g has c e n t e r e d
around Renford Bambrough's well-known c o n s t r u c t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks
i n t o a proposed s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s . I n t h i s paper I
propose t o re-examine W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s comments on f a m i l y resemblance, and
o f f e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e that w i l l r e q u i r e s e e i n g t h e
family resemblance d i s c u s s i o n as o n l y p a r t of a much l a r g e r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h i n
t h e c o n t e x t of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work.

My s t r a t e g y w i l l be t o f i r s t review Bambrough's argument i n l i g h t of

r e c e n t c r i t i c i s m , and conclude that h i s argument, a l t h o u g h inadequate, does
c o r r e c t l y s u g g e s t t h e r a d i c a l import of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s comments. I will
argue, however, t h a t Bambrough's a t t e m p t t o account f o r t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e and
n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of a l l g e n e r a l t e r m s by means of "family resem-
blances" i s a mistaken i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks. Following
this, I s h a l l a r g u e f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e a n a l y s i s of t h e family resemblance
d i s c u s s i o n by emphasizing t h e r e l a t i o n between i t and W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s -
c u s s i o n of r u l e s and rule-governed behavior. This a n a l y s i s w i l l e x h i b i t what
I t a k e t o b e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c e n t r a l concern, namely, t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h e pre-
s u p p o s i t i o n that t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y , o b j e c t i v e , and j u s t i f i a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n of
a g e n e r a l t e r m depends upon t h e e x i s t e n c e of a f e a t u r e o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t
i s common and p e c u l i a r t o e v e r y t h i n g s p e c i f i e d by t h e same g e n e r a l t e r m s .

I take t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t o u n d e r l i e t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t view c r i t i c i z e d
by b o t h t h e family resemblance d i s c u s s i o n and W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n of
r u l e s . * I s h a l l contend t h a t t h i s l a t t e r d i s c u s s i o n of r u l e s demonstrates
that even when t h e c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d by t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t a r e g r a n t e d , i . e . ,
t h e p r e s e n c e of a common l i n k of n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e s between e v e r y t h i n g
c o r r e c t l y subsumed under t h e s a m e g e n e r a l t e r m , t h a t e s s e n t i a l i s a c o n t i n u e s
t o be an inadequate account of what w e e x p e r i e n c e as i n t e l l i g i b l e and non-
a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n s of g e n e r a l t e r m s . I w i l l argue t h a t f o r Wittgenstein
i t makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e whether t h e items c o r r e c t l y subsumed under a
g e n e r a l term f u l f i l l t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s requirement o r n o t . The d i f f i c u l t y
of accounting f o r t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of a t e r m by r e f e r e n c e t o
f e a t u r e s i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same f o r t e r m s which r e q u i r e t h e presence of

1
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DOUCLAS HUFF

common and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s and t h o s e which do not. If t h i s i s t r u e , then

I w i l l contend t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m i s complete
and a p p l i e s t o a l l g e n e r a l terms. Furthermore, I w i l l contend that t h i s
r e j e c t i o n i s a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s .

Bambrough makes, a t least, t h e following f o u r claims f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s

a n a l y s i s of games: (1) W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n demonstrates t h a t t h e r e i s
no f e a t u r e that i s both cormon and p e c u l i a r t o every a c t i v i t y p r o p e r l y
subsumed under t h e term "game", which could s e r v e as an o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e term. (2) There i s s t i l l a n o b j e c t i v e and non-
a r b i t r a r y b a s i s f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l terms, because t h i n g s subsumed
under t h e s a m e term are r e l a t e d t o one another by a family resemblance. (3)
This i s t r u e of every g e n e r a l t e r m . And, (4) the t r u t h of t h e f i r s t t h r e e
claims provides a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s .

Bambrough's c e n t r a l argument f o r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e family

resemblance d i s c u s s i o n rests upon h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a family resemblance
w i t h t h e overlapping and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g of f e a t u r e s between t h e members of
a kind. For example, Bambrough a s k s u s t o consider t h e following:

W e may c l a s s i f y a set of o b j e c t s by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e presence o r

absence of f e a t u r e s ABCDE. I t may w e l l happen t h a t f i v e o b j e c t s
edcba a r e such t h a t each of them h a s f o u r of t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s
and l a c k s t h e f i f t h , and t h a t t h e missing f e a t u r e is d i f f e r e n t i n
each of t h e f i v e c a s e s . A simple diagram w i l l i l l u s t r a t e t h i s
situation:

e d C b a
ABCD AB CE ABDE ACDE B CDE

Here we can a l r e a d y s e e how n a t u r a l and how proper i t might be t o

apply t h e same word t o a number of o b j e c t s between which t h e r e i s
no common f e a t u r e . And i f we c o n f i n e our a t t e n t i o n t o any a r b i -
t r a r i l y s e l e c t e d f o u r of t h e s e o b j e c t s , s a y edca, then although
they a l l happen t o have B i n common, i t i s c l e a r t h a t i t i s n o t i n
v i r t u e of t h e presence of B t h a t they a r e a l l r i g h t l y c a l l e d by t h e
same name. Even i f t h e a c t u a l i n s t a n c e s w e r e i n d e f i n i t e l y numerous,
and they a l l happened t o have one o r more of t h e f e a t u r e s i n common,
i t would n o t be i n v i r t u e of t h e presence of t h e common f e a t u r e o r
f e a t u r e s t h a t they would a l l be r i g h t l y c a l l e d by t h e same name,
s i n c e t h e name a l s o a p p l i e s t o possible i n s t a n c e s t h a t l a c k t h e
feature or features. 3

Two t h i n g s seem t o f o l l o w from t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . F i r s t , t h e groups of

l e t t e r s can be i n t e l l i g i b l y understood t o be subsumed under t h e same name even
though t h e shared f e a t u r e s a r e l i m i t e d and no one l e t t e r , o r s e t of l e t t e r s ,
i s held i n common. And second, i t cannot be s a i d t h a t they a r e subsumed under
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

t h e s a m e name because they a l l share t h e s a m e kind of r e l a t i o n t o one

another.

This d e s c r i p t i o n of family resemblance a l s o seems t o suggest t h a t

t h e r e w i l l be some f e a t u r e s held i n ccmrmon between s o m e of t h e f a m i l y ' s
members. However, t h e n e c e s s i t y of this s t i p u l a t i o n i s brought i n t o
q u e s t i o n by what Bambrough goes on t o s a y about t h e "Churchill face." He
s u g g e s t s t h a t f e a t u r e s of t h e C h u r c h i l l f a c e , such a s a c l e f t c h i n , are
themselves only c l e f t c h i n s because they e x h i b i t a family resemblance.
Consequently, even when two members of t h e s a m e family have c l e f t c h i n s i t
s t i l l cannot be s a i d that they s h a r e some f e a t u r e i n common. Bambrough
concludes from t h i s a n a l y s i s that ". . . t h e r e i s a good s e n s e i n which
no two members of t h e C h u r c h i l l family need have any f e a t u r e i n common i n
order f o r a l l members of t h e C h u r c h i l l family t o have t h e C h u r c h i l l face."4
I would l i k e t o suggest that i f Bambrough's a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , t h e r e i s
a good sense i n which no two members of t h e C h u r c h i l l family could ever
have any f e a t u r e i n common, s i n c e whatever f e a t u r e w e suggest a s c a n d i d a t e
f o r t h e common f e a t u r e t h a t f e a t u r e i t s e l f could undergo Bambrough's a n a l y s i s .

This extension of Bambrough's is unnecessary and s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . It i s

s e l f - d e f e a t i n g because i f Bambrough's diagram i s meant t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e
n a t u r e of a family resemblance, then w e m u s t see some f e a t u r e s overlap, i . e . ,
i t must b e understood that some f e a t u r e s are held i n common between members
of a kind, and some not held i n common. But i f a complete o r extended
a n a l y s i s of t h e diagram demonstrates that no f e a t u r e s are held i n common,
then Bambrough has reduced t h e notion of family resemblance t o h i s v e r s i o n
of nominalism, i . e . , t o where games, f o r example, have nothing i n common
except t h a t they are c a l l e d games. Consequently, i f overlapping f e a t u r e s are
t o e x h i b i t a family resemblance, then some f e a t u r e s must be held i n common
between some members of a family. And t h i s must be t r u e r e g a r d l e s s of how
f a r Bambrough's a n a l y s i s i s c a r r i e d o u t .

I n c i d e n t a l l y , Bambrough's extension of family resemblance t o f e a t u r e s

which c o n s t i t u t e t h e resemblance s u g g e s t s a n i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f i c u l t y f o r
e s s e n t i a l i s m as w e l l . I f w e undertake an extended a n a l y s i s ( i n Bambrough's
sense) of a concept by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e common and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s of
e s s e n t i a l i s m , such an a n a l y s i s w i l l be a s d e s t r u c t i v e t o e s s e n t i a l i s m as i t
is t o t h e notion of family resemblance. For example, i f w e have a number of
i n s t a n c e s of a p a r t i c u l a r concept, e s s e n t i a l i s m w i l l r e q u i r e a common and
p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e between every i n s t a n c e . Now i f we c o n c e n t r a t e on t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r feature-concept, or set of feature-concepts, a s Bambrough asked
us t o do w i t h regard t o overlapping f e a t u r e s , t h e q u e s t i o n of what every
i n s t a n c e of t h i s feature-concept has i n common a l s o must be answered i n an
extended a n a l y s i s of t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s p i c t u r e , and so on and so f o r t h .
This would have t h e curious consequence of demonstrating t h a t i n an a n a l y s i s
of t h e s o r t suggested by Bambrough, an e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s account of general terms
would r e s u l t i n everything having everything e l s e i n common. That i s t o s a y ,
t h e r e would be no b a s i s f o r a non-arbitrary boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n by r e f e r -
ence t o common f e a t u r e s . The e s s e n t i a l i s t presumably avoids t h i s consequence
by r e f e r e n c e t o u n i v e r s a l s a s an o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t kind of f e a t u r e .
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DOUGLAS HUFF

However, t h e supposed need t o i n t r o d u c e u n i v e r s a l s i s what Bambrough's

a n a l y s i s of f a m i l y resemblance i s meant t o deny. The above e x t e n s i o n of
Bambrough's diagram of family resemblance i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s purpose.
I n f a c t , i f what I have s a i d i s c o r r e c t , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r Bambrough
t o deny t h e need f o r u n i v e r s a l s i n this way w i t h o u t a d o p t i n g a form of
nominalism, which he h a s no i n t e n t i o n of doing. On t h e c o n t r a r y , Bambrough
a r g u e s that t h e n a t u r e of f a m i l y resemblance, d e p i c t e d i n h i s diagram,
s o l v e s t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s , because i t makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n
t o p r o v i d e a n a n a l y s i s f o r t h e r e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l t e r m s t h a t i s n e i t h e r
a v e r s i o n of r e a l i s m n o r a v e r s i o n of nominalism. The n o m i n a l i s t i s s e e n
by Bambrough as anyone who d e n i e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l t e r m by denying t h e e x i s t e n c e of common
and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s . The realist, i . e . , e s s e n t i a l i s t , i s s e e n a s anyone
who i n s i s t s upon t h e e x i s t e n c e of something h e l d i n common among t h i n g s
subsumed under t h e same t e r m , i n o r d e r t o have a n o b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l t e r m s . 5 I n response t o t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n
Bambrough a r g u e s that t h e f a m i l y resemblance p r o p o s a l p r o v i d e s a t h i r d
a l t e r n a t i v e by denying a n assumption fundamental t o t h e d i s p u t e between r e a l -
ism and nominalism.

