Runway Excursion Analysis 2004-2009: (RERR 2nd Edition - Issued 2011)

RUNWAY
EXCURSION
ANALYSIS
REPORT
2004-2009
(RERR 2nd Edition – Issued 2011)
NOTE
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© International Air Transport Association 2011. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be
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written permission from:
Senior Vice President

Safety, Operations and Infrastructure
International Air Transport Association
800 Place Victoria, P.O. Box 113
Montréal, Québec
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2004-2009 RE Analysis Report ii RERR 2 Edition
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 RUNWAY EXCURSION DEFINITION .......................................................................... 2
1.2 DATA ........................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 EXCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................. 2
2 FUNDAMENTALS .................................................................................................................. 3
2.1 Runway excursions relative to all accidents ................................................................. 3
2.2 Runway excursions by aircraft type.............................................................................. 4
2.3 Runway excursions by phase of flight .......................................................................... 5
2.4 Accidents by type of excursion ..................................................................................... 7
2.5 Runway excursions by outcome – hull loss and fatality ................................................ 8
2.6 Fatalities by phase of flight:.........................................................................................10
3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 11

3.1 Runway excursions by region .....................................................................................11
4 CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS ............................................................................................... 13
5 AIRCRAFT GENERATION ................................................................................................... 19
6 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS .................................................................................................... 20
7 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 21
Appendix A — IATA Accident Criteria and Definitions ................................................................ 22
Appendix B — IATA REGIONS ....................................................................................................... 24
Appendix C — Aircraft Generations .............................................................................................. 28
Appendix D — Factors Involved in Runway Excursions.............................................................. 29
Appendix E — 2010 Excursion Accidents vs Incidents ............................................................... 31
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2004-2009 RE Analysis Report iii RERR 2 Edition
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2004-2009 RE Analysis Report iv RERR 2 Edition
1 INTRODUCTION
A runway excursion accident is defined as an accident where an aircraft on the runway surface
departs the end of the runway or side of the runway surface. It is the most frequent accident category
for worldwide accidents during the period of 2004-2009. Several accidents have brought the issue of
runway excursions to the forefront of aviation safety. Although runway excursions are the most
common type of accident, the fatality rate associated with runway excursions is much lower than in
other accident types such as Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) or Loss of Control (LOC).
Runway excursions can result in loss of life and/or injury to persons either on board the aircraft or on
the ground. The effect of runway excursions can result in damage to aircraft, airfield or off-airfield
installations including other aircraft, buildings or other items struck by the aircraft.
Runway excursions during takeoff and landing continue to be the highest category of aircraft accidents
and often exceed 25% of all annual commercial air transport accidents. In 2009, in response to a
continuing high number of runway excursions, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and
the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) published the first edition of the Runway Excursion Risk Reduction
(RERR) toolkit. The toolkit was designed to raise industry awareness of the magnitude and causes of
the phenomenon and to offer some guidance and best practices to mitigate the risks.
The IATA Safety Report for 2009 showed a continued high number of runway excursions, costing 19
lives and an estimated US$900 million in 2009 alone, and it was determined that an updated RERR
toolkit was warranted. The data in the first edition of the toolkit was compiled by the FSF and covered
a broad spectrum of aircraft operations. The FSF Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions report was
included in the 1st edition of the RERR toolkit, used data from runway excursions for all jet and
turboprop aircraft for the period of 1995 to 2008, including business jets and light twin aircraft. It has
also been included as a reference in the RERR 2nd edition toolkit.
This new Runway Excursion Analysis Report was compiled to provide a closer look at commercial
passenger and cargo operations, and is intended to complement the 2009 FSF report. In a number of
areas, comparisons were made with data from this report and the FSF report. It is important to note
that these two reports used different timeframes and accident categories, and therefore the results will
not align perfectly. Therefore, the data in this report is more accurate when directly addressing the
accident rate in the commercial air transport industry.
The IATA/ICAO RERR toolkit 2nd edition contains two very useful additional analyses of these types of
accidents:
• The Eurocontrol “Study of Excursions from a European Perspective,”
and
• A two part report on Runway Excursion from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (AR-208-
018).
