G.R. Nos.

133570-71
People Of The Philippines, appellee, 
v.
Nerio Suela y Hembra, Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan, appellants.
January 15, 2002
FACTS:
On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant John
Doe (not his real name) was at the master's bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse
residence at #95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision, Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his
former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo 'Gerry' Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in
the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves,
brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room. The three intruders then shouted 'dapa,
dapa.' So, the victims dropped to the floor with their faces facing the bed. Two of the malefactors
turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their backs. The intruders took, robbed and
carried away the following: one (1) 14" Sony Trinitron colored TV, three (3) cameras, assorted
jewelries, and cash money worth P500,000.00. On the occasion of said robbery, victim
Geronimo ‘Gerry’ Gabilo died from stab wounds.

After almost five (5) months of no leads towards solving the case, John Doe’s (not his
real name) executive secretary at his DECS received a call from a male person who said that he
has information as to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for the death of his
friend, Gabilo. He told her that he is willing to give the information in writing in exchange for
₱200,000.00. The man was caught in the entrapment operation executed with the police. This
person was later identified as appellant Edgar Suela, who subsequently confessed the names of
his conspirators.

The trial court found the appelants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide and simple robbery. Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of disguise was not
alleged in the Information, it cannot now be appreciated to increase the penalty to death,
notwithstanding the fact that the new rule requiring such allegation was promulgated only after
the crime was committed and after the trial court had already rendered its Decision. The trial
court sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of death.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of disguise can be appreciated against
appelants
Whether or not the proper penalty is death
RULING:
 The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110 states:

"Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

In People v. Mauricio, the Court elucidated:

"The use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure
to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are
not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are
given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused."

In the present case, the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was appreciated by the
court a quo was not alleged in the Informations against appellants. Following the above-cited
new rule and current jurisprudence, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
disguise against appellants. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the
penalty of reclusion perpetua  to death. There being no appreciable aggravating circumstance, the
proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, in People v. Catubig, we held that while a non-alleged but proven aggravating
circumstance cannot be used to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the source of civil
awards.
 G.R. Nos. 140407-08 and G.R. Nos. 141908-09 
People Of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, 
v.
PO3 Renato F. Villamor and Jessie "Joy" Maghilom (At Large), accused.
PO3 Renato F. Villamor, accused-appellant.
and
People Of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, 
v.
PO3 Renato F. Villamor and Jessie "Joy" Maghilom (At Large), accused.
PO3 Renato F. Villamor, accused-appellant.
January 15, 2002
FACTS:
At around dusk of November 24, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on
their way home to Barangay Mitakas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, on board a motorcycle
after having dinner at a friend's house at Barangay Landing, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.
Jerry was driving. As they neared the junction of Barangays Lusot and Mitakas, they heard a
speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. The brothers ignored the other motorcycle,
which caught up with them. As they were about to cross the bridge leading to their home,
gunshots rang out from behind them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around towards the
direction of the gunfire. The light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers aboard
the second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a second time and fled towards the direction
of Calamba, Misamis Occidental. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds on the abdomen and left
elbow, but survived. He got a good look at their assailants, PO3 Renato Villamor and Jessie
Maghilom. Maghilom was driving the motorcycle while Villamor was holding a short gun
pointed at them. Jelord, however, was not as fortunate, as he died on the spot during the first
gunburst.
The accused were charged with murder and frustrated murder, with treachery and taking
advantage of public position. PO3 Renato Villamor was sentenced to the penalty of death, while
Jessie Maghilom remained at large.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was treachery
Whether or not the accused took advantage of his public position
RULING:

We agree with the trial court that the killing of Jelord Velez was attended by treachery
or alevosia.  There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing inasmuch as the two
conditions for the same are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.  The essence of treachery is the swift, sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

The treacherous manner in which accused-appellant and Jessie "Joy " Maghilom

perpetrated the crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the
unsuspecting and apparently unarmed victims but also by the deliberate manner in which the
assault was perpetrated. In this case, a totally unsuspecting Jelord Velez held onto his brother
Jerry on board their motorcycle on their way home blissfully unaware of the onrushing peril
behind them. The attendance of treachery qualifies the killing to Murder.

The Court, however, agrees with the Solicitor General that the trial court improperly
applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position as provided for in
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance,
the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a
means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry
"Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?"

