Rule 2

1. Distinguish failure to state a cause of action from lack of cause of action

Asia Brewery Inc. and Charles Go v. Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO),
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017, Sereno, C.J.

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before
a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the
allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause
of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.

Other answer from another case:

Butuan Development Corporation(BDC) v. Court of Appeals (Mindanao Station),

et.al. G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J.

Failure to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state
a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a
situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
The remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in
the second is to demur to the evidence.

2. What is the test of sufficiency of cause of action?

Jose Diaz, Jr. and Adelina McMullen vs Salvador Valenciano, Jr.

G.R. 209376, December 6, 2017, Peralta

In ascertaining the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into whether or not the
same
evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and the former causes of action.
If the answer is in the affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar; otherwise, that
prior judgment would not serve as such a bar to the subsequent action.

3. What is the significance of “sufficiency” of the cause of action in the complaint?

Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production Co. v. Philippine

Information Agency and Department of Public Works and Highways
G.R. No. 223751 March 15, 2017 LEONEN, J.:

It is well to point out that the plaintiff's cause of action should not merely be "stated"
but, importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient."
This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the
complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action.

4. Is the refusal to comply with the earlier demand which deals with possession by
mere tolerance creates a different cause of action from the one created by the
refusal to comply with the second demand letter which refers to possession by
tolerance which only arose when they neglected to execute the earlier judgment?

Jose Diaz, Jr. and Adelina McMullen vs Salvador Valenciano, Jr. G.R. 209376,
December 6, 2017, Peralta

Yes.

The refusal to comply with the earlier demand letter sent to Salvador, Sr. creates a
different cause
of action different from the one created by the refusal to comply with the second
demand letter by Salvador, Sr. The first deals with possession by mere tolerance while
the second refers to possession by tolerance which only arose when they neglected to
execute the earlier judgment.

Res judicata applies in the concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites
concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.

In this case, the court held that the first action did not bar the second applying the same
evidence rule. In ascertaining the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into
whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and
the former causes of action.

In an unlawful detainer case, the evidence needed to establish the cause of action would
be the lease contract and the violation of that lease. However, in this case where a
person occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, what must be· proven is that such possession is by mere
tolerance, and that there was a breach of implied promise to vacate the land upon
demand.
Rule 3

1. Whether a widow of the original party-plaintiff an indispensable party.

ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, petitioner –versus- ANTONIO T.

VILAR, respondent.G.R. No. 225309, FIRST DIVISION, March 6, 2018, TIJAM,
J

YES.

The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties

is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.

Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the
widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the
action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily
affect her interest in the subject matter of litigation as the party-plaintiff.

2. Whether the action to recover damages for an injury to the State against a
defendant’s executors or administrators survives upon the defendant’s death

GENOVEVA P. TAN, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY MELCHOR P. TAN AS

THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DECEASED PETITIONER, Petitioner,
-versus- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS, Respondent. G.R. No. 216756, FIRST DIVISION, August 08,
2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.

YES.
The action against her survives as it is one to recover damages for an injury to the State.
Rule 87, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates actions that survive against a
decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real
and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property.

3. Whether an unregistered association have the legal capacity to sue

ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

-versus- THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, QUEZON CITY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, AND QUEZON CITY
TREASURER'S OFFICE, Respondents. G.R. No. 230651, EN BANC, September 18,
2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no separate juridical
personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own name.

The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-compliance with this
requirement renders a case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue,
which refers to "a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party."

4. Whether an assignor is an indispensable party to an ejectment suit between the

assignee-petitioner and the defendant.
Philippine Veterans Bank, Petitioner, V. Spouses Ramon And Annabelle Sabado,
Respondents G.R. No. 224204. August 30, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

No.

HTPMI is not an indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against
respondents.

Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights to petitioner under the
Contract to Sell. By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all rights of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law, including the right to endorse
any and all terms and conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect the
amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the Property.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be
joined in a suit. An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy
or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.

5. Whether members of the City Council of (Cagayan De Oro) a LGU, may file a case
to question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without the City
Council’s authority.

Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City

G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017, Leonen, J.

YES. Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may file a case to
question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without the City Council’s
authority.
The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract
entered into by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city
itself. It is the local government unit which stands to be injured or benefited by any
judgment that may be made in this case. The city councilors merely represent the city in
the suit.