For accuracy of the data, a timeframe of 2004 to 2009 was selected. For an accident to be included in
this report, it must have occurred to a commercial air transport industry passenger or cargo operator,
in a large aircraft, during commercial operations. See appendix A for the full IATA accident definition
used for data in this report.
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2004-2009 RE Analysis Report 1 RERR 2 Edition
Preliminary industry-wide IATA runway excursion data for 2010 recorded a total of 116 incidents and
accidents, with 24 of these events resulting in accidents. The 116 occurences may not represent
100% of the industry events due to under-reporting. In any case, these events represent one of
leading causes of accidents. A display of preliminary runway excursion incident events is presented in
Appendix E.
1.1 RUNWAY EXCURSION DEFINITION
For the purposes of this report a runway excursion event occurs when an aircraft on the runway
surface departs the end or side of the runway surface during takeoff or landing.
They consist of two types of events:
• Veer Off: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of a runway
• Overrun: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the end of a runway
It excludes both accidents where the aircraft did not initially land on a runway surface, and takeoff
excursions that did not start on a runway (e.g., inadvertent takeoffs from taxiways).
1.2 DATA
The data from which the report was generated included worldwide reported accidents resulting in hull
loss or substantial damage to all (western and eastern built) jet aircraft greater than 15,000 kgs and
turboprop aircraft greater than 5,700 kgs, from January 2004 to December 2009 inclusive.
This included a total of 594 accidents, of which 164 (28%) were identified to have constituted a
runway excursion. However, due to incomplete information for ten of those, the data for 154 accidents
was used for part of the analysis – findings are annotated to indicate which data set was used.
1.3 EXCLUSIONS
The data in this report specifically excludes the following:

• Private flights
• Business or military aviation
• Illegal flights
• Humanitarian relief flights
• Crop spraying or other agricultural flights
• Experimental or other test flights
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2 FUNDAMENTALS
2.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS RELATIVE TO ALL ACCIDENTS
During the preceding six years (2004 through 2009), commercial transport aircraft were involved in a
total of 594 accidents involving hull loss or substantial damage. Of those, 164 accidents (28%) were
runway excursion accidents. A total of 20 of the 164 accidents involved fatalities resulting in the death
of 483 passengers and crew. The accidents used in this analysis were included when there was
sufficient information available to make analytical determinations and category classifications; 154
runway excursion accidents were used in the analysis.
Figure 1 shows the number of runway excursion accidents involving commercial jet and turboprop
aircraft by year. Analyzing this data, the number of runway excursions initially declined year to year,
reaching a minimum total of 21 in 2006 but thereafter increasing or remaining constant. The peak
annual total maintained in 2008 and 2009 was 29 accidents. Runway excursions increased from 24%
of all accidents in 2007 to 32% in 2009. The close relationship between the annual number of runway
excursions and their percentage of the total is indicative of a consistent worldwide accident rate of
approximately 100 per year. The FSF report also indicated a similar pattern in runway excursion
accidents.
Figure 1: Runway excursions by year
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Figure 2 shows that 67% of runway excursions occurred in daylight vs. 24% in darkness. 9% were
unspecified.
Figure 2: Runway excursions during daylight vs. darkness
2.2 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
Turboprop aircraft were involved in 43% of the runway excursions and jets in the remaining 57%.
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of jets and turboprops involved in the runway excursion accidents.
The FSF report indicated a similar distribution of 45% turboprop and 55% jet aircraft.
Figure 3: Breakdown of runway excursions

by jets and turboprops
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Over the past six years, the annual percentage of accidents is approximately 15% runway excursion
accidents for jets and 12% for turboprops in the commercial aircraft fleet. Figure 4 depicts the
proportions of runway excursion accidents for jet and turboprop commercial aircraft. This does not
account for the relative fleet size or number of sectors flown by jets or turboprops.