It is assumed as obvious by b o t h t h e n o m i n a l i s t and t h e realist

that t h e r e c a n be no o b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of a g e n e r a l term t o i t s i n s t a n c e s u n l e s s i t s i n s t a n c e s have
something i n common over and above t h e i r having i n common that
they are i t s i n s t a n c e s . 6

Although Bambrough's d i s t i n c t i o n between what he c a l l s "nominalist" and

"realist" i s t o o h u r r i e d , t h e b r e v i t y i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s t o h i s
p o i n t . It i s n o t s e r i o u s because t h e assumption noted i s n o t a r t i f i c i a l o r
t r i v i a l . A . J . Ayer, f o r example, g i v e s c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n t o i t when h e s t a t e s ,
while d i s c u s s i o n g e n e r a l t e r m s , that:

Except where a word i s p a t e n t l y ambiguous, i t i s n a t u r a l f o r us

t o assume t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , o r t y p e s of s i t u a t i o n s ,
t o which i t a p p l i e s have a d i s t i n c t i v e common f e a t u r e . For o t h e r -
w i s e why should w e use t h e same word t o r e f e r t o them?7

According t o Bambrough, t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h i s assumption makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r

W i t t g e n s t e i n , by means of family resemblance, t o a g r e e w i t h t h e n o m i n a l i s t
t h a t t h e r e i s no common t h r e a d o r connecting l i n k of f e a t u r e s running through
e v e r y t h i n g subsumed under t h e same t e r m , w h i l e a l s o a g r e e i n g w i t h t h e r e a l i s t
that g e n e r a l terms must have a n o n - a r b i t r a r y boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n .

Bambrough's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n

h a s r e c e i v e d numerous c r i t i c i s m s . The a r t i f i c i a l i t y a n d / o r inadequacy of h i s
d i s t i n c t i o n between nominalism and r e a l i s m has been noted.8 It h a s been
argued t h a t he i s n o t r e a l l y d e a l i n g w i t h t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s , and i f
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

he is, he should not be.9 It has also been suggested that the notion of
family resemblance presupposes the underlying genetic link between members
of an actual family and consequently the analogy breaks down when applied
to groupings that do not share this link. Moreover, the breadth of
Wittgenstein's criticism of essentialism is argued to be not as broad as
Bambrough contends, i.e., it is argued that Wittgenstein did not intend
his comments to be applicable to every general term. But perhaps most
importantly, it is argued that Bambrough's construction of family re-
semblance is no more adequate as an account of a term's boundary of
application than those proposals it is meant to replace, i.e., essentialism
and nominalism.

There are other criticisms to be sure, but I would like to consider

only these, because I believe they identify what is of crucial importance
to Bambrough's interpretation, and they also help illuminate what Wittgenstein
was not doing when he referred to the notion of family resemblance. I will
deal primarily with the last three objections In order, namely, (1) the family
resemblance analogy presupposes an underlying link of continuity, ( 2 ) family
resemblance does not apply to all general terms, and ( 3 ) Bambrough's pro-
posal fails as a solution to the problem of universals.

The objection that the family resemblance notion presupposes an under-

lying continuity is a familiar criticism of Bambrough (and of Wittgenstein).
The standard basis for this objection is the observation that if we are to
draw an analogy between the similarity of appearance that members of an
actual family sometimes have and the similarity between things subsumed under
a general term, then we must take into account the fact that members of an
actual family are already linked by a genetic and/or legal relation. lo
Consequently, the philosophical importance of the notion of family resemblance
breaks down immediately, because the context in which it is introduced by
Wittgenstein, i.e., games, is one in which he denies such a principle of
continuity.

This is not a serious objection, but it does suggest a crucial misunder-

standing of Wittgenstein's employment of family resemblance. To begin with
"family resemblance" already has an established usage in ordinary language
and has had for some time. Furthermore, this use is already much broader
than the similarity that we sometimes experience between genetically related
people. Consider, for example, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's use of "family
resemblance" in A S t u d y in S c a r l e t , and see whether this usage is any less
complex, contrived, or extended with regard to crime than Wittgenstein's is
with regard to games.

Well, I have a trade of my own. I suppose I am the only one in

the world. I'm a consulting detective, if you understand what
that is. Here i n London we have lots of Government detectives
and lots of private ones. When these fellows are at fault, they
come to me, and I manage to put them on the right scent. They
lay all the evidence before me, and I am generally able, by the
help of my knowledge of the history of crime, to set them straight.
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DOUGLAS HUFF

There i s a s t r o n g f a m i l y resemblance about m i s d e e d s , and i f

you have a l l t h e d e t a i l s o f a thousand a t your f i n g e r e n d s ,
i t is odd i f you c a n ' t unravel t h e t h u s a n d and f i r s t . . 11 . .
Family resemblance i s n o t t o b e s e e n as a n overextended metaphor o r as
a technical t e r m t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n h a s i n t r o d u c e d t o i d e n t i f y a n e w and
complex way of r e l a t i n g members of a k i n d . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s e v e n t u a l r e f e r e n c e
t o " f a m i l y resemblances'' i s a way of drawing o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t
a term c a n have a n i n t e l l i g i b l e boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n , even though t h e
t h i n g s t o which i t c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e s s h a r e no common and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e ,
o r s e t of such f e a t u r e s . I t reminds u s of what w e know t o b e t h e c a s e
when w e are n o t d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y . ("The work of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r c o n s i s t s
i n a s s e m b l i n g r e m i n d e r s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose." 12)

Did W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t e n d h i s c r i t i c i s m of e s s e n t i a l i s m i n t h e game d i s -
c u s s i o n t o b e extended t o a l l g e n e r a l terms? Bambrough a r g u e s h e d i d , and
c o n s e q u e n t l y Bambrough's c o n s t r u c t i o n of f a m i l y resemblance must a c c o u n t
f o r t h e o b j e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of a l l g e n e r a l terms, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e t e r m s
t h a t can b e d e f i n e d by a s t a t e m e n t of n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s .
T h i s seems t o b e a m i s r e a d i n g o f W i t t g e n s t e i n . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of
e s s e n t i a l i s m d o e s n o t s o l e l y depend upon h i s d i s c u s s i o n of "game" ( o r of
" c h a i r " , "number", " l e a f " , etc. 1 3 ) , b u t r e q u i r e s a n a d d i t i o n a l and s e p a r a t e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h o s e terms t h a t do f u l f i l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f e s s e n t i a l i s m ,
e . g . , "modus ponens". For t h e s a k e of b r e v i t y , I would l i k e t o mark t h i s
d i s t i n c t i o n between terms whose b o u n d a r i e s of a p p l i c a t i o n are n o t f i x e d by
n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s ( e . g . , "game"), and t h o s e t h a t are ( e . g . ,
"modus ponens") by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e former as open terms and t o t h e l a t t e r as
closed t e r m s .

Both W i t t g e n s t e i n and Bambrough acknowledge t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c l o s e d terms.

However, Bambrough a r g u e s t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n w a s n o t c o n t r a s t i n g open terms
w i t h c l o s e d terms, i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of open t e r m s i s
p r o b l e m a t i c a l w h i l e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of c l o s e d terms i s n o t . l4 R a t h e r ,
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s t o be u n d e r s t o o d a s i n t e n d i n g h i s f a m i l y resemblance remarks
t o a p p l y t o b o t h open and c l o s e d t e r m s . For Bambrough, c l o s e d t e r m s a r e n o t
exempt from a f a m i l y resemblance a n a l y s i s b e c a u s e t h e r e f e r e n c e t o common
and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s i s " u l t i m a t e l y " a n i n c o m p l e t e e x p l a n a t i o n of a t e r m ' s
boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n , and t h u s f a i l s as a n a c c o u n t of t h e o b j e c t i v e
a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l terms. Bambrough makes t h i s c l e a r i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n
of " b r o t h e r ".
I t i s t r u e t h a t b r o t h e r s have i n common t h a t t h e y a r e male
s i b l i n g s , b u t t h e i r h a v i n g i n common t h a t t h e y are m a l e
s i b l i n g s i s t h e i r having i n common t h a t t h e y a re b r o t h e r s ,
and n o t t h e i r h a v i n g i n common something i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r
b e i n g b r o t h e r s . Even a c o n c e p t which can b e e x p l a i n e d i n
terms of n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t b e u l t i m a t e l y
e x p l a i n e d i n s u c h terms. To s a t i s f y t h e c r a v i n g f o r a n u l t i m a t e
e x p l a n a t i o n of ' b r o t h e r ' i n s u c h terms i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o
d e f i n e ' m a l e ' and ' s i b l i n g ' , and t h e words i n which ' m a l e ' and
s i b l i n g ' w e r e d e f i n e d , and so on ad i n f i n i t u m and ad i m p s s i b i l e . l5
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

I n s h o r t , t h e r e f e r e n c e t o a s t a t e m e n t of n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t con-
d i t i o n s i s always doomed t o b e a n i n c o m p l e t e account of a g e n e r a l t e r m ' s
application. It i s d e s t i n e d t o f a i l u r e , because i t l e a d s t o a h o p e l e s s
r e g r e s s i o n of l i k e e x p l a n a t i o n s . Consequently, a l l t e r m s , c l o s e d and open,
r e q u i r e a f a m i l y resemblance a n a l y s i s i n o r d e r t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e i r o b j e c t i v e
and n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n .