In this case, there was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a
policeman to shoot Jelord Velez or that he used his "influence, prestige or ascendancy" in killing
the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Velez even without being a policeman. In other
words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position,
there is no abuse of public position. Only recently, in People v. Herrera, the Court emphatically
said that the mere fact that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his government issued .38
caliber revolver to kill is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the
commission of the crime.

The proper imposable penalty for the killing of Jelord Velez is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. So, too, must the penalty imposed by the trial court for
Frustrated Murder be modified considering that it necessarily arose from the same incident
which caused the death of one of the victims. While we agree with the lower court that the
penalty for a frustrated felony is one degree lower than that of a consummated crime, pursuant to
Article 50 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty in the absence of
any modifying circumstances is likewise to be imposed in its medium period in accordance with
Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Code.

In this case, the proper imposable penalty for Frustrated Murder is Reclusion Temporal in
its medium period, which has a range of Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day
to Seventeen Years and Four (4) Months. The penalty one degree lower than Reclusion
Temporal is Prision Mayor, from which the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
imposable on accused-appellant shall be taken.
 G.R. No. 137036
People Of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, 
v.
Hernando de Mesa and Two (2) John Does, accused.
Hernando de Mesa, accused-appellant.
March 14, 2001
FACTS:
In the evening of October 15, 1996, Patricio Motas, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Sta.
Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, was shot dead while playing a card game with some townmates at a
neighborhood store. One of those implicated in the killing was Hernando de Mesa, the appellant
in this case.
A few minutes after the shooting, two witnesses, Umali and Maghirang, saw accused-
appellant within the vicinity of the crime scene carrying a long firearm. He and his companions
were walking fast. Umali heard accused-appellant's companion ask him, "Ano sa palagay mo
pare?" to which he replied, "Sigurado akong patay iyong putang inang si Chairman." Evidence
shows that accused-appellant and the victim had some violent fights in the past, resulting in
accused-appellant threatening to kill Barangay Chairman Motas. Motive is generally irrelevant,
unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Accused-appellant left his
residence in Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City after the killing of Barangay Chairman
Motas. Records show that he did not appear during the preliminary investigation despite service
of notice. Neither did he file a counter-affidavit. Furthermore, when the police went to his
residence to serve the warrant of arrest, they found that accused-appellant was no longer there.
They gathered information that he was hiding somewhere in Quezon Province to evade his
arrest. He was later apprehended by the police in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
Hernando de Mesa and two (2) John Does were charged with murder with treachery and
evident premeditation. The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
trial court, in convicting accused-appellant for murder, appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, nighttime and commission of the crime in contempt of or with
assault to public authorities.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances are present and can be appreciated against
the accused

RULING:

The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms of attack which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the
crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For
treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2)
the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. The circumstantial evidence on
record does not prove that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the
accused-appellant to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack to ensure the
commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. Absent any
particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in
the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. The mere fact that the wounds
were found at the back of the victim does not by itself prove that there was treachery. An attack
from behind is not necessarily treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was
adopted by the accused deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without
any risk to the assailant from the defense that the party assaulted may make. Hence, treachery
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar, there being no eyewitnesses
to the killing or evidence on the manner of its execution.

The Court also found that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. The
fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain such aggravating
circumstance. For nocturnity to properly attend the commission of a crime, it must be shown that
it facilitated the commission and that it was purposely sought by the offender. These facts were
not proved in the case at bar.

The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the
commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. The requisites
of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2)
he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are
present in this case. In the first place, the crime was committed against the barangay chairman
himself. At the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he
was in fact playing a card game with his neighbors.