City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the basis that
the city
mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor’s authority to bind the city to
obligations
must emanate from the City Council. Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section
455(b)(l)(vi) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the city mayor
may sign
all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a city only upon authority of the
sanggumang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance.

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, requires prior
authorization from the Sangguniang Panlungsod, law, or ordinance, before a city mayor
may sign a contract in behalf of the city. If the city mayor has no authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to sign a contract, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
have standing to file a case to have this contract declared null and void.
Rule 4

1. What is the venue for annulment of contract

*Or can be asked in this way:
2. What is the venue for an complaint for Declaration For Nullity of Deed of Sale

RUDY L. RACPAN, Petitioner, -versus- SHARON BARROGA-HAIGH, Respondent.

G.R. No. 234499,THIRD DIVISION, June 06, 2018, VELASCO JR., J.

Applying the pronouncement in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, Inc., the
Court ruled that where the action is not intended for the recovery of real property but
solely for the annulment of a contract, it is a personal action that may be filed in the
court where the plaintiff or the respondent resides.

The venue of a case is determined by the primary objective for the filing of the case.
If the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract
or the recovery of damages, his complaint is a personal action that may be filed in the
place of residence of either party. On the other hand, if the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or if the action affects title to real property or or the
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property, then the complaint is a real action that must be brought
before the court where the real property is located.

3. How to determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is
capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation?

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, -versus- PHILIPPINE

BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 202836, En Banc, June 19,
2018, Leonen, J.

To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or
incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be
ascertained.

If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not
for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money
or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

4. Is the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note – which reads "any
action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be
brought in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any
place where RFCI has a branch/office, at its sole option" restrictive in nature?
Yes. It is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of
the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region;
or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing
allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has been
properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later
on.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be

shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only"
preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words
of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

5. Is the written stipulation on venue allowed?

The parties are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as
qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

Case for Qs number 4 & 5: RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER,

VS. ALFONSO O. PINEDA, JR., AND JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA, RESPONDENTS. [G.R.
No. 227147, SECOND DIVISION, July 30, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.]
Rule 5

Rule 6

1. Whether a complainant can file a motion for reconsideration from the decision
of the Ombudsman imposing upon her a penalty of one month suspension.

Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 198583, June 28, 2017, Mendoza, J.

Yes. A complainant is not entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for

reconsideration in the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts if the penalty imposed
was not higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine
equivalent to a one month salary.

2. What is the effect when the defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically
excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court?

The Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017,
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

If a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be
deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon
the same in further proceedings.

3. Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint for unsound business
practices filed by the petitioners and actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the
duly constituted acts of the defendants.

PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM, Petitioners, -versus-

DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Respondent. G.R. No. 194024, THIRD DIVISION, April 25, 2012, MENDOZA, J.

NO.
The HLURB is given a wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which may
constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in the real
estate trade. This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however,
that all cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under
its jurisdiction.

4. What is the criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or

permissive?

MANUEL C. BUNGCAYAO, SR, Petitioner, -versus- FORT ILOCANDIA

PROPERTY HOLDINGS, AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170483, SECOND DIVISION, April 19, 2010, CARPIO, J.
 (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the
compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well
as defendant’s counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory

5. Is it required that the cause of action of the original defendant(impleader) be the

same with the third-party defendant to implead the latter in a third-party
complaint?

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, -versus- FELIX

PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. G.R. No. 161909, FIRST DIVISION, April 25, 2012, BERSAMIN, J

No. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants
those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against him, or even
directly to the plaintiff.

Revised question:

The original defendant’s cause of action is based on contract of carriage, while the
third-party is based on torts. Is it correct when the original defendant impleads the
third-party in a third party complaint?

Yes. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants
those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against him, or even
directly to the plaintiff.
Rule 7

For Qs No. 1-3 MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG, Petitioner, -versus- PEAKHOLD

FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN
CITY, Respondents.G.R. No. 233922, SECOND DIVISION, January 24, 2018,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. How to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping

In Fontana Development Corporation v. Vukasinovic:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential
to ask whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another or
whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in
both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.

2. How to determine whether a party committed Forum shopping?

It can be committed in three (3) ways:

(1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).

3. Define forum shopping

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved
by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not
in one court, then in another.

