Meaning and Circular Definitions (F. Orilia)

Meaning and Circular Definitions
Author(s): Francesco Orilia

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 155-169
Published by: Springer
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FRANCESCO ORILIA
MEANING AND CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS'
Received on 22 October 1998; revised on 24 September 1999
ABSTRACT. Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of
circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of mean-
ing. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying
on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.
KEY WORDS: analysis, circularity, definition, meaning, truth
1. INTRODUCTION
A stipulative definition is an imperative statement (or system of state-

ments, as, e.g., in an inductive definition) to the effect that (roughly) a
certain newly introduced expression, a definiendum, ought to be treated as
equivalent in meaning to another expression, a definiens, whose meaning
is assumed to be known. Since it is based on an imperative use of lan-
guage, a stipulative definition is neither true nor false, but may be more
or less appropriate or legitimate (cf. Castafieda, 1975). To the extent that a
stipulative definition is legitimate and actually accepted, the definiendum
acquires a meaning. Accordingly, we can say that a definition fixes the
meaning of the definiendum as being equivalent to that of the definiens.
A real definition (analyzing definition, analysis) is (in its simplest form)2
an assertion that aims at capturing a certain profound, intimate link be-
tween the concept or property (analysandum) expressed by a certain ex-
pression (definiendum) and the concept or property (analysans) expressed
by another linquistically more complex expression (definiens). Classical
examples of proposed analyses are:
(1) a circle is a locus of point in the same plane equidistant from some
common point,
(2) knowledge is justified true belief.
The nature of the link between the analysandum and the analysans is a
matter of dispute. Castafieda (1980, p. 59) distinguishes a View (A) and a
View (B) of analysis, as follows:
Journal of Philosophical Logic 29: 155-169, 2000.

Sc 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
156 FRANCESCO ORILIA
(A) A correct analyzing definition is a schema of o

it reduces a complex concept, or property, to sim
properties - where the word 'reduction' must be
noting that somehow, at least in the fundamental
complex does not exist.
(B) A (correct) analyzing definition is merely a sch
cial and profound equivalence between a concept,
complex of concepts, or properties.
View (A) is based on the idea that the analysis relatio

the analysandum and the analysans are one and the same
analyses merely provide linguistic information. View
the idea that an analysis provides conceptual informatio
sically linked to a particular language, for it relates
two distinct entities.
An analysis, in contrast to a stipulative definition,
it is true or false, as the case may be. An analysis i
linked to a stipulative definition, for clearly, if an
as if a certain stipulative definition were accepted b
community. This is in essence what Orilia and Varzi
Definition Constraint.
Traditionally, circular definitions have been consid
gitimate; something to be avoided at all costs. Clearly, t
that circularity can cause lack of semantic content for t
even contradictions. Therefore, according to the stan
initions, one should not introduce circular stipulative
tively, Gupta and Belnap (1993) propose a Revision T
(RTD, hereafter), which allows for circular definitions w
inconsistency. In the light of RTD, we can clearly se
definition can insure some semantic content for the
ingly, RTD allows for circular predicates, i.e., pred
is fixed by a circular definition. The meaning of a ci
taken to be a circular concept.
The Orilia-Varzi Definition Constraint suggests tha
dard account of stipulative definitions, it is very pro
there are true circular analyses, for this may even i
to contradictions; (ii) in contrast, given RTD, it may
any fear of contradictions, that there are true circu
circular concepts.
In fact, the central claim of Gupta and Belnap (199
circular concept: this is the essence of their Revision Th
hereafter). Moreover, Gupta and Belnap propose oth
MEANING AND CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS 157
candidates for a circular analysis, namely, predication,3 set membership,