Absent any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by accused-

appellant is only homicide, for which the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering that there is neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance present in this case, the penalty that may be imposed on
accused-appellant is prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum.
 G.R. Nos. 144086-87
People Of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, 
v.
Edralin Taboga, accused-appellant.
February 6, 2002
FACTS:

In the early morning of April 1, 1998, at Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, Barangay Councilman
Cirilo Urayani woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He thought people were lighting
firecrackers in the neighboring barangay to celebrate their fiesta. He went out of the house to
fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire. Marites Ceria, a niece of Francisca
Tubon, was also awakened by the explosions. She rushed to her aunt’s house and, seeing it on
fire, shouted for help. She called out the name of her aunt but there was no response. Barangay
Captain William Pagao heard Marites’ shouts for help. He and other barangay officials and
residents helped in dousing out the fire using a water pump. When they entered the burned
house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and
found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased. A sack of about four (4) gantas of rice was
found some thirty to forty meters away from the burned house. Also found were two crumpled
five peso bills, twenty peso and fifty peso bills, and a five dollar bill underneath a big stone along
the barangay road. The investigators likewise found a necklace with pendant, three rings, a
certificate of ownership of large cattle and a vial of perfume near the scene. The deceased’s
former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria, Edwin Ceria, Tante Dumadag and
Edralin Taboga. Brgy. Capt. Pagao noticed fresh blood stains on the short pants of Taboga. He
confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca Tubon and set the
flue-cured tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead
body of the old woman, to be burned.

The accused was charged with robbery with homicide, aggravated by the circumstances
that the crime was committed in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of
her age and sex, that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party and that the
crime was committed after an unlawful entry. The accused was also charged with arson,
aggravated by the circumstance that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and that the crime was committed after an unlawful entry.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes with all
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, and sentenced him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide for the robbery or theft was not proven
 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating that the crime of homicide was
committed  in the victim’s dwelling and without regard to her age and sex

RULING:

1. The elements of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property thus
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in a
generic sense, was committed. In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is the basic
tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for all
the offenses charged – ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove. The conviction of accused-appellant must rest not on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

In proving the case of Robbery with Homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be
established conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. This is not so in the instant
case. Apart from the sack of rice, necklace with pendant, three rings, vial of perfume and cash
which were recovered within the vicinity of the burned house, no one saw accused-appellant
actually asporting these items, much less has it been satisfactorily shown that robbery was the
main purpose of the culprit in perpetrating the crimes. Yet accused-appellant was convicted of
the complex crime because according to the lower court, "[w]ith the recovery of the various
items in or about the vicinity of the burned house, including cash money, the [c]ourt
is convinced that robbery was the main purpose of the culprit and that the killing was merely
incidental thereto." This is a glaring error because it practically convicts the accused-appellant of
the crime charged on the basis of an assumption. Where a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the accused can be
convicted only of the offense proved. Absent any evidence that the accused indeed robbed the
victim, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide cannot stand.

2. The circumstance of dwelling aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in
the residence of the offended party and the latter was not given provocation. It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the
human abode. As one commentator puts it, one’s dwelling is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus
one who slanders another in the latter’s house is more severely punished than one who offends
him elsewhere.

Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the

malefactor deliberately  intended to offend or insult the age of the victim.  Neither could disregard
of respect due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to offend or
disregard the sex of the victim. In other words, killing a woman is not attended by the
aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect
towards the offended party’s sex. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that accused-
appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim. However, even if disrespect or
disregard of age or sex were not appreciated, the four circumstances enumerated in Article 14,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, can be considered singly or together.
 G.R. No. 183563
People Of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v.
Henry Arpon y Juntilla, Accused-Appellant.
December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines,
Henry Arpon, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will. The
same happened five (5) times in July, 1999, the offended party was then twelve years old. The
same crime happened two (2) more times in August, 1999.
AAA testified that in one afternoon when she was only eight (8) years old, the accused-
appellant, who was then thirteen (13) years old, raped her inside their house. She could not
remember, though, the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off
her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down
his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA
felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he pulled out his organ,
she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times
on different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of
AAA, in the house of AAA’s neighbor. He came to AAA’s house, took off her panty and went
on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his
penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July
of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped.
She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.
AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night
and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door therein
was detached.
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at
nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt
pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis
penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother
of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-
appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded
to also rape her younger sister, DDD.
The accused-appellant was charged with eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations.
The aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree is alleged in all informations.
 The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years
old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle,
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against
the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, stated that the court failed to consider his minority as a
privileged mitigating circumstance.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating
circumstance
Whether or not the proper penalty is death
RULING:

The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal
responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count
of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-
appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor. For the subsequent counts of rape that
were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. In accordance
with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in
conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of
age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with." Thus, because the accused-appellant acted with discernment, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.