Pao-2018-01 BFP MP PDF

Performance Audit Report
PAO-2018-01
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
BFP’s Capability of Safeguarding

the Populace from Destructive
Fires Hampered by Scarce
Resources, and Gaps in the
Procurement, Construction of Fire
Stations, and Maintenance of Fire
Trucks
December 2018
Audit BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION – MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
Highlights BFP’s Capability of Safeguarding the Populace from Destructive Fires

Hampered by Scarce Resources, and Gaps in Procurement, Construction of Fire
Stations, and Maintenance of Fire Trucks
Why COA Did This Study What COA Found
In 2010, the Bureau of Fire Protection The BFP is not on track in accomplishing the Modernization Program’s goals and objectives
launched its Modernization Program within its timelines. As of June 30, 2018, BFP completed only 263 out of its target of 945 fire
pursuant to the Comprehensive Fire stations. There are 44 fire stations which are still ongoing while the rest have not even started.
Code of 2008. It aims to upgrade the For fire trucks, the BFP procured 621 out of its target of 1,057. The audit team identified three (3)
government’s firefighting capability major reasons for the non-attainment of these targets. First is funding. The total fund allotted to
with adequate personnel and equipage the Modernization Program is ₱13.17 billion. This is only 22 per cent of the total funding
in order to safeguard the populace from requirement in the amount of ₱60.29 billion. As a result, only 416 out of the 945 fire stations and
the hazards of destructive fire. Total 597 out of the 1,057 fire trucks were funded by the government. One hundred fifty-two (152) fire
funds of the Modernization Program trucks were procured through Official Development Assistance (ODA). Second reason is
amounted to ₱13.17 billion from CY procurement. The BFP did not have a functioning Bids and Awards Committee (BAC). As an
2011 to CY 2017. However, despite its alternative, BFP secured the services of the Department of Budget and Management-
launch, the BFP registered 96,447 fire Procurement Service (DBM-PS) and the Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) for
incidents in the entire Philippines for its procurement needs. However, even with outsourcing, the BFP still encountered delays in
the same period. These destructive procurement. Hence, given that the allotted budget did not meet the funding requirements, BFP
fires caused 1,924 deaths, 5,750 still failed to utilize ₱1.91 billion, which was later reverted to the Bureau of Treasury (BTr). The
injuries and ₱31.06 billion in property last reason is monitoring. BFP failed to properly monitor the construction of its fire stations and
damages, thereby raising issues as to the maintenance of its fire trucks. Upon inspection, 11 out of the 44 ongoing construction were
the effectiveness of the program. already abandoned by its contractors. The inspection only covered a fraction of the program,
hence, there is a possibility that there could be more abandoned construction sites. As for the fire
The audit intends to identify the key trucks, this Commission already reported in its 2016 Consolidated Annual Audit Report (CAAR)
reasons behind the gap between the that 176 out of the 469 delivered in 2015 already manifested defects. During site visits, the audit
program’s target and its team found that at least 67 out of the 84 fire trucks inspected have defects or non-functioning
accomplishment and aims to assess: parts.
(1) the extent to which the BFP
ensured that it has achieved the
program’s goals and objectives; (2) the Photo of Abandoned Fire Stations
extent the BFP upgraded its firefighting
capabilities; and (3) the extent the BFP
safeguarded the populace from the
hazards of destructive fire.
The Commission on Audit (COA)

reviewed the program documents and
accomplishment reports, conducted
technical and visual inspections of
several fire protection services, and
interviewed key BFP personnel and
selected barangay respondents to
assess the extent of coordination
during fire incidents.
Abandoned fire station construction sites in Tibiao, Antique and Tarragona, Davao Oriental. These are two (2)
out of the eleven (11) abandoned construction sites found by the audit team during inspection.
What COA Recommends The BFP failed to fully upgrade its firefighting capabilities. As of June 30, 2018, there are still 308
municipalities without fire stations including 19 with fire trucks already, 59 fire stations without
COA recommends that the BFP fire trucks, 1,756 fire trucks without Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and 13,119 fire
capacitate its personnel on the personnel without complete set of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Agency officials
procurement process to address the admitted that they are having difficulties addressing these issues due to their lack of expertise in
gaps hindering the efficient and the procurement process. Currently, more than half of the country’s firefighters themselves are
economical provision of fire protection vulnerable to the hazards of destructive fires. Apart from procurement, non-availability of lots
services. Conduct procurement in a and/or the inappropriateness of the project sites prevents BFP from setting-up fire stations.
timely manner to maximize utilization of Hence, even if there are still available funds, BFP could not proceed with the construction of the
its limited budget. Moreover, the BFP fire stations.
needs to strengthen its monitoring on
the projects implemented to ensure BFP data showed that the populace experienced less devastation from the incidence of fires.
their timely completion. There is also a While the Philippines experienced a steady increase of fire incidence from 2011 to 2016 (and a
need to improve its key performance significant dip in 2017), incidence of deaths and injuries remained below the threshold while
indicators and reporting to provide incidence of property damages has been on a steady decline except in 2017. Existing BFP data,
relevant and accurate information for however, do not show direct correlation between the Modernization Program and the trends. This
decision-making. Lastly, BFP should is mainly due to the lack of reports, which contain performance indicators and relevant information
strengthen its partnership with key on the effects of the Modernization Program. In fact, data gathered by the audit team on the
stakeholders for a coordinated effort in conditions of the firefighting capabilities and the participation of key stakeholders in fire prevention
safeguarding the populace from the and suppression activities say otherwise. With less functioning fire trucks, municipalities without
hazards of destructive fires. fire stations, and limited support from key stakeholders during fire incidents, it is difficult to
attribute to the BFP the decrease of devastation of destructive fires in the Philippines.
BFP-Modernization Program
Contents
Letter 1
Background 2
The BFP is not on track in accomplishing the Modernization 5
Program’s goals and objectives within its timelines due to issues
with funding, procurement, and monitoring
The BFP failed to reach its seven-year upgrade target for fire 9
protection services
The BFP does not generate enough data to determine the extent to 48
which the Modernization Program safeguarded the populace from
the hazards of destructive fire
Conclusions 58
Recommendations 60
Agency Comments 62
Appendix I Objectives, Scope and Methodology 63
Appendix II 19 Municipalities with Fire Trucks but without BFP-Owned Fire 64

Stations
Appendix III Delays in the Construction of Fire Stations 65
Appendix IV Typical Design of Fire Stations 66
Appendix V 308 Municipalities without Fire Stations 68
Appendix VI 59 Municipalities with Fire Stations but without Fire Truck 74
Appendix VII Jiangte and Rosenbauer Fire Trucks Inspected with Mechanical 76
Problems
Appendix VIII Regions with BFP Unserviceable Units 78
Appendix IX COA Contacts and Acknowledgments 79
Tables Table 1: Financial Requirement of SEP and SUMP 5

Table 2: Sources of Funds for the Modernization Program 6
Table 3: Improvement Standard for Fire Stations 8
Table 4: Target Construction of Fire Stations per SEP and SUMP 9
Table 5: Target Fire Stations versus Programmed in the APP 10
Table 6: Status of Funds for the Construction of Fire Stations 10
Table 7: Breakdown of Fund Transfer to PITC 11
Table 8: Status of Programmed Fire Stations 13
Table 9: List of 11 Abandoned Fire Stations 14
Table 10: Donated Lots less than the Required Area 17
Table 11: Fire Trucks Financial Requirements and APP 23
Table 12: Unutilized Funds and Reason for Reversal 24
Table 13: Fire Trucks Acquired as of June 30, 2018 24
Table 14: Procurement Process of 469 Jiangte Fire Trucks 25
Table 15: Fire Trucks Financial Requirements, APP and Actual 26
Procurement
Table 16: CBP Phase 1 Shipment Schedule and Actual Delivery 27
Dates
Page i PAO-2018-01
Contents
Table 17: CBP Phase 2 Shipment Schedule and Actual Delivery 28

Dates
Table 18: Criteria for the Deployment of Fire Trucks 28
Table 19: Ranked Cities Not Issued Rosenbauer 29
Table 20: Unranked Cities Issued Rosenbauer 29
Table 21: Recipient Cities in CBP Phases 1 and 2 29
Table 22: Gap Analysis between the Number of Serviceable and 30
Ideal Number of Fire Trucks by Region as of June 2018
Table 23: Jiangte Fire Trucks Found Non-Operational in 2018 31
Inspection
Table 24: Jiangte Fire Trucks Found Non-Operational in 2017 32
Inspection
Table 25: Common Mechanical and Electrical Defects and other 32
Findings on Fire Trucks Inspected
Table 26: Warranty Provisions on the Procurement of Fire Trucks 34
Table 27: Total Repair Costs, Average Repair Costs and Average 35
Age of Fire Trucks
Table 28: BFP Modernization Program’s Target for SCBA 36
Table 29: Actual Quantity of SCBA Budgeted/Programmed from 37
2011-2017
Table 30: Status of Fund Transfer to DBM-PS and PITC 37
Table 31: BFP Modernization Program’s Target for PPE 39
Table 32: BFP Modernization Program’s Target and Financial 40
Requirements from 2011-2017 for PPE
Table 33: Comparison of Program’s Targets and Actual Quantity of 40
PPE Budgeted/Programmed from 2011-2017
Table 34: Status of Fund Transfer to DBM-PS 41
Table 35: Delays in the Procurement of 625 Sets of PPE 42
Table 36: Shortage of Personnel as of June 30, 2018 45
Table 37: Hired and Trained FO1 from 2011-2017 46
Table 38: Comparison of Uniformed Personnel Positions in 2011 47
and 2018
Table 39: Performance Indicators per NEP 48
Table 40: BFP’s Performance Indicators and its Respective Targets 52
for CYs 2015-2017
Figures Figure 1: Goals, Performance Indicators and Targets of the 3

Modernization Program
Figure 2: Key Implementers of the Modernization Program 4
Figure 3: Budget Share of Fire Protection Services 7
Figure 4: Annual Target Number of Fire Stations against Number of 13
Stations Funded and Status of Accomplishment
Figure 5: Status of Construction of 416 Fire Stations Contracted in 14
CYs 2011-2017
Figure 6: Photos of 11 Abandoned Fire Stations 15
Figure 7: Sample Photos of LGU-Owned Fire Stations 18
Figure 8: Photos of Fire-Hazard and Earthquake-Hazard Fire 18
Stations
Figure 9: Sample Photos of Defective Fire Stations 19
Figure 10: Fire Stations Reported as Completed but were Non- 20
Operational
Page ii PAO-2018-01
Contents
Figure 11: Sample of Fire Stations Below the Existing Concrete 21

Roads
Figure 12: Sample of Existing Fire Stations with Female Living 22
Quarters but with Limited Space
Figure 13: Sample of Existing Fire Stations without Separate 22
Female Living Quarters
Figure 14: Sample Photographs of Non-operational Fire Trucks in 31
2018
2017
Figure 16: Ideal Number of SCBA based on the Current Number of 38
Fire Trucks vs. Actual Number of Serviceable SCBA
Figure 17: BFP Operations Personnel vs. Complete Set of 43
Serviceable PPE
Figure 18: Example of Worn-out Fire Coats, Fire Trousers and Fire 44
Boots, March-June 2018
Figure 19: Shortages of PPE and SCBA in 126 Fire Stations 44
Figure 20: Percentage of Hired Personnel from 2011-2018 46
Figure 21: Statistics of Fire Incidence from CYs 2011-2017 49
Figure 22: Statistics of Casualties for CYs 2011-2017 49
Figure 23: Statistic of Persons Injured for CYs 2011-2017 50
Figure 24: Annual Average Property Damage Caused By Fire for 50
CYs 2011-2017
Figure 25: Occupancy Type Affected by Fire and the 51
Corresponding Causes
Figure 26: BFP’s Shortage in Equipage and Personnel as of June 52
30, 2018
Figure 27: Details for the Fire Alarm Level and Fire Truck 53
Requirements
Figure 28: Summary of Fire Incidence Statistics from CYs 2011- 56
2017
Page iii PAO-2018-01

Abbreviations
ABC Approved Budget for Contract

AFOR After Fire Operation Reports
AOR Agency Outsourcing Request
APP Annual Procurement Plan
APR Agency Procurement Request
ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BAC Bids and Awards Committee
BFP Bureau of Fire Protection
BOC Bureau of Customs
BTr Bureau of Treasury
CAAR Consolidated Annual Audit Report
CAR Cordillera Administrative Region
CBP Capacity Building Program
CHB Concrete Hollow Blocks
COA Commission on Audit
CY Calendar Year
DBM Department of Budget and Management
DILG Department of the Interior and Local Government
DOF Department of Finance
FBRC Fire Basic Recruit Course
FO1 Fire Officer 1
FY Fiscal Year
GAA General Appropriations Act
GOP Government of the Philippines
HoPE Head of the Procuring Entity
IRR Implementing Rules and Regulations
JV Joint Venture
LBP Land Bank of the Philippines
LED Logistic and Engineering Division
LGUs Local Government Units
MFO Major Final Outputs
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
NBC National Budget Circular
NCR National Capital Region
NCSEP Non-Conventional Service Establishment Program
NEP National Expenditure Program
NFTI National Fire Training Institute
NHQ National Headquarters
ODA Official Development Assistance
PD Presidential Decree
PDP Philippine Development Plan
PIB Performance-Informed Budgeting
PITC Philippine International Trading Corporation
PNP Philippine National Police
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PS Procurement Services
RA Republic Act
ROs Regional Offices
SAGF Special Account in General Fund
SARO Special Allotment Release Order
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
Page iv PAO-2018-01
Abbreviations
SEP Service Establishment Program

SUMP Service Upgrading and Modernization Program
TOR Terms of Reference
TWG Technical Working Group
WPP Work Project Plan
Page v PAO-2018-01
Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Commonwealth Avenue
Quezon City
December 21, 2018
DIRECTOR LEONARD R. BAÑAGO, DSC

Fire Chief
Bureau of Fire Protection
Agham Road, Quezon City
Dear Director Bañago:
In line with its vision to become an enabling partner of the government in

ensuring a better life for every Filipino, the Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted performance audits to help government agencies better perform
their mandates and achieve program goals and objectives more economically,
efficiently and effectively. It has identified the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
– Modernization Program as one of the priority programs to be audited. The
audit aimed to determine the extent to which the BFP: (1) ensured that it has
achieved the program’s goals and objectives; (2) upgraded its firefighting
capabilities; and (3) safeguarded the populace from the hazards of destructive
fire.
Pursuant to the Comprehensive Fire Code of 2008, the BFP launched its
Modernization Program in 2010 to upgrade the government’s firefighting
capability with adequate personnel and equipage in order to safeguard the
populace from the hazards of destructive fires. Total allotted fund for the
program amounted to ₱13.17 billion from Calendar Years (CYs) 2011 to 2017.
In spite of this, 96,447 fire incidents were reported nationwide for the same
period causing 1,924 deaths, 5,750 injuries and ₱31.06 billion in property
damages raising issues on the effectiveness of the program.
The audit focused on the two components of the program, namely, the Service
Establishment Program (SEP) and the Service Upgrading and Modernization
Program (SUMP). The SEP is a multi-year program estimated to cost ₱38.03
billion during the entire implementation from CYs 2011 to 2020 while the
SUMP to be implemented from CYs 2011 to 2030 is estimated to cost ₱76.39
billion. The audit covered the program implementation from CY 2011 to June
30, 2018. The audit team reviewed program documentation, relevant laws,
regulations, policies and guidelines, procurement and project documents,
reports and related materials. Interviews with key agency officials and
personnel as well as stakeholders from the Local Government Units (LGUs)
were conducted to obtain information and seek clarification, as necessary.
The audit team administered survey questionnaires from respondents in
sample fire stations and barangays. Likewise, the audit team conducted
technical inspections on the constructed fire stations and procured fire trucks.
The audit team conducted the performance audit from February 2018 to
October 2018 in accordance with the International Standards of Supreme
Audit Institutions 3000 – Standard for Performance Auditing. The standard
requires that the audit team plans and performs the audit to obtain sufficient
and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and
conclusions based on the audit objectives. The audit team believed that the
evidences obtained provide reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions
based on the audit objectives.
Page 1 PAO-2018-01
Background It is the policy of the State to ensure public safety and promote economic
development through the prevention and suppression of all kinds of
destructive fires and promote the professionalization of the fire service as a
profession. Toward this end, the State shall enforce all laws, rules and
regulations, to ensure adherence to standard fire prevention and safety
measures, and promote accountability for fire safety in the fire protection
service and prevention service.1 Under Republic Act (RA) No. 6975, also
known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of
1990, the BFP shall be responsible for the prevention and suppression of all
destructive fires on buildings, houses and other structures, forest, land
transportation vehicles and equipment, ships or vessels docked at piers or
wharves or anchored in major seaports, petroleum industry installations, plane
crashes and other similar incidents, as well as the enforcement of the Fire
Code and other related laws.2
The Philippine Development Plan (PDP) for 2011-2016 identified the BFP as
one of the implementing agencies to achieve the highest standard of capability
and preparedness against natural calamities and disasters 3. On the other
hand, PDP for 2017-2022 envisions that the government will have better
capability to ensure the safety and security of all Filipinos in the country and
overseas from all forms of hazards. One of the government’s strategies to
ensure public safety is to improve capability of the fire protection services.4
This is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No. 11 of the
global indicator framework making cities and human settlements inclusive,
safe, resilient and sustainable.5
The Modernization Program of 2010 was brought about by the enactment of

the RA No. 9514 also known as the Comprehensive Fire Code of 2008.
Section 13 of the new Fire Code prescribes that 80 per cent of all revenues
collected out of the implementation of the new Fire Code shall be remitted into
a Special Account assigned for the “modernization of the BFP.”
The Modernization Program seeks to upgrade the government’s firefighting

capability to include not only the fire protection services for buildings and
structures but also for forest, airports, ships and vessels docked at wharves.
Essentially, the Modernization Program has the following major components:
 Service Establishment Program – is a multi-year comprehensive

program to establish the minimum requirement for fire protection
capability in 692 municipalities with no fire protection services in
compliance with the legal mandate of the BFP under RA No. 6975
(Figure 1). The SEP is proposed to be implemented starting in CY 2011
until CY 2020 at the rate of 69 new fire stations annually. The program
will involve the construction of at least one (1) fire station in each of the
692 municipalities inclusive of the required office facilities,
communication equipment, furniture and fixtures, and living quarters of
firefighters; acquisition of at least one (1) 1,000 gallon water pumper fire
truck for each new fire station inclusive of the required ancillary
equipment and accessories; and the hiring of at least fifteen (15) fire
personnel to man each of the fire truck working at 2 shifts per day and a
1
RA No. 9514 also known as the “Fire Code of the Philippines of 2008” , Section 2
2
RA No. 6975 also known as the “DILG Act of 1990”, Sections 53 and 54
3
PDP 2011-2016, Chapter 9: Peace and Security, p. 81
4
PDP 2017-2022, Part 6: Foundations for Sustainable Development, p. 38 and 39
5
The Philippine Government together with other 192 Member States of the United
Nations jointly committed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the
SDGs.
Page 2 PAO-2018-01
provision for 7 additional staff to take charge of the fire prevention

functions. The SEP is estimated to cost ₱38.03 billion for the next 10
years starting in CY 2011.
 Service Upgrading and Modernization Program – is also a multi-year

comprehensive program aimed at upgrading the level of fire protection
services in 138 cities and 804 municipalities that now enjoy BFP services
in order to comply with the ideal equipage complementation based on
the Philippines and internationally-accepted standards. The program will
involve the construction of new fire stations and sub-stations, acquisition
of new units of water pumper fire truck and special purpose fire trucks
such as aerial ladders, water tankers. The program will likewise involve
the acquisition of new communication equipment; emergency medical
and rescue vehicles and equipment and complete sets of Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) such as breathing apparatus, boots, coats,
helmets, information technology equipment and other similar firefighting
accessories. This program is estimated to cost ₱76.39 billion and will be
implemented within twenty (20) years period, from CY 2011 to CY 2030.
 Non-Conventional Service Establishment Program (NCSEP) – proposes

to establish firefighting services in non-structural areas such as forest,
airports, wharves and industry installations to be administered and
operated by the BFP.
The NCSEP, however would have a lesser priority compared to the first two
program components considering that presently other agencies of the national
government are attending to the fire protection requirement of non-structural
fires. These agencies include, among others, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for forest fires; the Air Transportation Office for airport
fires; the Philippine Ports Authority for ships fires; and other similar national
entities.
Figure 1: Goals, Performance Indicators and Targets of the

Modernization Program
Source: BFP
Stakeholders of the There are three (3) major government agencies that play critical roles in the
Program provision of firefighting/protection and rescue services to the populace. These
are the DILG, the BFP and all concerned LGUs (Figure 2).
Page 3 PAO-2018-01
Figure 2: Key Implementers of the Modernization Program
Source: BFP
Under RA No. 6975, the provision of firefighting protection and rescue

services was placed under the administrative supervision of the DILG.
Specifically, these services fall within the jurisdiction of the DILG
Undersecretary for Peace and Order. Under the same Act, the newly created
BFP was tasked with the general responsibility of handling all operational
aspects related to the provision of the services. These consist of (a) Fire
Prevention Operations; (b) Fire Suppression and Control Operations; (c) Fire
Investigation and Intelligence Operations; and (d) Emergency Medical and
Rescue Services.
On the other hand, under RA No. 7160, concerned LGUs shall provide the
necessary support to the supply of firefighting/protection and rescue services.
This includes, among others, the sites for station/sub-stations, as well as
firefighting equipment and related infrastructure facilities. In particular, the
LGUs are mandated to extend support for the maintenance of fire station,
repair of fire trucks, provision of fire auxiliary personnel and similar financial
and technical assistance, when LGU revenue warrants.
To institutionalize the areas of cooperation and coordination of the BFP with

other departments, bureaus, agencies, offices and corporations of the
government, as well as private institutions, the BFP may enter into
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the National and Local Waterworks
for providing sufficient source of water, especially in times of fire or
conflagration and for the establishment of fire hydrants in strategic areas, and
with the Electric Companies and Cooperatives on the immediate cut-off of
electric main lines/power lines during fires or conflagration to avoid the danger
of the people being electrocuted.6 In addition, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) shall render necessary assistance during actual firefighting operations
and fire scene investigations.7 All barangays shall also endeavor to organize
their own Fire Brigades.8 And in order to achieve fire safety in the community,
all persons are encouraged to inspect their own premises and to abate any
fire hazard therein, as well as take the necessary fire safety precautions. They
shall strive to organize themselves into effective fire safety and fire prevention
organizations in their community and places of work in order for them to take
the necessary contingent actions during fire emergencies and eventually
avoid unnecessary loss of life and property.9
6
IRR of RA No. 9514, Rule 7, Division 2, Section 7.0.1.1, items A and B
7
Ibid., Division 1, Section 7.0.2.1, item A
8
Ibid., Rule 6, Division 2, Section 6.0.2.1, item D
9
Ibid., Rule 14, Section 14.0.0.2, item B
Page 4 PAO-2018-01
The BFP is not on track

in accomplishing the
Modernization
Program’s goals and
objectives within its
timelines due to issues
with funding,
procurement, and
monitoring
The BFP is not on track in accomplishing the Modernization Program’s
goals and objectives within its timelines. As of June 30, 2018, BFP is
behind by 682 or 72 per cent of its target construction of fire stations.
For fire trucks, the BFP is behind by 436 or 41 per cent of its targets. The
audit team identified three (3) major reasons for the non-attainment of
these targets: (1) funding, (2) procurement, and (3) monitoring.
Budget allotted and First, funding. Budget allotted and revenue collected from Fire Code fees are
Insufficient and
revenue collected insufficient to meet the funding requirement of the program. The total fund
Unverifiable allotted to the Modernization Program is ₱13.17 billion. This is only 22 per
from fire code fees
cent of the total funding requirement in the amount of ₱60.29 billion. The audit
Remittances
not sufficient of
to Fire identified two reasons for such: first is the low budget utilization rate of BFP
Code Fees
meet the funding and second is the unverifiable and untimely remittances of fire code fees from
Collection
requirement byof the LGUs. As a result, the BFP had to apportion its limited resources and prioritize
Concerned
ModernizationLGUs among its equally important deliverables. Based on BFP data, it prioritized the
Program procurement of fire trucks, which took 69 per cent of the entire allocation.
For CY 2011 to CY 2017, the BFP had set the financial requirements of SEP
and SUMP at ₱25.94 billion and ₱34.35 billion, respectively bringing the total
funding requirement of these two components of the Modernization Program
to ₱60.29 billion (Table 1).
Table 1: Financial Requirement of SEP and SUMP