4. What is the essence of forum shopping

Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., Yvonne S. Yuchengco, Atty. Emmanuel G.
Villanueva,
Sonny Rubin, Engr. Francisco Mondelo, and Michael Requijo, Petitioners.
vs.
Emma Concepcion L. Lin, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207277, January 16, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.

5. When does a petitioner guilty of forum shopping?

Union Bank of The Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 207914, January 18, 2017, Del
Castillo, J.

There is forum shopping ‘when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court.
Rule 8

1. Is the allegation of prescription against a complaint deemed as an admission?

FLORO MERCENE, Petitioner vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 192971, THIRD DIVISION, January 10, 2018, MARTIRES, J.

Yes. The allegation of prescription in the petitioner’s complaint is a mere conclusion of law.

Material averments not specifically denied are deemed admitted. Nonetheless, his conclusion that GSIS
judicially admitted that its right to foreclose had prescribed is erroneous. It must be remembered that
conclusions of fact and law stated in the complaint are not deemed admitted by the failure to make a
specific denial. Only ultimate facts must be alleged in any pleading and only material allegation of facts
need to be specifically denied.

2. What is the rule for failure to comply on a statement of material dates in the petition

Henry E. Yu, et al. v. SR Metals, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017, Peralta, J.
Failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused if the
dates are evident from the records. The more material date for purposes of appeal to the CA the date of
receipt of the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

3. DCDC
4. SC
5. CSC
 Rule 9

Failure to plead defenses and objections

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO G.R. No.
173946, SECOND DIVISION, June 19, 2013, Perez, J. (for Qs 1-3)

1. What is the effect of failure of the respondent to question in her motion to dismiss the
trail court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?

2. Does the Principle of estoppel by laches applies on the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of the parties? NO

3. Is the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant deemed waived if not
raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss?

Yes. Respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being
subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can
thereby waive it by silence."

ANSWER AND ADDITIONAL ANSWER for numbers 1,2 &3:

Based on the foregoing provisions(Rule 9,Sec. 1 and Rule 15, Sec. 8), the "objection on
jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the
answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by
laches."

Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of
those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must
be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of
the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived by virtue of the first sentence of the abovequoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.

Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim

FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FORBES PARK ASSOCIATION, INC.,

respondent. G.R. No. 133119, SECOND DIVISION, August 17, 2000, DE LEON, JR., J.
What is the effect when a compulsory counterclaim is not set up in the action filed by the
opposing party?

A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. If it is within
the jurisdiction of the court and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is
barred if it is not set up in the action filed by the opposing party.

What is the effect when a motion to dismiss was filed by the respondent but its existing
compulsory counterclaim at that time is already barred?

A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against
the party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant,
the counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed
at the instance of the counterclaimant.

3. When declaration of default is proper

NATIVIDAD LIM, Petitioner, - versus -NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, SPOUSES ROBERTO LL.
ARCINUE and ARABELA ARCINUE, Respondents G.R. No. 178789, THIRD DIVISION, November 14,
2012, ABAD, J.

The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion here. As the RTC pointed out, notwithstanding that
the Arcinues' failed to explain their resort to service by registered mail rather than by personal
service, the fact is that Lim's counsel expressly admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues'
motion for judgment by default on December 7, 1998 or 10 days before its scheduled hearing.
This means that the Arcinues were diligent enough to file their motion by registered mail long
before the scheduled hearing.

Personal service is required precisely because it often happens that hearings do not push
through because, while a copy of the motion may have been served by registered mail before
the date of the hearing, such is received by the adverse party already after the hearing. Thus,
the rules prefer personal service. But it does not altogether prohibit service by registered mail
when such service, when adopted, ensures as in this case receipt by the adverse party

ISSUE: Whether the order of default that the RTC entered against Lim was proper. (YES)
RULING:
Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such
an answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires
the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice
of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the
procedure under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s
failure to file the required answer can give rise to default. The Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion here. As the RTC pointed out, notwithstanding that the Arcinues' failed to explain
 their resort to service by registered mail rather than by personal service, the fact is that Lim's
counsel expressly admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment by
default on December 7, 1998 or 10 days before its scheduled hearing. This means that the
Arcinues were diligent enough to file their motion by registered mail long before the scheduled
hearing. Personal service is required precisely because it often happens that hearings do not
push through because, while a copy of the motion may have been served by registered mail
before the date of the hearing, such is received by the adverse party already after the hearing.
Thus, the rules prefer personal service. But it does not altogether prohibit service by registered
mail when such service, when adopted, ensures as in this case receipt by the adverse party.