Figure 4: Runway excursion accidents for jets and turboprops
2.3 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT
A total of 28 (or 17%) of runway excursions occurred during takeoff, and 136 (or 83%) of runway
excursion accidents occurred during landing, with two of them occurring during a balked (or rejected)
landing (statistically included in the landing phase). Figure 5 shows the percentage of runway
excursions during landing vs. takeoff.
Figure 5: Breakdown of runway excursion accidents by flight phase
The runway excursion probability was almost five times greater during landing than during takeoff.
The FSF report indicated 21% of runway excursions occurred on takeoff and 79% on landing.
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Viewed annually, takeoff excursion accidents decreased from 13 in 2004 to just one in 2006, but
increased again to an average of four per year in the next three years. From 2006 to 2009, the
number of landing excursion accidents grew at an increasing rate, to a peak total of 26. Figure 6
depicts the runway excursion accidents by phase of flight per year.
The FSF report showed an increasing trend in runway excursions on landing and a decreasing trend
on takeoff.
Figure 6: Runway excursion accidents per year by flight phase
Of the 124 accidents with sufficient information, 90 or 72% of landing excursions occurred during
daytime, and 34 or 27% of landing excursions occurred during darkness.
Figure 7: Take off and landing excursions during daylight vs. darkness
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2.4 ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF EXCURSION
Runway excursions were almost equally divided, with 54% veer-off and 46% overrun. This became
even closer to parity when analysis indicated that in approximately 3% of veer-off accidents the pilots
had deliberately steered off the side of the runway to avoid perceived hazards in the overrun. Figure 8
shows a minor difference between veer-off accidents and runway overrun accidents. The two types of
excursions were also almost equally divided in both the takeoff and landing phases. The FSF report
differed in this regard, showing an almost even distribution on landing but a significantly greater
proportion of overruns (63%) on takeoff.
Figure 8: Runway excursions veer-off vs. overrun
When analyzed by aircraft type, jet aircraft were significantly more prone to overrun accidents than
turboprops (52 accidents as opposed to 23), potentially due to the higher aircraft energy at takeoff and
landing and generally longer takeoff and landing distances. Figure 9 compares the turboprop with the
jet aircraft in regards to veer-off accidents vs. overrun accidents.
Figure 9: Runway excursions turboprops & jets – overruns vs. veer-off
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2.5 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY OUTCOME – HULL LOSS AND FATALITY
Runway excursion accidents were frequently survivable, even if the outcome was a hull loss. The data
in Figure 10 represents runway excursion hull loss and substantial damage accidents involving
western - and eastern-built jet and turboprop aircraft from 2004 – 2009.
Figure 10: Jet and turboprop hull loss vs. substantial damage accidents
Approximately 50% of the runway excursion accidents resulted in a hull loss, as opposed to
substantial damage, but only 20 accidents (12% of the total) included one or more fatalities. Figure 11
presents the hull loss and fatal runway excursion accidents. A total of 483 lives were lost in runway
excursions between 2004 and 2009 inclusive, the vast majority (469) resulted from the 15 fatal jet
aircraft accidents. Figure 12 presents the breakdown of the fatalities resulting from runway excursion
accidents per year.
Figure 11: Fatal and non-fatal hull loss runway excursion accidents
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Figure 12: Breakdown of the fatalities lost in runway excursion accidents per year
Fatal veer-off accidents (total seven across both jets and turboprops) were just over half the number
of fatal overrun accidents (13) but resulted in proportionately greater numbers of fatalities – an
average of 32.5 fatalities per veer-off as opposed to 19.7 for overruns. Figure 13 presents the number
of fatal accidents per runway excursion accident type.
Figure 13: Fatal veer-off vs. overrun accidents
In the five fatal takeoff runway excursions 23 fatalities occurred – an average of 4.6 per accident –
whereas the 15 fatal landing accidents accounted for 460 fatalities, or 30.6 per accident. Figure 14
shows the fatal accidents per phase of flight. The landing fatalities were divided almost equally
between veer-offs (224) and overruns (236). The two worst accidents in terms of fatalities (124 and
187) both occurred to jet aircraft on landing and were respectively an overrun and a veer-off. Table 1
in the next section shows the comparison between jet vs turboprop overrun and veer off fatalities.