Year SEP SUMP Total
2011 ₱3,614,560,130 ₱5,421,463,106 ₱9,036,023,236
2012 3,705,946,488 4,669,332,857 8,375,279,345
2013 3,742,337,668 4,727,699,518 8,470,037,186
2014 3,800,498,998 4,786,795,762 8,587,294,760
2015 3,865,565,519 4,878,159,069 8,743,724,588
2016 3,636,495,496 4,905,016,263 8,541,511,759
2017 3,573,674,680 4,966,328,966 8,540,003,646
Grand Total ₱25,939,078,979 ₱34,354,795,541 ₱60,293,874,520
Source: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP
Available BFP budget for the Modernization Program, on the other hand, is
₱13.17 billion, which is broken down as follows: (1) the amount of ₱6.54
billion, which is the 80 per cent share of the Modernization Program from the
total collection of fire code fees in the amount of ₱8.21 billion, (2) the amount
of ₱3.89 billion from the Regular Agency Fund provided in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA), (3) the amount of ₱2.54 billion from the Republic of
Austria’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Scheme, and 4) the amount
of ₱199.17 million sourced from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) Transition Investment Plan Fund (Table 2).
Page 5 PAO-2018-01
Table 2: Sources of Funds for the Modernization Program (in million)

80 per cent BFP
Other Sources
Fire Code Modernization Share
Year Fees GAA Total Allocation Foreign Loan ARMM Total Funds
Peso
Collections Should Be Actual (Republic of Transition
Equivalent
Austria) Investment Plan
(a) (a x 80%) (b) (c) (d = b + c) (e) (f) (d + e + f)
2011 ₱830.26 ₱664.21 ₱416.32 ₱412.42 ₱828.74 €20.49 ₱1,310.16 ₱2,138.90
2012 928.95 743.16 722.91 51.33 774.24 774.24
2013 1,003.16 802.53 117.24 179.83 297.07 297.07
2014 1,128.00 902.40 2,448.50 1,554.51 4,003.01 4,003.01
2015 1,251.13 1,000.90 65.87 411.00 476.88 ₱199.17 676.05
2016 1,423.21 1,138.57 467,11 741.58 1,208.70 20.49 1,229.62 2,438.32
2017 1,643.35 1,314.68 2,300.00 543.61 2,843.61 2,843,61
Total ₱8,208.06 ₱6,566.45 ₱6,537.95 ₱3,894.28 ₱10,432.23 €40.98 ₱2,539.78 ₱199.17 ₱13,171.18
Source: BFP Fund Releases for CYs 2011-2017
Because of BFP’s low Even if there is a need for additional budget from the National Government,
budget utilization rate, BFP could not request for such because of its low budget utilization rate.
it could not request for Based on BFP’s Budget Utilization Report, BFP failed to utilize an
additional budget from accumulated amount of ₱1.91 billion during the course of the Modernization
Program from CYs 2011 to 2017. The amount was reverted to the Bureau of
DBM
Treasury (BTr). According to BFP, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) requires them to improve their budget utilization rate
before the latter considers increasing the funding for the Modernization
Program.
Unverifiable and Another major issue on funding is that the remittances of Fire Code fees by
untimely remittances of LGUs are unverifiable and untimely. Our validation revealed that the Central
fire code fees from Fire Station in Parañaque City did not allow its LGU counterpart to collect fire
LGUs code fees. The City used to remit collections only once a year without any
supporting receipts contrary to Section 69 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
144510. As a result, accuracy of the remittance could not be verified by the
BFP. In addition, Manila, Valenzuela, Las Piñas, Makati, Pasay, Marikina,
Pasig, Taguig and Quezon City collected the fire code fees in behalf of the
BFP but no regular remittance and reporting of collections were observed.
Delayed and inaccurate remittance of fire code fees collection adversely affect
the ability of the BFP to meet the funding requirements of the Modernization
Program. The major source of financing of the Modernization Program is the
80 per cent of the Fire Code revenues collected by the BFP. Should the Fire
Code revenues fall short of the projected funding requirement, the BFP will
have to request additional appropriation from the national government. The
BFP is the primary collector of these fees, as provided in Section 13 of the
Fire Code, which states that “all taxes, fees and fines shall be collected by the
BFP.”11 However, the BFP may enter into agreements with
cities/municipalities, allowing the latter to be deputized as assessors and/or
10
Public officers authorized to receive and collect moneys arising from taxes, revenues,
or receipts of any kind shall remit or deposit intact the full amounts so received and
collected by them to the treasury of the agency concerned and credited to the particular
accounts to which the said moneys belong. The amount of the collections ultimately
payable to other agencies of the government shall thereafter be remitted to the
respective treasuries of these agencies. The respective treasuries of those agencies
shall in turn deposit with the proper government depositary the full amount of the
collections not later than the following banking day.
11
Supra, note 1, Section 13
Page 6 PAO-2018-01
collecting agents for the fire safety inspection fees.12 As in this case, the LGUs
were deputized to collect the fees but the BFP failed to establish mechanisms
that shall ensure verifiability and timeliness of the remittances. This led to the
revocation of deputization of some LGUs, as in the case of Parañaque City.
The BFP agreed with the observations and explained that Fire Code Fees
Monitoring Division has been monitoring the process of collection in the
National Capital Region (NCR). To verify the fees collected by the LGUs, BFP
plans to require the LGUs to submit corresponding collection list to ascertain
the accuracy of collections and remittances. The BFP added that it has
initiated an alternative collection mechanism through e-payment for a timely
and accurate remittance of fire code fee collections to be implemented in CY
2019 as MOA with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has been signed.
With limited resources, the BFP had to prioritize among its equally important
deliverables. BFP data showed that from the total fund allocation, acquisition
of fire trucks received the biggest share accounting to 69 per cent or a total of
₱9.05 billion followed by the construction of fire stations with 19 per cent share
or ₱2.52 billion while procurement of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
(SCBA) and PPE received 4 per cent and 1 per cent of the budget share or
₱561.31 million and ₱141.51 million, respectively (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Budget Share of Fire Protection Services
1%
4%
7%
19% Firestations, ₱2.52B
Firetrucks, ₱9.05B
SCBA, ₱561.31M
69% PPE, ₱141.51M
Others, ₱901.89M
Details on fund utilization regarding construction of fire stations, procurement

of fire trucks, SCBA and PPE are discussed in separate findings under this
report.
Low budget Second, procurement. As mentioned in previous discussions, BFP failed to

utilization caused by fully utilize its budget. One major reason for such is its lack of expertise to
lack of procurement conduct its own procurement. The BFP did not have a functioning Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC). As an alternative, BFP secured the services of the
expertise of the BFP
Department of Budget and Management-Procurement Service (DBM-PS) and
the Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) for its procurement
needs. However, even with outsourcing, the BFP still encountered delays in
procurement. The specific effects of these delays are discussed in the
succeeding observations of this report.
12
RA No. 11032 otherwise known as the “Ease of Doing Business and Efficient
Government Service Delivery Act of 2018”, Section 12 (h)
Page 7 PAO-2018-01
No monitoring in Third, monitoring. As discussed earlier, the two main components of the BFP
place for the Modernization Program are the SEP and SUMP.13 In upgrading and
progress of SEP modernizing the existing fire protection capability nationwide, the BFP
adopted the improvement standards for fire station presented in Table 3 which
and SUMP
classifies fire stations into Type A, Type B, Type C, Type D and Type E using
implementation as basis the equipment configuration, land area of the station and number of
personnel.
At the inception of the program, the BFP targeted 692 municipalities with no
fire protection services under SEP while 804 municipalities and 138 cities
were targeted for upgrading of fire protection services under SUMP. During
the audit, however, the BFP did not provide the list of targeted cities and
municipalities with the corresponding type of fire stations to be constructed
under SEP and SUMP, respectively. In addition, our verification of documents
disclosed that no separate progress reports had been prepared by the BFP
Management for the respective components – an indication that no monitoring
was conducted for the individual progress of the said components. The only
available accomplishment reports presented were for the whole
Modernization Program. As a result, the audit team found it difficult to evaluate
the progress as far as the attainment of targets, goals and objectives of SEP
and SUMP is concerned for the seven years of program implementation.
Table 3: Improvement Standard for Fire Stations

Type of Fire Station Component Criteria for Categorization of Fire Station
Fire No. of Population No. of High Vital 5-Year Fire Income
Equipment Land Area
Station Personnel Density Rise Bldg. Industries Incidents Classification
1 Ladder
1 Tanker At least
>10,000 per High >50 First and Second
A 2 Pumpers 1,000 sq. 135 > 50 buildings
sq. km. presence Incidents Class Cities
1 Ambulance meters
1 Rescue
1 Ladder At least Thirds and
5,001-10,000 High 30-50
B 2 Pumpers 700 sq. 82 20-50 buildings Fourth Class
per sq. km. presence Incidents
1 Ambulance meters Cities
Fifth and Sixth
At least
2 Pumpers 1,001-5,000 Low 15-30 Class Cities and
C 500 sq. 58 <20 buildings
1 Ambulance per sq. km. Presence Incidents First Class
meters
Municipalities
At least First and Second
1 Pumper 600-1,000 per Negligible 10-15
D 400 sq. 39 none Class
1 Ambulance sq. km. Presence Incidents
meters Municipalities
At least Third to Sixth
<500 per sq. <10
E 1 Pumper 400 sq. 22 none none Class
km. incidents
meters Municipalities
Source: Modernization Program’s WPP
13
See details in the “Background” section of this Report.
Page 8 PAO-2018-01
The BFP failed to

reach its seven-year
upgrade target for fire
protection services
The BFP failed to reach its seven-year target for fire protection services
upgrades in view of gaps on funding, procurement, and monitoring. As
of June 30, 2018, BFP completed only 263 or 28 per cent of the target 945
fire stations, procured only 621 or 59 per cent of the 1,057 target fire
trucks, delivered only 2,117 or 23 per cent of the 9,144 target SCBAs,
delivered only 10,183 or 45 per cent of the 22,440 target PPE and hired
only 20,411 or 64 per cent of the 32,004 required operations personnel.
Findings on funding
for fire stations
Since the budget Since the budget approved for BFP is significantly lower compared with the
approved for BFP is amounts indicated in the Annual Procurement Plan (APP), the BFP had to
significantly lower lower its Approved Budget for Contract (ABC) for the fire stations. In the APP,
compared with the BFP determined that it would cost ₱4.01 million to construct a complete fire
station (Phase 1 and Phase 2). Based on its target of 1,047 fire stations, BFP
APP, the BFP had to
expected to receive an allocation in the amount of ₱4.06 billion. However,
adjust its ABC to since the budget released for fire stations is only ₱2.52 billion, which is
construct only the significantly lower than expected, BFP lowered the amount allotted for one fire
Phase 1 of the fire station to ₱2.62 million. Due to the adjustments, BFP was only able to
stations construct mostly Phase 1 of the fire stations.
For CYs 2011 to 2017, the BFP aimed to establish at least one (1) fire station
in the 490 municipalities without fire protection services pursuant to its
mandate under the SEP component of the Modernization Program. BFP
initially projected that the total cost for this component would be ₱2.03 billion.
In the same period, the BFP also aimed to modernize the existing 455 fire
stations, pursuant to its mandate under the SUMP component of the
Modernization Program. BFP initially projected that the SUMP would cost
₱3.19 billion to complete. Total funding requirement for the total targeted 945
fire stations amounted to ₱5.22 billion at the end of CY 2017 (Table 4).
Table 4: Target Construction of Fire Stations per SEP and SUMP

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Particulars Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount
Quantity (in million) (in million) (in million) (in million) (in million) (in million) (in million) (in million)
SEP 70 ₱280.00 70 ₱283.50 70 ₱287.04 70 ₱290.63 70 ₱294.26 70 ₱297.94 70 ₱301.67 490 ₱2,035.05
SUMP 65 ₱452.13 65 ₱457.77 65 ₱463.48 65 ₱469.26 65 ₱475.11 65 ₱381.03 65 ₱487.03 455 ₱3,185.80
Type A 1 1.20 1 1.20 1 1.20 1 1.20 1 1.20 1 1.20 1 1.20 7 8.40
Type B 3 43.73 3 44.28 3 44.83 3 45.39 3 45.96 3 46.54 3 47.12 21 317.85
Type C 6 72.00 6 72.90 6 73.81 6 74.73 6 75.67 6 76.61 6 77.57 42 523.30
Type D 29 230.40 29 233.28 29 236.20 29 239.15 29 242.14 29 245.16 29 248.23 203 1,674.56
Type E 26 104.80 26 106.11 26 107.44 26 108.78 26 110.14 26 11.52 26 112.91 182 661.69
Grand Total 135 ₱732.13 135 ₱741.27 135 ₱750.52 135 ₱759.89 135 ₱769.37 135 ₱678.97 135 ₱788.69 945 ₱5,220.85
Source: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP
Due to reduction in the average cost per fire station, BFP adjusted its cost
estimate per fire station from ₱5.52 million to ₱4.01 million. Hence, in its
APP14, the BFP had programmed a total of ₱4.06 billion to construct 1,047 fire
stations from its target of 945 stations costing ₱5.22 billion (Table 5).
14
APP for CYs 2011-2017 including the Supplemental APP for CY 2012
Page 9 PAO-2018-01
Table 5: Target Fire Stations versus Programmed in the APP

Target Programmed as per APP Variance
Year
Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount
2011 135 ₱732,133,333 - ₱ - 135 ₱732,133,333
2012 135 741,270,000 144 481,314,424 -9 259,955,577
2013 135 750,520,875 134 539,216,000 1 211,304,875
2014 135 759,887,387 92 1,223,250,000 43 463,362,613
2015 135 769,370,978 597 1,610,243,000 -462 840,872,022
2016 135 678,973,116 40 105,000,000 95 573,973,116
2017 135 788,695,280 40 105,000,000 95 683,695,280
Total 945 ₱5,220,850,969 1,047 ₱4,064,023,424 -102 ₱1,156,827,546
Ave. cost
₱5,524,710 ₱4,011,869 ₱1,512,841
per unit
Source: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP vis-à-vis APP
Based on BFP Fund Releases for CYs 2011-2017, the BFP received the
amount of ₱2.52 billion for the construction of fire stations (Table 6).
Compared with the original estimate of the BFP, this amount accounted only
to 48 per cent of the total funding requirement. Compared with the amount
indicated in the APP, the total fund releases is only 62 per cent of the
programmed amount. BFP Management explained that the amount released
by the DBM is based on the amount of fire code fees remitted to the BTr.
However, upon evaluation of the documents, the audit team found that the
amount released already included the additional appropriations from the
national government under the GAA. Despite the inclusion of funds from the
GAA, actual fund released for the program fell short from the projected funding
requirements. The BFP Management further pointed out that the low budget
for the construction of fire station could be attributed to the instructions of the
DILG to prioritize the procurement of fire trucks over the construction of fire
stations.
Table 6: Status of Funds for the Construction of Fire Stations

80 per cent
BFP Share on Total Allotment/ Obligations/
Year GAA Unutilized
Fire Code Fund Releases Disbursements
Fees
2011 ₱ - ₱111,257,157 ₱111,257,157 ₱ 101,701,886 ₱9,555,271
2012 31,571,430 - 31,571,430 2,571,430 29,000,000
2013 - - - - -
2014 858,500,000 151,563,000 1,010,063,000 503,693,538 506,369,462
2015 - 110,000,000 110,000,000 109,438,699 561,301
2016 261,372,634 96,411,808 357,784,442 187,604,745 170,179,697
2017 791,000,000 105,000,000 896,000,000 892,335,054 3,664,946
Total ₱1,942,444,064 ₱574,231,965 ₱2,516,676,029 ₱1,797,345,352 ₱719,330,677
As a result, based on the ABC, the cost estimate per fire station is currently
pegged at ₱2.62 million. According to BFP officials, they implemented the
construction of the fire station per phase. The adjusted amount only pertains
to Phase 1 of the construction of the fire station. BFP officials further explained
that Phase 1 already provides the basic fire protection services needed by a
city or municipality.
Page 10 PAO-2018-01
Findings on the
procurement of fire
stations
Even with a lower Even with a lower budget, BFP was not able to fully utilize its allocation for fire
budget, BFP was not stations due to issues with procurement. From the total fund released as seen
able to fully utilize its in Table 6, 28 per cent or ₱719.33 million was unutilized. Ninety-nine per cent
allocation due to or ₱715.67 million15 of these unutilized funds reverted to the BTr due to failed
biddings, fear of law suit, and lack of project site evaluation. As a result, even
issues with
with available budget, a total of 134 municipalities with donated lots remain
procurement without a fire station.
First, failed biddings. According to BFP officials, one of the factors, which
contributed to its low budget utilization rate is the absence of bidders on the
construction of fire stations. The audit team identified two (2) common causes:
first is location and second is lack of technical documentation. An example of
failed bidding due to location is the construction of fire stations in island
provinces. Two (2) fire stations funded in 2016, which was set to be
constructed in Busuanga, Palawan and Lubang, Occidental Mindoro had
failed biddings because the donated sites were both located in isolated
islands. BFP officials pointed that prospective bidders are not interested to
participate in the bidding since the amount stated in the ABC is not
commensurate to the amount needed to transport the materials. Another fire
station funded in 2016 to be constructed in Midsalip, Zamboanga Del Sur was
also not procured due to failure in bidding leaving no more time by the end of
the year resulting to reversion of funds to the BTr. There are three fire stations
funded in 2016, which were set to be constructed in Arayat, Pampanga;
Bamban, Tarlac; and Candelaria, Zambales but BFP encountered failed
biddings due to lack of procurement documentation.
Second, fear of lawsuit. Another factor which contributed to the BFP’s low
budget utilization rate is the BAC members’ fear of a lawsuit from losing
bidders. According to BFP officials, practically no one wants to become a BAC
member for fear of being subjected to a lawsuit. A working BAC is crucial to
avoid the reversion of funds, especially in the case of BFP where major part
of its budget is sourced from the continuing funds which if not utilized within
the year, has to be reverted to the BTr.16 To avoid further reversion of
allotments, the BFP outsourced its procurement to the PITC causing the fund
transfer of ₱3.39 billion in 2017 of which ₱892.34 million pertained to the
construction of 97 fire stations (Table 7).
Table 7: Breakdown of Fund Transfer to PITC

Pariculars Amount
Construction of Fire Stations ₱892,335,117
Procurement of Fire trucks 1,902,546,500
Procurement of SCBA 125,215,500
Others 469,769,025
Total ₱3,389,866,142
Source: BFP issued AORs to PITC
15
Total amount unutilized from CY 2011 to CY 2016. Fund releases for CY 2017 are
still valid until CY 2018 as per DBM NBC No. 567 dated January 3, 2017.
16
BFP BAC Resolution No. 2017-OTH-004 resolved on May 28, 2017. An approved
Resolution for the outsourced procurement of goods, infrastructure and ICT to PITC, 7th
“WHEREAS” clause.
Page 11 PAO-2018-01
Clarification on the status of procurement relating to the fund transfer revealed

that as of May 28, 2018, a series of pre-procurement conferences among BFP
Ad hoc Members, Technical Working Group (TWG) and PITC BAC were held
for all outsourced procurements to PITC to agree on the revised Terms of
Reference (TOR) and Agency Outsourcing Requests (AORs). The next
procurement activities shall only be undertaken upon finalization of the TOR
and AORs.
BFP further commented that they will no longer transfer funds to any
government agency for the conduct of procurement starting 2018. The new
members of the current BAC are mostly lawyers. All CY 2018 projects were
already obligated and procurement for CY 2019 are being conducted in
advance by the BFP-National Headquarters (NHQ) BAC with awards
expected in January 2019.
Third, lack of project site evaluation. Based on the verification made by the
audit team, there are three fire stations funded in 2014 which were not
procured due to issues with the appropriateness of the land. This cases
pertained to the following municipalities:
1) Paluan, Occidental Mindoro - no bidder/contractor wanted to bid

due to site problem in which more volume of embankment
materials were needed;
2) Lakewood, Zamboanga Del Sur - site/donated lot is prone to
landslide; and
3) Mayoyao, Ifugao - donated lot has an existing concrete building.
Further details on this issue are discussed on page 13 – Findings on the

Monitoring of the Construction of Fire Stations
Delays in the The BFP did not observe sound fiscal management because it consistently
procurement of fire initiated its procurement process one year after receiving its appropriation. As
stations shown in Table 8, fire stations funded in CYs 2011, 2014 and 2015 were
procured one year after appropriation. The audit team found that BFP heavily
relied on the two-year validity of the utilization of the released funds. As a
result, 106 or 25 per cent of the funded fire stations were not yet procured as
of June 30, 2018. It included the 97 fire stations that were outsourced to the
PITC in 2017.
Section 7.6 of 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of RA

No. 9184 provides that, to facilitate the immediate implementation of
procurement activities, even pending approval of the GAA, the Procuring
Entity may undertake the procurement activities short of award. National
government agencies are encouraged to start their procurement activities
immediately after the National Expenditure Program (NEP) has been
submitted by the President to Congress, provided that the Head of the
Procuring Entity (HoPE) has approved the corresponding indicative APP.
Page 12 PAO-2018-01
Table 8: Status of Programmed Fire Stations

Quantity Procurement Not
Year Funded Total
per APP 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Procured
2011 0 33 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
2012 144 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
2013 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 92 194 0 0 0 0 171 20 0 3 194
2015 597 28 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 28
2016 40 61 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 6 61
2017 40 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 97
Total 1,047 416 0 35 0 0 172 103 0 106 416
Sources: APP, Supplemental APP, Fund Releases and Status of Accomplishments
Findings on the
monitoring of the
construction of fire
stations
Delays in the Delays in the construction of fire stations as well as abandonment of projects
construction of fire by contractors were not monitored by the BFP. Out of the 416 funded and
stations as well as contracted fire stations, 109 have not started construction and 44 are ongoing
abandonment of construction but delayed. Based on the site inspections conducted by the
audit team, out of the 44 fire stations, which are ongoing construction, 11 are
projects by the
already abandoned. When we brought up the observation to the attention of
contractors slipped the BFP officials, the audit team discovered that it was the first time that they
past the monitoring were made aware of the situation.
mechanism of the BFP
In evaluating the actual accomplishments of BFP on the construction of fire
stations, the audit team used BFP’s target of 945 fire stations as baseline
instead of the programmed 1,047 fire stations in the APP (Figure 4).
As of June 30, 2018, only 263 fire stations were reported completed or 28 per
cent of the 945 stations targeted for construction from 2011 to 2017 without
distinction whether the completed stations belonged to the SEP or SUMP
component of the Modernization Program.
Figure 4: Annual Target Number of Fire Stations against Number of

Stations Funded and Status of Accomplishment
250
194
200 171
150 135 135 135 135 135 135 135
97 97
100
61
50 3333 36
2821
19 17
3210 4 70 8
00 0000 00
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Targeted Funded Completed Ongoing