There a r e two s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s r e a d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n .
F i r s t l y , a l t h o u g h Bambrough i s c o r r e c t i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n
rejects t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s a c c o u n t of c l o s e d t e r m s , W i t t g e n s t e i n d o e s con-
s i d e r t h e problems p e c u l i a r t o c l o s e d terms, and h e c o n s i d e r s them w i t h o u t
i n v o k i n g t h e f a m i l y resemblance model as a n a n a l y s i s of c l o s e d t e r m s . A
d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h i s p o i n t w i l l b e l e f t u n t i l S e c t i o n 4. Secondly, i f a
word can b e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s of n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , i t
would c l e a r l y seem t o have a n o b j e c t i v e and n o n - a r b i t r a r y boundary of a p p l i -
c a t i o n . Now i f t h e r e i s a problem w i t h t h i s account of g e n e r a l t e r m s , i t i s
n o t because t h i s method of e x p l a n a t i o n l e a d s t o a d e s t r u c t i v e r e g r e s s i o n of
l i k e e x p l a n a t i o n s . The t h r e a t of a n e n d l e s s r e g r e s s i o n i s , a s a l r e a d y n o t e d ,
no more s e r i o u s f o r t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t t h a n i t i s f o r Bambrough. Bambrough's
account of a t e r m ' s boundary by means of f a m i l y resemblance depends upon t h e
o v e r l a p p i n g and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g of f e a t u r e s , e a c h of which would i n t u r n re-
q u i r e a f a m i l y resemblance a c c o u n t and so on ad infiniturn and ad irnpossibile.
I f a r e g r e s s i o n of l i k e e x p l a n a t i o n s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e j e c t t h e e s s e n t i a l -
i s t ' s account of even some g e n e r a l t e r m s , i t i s l i k e w i s e a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n
. t o r e j e c t Bambrough's a c c o u n t .

Furthermore, even i f Bambrough's r e q u i r e m e n t of a f a m i l y resemblance

account f o r a l l g e n e r a l terms w e r e g r a n t e d , he would s t i l l n o t have a n
a d e q u a t e a n a l y s i s of g e n e r a l t e r m s and t h e i r n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n . The
major d i f f i c u l t y w i t h Bambrough's c o n s t r u c t i o n of f a m i l y resemblance i s t h a t
i t cannot p o s s i b l y f u l f i l l t h e purpose h e i n t e n d s i t t o f u l f i l l , i . e . , i t
cannot account f o r t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e boundary w e r e c o g n i z e between c l e a r
examples of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of t h i n g s . I f t h e n o t i o n of f a m i l y resemblance
i s l i m i t e d t o t h e c r i s s - c r o s s i n g and o v e r l a p p i n g of f e a t u r e s among t h i n g s
subsumed under a g e n e r a l t e r m , t h e n i t c a n b e shown t h a t w e have l o s t a l l
p o s s i b i l i t y of a c c o u n t i n g f o r a t e r m ' s n o n - a r b i t r a r y boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n .

Consider t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e a c t i v i t i e s : b u s i n e s s , poker, and Monopoly

( t h e board-game). F e a t u r e s can b e s e e n t o c r i s s - c r o s s and o v e r l a p i n t h e s e
a c t i v i t i e s , e . g . , a c t u a l c u r r e n c y i s used i n two, b u t n o t i n Monopoly; buying
and s e l l i n g occur i n two, b u t n o t i n poker, e t c . ; y e t w e a r e w i l l i n g t o c a l l
o n l y two of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s games. Now what makes t h e o v e r l a p p i n g of
f e a t u r e s s i g n i f i c a n t i n one case and n o t i n t h e o t h e r when s p e c i f y i n g which
a c t i v i t i e s a r e c o r r e c t l y c a l l e d games? I t i s c u r i o u s t h a t s h a r e d f e a t u r e s ,
such as c o m p e t i t i o n , may b e r e l e v a n t t o t h e f a m i l y resemblance of games, b u t
l o s e any such r e l e v a n c e when found i n a c t i v i t i e s t h a t a r e n o t games. The
o v e r l a p p i n g and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g of f e a t u r e s i s n o t a d e q u a t e by i t s e l f t o pro-
v i d e f o r a boundary between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of t h i n g s , and c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
Bambrough's account of f a m i l y resemblance f a i l s as a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l t e r m s .
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DOUGLAS HUFF

I t might be o b j e c t e d t h a t t h i s r e a d i n g of Bambrough's a c c o u n t i s t o o
narrow. The t e m p t a t i o n i s p e r h a p s t o s a y t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of over-
l a p p i n g f e a t u r e s i s merely a q u e s t i o n of t h e number of s i m i l a r i t i e s
i n v o l v e d , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t Monopoly and poker may s h a r e more f e a t u r e s
w i t h e a c h o t h e r t h a n e i t h e r s h a r e s w i t h b u s i n e s s . T h i s o p t i o n , however,
is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o Bambrough. F e a t u r e s do n o t become r e l e v a n t t o making
some a c t i v i t y a game (and n o t b u s i n e s s ) merely because t h e y a r e h e l d i n
some a p p r o p r i a t e q u a n t i t y . It is perfectly possible, i n f a c t i t is likely
a c c o r d i n g t o Bambrough, t h a t two games may s h a r e no f e a t u r e s i n common and
s t i l l b e unmistakably games. I t i s n o t t h e q u a n t i t y of f e a t u r e s t h a t
o v e r l a p between t h e members of a f a m i l y , b u t t h e o v e r l a p and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g
i t s e l f t h a t i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a f a m i l y resemblance. T h i s much i s clear.
What i s n o t c l e a r i s why t h e o v e r l a p of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s i s sometimes
r e l e v a n t t o making a n a c t i v i t y a member of a p a r t i c u l a r f a m i l y and sometimes
n o t . The f a c t t h a t some f e a t u r e s o v e r l a p i s n o t enough t o make v a r i o u s and
d i s t i n c t a c t i v i t i e s t h e same k i n d of t h i n g . There i s , i n s h o r t , no j u s t i f i -
c a t i o n f o r Bambrough's b e l i e f i n t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of open terms
on t h e b a s i s of o v e r l a p p i n g and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g f e a t u r e s between members of
a kind.

T h i s i s n o t t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e f e a t u r e s of p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s are
n o t r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r b e i n g games. R a t h e r , t h e mystery i s what makes some
f e a t: u r e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a term, and n o t o t h e r s . I t i s n o t
enough t o n o t e a p a t t e r n of d u p l i c a t i o n between i t s f e a t u r e s and t h e f e a t u r e s
of some a c t i v i t i e s a l r e a d y recognized a s games. I t i s n o t enough, because
w e o f t e n have d i r e c t o v e r l a p p i n g of such f e a t u r e s i n t o a c t i v i t i e s t h a t a r e
n o t games; and i t i s c l e a r t h a t i n such c a s e s , i . e . , gamelnon-game, t h e
e x i s t e n c e of a s i m i l a r i t y between some of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e f e a t u r e s does n o t
endanger, i n t h e l e a s t , t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s as s e p a r a t e k i n d s of a c t i v i t i e s .
Consequently, i f w e are u n a b l e t o account f o r why some f e a t u r e s are r e l e v a n t
t o a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n of "family resemblance," and n o t o t h e r f e a t u r e s , and
n o t t h e same f e a t u r e s when found i n o t h e r p a t t e r n s of resemblance, t h e n we
have l o s t o u r boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n . l6

The f a i l u r e of Bambrough's c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f a m i l y resemblance d i s -

c u s s i o n i n t o a t h e o r y of g e n e r a l t e r m s i s t h u s twofold: (1) I t f a i l s t o
e s t a b l i s h i n t e l l i g i b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r an open t e r m ' s boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n
by r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s t h a t o v e r l a p and c r i s s - c r o s s , and ( 2 ) h i s i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n i s l i k e w i s e n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o c l o s e d
terms. N o n e t h e l e s s , I b e l i e v e Bambrough is c o r r e c t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s t h e primary p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m , i . e . , t h a t
a l l t h i n g s c o r r e c t l y subsumed under a g e n e r a l t e r m must have something i n
common i n v i r t u e of which they a r e s o subsumed, and r e j e c t s i t f o r all g e n e r a l
terms. However, t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h i s t h e s i s r e q u i r e s a b r o a d e r con-
s i d e r a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work t h a n undertaken by Bambrough i n h i s a n a l y s i s
of f a m i l y resemblance.

I b e l i e v e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own p o s i t i o n can b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Bambrough's

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way. The family resemblance d i s c u s s i o n
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t requirement of common and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s
i s n o t f u l f i l l e d f o r each and e v e r y t e r m . I t a l s o demonstrates t h a t t h i s
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F M L Y RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

non-fulfillment of camon f e a t u r e s does not a f f e c t the non-arbitrary s t a t u s

of a n open term's a p p l i c a t i o n . Open terms obviously do admit of a boundary
of a p p l i c a t i o n , even though t h e f e a t u r e s that presumably determine a n open
term's a p p l i c a t i o n are n o t held i n camuon. I n a d d i t i o n , Wittgenstein does
allow f o r the existence of terms w i t h sharp boundaries, of a p p l i c a t i o n , i.e.,
closed terms, which seem i d e a l l y s u i t e d t o f u l f i l l t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t program.
Consequently, i f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m is t o be complete,
then an a n a l y s i s of closed terms is required a s w e l l . Closed terms must
e i t h e r be reduced t o t h e status of open terms, o r i t must be demonstrated
t h a t e s s e n t i a l i s m i s no more s u c c e s s f u l with regard t o explaining a closed
term's boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n t h a n i t i s f o r open t e r m s . Bambrough's
a n a l y s i s i s a c a s e of attempting t h e former while W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own p o s i t i o n
i s more c o r r e c t l y construed a s a v e r s i o n of t h e l a t t e r .