Effect of an order of default, effect of partial default

MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, RENATO P. DRAGON and ESPERANZA TOLENTINO,

Petitioners, - versus - THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN
ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-AMC), INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 195592, FIRST DIVISION,
September 5, 2012, REYES, J.

Whether the prescriptive period was legally interrupted when petitioners, through several
letters, proposed for the restructuring of their loans until the respondent sent its final demand
letter on September 10, 1999.

YES

We agree with the trial and appellate courts, for as the records bear, that the ten (10)-year
prescriptive period to file an action based on the subject promissory notes was interrupted by
the several letters exchanged between the parties. This is in conformity with the second and
third circumstances under Article 1155 of the New Civil Code (NCC) which provides that the
prescription of actions is interrupted when: (1) they are filed before the court; (2) there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors; and (3) there is any written acknowledgment of
the debt by the debtor. In TMBC’s complaint against the petitioners, the bank sufficiently made
the allegations on its service and the petitioners’ receipt of the subject demand letters, even
attaching thereto copies thereof for the trial court’s consideration.

5. Relief from an order of default, extent of relief

SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, - versus - RAMON ONG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205249, SECOND DIVISION, October 15, 2014, LEONEN, J.

We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel was
validly acquired. This is so because, personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner
Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.

Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6.
Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative —
substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7.

The claim that they did not reside in the addressed stated is unmeritorious.The Spouses Manuel
cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing
to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential.
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally
handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse
to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the
person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
Rule 10

Amendment as a matter of right

Lisam Enterprises, Inc. etc. v. BDO, et al., G.R. No. 14264, April 23, 2012

1. What is the nature of Amendment as a matter of right?

Should the trial court admit an amended complaint if such amendment is a matter of right? YES

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer
and to prepare for trial.

2. How can a complaint be amended when a responsive pleading have already been filed?

A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made
only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case,
or that it was not made to delay the action.

Supplemental pleadings, distinction between amended and supplemental pleadings

3. Is the admission by the court of the supplemental pleading mandatory?

MA. MERCEDES L. BARBA, Petitioner, - versus - LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY,

Respondent. G.R. No. 193857, FIRST DIVISION, November 28, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

NO.
Under Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing
supplemental pleadings, the court "may" admit supplemental pleadings, such as the
supplemental petition filed by respondent before the appellate court, but the admission of
these pleadings remains in the sound discretion of the court.

For Qs 4-6
CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Petitioner - versus -BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent G.R. No. 173399, EN BANC, February 21, 2017, SERENO, CJ.
4. When may an amended/supplemental complaint be allowed by the court?
If no right existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit cannot be maintained,
even if the right of action may have accrued thereafter.

5. When may an amended/supplemental complaint NOT allowed by the court?

If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the
complaint, amendment is not allowed.

6. Can the party-litigant has the option to amend his pleading?

Yes. The prevailing rule on the amendment of pleadings is one of liberality, with the end of
obtaining substantial justice for the parties. However, the option of a party-litigant to
amend a pleading is not without limitation. If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not
existing at the time of the filing of the complaint, amendment is not allowed. If no right
existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit cannot be maintained, even if the
right of action may have accrued thereafter.
 Rule 11

Rules on payment of docket fees; effect of non-payment

1. What is the rule on payment of docket fees when the action is an intra-corporate controversy
where the recovery of some of money is the consequence of the principal relief sought?

HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED

- versus -
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
G.R. No. 224834, FIRST DIVISION, March 15, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

An intra-corporate controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable or incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such action is
one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Thus, the complainant should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the
applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141 (fees for all other actions not involving
property) of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.

For numbers 2&3: AYALA LAND, INC., Petitioner, -versus- THE (ALLEGED) HEIRS OF
THE LATE LUCAS LACTAO AND SILVESTRA AQUINO G.R. No. 208213, FIRST DIVISION,
August 08, 2018

2. Is a party-litigant estopped form claiming indigence should he subsequently be required to pay

additional fees?

Does a party-litigant precluded from filing a motion for exemption from paying the additional fees by
reason of indigence?