On-going Not Started
Sources: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP, Fund Releases and

Status of Accomplishments
Page 13 PAO-2018-01
The completed fire stations represented 63 per cent of the 416

funded/contracted fire stations while ongoing projects stood at 44 or 11 per
cent and 109 projects or 26 per cent were not yet started (Figure 5). As a
result, 19 LGUs have fire trucks already even without BFP-owned fire stations
(Appendix II).
Figure 5: Status of Construction of 416 Fire Stations Contracted in CYs

2011-2017
26%
11% 63%
Completed, 263 Ongoing, 44

On-going, Not Started, 109
Source: Status of Accomplishments
Review of project documents revealed that delays were incurred in the

completion of 23 fire stations inspected ranging from 45 to 600 calendar days
(Appendix III). It was also noted that the 44 stations that were still under
construction were caused by work suspensions arising from delayed/non-
payment of progress billings, road closure/soil erosion at the project site, and
unfulfilled commitments from LGUs for site embankment.
Apart from delays, the audit team also found instances of abandonment by
several contactors. Here are the 11 abandoned construction sites, which the
audit team found during site inspection (Table 9 and Figure 6).
Table 9: List of 11 Abandoned Fire Stations

Region Fire Station Project Cost
VI Tibiao ₱2,616,648
VI Malinao 2,616,648
VI Madalag 2,616,648
VI Makato 2,616,648
XI Braulio E. Dujali 2,556,141
XI Carmen 2,152,878
XI Tarragona Fire 2,621,544
XIII Gigaquit 2,623,474
XIII Sta. Monica 2,622,297
XIII Remedios T. Romualdez 2,623,000
XIII Las Nieves 2,602,622
Total ₱28,268,550
Source: BFP
Page 14 PAO-2018-01
Figure 6: Photos of 11 Abandoned Fire Stations
Tibiao Fire Station, Antique, Region VI Malinao Fire Station, Aklan, Region VI
Madalag Fire Station, Aklan, Region VI Makato Fire Station, Aklan, Region VI
Carmen Fire Station, Davao Del Norte, Davao Region Tarragona Fire Station, Davao Oriental, Davao Region
Braulio E. Dujali Fire Station, Davao Del Norte, Davao Region Las Nieves Fire Station, Agusan Del Norte, CARAGA Region
Page 15 PAO-2018-01
Gigaquit Fire Station, Surigao Del Norte, CARAGA Region Sta. Monica Fire Station, Surigao Del Norte, CARAGA Region
Remedios T. Romualdez Fire Station, Agusan Del Norte,

CARAGA Region
Source: COA Site Inspection Photographs
BFP Management commented that Regional Offices (ROs) are responsible

for the monitoring and supervision of the implementation of their respective
projects. In the last Command Conference in the BFP-NHQ, the Regional
Directors were advised to terminate the contracts of contractors with negative
slippages and to reprogram the corresponding remaining funds and take
appropriate actions against the erring contractors.
The audit team believed that immediate actions could have been undertaken
by the BFP-NHQ and its ROs to address delays and negative slippages in the
construction of fire stations which were eventually abandoned by the
contractors as early as CY 2015.
Incomplete site There are lots donated by the LGUs, which do not meet the standard size
development and required for the construction of fire stations. Before the BFP can
inadequate lot area construct/modernize a fire station, there should be an available lot transferred
by the LGU to BFP for the purpose. The audit team found that only 121 out of
of sites transferred 154 fire stations validated or 79 per cent were covered by donated or
by the LGUs to the transferred lots by LGUs through Deed of Donation. Out of the said 121 fire
BFP stations with donated lots, 70 fire stations were constructed by BFP. However,
22 of these fire stations had lot areas ranging from 120 to 388 square meters
or less than the minimum area of 400 square meters under the Improvement
Standards for Fire Stations (Table 10). As a result, BFP had to deviate from
the prescribed design by reducing the size of some components of the fire
station, i.e. parking bays for fire trucks and quarters for fire personnel as
incorporated in the typical design of fire station (Appendix IV).
Page 16 PAO-2018-01
Table 10: Donated Lots less than the Required Area

Type of Fire Lot Donation
Region Province City/Municipality
Station (In m²)
IV-A Batangas Agoncillo E 120
IV-B Romblon Calatrava E 120
VII Bohol Loay E 128
IV-A Cavite Indang D 150
IV-A Laguna Calauan D 163
IV-A Laguna Pangil E 180
IV-A Cavite Magallanes E 200
IV-A Quezon Calauag C 200
IV-A Laguna Sta. Maria E 203
VI Antique San Jose D 238
IV-B Romblon Cajidiocan E 250
VII Bohol Sikatuna E 255
IV-A Laguna Magdalena E 258
IV-B Oriental Mindoro Puerto Galera C 300
VII Bohol Bien Unido E 300
XI Davao Oriental San Isidro E 300
IV-A Batangas Alitagtag E 311
IV-A Quezon Buenavista E 313
IV-A Batangas Taysan D 315
VII Bohol Sierra Bullones E 315
VII Negros Oriental La Libertad E 340
IV-A Batangas Calatagan D 388
Source: COA Survey Tally Sheet
The BFP Management commented that because of the available funds during
CYs 2014 and 2015, the lots were not evaluated thoroughly. It added that site
inspections are conducted by the BFP ROs and evaluation efforts were not
comprehensive. To assist the BFP ROs in the evaluation of donated lots,
Management is planning to create a Division for the particular function.
Furthermore, the BFP management explained that the budget amounting to

₱7.32 million for at least 400 sq. m. lot includes the cost for embankment,
landscaping and fencing. It is the prerogative of the BFP ROs on what portion
of the fire station to sacrifice in case site preparation requires additional
budget. Likewise, detailed engineering is the responsibility of the BFP ROs. If
in case allocated budget is not enough despite exclusion of landscaping
and/or fencing, the respective Regional Director can request for additional
budget.
Due to lack of fire The audit team found that in the absence of fire stations, there were fire trucks
stations, there are which were housed either in the LGUs’ gymnasium, basketball court and other
fire trucks housed in available buildings (Figure 7). In addition, a number of these existing fire
makeshift stations stations could be considered fire hazards as these were made of light
materials or earthquake hazards as these are structurally unsafe due to major
cracks on the walls and/or floors (Figure 8).
Page 17 PAO-2018-01
Figure 7: Sample Photos of LGU-Owned Fire Stations
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro: existing fire station is under the Badiangan, Iloilo: existing fire station is located at the back of
bench of the Municipal Gymnasium. the Municipal Gymnasium. Newly constructed fire station
reported as completed became a storage for palay.
Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur: existing fire station is located inside the Bayawan, Negros Oriental: existing fire station is located inside
PNP compound. During PNP heightened alert, entrance/exit gate is a covered basketball court while its office shares with the Multi-
always locked hindering BFP to immediately respond to fire incidents. Purpose Hall building owned by Brgy. Poblacion.
Figure 8: Photos of Fire-Hazard and Earthquake-Hazard Fire Stations
Mawab, Compostela Valley: currently housed in MDRRMO building Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte: A dilapidated building made
and is made up of light materials. Newly constructed fire station was only of light materials.
not utilized due to the development plan proposed by the LGU.
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan: Major cracks on floors and walls were Maco, Compostela Valley: Major cracks on floors and walls
observed. Requests for repair had been made but no action taken by were observed. Fire station is located beside a creek.
the LGU.
Page 18 PAO-2018-01
To date, out of the total 1,634 LGUs nationwide composed of 145 cities and
1,489 municipalities, 19 per cent or 308 municipalities still do not have fire
stations including 19 with fire trucks already. One hundred thirty-four (134) of
these municipalities or 44 per cent had already donated lots to BFP leaving 56
per cent or 174 municipalities that have yet to transfer lots to enable the BFP
to program the construction of fire stations (Appendix V).
The Management informed the audit team that there is a pending bill in
Congress for the revision of Fire Code of the Philippines giving authority to the
BFP to procure lots for the construction of fire station using fire code fees
collected to solve the issues on the strategic locations of fire stations.
Defects in the Technical and physical inspection of the 70 newly constructed fire stations
construction and revealed deficiencies in 36 stations. These deficiencies included
unguaranteed structural stability since no beam was constructed to support
incomplete installation
the provision for mezzanine floor, major cracks on interior concrete hollow
of required Items of blocks (CHBs) walls because four (4) inches CHBs were used instead of six
work in the (6) inches, and water leaks on the ceiling. It was also noted that there were
constructed fire panel doors infested with termites and exposed to open weather causing easy
stations deterioration while some work items were not accomplished/installed to
include painting works, carpentry/plumbing works, signage and logo (Figure
9).
Figure 9: Sample Photos of Defective Fire Stations
Calauan Fire Station, Laguna: no trace of middle beam Calatrava Fire Station, Romblon: major cracks on
constructed compromising the structural stability. the interior of CHB wall.
Baganga Fire Station, Davao Oriental: water leaks at Gen. Luna Fire Station, Surigao Del Norte:
ceiling, painting and plumbing works were deleted in the damaged panel door infested by termites and being
scope of work exposed to open weather
Page 19 PAO-2018-01
Furthermore, there were four (4) fire stations reported as completed, however,
inspection revealed that these were non-operational (Figure 10). One fire
station located in Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan Del Norte was actually
abandoned. Badiangan fire station in Iloilo, on the other hand, became a
storage for palay while Ajuy and Carles fire stations both located in the same
province need more additional works like site embankment, painting works
and carpentry works. Meanwhile, one of the abandoned projects, particularly
the Braulio E. Dujali fire station in Davao Del Norte, was located in the inner
part of a rice field. The site was almost two (2) meters below the municipal
road and prone to floods. In seven other fire stations, the ground level of the
structure was 1.2 to 3 meters below the existing concrete roads in Gloria,
Bulalacao, Calintaan and Baco all located in Oriental Mindoro; Los Baños,
Laguna; Carles, Iloilo; and Dagohoy, Bohol (Figure 11). The lack of site
inspection and evaluation caused these conditions where parking bays for fire
trucks were not possible. Consequently, additional excavation and
embankment works were needed.
Figure 10: Fire Stations Reported as Completed but were Non-Operational
Remedios T. Romualdez Fire Station, Agusan Del Norte: Badiangan Fire Station, Iloilo: became a storage for
abandoned fire station. palay.
Ajuy Fire Station, Iloilo: additional painting and carpentry Carles Fire Station, Iloilo: additional site embankment
works were needed. was needed.
Page 20 PAO-2018-01
Figure 11: Sample of Fire Stations Below the Existing Concrete Roads
Dagohoy Fire Station, Bohol Los Baňos Fire Station, Laguna

Review of project documents also revealed instances where contractors were

paid for some work items not accomplished. One abandoned project,
particularly the Tarragona Fire Station in Davao Oriental, had an overstated
work accomplishment reported by contractor on the installation of concrete
roof deck slab, roughing-ins for plumbing and electrical works, and concrete
septic tank. No actions were taken so far against erring contractors regarding
the abandoned fire stations. Also, the BFP ROs kept on deleting/changing the
work items, and even the design of the fire station to accommodate positive
variations without consultation and approval from the BFP-NHQ The latter
failed to consider in the planning stage the actual terrains of the site for
construction, soil poisoning, and site embankment as necessary works for site
conditioning/development. Hence, additional costs were incurred or some
scope of works were dropped to cover the needed engineering works in the
actual construction of fire stations.
Findings on the
gender inclusiveness
of the construction of
fire stations
No separate living The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
quarters for women conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
operations personnel in opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their
some existing fire full potential in the service of the nation.17 Hence, a separate living quarters
stations and crowded for women is required.
living quarters due to
One of the objectives of Modernization Program is the establishment and/or
limited space in newly upgrading of fire stations. Based on the typical design to construct fire station,
constructed stations separate female quarters are considered. Validation in 57 completed newly
constructed fire stations revealed that 100 per cent had been noted to have a
separate female living quarters although a number of them were crowded due
to limited space. Likewise, a number of separate living quarters in the existing
(old) fire stations validated were also crowded due to the increase in number
of hired firefighters (Figure 12).
17
1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 14
Page 21 PAO-2018-01
Figure 12: Sample of Existing Fire Stations with Female Living Quarters but with Limited Space
Iloilo City Fire Station, Iloilo Parañaque City Fire Station, NCR
Dumaguete City Fire Station, Negros Oriental Numancia Fire Station, Negros Occidental
For the 82 existing fire stations validated, the team noted that 24 fire stations
or 29 per cent had no separate living quarters for women (Figure 13). Out of
these 24 fire stations, 21 were LGU-owned, thus the BFP could not implement
major repair to provide separate quarters for women.
Figure 13: Sample of Existing Fire Stations without Separate Female Living Quarters
Commonwealth Fire Sub-Station, Quezon City Catigbian Fire Station, Bohol
Mamburao Fire Station, Occidental Mindoro Bayawan City Fire Station, Negros Oriental
Page 22 PAO-2018-01
Findings on the
funding of fire trucks
Even in the acquisition Even in the acquisition of fire trucks, the BFP could not fully utilize its allocation
of fire trucks, the BFP due to its lack of procurement expertise. Available budget allocation for fire
could not fully utilize its trucks could only cover 749 out 1,057 fire trucks targeted for the Modernization
allocation due its lack Program. Despite its priority status as mentioned in the earlier findings, BFP
could not efficiently use its budget allocation for fire trucks. BFP reverted an
of procurement
amount of ₱1.19 billion to the BTr which could have been used to procure
expertise additional 128 fire trucks.
As discussed in the earlier findings, the bulk of the funding of the

Modernization Program is allotted for the procurement of fire trucks. Pursuant
to the Work Project Plan (WPP), the BFP targeted 1,057 fire trucks amounting
to ₱13.48 billion. This covers the target number of fire trucks under SEP and
SUMP for CYs 2011-2017. The audit team found a discrepancy between the
targets under the WPP and the APP. Based on the APP, BFP had
programmed the procurement of 597 fire trucks amounting to ₱P4.37 billion
(Table 11). This amount excludes the ₱2.54 billion ODA loan from the Austrian
government (Table 2). The number of fire trucks programmed in the APP
represented only 56 per cent of the target number of fire trucks under the WPP.
Management did not provide the reason(s) for the discrepancy.
Table 11: Fire Trucks Financial Requirements and APP

Target APP/PPMP(Programmed)
SEP SUMP Total Supplemental Total
Year No. No. No. No.
Amount Amount No. of Amount Amount No. of Amount
of of of Amount of
(in million) (in million) Units (in million) (in million) Units (in million)
Units Units Units Units
APP no APP no
2011 70 ₱910.00 81 ₱944.96 151 ₱1,854.96 quantity
₱659.07 quantity
₱659.075
2012 70 921.37 81 956.77 151 1,878.15 85 513.01 33 ₱199.167 118 712.173
2013 70 932.89 81 968.73 151 1,901.62 76 518.32 76 518.320
2014 70 944.55 81 980.84 151 1,925.40 93 558.00 93 558.000
2015 70 956.36 81 993.10 151 1,949.46 226 1,317.36 33 199.167 259 1,516.528
2016 70 968.32 81 1,005.52 151 1,973.83 40 241.04 40 241.042
2017 70 980.42 81 1,018.09 151 1,998.50 11 166.04 11 166.041
TOTAL 490 ₱6,613.91 567 ₱6,868.02 1,057 ₱13,481.93 531 ₱3,972.84 66 ₱398.334 597 ₱4,371.179
Note: APP CY 2017 has no quantity. Quantity shown in the table was derived from PPMP CY 2018 having the same total amount.
Source: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP vis-à-vis APP and Supplemental
From 2011 to 2017, the BFP received a total allotment of ₱9.05 billion (Figure
3) for the procurement of 749 fire trucks (excluding 2011). Based on the WPP,
the funding is short to finance the remaining 308 fire trucks. The amount
already included the 1st and 2nd Phases of the ODA loan for the 152 fire
trucks. The total obligation/disbursement for the same period amounted to
₱6.55 billion. This amount includes the fund transfer of ₱1.90 billion to the
PITC (Table 7) for the procurement of 126 fire trucks, which BFP claimed was
in the bidding process in November 2018.
While the allotments received fell short of the required amount to acquire the
target number of fire trucks per WPP, still the BFP failed to utilize its allotments
resulting in the reversion of ₱1.19 billion to the BTr (Table 12). Reasons
provided by the BFP on the reversal of allotments pertained to issues on
procurement processes, limited time for bidding, and savings from public
bidding.
Page 23 PAO-2018-01
Table 12: Unutilized Funds and Reason for Reversal (in million)
ARMM
Year SAGF GAA Transition ODA TOTAL Reason for Reversal
Investment Plan
2011 ₱416.32 - - ₱416.32 Reverted in 2012 due to non-approval of Purchase Order
Reverted in 2013 due to Secretary of Interior and Local
565.44 - - 565.44
2012 Government (SILG’s) instruction to conduct market study
- - ₱199.17 - Reverted. Reprogram in 2015 and transfer to DBM-PS.
2013 - - - -
Reverted. Savings from public bidding procurement of fire
2014 12.72 - - 12.72
trucks under SAGF
2015 - - - -
Due to limited time to implement public bidding , date of
2016 196.74 - - 196.74 release of SARO were December 6, 2016, while authority
to obligate was until December 31, 2016
2017 - ₱0.44 - 0.44 Savings, reverted as a result of public bidding
subtotal ₱1,191.22 ₱0.44 ₱199.17 ₱1,191.66
Unobligated. Booked-up in 2013 awaiting issuance of
2011 ₱1,310.16 1,310.16
SARO from DBM
TOTAL ₱1,191.22 ₱0.44 ₱199.17 ₱1,310.16 ₱2,501.82
Source: Schedule of BFP Unutilized Funds with Remarks on Reason for Reversion and Revised Summary of Expenses Incurred relative to Rosenbauer Fire
trucks
The audit team found that the reverted amount for the procurement of fire truck
from the BFP Special Account in the General Fund (SAGF) for CYs 2011 to
2013, together with the allotment from the GAA for CY 2014, was reprogramed
in a Supplemental APP in CY 2014 for the procurement of 469 units of Jiangte
fire trucks.
Findings on the
procurement of fire
trucks
BFP could only Review of procurement documents revealed that only 621 fire trucks
procure 621 out of representing 59 per cent of the targeted fire trucks under the Modernization
749 fire trucks Program were actually acquired as of June 30, 2018 as shown in Table 13:
programmed for
procurement Table 13: Fire Trucks Acquired as of June 30, 2018
Description Quantity Amount
Jiangte - Water Tank Pumper Fire Trucks 500
225 ₱ 1,119,375,000
Gallons Capacity
Jiangte - Water Tank Pumper Fire Trucks
244 1,457,900,000
1,000 Gallons Capacity
Rosenbauer Tank Fire Fighting Vehicle TLF
76 1,310,161,007
4000 (Phase1)*
Rosenbauer Tank Fire Fighting Vehicle TLF
76 1,229,624,400
4000 (Phase2)
Total 621 ₱ 5,117,060,407
*Non-Cash Availment Authority (NCAA), no SARO was issued yet by DBM
Source: BFP Purchase Order, and Revised Summary of Expenses Incurred relative to
Rosenbauer Fire trucks & Sub-Allotment Release Order
Discrepancy between Discrepancy between the canvass made by the BFP and the DILG contributed
the canvass made by to the delay in the procurement of fire trucks. Further verification of documents
the BFP and the DILG for the procurement of fire trucks for CY 2011 revealed that upon instructions
contributed to the from the DILG, the BFP had determined the prices of the 1,500-gallon and
1,000-gallon capacity fire trucks at ₱12.44 million and ₱11.98 million,
delay in procurement
respectively based on canvass conducted in 2011. Comparison of these prices
with the canvass obtained by the DILG at ₱7.51 million and ₱7.24 million for
the 1,500-gallon and 1,000-gallon capacity, respectively, led to immediate re-
Page 24 PAO-2018-01
assessment and/or setting-up of the ABC for fire truck with the DILG’s canvass
as the benchmark. Fire trucks’ readjusted estimated unit prices are as follows:
Capacity Unit Cost

1,500 gallons, Low Risk ₱ 6,343,675
1,000 gallons, Low Risk 6,035,365
1,500 gallons, High Risk 7,331,966
Source: BFP BAC Resolution No. 2011-07 dated May 12, 2011 and DILG Memorandum
dated May 18, 2011
Despite canvass made in 2011, it was not until CY 2014 that the procurement
of fire truck was made as per APP CY 2014 and its amendment as approved
and signed by the DILG Undersecretary for Operations. Details are as follows:
Previous Amended
Fire Truck Variance
Capacity Unit Price No. Of ABC Unit Price No. Of ABC
(In ‘000) Units (In ‘000) (In ‘000) Units (In ‘000) Price
Units
(In ‘000)
1000-gallon 8,000.00 155 1,240,000.00 6,000.00 244 1,464,000.00 89 -224,000.00
500-gallon 6,000.00 225 1,350,000.00 5,000.00 225 1,125,000.00 0 225,000.00
380 2,590,000.00 469 2,589,000.00 1,000.00
Source: BFP BAC Resolution No. 2014-004 dated August 22, 2014
Apart from delay in the In addition to delay in the procurement, there is also delay in the delivery of
procurement, there is fire trucks. The procurement process of the aforementioned 469 Jiangte fire
also delay in the trucks took 5 months until Notice of Award was issued and another year until
all delivery was made (Table 14). As discussed in detail in Consolidated
delivery of fire trucks
Annual Audit Report (CAAR) CY 2016, there were delays in the delivery of 225
units of 500-gallon fire trucks ranging from 18 to 88 days and liquidated
damages were charged to supplier in the amount of ₱51.98 million but was not
collected.
Table 14: Procurement Process of 469 Jiangte Fire Trucks