knowledge, necessity, physical object.
Undoubtedly, the standard account of definitions has contributed to
shaping our ordinary conception of meaning. As will be shown below,
there are some commonly accepted theses about meaning that cannot be
jointly endorsed, once circular definitions and thus circular predicates are
accepted. Here I shall take RTD and RTT for granted. Accordingly, I shall
investigate how our conception of meaning should be reshaped, once the
need to account for the semantics of circular predicates enters the picture.
(It should not be difficult to extend the ideas proposed here to expressions
other than predicates, such as singular terms and function symbols.)
2. THE REVISION THEORY OF DEFINITIONS
For the convenience of the reader, let us briefly review how RTD works,
and in particular how it can be used to introduce circular predicates (for
further details, cf. Gupta and Belnap, 1993).
Assume that (i) L is a first-order language not involving the members
of the set 9 of primitive predicate constants, and (ii) L+ is just like L
except that it also involves the members of s (L is called a base language
with respect to the extended language L+). For simplicity's sake, the only
singular terms of these two languages are individual variables and primi-
tive constants. We shall take any wff with n free variables to be an n-adic
predicate. Two wffs that are notational variants of each other (i.e., roughly,
that differ only for the choice of their variables) will count as the same
predicate. 'Fn', 'Gn', 'Hn ', pn, 'Qn' will range over members of 9. 'A',
't', 'x', possibly primed or with subscripts, will range, respectively, over
wffs, individual constants, individual variables. For any wff A, any use of
'A(xl, ..., xn)' will indicate that x, . .., xn are all the variables occurring
free in A; moreover, 'A(xl / tl, ... , xn, / tn)' will denote the wff resulting
from A by replacing each free occurrence of xi with ti, for 1 < i < n.
Consider now a set +D containing, for each member Gn of 9, a unique
definition of the form
(D) Gn(xl, ~~~,X,) =df AG(X1, +++, X,),
where AG(x1, ... , Xn) is a formula of L+. RTD provides a strategy that
permits us to plausibly consider each member of D - in spite of its circu-
larity - as a definition based on the expressive resources of L. This works
as follows. We assume standard first-order models M, M1, M2, ... of L,
which, obviously, do not tell us anything about the extension of the predi-
cates of L+ that are not in L. (Let us understand that + (+1, +2, .. .) is the
interpreted language resulting from the 'syntactic p