Wittgenstein extends h i s criticism of e s s e n t i a l i s m t o closed terms by

drawing our a t t e n t i o n t o rule-governed behavior. The q u e s t i o n of r u l e -
governed behavior e n t e r s t h e argument i n t h e following way. Our i n a b i l i t y
t o s p e c i f y a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n f o r some g e n e r a l terms, as Wittgenstein
suggests, i s unacceptable t o t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t , because t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y seems
t o leave us with a host of conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s . For example, i f t h e r e
i s nothing i n common among everything s p e c i f i e d by t h e same term, then, t h e
e s s e n t i a l i s t asks, (1) how i s i t p o s s i b l e t o j u s t i f y one a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
term over another o r , (2) how i s i t p o s s i b l e t o have c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t
a p p l i c a t i o n s of a term o r a g a i n , (3) how i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r us t o apply a
term i n a non-arbitrary manner t o t h i n g s w e have not previously experienced?
I n b r i e f , our i n a b i l i t y t o g i v e a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of a t e r m by r e f e r e n c e
t o a set of cOmmOn and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s suggests t o t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t that
w e have no f i r m b a s i s f o r our a p p l i c a t i o n . W e have-no r u l e f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of such a t e r m , and consequently t h e n a t u r e of i t s supposed non-arbitrary
a p p l i c a t i o n i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . What i s needed t o avoid such d i f f i c u l t i e s i s
t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a r u l e of a p p l i c a t i o n that would l e a v e no doubt as t o how
a term i s t o be applied. For t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t , t h i s can be provided by a
general d e f i n i t i o n t h a t draws a term's boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n by r e f e r e n c e
t o a p a r t i c u l a r set of f e a t u r e s held i n common among everything c o r r e c t l y
subsumed under t h e s a m e t e r m . These f e a t u r e s are w h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e necessary
and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l t e r m f o r t h e
e s s e n t i a l i s t and consequently provide a r u l e f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l
term.

This a n a l y s i s of general t e r m s i s r e j e c t e d by Wittgenstein, and i t i s

r e j e c t e d f o r closed t e r m s as w e l l as f o r open terms. The f a c t t h a t we cannot
s p e c i f y a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of open terms, but must refer t o examples of how
the term i s applied when explaining w h a t (say) a game i s , does not make t h e i r
a p p l i c a t i o n more doubtful, l e s s c e r t a i n , o r harder t o understand than closed
terms. gxamples can, of course, be misunderstood o r taken i n t h e wrong way,
but t h i s i s t r u e of general d e f i n i t i o n s a s well. Both examples and general
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DOUGLAS HUFF

d e f i n i t i o n s m u s t be understood i n a p a r t i c u l a r l i g h t b e f o r e w e have c o r r e c t
a p p l i c a t i o n of a term, and both can be misconstrued. W i t t g e n s t e i n n o t e s i n
paragraph 7 1 of t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s :

And t h i s is j u s t how one might e x p l a i n t o someone w h a t a game

is. One g i v e s examples and i n t e n d s them t o b e taken i n a
p a r t i c u l a r way.--1 do n o t , however, mean by t h i s t h a t he is
supposed t o see i n t h o s e examples t h a t common t h i n g which I,
f o r some reason, w a s unable t o e x p r e s s ; b u t that h e i s now t o
employ those examples i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. Here g i v i n g examples
i s n o t a n i n d i r e c t means of explaining--in d e f a u l t of a b e t t e r .
For any g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n can be misunderstood too.

W i t t g e n s t e i n i s h e r e s u g g e s t i n g that w e are conceptually no worse o f f ,

when s p e c i f y i n g a term's boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n , by g i v i n g examples than w e
are by g i v i n g a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n . There i s e s s e n t i a l l y no more danger of
our misunderstanding t h e examples given f o r an open t e r m ' s a p p l i c a t i o n , i - e . ,
t h e r e i s no more danger of o u r employing t h o s e examples i n c o r r e c t l y , than
t h e r e i s of o u r applying a rule of a p p l i c a t i o n i n c o r r e c t l y f o r a c l o s e d t e r m .
The p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt i s n o t e l i m i n a t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o a r u l e .

A rule s t a n d s t h e r e l i k e a sign-post.--Does t h e sign-post l e a v e

no doubt open about t h e way I have to go? Does i t shew which
d i r e c t i o n I a m t o t a k e when I have passed i t ; whether a l o n g t h e
road o r t h e f o o t p a t h o r cross-country? But where i s i t s a i d
which way I a m t o f o l l o w i t ; whether i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of i t s
f i n g e r o r ( e . g . ) i n t h e o p p o s i t e one?--And i f t h e r e w e r e , n o t a
s i n g l e sign-post, b u t a c h a i n of a d j a c e n t ones o r of c h a l k marks
on t h e ground--is t h e r e only one way of i n t e r p r e t i n g them? l7

There i s , of course, as W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t i m a t e s , more than one i n t e r p r e -

t a t i o n f o r t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t make up a p a r t i c u l a r r u l e ,
b u t n a t u r a l l y n o t every i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a c c e p t a b l e . The f e a t u r e s t h a t make
up a r u l e of a p p l i c a t i o n must be understood i n a p a r t i c u l a r way b e f o r e w e
have a n a c c e p t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Their m e r e e x i s t e n c e does n o t guarantee
c e r t a i n t y and remove a l l doubt a s t o how a term i s t o be a p p l i e d . Reference
t o f i x e d f e a t u r e s i s necessary t o our understanding of a closed t e r m , but
t h e s e f e a t u r e s are necessary i n t h e s a m e way t h a t examples w i t h p a r t i c u l a r
f e a t u r e s a r e e s s e n t i a l t o understanding an open term's a p p l i c a t i o n . F e a t u r e s
do n o t become p r i v i l e g e d , o r become s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a t e r m
merely because they a r e held i n common. Consequently, a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n i s
no more (and no l e s s ) a foundation f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l term than
an e x p l a n a t i o n by means of examples.

I t might be objected t h a t , even though how closed terms a r e a p p l i e d can

be misunderstood, t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of f i x e d f e a t u r e s l e a v e s l e s s room f o r
doubt o r misunderstanding than t h e enumeration of examples does. I t would
s e e m obvious, t h e o b j e c t i o n runs, t h a t f i x e d f e a t u r e s provide f o r a g r e a t e r
degree of c e r t a i n t y i n applying g e n e r a l terms than r e f e r e n c e t o examples w i t h
non-fixed f e a t u r e s . This, i n t u r n , would seem t o suggest t h a t we a r e much
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

c l o s e r t o a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l names
i n t h e case of c l o s e d terms than w e are i n t h e c a s e of open terms. This i s
a n important o b j e c t i o n , because it emphasizes t h e f o r c e of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l
tendency t o i n s i s t upon comnon and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
a l l g e n e r a l terms. It i s , however, c o n t r a r y t o f a c t . There is no scale of
c e r t a i n t y i n our a p p l i c a t i o n of terms t o t h e world t h a t ranges i n s t r e n g t h
from c l o s e d terms t o open terms. Some terms, of c o u r s e , have a clearer and
more c e r t a i n a p p l i c a t i o n t h a n o t h e r terms, b u t this is t y p i c a l l y a case of
f a m i l i a r i t y o r of r e l a t i v e l y simple terminology (e.g., t a b l e , square) versus
c o n c e p t u a l l y complex terminology (e.g., comedy, e l e c t r o n ) , and t h e f a m i l i a r i -
t y o r complexity of a term h a s nothing t o do w i t h its boundaries b e i n g open
or closed.

Furthermore, b o r d e r l i n e cases o r cases of d o u b t f u l a p p l i c a t i o n are n o t

t h e c e n t r a l concern. What m u s t be explained i n a n account of g e n e r a l terms
i s n o t q u e s t i o n a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n , which may occur f o r any number of reasons;
what must be explained is c l e a r and undisputed a p p l i c a t i o n . This form of
a p p l i c a t i o n i s no less c e r t a i n i n t h e c a s e of open terms, e . g . , " t a b l e " o r
"chair", than i t is i n t h e c a s e of c l o s e d terms, e . g . , " c o n s t r u c t i v e dilemma".
It i s t h e n a t u r e of this c e r t a i n t y , i . e . , t h e confidence w e normally have i n
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l terms, t h a t is i n q u e s t i o n . It h a s a l r e a d y been
shown t h a t t h e m e r e overlapping and c r i s s - c r o s s i n g of f e a t u r e s cannot account
f o r o r j u s t i f y any such a p p l i c a t i o n of terms. Fixed f e a t u r e s , however, f a c e
t h e s a m e d i f f i c u l t y . Common and p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e s cannot, by themselves,
j u s t i f y our i n s i s t e n c e upon a p p l y i n g a term i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, because
f i x e d f e a t u r e s cannot d i c t a t e t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n anymore than overlapping
f e a t u r e s can determine t h e way i n which they are s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of g e n e r a l terms. The d i f f i c u l t y of j u s t i f y i n g o u r employment of a t e r m by
r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same f o r both open and c l o s e d terms.