Activity Date Remarks
Bid Documents Posting 8/27/2014
Pre bid conference 9/3/2014
Several addenda
Submission & opening of bids 10/17/2014
9/15-10/4/2010
BAC endorsed JV of LDLA Mktg and Wuhan Found non-
Automobile Refitting Factory for post qualification 10/27/2014 responsive on
to TWG 11/14/2014
BAC endorsed JV of Kolonwel Trading and Hubei
2nd eligible bidder as
Jiangnan Special Automobile Company Ltd. for 1/8/2015
responsive
post qualification to TWG
Notice of Award (NOA) 1/20/2015
Contract Agreement and Notice to Proceed (NTP)
2/2/2015
was signed and issued
Actual Delivery – 1,000-gallon fire trucks 4/30-10/19/2015
500-gallon fire trucks 10/19/2015-2/29/2016
Source: BFP BAC Resolution No. 2015-PBM-01, Auditorial Review Checklist and CAAR CY 2016
Page 25 PAO-2018-01
To resolve delays in The BFP outsourced the procurement of fire trucks to PITC and DBM-PS to
the procurement address delays in the procurement. This action, however, was proven not
process, BFP effective since none of the fire trucks were procured. In CY 2017, BFP BAC
drafted a resolution outsourcing the procurement of goods, infrastructure and
outsourced the
information and communications technology projects to the PITC. Among
procurement of fire others, a total amount of ₱407.08 million was approved for procurement of fire
trucks to PITC and trucks with total quantity of 26 units as identified in AOR dated July 3, 2017.
DBM-PS, however, it The total amount was taken out from approved APP for CY 2016 (₱241.04
did not solve the million) and CY 2017 (₱166.04 million). Additional 100 units were requested
problem since none of for procurement by PITC with total budget estimate of ₱1.50 billion per AOR
the fire trucks were dated November 27, 2017. As of December 31, 2017, total fund transfer for
procured fire truck procurement amounted to ₱1.91 billion. On May 25, 2018, a revised
AOR was prepared combining the two requests for a total of 126 units with
unit price of ₱14.93 million or a total amount of ₱1.88 billion.
In addition, 36 units of fire trucks with total cost of ₱494.77 million were
requested for procurement by the DBM-PS under the Agency Procurement
Request (APR) No. 11-12-0007 dated December 29, 2011 for 8 units of 1,500-
gallon fire trucks and APR No. 18-03-0006 dated March 26, 2018 for 28 units
of 1,000-gallon fire trucks.
As of July 30, 2018, these fire trucks had not been procured. As per inquiry
on the status at Supply Management Division of the BFP, the 28 units of fire
trucks were under post-qualification while the 8 units were part of failed
bidding that was later on cancelled on November 28, 2016 due to substantial
change in technical and financial requirements of the end-user agency.
It was noted that no documentation was available on how many of these fire
trucks were programmed and procured for SEP and SUMP (Table 15).
Table 15: Fire Trucks Financial Requirements, APP and Actual Procurement
Target APP/*PPMP(Programmed) Actual Procurement by BFP ODA by DILG
Year Total No. of Amount Total No. of Amount Total No. of Amount Total No. of Amount
Units (In million) Units (In million) Units (In million) Units (In million)
2011 151 ₱1,854.96 APP no quantity ₱659.07 76 ₱1,310.16
2012 151 1,878.15 118 199,680.06
2013 151 1,901.62 76 518.32
2014 151 1,925.40 93 558.00
2015 151 1,949.46 259 200,484.36 469 ₱2,577.27
2016 151 1,973.83 40 241.04 76 1,426.36
2017 151 1,998.51 11 166.04
Total 1,057 ₱13,481.93 597 ₱402,306.89 469 ₱2,577.27 152 ₱2,736.52
Source: BFP Financial Requirements CYs 2011-2017, APP CYs 2011-2017 and Supply Contracts
Pending Supreme Court The delivery of 76 fire trucks under Phase 2 procured through ODA loan
case caused the delay incurred delays ranging from 7 months to 13 months because the DILG
of the delivery of fire suspended the distribution of the BFP-Capacity Building Program (CBP)
trucks procured through Phase 2. According to the DILG Memorandum dated June 19, 2017, the DILG
ODA loan and BFP temporarily suspended the BFP-CBP because it had been under
public scrutiny and that there was a pending Supreme Court case 18 involving
the same. As a result, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) declared the shipment
abandoned since the fire trucks remained unclaimed for at least seven
months.
18
G.R. No. L-224997 entitled “Hon. Jonathan A. Dela cruz vs Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa,
et al.” pending with the Supreme Court (SC)
Page 26 PAO-2018-01
The government through the Department of Finance (DOF) obtained an ODA

loan for the procurement of 152 fire trucks from the Austrian government
(Table 2). The corresponding Supply Agreements entered into between DILG
and Rosenbauer International Artiengesellschaft on December 14, 2011 and
April 20, 2016 covered the delivery of 76 units of Rosenbauer fire trucks for
Phase 1 and another 76 units of Rosenbauer fire trucks for Phase 2.
For Phase 1, Export Credit Facility Agreement in the amount of €20.49 million
was entered into between the Republic of the Philippines through DOF and
UniCredit Bank Austria AG on January 12, 2012 while Concessional Credit
Agreement for the same amount was entered by the same parties on April 1,
2016 for Phase 2. These agreements were both part of the BFP-CBP.
As per inquiry and review of documents obtained from the BFP-Accounting

Division, the CBP Phase 1 was booked up in the amount of ₱1.31 billion
including the ₱7.85 million taxes, duties and transportation expenses but still
awaiting issuance of Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) from DBM as
to date. The import duties, taxes, etc. as well as local transport are not
included in contract price and shall be borne and paid directly by the buyer
from its own funds as it falls due. In contrast, SARO for the amount of ₱1.23
billion for the ODA taken out from unprogrammed funds and ₱196.74 million
to cover Government of the Philippines (GOP) counterpart of the CBP taken
out from SAGF, both for Phase 2, were issued by DBM to the BFP.
Actual deliveries consisting of six batches for Phase 1 started on December

19, 2012 and were completed in November 2013 based on the Inspection and
Acceptance Reports (Table 16). The shipment schedule should come into
force not later than end of January 2012. However, based on documents
examined, the required performance security by the supplier and advance
payment/down payment in order for the contract to come into effect were
made only on April 16, 2012 resulting in the extension of delivery period by
about two months.
Table 16: CBP Phase 1 Shipment Schedule and Actual Delivery Dates
Date Delivered as per
Batch of Shipment Schedule per
Quantity Inspection and Acceptance
Delivery Supply Contract
Report (IAR)
1st Batch 12 End of October 2012 12/19/2012
2nd Batch 12 End of November 2012 01/22/2013
3rd Batch 14 End of December 2012 02/02/2013
4th Batch 12 End of March 2013 05/16/2013
5th Batch 12 End of June 2013 08/16/2013
6th Batch 14 End of September 2013 11/05/2013
TOTAL 76
Source: BFP-CBP Phase 1 Supply Contract and Inspection and Acceptance Reports
On the other hand, it was observed that the shipments of 76 units of

Rosenbauer fire trucks under Phase 2 at the Port of Batangas from April to
November 2017 (Table 17) were not claimed by the DILG, as consignee, until
these were declared abandoned by the BOC under amended Decrees of
Abandonment Nos. 008-17 and 009-17. On June 5, 2018, the BOC donated
these fire trucks to BFP. It was explained that the shipments were not claimed
due to temporary suspension of the implementation of BFP-CBP Phase 2 by
the DILG because the CBP has been under the public’s scrutiny with a pending
case filed with the Supreme Court. It was noted that these fire trucks remained
unclaimed from seven to 13 months, thereby delaying the distribution and use
thereof by the intended users.
Page 27 PAO-2018-01
Table 17: CBP Phase 2 Shipment Schedule and Actual Delivery Dates
No. of Months
Shipment Schedule per Delayed per
Batch of Date of Arrival at Unclaimed Before
Quantity Supply Contract Bill of Lading Shipment
Delivery Batangas Port Distribution on
(Ready for Shipment) Schedule
June 2018
1st Batch 14 End of November 2016 MOLU692384471 April 18, 2017 5 months 13
2nd Batch 12 End of January 2017 MOLU692394597 May 17, 2017 3.5 months 13
3rd Batch 17 End of March 2017 MOLU692413490 July 19, 2017 3.5 months 10
4th Batch 17 End of April 2017 MOLU692440013 September 18, 2017 4.5 months 8
5th Batch 16 End of June 2017 MOLU692440013 November 1, 2017 4 months 7
TOTAL 76
Source: BFP-CBP Phase 2 Supply Contract and Deed of Donation between BFP and BOC
Findings on the
prioritization and
distribution of fire
trucks
BFP deviated from its BFP deviated from its established set of criteria in distributing the fire trucks
established set of to the cities and municipalities. There were cities/municipalities that received
criteria in distributing fire trucks which were not in the prioritization list. Also, there were
the fire trucks to the cities/municipalities which received fire trucks from both Phase 1 and Phase
cities and municipalities 2. The criteria developed were supposed to prioritize areas, which are most
in need.
Unnumbered BFP Memorandum dated September 13, 2010 provided the

criteria for the deployment of fire trucks taking into consideration the statistics
on population, fire incidents, property damage and injured victims (Table 18).
Table 18: Criteria for the Deployment of Fire Trucks

Area Weight
Fire truck-to-Population Ratio 50%
Number of Fire Incidents 10%
Property Damage 10%
Deaths 10%
Injured Victims 10%
Population Density 10%
TOTAL 100%
Source: BFP Memorandum dated September 13, 2010
The priority ranking of cities for distribution of Rosenbauer fire trucks was
specified in the Feasibility Study Report on April 2008 prepared by the BFP-
Plans and Programs Division while ranking of cities and municipalities used
for the deployment of Jiangte fire trucks was made by BFP-Logistic and
Engineering Division (LED), both distributions based on the above-mentioned
criteria.
Validation of priority ranking of cities vis-à-vis the distribution list revealed that
the 76 units of Rosenbauer fire trucks under Phase 1 were distributed in 2013
and 2014 based on the Top 76 cities out of the 136 cities ranked in the
prioritization list. For the 76 units procured under Phase 2 which were
distributed in June 2018, only 27 cities in the remaining 60 cities ranked were
issued fire trucks. It was observed that 20 fire trucks were issued to cities which
were not in the list while 29 fire trucks were given to cities that already received
fire trucks from Phase 1. Details are shown in Tables 19 to 21:
Page 28 PAO-2018-01
Table 19: Ranked Cities Not Table 20: Unranked Cities Table 21: Recipient Cities in
Issued Rosenbauer Issued Rosenbauer CBP Phases 1 and 2
Cities Not Issued Cities Not in List but Issued Cities already received
No. Rank No. No. Rank
Rosenbauer Rosenbauer Rosenbauer in Phase 1
1 San Carlos City (R1) 78 1 Lingayen (R1) 1 Quezon City (NCR) 1
2 Sta. Rosa City (R4A) 80 2 Bayombong (R2) 2 City of Manila (NCR) 2
3 Calbayog City (R8) 85 3 Cabarroguis (R2) 3 City of Manila (NCR) 2
4 Cabadbaran (R13) 86 4 Baler (R3) 4 Caloocan City (NCR) 3
5 Canlaon City (R7) 88 5 San Pedro City (R4A) 5 Davao City (R11) 4
6 San Carlos City (R6) 91 6 City of Biñan (R4A) 6 Davao City (R11) 4
7 Tayabas (R4A) 92 7 San Mateo(R4A) 7 Malabon City (NCR) 5
8 City of Ligao (R5) 93 8 Daet (R5) 8 Parañaque (NCR) 6
9 Bayugan (R13) 96 9 San Jose De Buenavista (R6) 9 Pasay City (NCR) 7
10 City of Victorias (R6) 98 10 Kalibo (R6) 10 Pasig City (NCR) 8
11 City of Bislig (R13) 99 11 Dauis (R7) 11 San Juan City (NCR) 10
12 Carcar (R7) 100 12 Catarman (R8) 12 Mandaluyong City (NCR) 11
13 Naga City (R7) 101 13 Ipil (R9) 13 Las Piñas City (NCR) 12
14 Guihulngan (R7) 102 14 Villanueva (R10) 14 Taguig City (NCR) 13
15 Bogo (R7) 103 15 Nabunturan (R11) 15 Muntinlupa (NCR) 14
16 Ozamis City (R10) 108 16 Malita (R11) 16 Navotas City (NCR) 16
17 Ormoc City (R8) 110 17 Isulan(R12) 17 Marikina City (NCR) 17
18 City of Maasin (R8) 113 18 Bangued(CAR) 18 Mandaue City (R7) 18
19 City of Candon (R1) 116 19 Prosperidad (R13) 19 Bacolod City (R6) 20
20 City of Muñoz (R3) 117 20 Pateros (NCR) 20 Cebu City (R7) 21
21 Oroquieta City (R10) 119 21 Iloilo City (R6) 23
22 Iriga City (R5) 120 22 Zamboanga City (R9) 25
23 Tangub City (R10) 124 23 General Santos City (R11) 35
24 City of Himamaylan (R6) 126 24 Iligan City (R10) 41
25 City of Talisay (R6) 127 25 Lapu Lapu City (R7) 42
26 City of Escalante (R6) 129 26 Cagayan De Oro City (R10) 50
27 City of Alaminos (R1) 130 27 City of Koronadal (R12) 54
28 Danao City (R7) 131 28 Butuan City (R12) 58
29 La Carlota City (R6) 132 29 Panabo City (R11) 67
30 Batac (R1) 133
31 Gingoog City (R10) 134
32 Tandag (R13) 135
33 El Salvador City (R10) 136
Source: COA Analysis
Furthermore, validation of documents on distribution of Jiangte fire trucks

revealed that Priority Ranking for Deployment of Fire Trucks to fire stations
without BFP-owned or LGU-owned engines was not followed. The fire trucks
were distributed only to 224 out of 626 municipalities or 48 per cent of
municipalities without BFP-owned or LGU-owned fire trucks while the
remaining 245 fire trucks were deployed to cities and municipalities with
existing firefighting engines. As a result, 59 municipalities with fire stations
but without BFP fire trucks were not given the needed fire trucks (Appendix
VI).
The Chief of Engineering explained that gaps between Priority Ranking List of
Jiangte fire trucks and final Distribution List were attributed to changes made
by DILG on the BFP recommended recipients. No document, however, was
presented authorizing the revised priority ranking for the distribution of Jiangte
fire trucks.
On the deviations in the distribution of Rosenbauer fire trucks under Phase 2,

according to the BFP-LED, the DILG and the BOC had an agreement to
prioritize highly-urbanized cities. As a result, a new distribution list was
implemented. The cities under Table 19, which were previously prioritized, no
longer receive fire trucks. On the other hand, cities under Table 20, which were
Page 29 PAO-2018-01
not originally in the ranking list, were given fire trucks. Further, cities under
Table 21, those which already received fire trucks became recipients again.
However, no minutes of the said agreement was presented upon request and
no written directive was issued by BFP on this new basis of deployment of fire
trucks.
It is worthy to mention that using the prioritization criteria in the deployment of

fire trucks would ensure that the limited fire trucks procured are allocated
based on need and in line with the goals and objectives of enhancing the
firefighting capability of the BFP under the Modernization Program. The
establishment of fire stations in municipalities will not totally enhance the
firefighting capability of the station unless allocated with fire trucks and
necessary resources to keep them operational.
Further analysis of gap in the ideal number of fire trucks and the existing
serviceable fire trucks as of June 30, 2018 revealed that Region VIII had
already exceeded the ideal number of fire trucks using the prescribed fire
truck-to-population ratio of one fire truck for every 28,000 population. Likewise,
except for Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) and Region XIII (CARAGA)
which almost have the ideal number of fire trucks, the gaps in the remaining
regions ranged from 17 to 82 per cent or an average nation-wide gap of 44 per
cent equivalent to 1,584 fire trucks shortage (Table 22).
Table 22: Gap Analysis between the Number of Serviceable and Ideal
Number of Fire Trucks by Region as of June 2018
Ideal Serviceable
Population* Shortage Percentage
Regions (1: 28,000 pop) As of June 2018
(a) (b) (c) (d = b - c) (e= d / b)
NCR 12,877,253 460 91 369 80%
CAR 1,722,006 62 58 4 6%
REGION I 5,026,128 180 123 57 32%
REGION II 3,451,410 123 99 24 20%
REGION III 11,218,177 401 181 220 55%
REGION IV-A 14,414,774 515 223 292 57%
REGION IV-B 2,963,360 106 88 18 17%
REGION V 5,796,989 207 148 59 29%
REGION VI 7,536,383 269 179 90 33%
REGION VII 7,396,898 264 145 119 45%
REGION VIII 4,440,150 159 194 0 0%
REGION IX 3,629,783 130 87 43 33%
REGION X 4,689,302 167 97 70 42%
REGION XI 4,893,318 175 90 85 49%
REGION XII 4,545,276 162 98 64 40%
CARAGA 2,596,709 93 91 2 2%
ARMM 3,781,387 135 30 105 78%
NATIONWIDE** 100,979,303 3,606 2,022 1,584 44%
*Based on PSA PopCen 2015 (latest)
**Population counts for the regions do not add up to the national total. Excludes 2,134 Filipinos in
Philippine Embassies, Consulates and Mission Abroad.
Page 30 PAO-2018-01
Findings on the quality

of the fire trucks
Fire trucks already Fire trucks already manifested mechanical and electrical defects barely a year
manifested mechanical after delivery. In the 2016 CAAR, COA already found defects from the fire
and electrical defects a trucks delivered in 2015. In the inspections conducted for this audit, the audit
few years after its team found more fire trucks with defects or non-functioning parts. Based on
the results of the inspection, Jiangte fire trucks manifested significantly more
delivery
defects compared with Rosenbauer fire trucks.
Technical evaluation and physical inspection of 84 units of fire trucks were

conducted in seven sample regions from March to June 2018. The fire trucks
were composed of 33 units of Rosenbauer, 25 units of Jiangte (500 gallons),
and 26 units of Jiangte (1,000 gallons).
Out of the 84 units inspected, three units of Jiangte fire trucks, were found non-
operational (Table 23 and Figure 14). This is in addition to the seven non-
operational Jiangte fire trucks reported in the 2017 Technical Inspection
Reports of the COA Technical Services Office (Table 24 and Figure 15). In
total, 10 fire trucks out of 302 units inspected were already non-operational as
of June 30, 2018:
Table 23: Jiangte Fire Trucks Found Non-Operational in 2018 Inspection

Region Province Municipality/City Fire Truck Brand Capacity
4A Batangas Calatagan Jiangte Sinotruk 1,000
11 Davao Del Norte Kapalong Jiangte Sinotruk 1,000
13 Surigao del Sur Madrid Jiangte Dongfeng 500
Calatagan, Batangas: Out of service, Kapalong, Davao Del Norte: Madrid, Surigao del Sur:
water pump for overhaul brought to Unserviceable water pump. Unserviceable due to stuck up
Manila for repair. ignition switch and the burnt starter.
Page 31 PAO-2018-01
Table 24: Jiangte Fire Trucks Found Non-Operational in 2017 Inspection

Region Province Municipality/City Fire Truck Brand Capacity
7 Cebu Consolacion Jiangte Dongfeng 500
NIR Negros Oriental Zamboanguita Jiangte Dongfeng 500
5 Catanduanes Baras Jiangte Dongfeng 500
6 Iloilo Badiangan Jiangte Dongfeng 500
4A Laguna Magdalena Jiangte Dongfeng 500
3 Bulacan Bocaue Jiangte Sinotruck 1,000
3 Bulacan Santa Maria Jiangte Sinotruck 1,000
Magdalena, Laguna (July 2017 – Out of Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental Consolacion, Cebu (February
service due to cross joint flange broke (May 2017 - Not operational due to 2017 – Not operational since
and propeller shaft was disconnected) clutch master cylinder problem) December 2016 due to defective
starter motor)
The technical inspection of 51 Jiangte and 33 Rosenbauer fire trucks in 2018

revealed common defects relating to mechanical, electrical and other findings.
The inspectors attribute such defects to the inherent low quality of Jiangte fire
trucks and the inadequate periodic maintenance on the fire trucks (Table 25).
At least 98 per cent of the 51 Jiangte fire trucks have defects or non-
functioning parts compared to a lower percentage of at least 48 per cent for
Rosenbauer fire trucks (Appendix VII). These defects impact on the overall
performance of the fire trucks particularly on the quality of response to fire
incidents.
Table 25: Common Mechanical and Electrical Defects and other Findings
on Fire Trucks Inspected
JIANGTE FIRE TRUCKS (500 and 1000 Gallons)
Mechanical Electrical Others
50 out of 51 (98%) 51 out of 51 (100%) 50 out of 51 (98%)
Due to Low Quality Due to Low Quality Due to Low Quality
 Complaints on hard time  Busted light-emitting diode  No undercoating on
shifting gears stick side visibility lights chassis
 Non-functional cab-tilt,  Front searchlight not functional  Leaking wye
unable to lift the cowl  Rear spotlight not functional connections
 Hose gets busted easily  Modified/repaired ignition key
due to thin materials used due to original key getting Due to Poor
 Leaking Air tanks stuck in ignition keyhole Maintenance/Handling
 PTO magnetic valve switch  No covered parking
Due to Poor Maintenance/ replaced/repaired and thus exposed to all
Handling relocated due to malfunction elements
Page 32 PAO-2018-01
JIANGTE FIRE TRUCKS (500 and 1000 Gallons)

 Visible oil leak/carbon  Starter assembly replaced due Due to Low Quality and
build-up forming at top of to key getting stuck in the Poor Maintenance/
the PTO gearbox keyhole Handling
 Alternator specification is 70A  Rusted under chassis
Due to Low Quality and instead of 80A - 120A due to the primer
Poor Maintenance/  Verified spotlight capacity is peeling off
Handling 35W instead of 100W  Broken door handles
 Non-functional air-  Verified searchlight capacity is  Paint peeling
conditioning 55W instead of 250W off/flaking/de-lamination
 No change oil for fire truck visible on the cowl/cabin
engine Due to Low Quality and Poor  Busted FM radio display
Maintenance/Handling due to contact during
 Water tank gauge level gear shifting
indicators not fully functional
ROSENBAUER FIRE TRUCKS -1000 Gallons

Due to Poor Maintenance/Handling
 Visible carbon build-up on  Have/had problems with  Hoses supplied are
outside of exhaust gas the blinkers single-jacket only
recirculation (EGR) pipes  Non-functional water tank instead of doubled-
 No change oil for fire truck gauge level indicators jacketed
engine and water pump  Rear access ladder
engine broken/bent/damaged
 Notable noise on pump when  Water leak/backflow on
engage to power take-off water pump intake/refill
(PTO) pipe
 No covered parking
thus exposed to all
elements
BFP Management explained that the cost of a quality fire truck would normally
range from ₱12 million to ₱14 million. But pursuant to the order/directives of
the DILG, the BAC proceeded with the procurement of 1,000-gallon fire trucks
priced at ₱6 million and 500-gallon fire trucks priced at ₱5 million. Due to
meager price indicated in the ABC, only bidders from China could participate
in the bidding. BFP Management further explained that in addition to low
quality of Jiangte fire trucks, the drivers manning the fire trucks are not
professional drivers. BFP could not hire drivers due to lack of DBM-approved
plantilla for drivers. BFP Management added that DBM had suggested that
fire fighters should be able to perform multi-tasked to include operating
(driving) the fire truck.
In the 2016 CAAR for the BFP, COA reported that in addition to lapses in the
procurement process, various defects were noted in 37 per cent or 176 out of
the 469 (Jiangte) fire trucks delivered in 2015. All BFP ROs were then directed
to report all noted defects to determine with certainty the total defective fire
trucks delivered by the Joint Venture (JV) so that remedial actions can be
undertaken immediately and to comply with the standards on future
procurement. Currently, procurement for major repair of 469 Jiangte fire trucks
is subject to bidding and will take time to repair the defective fire trucks to
make them functional.
BFP missed its The warranties on the purchases of these fire trucks (Table 26) had lapsed.
opportunity to enforce Defects, which are inherent in the quality of the fire trucks, such as those not
its warranties in accordance with required specifications, should had been corrected or
replaced/repaired during the warranty period.
Page 33 PAO-2018-01
Findings on after sales

services
Crucial provisions on Further review of the contracts disclosed that while the Supplier of
after sales services, Rosenbauer had guaranteed the availability of spare parts of the fire trucks for
including availability of a period of ten years from the effective date of the contract, no specific
spare parts included in provision on after-sales services was provided in the contract on the
procurement of Jiangte fire trucks. As a result, BFP personnel complained the
the Rosenbauer
unavailability of parts/consumables from local automotive supply stores for
contracts but not in Jiangte fire trucks as well as the high cost of maintenance and parts for
Jiangte contracts Rosenbauer fire trucks.
Table 26: Warranty Provisions on the Procurement of Fire Trucks