tic part' M (M1, M2, .. .); cf. Gupta and Belnap (199
i+ (4+, 4-, ...) is the interpreted language resulting from the 'syntactic
part' L+ and the 'semantic part' M (M1, M2, .. .), as well as the definitions
in i; cf. Gupta and Belnap (1993, p. 145).) We then 'extend' each model
M by means of hypotheses regarding the extension of the definientia, so as
to get models M + h (M + hi, M + h2,...) of L+ where h (hi, h2, ... )
is any such hypothesis. M (+) is a ground model (language) with respect
the extended model (language) M + h (4h) (cf. Gupta and Belnap, 1993,
p. 146). The extended models are arbitrary in that no appropriate relation
between a definiendum in D and its corresponding definiens can be taken
for granted from their point of view. Nevertheless, each model M + h
informs us about what the extension of a definiens is, once the corre-
sponding definiendum has been assigned an arbitrary extension. At this
point, RTD provides us with instructions, i.e., a rule of revision, concern-
ing how to construct, for any ground model M, a sequence of extended
models M + h in an effort to overcome the arbitrariness of each individual
member of the sequence. This gives rise to an evaluation sequence G of
++ (Gupta and Belnap, 1993, p. 188). Each member of this sequence
specifies a truth-value for each pair (A(x1, ..., xn), (dl, ..., dn)), where
(d1, ...., d) is an n-tuple of M. (Let us call such pairs predicate/individual
pairs; if the predicate in question is a definiens or definiendum we shall
also say definiens/individual pair or definiendum/individual pair, as the
case may be.) In this sequence as a whole some predicate/individual pairs,
but not all, acquire from some point onward a stable evaluation, i.e., they
are stably x in 6, where 'x' ranges over the set of truth-values {t, f,...},
and 't' and 'f' represent truth and falsehood (see Gupta and Belnap, 1993,
p. 167, for a precise definition). The fact that some evaluations stabilize
is taken to indicate that the arbitrariness of the extended models has been
eliminated.
Let us now be more specific about revision rules. Essentially, a rule
of revision consists of (i) a definition, (ii) the successor rule and (iii) a
limit rule. The successor rule - to be used at successor ordinals - tells
us (roughly) that the evaluation of a definiendum/individual pair, accord-
ing to the (n + 1)th member of an evaluation sequence, must be equal
to the evaluation of the corresponding definiens/individual pair, accord-
ing to the nth member of the sequence in question. The limit rule is the
policy to be followed in assigning an evaluation at limit levels to those
definiendum/individual pairs that have not yet acquired a stable evaluation.
Here several choices are possible (cf. Gupta and Belnap, 1993, p. 168).
For present purposes, we can assume that the only limit rule we have to
deal with is the simplest one, namely, Belnap's (1982) vacuous limit rule,
according to which the evaluations in question are assigned arbitrarily.
From the point of view of RTD, the notion of logical truth can be char-
acterized as follows: a sentence (0-adic predicate) A of L+ is logically
true (in the sense of RTD) iff for every M, (A, ()) is stably t in every
evaluation sequence for M. The following is a noteworthy feature of RTD:
all the sentences of L+ that have the same logical form as a logical truth of
L, as standardly defined in terms of truth in every model, are also logical
truths of L+, in the sense of RTD. In other words,
(GROUND-LOGIC) RTD preserves the logic of the ground languages.
Therefore, in particular, if the ground languages + are two-valued classical
languages, all sentences of L+ that have the form of theorems of first-order
classical logic are logical truths in the sense of RTD. Let us make, for
simplicity's sake, the following Classical Logic Assumption:
(CLA) The ground languages we deal with are classical.
Thus, we assume that the set of truth-values is {t, f}.
Given a revision rule and a model of L, each n-adic predicate of L+
can be naturally classified, in relation to an n-tuple of M, in terms of
pathological vs. categorical (nonpathological). The former unfolds into
paradoxical, truth-teller-like, and mixed; while the latter unfolds into true
and false. Moreover, there is a classification in terms of stable, which sub-
sumes the categorical and the truth-teller-like. Let us call each of these
notions an RTD-category. (In certain formal contexts, I shall use capital
letters to refer to an RTD-category, so as to single it out more explicitly
('CATEGORICAL', 'STABLE', etc.).) These concepts are to be under-
stood as follows (where A is an n-adic predicate of L+ and (dl, ...., d,) is
any n-tuple of a model M of L):4
A is stable for (dl, ...., d,) in M iff for every evaluation sequence & of
++, there is a truth value x such that (A, (dl,..., d,)) is stably x in 8.
A is nonpathological (categorical) for (dl, ..., d,) in M iff there is a truth
value x such that (A, (dl, ...., d,)) is stably x in all evaluation sequences
of 0++
A is true for (dl ...., d,) in M iff (A, (dl ...., d,)) is stably t in all evalu-
ation sequences of ++.
A isfalse for (dl, ..., d,) in M iff (A, (dl,..., d,)) is stably f in all eval-
uation sequences of ++.
A is pathological for (dl, ..., d,) in M iff (A, (dl, .... d,)) is truth-teller-
like, paradoxical, or mixed for (dl, ..., d,) in M.
A is truth-teller-like for (dl, ..., d,) in M iff (A, (dl, ..., d,)) is stable in
all evaluation sequences of ++, and stably t in some,

sequences of ++.
A is paradoxical for (dl, ..., dn) in M iff (A, (dl,
any evaluation sequence of ++.
A is mixed for (dl,..., d,) in M iff (A, (dl,..., d,))
not all, evaluation sequences of +.
If tl, ..., t,~ denote, respectively, dl, ..., d,, then A
dn) (A is categorical for (dl, ...., d,), etc.) and A
(A is categorical for tl,..., tn, etc.) will be consi
pressions. Moreover, if A is a sentence, rather th
(categorical, etc.) for () in M, we shall simply say A
etc.) in M.
Following a standard practice, we can take the ext
with respect to a given model M, to be a function
any n-adic predicate A, EXTM(A) is a set of ord
x), where (dl,..., d,~) is an n-tuple of M and x is
larly, construe the RTD-classifier relative to M of
of L+ as the function CM that, given A, deliver
X): (dl,..., dn) is an n-tuple of M, X is an RTD-c
for (dl, ..., dn) in M}. CM(A) will be called 'the
A, relative to M'. Furthermore, two n-adic predica
(i) are equi-RTD-classified in M iff they have the s
relative to M, i.e., CM(AI) = CM(A2); (ii) are egui-RT
any M, CM(A1) = CM(A2).
RTD is in line with the standard account of defini
traditional Principle ofNon-Creativity, namely,
(PNC) essentially new facts cannot be brought about