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Figure 14: Fatal accidents per flight phase
2.6 FATALITIES BY PHASE OF FLIGHT:
Fatalities by aircraft type:

• Total (2004-2009): 483
• Jet: 469 (97%)
• Turboprop: 14 (3%)
Note that jet operations accounted for 43% of total accidents, but 97% of total fatalities. Table 1 shows
the comparison between jet fatalities and turboprop fatalities.
Jet Fatalities Turboprop Fatalities

LND T/O LND T/O
Overrun 235 13 Overrun 1 7
Veer-off 218 3 Veer-off 6 0
Total 453 16 Total 7 7
Table 1: Jet and turboprop fatalities
Two major jet accidents accounted for 300 of these 469 jet fatalities. If these two accidents are
excluded, jet operations would account for 35% of fatalities.
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3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS
3.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY REGION
Regional distribution of runway excursions may be analyzed in two ways: the region of registration of
the operator and the region of occurrence. IATA regions are listed in Appendix B.
The same data normalized to reflect the accident rate per million sectors, or the statistical probability
of an operator encountering a runway excursion on any given flight, indicated the highest accident
rates for operators from Africa (AFI) (3.76 per million sectors) and Middle East & North Africa (MENA)
(3.39 per million sectors). Figure 15 presents the accident rate per million sectors based on region of
operator (region of registration of operator).
Figure 15: Runway excursion rates by IATA region
It is worthwhile to analyze runway excursions occurrences in all parts of the world and to involve
operators from all regions. Figure 16 presents the overall distribution by geographic region of
excursion occurrences. The Asia Pacific (ASPAC) region witnessed the greatest number of
occurrences (44 accidents) at 26.8% of the total, and combined with Latin America & the Caribbean
(LATAM) (29 accidents) the two regions accounted for 44.5% of worldwide runway excursion
accidents.
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Figure 16: Runway excursion counts by IATA Region
Figure 17 is a comparison of the geographic distribution between the region of operator and the
distribution of involved operators, based on their country of origin. Analyzed by region of operator,
ASPAC remained almost the same (43 accidents) whereas LATAM significantly decreased (23
accidents) and North America (NAM) proportionately increased (from 20 to 26 accidents), indicating
that NAM operators may have encountered their greatest runway excursion risk on flights to LATAM.
However, these figures do not account of traffic density.
Figure 17: Runway excursion comparison:

region of accident versus region of operator
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4 CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
The most frequently occurring factor (121 accidents) was ‘embedded piloting skills’, indicating that the
majority of runway excursion accidents were due in some part to the inability of the pilots to execute
their basic flying skills. Other factors which might exacerbate a weakness in flying skills, for example
pilot fatigue, may have been present but were not identified in the accident report as contributing
factors. The second most frequent ‘human’ factor was ‘aircraft handling’ (85 accidents), and these two
factors were indicated in virtually all fatal excursion accidents.
‘Flight crew procedures’, more indicative of non-compliance rather than ability, was present in
59 accidents, and three quarters of these were recorded in jet aircraft accidents. ‘Pilot adherence to
procedures’ and ‘crosscheck as Non-flying Pilot (NFP)’ were also listed as factors in these accidents.
227 fatalities occurred in ten accidents including this category. The two regions of occurrence (as
reported in the accident reports) least affected by ‘flight crew procedures’ as a factor were North Asia
(NASIA) and Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) with just two accidents in this category; all
others were approximately equal close to ten. When analyzed by region of operator CIS continued to
show the lowest correlation with this contributing factor, while MENA increased to equal the other
regions.
In 72 of the accidents (44%) ‘loss of control on ground’ (LOC-G) was identified as a factor. Three
quarters of these occurred on landing, reflecting a relationship close to the total of landing versus
takeoff accidents, and perhaps unsurprisingly 76% resulted in veer-off accidents rather than overruns.
This factor category was divided equally between jets and turboprops and five of the LOC-G accidents
caused a total of 59 fatalities.