ROSENBAUER JIANGTE
Warranty Warranty
 That equipment sold will be brand new  Guaranteed in favor of BFP against
 Free from defects in materials and defaults and defects
workmanship during warranty period  Warranty period is two (2) years from
 Will function in conformity with the date of acceptance or upon reaching
Specifications set 200,000 km mileage whichever comes
 Warranty period is one (1) year from first
the date of Final Certificate of  The obligation for warranty shall be
Acceptance of the Equipment covered, at the option of the JV, by
 During the period, any and all either retention money or special bank
defective equipment and guarantee equivalent to at least 10 per
components/parts covered and cent of the contract price and will be
delivered shall be replaced/repaired release after lapse of the period
free-of-charge and as expediently as
possible
 Furnish all parts and corrective
services covered on free-of-charge
basis including transportation and
charges for import to the Philippines
Source: Supply Contracts
Inquiry by the audit team on the after sales services of the acquired fire trucks
disclosed that there are sources of spare parts and services but repair and
maintenance budget is limited only to ₱10,000 per quarter. It was added that
although BFP is currently requesting for increasing budget for repair and
maintenance to ₱20,000 per quarter, the amount is still not enough to cover
the periodic maintenance alone. BFP Management admitted that no amount
of maintenance can prolong the useful life of Jiangte fire trucks. For
Rosenbauer fire trucks, periodic maintenance is lacking due to its high cost
and service centers are very few.
Page 34 PAO-2018-01
Findings on fire truck

maintenance
BFP does not conduct Inquiries with the Motor Vehicle Section of the BFP disclosed that no regular
regular maintenance periodic maintenance checks were performed on new fire trucks and problems
checks on its fire trucks were reported only when they occurred. With regard to old fire trucks, repairs
were done by automotive shops available. Moreover, during personnel
reshuffle of fire truck operator/drivers, no technical training was conducted for
the next operator on the proper care/maintenance of fire trucks as well as
basic trouble shooting.
Table 27: Total Repair Costs, Average Repair Costs and Average Age of
Fire Trucks
Total Repairs Average Number of Fire
Number of Average
Regions (Jan 2015- Repair Cost/ Trucks with
Fire Trucks Age
Mar 2018) Fire Truck Acquired Date
NCR ₱22,216,495 55 ₱403,936 42 19
CAR 10,579,242 29 364,801 22 17
REGION I 14,953,735 37 404,155 32 19
REGION II 10,824,246 43 251,727 36 14
REGION III 25,644,034 75 341,920 63 20
REGION IV-A 10,621,933 38 279,525 32 16
REGION IV-B 13,968,762 43 324,855 31 16
REGION V 17,278,706 42 367,632 32 16
REGION VI 22,174,052 30 739,135 21 15
REGION VII 5,534,350 18 307,464 16 23
REGION VIII 16,941,303 40 423,533 28 17
REGION IX 14,114,995 38 371,447 29 16
REGION X 10,892,059 32 340,377 25 19
REGION XI 16,429,885 34 483,232 32 19
REGION XII 10,729,646 30 357,655 25 17
CARAGA 15,028,712 45 333,971 36 20
ARMM 9,215,111 21 438,815 4 20
NATIONWIDE ₱247,147,266 650 ₱380,227 506 18
BFP have been BFP has been spending significantly on the maintenance costs for old fire
spending significantly trucks. Due to the lack of fire trucks, the BFP is forced to use aged units in
on the maintenance order to meet the fire services needs of some areas. In the Detailed Summary
costs for old fire trucks of Major Repairs provided by the BFP-NHQ, significant repair costs of at least
₱247.15 million for 650 trucks were incurred for the period January 2015 to
March 2018. The average repair cost of a fire truck per region ranged from
₱251,727 to ₱739,135 or a BFP-wide average repair cost of ₱380,227 per fire
truck (Table 27). Contributing heavily to the repair costs were the costs to
maintain old fire trucks with an average age of at least 18 years. BFP could
not disposed these fire trucks even if they are beyond economic repair. The
amount did not include charges to the fire station's petty cash fund for minor
repairs and spare parts replaced from time to time and fund augmentation from
LGUs concerned.
Page 35 PAO-2018-01
Findings on the Self-

Contained Breathing
Apparatus
BFP could not procure Based on the Modernization Program’s financial requirement, the target
enough SCBA due to number of fire trucks to be acquired was 1,900 units under SEP and SUMP
limited funding components at a total cost of ₱24.02 billion inclusive of 7,600 units SCBAs
and other basic firefighting accessories such as hoses, nozzles, pick axe,
ladder, etc. (Table 28).
Table 28: BFP Modernization Program’s Target for SCBA

Fire truck Inclusive of 4
Quantity Amount SCBA per fire
Program's Target
(in million) truck
(a) (b = a * 4)
SEP
Water Pumper Fire
truck PTO (1,000 gals 692 ₱8,532.60 2,768
capacity)
Sub-total for SEP 692 8,532.60 2,768
SUMP:
Type A
(1) Aerial Ladder Fire
20 1,445.27 80
truck PTO
(2) Tanker Fire truck
PTO (2,500 gals 20 546.21 80
capacity)
(3) Water Pumper Fire
truck PTO (1,000 gals 40 668.74 160
capacity)
Type B
41 2,962.81 164
truck PTO
truck PTO (1,000 gals 82 1,164.52 328
capacity)
Type C
Water Pumper Fire
truck PTO (1,000 gals 180 2,556.27 720
capacity)
Type D
Water Pumper Fire
truck PTO (1,000 gals 432 6,135.04 1,728
capacity)
Type E
Water Pumper Fire
truck PTO (1,000 gals 393 5.58 1,572
capacity)
Sub-total for SUMP 1,208 15,484.46 4,832
GRAND TOTAL 1,900 ₱24,017.05 7,600
Source: BFP
Based on the Modernization Program’s WPP in 2010, the 1,486 serviceable

fire trucks would require a total of 5,944 units of SCBAs and the BFP had only
161 serviceable units in its inventory, thus the shortage of 5,783 units needed
to be procured for the existing fire trucks.
Review of the APPs and related documents revealed that the BFP
programmed the procurement of 5,035 units of SCBA amounting to ₱561.31
million from 2011 to 2017. It was noted that savings from 2011 to 2014
Page 36 PAO-2018-01
aggregating to ₱93.02 million was utilized to purchase additional 989 units of

SCBA bringing the total procurement of SCBA to 6,024 units (Table 29).
Table 29: Actual Quantity of SCBA Budgeted/Programmed from 2011-

2017
GAA/Programmed Savings/Unprogrammed Total No. of
Year Units to be
No. of Amount No. of Amount
procured
Units (in million) Units (in million)
2011 448 ₱72.02 140 ₱21.31 588
2012 180 21.33 - - 180
2013 1,180 137.22 - - 1,180
1,248 145.56 - - 1,248
2014 &
2015 506 59.96 - - 506
- - 849 71.71 849
2016 55.58 - -
1,473 1,473
2017 69.64 - -
Total 5,035 ₱561.31 989 ₱93.02 6,024
Source: BFP
The quantity programmed for procurement of SCBA for CYs 2011 to 2017 was
enough to cover the requirement of existing fire trucks before the
implementation of the Modernization Program. Due to limited funding, SCBA
requirements of newly acquired fire trucks were not programmed for
procurement.
The same with the procurement of fire stations and fire trucks, procurement of
The same with the SCBA was transferred to DBM-PS and PITC, however, BFP still failed to meet
procurement of fire its target. BFP took note on the delays it incurred during its procurement of
stations and fire trucks, SCBA in CYs 2012 and 2014. To avoid reversion, BFP decided to secure the
procurement of SCBA services of DBM-PS. Similarly for 2016 allotments, BFP also secured the
was transferred to DBM- services of PITC for the procurement of SCBA. Of the ₱364.07 million
PS and PITC but BFP transferred to DBM-PS, only ₱133.82 million worth of SCBAs was delivered
still failed to meet its from funds transferred in 2015 and no delivery was made on ₱158.55 million
target fund transfers in 2013. Also, no delivery was received on the fund transfer
amounting to ₱125.22 million to PITC in 2017 (Table 30).
Table 30: Status of Fund Transfer to DBM-PS and PITC

Undelivered
Fund Transfer per Agency Procurement/Outsourcing Completed/Delivered Delay
as of June 30,
Request as of June 30, 2018 from
Year 2018
date of
APR/AOR No of Amount No of Amount Date of No of transfer
Agency Date % %
No. Units (in million) Units (in million) Delivery Units
4 yrs. &
2012 13-03225 12/17/2013 180 ₱21.33 - - 0% - 180 100%
6 mos.
4 yrs. &
2013 13-03295 12/26/2013 1,180 137.22 - - 0% - 1,180 100%
6 mos.
DBM-PS 1,248 145.56 1,248 100% 8/29/2017; - - 1 yr. & 9
15-0268S 12/29/2015 ₱133.82 9/5/2017;
2014 & 506 59.96 506 100% - - mos.
9/25/2017
2015
Utilization
1/23/2018 849 71.71 - - 0% - 849 100%
of savings
Sub-total 3,963 ₱364.07 1,754 ₱133.82 44% 2,209 56%
2016 not 55.58 - - -
PITC 7/3/2017 1,473 0% 1,473 100% 1 yr.
2017 indicated 69.64 - - -
Sub-total 1,473 ₱125.22 - - 0% 1,473 100%
Source: COA Analysis of BFP information
Page 37 PAO-2018-01
Delays in the delivery Of the 6,024 units of SCBA procured from 2011 to 2017, only 2,342 units or
of SCBA procured 39 per cent were delivered to BFP. The delivery is composed of 588 units of
through DBM-PS and SCBAs procured by BFP in 2011 and the 1,754 units procured through DBM-
PITC PS in 2015. Procurement and deliveries of units outsourced to DBM-PS took
one year and nine months to complete. Four and a half years after fund
transfers, DBM-PS had not delivered the 1,360 units ordered in 2013.
Likewise, PITC had not delivered the 1,473 units ordered in 2017 or more than
a year ago and post qualification of bidders was ongoing as of date of audit.
As can be observed from the figure below, from CYs 2011-2018, the actual
number of serviceable SCBA is significantly less than the number of SCBA the
firefighters actually need (Figure 16). Shortage in the number of SCBA based
on the existing fire trucks stood at 7,027 units or 77 per cent as of June 30,
2018 compared to 6,377 units or 96 per cent in 2012. The lack of serviceable
SCBA resulted in 1,756 fire trucks which were not fully equipped with the
prescribed number of SCBA, thus compromising the safety of firefighters and
impacting on the BFP’s efficiency and effectiveness in fire suppression
activities.
Figure 16: Ideal Number of SCBA based on the Current Number of Fire
Trucks vs. Actual Number of Serviceable SCBA
10,000 2,500
9,000
8,000 2,000
No. of Firetruck
7,000
No. of SCBA
6,000 7,026 7,027 1,500

5,000 7,158 8,205 (77%)
6,193 (91%) (78%)
4,000 6,377 6,346 (91%) 1,000
3,000 (96%) (92%) (88%)
2,000 500
1,000
- -
1st
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Sem.
2018
Ideal No. SCBA 6,676 6,904 7,040 7,928 9,012 8,964 9,144
No. of serviceable SCBA 299 558 847 770 807 1,938 2,117
No. of Firetruck 1,669 1,726 1,760 1,982 2,253 2,241 2,286
Ideal No. SCBA No. of serviceable SCBA No. of Firetruck
Findings on the
Personal Protective
Equipment
Section 56 of RA No. 6975 states the establishment of at least one (1) fire
station with adequate personnel, firefighting facilities and equipment in every
provincial capital, city and municipality. 19 The international standard for
prescribing PPE requires that firemen assigned in fire suppression,
Emergency Medical Services and rescue operations and investigation should
be provided with a complete set of PPE (i.e. fire helmets, fire coats, fire
trousers, fire boots and gloves) individually to ensure their safety during
firefighting and rescue operations. PPE have an average useful life of three
(3) years due to wear and tear and are therefore required to be replaced with
new sets every three (3) years.
19
Supra, note 2, section 56
Page 38 PAO-2018-01
The target on the complete sets of PPE for procurement was derived using
the manpower complement needed for the targeted fire stations and sub-
stations to be constructed and fire trucks to be acquired per program
component. The ideal manpower complement for each fire station is one (1)
Station Commander and at least fourteen (14) fire personnel to man each of
the fire truck working at two (2) shifts per day. Thus, the target numbers of fire
personnel required under SEP and SUMP reached 10,380 and 17,888,
respectively, or a total of 28,268 operations personnel (Table 31). With the
ideal operation personnel-to-PPE ratio of 1:1, the target number of complete
sets of PPE was also equivalent to 28,268 at the end of the program.
Table 31: BFP Modernization Program’s Target for PPE

Target Manpower Complement
Target no. of
No. of ideal No. of ideal Total target no.
No. of fire No. of complete set of
Station Operation of Operations
Program station/ fire PPE based on the
Commander Personnel Personnel (OP)
sub-station truck target no. of OP
per fire station per fire truck
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)=(a*c)+(b*d) (f=e)
SEP 692 692 1 14 10,380 10,380
SUMP:
Type A
Fire station/sub-station 20 - 1 - 20 20
- 20 - 14 280 280
truck PTO
(2) Tanker Fire truck PTO
- 20 - 14 280 280
(2,500 gals capacity)
truck PTO (1,000 gals - 40 - 14 560 560
capacity)
Type B
- 41 - 14 574 574
truck PTO
truck PTO (1,000 gals - 82 - 14 1,148 1,148
capacity)
Type C
Water Pumper Fire truck
PTO (1,000 gals capacity) - 180 - 14 2,520 2,520
Type D
- 432 - 14 6,048 6,048
PTO (1,000 gals capacity)
Type E
- 393 - 14 5,502 5,502
PTO (1,000 gals capacity)
Sub-total for SUMP 976 1,208 17,888 17,888
GRAND TOTAL 1,668 1,900 28,268 28,268
Source: BFP
Page 39 PAO-2018-01
The Modernization Program’s WPP in 2010 disclosed that only 6,862 sets of
PPE were available for the 14,608 uniformed personnel assigned in
operations or only 47 per cent at any given time were fully equipped with
complete sets of PPE. As such, there was an urgent need to procure 7,746
sets of PPE to individually equip the existing personnel assigned in
operations. Additional construction of fire stations and acquisition of fire trucks
matched with the required manpower complement entail procurement of
corresponding sets of PPE to fully equip the fire operations personnel.
Specifically for CYs 2011 to 2017, the BFP should procure 7,266 and 8,346
complete sets of PPE amounting to ₱452.38 million and ₱519.65 million for
SEP and SUMP respectively, or a total of 15,610 sets for ₱972.04 million
(Table 32).
Table 32: BFP Modernization Program’s Target and Financial

Requirements from 2011-2017 for PPE
SEP SUMP Total
No. of No. of No. of
Year Amount Amount Amount
Complete Complete Complete
(in million) (in million) (in million)
sets of PPE sets of PPE sets of PPE
2011 1,038 ₱62.24 1,192 ₱71.50 2,230 ₱133.74
2012 1,038 63.02 1,192 72.39 2,230 135.41
2013 1,038 63.81 1,192 73.30 2,230 137.11
2014 1,038 64.61 1,192 74.21 2,230 138.82
2015 1,038 65.41 1,192 75.14 2,230 140.56
2016 1,038 66.23 1,192 76.08 2,230 142.31
2017 1,038 67.06 1,192 77.03 2,230 144.09
Total 7,266 ₱452.38 8,346 ₱519.65 15,610 ₱972.04
Source: BFP
In spite of the limited The audit team found that only ₱141.51 million was allotted/budgeted for the
resources, the BFP still procurement of 3,425 sets of PPE or 15 per cent of the estimated financial
failed to fully utilize its resources of ₱972.04 million for 15,610 sets of PPE targeted per WPP (Table
budget for PPE 33). Out of which, only ₱141.25 million was utilized in CY 2011 to CY 2014
reverting the balance of ₱256,236 to the BTr at the end of 2014.
Table 33: Comparison of Program’s Targets and Actual Quantity of PPE

Budgeted/Programmed from 2011-2017
Percentage of
Program's Target Allotment/Programmed
Programmed to Target
Year No. of No. of No. of
Amount Amount Amount
complete complete complete
(in million) (in million) (in million)
sets of PPE sets of PPE sets of PPE
2011 2,230 133.74 625 29.98 28% 22%
2012 2,230 135.41 800 30.00 35% 22%
2013 2,230 137.11 800 32.61 35% 24%
2014 2,230 138.82 1,200 48.92 54% 35%
2015 2,230 140.56 - - - -
2016 2,230 142.31 - - - -
2017 2,230 144.09 - - - -
Total 15,610 972.04 3,425 141.51 22% 15%
Page 40 PAO-2018-01
BFP tried to BFP tried to decentralize the procurement of PPE to the regions, however, the
decentralize the BFP-NHQ does not have a mechanism to monitor its efficiency. Hence, there
procurement of PPE to is no data to say whether or not such mode is effective. As seen in Table 33,
the BFP-NHQ did not program any procurement of PPE for the period 2015-
the regions but there is
2017 due to incomplete/undelivered items from prior years’ procurement. The
no data to say whether BFP-Budget Division informed the audit team that the procurement of
or not such mode is complete set of PPE was decentralized to BFP ROs to be sourced from their
effective respective maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE) budget
provided that the amount per unit cost will be ₱15,000 and below. However,
according to BFP, the NHQ does not receive data/report as to the
effectiveness or efficiency of the decentralization.
BFP also secured the Consistent with its general strategy of outsourcing procurement, the BFP
services of DBM-PS transferred to DBM-PS a total of ₱108.18 million for the procurement of PPE
and PITC in the funded under CYs 2012 to 2014 (Table 34). In outsourcing the procurement
of PPE, the BFP intended to avoid the reversion of ₱30 million from its 2012
procurement of PPE,
allotment and ₱45.57 million from its 2014 allotment to the BTr. For the 2013
however, just like the allotment of ₱32.61 million, BFP outsourced its procurement before the year
other items, its budget ended. The audit team also found that savings from the public bidding
for PPE was not also conducted by DBM-PS were utilized to purchase additional 4,801 units of PPE
fully utilized amounting to ₱23.98 million sourced from CY 2010 to CY 2014 funds.
Table 34: Status of Fund Transfer to DBM-PS

Undelivered
Delivered
Fund Transfer per Agency Procurement/Outsourcing Request as of June 30, Delay from
as of June 30, 2018
Year Agency 2018 date of
APR/ Date of Amount Amount Date of transfer
Item Qty Unit Qty Quantity
AOR No. Transfer (in million) (in million) Delivery
Fire Helmet 800 pcs ₱5.05 800 ₱5.05 2015 - -
Fire Gloves 800 pairs 2.05 800 2.05 2015 - -
13-
2012 12/17/2013 Fire Coats 4 yrs. & 6
03225 800 sets 19.13 - - - 800
and Trousers mos.
Fire Boots 800 pairs 3.77 800 3.77 2015 - -
Fire Helmet 800 pcs 5.49 800 5.49 2015 - -
Fire Coats 4 yrs. & 6
DBM-PS 13- 800 sets 20.79 - - - 800
2013 12/27/2013 and Trousers mos.
03295
Fire Gloves 800 pairs 2.23 800 2.23 2015 - -
Fire Boots 800 pairs 4.10 800 4.10 2015 - -
Fire Helmet 1,200 pcs 8.24 1,085 6.53 4/26/2017 115
15- 2 yrs. & 6
2014 12/29/2015 Fire Coats 1,200 sets 31.18 - - - 1,200
021095 and Trousers mos.
Fire Boots 1,200 pairs 6.15 1,150 4.55 6/15/2017 50
Sub-total 10,000 units ₱108.18 7,035 ₱33.77 2,965
Fire Helmet 162 pcs ₱0.84 162 ₱0.84 11/21/2013 - -
Fire Gloves 162 pairs 0.37 162 0.37 4/7/2014 - -
2011 2012 Fire Coats
162 sets 3.34 162 3.34 11/27/2013 - -
and Trousers
Fire Boots 162 pairs 0.64 162 0.64 11/14/2013 - -
Fire Helmet 35 pcs 0.25 - - - 35
Utilization
DBM-PS of savings Fire Gloves 35 pairs 0.10 - - - 35
2 yrs. & 2
4/19/2016 Fire Coats
2015 35 sets 0.94 - - - 35 mos.
and Trousers
&
Fire Boots 35 pairs 0.19 - - - 35
2016
Fire Helmet 1,338 pcs 8.52 - - - 1,338 -
8/29/2017 Fire Gloves 1,337 pairs 3.19 - - - 1,337 -
Fire Boots 1,338 pairs 5.6 - - - 1,338 -
Sub-total 4,801 units ₱23.98 648 ₱5.19 4,153
Total 14,801 units 7,683 7,118
Source: BFP
Page 41 PAO-2018-01
Out of the ₱108.18 million, only ₱38.96 million worth of PPE were delivered
by DBM-PS. Furthermore, the PPE procured did not include fire coats and
trousers. Thus, BFP was not able to equip its fire personnel with complete sets
of PPE.
BFP resorted to BFP resorted to outsourcing because of the delays it incurred when it
outsourcing because of conducted procurement on its own. However, the delay incurred got even
the delays it incurred worse when it transferred the responsibility to the DBM-PS. The BFP started
when it conducted the procurement of 625 sets of PPE by conducting a bidding on October 25,
2011. Deliveries of the procured PPE were supposed to be completed on May
procurement on its 12-16, 2012 but were actually delivered on June 6, 2012 to September 10,
own. However, the 2012. Delays in the deliveries ranged from 21-121 days as shown in Table 35.
delay incurred got
even worse when it The outsourcing of the procurement of PPE is covered by a MOA executed by
transferred the and between the BFP and DBM-PS on October 08, 2015. Section 53.6 of the
responsibility to the IRR of RA No. 9184 was cited as basis of the MOA.20 It also provided that the
DBM-PS funding commitment by the BFP and its submission of documentary
requirements shall be a sufficient basis by the procurement agent to
commence procurement activities under APR.
Table 35: Delays in the Procurement of 625 Sets of PPE

Expected No. of
Notice to Actual
Particulars Awarded to Term Delivery/ Days
Proceed Delivery
Completion Delayed
Fire boots Panpisco
1/17/2012 120 5/16/2012 6/6/2012 21
(625 pairs) Technologies
Fire gloves
Palmer Asia 1/13/2012 120 5/12/2012 6/4/2012 23
(625 pairs)
Fire helmet Panpisco
1/13/2012 120 5/12/2012 6/11/2012 30
(625 pcs.) Technologies
Panpisco
Fire coats
Tech. Inc &
and trousers 1/13/2012 120 5/12/2012 9/10/2012 121
Sancheong
(625 sets)
Co. Ltd. (JV)
Source: BFP
As mentioned in the previous discussions, no procurement activity was

conducted for allotments covered in CY 2012 as the full amount of ₱30 million
was transferred to DBM-PS on December 17, 2013. Similarly for the CY 2014
funding, ₱45.57 million was transferred to DBM-PS on December 29, 2015.
Also as discussed earlier, the transfers prevented the reversion of these
allotments even after being unutilized for almost two years. The problem in
outsourcing the procurement of PPE to the DBM-PS is that there is no
timeframe for DBM-PS to complete the delivery of the ordered PPE. As of
audit date, there were delays ranging from 2.5 to 4.5 years from the dates of
the fund transfers.
20
Procurement Agent. In order to hasten project implementation, Procuring Entities
which may not have the proficiency or capability to undertake a particular procurement,
as determined by the HoPE concerned, may request other GOP agencies to undertake
such procurement for them, or at their option, recruit and hire consultants or
procurement agents to assist them directly and/or train their staff in the management of
the procurement function.
Page 42 PAO-2018-01
The annual increase in One of the priorities of BFP is the hiring of operation personnel, who will man
personnel was not the fire trucks during fire suppression operations. As a result, the number of
supported by the fire operations personnel increased annually. However, the annual increase
in personnel was not supported by the required increase in the number of
required increase in the
complete sets of PPE. Based on the nationwide data provided by the BFP
number of complete from 3rd quarter of CY 2013 up to 1st semester of CY 2018, gaps between the
sets of PPE number of personnel and the complete sets of PPE ranged from 6,552 to
13,119 or 55 to 64 per cent of the said personnel had no complete sets of PPE
(Figure 17). On a per regional basis, NCR had the highest shortage of
complete sets of PPE at 1,400 sets for its 2,199 fire operations personnel.
Figure 17: BFP Operations Personnel vs. Complete Set of Serviceable