tions.
This is captured by RTD in that the following holds:
(CONSERVATIVENESS) no sentence of L+ that is also a sentence of L

gets classified as true (false) in a model M of
L, or as logically true, in the sense of RTD, un-
less it was already so classified, in the standard
sense, independently of RTD.
From the point of view of RTD, the sentences of the form
(D') G(xl ltl ,..., xl t,) t, AG (X1 / tl , + + + ~ X, I t,)
may not be logically true, in spite of (D). Clearly, this cannot be the case,
if (D) involves certain forms of self-contradictory circularity, as in the
definition
(CONTR) G(x) =df -,G(x).
Under such circumstances, the other traditional landmark of definitions,

the Principle ofEliminability, fails. According to this principle,
(PE) a definiendum can in principle always be eliminated in favor of the

corresponding definiens in the context of every wff.5
Of course, if one holds the view that (PE) is essentially involved in the
notion of definition, one is led to claim that RTD does not really treat the
members of D) as definitions. From the point of view of RTD, however,
only (PNC) is an essential feature of definitions. Principle (PE) can thus
be given up, provided it is replaced by constraints that capture its spirit.
That RTD provides such constraints is granted by the following facts.
First, RTD grants that (PE) holds in the context of stable sentences, i.e.,
roughly speaking, whenever no self-contradictory circularity is involved.
Second, RTD satisfies the Same Classification Principle, that is,
(SCP) A definiendum G(xl,..., x,) in l) and the corresponding defi-

niens AG(x1,..., x, ) are equi-RTD-classified.
The following principle, call it the Same Truth-value Assumption, follows
from (SCP):
(STA) By committing oneself to the truth (falsehood) of the sentence
G(tl ..., t,), one by the same token implicitly commits oneself to
the truth (falsehood) of the corresponding 'definitional' sentence
AG (Xl/tl, ... , Xn,/tn) and vice versa.
3. SOME TRADITIONAL THESES ABOUT MEANING
Let us say that two sentences are co-assertable iff they have the same truth
value. The following Co-assertability Principle is in practice universally
accepted and indeed seems hardly objectionable:
(C-A) Sentences with the same meaning are co-assertable.
The following Functionality Principle underlies the compositional view
of meaning that is commonly accepted at least since Frege:
(FUNC) The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the mean-
ings of its parts, so that the meaning of the complex is preserved
when one of its constituents is replaced by a synonym.
As we have seen in the introduction, a stipulative d

cepted) makes it true that its definiens and the corr
dum are equivalent in meaning; similarly, a real defi
an already existing truth to the effect that the definiend
sponding definiens ofRD are equivalent in meaning. A
definitions, the equivalence in question is typically tak
regards, real definitions, there is a strong tradition (V
which the equivalence in question is also identity. The
be considered another traditional thesis about meanin
(FIX) A definition (whether real or stipulative) fixes

definiendum as being identical to the meaning of t
definiens.
Note that (FIX) obviously implies this further traditio
(ID) The meaning of a definiendum is identical to

corresponding definiens.
In turn, (FUNC), (ID) and (C-A) imply the follow

Principle:
(SP) A definiendum and the corresponding definiens

tutable in any sentence, salva veritate.
4. CIRCULARITY AND THE MEANING THESES
As first noted by Orilia and Varzi (forthcoming), RTD may be taken to

suggest the rejection of what they call the Sameness View, that is, in the
terminology of this paper, (FIX) and (ID). This is in fact one possible pre-
liminary reaction to the fact that (FUNC), (C-A), and (FIX), and thus (ID),
cannot be jointly endorsed, once circularity is admitted. Let us illustrate
this by means of a simple example.
Suppose we move from L to L+ by means of the definition (CONTR),
above. By (FIX), the definiendum and definiens of (CONTR) have the
same meaning. By (FUNC),
(CONTR1) G(t) * --G(t)

and
(CONTR2) G(t) t- G(t)
have therefore the same meaning. The latter is true by (GROUND-LOGIC)

and the Classical Logic Assumption (CLA). Hence, by the Co-assertability
Principle (C-A), so is the former. Given (CLA), we thus contradict (CON-