In figure 18, the components of Human factors are illustrated; figure 19 presents the breakdown of the
frequency of Human factors components as per phase of flight, as well as excursion type, and figure
20 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While in figure 21, the distribution
of the Human factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of operator.
Figure 18: Component of human factors
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Figure 19: Breakdown of the frequency of human factors
Figure 20: Component of human factors per fleet type
Figure 21: Distribution of human factors
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Weather was identified as a factor in 72 accidents (47%), most frequently (48 accidents) associated
with rain. This indicates that rain was present in 48 of 164 total accidents (29% of all accidents). The
second most common weather factor was windshear (34 accidents), with the overwhelming majority of
windshear related accidents (88%) occurring on landing. Jet aircraft were slightly more prone to
windshear as a factor with 20 accidents, as opposed to 14 for turboprops. Six of the windshear related
accidents accounted for a total of 166 fatalities. 62 accidents indicated ‘contaminated runway’ as a
factor, with the majority as ‘wet’ or ‘standing water’, and 11 a combination of ‘slush’, ‘snow’ or ‘ice’. Of
the 164 total runway excursion accidents, 62 (38%) reported some type of runway contamination. 22
accidents indicated ‘poor visibility’ as a factor.
Figure 22, illustrates weather related factors in runway excursion accidents; figure 23 presents the
breakdown of the frequency of weather factors components as per phase of flight, as well as
excursion type, and figure 24 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While
in figure 25, the distribution of the factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of
operator.
Figure 22: Weather related factors in runway excursion accidents
Figure 23: Breakdown of the frequency of weather related factors
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Figure 24: Component of weather related factors per fleet type
Figure 25: The distribution of the weather related factors
Note: no data in NASIA in the weather related category
‘Aircraft malfunction’ was identified in 58 accidents (37% of the total) with the most common factors
being ‘gear/tire’ issues (33 accidents), ‘gear collapse’ (32 accidents) and ‘engine malfunction’ (21
accidents). Most of the gear collapses occurred on landing (27), only two of them associated with hard
landings, whereas the engine malfunctions were evenly divided between takeoff and landing.
Analyzed by region of operator CIS and North Asia (NASIA) recorded only one accident each
attributed in part to ‘aircraft malfunction’, whereas MENA, North America (NAM) and Asia Pacific
(ASPAC) each recorded 11 maintenance related accidents.
Figure 26, illustrates technical related factors in runway excursion accidents; figure 27 presents the
breakdown of the frequency of technical factors components as per phase of flight, as well as
excursion type, and figure 28 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While
in figure 29, the distribution of the factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of
operator.
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Figure 26: Technical related factors in runway excursion accidents
Figure 27: Breakdown of the frequency of technical related factors
Figure 28: Component of technical related factors per fleet type
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Figure 29: The distribution of the technical related factors
‘Unstable approach’ appeared as a factor in 40 accidents (29%), and all but two of these were also
categorized as ‘unstable approach continued’ and ‘failure to go-around’. Those two were the balked
landing accidents, when in spite of the initiation of a go-around it was too late to avoid runway contact
and a subsequent excursion. Almost three quarters of ‘unstable approach’ (28 accidents) events also
indicated the factor ‘long float’ and 30 included the factor ‘bounce, flare, fast, long touchdown’.
‘Unstable approach continued’ accounted for 125 fatalities from 6 accidents. 60% of this factor
category occurred on jet aircraft.
Figure 30: Unstable approach
‘Inadequate landing overrun safety area’, ‘ditches, berms, buildings location’ and ‘no overrun’ were all
indicated as factors in 38 accidents. More than half of these occurred in LATAM (11 accidents) and
ASPAC (10) combined. Six accidents in this category resulted in a total of 30 fatalities.
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Figure 31: Inadequate Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
‘Late RTO’ was indicated as a factor in 11 accidents, two of which accounted for ten fatalities. The
FSF report indicated this factor in almost 50% of all takeoff runway excursion accidents.
5 AIRCRAFT GENERATION
The year of design, and overall aircraft generation, was assessed to see if any trends were obvious.
A categorization of aircraft generations and types is presented in Appendix C.
