I.A.

1. Imbong vs Ochoa

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law). Petitioners herein challenge the said law for being unconstitutional based on the following
grounds:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
2. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
3. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
4. The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of
conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.
5. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners
note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still
forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are correct in claiming that the RH Law is unconstitutional based on the grounds
alleged.

Answer:

1. Right to Life is violated. In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily
destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its
approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. Evidently, with the addition of the word
"primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires.. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. For the same reason, this definition
of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
fail-safe mechanism. Thus the two provisions containing the word “primarily” must be struck down.

2. No involuntary servitude involved. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render
pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their
will.

3. No violation of equal protection clause. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged
by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.” For a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. 

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number. Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple
may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.

4. Due Process Clause not violated. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

According to petitioners, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution.”

In determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the
RH Law which defines a "public health service provider,” viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services;
or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as
such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information,
but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information.”

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth.

5. The guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to
provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH
Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

RH Law was declared constitutional.

I.A.3
2. International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing

Facts:
The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.

The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages”
foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.

The compensation scheme is simply the School’s adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level
in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.

Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

Issue:
Whether or not the School’s system of compensation is violative of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”.

Ruling:
Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. In the workplace, where the
relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are
not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by
which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the
Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would
be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to
promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example,
prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for
work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. 

There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

3. Serrano vs Gallant Maritime

Facts:
*The law in question is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 – Migrant Workers Act, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The petitioner, Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
approved Contract of Employment.

During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. The downgrade is contrary to the Chief
Officer post that he initially signed up for. (with higher salary rate).

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on
as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.

Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months, but at the time of his repatriation he had served
only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-
three (23) days. He then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73. LA declared the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarded him monetary benefits. As to the benefits, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC citing that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts. Respondents also appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable
salary rate.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of such clause based on Sec. 3, Art. XIII on labor as a protected sector,
arguing that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of
OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases
involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only
three months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries
of their employees. As petitioner puts it:

In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they have to give
their employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers
the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be
more than three (3) months.

Issue:
Does the subject clause violate Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?

Ruling:
Yes. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as
to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at
two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.

The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph
of Sec. 10 of Republic Act 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

4. Canuel vs Magsaysay Maritime

Facts:
On July 14, 2006, Nancing Canuel was hired by respondent Magsaysay Maritime as Third Assistant Engineer dor its
foreign principal, Kotani Ship Management to be employed for a period of 12 months.

Seven months later, Nancing figured in an accident while in the performance of his duties on board the vessel and as
a result, injured the right side of his body. He was brought to Shanghai Seamen’s Hospital where he was diagnosed
with “bilateral closed traumatic hemothorax.” On March 24, 2007, he was medically repatriated and immediately
admitted to Manila Doctor’s Hospital. Due to his worsening conditions, he eventually died on April 25, 2007 where
his medical certificate indicated that the cause of death as acute respiratory failure, with lung metastasis and r/o bone
cancer as antecedent cause and underlying cause, respectively.

Nancing’s widow and children filed a complaint against Magsaysay and Kotani, as well as Magsaysay’s
Manager/President, Eduardo U. Manese (respondents), before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
seeking to recover death benefits, death compensation of minor children, burial allowance, damages, and attorney’s
fees.
Respondents denied any liability and contended that while Nancing died of acute respiratory failure, the real cause
of his death, as shown in the autopsy conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, was "moderately
differentiated andenocarcinoma, pneumonia and pulmonary edema, lung tissue" or lung cancer. The said illness is
not work-related hence, not compensable.

LA ruled in favor of petitioners and held that his death occured during the term of his contract and that the death was
sustained in performance of his job, thus work-related. Further it held that the injury sustained while working on
board the vessel that triggered the deterioration of his resistance against lung cancer.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of Nancing occured during the term of his contract, work-related and compensable.

Ruling:
Yes.
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
xxxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the
term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the
seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local
government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at
sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master’s
best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency
to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines currency
equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at
the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. 

Integral as they are for a valid claim for death compensation, the Court examines this case according to the above-
stated dual requirements.

First Requirement:

“11. Work-Related Injury – injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment.
12. Work-Related Illness – any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied.”

It is clear that the first requirement for death compensability is present. Compensability does not depend on whether
the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related
or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer’s]
employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his
employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an
employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain
infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them,
and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a
perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which
compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be
had for injury independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease.
Second Requirement:

The Seafarer’s Death Should Occur During The Term Of Employment.

The Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur during
the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of his employment due to his
medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto.

Section 18 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC:

SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the seafarer arrives at the
point of hire for any of the following reasons:
1. when the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to Section 20 (B)
[5] of this Contract.

A strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC, especially when the same would result into inequitable
consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to
give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so impressed with public interest
that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is one of liberal
construction.

Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that medical repatriation cases
should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. It is enough that the seafarer’s work-
related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.
Here, since it has been established that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related injury or illness
during the term of his employment, (b) his injury or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was
later determined that the injury or illness for which he was medically repatriated was the proximate cause of his
actual death although the same occurred after the term of his employment, the above-mentioned rule should squarely
apply. Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should be granted.

Thus, the death of Nancing occured during his term of contract, work-related, and thus, compnesable.