SERVATIVENESS).
We must thus explore in some detail what to make of (C-A), (FIX) and
(FUNC) from the point of view of RTD.
5. A POSSIBLE APPROACH
The co-assertability principle (C-A) appears to me more fundamental than

(FIX) and (FUNC). I shall thus consider what to make of (FIX) and
(FUNC), if (C-A) is retained. Clearly, the tradition supporting (FIX) and
(FUNC) has good motivations in its favor. It is thus wise to explore this
matter with the following Minimality Constraint in mind:
(MIN-CONSTR) (FIX) and (FUNC) should be modified as minimally as

possible.
Note this other traditional thesis about meaning:
(S-R) the notion of meaning should be subdivided into sense (intension)

and reference (extension), where the former determines the latter,
but not vice versa.
(S-R) yields the following corollaries:
(S-R1) two expressions with the same sense must have the same exten-
sion;
(S-R2) two expressions with the same extension may have different sen-
ses.
These Fregean principles are typically linked to the problems raised by

intensional contexts. Independently of intensional contexts, RTD suggests
an analogous subdivision of the notion of meaning. It is in fact natural to
associate a (circularly) defined predicate with its rule of revision, which
determines its RTD-classification in any M, and thus, in particular in the
model 'representing the real world', call it M*. In the following, by RTD-
classification, tout court, we shall mean RTD-classification in M*. Of
course, two expressions with the same rule of revision will be equi-RTD-
classified, whereas two expressions with the same RTD-classification in
a given M may in principle have different revision rules. To illustrate,
suppose that + contains the following four definitions (where A is a wff
of L):
G(x) =df A(x);

F(x) =df A(x);
H(x) =df H(x);

Q(x) =df --Q(x).
Clearly, G(x) and F(x) have exactly the same rule of revision and will be
equi-RTD-classified. On the other hand, H(x) and Q(x) have two different
revision rules (because they have two different definientia), but the same
RTD-classification - characterizing their pathological status - in every M.
In sum, revision rule and RTD-classification can be seen, respectively,
as sense and extension of predicates. If we wish to characterize the sense
of an expression as something that can somehow be 'in the mind', we can
alternatively say that some psychological counterpart of a rule of revi-
sion is the sense of a circularly defined predicate. We shall neglect this
complication in the following, since nothing hinges on it.
Clearly, the notion of sense is more general than the notion of rule of
revision. For instance, an expression such as 'red' can be assumed to have
a sense that is not a rule of revision. On the other hand, the notion of RTD-
classification is more general than the traditional notion of extension and
somehow encompasses it. For instance, traditionally, the extension of 'red'
can be viewed as EXTM* ('red'), i.e., the smallest set containing (i) every
((d), t) such that d is (represents) a red object and (ii) every ((d'), f) such
that d' is not (does not represent) a red object. Similarly, for any such d
and d', CM,* ('red') will contain ((d), TRUE) and ((d'), FALSE), but it
will also contain, e.g., ((d), STABLE). More interestingly, for example,
the notion of RTD-classification allows us to characterize the pathological
character of G(x) as defined by (CONTR). In fact, for any d, CM* (G(x))
will contain ((d), PATHOLOGICAL) and ((d), PARADOXICAL).
Once circularity is admitted, we are thus led to reformulate (S-R), (S-
R1) and (S-R2), as follows (for predicates):
(S-C) The notion of meaning should be subdivided into sense (possi-

bly, a rule of revision) and RTD-classification, where the former
determines the latter, but not vice versa.
(S-C1) Two predicates with the same sense must have the same RTD-
classification.
(S-C2) Two predicates with the same RTD-classification may have differ-
ent senses.
Once we distinguish between sense and RTD-classification, we must dis-

tinguish two subparts of (C-A), (FIX), and (FUNC):
(C-A1) Sentences with the same sense are co-assertable.