Figure 32: Aircraft generation
Aircraft generation as a factor in runway excursion accidents demonstrated an erratic distribution over
the period, with the exception that the first generation aircraft are statistically less likely to be involved.
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6 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS
Runway excursions as an accident category annually accounted for between one quarter and one
third of all substantial damage and hull loss accidents, and although frequently survivable, excursion
accidents by their sheer number caused 483 fatalities. It is essential therefore that the industry
focuses its attention on developing strategies to mitigate the risk.
From the foregoing contributory factors it can be seen that minimizing human factors in flying skills
and decision making is vital to this effort. Advances in automation and system technologies have
without a doubt brought greater opportunity for safe flight but the consequent erosion of manual flying
skills and decision making under pressure must be addressed. A pilot only learns and maintains skills
by repetition. Therefore initial and recurrent training must require pilots to develop and regularly
demonstrate a high proficiency in manual flying and decision making.
Their decisions must be based upon well-founded information and it is essential that corporate policies
and procedures provide adequate and unambiguous background for each decision. In order to ensure
that the policies are correct, management require comprehensive operational data from a robust
reporting system and universal flight data analysis, but this will only be achieved within a sound
corporate safety culture.
In particular, operators need to be sure that pilots will always make the right decision in two
fundamental cases: to go-around from an unstable approach, and to continue the takeoff after V1 (e.g.,
the Rejected Take Off {RTO} decision).
Failure to go-around from an unstable approach can be driven by a number of factors: lack of
situational awareness and failure to recognize an unstable approach; subconscious desire to complete
the task even in the face of contra-indications; deliberate non-compliance; fear of retribution or
ridicule; absence of clear policy.
The RTO decision differs from the go-around decision in that there is less time to decide, and
therefore the reaction must be conditioned by repetitive practice using varied scenarios, to alter the
response from a cognitive process to a learned behavior.
Procedural non-compliance may be the result of individual bad practice, inappropriate procedures
and/or general ‘practical drift’. Once again, the identification and management of non-compliance can
only be achieved with a good reporting system and flight data analysis within a sound safety culture.
With the exception of extremes like micro-burst or very heavy rain, weather phenomena alone should
rarely be the sole cause of a runway excursion. However, the study showed weather (especially rain)
to be at least a contributing factor in numerous accidents and this is illustrative of the importance of
identifying cumulative runway excursion risks. A known but otherwise not severe environmental risk
factor (e.g., a short runway or steep approach), may be escalated to an unacceptable risk in the
presence of a tailwind or heavy rain. Although that decision can only be made ‘on the day’ by the pilot,
considered analysis in advance of the potential for short term increases in risk may help to raise
awareness, using crew information tools. The RERR Toolkit 2nd edition includes a sample Risk
Management Process to help operators develop a process to address the unique risks associated with
their operations.
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With the recognition that runway excursions do occur, then it falls to airports to ensure that the
likelihood of aircraft damage and injuries is minimized. A significant number of accidents included the
factor ‘inadequate overrun area’ and much accident damage was the result of the obstacles
encountered after the aircraft left the runway. Every effort must be made to ensure that the runway
end safety area meets and wherever possible exceeds ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). Where this is not possible alternative means of reducing post-excursion damage, such as
engineered materials arrestor system, should be employed.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The greatest runway excursion risk and the greatest risk of fatalities occurred during the landing
phase.
The most common single factor in landing excursions was an unstable approach and an associated
failure to go-around.
The most significant weather factors contributing to runway excursions are rain and windshear.
The majority of runway excursions included a significant element of human factors, especially in flying
skills and decision making.
Airport design, especially compliance with ICAO required and recommended practices, is critical to
minimizing post-excursion damage.
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APPENDIX A — IATA ACCIDENT CRITERIA AND DEFINITIONS
TYPE OF OPERATION CRITERIA
In order for an event to be considered an accident, the flight must be listed as a scheduled or
unscheduled passenger or cargo flight, or a positioning flight. All other types of operation (e.g. training,
maintenance, etc…) are excluded. Furthermore, single-pilot operations are excluded.