The e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s i n s i s t e n c e upon t h e e x i s t e n c e of common f e a t u r e s i s

thus of l i m i t e d value a s an e x p l a n a t i o n . Common f e a t u r e s cannot, by v i r t u e of
t h e i r being held i n comon, j u s t i f y t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of a term.
The e s s e n t i a l i s t i s , of course, c o r r e c t i n maintaining t h e r e l e v a n c e of f e a t u r e s
t o a p p l i c a t i o n , b u t t h e e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s of f e a t u r e s cannot account
f o r t h e way i n which they are r e l e v a n t . The family resemblance d i s c u s s i o n has
demonstrated t h a t f e a t u r e s c o n t i n u e t o remain r e l e v a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a
t e r m , even when they are n o t held i n common. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n of
g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n s demonstrates t h a t we have n o t reached t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s
g o a l of a f i r m foundation a g a i n s t doubt by r e f e r e n c e t o a common set of
f e a t u r e s , because t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h e s e f e a t u r e s , l i k e t h e r e l e v a n c e of
f e a t u r e s given i n examples, can be misunderstood o r taken i n c o r r e c t l y . Again,
t h a t f e a t u r e s a r e held i n common does n o t make them f a i l - s a f e guides i n our
a c t i o n . The relevance of a p a r t i c u l a r set of common f e a t u r e s o r a p a r t i c u l a r
family of f e a t u r e s ( a s opposed t o o t h e r sets o r o t h e r f a m i l i e s ) m u s t themselves
be accounted f o r i n an adequate e x p l a n a t i o n of a term's boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n .
I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t e s s e n t i a l i s m proves t o be an inadequate p i c t u r e of our
use of g e n e r a l terms, and i t s f a i l u r e a p p l i e s t o a l l g e n e r a l t e r m s .
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DOUGLAS HUFF

Ilham Dilman, in "Universals: Bambrough on Wittgenstein," also rejects

Bambrough's reconstruction of the family resemblance remarks into a theory
of universals. l8 However, Dilman's argument against Bambrough depends on
a misleading interpretation of Wittgenstein, which obscures the philosophi-
cal importance of Wittgenstein's rejection of essentialism. Dilman agrees
with Bambrough that no general term can "ultimately" be explained in terms
of objective features in the world, but argues that Bambrough still manages
to construct a theory of universals which reasserts the prominence and
necessity of objective features. For Dilman, the flaw in Bambrough's
account is immediately evident when Bambrough compares alternative systems
of classifications. Here Bambrough suggests that alternative systems of
classifications by people of different cultures are "backed by objective
differences and similarities in the world." l9 Thus, even though different,
alternative forms of classification are not arbitrary, since they depend
on objective differences and similarities which are independent of language.

Dilman rejects Bambrough's realism by arguing that there are no objective

differences and similarities of features in the world which could provide a
non-arbitrary basis for different language-games or for culturally different
natural languages. This is not possible because what we mean by "difference"
or "similarity" at any given time will depend on a particular language-game,
and this meaning may or may not be relevant to what is meant by "difference"
or "similarity" in another language-game. "Thus," Dilman concludes, "if what
we call 'difference' varies from one language-game to another and, therefore,
also from one system of classification to another, how can similarities and
differences constitute the common basis of different classifications?"20 It
seems they cannot, and thus any dependence on objective similarities and
differences in the world is always doomed to fail as an account of different
systems of classification.

Dilman, however, does agree with Bambrough that the notion of family
resemblance is fundamental to Wittgenstein's rejection of essentialism. Dilman
makes this quite clear in his discussion of closed terms. Here he notes that
there are terms whose boundary of application can be deductively deduced from
a specification of sufficient and necessary conditions. And wherever these
conditions are satisfied and the "essence" of the term "is exemplified," we
are then justified in using the term in the way we do.21 The difficulty is
that a determination of when these conditions are satisfied or fulfilled in
new cases cannot itself be justified deductively. This leads Dilman to
conclude that the problem of measuring the comparison of features in a case
where the conditions are satisfied with the features in a new case is what
the family resemblance remarks are meant to emphasize. And this difficulty
of justifying our measurement is as much a problem for closed terms as it is
for open terms.

T o put the point differently: a student is given both an example of modus

ponens and a definition of "modus ponens" in terms of necessary and sufficient
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

c o n d i t i o n s . The s t u d e n t is t h e n a s k e d t o i d e n t i f y new cases of m d u s ponens

i n a n e x e r c i s e book. H e must, that i s , d e c i d e when t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r m d u s
ponens a r e f u l f i l l e d i n t h e new cases and when t h e y are n o t . H e presumably
n o t e s t h e way t h e r e q u i r e d c o n d i t i o n s are f u l f i l l e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l case
and compares t h i s example t o t h e new arguments and d e c i d e s which of t h e s e
a r e cases of m d u s ponens. These comparisons, however, c a n n o t themselves
be j u s t i f i e d d e d u c t i v e l y . There i s no s e p a r a t e and o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d of
measurement t o d e t e r m i n e when t h e comparison i s c l o s e enough and when i t
is n o t . I n t h e end, t h e q u e s t i o n o f which arguments are cases of m d u s
ponens can "only b e answered i n t e r m s of examples and t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s
t o one a n o t h e r . " 2 2 There i s no o b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s a y i n g t h a t t h e
n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n are f u l f i l l e d i n a new case.

There a r e a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n .
F i r s t , Dilman's n o t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s a language-game i s v e r y wide r a n g i n g ,
and l e a d s him t o emphasize t h e c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s . o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s
when c r i t i c i z i n g Bambrough's a c c o u n t of a l t e r n a t i v e s y s t e m s o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
Dilman n o t e s , f o r example, that "What w e c o u n t a s a common p r o p e r t y o r
similarity ... v a r i e s from one c o n t e x t t o a n o t h e r and depends upon f e a t u r e s
of t h e c u l t u r e t o which w e b e l o n g and t h e language w e speak."23 C l e a r l y
W i t t g e n s t e i n d i d n o t c o n c e i v e of language-games i n t h i s f a r r e a c h i n g f a s h i o n ,
which would, on Dilman's a c c o u n t , i n c l u d e t h e c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s between
n a t u r a l languages. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own examples of language-games makes t h i s
q u i t e e v i d e n t , e . g . , p r a y i n g , g i v i n g o r d e r s and obeying them, g u e s s i n g r i d d l e s ,
forming and t e s t i n g a h y p o t h e s i s , g r e e t i n g , and i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, t r a n s -
l a t i n g from one language i n t o a n o t h e r . 2 4 A l l o f t h e s e were s e e n by W i t t g e n s t e i n
as d i s t i n c t l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s t h a t s h a r e only s u p e r f i c i a l similarities t o
one a n o t h e r , such as t h e o r d i n a r y o r s u r f a c e grammar of a p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r a l
language. To emphasize t h e c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , i n
t h e s e n s e t h a t what a Turk means by " d i f f e r e n c e " o r " s i m i l a r i t y " under c e r t a i n
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s n o t what an Englishman might mean, i s a t b e s t t o m i s c o n s t r u e
t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l importance of what W i t t g e n s t e i n took t o b e a f a c t , i . e . , t h e
p l u r a l i s t i c n a t u r e of language. And a t i t s w o r s t i t s e r v e s o n l y t o r e i n t r o d u c e
t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s and t e n d e n c i e s o f a t r a d i t i o n W i t t g e n s t e i n had
clearly rejected .

For example, Dilman c o n c l u d e s h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f f a m i l y resemblance w i t h a

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c e r t a i n "formal c o n c e p t s , " s u c h as " t r u t h , " " p r o p o s i t i o n , "
" r e a s o n , " " j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " "knowledge," and " p r o p e r t y , " which he s t a t e s c u t
a c r o s s t h e b o u n d a r i e s of language-games o r grammars. 2 5 Thus, he s u r m i s e s , w e
cannot g i v e a complete a c c o u n t o f t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f o u r words w i t h o u t a l s o
a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e g e n e r a l i t y of t h i s p r i v i l e g e d s e t of c o n c e p t s which c r o s s
language-games and l i e behind a l l language. 2 6 For Dilman, o n c e e s s e n t i a l i s m
h a s been r e j e c t e d , t h e s e f o r m a l c o n c e p t s become t h e p r i m a r y f o c u s of p h i l o -
s o p h i c a l concern. I n s h o r t , t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n t e r p r i s e remains v e r y much
what i t h a s always been on t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n . I t remains
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h a p r i v i l e g e d s e t of c o n c e p t s which a r e i n some s e n s e funda-
m e n t a l t o e v e r y t h i n g e l s e . C o n t r a r y t o r a i s i n g new q u e s t i o n s o r l e a d i n g u s
i n t o u n f a m i l i a r t e r r i t o r y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Dilman's i n t e r p r e -
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DOUGLAS HUFF

t a t i o n l e a d s us i n t o a t e r r i t o r y a l l too f a m i l i a r t o t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy
and q u i t e incompatible w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s g o a l of r e s o l v i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l
problems.

I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e a r e two d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h Dilman's a n a l y s i s of
closed terms. F i r s t , Dilman f a i l s t o see t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e f a c t t h a t
f e a t u r e s remain r e l e v a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a closed term, even though
f e a t u r e s cannot by themselves u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a
closed t e r m . And second, t h e kind of comparison of f e a t u r e s Dilman d e s c r i b e s
i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s i s i t s e l f a v e r y
common and f a m i l i a r a c t i v i t y o r language-game. And even though t h i s a c t i v i t y
does h e l p t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e c e n t r a l problem of concern t o W i t t g e n s t e i n , i t i s
not fundamental t o t h e problem. Dilman h a s , i n essence, confused a n i n s t a n c e
of t h e problem w i t h t h e problem i t s e l f .

Both of t h e s e p o i n t s c a n be i l l u s t r a t e d by means of our l o g i c s t u d e n t ' s

a t t e m p t s t o f i n d cases of m d u s ponens i n h i s e x e r c i s e book. L e t u s say,
t h a t t h e s t u d e n t c o n t i n u a l l y m i s i d e n t i f i e s arguments a s c a s e s of m d u s ponens.
Do w e s a y i n this case that t h e s t u d e n t has d i f f i c u l t y comparing f e a t u r e s of
t h e o r i g i n a l example of modus ponens w i t h new c a s e s , o r do w e s a y i n s t e a d t h a t
h e h a s misunderstood t h e r e l e v a n c e and importance of f e a t u r e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l
example?

Dilman s e e m s t o suggest that i t would be a c a s e of t h e former, w h i l e

W i t t g e n s t e i n , i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of rule-governed behavior i n mathematics, makes
i t q u i t e clear that i t i s a c a s e of t h e l a t t e r . Comparisons of t h e kind noted
by Dilman are n o t c e n t r a l t o t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s d i f f i c u l t y i n accounting f o r
t h e g e n e r a l i t y of words. It i s n o t simply a q u e s t i o n of our i n a b i l i t y t o
ground our comparison of c a s e s of modus ponens deductively. The very act of
making any such comparison i s p o s s i b l e only because c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s are seen
as r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i v i t y of comparing. How t h e s e f e a t u r e s become r e l e v a n t
i n t h e way they do as guides to o u r behavior i s what i s i n q u e s t i o n . And t h i s
puzzle is n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e a c t i v i t y of determining when c o n d i t i o n s have been
f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a closed term.

