Definitions and Criteria

Author(s): Robert Brown

Source: Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 5 (Apr., 1962), pp. 109-112
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3326337
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 DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

By ROBERT BROWN

THERE is a common distinction between two sorts of definitions

which is rapidly assuming the unwarranted status of a truism. It is
the distinction between definition by genus and species, on the one hand,
and definition by deviation from paradigms, on the other.
Thus in his essay 'Definition, Presupposition and Assertion ', Max
Black begins by saying:
When logicians speak of the definition of a term, they usually have in
mind analysis or description of the term's connotation. A characteristic
statement is ' To define a term is to state its connotation or to enumerate
the attributes ;t implies. Thus we define a parallelogram as a quadrilateral
figure whose sides are parallel '. In this type of definition, we are supposed
to ' state' the connotation by successively dividing an inclusive genus
into progressively narrower subspecies. Such a definition provides a
necessary and sufficient condition for the application of the term. ....
(The definition) provides a conclusive test for membership in the . . .
corresponding class.'

But, Black goes on to say, such definitions hardly occur outside an

uninterpreted calculus, e.g., pure mathematics. For consider how we
define the names of natural types, names like 'dachshund '. The
dictionary gives: 'one of a German breed of small hounds with a long
body and very short legs '. This, says Black, would not enable a person
unacquainted with these ' agreeable little beasts or with the name applied
to them ... to recognise a dachshund when he met one '.2 And this, he
thinks, is equivalent to saying that the definition does not provide a
necessary and sufficient criterion for the application of the term. By ' a
criterion ' he means ' a test which can be used in determining whether the
word in question should be rightly applied to a given specimen. Such a
test will normally mention some character . . . that the specimen is
required to have. Thus, one criterion for the application of the word
" dachshund " is that the specimen be within a given size range '.3 Not
all words have criteria of application, e.g., colour words do not.
Black concludes that no one of the criteria of 'dachshund '--even
those listed in a Kennel Club Handbook-is by itself either necessary or
sufficient, nor is any combination of them. Instead, there is a large
variety of features with a certain range of variation; a typical dachshund
-a paradigm case-possesses these features within their permitted ranges.
But dachshunds do not form a class; they have no common attribute;
there are border line regions between them and other breeds.
1 In Problems of Analysis, p. 24. 2 Ibid., p. 25.
3 Ibid., footnote, p. 26.
109

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110 ANALYSIS

A similar situation, says B

of the arts and crafts, of l
philosophy as well. All of t
conformity to type-to st
definition per genus et differ
Paul Ziff, in his book Sem
argues that there is a differ
in English and saying th
' tiger' has meaning, but no
'tiger' not being definable
for example, is so definable
vorous feline quadruped '. I
the phrase ' three-legged t
not, whereas the phrase
" Unlike the word ' tiger ',
English but has a meaning
thus: In one sense, the word
'brother', unlike the wor
necessary and sufficient co
correctly ask either "Wh
is a tiger? " but not, wha
" What is the meaning of '
be asked only if there we
sufficient conditions for be
Now this distinction betw
the obscurity arises from t
the application of the term
its application. A criterio
character that the specim
difference between apply
'brother ') and applying a t
The necessary and sufficien
' parallelogram' is that the s
sides. But how can I test fo
terpreted calculus ? I can co
ruler and compasses metho
whose opposite sides repres
this type, I can then mathem
sides are parallel. What I am
ever, is a class of figures
specimen. If, following Blac
instance of a figure is a pa
particular area, e.g., the are
Sp. 185.

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 DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA 111

does the status of this window differ from that

the instance is not an outline of a specific area,
after all, token-parallelograms which do not
Unless there are, it looks as though the' sufficient
does not apply to parallelograms any more-or a
dachshunds.
The problem is supposed to be that of finding a criterion which will
enable us to correctly apply a term to individual specimens. And the only
way in which this can be done in the case of individual parallelograms, it
seems, is by physical procedures, e.g., measurement of the distances
between the sides to discover if they are parallel. But how does this
procedure differ from measuring the length of Putzi's legs in order to
find out whether they are under the maximum permitted length for
dachshunds ? The same sort of doubt can arise in each case: whether our
figure and Putzi are admitted may well depend upon our measuring
techniques. In each case there will be a range of variation displayed by
the 'defining feature'. What is to count as having parallel sides is no
more clearcut than what is to count as being at least eight inches high
at the shoulder. There are clear and unclear cases of parallelograms
exactly as there are of dachshunds.
There are two questions which Black amalgamates. One is the
question whether a given definition states sufficient and necessary
conditions for the application of a term. The other is whether that same
definition will enable some given person to recognize a specimen-to
apply the term. The mere fact that a definition supplies necessary and
sufficient conditions does not ensure that a particular person will under-
stand how to make use of them-or be in a position to do so. If I am
ignorant of simple mathematics I shall not be able to determine whether
this figure formed by the ruler and compasses method is a parallelogram
-even though I am familiar with the definition of 'parallelogram'.
On the other hand, the definition of' dachshund' as ' one of a German
breed of small hounds with a long body and very short legs ' may well
enable some people to recognize a dachshund. It will do so if they have
a certain background of knowledge. Their failure or success in recog-
nition is quite independent of the sorts of conditions supplied by the
definition. When we ignore this simple distinction we are likely to be
led on to say, as Black implies, that the definitions of words like ' dach-
shund' supply no necessary and sufficient conditions because the
definitions do not enable every person to recognize every specimen.
But is it true that such conditions cannot be supplied for ' dachs-
hund' or 'tiger' or 'platypus ', whereas they can be for 'parallelo-
gram' or' brother '? Consider the platypus as an oviparous monotreme
mammal with webbed feet. The only other monotreme mammals are
the echidnas, and they have claws. Does this characterization of the

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 112 ANALYSIS

platypus supply a necessa

class ? Why is not each feat
all three features not suff
is the objection that of Z
platypus that has one foo
biologists distinguish betw
three-legged kind of tiger,
variety of platypus with u
or sufficient when they are t
which are left unstated. In
tions as: mammals require f
and deformity; they do not
is true, however, of all u
conditions' when it is app
contexts. The definition of
Its definition (' male of the
way as can the definition o
same parents' then sons o
brothers. Nor would her
difference, if any, between
meaning cannot be accounte
Black be correct in saying
no common attribute whic
the only type of dog whose
length.
The conclusions I draw are three: (1) we ought not to confuse our
ability to state a necessary and sufficient criterion with our ability
decisively to apply the criterion in a given case; that is, we ought not to
confuse defining a class with recognizing a member of that class; (2) we
ought not to confuse the vagueness of words that refer to empirical
properties with our ability-or inability-to state necessary and sufficient
criteria for their use; (3) we ought to be clear about the need for assump-
tions when we make use, in empirical contexts, of the phrase ' necessary
and sufficient conditions '.

Australian National University

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