PPE
25,000
20,000
15,000 13,119
12,957 (64%)
10,980 11,637 (67%)
(66%) (64%)
7,164
10,000 6,552
(55%)
(55%)
5,000
-
3rd Qtr. CY 2014 CY 2015 CY 2016 CY 2017 1st
2013 Sem.
2018
No. Fire Operations Personnel 11,919 12,930 16,751 18,045 19,479 20,411
No. of complete set of PPE 5,367 5,766 5,771 6,408 6,522 7,292
During our ocular inspection from March to June 2018, it was observed that
due to shortage of PPE, operations personnel were sharing the use of PPE
and even worn-out PPE are still being used (Figure 18). Of the 138
respondents on the survey conducted by the audit team, 38 per cent
complained of insufficient firefighting apparatus and PPE. The shortages in
PPE and other firefighting equipment (Figure 19) will not help improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of BFP in providing fire protection services and
will leave their personnel vulnerable to physical injuries and even loss of life
during fire suppression activities.
Page 43 PAO-2018-01
Figure 18: Example of Worn-out Fire Coats, Fire Trousers and Fire Boots, March-June 2018
Sampaloc Fire Sub- San Lazaro District Fire Congress Fire Sub- Maco Fire Station,
Station, Manila Station, Manila Station, Quezon City Compostela Valley
Figure 19: Shortages of PPE and SCBA in 126 Fire Stations
Findings on the
Number of Fire
Personnel
BFP lacks fire One of the performance indicators used to determine whether or not BFP
personnel achieved its goal to modernize and upgrade the government’s firefighting
capability is sufficiency of personnel to man the fire trucks. Ideally, the BFP
needs fourteen (14) firemen working on two (2) shifts per day to man each fire
truck. A team is composed of one (1) fire lieutenant and/or crew supervisor,
one (1) fire truck driver/pump operator, two (2) nozzlemen, two (2)
linemen/hosemen and one (1) reserved firefighter. According to PD No. 1184
“in large/small cities or municipalities the minimum fireman-to-population ratio
shall be one fireman for every two thousand inhabitant” or 1:2,000 inhabitant.”
As of June 30, 2018, the BFP had a total of 20,411 operations personnel
assigned to man 2,286 units of fire trucks. Based on the 14 personnel
requirement per fire truck, BFP needed 32,004 personnel. It has a shortage of
11,593 operations personnel, which is equivalent to 36 per cent of the total
manning requirement (Table 36). Further acquisition of fire trucks without
Page 44 PAO-2018-01
hiring additional personnel would aggravate the problem on personnel

shortage considering that newly constructed fire stations also need personnel.
Table 36: Shortage of Personnel as of June 30, 2018

Current Ideal Ratio
(1 Fire Truck : 14 Operations Personnel)
Regions No. of
No. of Fire Required Shortage
operations
truck (1:14) (1:14)
personnel
Region 1 146 2,044 1,277 767
Region 2 109 1,526 1,010 516
Region 3 215 3,010 1,589 1,421
Region 4-A 235 3,290 1,770 1,520
Region 4-B 91 1,274 681 593
Region 5 162 2,268 1,366 902
Region 6 203 2,842 1,580 1,262
Region 7 181 2,534 1,328 1,206
Region 8 198 2,772 1,518 1,254
Region 9 98 1,372 1,119 253
Region 10 113 1,582 1,036 546
Region 11 99 1,386 1,002 384
Region 12 99 1,386 743 643
ARMM 34 476 700 (224)
CAR 68 952 653 299
CARAGA 102 1,428 649 779
NCR 133 1,862 2,390 (528)
Total >> 2,286 32,004 20,411 11,593
Ratio >> 100% 64% 36%
Source: BFP
In its validation, the audit team found that there was a shortage in personnel
totaling 1,911 or 35 per cent in 126 fire stations in the seven (7) regions visited.
One of the causes of personnel shortage is the limited number of DBM
approved plantilla positions. For CYs 2014-2016, the DBM authorized 1,200
Fire Officer 1 (FO1) personnel to be distributed nationwide and 2,000 for CYs
2017 and 2018. This additional personnel addressed only 17 per cent of the
current personnel shortage.
Another reason for the shortage of field personnel is the absence of Fire Basic
Recruit Course (FBRC) training for new recruits. FBRC training is a pre-
requisite for the deployment of personnel to fire suppression operation. It
provides the new recruits with the basic knowledge and skills necessary in
achieving minimum standards of personnel competence. As at the end of
2017, there were 2,773 personnel still without FBRC training because the
National Fire Training Institute (NFTI), as administrator of the course, could
not accommodate all newly hired personnel due to lack of trainers, quarters
and equipment. The BFP explained that in order to address these constraints,
the NFTI created satellite classes for FBRC in four regions but still could not
accommodate all new hired personnel. Table 37 shows the detailed analysis
of the personnel without FBRC training.
Page 45 PAO-2018-01
Table 37: Hired and Trained FO1 From 2011–2017

Year Hired Trained Untrained
2011 456 1,072 -
2012 485 607 -
2013 1,613 581 1,032
2014 2,228 2,004 224
2015 2,789 638 2,151
2016 1,667 2,263 -596
2017 2,476 2,514 -38
Total 11,714 9,679 2,773
Source: BFP
As shown above, in CYs 2011 to 2012, the number of trained personnel

exceeded the number of hired personnel. This is due to the inclusion of
untrained personnel from previous years.
The insufficiency of fire personnel affects the delivery of services such as

collection of fire codes fees, conduct of trainings/seminars in different
agencies or any public or private establishments, and quick response to fire
incidence. Delay or slow response in the suppression of fire may increase cost
of fire damages and number of casualties.
The percentage of Analysis of personnel complement from CY 2011 to 1st semester of CY 2018
women personnel in disclosed that the percentage of women to total personnel posted a continuous
BFP continuously increase from 15 per cent in 2011 to 24 per cent in 2018 (Figure 20) which
could be attributed to BFP’s hiring policies giving equal opportunity in
increased due to hiring
employment and promotion. In the hiring of female personnel, a lower height
policies giving both requirement (at least 5’2” for female and 5’4” for male) and lower rating for
sexes equal opportunity physical agility test (at least 50 per cent for female and 70 per cent for male)
in employment and were adopted. In all other requirements, both sexes are required to possess
promotion the minimum qualifications for the position applied for.
This is consistent with RA No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which
provides that the State, private sector, society in general, and all individuals
shall contribute to the recognition, respect, and promotion of the rights of
women in all spheres, including their rights to substantive equality and non-
discrimination. RA No. 9710 further provides that women in the military, police,
and other similar services shall be provided with the same right to employment
as men on equal conditions.21
Figure 20: Percentage of Hired Personnel from 2011-2018

100.0% 84.9% 84.4% 81.1% 80.1% 78.3% 77.4% 76.3% 75.7%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0% 18.9% 19.9% 21.7% 22.6% 23.7% 24.3%
15.1% 15.6%
20.0%
0.0%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Male Female
Source: BFP
21
RA No. 9710 also known as “The Magna Carta of Women”, Chapter 4, Section 15
Page 46 PAO-2018-01
Further analysis revealed significant rise in the number of female officers from
2011 to 2018 by 61 per cent compared to a drop of 5 per cent on male officers.
On non-officers, female increased by 140 per cent while male increased by
32 per cent (Table 38).
Table 38: Comparison of Uniformed Personnel Positions in 2011 and

2018
2011 As of June 2018 Increase/(Decrease)
Ranks
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Male Female
Dir 1 1 1 1 - - 0% 0%
CSupt 7 1 8 8 8 1 (1) 14% -100%
Ssupt 27 3 30 20 3 23 (7) - -26% 0%
Supt 71 6 77 98 24 122 27 18 38% 300%
Cinsp 151 25 176 143 41 184 (8) 16 -5% 64%
Sinsp 252 38 290 235 100 335 (17) 62 -7% 163%
Insp 355 87 442 313 90 403 (42) 3 -12% 3%
Total
864 160 1,024 818 258 1,076 (46) 98 -5% 61%
Officers
SFO4 411 8 419 563 35 598 152 27 37% 338%
SFO3 485 18 503 704 102 806 219 84 45% 467%
SFO2 1,042 34 1,076 1,355 243 1,598 313 209 30% 615%
SFO1 1,701 94 1,795 1,963 520 2,483 262 426 15% 453%
FO3 2,094 192 2,286 2,126 701 2,827 32 509 2% 265%
FO2 2,155 347 2,502 2,323 906 3,229 168 559 8% 161%
FO1 4,941 1,581 6,522 7,894 2,939 10,833 2,953 1,358 60% 86%
Total Non-
12,829 2,274 15,103 16,928 5,446 22,374 4,099 3,172 32% 140%
officers
Total
Uniformed 13,693 2,434 16,127 17,746 5,704 23,450 4,053 3,270 30% 134%
Personnel
Source: BFP
Page 47 PAO-2018-01
The BFP does not

generate enough data
to determine the
extent to which the
Modernization
Program safeguarded
the populace from the
hazards of destructive
fire
BFP data showed that the populace experienced less devastation from
the incidence of fires. While the Philippines experienced a steady
increase of fire incidence from 2011 to 2016 (and a significant dip in
2017), incidence of deaths and injuries remained below the threshold
while incidence of property damages has been on a steady decline
except in 2017. Existing BFP data, however, do not show direct
correlation between the Modernization Program and the trends. This is
mainly due to the lack of reports, which contain performance indicators
and relevant information on the effects of the Modernization Program. In
fact, data gathered by the audit team on the conditions of the responding
fire trucks and the participation of key stakeholders in fire prevention
and suppression activities say otherwise.
The Philippine Government had adopted Performance-Informed Budgeting

(PIB) for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 GAA as the initial step towards making the
budget a more comprehensible, transparent and accountable document by
making available both financial and non-financial performance information. To
further enhance the FY 2014 PIB, outcome-based PIB was adopted for FY
2015 Budget through National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 552 dated February
19, 2014. Under the outcome-based PIB, development and enhancement of
organizational outcomes and crafting of their respective performance
indicators had provided the Congress, the public and other stakeholders a
clearer picture of the short- to medium-term benefits of the Agencies’ delivery
of their respective mandated outputs.22 Table 39 shows the BFP’s
performance indicators based on the outcome-based PIB.
Table 39: Performance Indicators per NEP

Organizational Outcomes/
Targets
Performance Indicators
Protection of communities from destructive fires and related emergencies improved
Fire incidents 1 fire incident for every 10,000 population
Prevention of loss of life 1 loss of life for every 200,000 population
Prevention of injuries 1 person injured for every 100,000 population
Source: GAA, NEP from CYs 2015-2017
22
NBC No. 552, February 19, 2014, § 1 (1)
Page 48 PAO-2018-01
Findings on fire-related
statistics
The number of fire The number of fire incidence in the Philippines has been steadily increasing
incidence in the since 2013 (except in 2017). Statistical analysis of the data for CYs 2011-2017
Philippines has been disclosed that for the first two years during CYs 2011-2012, reported number
steadily increasing of fire incidence was below threshold, however, starting CY 2013 the number
of fire incidence was consistently increasing by 6 per cent (Figure 21).
since 2013 (except in
2017)
Figure 21: Statistic of Fire Incidence from CYs 2011-2017
Fire Incidence 25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Threshold Actual
Source: Consolidated Fire Incident Report Nationwide, CYs 2011-2017
BFP had set its fire incidence threshold at 1 incident for every 10,000
population. The threshhold is based on the BFP’s organizational outcomes for
the protection of communities from destructive fires and related emergencies.
As seen in Figure 21, fire incidence has been above the threshold for the most
part of 2013 to 2017.
The number of The number of casualties due to fire consistently remained below the
casualties due to fire threshold. According to BFP’s organizational outcomes for the protection of
consistently remained communities from destructive fires and related emergencies, the threshold for
below the threshold casualties is 1 loss of life for every 200,000 population.
Figure 22: Statistics of Casualties for CYs 2011-2017

600
500
Casualties
400
300
200
100
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Threshold 474 483 491 499 508 516 525
Actual 219 252 244 263 356 285 305
Threshold Actual
Source Consolidated Fire Incident Report Nationwide, CYs 2011-2017
Page 49 PAO-2018-01
The number of persons The number of persons injured due to fire consistently remained barely below
injured due to fire the threshold. According to BFP’s organizational outcomes for the protection
consistently remained of communities from destructive fires and related emergencies, the threshold
for injuries is 1 person injured for every 100,000 population.
barely below the
threshold
Figure 23: Statistics of Persons Injured for CYs 2011-2017
1,200
1,000
Persons Injured
800
600
400
200
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Threshold 948 965 982 999 1,016 1,032 1,049
Actual 719 745 774 798 838 987 889
Threshold Actual
Source Consolidated Fire Incident Report Nationwide, CYs 2011-2017
Property Damages For the first three years of the implementation of the Modernization Program,
caused by fire seem average property damages caused by fire remained consistently high. Based
to be declining from on the trend, it seems to be declining from CYs 2014-2016 (Figure 24).
2014 -2016
Figure 24: Annual Average Property Damage Caused By Fire for CYs
2011-2017
600,000
500,000
Property Damage
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Threshold 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000
Actual 453,384 424,783 444,341 207,435 210,940 159,628 553,744
Source Consolidated Fire incident Report Nationwide, CYs 2011-2017
Actual Property BFP computes the average property damages by dividing the total amount of
Damages cost the property damages by the number of fire incidences.
Philippines the
amount ranging from Actual Property Damages
= Average Property Damages
Fire Incidences
three to eight Billion
Pesos Using this formula, actual damages caused by fire annually would cost billions
of pesos. For example in 2016, the number of fire incidences in the Philippines
is 19,292 based on Figure 21 with average property damage of ₱159,628.
Using the formula, the actual property damages incurred by the Philippines is
approximately ₱3 billion for CY 2016 and almost ₱8 billion for CY 2017.
Page 50 PAO-2018-01
In its organizational outcomes for the protection of communities from

destructive fires and related emergencies, BFP set the property damage
threshold at ₱300,000 maximum for any given fire occurrence. Analysis of
pertinent data revealed that the annual average property damage exceeded
the threshold four times within the period covered by the audit. But in the years
that the trend was on a decline, property damages also went below the
threshold.
Problems with Analysis of report on the causes and types of occupancy commonly affected
electrical connections by fire incidents during CYs 2011–2017 revealed that structural type of
is the leading cause occupancy was the most affected by fire incidents which are mostly residential
of fire with 56 per cent share of the total incidents. Occupancy was classified into
three types, namely, a) Structural; b) Non Structural; and c) Vehicular, with
problems on electrical connections identified as the leading cause of fire
incidence with an average occurrence of 66 per cent (Figure 25).
Figure 25: Occupancy Type Affected by Fire and the Corresponding

Causes
Type of Occupancy Causes of Fire

ELECTRICAL
CONNECTIONS
17% LIGHTED CIGARETTE
66% BUTT
Vehicular OPEN FLAME DUE TO
6% TORCH OR SULO
Non-structural Structural OPEN FLAME DUE TO

38% 25% UNATTENDED COOKING
/ STOVE
OPEN FLAME DUE TO
4% UNATTENDED LIGHTED
CANDLE OR GASERA
5% 7%
6% UNDER INVESTIGATION
OTHERS
Findings on the
reasons for the
increasing trend of
fire incidences and
property damages
Lack of capabilities, Validations in selected fire stations from seven regions including NCR
awareness, and disclosed three major reasons for the increasing fire incidence, which are as
stakeholder follows:
participation contribute
1. Lack of fire suppression capability;
to the increasing
2. Lack of public awareness on fire suppression; and
incidence of fire 3. No signed MOA between the BFP and the major stakeholders.
First, lack of fire suppression capability. As determined by the BFP, the

level of property damage in a fire incident is directly related to firefighters’
timely response and their capability in fire suppression. Fire trucks and
firefighting gears are their main weapons in conducting fire suppression
operations. Hence, availability or non-availability of these equipment together
with the number of firemen will determine the extent of fire damage to property
Page 51 PAO-2018-01
and life. Shortage in firefighting equipage and personnel were already

identified before the implementation of the Modernization Program but after
seven years of implementation, it has yet to be addressed by the BFP (Figure
26).
Figure 26: BFP’s Shortage in Equipage and Personnel as of June 30,

2018
The BFP argued that the cost of fire damage cannot be controlled as it
depends on the type of structure involved in a fire incident. It is the fire
investigator who assessed whatever the damage structure was high value or
not. Sometimes, even if there are many fire incidents that occurred, the value
of damage is low because the property involved are located in the squatters
area.
Currently, the BFP has not set different average cost of fire damage as per
type of structure involved. Every incident is assessed at ₱300,000 threshold
which is viewed as immaterial when an industrial structure is involved in a fire
incident.
Fire Suppression Capabilities is measured based on the Major Final Outputs

(MFO) determined by BFP. MFO No. 2 provides the BFP’s performance
indicators and targets (Table 40).
Table 40: BFP’s Performance Indicators and its Respective Targets for
CYs 2015-2017
MFO 2: Fire Suppression and Investigation Services
Period Covered
Performance Indicators
2015 2016 2017
Percentage of fire calls with low level of alarm (up to
3rd alarm) out of the total number of fire calls 85% 89% 88%
responded nationwide
Percentage of fire calls responded within 5-7 minutes 90% 90% 90%
Source: GAA, NEP from CYs 2015-2017
Number of a.) Percentage of fire calls with low level of alarm (up to 3rd alarm) out
Responding Fire of the total number of fire calls responded nationwide. During fire
Trucks was Not suppression operations, the Fire Ground Commander assesses which fire
alarm level to call. The Commander is responsible in management,
Sufficient
supervision, and control of firefighting activities in a specific fire
incidence.23 The required number of fire trucks varies per alarm level
(Figure 27).
23
DILG Memorandum Circular 2011-84, June 09, 2011, § 5 (c)
Page 52 PAO-2018-01
Figure 27: Details for the Fire Alarm Level and Fire Truck Requirements
Source: BFP, NCR
Review and validation of BFP’s performance in minimizing the fire alarm

to 3rd level of fire calls responded revealed that BFP attained and even
exceeded the target percentages by posting 97 per cent and 99 per cent
compared to the targets of 89 per cent and 88 per cent, respectively for
CY 2016 and CY 2017. However, analysis of submitted After Fire
Operation Reports (AFOR) disclosed that the responding fire trucks were
insufficient in 47 per cent or 44 out of 93 fire incidents based on the ideal
number of responding fire trucks on a certain level of fire alarm status
declared.
While the BFP had achieved its target percentage of minimizing fire alarm
status up to 3rd level, the impact of non-attainment to response time to fire
calls within 5-7 minutes and the deficiencies in firefighting capability
contributed in upward trend on statistics on fire incidents.
Deficiencies in the b.) Percentage of fire calls responded within 5-7 minutes. The BFP had
Recording and set the 5-7 minutes response time in relation to the fire curve, wherein,
Reporting of the flammable contents of the affected area in a structure identified as fire
Response Time origin are consumed at the onset of 5-7 minutes. The purpose of timely
and effective fire response is to prevent flame spread, minimize property
damage and casualties, as well as, environmental damage. Validation
and analysis of data on this indicator in sample fire stations nationwide
disclosed that the targets of at least 90 per cent were not attained as the
BFP posted only 82 per cent and 85 per cent for CYs 2016 and 2017,
respectively.
Analysis of sampled documents pertaining to AFOR revealed that in 11

out of 93 fire incidents, the structures involved were already razed by fire
to the ground when the first responding unit arrived. It is significant to
mention that average response time from the receipt of the emergency
call to the arrival of the first responding unit was 8.64 minutes for the
identified fire incidents. Further analysis disclosed that at average, the
first responding unit arrived at the fire scene in 17.73 minutes from the
time the fire had started. Clearly it was beyond 7 minutes, that total
Page 53 PAO-2018-01
destruction of structure already occurred before the first responding unit

started their suppression operation.
The audit team noted that the response time reckoned from the time the
call is received by the fire station may not be the appropriate measure of
effectiveness of fire suppression activity. As gathered in the survey
conducted by the team, late receipt of message or call is the number one
reason on the delay of response. The traffic and the absence of nearby
fire stations are the two other main reasons. Late receipt of fire calls (over
seven minutes after start of fire) implies that the fire has already spread
even before the BFP responding unit arrived at the fire scene. Even if the
responding unit arrived at the fire scene within 5-7 minutes upon receipt
of call, the damage fire has already accelerated.
BFP Management explained that it is unfair for the BFP to start counting
the response time upon discovery of fire considering that no one called
the BFP. It was further explained that the 5-7 minutes response time will
be met if the incident is within 10 kilometers radius of the existing fire
stations. One of the objectives of modernization is to be able to establish
sub-stations in different locations to shorten the response time. For now,
BFP uses the running card system wherein even if the responding fire
truck has not yet reached the fire scene, an alarm is raised to alert other
nearby stations so that before water runs out on the first responding fire
truck, there will be assistance coming to prevent conflagration.
To be able to respond within seven minutes upon discovery of the fire,

late receipt of call should be minimized. If the receipt of call is immediately
right after the fire has started, there will be no significant difference
whether the reckoning of response time is based on the time of receipt of
call or start of fire. BFP may need the assistance of LGUs which have
existing communications/command centers, strengthening of its Ugnayan
sa Barangay program and intensified drive in organizing fire brigades to
address the delay in receipt of call.
Likewise, indications of doubtful and incomplete response time were

noted in the examination of Monthly Monitoring Reports of Fire Incidents
submitted by field offices for the period 2016-2017. Response time was
not indicated in Fire Incidents Report of 15 fire stations while the response
time was fixed at 5 minutes in 2 fire stations. Under these circumstances,
statistics on fire incidents pertaining to response time could not be
considered accurate.
No Consistent Second, lack of public awareness on fire suppression. As provided in the