(C-A2) Sentences with the same RTD-classification are co-assertable.
(FIX1) A definition fixes the sense of a definiendum as being identi-

cal to the sense of the corresponding definiens.
(FIX2) A definition fixes the RTD-classification of a definiendum as
being identical to the RTD-classification of the corresponding
definiens.
(FUNC1) The sense of a complex expression is a function of the senses

of its parts, so that the sense of the complex is preserved when
one of its constituents is replaced by an expression with the
same sense.
(FUNC2) The RTD-classification of a complex expression is a fu

tion of the RTD-classification of its parts, so that the RTD-
classification of the complex is preserved when one of its
constituents is replaced by an equi-RTD-classified expres-
sion.
The assumption of the most fundamental character of (C-A) implies

shall assume, that both (C-A1) and (C-A2) should be retained. In t
the Same Classification Principle (SCP) implies that (FIX2) canno
given up. Finally, the endorsement of (FIX2) implies that (FUNC2) m
be abandoned, as the following argument shows.
By (FIX2) and (CONTR), G(x) and -G(x) are equi-RTD-classified
(FUNC2) held, G(t) v -G(t) and G(t) v G(t) should then also be e
RTD-classified, and hence, by (C-A2), they should be co-assertable. Y
the former is logically valid, by (GROUND-LOGIC) and the Class
Logic Assumption (CLA), and hence it is true; whereas the latter is n
true, as it is paradoxical in any M.
One might think that the following weaker version of (FUNC2) can
be accepted.
(FUNC2') The RTD-classification of a complex expression is prese

when one of its constituents is uniformly replaced by an equi-
RTD-classified expression.
For example, by uniformly substituting G(x) with -G(x) in the logic

true G(t) v -G(t), we get -G(t) v ---G(t), which is also logica
true. (FUNC2') should be welcome in view of the Minimality Constra
(MIN-CONSTR). Unfortunately, here is a counterexample to (FUN
Consider the following set of definitions:
G(x) =df H(x)

H(x) =df "G(x).
Clearly, G(t) v -H(t) is paradoxical, yet the logical truth G(t) v -,G(t)
can be obtained from it by uniformly substituting H(x) with G(x).
The abandonment of (FUNC2) is not sufficient, fo

Section 4 still stings. By (FIX1), the definiens and de
have the same sense. Therefore, by (FUNC1), (CO
have the same sense. But the latter is assertable,
and the Classical Logic Assumption; hence, by (C-Al
Given (GROUND-LOGIC) and the Classical Logic A
contradict (CONSERVATIVENESS).
We are thus left with the choice of jettisoning either
Since we were already led to abandon (FUNC2), the M
(MIN-CONSTR) suggests - in my view - that we s
and give up (FIX1). This choice is supported by the
endorse a weaker version of (FIX1), namely,
(FIX1') A definition fixes the sense of a definiendu

pendent on the sense of the definiens. In particu
finition makes the sense of a definiendum equal
that, given a hypothetical extension for the def
the extension of the corresponding definiens.
As an effect of these revisions, the Substitutivity

arly no longer tenable (cf. Orilia and Varzi (forthco
untenability of (SP) underlies the fact that RTD jet
of Eliminability (PE). We have seen however that (P
non-circular contexts, and so is the case for (SP).
Obviously, (ID) must also be subdivided as follows:
(ID 1) A definiendum and the corresponding definie

se.
(ID2) A definiendum and the corresponding definiens have the same

RTD-classification.
Clearly, the acceptance of (FIX2) implies that (ID2) is also retained. On

the other hand, the abandonment of (FIX1) implies that (ID1) is given up.
The failure of (SP) may seem striking, but the abandonment of (FIX1),
(ID 1) and (FUNC2) provides an explanation and rationale for it.
6. CIRCULARITY AND THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS
As noted by Orilia and Varzi (forthcoming), there is an interesting connec-

tion between RTD and the so-called paradox of analysis. In this section, I
wish to comment on this briefly. Let us first review the connection.
The paradox of analysis can be presented as follows. The use of 'is' to
express the analysis relation suggests that such a relation is identity, which
grants the acceptance of the Substitutivity Principle (SP), as applied to

analyzing definitions. Hence, for instance, by appealing to (SP), (1) above
and
(3) a circle is a circle
should be taken to express the same proposition. Yet (3) appears to express
a trivial tautology, whereas (1) appears to express a non-trivial informative
proposition. Furthermore, it makes sense to suppose that if Mary is not
very knowledgeable about geometry, both (M1) and (M2) below might be
true.
(M1) Mary believes that a circle is a circle.