Dilman himself goes a long way toward b r i n g i n g t h i s concern t o t h e f o r e -

f r o n t . H e n o t e s , f o r example, that "Not only does t h e common essence g i v e us
f a l s e comfort, b u t i t keeps us from recognizing that in the end t h e meaning of
any word i s t o be gathered from t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i n which i t i s a ~ p l i c a b l e . ~ ~
The d i f f i c u l t y i s that t h e r e i s nothing t o be "gathered" from p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s
o r s i t u a t i o n s b u t t h e r e l e v a n c e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t o t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of a t e r m . We a r e , i n o t h e r words, faced w i t h a c u r i o u s dilemma,
i . e . , f e a t u r e s make t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f g e n e r a l terms. This i s what makes
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s bf rule-governed behavior i n mathematics of paramount
importdnce t o h i s r e j e c t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m . The c e n t r a l problem can be s t a t e d
i n t h e following way: I f (1) t h e f e a t u r e s of a r u l e a r e e s s e n t i a l t o i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n i n mathematics, b u t ( 2 ) r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s cannot j u s t i f y a
 15

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

r u l e ' s a p p l i c a t i o n i n one and only one way, then (3) t h e only way t o ground.
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e i s t o g i v e an account of how f e a t u r e s a c q u i r e t h e
relevance they have a s s t r i c t guides t o our behavior when c a l c u l a t i n g . The
f a c t t h a t they a r e held i n c a m o n i s not a s u f f i c i e n t account. This is t h e
f a i l u r e of e s s e n t i a l i s m . I n s h o r t , W i t t g e n s t e i n does n o t , as Dilman suggests,
reject e s s e n t i a l i s m by denying t h a t t h e r e a r e o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s i n t h e world,
f o r even i f there w e r e , this would resolve n o t h i n g .

The e s s e n t i a l i s t f a i l u r e i s both complete and profound. However, a

complete account of t h e importance of t h i s f a i l u r e f o r t h e problem of uni-
v e r s a l s r e q u i r e s a n a d d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on r u l e -
governed behavior i n mathematics. The p a r a l l e l between W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s
d i s c u s s i o n of t h e n e c e s s i t y w e experience i n following a r u l e , i n mathematics
and h i s d i s c u s s i o n of g e n e r a l terms i s q u i t e c l e a r . H e a l l u d e s t o t h e
s i m i l a r i t y when d i s c u s s i n g t h e i n e x o r a b i l i t y of a g e n e r a t i v e r u l e i n Remarks
on the Foundations of Mathematics.

How do I know t h a t i n working out t h e +2 I must w r i t e

"20004, 20006"

and n o t

"20004, 20008"?

--(The question: "How do I know t h a t t h i s colour i s 'red'?'' is

s i m i l a r . )2*

Thus whatever i t i s t h a t u l t i m a t e l y accounts f o r our a b i l i t y t o follow a

r u l e i n t h e employment of a g e n e r a l t e r m i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s a m e as t h a t which
n e c e s s i t a t e s employing a r u l e i n mathematical c a l c u l a t i o n i n one and only one
way. The r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d context of following a r u l e i n mathe-
matics w i l l demonstrate t h a t no f e a t u r e ( o r s e t of f e a t u r e s ) whether held i n
common o r n o t , can provide f o r i t s ( t h e i r ) own s i g n i f i c a n c e as a guide (guides)
t o our behavior. Consequently t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of f e a t u r e s held i n common
i s no more adequate as a n account of a term's boundary of a p p l i c a t i o n than
r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s t h a t c r i s s - c r o s s o r overlap. The fundamental d i f f i c u l t y
i n both c a s e s i s t o e x p l a i n how f e a t u r e s of t h e world come t o have t h e s i g n i f i -
cance they do when explaining a g e n e r a l term. Whether f e a t u r e s a r e held i n
common o r not i s i n c i d e n t a l t o e x p l a i n i n g t h e i r relevance t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of a g e n e r a l t e r m .

I n t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s Wittgenstein begins t h i s a n a l y s i s of
rule-governed behavior by asking us t o consider t h e a r i t h m e t i c a l s e r i e s 1 5 11
19 29.29 H e suggests t h a t i f w e now a s k someone t o continue t h e series i n t h e
"same way," w e w i l l have t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which t h e n o t i o n of l o g i c a l
16

DOUGLAS HUFF

n e c e s s i t y i s s a i d t o b e experienced. When c o n s i d e r i n g t h e series w e may

be i n c l i n e d t o s a y t h a t i f t h e series is t o b e continued i n t h e same way,
t h e n e x t number is, i n some s e n s e , determined. That is, w e would normally
expect t h e series t o b e continued w i t h 41, t h e n 55, e t c . It i s a t t h i s
p o i n t that w e may b e tempted, W i t t g e n s t e i n sug ests, t o say t h a t once w e
have grasped t h e r e l e v a n t a l g e b r a i c formula (N + N 4 -
l ) , o r have come t o
understand t h e p a t t e r n b e i n g developed i n extending t h e series (4, 6, 8,
10, 12, e t c . ) w e f e e l compelled t o c o n t i n u e t h e series i n one and o n l y one
way.

This f e e l i n g of i n f l u e n c e or compulsion w e e x p e r i e n c e as l o g i c a l
n e c e s s i t y can b e f u r t h e r exemplified by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f o l l o w i n g two
series:

A: 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

B : 4 6 9 2 1 2 3 4 19

When asked t o c o n t i n u e o r select t h e n e x t number f o r both series w e may

have a d i f f e r e n t i n c l i n a t i o n f o r S e r i e s A than f o r S e r i e s B. This d i f f e r e n c e
of f e e l i n g amounts t o b e i n g compelled i n one c a s e , w h i l e n o t i n t h e o t h e r .
I n t h e c a s e of c o n t i n u i n g S e r i e s A t h e r e i s o n l y one normal r e a c t i o n and many
abnormal r e a c t i o n s .

The compulsion w e f e e l i n c o n t i n u i n g S e r i e s A stems from t h e f a c t t h a t i t s

development is obviously circumscribed by a r u l e , w h i l e t h i s i s less obvious
i n Series B, i f a t a l l . W i t t g e n s t e i n , however, a s k s us t o c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e
of a p e r s i s t e n t development of S e r i e s A i n an abnormal f a s h i o n . For example,
w e have a n odd s t u d e n t who when asked t o c o n t i n u e t h e series a c t u a l l y does
so i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: 16 18 20 40 80. W i t t g e n s t e i n a s k s what
we are t o do w i t h such a s t u d e n t . W e could, of course, c o r r e c t him by showing
our d i s p l e a s u r e and r e p e a t t h e r u l e t h a t he i s t o add two t o t h e preceding
number; b u t i f he i n s i s t s upon having continued t h e series a c c o r d i n g t o our
r u l e , what are w e t o s a y ? W i t t g e n s t e i n s u g g e s t s t h a t a t t h i s s t a g e i t would
be u s e l e s s t o e x p l a i n t h e r u l e a g a i n o r go through t h e series a g a i n , f o r i n
t h i s c a s e t h e s t u d e n t f e e l s h e h a s under'stood t h e rule and h a s a c t e d i n
accordance w i t h i t .

Strange a 3 t h i s may sound i t amounts t o no more than a s k i n g whether i t

is p o s s i b l e f o r t h e s t u d e n t t o i n s i s t upon developing t h e series i n t h i s way
and s t i l l be r a t i o n a l . W e seemed forced t o say t h a t i f t h e s t u d e n t h a s come
t o understand t h e p a t t e r n being developed o r h a s grasped t h e a p p l i c a b l e r u l e ,
then any a c t i o n t o t h e 'contrary i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Frege d e n i e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of such behavior i n mathematics and sees i t a s a ". . .
h i t h e r t o unknown kind
of i n s a n i t y . " 3 1

W i t t g e n s t e i n , however, i n s i s t s t h a t we t a k e t h e d i f f i c u l t y of abnornal
development s e r i o u s l y . We must t a k e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y s e r i o u s l y , because a
r u l e o r p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y cannot p r o v i d e f o r i t s own j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n
employing i t i n one and only one way. Of c o u r s e , i t i s t r u e t h a t when w e
 17

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

c o n t i n u e S e r i e s A i n t h e " s a m e way" w e a r e a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o a r u l e ; but

knowing how t o c o r r e c t l y a p p l y a r u l e is not something d e r i v e d from t h e
r u l e i t s e l f , or from i n t r o d u c i n g a n o t h e r r u l e t o r e g u l a t e i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .
There is no way t o u l t i m a t e l y ground o r determine t h e c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n
of a r u l e by r e f e r e n c e t o a n o t h e r r u l e . "However many r u l e s you g i v e me--1
g i v e a rule which j u s t i f i e s my employment of your rules."32

A r u l e m u s t be understood o r i n t e r p r e t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way b e f o r e
c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e ; b u t a g a i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot determine
t h e meaning of a rule any more t h a n r e f e r e n c e t o a n o t h e r r u l e could s e t t l e
i t s meaning. As W i t t g e n s t e i n n o t e s , "An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t i l l hangs i n t h e
a i r a l o n g w i t h what i t i n t e r p r e t s , and cannot g i v e i t any support."33 I t
hangs i n t h e a i r w i t h t h e r u l e because w e are merely exchanging one de-
s c r i p t i o n of a c t i o n f o r a n o t h e r . 3 4 Thus t o move from r u l e s t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of r u l e s i s of no h e l p when g i v i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r how w e are t o proceed
i n a p p l i c a t i o n . The i s s u e of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e proper employment of a r u l e i s
merely s h i f t e d t o t h e problem of j u s t i f y i n g one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by means of
another. The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a rule j u s t i f y i n g i t s own a p p l i c a t i o n is a l s o
s t r e s s e d i n t h e Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: "And where does
i t s a y how they ( r u l e s ) are t o be applied--and i f i t does s a y somewhere,
where does i t say how t h a t is t o be applied."35

W i t t g e n s t e i n i s n o t h e r e q u e s t i o n i n g t h e adequacy o r a c c e p t a b i l i t y of
any r u l e of l o g i c o r mathematics, b u t merely n o t e s t h a t t h e n e c e s s i t y o r
compulsion w e e x p e r i e n c e when f o l l o w i n g a r u l e is n o t accounted f o r by r e f e r -
ence t o t h e r u l e , o r by r e f e r e n c e t o what w e o f f e r as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
r u l e . Any a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e such a n account w i l l i n v o l v e one i n a n i n f i n i t e
regression. Consequently, no ground i s gained by a t t e m p t i n g t o account f o r
l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y by r e f e r e n c e e i t h e r t o r u l e s o r t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of r u l e s .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , w e may s t i l l r i g h t l y i n s i s t t h a t n o t any manner of con-

t i n u i n g S e r i e s A w i l l count as c o n t i n u i n g t h e series i n t h e s a m e way. But
w h a t does " s a m e " mean h e r e ? Is t h i s merely a c a s e of looking and s e e i n g ? W e
may be i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k i t i s , and t h u s " s a m e " w i l l amount t o o u r a b i l i t y t o
g r a s p t h e p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y e x h i b i t e d by t h e series a s i t is p r e s e n t e d t o
u s . We a r e then guided i n t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e series by choosing numbers
t h a t w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e x h i b i t t h i s p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y .