No.
A party who was assessed a minimal amount in filing fees may opt to simply pay the same although
he may qualify as a pauper litigant. He is not, by such initial payment, estopped from claiming
indigence should he subsequently be required to pay additional fees.

3. Is the requirement to pay additional docket fees denies the plaintiff’s right to free access to the
courts?

No. plaintiff's right to free access to the courts is not denied by the correct application of the rules on
legal fees because he could apply for the privilege to litigate his case as pauper if he is so entitled.

For numbers4&5:ISABEL G. RAMONES, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES TEODORICO GUIMOC,

JR. AND ELENITA GUIMOC, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226645, SECOND DIVISION, August 13, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

4. What is the effect of deficiency of the docket fees when the party acted in bad faith?

Jurisprudence now uniformly holds that "when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs
and there is intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule applies."

In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that "the non-payment of the
prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest
jurisdiction over the case in the trial court.

5. What is the effect of deficiency of the docket fees when the party acted in good faith?

The filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid
turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by
the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment." "The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the
clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith."
Rule 12
Motion for bill of particulars a. Purpose and when applied for

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 540 SCRA 431

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), petitioner, -versus- SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as
executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS), respondents. G.R. No. 148154, SECOND DIVISION,
December 17, 2007, QUISUMBING, J.

ISSUE: Whether the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as executor of former President
Marcos' estates considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the
motion was filed. (NO)

Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to
file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the default order against
the former president is deemed lifted

The only objection to the action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation,
it would be erroneous to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. Rules of procedure should be
liberally construed to promote their objective in assisting the parties obtain a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their case.

In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature,
manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz;
particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties; and the
specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.

While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and
unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful concert with" the former.

There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of
or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged
unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being
maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that
could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by
petitioner.
Rule 13
Modes of service of pleadings

1. What is the effect of lack of evidentiary basis upon the service made to the petitioner’s counsel’s
former address?

MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, Petitioner - versus -FRANCISCO DOLOR (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS)

AND HERMOGENA DOLOR, Respondents G.R. No. 198120, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 2017,
LEONEN, J.

The service made on the petitioner’s counsel's former address was ineffectual. Because the petitioner
failed to discharge her burden of proving the specific date in which service upon her counsel's updated
address was actually made.

In this case, none of the documents that petitioner adduced before this Court attests to the truth of her
allegation that service to her counsel's new and correct address was made only on a later date. Lacking
evidentiary basis, petitioner's contention that service upon her counsel's updated and correct address
was made only on a later date cannot be sustained.

2. When does the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be
excused?
Henry E. Yu, et al. v. SR Metals, Inc., et al.
G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017, Peralta, J.

Failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused if the
dates are evident from the records. The more material date for purposes of appeal to the CA the date of
receipt of the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

3. What are the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

REYNALDO E. ORLINA, Petitioner, -versus – CYNTHIA VENTURA, represented by her sons
ELVIC JHON HERRERA and ERIC VON HERRERA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 227033, THIRD DIVISION, December 3, 2018, PERALTA, J.
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to anyparty;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decisionrendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.

4. What are instances when the court relax the rule on failure to attach a written explanation in the
pleadings and paper?
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP./AIR-SEA HOLIDAY GMBH STABLE ORGANIZATION
ITALIA/ MARLON R. ROÑO, Petitioners, -versus- ELMER V. ENANOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 224115, SECOND DIVISION, June 20, 2018, REYES, JR., J.

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court mandates that pleadings and papers be served and filed
personally; in the instances that personal service and filing are not practicable, resort to other modes
could be had, but only if the party concerned attaches a written explanation as to why personal service
and filing is deemed impracticable.

Even then, should the party concerned fail to attach a written explanation in his/her pleadings and
papers, the Court, in its discretion, may consider the same as not filed.
In the exercise of this authority, and in ruling for the liberal interpretation of the mandatory rule, the
Court shall consider: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3) "the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to
be expunged for violation of Section 11.

5. What is the effect of failure to attach an affidavit of the person who sent a copy of the motion via
private courier?

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, -versus-JOSEPHINE L. PAPA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200469, THIRD DIVISION, January 15, 2018, MARTIRES, J.

It has the effect of denial of motion, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively considered
as not filed.