Organization and Fire Code, all Barangays shall likewise endeavor to organize their own Fire
Training for Fire Brigades24. These fire brigades shall be organized and trained by the LGUs in
Brigades partnership with the BFP to serve as the first responder during fire incidents25.
Simulation and fire drill exercises are also important in preparation for
emergency cases. The people are made aware of the whereabouts of the
escape routes, the use of fire extinguishers as basic firefighting tool, including
any other available fire protection equipment. With these kind of activities, the
public will be informed with the basic thing to do when fire incident occurs.
24
Supra, note 7, IRR, Rule 6, Division 1
25
Ibid., § 7 (B)
Page 54 PAO-2018-01
Results of the survey conducted by the audit team in sample barangays from
seven regions revealed the following:
• 66 per cent or 132 out of 200 barangay respondents have an

organized fire brigades or 34 per cent of respondents do not
belong to a fire brigade formally created by the BFP; and
• 14 respondents with fire brigades claimed that the members of the
brigade are not well trained.
Without formal organization of barangay fire brigade and provision of proper

training to its members, immediate fire protection services cannot be efficiently
provided to the populace especially in isolated barangays where there are no
fire stations or sub-stations. In one of the fire stations validated, a fire incident
occurred wherein the whole residential area was razed by fire without any
intervention from the BFP because the fire incident was in an island barangay.
The incident was made known only to the fire station after a house owner
reported the incident the following day.
In spite of the ongoing efforts of the BFP to reach out the public, especially in
the barangay level to provide fire prevention information and fire safety
consciousness to the community, the following issues were also noted during
our survey:
 44 out of 200 barangay respondents or 22 per cent raised clamor for

additional training and awareness on fire prevention;
 126 out of 200 respondents or 63 per cent has no guidelines or
dissemination tools/materials on fire suppression given to them
during seminars conducted by the BFP;
 42 out of 200 respondents or 21 per cent lack orientation and
experience in conducting fire drill and simulation exercises; and
 60 out of 200 or 30 per cent of survey respondents raised their
concern on the provision of firefighting gears/equipment and fire sub-
station.
The importance of the formally created fire brigades and enhancing their
capability as first responder to fire incident need to be emphasized to help the
BFP perform its mandated services in line with the Modernization Program.
Poor Coordination Third, no signed MOA between the BFP and the major stakeholders. To
among the BFP and institutionalize the areas of cooperation and coordination of the BFP with other
Major Stakeholders in departments, bureaus, agencies, offices and corporations of the government,
as well as private institutions, the BFP may enter into a MOA with the National
the Fire Prevention and
and Local Waterworks, the Electric Companies and Cooperatives and the
Suppression Activities PNP, among others.26
It was noted that BFP’s partnership for cooperation and coordination with
LGUs, PNP, Water Districts, Electric Cooperatives and other stakeholders in
the fire prevention and suppression activities was not working fully as
expected. LGUs, for example, are mandated to provide an available lot/site
for the construction of fire station as well as in organizing and training the fire
brigades in their respective barangays. However, our audit revealed that most
of these LGUs especially in cities, were hesitant to transfer available lots to
the BFP as sites for the construction of fire stations. As a result, new fire
stations could not be constructed in these LGUs or BFP had to contend with
26
See details in the “Background” section of this Report.
Page 55 PAO-2018-01
the existing fire stations owned by LGUs or any available space as location of
fire stations.27 As to the organization of fire brigades, most of the LGUs could
not sustain the fire brigades in their respective barangays since members of
the said fire brigades were only appointees of the incumbent barangay
captains and budget to organize the same was a major constraint. Currently,
the BFP has shortage of staff and insufficient budgetary allocation for such
activities.
Meanwhile, results of survey conducted by the audit team disclosed that major
problems which firefighters encountered during fire emergency responses
were uncontrolled crowd, traffic congestion, unstable water sources and
improper connections of cable and electric wirings. As to the water source,
some of the firefighters particularly in rural areas resort to rivers and even sea
water just to fill the needed supply of water in their fire trucks since water
source was not included in the design of the constructed fire stations. The
PNP, LGUs, Public Utility Companies and other concerned authorities could
provide support and help curb these identified problems to facilitate the BFP’s
service delivery and mitigate the impact of fire incidents but their support were
noted to be limited. These concerned authorities are expected to provide a
reasonable service during fire suppression activities. However, absence of
MOA which could establish and strengthen the level of partnership for
cooperation and coordination between the BFP and these concerned
institutions impacts on the services provided by the BFP particularly during
fire emergency response. In effect, delivery of fire services could not be
carried out efficiently and effectively leading to increasing trend of fire
incidents, deaths, injuries and property damages per year (Figure 28).
Figure 28: Summary of Fire Incidence Statistics from CYs 2011- 2017
BFP Management agreed that they should have MOA with these supposedly
partners in fire suppression activities. BFP pointed out that they had drafted a
MOA with PNP in 2016 but still for reconsideration of the PNP. It was added
that BFP had conducted dialogues on the provisions of water hydrants by
water districts. The PNP assisted the BFP especially with the traffic in case of
emergencies. Follow-up action on the draft MOA with PNP shall be
undertaken by the BFP and shall work on entering into a MOA with other
stakeholders such as the electric cooperative and water districts to be able to
attain their objectives.
27
See details on “The BFP failed to reach its seven-year upgrade target for fire
protection services” section of this Report.
Page 56 PAO-2018-01
It was further commented that BFP has MOAs with Manila Waters and in
certain area like Mandaluyong City but still agreed that mostly there was none.
Moreover, BFP has proposed program in partnership with national and local
government as well as private sector to establish standpipe system in
squatters or congested areas.
Furthermore, results of the survey conducted by the audit team revealed that
77 per cent or 106 out of 138 fire stations had no signed MOA on partnership
with key stakeholders. Seventeen per cent or 23 fire stations with supposed
signed MOA, did not provide any copy of the document to support their
initiatives. As a result of not having signed agreement with major stakeholders,
43 per cent or 87 out of 200 validated Barangays were not provided with fire
hydrants by the respective national and local waterworks. Accordingly, 21 per
cent or 29 out of 138 fire stations validated could not hastily refill their fire
trucks during fire incidents for the same reason that there were no fire hydrants
installed on their respective areas of responsibility. The identified fire stations
without fire hydrants opted to refill their fire trucks to the following water
sources during fire suppression operations:
 Reservoir 38% or (10 out of 29 FS)

 Water tanks 31% or (9 out of 29 FS)
 Rivers 14% or (4 out of 29 FS)
 Deep well 10% or (3 out of 29 FS)
 Waterworks 7% or 2 out of 29 FS)
Fire hydrant system is essential to fire suppression operations as it provides

steady supply of water for fire trucks aside from the fact that fire hoses can be
conveniently connected to it. As validated, one fire station resorted to refilling
from water tank owned by private individual for a fee.
Another identified factor that interrupts fire suppression operation is the delay
or not cutting-off immediately the electric power lines during fire incidents. This
may expose the firefighters to the hazards of electrocution. In a fire incident in
the NCR, one of the causes of delayed fire suppression operation was due to
live electric wire. The firefighters were not able to perform direct fire
extinguishment in the early stage that resulted in abrupt spreading of fire to
adjacent structures. It is therefore important that the Fire Ground
Commander28 should notify electric utility companies on early stage of fire
incidents to immediately cut off the electric main lines. Responses to
notification between electric power providers and the BFP can be facilitated
during operations when their responsibilities are well-defined in the MOA.
28
As defined in the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2011-84 dated June 9, 2011, the
Fire Ground Commander (FGC) is an officer or non-officer position such as Regional
Director, Provincial/City/Municipal Fire Marshal or Supervisor/Team Leader, specifically
identified on whose shoulders, the responsibilities of management, supervision, and
control of firefighting activities in a specific fire alarm or conflagration are vested.
Page 57 PAO-2018-01
Conclusions Of the ₱60.29 billion total funding requirement of the Modernization Program
covering CYs 2011 to 2017, only 22 per cent or ₱13.17 billion was allotted to
BFP. The revenue collections from fire code fees which should finance the
Modernization Program fell short of the projected funding requirement and
BFP could not request for additional appropriations from the national
government to fund the full requirements of the program due to its low
absorptive capacity. The BFP allotted only ₱2.52 billion out of the required
₱5.22 billion for the construction of fire stations but still ₱719.33 million
remained unutilized and was reverted to the BTr. For the procurement of fire
trucks, the required financial requirement for the period stood at ₱13.48 billion
but only ₱9.05 billion allotments were received of which ₱1.19 billion was
reverted to the BTr. The required funding for PPE was ₱972.04 million but
allotted budget was only ₱141.51 million. The DBM’s allocation to the
program depended mainly on the BFP’s performance reported in the Budget
Utilization Report.
During the initial period of program implementation the BFP procured the
construction of fire stations and fire trucks and there were delays in the
initiation of the procurement activities. Lots were not always available as
projects sites for fire stations while others were not in accordance with the
required lot areas or still need site development and preparation. Delays were
noted in the setting and approval of ABCs for fire trucks. The absence of
bidders on the construction of fire stations particularly in island provinces due
to low ABC and standard costing also contributed to the delay in the
procurement. The BFP’s procurement function was then incapacitated
because no one was interested to become members of its BAC for fear of
lawsuits from the losing bidders. As a result, procurements were outsourced
to DBM-PS and PITC and at the same time prevented the reversion of
unutilized allotments.
The outsourcing of procurement did not result in timely acquisition on

equipage and construction of fire stations. In 2017, a total of ₱3.39 billion was
transferred to PITC for the procurement of fire stations, fire trucks, SCBA and
others which remained in various stages of pre-procurement and bidding as
of end of audit. From 2012 to 2015, a total of at least ₱526.81 million was
transferred to DBM-PS for the procurement of fire trucks, SCBA and PPE from
which only ₱172.78 million worth of SCBAs and PPE or 33 per cent had been
delivered while the remaining items were still undelivered after more than four
years.
As of June 30, 2018, there were 308 municipalities without fire stations
including 19 with existing fire trucks, 59 fire stations without fire trucks, 1,756
fire trucks without complete SCBA, 13,119 fire personnel without complete set
of PPE and 11,593 lacking personnel based on the required manning of 14
per fire station. With the current pace of implementation, it is unlikely that the
BFP could establish at least one fire station with at least one fire truck manned
by the required number of personnel in CY 2020 to each municipality without
firefighting services at the start of the program. These implementation gaps
hindered the timely attainment of program targets for the establishment and
upgrading of firefighting services.
Of the 70 fire stations audited, 23 stations or 33 per cent were delayed in

completion, 36 stations or 51 per cent were not in accordance with the required
specifications, and 11 stations or 16 per cent were abandoned. These
deficiencies could be attributed to inadequate planning and monitoring of the
projects. Meanwhile, out of the 84 fire trucks inspected, 78 trucks or 93 per
cent have mechanical defects, 67 trucks or 80 per cent have electrical defects,
Page 58 PAO-2018-01
and 83 trucks or 99 per cent with other defects. These conditions hampered
the efficient and effective provision of fire protection services.
Except for minimizing fire alarm status up to 3rd alarm level, the BFP also fell
short in the attainment of its targets on performance indicators concerning its
fire suppression activities. The target of at least 90 per cent on 5-7 minutes
response time to fire incidents was not attained in CYs 2016 and 2017
nothwithstanding noted deficiencies in the recording and reporting of response
time. The average property damage per fire incident went beyond the
₱300,000 level in at least four years from CYs 2011 to 2017 and the target
reduction of property damage was not differently set for each structural
category.
On top of these deficiencies, no assessment was conducted by BFP to track

the progress as far as the attainment of goals and objectives of SEP and
SUMP are concerned after seven years of program implementation. As noted
there was no separate monitoring and reporting for these two components of
the program.
Meanwhile, the BFP’s partnership for cooperation and coordination with LGUs,
PNP, Water Districts, Electric Cooperatives and other stakeholders in the fire
prevention and suppression activities was not working as expected due to
absence of MOA that would define their respective roles and responsibilities.
The barangay fire brigades were not fully organized in barangays and their
capabilities were lacking. Thirty-four per cent of the barangays visited by the
audit team have not organized barangay fire brigades. These brigades are the
designated first responders during a fire incident.
It is notable that actions and initiatives have been undertaken to address the
implementation gaps. BFP committed to conduct its own procurement and not
to transfer any funds starting CY 2018 in view of the magnitude of the
undelivered items outsourced to PITC and DBM-PS. The introduction of e-
payment for fire code fees starting CY 2019 is a welcome development to
improve accuracy and timeliness of remittance of collections while the
passage of the bill authorizing the BFP to purchase lots for the construction of
fire stations using collected fire code fees may address the issues on the
strategic locations of fire stations. Moreover, it is likely that an increase in the
absorptive capacity of the BFP to implement the program shall result in higher
budget allocation to match the financial requirements of the program targets.
Overall, the insufficient funding and the inability of the BFP to fully utilize its
available allotments in a timely manner coupled with the implementation gaps
had put the implementation of the Modernization Program behind schedule. It
is unlikely that BFP could upgrade the government’s firefighting capability with
the required facilities and equipage and personnel by CY 2020. Due to the
inability of the BFP to upgrade its firefighting capabilities, the public and even
the firefighters are left vulnerable to destructive fire without adequate
safeguards from the envisioned modernization.
Page 59 PAO-2018-01
Recommendations As the BFP continues its efforts to upgrade the country’s firefighting capability,
it is important to address the gaps that are hindering the efficient, economical
and effective implementation of its Modernization Program. A monitoring and
reporting mechanism must be put in place in order to track the individual
progress of each component of the Modernization Program to be able to
immediately address deficiencies in the targets and other implementation
gaps.
The BFP needs to enhance its absorptive capacity in implementing projects to

secure higher appropriations that would approximate the funding requirements
of the program. Its budget can be improved by initiating procurement at the
earliest time possible and in efficient manner to fully utilize allotments received.
Adequate procurement planning is necessary to ensure that items in the APP
are acquired without delay in accordance with the procurement schedule. Lots
transferred by LGUs need to be inspected and evaluated to ensure their
appropriateness/suitability as site for fire stations. These lots should be
covered with valid documents on transfer of ownership before including them
in the APP. Also, BFP should conduct necessary market study for the
reasonableness of ABCs based on required quality and specifications of
complete equipage for Modernization Program.
Continuous coordination and follow-up with PITC and DBM-PS need to be

undertaken by BFP to fast track the procurement of items covered by long
outstanding requests and paid already through fund transfers. As the BFP has
started anew in procuring by itself the requirements for the Modernization
Program in the latter part of 2018, it should capacitate its personnel on
procurement and monitoring and it may need to request for training.
Assistance of the Government Procurement Policy Board may be tapped for
this aspect. The BFP needs to intensify its supervision and monitoring on
construction of fire stations to ensure timely completion of projects in
accordance with required specifications and prevent abandonment of projects
by the contractors. Poor maintenance of fire trucks need to be addressed to
maximize their useful lives and benefits that could be derived from their
utilization.
In coordination with the LBP, implement as planned in CY 2019 the e-payment

of fire code fees for timely and accurate remittance of collections to the BTr.
In case the BFP deputizes its LGU counterparts to collect the said fees,
controls need to be strengthened in the reporting and remittance of collection
for transparency, accuracy and completeness of remittance in accordance with
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
To ensure coordinated efforts during fire suppression activities, the BFP needs
to enhance its partnership with key stakeholders by executing MOAs that will
define individual roles and responsibilities during fire response. Follow-up with
the PNP the MOA drafted in 2016 to finalize and operationalize the
partnership. Intensify public awareness campaign on fire prevention and
suppression through the continuous organization and training of barangay fire
brigades. The BFP in coordination with LGUs should regularly conduct
simulation exercises and drills. It is also recommended to tie-up with the LGU’s
communications/command center, if there is any, so that any fire incident can
be monitored on real time. Moreover, continue working for the
operationalization of the proposed partnership with the national and LGUs
concerned on the establishment of standpipe in squatters and congested
areas. Meanwhile, performance indicators and targets as well as data
collection and reporting process need to be reviewed for appropriateness,
reasonableness, accuracy and completeness.
Page 60 PAO-2018-01
It is acknowledged that initial measures have been instituted to address the

gaps identified in the audit. Moving forward, improvement in program
implementation is expected with the observance of the foregoing
recommendations.
Page 61 PAO-2018-01
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope

and Methodology
Commission on Audit (COA) has conducted performance audits to help

government agencies better perform their mandates and achieve program
goals and objectives more economically, efficiently and effectively. It identified
the Modernization Program implemented by the Bureau of Fire Protection
(BFP) as one of the high impact programs to be audited. The audit focused
on the two components of the program, namely: the Service Establishment
Program (SEP); and the Service Upgrading Modernization Program (SUMP).
The audit intends to identify the key reasons behind the gap between the
program’s accomplishments and targets and aims to determine: (1) the extent
to which the BFP ensured that it has achieved the program’s goals and
objectives; (2) the extent the BFP upgraded its firefighting capabilities; and (3)
the extent the BFP safeguarded the populace from the hazards of destructive
fire.
To identify the goals, objectives, and performance indicators of the

Modernization Program, the audit team collected, reviewed, and analyzed
documents such as relevant laws, rules, and regulations governing the
program. In addition, the audit team analyzed the agencies’ implementing
guidelines, Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with partner agencies,
previously reported COA Consolidated Annual Audit Reports (CAARs),
budget issuances, and other reports relevant to the Modernization Program.
To facilitate our understanding on the Modernization Program’s goals and
objectives, the audit team also requested for a briefing with the Management.
Similarly, to determine the program’s accomplishment, the audit team used

data as of December 31, 2017 and on some points, included the data of the
first semester of CY 2018 to reflect the current data available. The audit team
also conducted technical inspections from March 18 to June 30, 2018 to
validate and assess the existence and condition of the newly constructed fire
stations and acquired fire trucks with the assistance of the COA’s Technical
Services Office. In addition, the audit team interviewed key agency
officials/personnel and Barangay respondents, administered survey
questionnaires to validate reported accomplishments by the BFP and to
assess the extent of coordination with key stakeholders during fire incidents.
The audit team have determined that the data used in this report were
sufficiently reliable to assess the status and condition of the Modernization
Program implemented by the BFP.
The audit team conducted the performance audit from February 2018 to
October 2018 in accordance with the International Standards of Supreme
Audit Institutions 3000 – Standard for Performance Auditing. The standard
requires that the audit team plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit team believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Page 63 PAO-2018-01
Appendix II: 19 Municipalities

with Fire Trucks but without
BFP-Owned Fire Stations
No. REGION PROVINCE MUNICIPALITY
1 REGION 3 ZAMBALES CABANGAN

2 REGION 4A BATANGAS BALETE
3 REGION 4A BATANGAS MABINI
4 REGION 4A LAGUNA FAMY
5 REGION 4B PALAWAN TAYTAY
6 REGION 4B OCCIDENTAL MINDORO LUBANG
7 REGION 4B OCCIDENTAL MINDORO PALUAN
8 REGION 4B ORIENTAL MINDORO MANSALAY
9 REGION 4B PALAWAN DUMARAN
10 REGION 4B ROMBLON SANTA FE
11 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VALLADOLID
12 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL SALVADOR BENEDICTO
13 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY NAGA
14 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR MIDSALIP
15 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY ROSELLER LIM
16 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL BALIANGAO
17 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL SAPANG DALAGA
18 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL GITAGUM
19 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE TAGOLOAN
Page 64 PAO-2018-01
Appendix III: Delays in the

Construction of Fire Stations
Contract Actual
Delayed
Project Finish Duration Date Duration
Region Province Fire Station Contractor Start Date (Calendar (Calendar
(Calendar
Cost Date Completed Days)
Days) Days)
Oriental Puerto Delrol
IV-B ₱2,619,813 10/30/2015 02/27/2016 120 04/12/2016 165 45
Mindoro Galera Enterprises
Oriental Delrol
IV-B San Teodoro 2,619,813 11/02/2015 03/01/2016 120 05/02/2016 182 62
Mindoro Enterprises
AQSIL
Builders and not
VII Bohol San Isidro Construction
2,622,760 11/2/2016 120 6/14/2017 224 104
indicated
Supply
Hadden
Tobias
VI Antique Construction 2,623,608 11/18/2015 07/18/2016 244 11/04/2016 353 109
Fornier and Supply
Negros RUDPA
VII La Libertad Construction
2,624,000 03/11/2016 07/08/2016 120 11/07/2016 242 122
Oriental
Negros RUDPA
VII Guihulngan Construction
2,624,000 03/11/2016 07/08/2016 120 11/07/2016 242 122
Oriental
A.A. De Vera
VII Bohol Bien Unido Construction 2,624,000 11/02/2016 03/01/2017 120 07/17/2017 258 138
AOSIL
Builders and 01/25/2017 11/03/2017
VII Bohol Guindulman Construction 2,625,000 05/24/2017 120 283 163
Supply
MJ
Barcelona
VI Iloilo Carles Construction 2,624,261 12/28/2015 4/26/2016 120 10/16/2016 293 173
and Supply
MJ
VI Aklan Libacao Barcelona 2,623,761 12/28/2015 04/25/2016 120 10/16/2016 294 174
and Supply
MJ
Barcelona
VI Iloilo Concepcion Construction 2,622,761 12/28/2015 4/26/2016 120 10/21/2016 298 178
and Supply
AQSIL
Builders and
VII Bohol Alburquerque
Construction
2,623,530 1/25/2017 5/25/2017 120 12/12/2017 321 201
Supply
Hadden
VI Antique San Remigio Construction 2,623,608 11/18/2015 03/16/2016 120 10/21/2016 339 219
and Supply
Q.M. Florete
VI Iloilo Badiangan Construction
2,616,543 09/07/2016 01/05/2017 120 9/6/2017 364 244
Q.M. Florete
VI Iloilo Ajuy Construction
2,616,922 10/21/2016 2/18/2017 120 11/03/2017 378 258
RUDPA
VII Bohol Dagohoy Construction
2,620,513 02/05/2016 07/04/2016 151 05/20/2017 471 320
Sierra B.L. Pangan
VII Bohol Construction 2,622,760 1/4/2016 5/3/2016 120 5/17/2017 499 379
Bullones
RUDPA
VII Bohol Sagbayan Construction
2,620,852 02/05/2016 06/03/2016 120 06/20/2017 502 382
A.A. De Vera
VII Bohol Catigbian Construction 2,598,995 1/20/2017 5/20/2017 120 6/27/2018 523 403
Rudpa
VII Bohol Sikatuna Construction
2,620,513 2/5/2016 6/4/2016 120 8/31/2017 573 453
Alvynna
VII Bohol Loay Trading and 2,622,704 2/19/2016 6/18/2016 120 9/21/2017 580 460
Construction
R.V. Dolar
VI Iloilo San Rafael Eng'g 2,624,626 9/6/2016 1/4/2017 120 06/06/2018 638 518
Services
3C'SL
Agusan
XIII Tubay Construction 2,590,820 11/15/2015 04/20/2016 158 12/11/2017 758 600
Del Norte and Supply
Total (Average) ₱65,489,459 128 364 241
Source: COA Technical Inspection Report
Page 65 PAO-2018-01
Appendix IV: Typical Design

of Fire Stations
A. Typical Design for City Fire Station
B. Typical Design for Municipality Fire Station
Page 66 PAO-2018-01
Appendix IV: Typical Design of Fire Stations
C. 2-Storey Typical Fire Station
Page 67 PAO-2018-01
Appendix V: 308 Municipalities