However, r e f e r e n c e t o p e r c e p t i b l e r e g u l a r i t i e s as c r i t e r i a f o r proceeding
c o r r e c t l y i n t r o d u c e s t h e c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y of t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ,
i . e . , w h a t i t i s t h a t g i v e s one p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y r e l e v a n c e over another.
I f w e a r e t o j u s t i f y our continuance of t h e series by r e f e r e n c e t o a n observed
r e g u l a r i t y , then i t i s p o s s i b l e t o j u s t i f y o u r c o n t i n u i n g t h e series i n any
manner w e l i k e , while, a t t h e s a m e t i m e , i n s i s t i n g t h a t w e a r e c o n t i n u i n g t h e
s e r i e s i n t h e same way. In mathematics i t is always p o s s i b l e t o f i n d a p a t t e r n
of r e g u l a r i t y f o r any f i n i t e s e r i e s of numbers t h a t would j u s t i f y our c o n t i n u i n g
t h e s e r i e s i n any manner.36 The problem then i s n o t a d i f f i c u l t y of f i n d i n g a
r e g u l a r i t y t o j u s t i f y our i n s i s t e n c e t h a t someone must c o n t i n u e i n one and o n l y
one way when asked t o go on i n t h e s a m e manner; on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e problem i s
t h e f a c t t h a t w e can always f i n d a p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y t o j u s t i f y whatever
way we c o n t i n u e t h e s e r i e s .
18

DOUGLAS HUFF

What a t f i r s t seemed t o be a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d d i s t i n c t i o n between

S e r i e s A and B , i n terms of a n observed r e g u l a r i t y , now t u r n s o u t t o be
a v e r y t h i n d i s t i n c t i o n . Not only can S e r i e s A and B be seen as b o t h
e x h i b i t i n g r e g u l a r i t i e s (however simple o r complex), b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y ,
both can be understood t o e x h i b i t r e g u l a r i t i e s t h a t would j u s t i f y o u r
continuing e i t h e r series i n any manner we l i k e .

This p a r t i c u l a r c u r i o s i t y a p p l i e s t o r u l e s g e n e r a l l y . As W i t t g e n s t e i n
notes: "Can't anything be d e r i v e d from anything by means of some rule--
even according t o any r u l e , w i t h a s u i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n ? " ~Thus ~ we
could j u s t i f y our continuance of S e r i e s A, f o r example, w i t h any number
w e l i k e and w e could l e g i t i m a t e l y s a y w e w e r e c o n t i n u i n g t h e series i n t h e
"same way" by s p e c i f y i n g a r u l e o r p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y t h a t is s e e n as
g e n e r a t i n g a l l preceding numbers and consequently our new s e l e c t i o n s i n
l i k e manner. I n s h o r t , t h e compulsion o r n e c e s s i t y w e may f e e l i n a t t e m p t i n g
t o c o n t i n u e S e r i e s A i n one and o n l y one way, o r i n s i s t upon its being con-
t i n u e d i n one way and n o t i n a n o t h e r , i s n o t grounded a g a i n s t e x c e p t i o n , i.e.,
doubt, by a n a p p e a l t o a r u l e o r t o an observed r e g u l a r i t y . Such a n appeal
cannot j u s t i f y one procedure over a n o t h e r by i t s e l f , because i f any con-
tinuance of a series can b e made t o accord w i t h a r u l e , o r the same r u l e
w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then w e have l o s t a l l b a s i s f o r drawing
a d i s t i n c t i o n between c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n .

Furthermore, t h e supposed i n e x o r a b l e n a t u r e of t h e l o g i c a l "must", i f

r u l e dependent, becomes a v e r y tenuous n o t i o n . I f w e can have n e i t h e r con-
f l i c t n o r accord i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s , then i t becomes impossible t o
s a y what must n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w from t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e . W i t t g e n s t e i n
d e s c r i b e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y as a paradox: "This w a s our paradox: no c o u r s e of
a c t i o n could be determined by a r u l e , because every course of a c t i o n can be
made o u t t o accord w i t h a rule."38 H e a l s o g i v e s a n answer t o t h e paradox:
"The answer w a s : i f e v e r y t h i n g can be made out t o accord with t h e r u l e , then
i t can a l s o be made o u t t o c o n f l i c t w i t h i t . And so t h e r e would be n e i t h e r
accord nor c o n f l i c t here."39 W i t t g e n s t e i n i s n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n denying t h e
e x i s t e n c e of rule-governed behavior, and t h u s what t h i s paradox shows i s
'I. .. t h a t t h e r e i s a way of g r a s p i n g a r u l e which i s not an interpretation,
b u t which is e x h i b i t e d i n what w e c a l l 'obeying t h e r u l e ' and 'going a g a i n s t
it' i n actual The e x i s t e n c e of t h e paradox s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e must
be a way of understanding a r u l e t h a t i s d i s t i n c t from any e x p r e s s i o n of t h e
r u l e , i . e . , d i s t i n c t from any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y of rule-governed
behavior depends upon something more than t h e formulation of a r u l e by r e f e r -
ence t o r e q u i r e d f e a t u r e s . The way i n which the f e a t u r e s t h a t make up a
p a r t i c u l a r r u l e t a k e on a c e r t a i n relevance o r s i g n i f i c a n c e as guides t o our
a c t i o n i s e x h i b i t e d i n rule-governed behavior; b u t t h e way i n which they a r e
meant t o be taken a s r e l e v a n t remains d i s t i n c t from any formulation of t h e
rule.

The i n a b i l i t y of a r u l e o r p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y t o provide a ground of

c e r t a i n t y f o r c o n t i n u i n g on i n a c e r t a i n f a s h i o n when c a l c u l a t i n g i s analogous
t o what we would experience with regard t o closed terms. For example, a
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FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

c o l l e c t i o n of t h i n g s , named by t h e same c l o s e d t e r m , t o which w e must add

t h i n g s of l i k e k i n d would e x h i b i t the s a m e d i f f i c u l t y of j u s t i f i c a t i o n as
a s e r i e s of numbers d o e s . The d i f f i c u l t y o f j u s t i f y i n g o u r a c t i o n by
r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s i s t h e same f o r b o t h . There i s no s i g n i f i c a n t
d i f f e r e n c e between j u s t i f y i n g the employment of a r u l e and j u s t i f y i n g t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of a c l o s e d t e r m by r e f e r e n c e t o a p a r t i c u l a r set of f e a t u r e s .
The a p p l i c a t i o n of "modus ponens", f o r i n s t a n c e , would b e j u s t i f i e d by t h e
e s s e n t i a l i s t i n j u s t t h e same way a s t h e employment of modus ponens i n a
l o g i c a l proof would be j u s t i f i e d , i . e . , by r e f e r e n c e t o a set o f f e a t u r e s .
Consequently, i f t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y and o b j e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e
cannot be j u s t i f i e d by r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s , i t l i k e w i s e c a n n o t
be j u s t i f i e d i n t h e c a s e of a c l o s e d t e r m , where t h e boundary o f a p p l i c a t i o n
is l i m i t e d t o t h o s e t h i n g s and o n l y t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t e x h i b i t a c e r t a i n s e t
of a p p r o p r i a t e f e a t u r e s .

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s o f rule-governed b e h a v i o r i n mathematics i s

a c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n of why t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s c o n d i t i o n s Tor j u s t i f i a b l e
a p p l i c a t i o n , even when i d e a l l y f u l f i l l e d , c a n n o t , by t h e m s e l v e s , a c c o u n t
f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l t e r m . What i s l a c k i n g i n t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t ' s
a c c o u n t i s a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f how c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s become r e l e v a n t t o t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of a t e r m . To merely i d e n t i f y a s e t of f e a t u r e s t h a t must b e
p r e s e n t f o r t h e c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f a t e r m i s no more a d e q u a t e a s a n
e x p l a n a t i o n o f a term's boundary o f a p p l i c a t i o n t h a n r e f e r e n c e t o f e a t u r e s
that are n o t h e l d i n common. There i s , of c o u r s e , a p o i n t t o r e f e r r i n g t o
f e a t u r e s t h a t are h e l d i n common o r t o g i v i n g examples w i t h p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s
when e x p l a i n i n g t h e meaning of a t e r m , b u t n e i t h e r e s s e n t i a l i s m , i . e . , ad-
h e r e n c e t o common f e a t u r e s , n o r a c o n s t r u c t i o n of f a m i l y resemblances, i . e . ,
o v e r l a p p i n g f e a t u r e s , can b e g e n e r a l i z e d i n t o a t h e o r y of meaning f o r a l l
g e n e r a l terms.