(M2) It is false that Mary believes that a circle is a locus of point in the
same plane equidistant from some common point.
Yet, by appealing to (SP), it should follow from (1) and (M1) that
(M3) Mary believes that a circle is a locus of point in the same plane
equidistant from some common point.
As Castafieda (1980, p. 60) notes, the paradox of analysis is linked to View

(A) of analysis, for on this view the analysis relation cannot but be identity.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of View (B) of analysis, (ID) is
rejected and the paradox of analysis consequently dissolves. Without (ID),
there is no reason to uphold the substitutivity principle (SP). Accordingly,
(1) and (3) can be taken to express different propositions and (M1) and
(M2) are compatible. As a matter of fact, View (B) of analysis has mainly
been proposed as a response to the paradox of analysis (cf. Ackerman,
1986). Now, RTD, by making circular definitions legitimate, provides a
quite different route to support View (B).
However, View (B) is not without difficulties. The basic problem is
that View (B) is only the beginning of a theory (Ackerman, 1986, p. 306).
Once it is ruled out that the analysis relation is not identity, one should try
to characterize what it is. Such a characterization should allow us as much
as possible to grasp the nature of the very special equivalence between
analysans and analysandum. RTD goes at least some way in this direction
by granting that a definiendum and the corresponding definiens must have
the same RTD-classification. This certainly provides an important sense in
which there is an intimate connection between the two distinct concepts
expressed, respectively, by the definiendum and the definiens of a real
definition. Of course, this is not the whole story and it goes beyond the
scope of the present paper to provide further details. I simply wish to note
how RTD can lead us in certain respects in a novel direction. For exam-
ple, Ackerman (1986) proposes that there must be some special 'epistemic
relation' between the analysandum and the correspon

then goes on to suggest (p. 309) that
the intuitive idea here is something along these lines: analysis
properties one in some sense 'goes by' or 'has in the back of o
concept.
Following the tradition, Ackerman takes for granted that non-circularity is

a constraint on analysis.6 Consequently, she also takes for granted that such
'properties in the back of one's mind' do not involve the analysandum. In
contrast, RTD suggests that, in some cases, i.e., when circular concepts are
involved, what one has 'in the back of one's mind' in applying a concept
is a psychological counterpart of a rule of revision which in some sense
involves the analysandum, for a revision rule involves the assumption of a
hypothetical extension for the analysandum.
7. CONCLUSION
Once Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Definitions is accepted,

some traditional ideas about meaning must be reconsidered. By relying on
an appropriate version of the sense-reference distinction, I have proposed
rejecting these two theses: the thesis according to which a definiendum
and the corresponding definiens always express the same sense; and the
thesis according to which the reference (RTD-classification) of a complex
expression is always a function of the reference of its parts.
NOTES
1 This paper stems from conversations with Anil Gupta in September 1995, based on
an early version of Orilia and Varzi (forthcoming) and a two-page outline by Gupta on
meaning and circularity. This outline anticipated some of the ideas presented here (in
particular, the proposal to revise what I here call (FUNC)). Gupta was very generous in
permitting me to develop his material further on my own and in declining my offer of
joint autorship. He also helped me to improve a previous version of this work with several
important comments. Finally, I also wish to thank an anonymous referee for some useful
remarks.
2 Systems of assertions such as those giving rise to an inductive definition may be taken
to constitute a more complicated form of analysis.
3 For an implementation of the view that predication is circular, see Orilia (1995) and
(forthcoming).
4 The definitions below extend those of Gupta and Belnap (1993, p. 189) in order to
encompass n-adic predicates in general, and not just sentences.
5 (PE) obviously neglects the special problems engendered by intensional contexts,
which are not part of our concern at this juncture.
6 For example, Bealer (1982, Ch. 3), also takes for granted that non-circularity is a
constraint on analysis.
REFERENCES
1. Ackerman, Diana, F.: 'Essential Properties and Philosophical Analysis', Midwest