without Fire Stations
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
1 REGION 1 ILOCOS NORTE ADAMS 
2 REGION 1 ILOCOS NORTE CARASI
3 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR BANAYOYO 
4 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR BURGOS 
5 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR GALIMUYOD 
6 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR NAGBUKEL 
7 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR SAN EMILIO 
8 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR SAN ESTEBAN 
9 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR SANTIAGO 
10 REGION 1 ILOCOS SUR SUGPON
11 REGION 1 LA UNION BAGULIN 
12 REGION 1 LA UNION BURGOS 
13 REGION 1 LA UNION CABA
14 REGION 1 LA UNION SANTOL 
15 REGION 1 PANGASINAN ALCALA 
16 REGION 1 PANGASINAN BAUTISTA 
17 REGION 1 PANGASINAN BURGOS 
18 REGION 1 PANGASINAN MABINI 
19 REGION 1 PANGASINAN SAN JACINTO
20 REGION 1 PANGASINAN SANTO TOMAS 
21 REGION 2 BATANES ITBAYAT
22 REGION 2 BATANES IVANA
23 REGION 2 BATANES UYUGAN
24 REGION 2 CAGAYAN CALAYAN 
25 REGION 2 CAGAYAN SANTA TERESITA 
26 REGION 2 ISABELA GAMU 
27 REGION 2 ISABELA MACONACON 
28 REGION 2 ISABELA PALANAN
29 REGION 2 ISABELA SAN MANUEL 
30 REGION 2 NUEVA VIZCAYA DUPAX DEL NORTE 
31 REGION 3 AURORA DINALUNGAN 
32 REGION 3 TARLAC ANAO 
33 REGION 3 TARLAC SAN JOSE 
34 REGION 3 ZAMBALES CABANGAN 
35 REGION 4A BATANGAS BALETE
36 REGION 4A BATANGAS MABINI
37 REGION 4A BATANGAS SAN LUIS 
38 REGION 4A BATANGAS SANTA TERESITA
39 REGION 4A BATANGAS TINGLOY
40 REGION 4A CAVITE TERNATE
41 REGION 4A LAGUNA FAMY
42 REGION 4A LAGUNA PAKIL 
43 REGION 4A QUEZON GENERAL LUNA 
44 REGION 4A QUEZON JOMALIG
45 REGION 4A QUEZON PATNANUNGAN
46 REGION 4A QUEZON PITOGO
47 REGION 4B OCCIDENTAL MINDORO LOOC 
48 REGION 4B OCCIDENTAL MINDORO LUBANG 
49 REGION 4B OCCIDENTAL MINDORO PALUAN 
50 REGION 4B ORIENTAL MINDORO MANSALAY 
51 REGION 4B PALAWAN AGUTAYA
52 REGION 4B PALAWAN ARACELI 
53 REGION 4B PALAWAN BALABAC
54 REGION 4B PALAWAN CAGAYANCILLO
55 REGION 4B PALAWAN DUMARAN 
56 REGION 4B PALAWAN EL NIDO (BACUIT) 
57 REGION 4B PALAWAN KALAYAAN 
Page 68 PAO-2018-01
Appendix V: 308 Municipalities without Fire Stations
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
58 REGION 4B PALAWAN LINAPACAN
59 REGION 4B PALAWAN MAGSAYSAY 
60 REGION 4B PALAWAN SAN VICENTE 
61 REGION 4B PALAWAN TAYTAY
62 REGION 4B ROMBLON BANTON 
63 REGION 4B ROMBLON CONCEPCION 
64 REGION 4B ROMBLON CORCUERA
65 REGION 4B ROMBLON FERROL 
66 REGION 4B ROMBLON SAN JOSE 
67 REGION 4B ROMBLON SANTA FE 
68 REGION 5 ALBAY RAPU-RAPU
69 REGION 5 CAMARINES NORTE SAN VICENTE 
70 REGION 5 CAMARINES NORTE TALISAY 
71 REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR BOMBON 
72 REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR CANAMAN
73 REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR LAGONOY 
PRESENTACION
74 
REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR (PARUBCAN)
75 REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR SAGÑAY 
76 REGION 5 CAMARINES SUR SIRUMA 
77 REGION 5 CATANDUANES BAGAMANOC
78 REGION 5 MASBATE BATUAN 
79 REGION 5 MASBATE CLAVERIA 
80 REGION 5 MASBATE MOBO
81 REGION 5 MASBATE PALANAS
82 REGION 5 MASBATE USON
83 REGION 5 SORSOGON BARCELONA 
84 REGION 5 SORSOGON SANTA MAGDALENA
85 REGION 6 AKLAN BANGA
86 REGION 6 AKLAN BATAN 
87 REGION 6 AKLAN LEZO
88 REGION 6 AKLAN MADALAG 
89 REGION 6 AKLAN MAKATO 
90 REGION 6 AKLAN MALINAO 
91 REGION 6 AKLAN NABAS 
92 REGION 6 ANTIQUE ANINI-Y 
93 REGION 6 ANTIQUE BARBAZA 
94 REGION 6 ANTIQUE CALUYA
95 REGION 6 ANTIQUE HAMTIC 
96 REGION 6 ANTIQUE TIBIAO 
97 REGION 6 CAPIZ PANAY 
98 REGION 6 CAPIZ PILAR 
99 REGION 6 CAPIZ SAPI-AN 
100 REGION 6 ILOILO SAN DIONISIO
101 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL ISABELA 
102 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL PULUPANDAN
103 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VALLADOLID 
104 REGION 6 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL SALVADOR BENEDICTO 
105 REGION 7 NEGROS ORIENTAL AYUNGON 
106 REGION 7 NEGROS ORIENTAL DAUIN 
107 REGION 7 NEGROS ORIENTAL MANJUYOD 
108 REGION 7 NEGROS ORIENTAL PAMPLONA
109 REGION 7 NEGROS ORIENTAL SIBULAN
110 REGION 7 BOHOL CORELLA 
111 REGION 7 BOHOL DANAO
112 REGION 7 BOHOL DUERO 
113 REGION 7 BOHOL JETAFE 
Page 69 PAO-2018-01
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
114 REGION 7 BOHOL LILA 
115 REGION 7 BOHOL LOBOC 
116 REGION 7 BOHOL SAN MIGUEL 
117 REGION 7 CEBU ALCANTARA
118 REGION 7 CEBU ALCOY 
119 REGION 7 CEBU ALEGRIA
120 REGION 7 CEBU ASTURIAS
121 REGION 7 CEBU BADIAN
122 REGION 7 CEBU BORBON
123 REGION 7 CEBU CATMON
124 REGION 7 CEBU MADRIDEJOS 
125 REGION 7 CEBU PILAR 
126 REGION 7 CEBU RONDA 
127 REGION 7 CEBU SANTA FE 
128 REGION 7 CEBU SANTANDER
129 REGION 7 CEBU TABOGON
130 REGION 8 EASTERN SAMAR LLORENTE 
131 REGION 8 EASTERN SAMAR MAYDOLONG
132 REGION 8 EASTERN SAMAR MERCEDES
133 REGION 8 EASTERN SAMAR SAN JULIAN
134 REGION 8 NORTHERN LEYTE BATO
135 REGION 8 NORTHERN LEYTE JULITA 
136 REGION 8 NORTHERN LEYTE MACARTHUR
137 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR BIRI 
138 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR BOBON 
139 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR LAPINIG
140 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR ROSARIO 
141 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR SAN VICENTE
142 REGION 8 NORTHERN SAMAR VICTORIA 
143 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR ALMAGRO 
144 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR DARAM 
145 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR SAN JOSE DE BUAN
146 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR SANTO NIÑO 
147 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR TALALORA 
148 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR ZUMARRAGA 
149 REGION 8 WESTERN SAMAR TAGAPUL-AN
150 REGION 8 SOUTHERN LEYTE ANAHAWAN 
151 REGION 8 SOUTHERN LEYTE LIMASAWA 
152 REGION 8 SOUTHERN LEYTE PADRE BURGOS 
153 REGION 8 SOUTHERN LEYTE PINTUYAN
154 REGION 8 SOUTHERN LEYTE TOMAS OPPUS
155 REGION 8 BILIRAN MARIPIPI 
156 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE KALAWIT 
157 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE MUTIA 
158 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE SERGIO OSMEÑA SR. 
159 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE SIBUCO
160 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE SIBUTAD 
161 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE GODOD
162 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR BAYOG 
163 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR DIMATALING
164 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR DUMALINAO 
165 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR LABANGAN 
166 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR MAHAYAG 
167 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR SAN MIGUEL 
168 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR TAMBULIG
169 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR JOSEFINA
Page 70 PAO-2018-01
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
170 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR MIDSALIP 
SOMINOT (DON MARIANO
171
REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR MARCOS)
172 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR VINCENZO A. SAGUN 
173 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR GUIPOS 
174 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR TIGBAO 
175 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR LAKEWOOD 
176 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR PITOGO 
177 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY NAGA 
178 REGION 9 ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY ROSELLER LIM 
179 REGION 10 CAMIGUIN GUINSILIBAN
180 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE BALOI 
181 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE LINAMON
182 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE MAGSAYSAY 
183 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE MATUNGAO 
184 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE MUNAI
185 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE NUNUNGAN 
186 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE PANTAO RAGAT 
187 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE PANTAR 
188 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE POONA PIAGAPO 
189 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE SALVADOR 
190 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE SAPAD 
191 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE TAGOLOAN 
192 REGION 10 LANAO DEL NORTE TANGCAL
193 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL BALIANGAO 
194 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL CLARIN 
195 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL CONCEPCION 
196 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL PANAON 
197 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL SAPANG DALAGA 
198 REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL SINACABAN
DON VICTORIANO
199 
REGION 10 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL CHIONGBIAN
200 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL BINUANGAN 
201 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL KINOGUITAN 
202 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL LAGONGLONG
203 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL LIBERTAD 
204 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL VILLANUEVA 
205 REGION 10 MISAMIS ORIENTAL GITAGUM 
JOSE ABAD SANTOS
206
REGION 11 DAVAO OCCIDENTAL (TRINIDAD) 
207 REGION 11 DAVAO OCCIDENTAL SARANGANI 
208 REGION 12 NORTH COTABATO MAGPET 
209 REGION 12 SULTAN KUDARAT LUTAYAN 
210 CAR ABRA BOLINEY
211 CAR ABRA BUCLOC 
212 CAR ABRA DAGUIOMAN
213 CAR ABRA DANGLAS 
214 CAR ABRA LACUB
215 CAR ABRA LAGANGILANG 
216 CAR ABRA LAGAYAN
217 CAR ABRA LANGIDEN
218 CAR ABRA LUBA
219 CAR ABRA MALIBCONG 
220 CAR ABRA MANABO 
221 CAR ABRA PILAR 
222 CAR ABRA SAN ISIDRO 
223 CAR ABRA TINEG
Page 71 PAO-2018-01
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
224 CAR ABRA TUBO 
225 CAR IFUGAO HINGYON 
226 CAR IFUGAO HUNGDUAN 
227 CAR KALINGA TANUDAN 
228 CAR BENGUET TUBLAY
229 CARAGA AGUSAN DEL NORTE CARMEN 
230 CARAGA AGUSAN DEL SUR SAN LUIS 
231 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE BURGOS 
232 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE GIGAQUIT 
233 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE PILAR
234 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE SAN BENITO 
235 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE SISON
236 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL NORTE TUBOD
237 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL SUR BAYABAS 
238 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL SUR CARMEN 
239 CARAGA SURIGAO DEL SUR TAGO 
240 CARAGA DINAGAT ISLANDS BASILISA (RIZAL) 
241 ARMM BASILAN SUMISIP 
242 ARMM BASILAN TIPO-TIPO
243 ARMM BASILAN AKBAR
244 ARMM BASILAN AL-BARKA
245 ARMM BASILAN HADJI MOHAMMAD AJUL
246 ARMM BASILAN UNGKAYA PUKAN
247 ARMM BASILAN HADJI MUHTAMAD
248 ARMM BASILAN TABUAN-LASA
249 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR BUBONG
250 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR BUTIG
251 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR GANASSI
252 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR KAPAI
253 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR LUMBATAN
254 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR MADAMBA
255 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR MULONDO
256 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR PAGAYAWAN (TATARIKAN)
257 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR PUALAS
258 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR TAMPARAN
259 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR TARAKA
260 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR TUBARAN
261 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR TUGAYA 
262 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR MAROGONG
263 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR CALANOGAS
264 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR BUADIPOSO-BUNTONG
265 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR MAGUING 
PICONG (SULTAN
266
ARMM LANAO DEL SUR GUMANDER)
267 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR LUMBAYANAGUE
268 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR BUMBARAN 
269 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR TAGOLOAN II
270 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR KAPATAGAN
271 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR SULTAN DUMALONDONG
272 ARMM LANAO DEL SUR LUMBACA-UNAYAN
273 ARMM MAGUINDANAO BULDON
274 ARMM MAGUINDANAO MATANOG
275 ARMM MAGUINDANAO PAGALUNGAN
276 ARMM MAGUINDANAO KABUNTALAN (TUMBAO)
Page 72 PAO-2018-01
WITH DEED OF
DONATION OF LOT
277 ARMM MAGUINDANAO BARIRA
278 ARMM MAGUINDANAO TALITAY
279 ARMM MAGUINDANAO SULTAN MASTURA
280 ARMM MAGUINDANAO GUINDULUNGAN
281 ARMM MAGUINDANAO RAJAH BUAYAN
282 ARMM MAGUINDANAO DATU BLAH T. SINSUAT 
DATU ANGGAL
283
ARMM MAGUINDANAO MIDTIMBANG 
284 ARMM MAGUINDANAO MANGUDADATU 
285 ARMM MAGUINDANAO PANDAG
286 ARMM MAGUINDANAO NORTHERN KABUNTALAN 
287 ARMM MAGUINDANAO DATU HOFFER AMPATUAN
288 ARMM MAGUINDANAO DATU SALIBO
SHARIFF SAYDONA
289
ARMM MAGUINDANAO MUSTAPHA 
290 ARMM SULU KALINGALAN CALUANG 
291 ARMM SULU MAIMBUNG 
HADJI PANGLIMA TAHIL
292
ARMM SULU (MARUNGGAS) 
293 ARMM SULU PANGUTARAN 
294 ARMM SULU PATA 
295 ARMM SULU SIASI 
296 ARMM SULU TAPUL 
297 ARMM SULU TONGKIL 
PANGLIMA ESTINO (NEW
298 ARMM SULU PANAMAO) 
299 ARMM SULU LUGUS 
300 ARMM SULU PANDAMI 
301 ARMM SULU OMAR 
MAPUN (CAGAYAN DE

302 ARMM TAWI-TAWI TAWI-TAWI)
303 ARMM TAWI-TAWI SIMUNUL 
304 ARMM TAWI-TAWI SITANGKAI 
305 ARMM TAWI-TAWI TANDUBAS 
306 ARMM TAWI-TAWI TURTLE ISLANDS 
307 ARMM TAWI-TAWI SAPA-SAPA 
308 ARMM TAWI-TAWI SIBUTU 
Page 73 PAO-2018-01
Appendix VI: 59 Municipalities

with Fire Stations but without
Fire Truck

1 1 Ilocos Norte Currimao
2 1 Ilocos Norte Dumalneg
3 1 Ilocos Sur San Vicente
4 1 La Union Pugo
5 1 Pangasinan Urbiztondo
6 2 Isabela Dinapigue
7 2 Isabela Divilacan
8 2 Isabela San Isidro
9 2 Nueva Vizcaya Ambaguio
10 3 Nueva Ecija Nampicuan
11 4A Cavite Magallanes
12 4B Romblon Sta. Maria (Imelda)
13 5 Camarines Sur Garchitorena
14 5 Catanduanes San Miguel
15 5 Sorsogon Casiguran
16 7 Bohol Dagohoy
17 7 Bohol Guindulman
18 7 Bohol San Isidro
19 7 Siquijor Enrique Villanueva
20 8 Northern Leyte La Paz
21 9 Zamboanga Del Sur Kumalarang
22 9 Zamboanga Del Sur Tabina
23 10 Misamis Oriental Laguindingan
24 CAR Abra San Juan
25 ARMM Basilan Lantawan
26 ARMM Basilan Tuburan
27 ARMM Lanao del Sur Bacolod-Kalawi
28 ARMM Lanao del Sur Balabagan
29 ARMM Lanao del Sur Balindong (Watu)
30 ARMM Lanao del Sur Bayang
31 ARMM Lanao del Sur Lumba-Bayabao
32 ARMM Lanao del Sur Mandalum
33 ARMM Lanao del Sur Marantao
34 ARMM Lanao del Sur Masiu
35 ARMM Lanao del Sur Piagapo
36 ARMM Lanao del Sur Poona Bayabao (Gata)
37 ARMM Lanao del Sur Ditsaan-Ramain
38 ARMM Lanao del Sur Saguiaran
39 ARMM Maguindanao Datu Paglas
40 ARMM Maguindanao Sultan sa Barongis
41 ARMM Maguindanao Talayan
42 ARMM Maguindanao South Upi
43 ARMM Maguindanao Gen. S. K. Pendatun
44 ARMM Maguindanao Mamasapano
45 ARMM Maguindanao Datu Montawal
46 ARMM Maguindanao Paglat
47 ARMM Maguindanao Datu Unsay
48 ARMM Maguindanao Datu Abdullah Sangki
49 ARMM Sulu Indanan
50 ARMM Sulu Luuk
51 ARMM Sulu Old Panamao
Page 74 PAO-2018-01
Appendix VI: 59 Municipalities with Fire Stations but without

Fire Truck

52 ARMM Sulu Parang
53 ARMM Sulu Patikul
54 ARMM Sulu Talipao
55 ARMM Tawi-tawi Panglima Sugala
56 ARMM Tawi-tawi South Ubian
57 ARMM Tawi-tawi Languyan
58 CARAGA Dinagat Islands Tubajon
59 CARAGA Agusan Del Norte Remedios T. Romualdez
Page 75 PAO-2018-01
Appendix VII: Jiangte and

Rosenbauer Fire Trucks
Inspected with Mechanical
Problems
Jiangte Fire Trucks Inspected with Mechanical Problems
50 out of 51 (98%) City/Municipality Fire Station
No. Cities/ Municipalities Region Capacity
1 Rizal, Palawan 4B 1000 GAL
2 Sofronio Española, Palawan 4B 1000 GAL
3 Kapalong, Davao Del Norte 11 1000 GAL
4 Tarragona, Davao Oriental 11 1000 GAL
5 Caraga, Davao Oriental 11 1000 GAL
6 Las Nieves, Surigao del Norte 13 1000 GAL
7 Nasipit, Agusan del Norte 13 1000 GAL
8 Calatagan, Batangas 4A 1000 GAL
9 San Juan, Batangas 4A 1000 GAL
10 Naujan, Or. Mdo 4B 1000 GAL
11 Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro 4B 1000 GAL
12 Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro 4B 1000 GAL
13 Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro 4B 1000 GAL
14 Malalag, Davao 11 1000 GAL
15 Maragusan, Compostela Valley 11 1000 GAL
16 Mawab, Compostela Valley 11 1000 GAL
17 Pantukan, Compostela Valley 11 1000 GAL
18 Carrascal, Surigao del Sur 13 1000 GAL
19 Cantilan, Surigao del Sur 13 1000 GAL
20 Marihatag, Surigao del Sur 13 1000 GAL
21 Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur 13 1000 GAL
22 Lingig, Surigao del Sur 13 1000 GAL
23 Veruela, Agusan del Sur 13 1000 GAL
24 Bunawan, Agusan del Sur 13 1000 GAL
25 Sibagat, Agusan del Sur 13 1000 GAL
26 Cajidiocan, Romblon 4B 500 GAL
27 Sta. Fe, Romblon 4B 500 GAL
28 Looc, Romblon 4B 500 GAL
29 B. Dujali, Davao Del Norte 11 500 GAL
30 San Isidro, Davao Del Norte 11 500 GAL
31 San Isidro, Davao Oriental 11 500 GAL
32 Boston, Davao Oriental 11 500 GAL
33 Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte 13 500 GAL
34 San Francisco, Surigao del Norte 13 500 GAL
35 Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte 13 500 GAL
36 San Isidro, Surigao del Norte 13 500 GAL
37 Santiago, Agusan del Norte 13 500 GAL
38 Tubay, Agusan del Norte 13 500 GAL
39 Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte 13 500 GAL
40 Agoncillio, Batangas 4A 500 GAL
41 Alitagtag, Batangas 4A 500 GAL
42 Baco, Oriental Mindoro 4B 500 GAL
43 San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro 4B 500 GAL
44 Magsaysay, Davao 11 500 GAL
45 Bansalan, Davao 11 500 GAL
46 Padada, Davao 11 500 GAL
47 New Bataan, Compostela Valley 11 500 GAL
48 Madrid, Surigao del Sur 13 500 GAL
49 Cortes, Surigao del Sur 13 500 GAL
50 San Agustin, Surigao del Sur 13 500 GAL
Page 76 PAO-2018-01
Appendix VII: Jiangte and Rosenbauer Fire Trucks Inspected

with Mechanical Problems
Page 77 PAO-2018-01
Appendix VIII: Regions with

BFP Unserviceable Units
Page 78 PAO-2018-01
Appendix IX: COA Contacts

and Acknowledgments
COA Contacts  Emelita R. Quirante (Director IV), (02) 952-5700 local 2022 or
erquirante@coa.gov.ph; performanceinitiative@yahoo.com
 Michael L. Racelis (Director III), (02) 952-5700 local 2033 or

mlracelis@coa.gov.ph
Acknowledgments Director Quirante and Director Racelis provided the technical assistance and
supervised the audit until the development of the report. Atty. Roberto D.
Mabagos, Jr. assisted in the review process. Priscilla DG. Rivera (Team
Leader), Jeremy A. Maceda (Assistant Team Leader), Policarpo L. Silva, Jr.,
Czyrhinne R. Castillo, Mariann U. Ceripulo, Gerverlyn Mila, Atty. Mark Dale
Diamond P. Perral, Engr. Reynaldo N. Lagunoy, Engr. Mark John L. Aquino
and Engr. Jan Robert V. Matienzo (All Team Members) performed the audit
and made key contributions to the report.
Alexander B. Juliano (Assistant Commissioner) provided invaluable inputs in

the finalization of the report.
Page 79 PAO-2018-01

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Performance Audit Report

BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION

BFP’s Capability of Safeguarding

Audit BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION – MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Highlights BFP’s Capability of Safeguarding the Populace from Destructive Fires

The Commission on Audit (COA)

Appendix I Objectives, Scope and Methodology 63

Appendix II 19 Municipalities with Fire Trucks but without BFP-Owned Fire 64

Appendix III Delays in the Construction of Fire Stations 65

Appendix IV Typical Design of Fire Stations 66

Appendix V 308 Municipalities without Fire Stations 68

Appendix VI 59 Municipalities with Fire Stations but without Fire Truck 74

Appendix VIII Regions with BFP Unserviceable Units 78

Appendix IX COA Contacts and Acknowledgments 79

Tables Table 1: Financial Requirement of SEP and SUMP 5

Table 17: CBP Phase 2 Shipment Schedule and Actual Delivery 28

Figures Figure 1: Goals, Performance Indicators and Targets of the 3

Figure 11: Sample of Fire Stations Below the Existing Concrete 21

Page iii PAO-2018-01

ABC Approved Budget for Contract

SEP Service Establishment Program

December 21, 2018

DIRECTOR LEONARD R. BAÑAGO, DSC

Dear Director Bañago:

In line with its vision to become an enabling partner of the government in

The Modernization Program of 2010 was brought about by the enactment of

The Modernization Program seeks to upgrade the government’s firefighting

 Service Establishment Program – is a multi-year comprehensive

provision for 7 additional staff to take charge of the fire prevention

 Service Upgrading and Modernization Program – is also a multi-year

 Non-Conventional Service Establishment Program (NCSEP) – proposes

Figure 1: Goals, Performance Indicators and Targets of the

Figure 2: Key Implementers of the Modernization Program

Under RA No. 6975, the provision of firefighting protection and rescue

To institutionalize the areas of cooperation and coordination of the BFP with

The BFP is not on track

Table 1: Financial Requirement of SEP and SUMP

Table 2: Sources of Funds for the Modernization Program (in million)

Figure 3: Budget Share of Fire Protection Services

Source: BFP Fund Releases for CYs 2011-2017

Details on fund utilization regarding construction of fire stations, procurement

Low budget Second, procurement. As mentioned in previous discussions, BFP failed to

Table 3: Improvement Standard for Fire Stations

The BFP failed to

Table 4: Target Construction of Fire Stations per SEP and SUMP

Table 5: Target Fire Stations versus Programmed in the APP

Table 6: Status of Funds for the Construction of Fire Stations

Table 7: Breakdown of Fund Transfer to PITC

Clarification on the status of procurement relating to the fund transfer revealed

1) Paluan, Occidental Mindoro - no bidder/contractor wanted to bid

Further details on this issue are discussed on page 13 – Findings on the

Section 7.6 of 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of RA

Table 8: Status of Programmed Fire Stations

Figure 4: Annual Target Number of Fire Stations against Number of

150 135 135 135 135 135 135 135

Targeted Funded Completed Ongoing

Sources: Financial Requirements of SEP and SUMP, Fund Releases and

The completed fire stations represented 63 per cent of the 416

Figure 5: Status of Construction of 416 Fire Stations Contracted in CYs

Completed, 263 Ongoing, 44

Source: Status of Accomplishments

Review of project documents revealed that delays were incurred in the