In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as equivalent to filing by
ordinarymail. The Court opines that this pronouncement equally applies to service of pleadings and
motions.Hence, to prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an affidavit of
the person who mailed the motion or pleading.
Rule 14

1. In an obligation involving conjugal partnership, is the service of summons to wife binds the
husband although the latter alleges that their marriage was annulled?
RAMON R. VILLARAMA -versus- CRISANTOMAS D. GUNO, G.R. No. 197514, FIRST DIVISION,
August 06, 2018, TIJAM, J.

Considering that the obligation entered into by Crisantomas and Carmelita clearly appeared to be a
transaction that their conjugal partnership is liable for, they were therefore correctly made codefendants
as they had the same interests therein. Also, as the case involves an action in personam over documents
entered into as regards a conjugal property, We reiterate that We deem the receipt of Carmelita of the
summons as binding to her as it is to Crisantomas.

The core of the service of summons, which is the protection of the right to due process, cannot be said to
have been transgressed in this case. Crisantomas failed to substantiate his claims that he failed to receive
summons or that he was never notified of the proceedings. We further stress that Carmelita was able to
actively participate in the proceedings and litigate their interests - which are undeniably the same, and
that Crisantomas was unable to prove that he and Carmelita were already separated in fact or their
marriage was otherwise annulled at that time

YES. When the conjugal partnership is liable, the receipt of the wife of the summons is considered as
binding to her and to her husband. Mere allegations of the husband that their marriage was annulled at
the time of service of summons, when unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

2. Was there a valid service of summons made at the office of the president of the company through
one of the the president’s secretary?
INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM, PETITIONERS, -versus-
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND
JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 203298, THIRD DIVISION, January 17, 2018, MARTIRES, J.

Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a domestic private juridical
entity,service may be made on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. It has been held that this enumeration is exclusive. Service on a domestic
private juridical entity must, therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. If the service of summons is made upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11, the same is invalid.

There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court, to
acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further
undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina, who was merely
one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under Section 11 of
Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial
court jurisdiction over Expressions.

For Qs 3,4&5 BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, AS REPRESENTED BY MARIE REGINE F. FUJITA,

Petitioner, - versus - ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194262, FIRST DIVISION, February 28, 2018, TIJAM, J.

3. What are the modes of service of summons when the action is a petition for annulment of
judgment and the defendant is in the Philippines?

For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment is
in personam. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the
service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service.

4. What are the circumstances required to a sheriff before resorting to a substituted service of
summons?

The following circumstances, as required in Manotoc, should be clearly-established:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or place of business

5. What is the effect when the sheriff fell short of the required standards?

For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service,
the same is rendered ineffective. As such, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions, which is generally accorded to a sheriff’s return,does not obtain in this case.
Rule 15

Notice of hearing & hearing of motions

Qs 1&2: Bernice Joan Ti vs Manuel Dino G.R. No. 219260, November 06, 2017

1. What is the effect of failure to comply with the requirement on Sec. 4 of Rule 15
(notice of hearing)?

All motions must be set for hearing and notice must be sent to adverse parties in such a manner that will
ensure their receipt 3 days before the scheduled date. Failure to comply with these requirements renders
a motion fatally defective which does not toll the reglementary period to appeal.

2. Is the court correct when it treated the MR as a mere scrap of paper for failure to comply with
the 3-day notice rule?

The RTC, in this case, correctly treated the MR as a mere scrap of paper for failure to comply with the 3-
day notice rule as petitioner was only able to receive a copy 3 days after the date of hearing.

The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least three
days before the date set for its hearing.

3. What is the purpose of the 3-day notice of hearing requirement?

United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v. Acropolis Central Guaranty Corp., G.R. No. 171750, January 25, 2012

The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least three
days before the date set for its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement, which was
established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon
the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments
interposed therein. It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been given the
opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule.

4. What is the effect when a party files motion for reconsideration which is not set for hearing?

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, petitioners, -versus- SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000, FIRST DIVISION, July 17, 2013,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

When a party files motion for reconsideration which is not set for hearing, it renders the motion without
no legal effect. It is considered a pro forma motion which shall not toll the reglementary period of the
appeal. This requirement is mandatory Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the
movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the
adverse party.

Omnibus motion rule

 5.
Heirs of Mariano Favis, et al. v. Juana Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014