Studies in Philosophy 11 (1986), 305-313.
2. Bealer, George: Quality and Concept, Oxford University Press, London, 1982.
3. Belnap, Nuel: 'Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth', Journal of Philosophical
Logic 11 (1982), 103-116.
4. Castafieda, Hector-Neri: Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of
Institutions, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.
5. Castafieda, Hector-Neri: On Philosophical Method, Noils Publication, Bloomington,
1980.
6. Gupta, Anil and Belnap, Nuel: The Revision Theory of Truth, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1993.
7. Orilia, Francesco: 'Knowledge Representation, Exemplification and the Gupta-
Belnap Theory of Circular Definitions', in Marco Gori and Giovanni Soda (eds.),
Topics in Artificial Intelligence, 4th Congress of the Italian Association for Artificial
Intelligence AI*IA 95, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 187-198, 1995.
8. Orilia, F.: 'Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions', Journal of
Symbolic Logic (forthcoming).
9. Orilia, Francesco, and Varzi, Achille C.: 'A Note on Analysis and Circular Defini-
tions', Grazer Philosophische Studien (forthcoming).
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze Umane,

Universitiz di Macerata,
62100 Macerata,
Italy

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Meaning and Circular Definitions

Author(s): Francesco Orilia

MEANING AND CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS'

Received on 22 October 1998; revised on 24 September 1999

KEY WORDS: analysis, circularity, definition, meaning, truth

A stipulative definition is an imperative statement (or system of state-

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29: 155-169, 2000.

(A) A correct analyzing definition is a schema of o

View (A) is based on the idea that the analysis relatio

candidates for a circular analysis, namely, predication,3 set membership,

2. THE REVISION THEORY OF DEFINITIONS

(D) Gn(xl, ~~~,X,) =df AG(X1, +++, X,),

interpreted language resulting from the 'syntactic p

all evaluation sequences of ++, and stably t in some,

(PNC) essentially new facts cannot be brought about

This is captured by RTD in that the following holds:

(CONSERVATIVENESS) no sentence of L+ that is also a sentence of L

From the point of view of RTD, the sentences of the form

(D') G(xl ltl ,..., xl t,) t, AG (X1 / tl , + + + ~ X, I t,)

(CONTR) G(x) =df -,G(x).

Under such circumstances, the other traditional landmark of definitions,

(PE) a definiendum can in principle always be eliminated in favor of the

(SCP) A definiendum G(xl,..., x,) in l) and the corresponding defi-

3. SOME TRADITIONAL THESES ABOUT MEANING

As we have seen in the introduction, a stipulative d

(FIX) A definition (whether real or stipulative) fixes

Note that (FIX) obviously implies this further traditio

(ID) The meaning of a definiendum is identical to

In turn, (FUNC), (ID) and (C-A) imply the follow

(SP) A definiendum and the corresponding definiens

4. CIRCULARITY AND THE MEANING THESES

As first noted by Orilia and Varzi (forthcoming), RTD may be taken to

(CONTR1) G(t) * --G(t)

(CONTR2) G(t) t- G(t)

have therefore the same meaning. The latter is true by (GROUND-LOGIC)

Principle (C-A), so is the former. Given (CLA), we thus contradict (CON-

The co-assertability principle (C-A) appears to me more fundamental than

(MIN-CONSTR) (FIX) and (FUNC) should be modified as minimally as

Note this other traditional thesis about meaning:

(S-R) the notion of meaning should be subdivided into sense (intension)

(S-R) yields the following corollaries:

These Fregean principles are typically linked to the problems raised by

G(x) =df A(x);

H(x) =df H(x);

(S-C) The notion of meaning should be subdivided into sense (possi-

Once we distinguish between sense and RTD-classification, we must dis-

(C-A1) Sentences with the same sense are co-assertable.

(FIX1) A definition fixes the sense of a definiendum as being identi-

(FUNC1) The sense of a complex expression is a function of the senses

(FUNC2) The RTD-classification of a complex expression is a fu

The assumption of the most fundamental character of (C-A) implies

(FUNC2') The RTD-classification of a complex expression is prese

For example, by uniformly substituting G(x) with -G(x) in the logic

G(x) =df H(x)

The abandonment of (FUNC2) is not sufficient, fo

(FIX1') A definition fixes the sense of a definiendu

As an effect of these revisions, the Substitutivity