The purpose of t h e f o r e g o i n g h a s been t o e x p l i c a t e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c e n t r a l

o b j e c t i o n t o e s s e n t i a l i s m . I have argued t h a t a complete r e j e c t i o n of
e s s e n t i a l i s m by W i t t g e n s t e i n r e q u i r e s t h e c o n j u n c t i o n of b o t h h i s f a m i l y
resemblance d i s c u s s i o n and h i s a n a l y s i s of rule-governed b e h a v i o r . The f a m i l y
resemblance d i s c u s s i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of e s s e n t i a l i s m a c -
c o u n t i n g f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of open t e r m s , and t h e r u l e d i s c u s s i o n r e j e c t s
e s s e n t i a l i s m f o r c l o s e d terms, where t h e c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d by e s s e n t i a l i s m
seem i d e a l l y f u l f i l l e d .

Furthermore, t h e t h r u s t of b o t h d i s c u s s i o n s i s t h e same, namely, t h e

r e j e c t i o n of t h e view t h a t s i t u a t i o n s i n which a t e r m i s c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d
must have f e a t u r e s i n common. The f a m i l y resemblance remarks d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t i n s t a n c e s of a term's c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n need n o t always h a v e f e a t u r e s
i n common and, p e r h a p s more i m p o r t a n t l y , t h a t f e a t u r e s remain r e l e v a n t t o t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of a t e r m , even though t h e y a r e n o t h e l d i n common. The r u l e
20

DOUGLAS HUFF

d i s c u s s i o n e x t e n d s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s by demonstrating t h a t t h e r e l e v a n c e
of such f e a t u r e s t o a t e r m ' s a p p l i c a t i o n i s not a consequence of t h e i r b e i n g
h e l d i n common. Consequently, Bambrough's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n
a d h e r e s t o t h e n o n - a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l terms, w h i l e r e j e c t i n g
t h e need f o r a common t h r e a d of f e a t u r e s running through e v e r y t h i n g s p e c i f i e d
by t h e same g e n e r a l t e r m i s c o r r e c t . However, t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h i s view
is n o t because c l o s e d terms must a l s o be e x p l a i n e d by means of a f a m i l y
resemblance of f e a t u r e s , b u t because t h e s e f e a t u r e s , even when h e l d i n common,
cannot p r o v i d e f o r t h e way i n which t h e y are r e l e v a n t t o d e t e r m i n i n g t h e
boundary of a term's a p p l i c a t i o n .

W e have been r e l e a s e d from a p e r s u a s i v e p i c t u r e of meaning w i t h t h e

f a i l u r e of e s s e n t i a l i s m , a p i c t u r e t h a t p u r p o r t e d t o be a n e x p l a n a t i o n b u t
o n l y encouraged p h i l o s o p h i c a l p e r p l e x i t y and s p e c u l a t i o n . The n a t u r e of t h e
" g r e a t q u e s t i o n t t 4 h a s been c l e a r l y changed by W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s . I t
h a s changed from a concern and s e a r c h f o r e s s e n c e s t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y of under-
s t a n d i n g how f e a t u r e s of t h e world, whether h e l d i n common o r n o t , a f f e c t t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of a g e n e r a l t e r m . However, a d d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c e x p l a n a t i o n
a s t o how f e a t u r e s p o s s e s s such r e l e v a n c e is not pursued by W i t t g e n s t e i n .
For W i t t g e n s t e i n , w e have reached r o c k bottom w i t h t h e r e j e c t i o n of e s s e n t i a l -
i s m and must t u r n o u r spade.42 We are, i n e f f e c t , l e f t w i t h o u r s e l v e s and
what w e i n f a c t do as human b e i n g s . H i s c r y p t i c comments and r e f e r e n c e s t o
o u r n a t u r a l h i s t o r y and form o f l i f e s i g n a l a h a l t t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l expla-
n a t i o n . A h a l t moreover which is i t s e l f v e r y incomplete and h i g h l y q u e s t i o n -
able.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f e r e n c e t o forms of l i f e does h e l p

i l l u m i n a t e t h e s e n s e i n which h e h a s s o l v e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l problem of uni-
v e r s a l s , even though h i s argument a g a i n s t e s s e n t i a l i s m does n o t depend upon
forms of l i f e f o r i t s s u c c e s s . Again, t h e problem h a s changed from a s e a r c h
f o r u n i v e r s a l s t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y of e x p l a i n i n g how f e a t u r e s of t h e world,
whether h e l d i n common o r n o t , a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l
terms. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f e r e n c e t o forms of l i f e a t t h i s p o i n t s u g g e s t s t h a t
t h e r e l e v a n c e of f e a t u r e s u l t i m a t e l y depends upon t h e n a t u r e of o u r e x i s t e n c e
a s human b e i n g s . F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e f a c t s of o u r form of l i f e s e r v e a s
a "given" f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . They do n o t s e r v e as c a n d i d a t e s f o r
a d d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y . Consequently, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o see
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f e r e n c e t o forms of l i f e a s an e v e n t u a l s t o p p i n g p o i n t f o r
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , because i t i s e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e t o see t h e s t u d y and
d e s c r i p t i o n of o u r forms of i i f e a s t h e l e g i t i m a t e domain of d i s c i p l i n e s
o t h e r t h a n philosophy. Whenever t h e r e s o l u t i o n of a t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l
problem l e a d s t o " t h e g i v e n , " i . e . , forms of l i f e , i t h a s been, i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s
s e n s e , reduced t o t h e l i m i t s of what can be s a i d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y .

The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s g e n e r a l view, even i f c o r r e c t , i s t h a t

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l e a p from t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of such problems as u n i v e r s a l s t o
forms of l i f e i s much t o o g r e a t . W i t t g e n s t e i n himself was c l e a r l y aware of
t h i s f a c t . H i s c o n t i n u a l r e t u r n t o t h e same problems i n h i s n o t e s g i v e s a
c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of how tenuous h e f e l t t h e connection was between h i s
 21

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

d i s c u s s i o n and a s a t i s f a c t o r y s t o p p i n g p o i n t . H i s r e j e c t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m ,
however, does n o t depend upon a s u c c e s s f u l d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e l i m i t s o f
p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , i . e . , i t does n o t depend upon i d e n t i f y i n g t h e
p o i n t a t which n o t h i n g more c a n b e s a i d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . Rather, W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s
argument depends upon h i s a n a l y s i s o f rule-governed b e h a v i o r and h i s d i s c u s s i o n
of f a m i l y resemblance, which, as w e have s e e n , make t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d e b a t e
over u n i v e r s a l s obsolete. I t is i n t h i s s e n s e t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n
of e s s e n t i a l i s m p r o v i d e s a s o l u t i o n to t h e problem of u n i v e r s a l s .

GUSTAYUS ADOLPHUS COLLEGE

ST. PETER, MINNESOTA 56082

NOTES

Renford Bambrough, " U n i v e r s a l s and Family Resemblances" as found i n

Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, e d . George P i t c h e r
(Garden C i t y , N . Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 186-204.

2The most f a m i l i a r d i s c u s s i o n of r u l e s i s found i n t h e Philosophical

Investigations, (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1953), p a r a g r a p h s 198-241.

3Bambrough, p. 189.

4Bambrough, pp. 190-91.

5Bambrough, p . 198.

6Bambrough, p . 198.

'A.J. Ayer, The Problems of Knowledge (New York: Penguin Books, 1956),
p. 10.

*J.W. Thorp, "Whether t h e Theory of Family Resemblances S o l v e s t h e

Problem of U n i v e r s a l s " Mind 1973: 567-70.

'Jamil Nammour, "Resemblances and U n i v e r s a l s " Mind 1974: 516-24.

% a u r i c e Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances and G e n e r a l i z a t i o n Concerning

The A r t s , " American Philosophical Quarterly 1965: 221; and Nicholas G r i f f i n ,
" W i t t g e n s t e i n , U n i v e r s a l s and Family R e s e m b l a n c e s , " C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l of
Philosophy 1974: 637.
22

WUGLAS HUPF

"Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study i n S c a r l e t (London: 1887). (Emphasis

added. )

2Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 127.

3Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraphs 67, 73, 80.

14Bambrough, p. 194.

5Bambrough, p . 194.
I6The general import of this argument has appeared in a number of places,
including the following: Douglas Huff, General Terms (Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms, 1974), pp. 62-63: L. Pompa, "Family Resemblance," P h i l o s o p h i c a l
Q u a r t e r l y 1967: 66; von R. K. Gupta, "Wittgenstein's Theory of 'Family
Resemblances' in his P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , " P h i l o s o p h i a N a t u r a l i s
1971: 285-86; Hjalmar Wennerberg, "The concept of family resemblance in
Wittgenstein's later philosophy," Theoria 1967: 116; and Griffin, "Wittgenstein,
Universals and Family Resemblances," p. 664.

7Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 85.

811ham Dilman, "Universals: Bambrough on Wittgenstein," Proceedings

1980: 36-58.
of t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y

9Bambrough, p. 203.

2oDilman, p. 4 6 .

21Dilman, p. 4 4 .

221bid.

23Dilman, p. 58.

4Wittgenstein, Phi 1osophi c a 1 r n v e s ti g a t i o n s , paragraph 2 3.

25Dilman, p. 56.

261bid.

27Dilman, p. 45.

28Wittgenstein, Remarks on t h e Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G.H. van

Wright, R. Rhees and G . E . M . Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), Part I,
paragraph 3 .

29Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 151.

 23

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

3 b ittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a tions, paragraph 185.

31Gottlob Frege, G r z m d g e s e t z e d e r A r i t h m e t i k (Jena, 1903), p. m i .

32Wittgenstein, Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of M a t h e w t i c s , Part I,

paragraph 113.

3Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 198.

34Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 201.

35Wittgenstein, Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of M a t h e m a t i c s , Part T ,

paragraph 112.

36Brian Skyrms provides a more detailed discussion of this particular

characteristic of a finite series in C h o i c e and Chance (19661, p. 66.

37Wittgenstein, Remarks on the F o u n d a t i o n s of M a t h e m a t i c s , Part I,

paragraph 7.

38Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , paragraph 201.

91b id.

OIb id.

41 Wit tgenstein, P h i 1o s o p h i c a l Inves t i q a t i o n s , paragraph 6 5 .

2Wittgenste in, P h i 1o s o p h i ca 1 Inves ti qa tions , paragraph 2 1 7.