AIRCRAFT CRITERIA
In order for an event to be considered as an accident, the aircraft involved must meet the following
criteria:
Jets:
• Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) above 15,000 KG
• Twin-engine
• Turbine powered only
Turboprops:
• MTOW above 5,700 KG
• Twin-engine
• Turbine powered only
Exclusions: cases of contained engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine,
its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennae, tires, brakes,
fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or the aircraft is missing or is completely
inaccessible; or acts of war, sabotage or unlawful interference are not considered accidents.
DEFINITIONS
Eastern-built
Aircraft designed in a current CIS country or in the former Soviet Union. Certain aircraft made in
Eastern Europe or China (e.g. Xian aircraft) that are based on copies of Soviet designs are considered
eastern-built aircraft.
Western-built
Aircraft designed in a country other than the current CIS or former Soviet Union. Aircraft from
Indonesia and Israel are considered western-built.
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Hull Loss
An accident where the aircraft is completely destroyed or will not be repaired (economic write-off).
Substantial Damage
An accident where the aircraft has been damaged to the point where the performance, structural
integrity or flight characteristics of the aircraft and/or substantial repair is needed. Damage must be
listed as Major or Total (Repaired).
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APPENDIX B — IATA REGIONS
Region Country Region Country

Angola Tanzania
Benin Togo
Botswana Uganda
Burkina Faso Zambia
Burundi Zimbabwe
Cameroon Australia1
Cape Verde Bangladesh
Central African Bhutan
Republic Brunei Darussalam
Chad Burma
Comoros Cambodia
Congo, Democratic East Timor
Republic of ASPAC
Fiji Islands
Congo, Republic of India
Côte d’Ivoire (Asia Pacific)
AFI Indonesia
Djibouti Japan
(Africa) Equatorial Guinea Kiribati
Eritrea Laos
Ethiopia Malaysia
Gabon Maldives
Gambia Marshall Islands
Ghana Micronesia
Guinea Nauru
Guinea-Bissau Nepal
Kenya New Zealand2
Lesotho Pakistan
Liberia Palau
Madagascar Papua New Guinea
Malawi Philippines
Mali Samoa
Mauritania ASPAC Singapore
Mauritius Solomon Islands
Mozambique (Asia / Pacific) South Korea
Namibia Sri Lanka
Niger Thailand
Nigeria Tonga
Rwanda Tuvalu, Ellice
AFI
São Tomé and Islands
Príncipe Vanuatu
(Africa)
Senegal Vietnam
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Swaziland
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Region Country Region Country
Armenia Slovenia
Azerbaijan Spain
Belarus
Georgia Sweden
CIS
Kazakhstan Switzerland
(Commonwealth Kyrgyzstan Turkey
of Independent Moldova United Kingdom6
States) Russia Vatican City
Tajikistan Antigua and
Turkmenistan Barbuda
Ukraine Argentina
Uzbekistan Bahamas
Albania Barbados
Andorra Belize
EUR Bolivia
Austria
Belgium Brazil
(Europe) Chile
Bosnia and
Herzegovina Colombia
Bulgaria Costa Rica
Croatia Cuba
Cyprus Dominica
Czech Republic Dominican Republic
Denmark3 Ecuador
Estonia El Salvador
LATAM
Finland Grenada
France4 Guatemala
(Latin America
Germany Guyana
& the
Greece Caribbean) Haiti
Hungary Honduras
Iceland Jamaica
Ireland Mexico
Israel Nicaragua
Italy Panama
Kosovo Paraguay
EUR
Latvia Peru
(Europe) Liechtenstein Saint Kitts and
Lithuania Nevis
Luxembourg Saint Lucia
Macedonia Saint Vincent and
Malta the Grenadines
Monaco Suriname
Montenegro Trinidad and
Tobago
Netherlands5
Uruguay
Norway
Venezuela
Poland
Portugal
Romania
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
nd
Region Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
MENA Kuwait
Lebanon
(Middle East & Libya
North Africa) Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Yemen
NAM Canada
(North United States of
American) America7
NASIA China8
Mongolia
(North Asia) North Korea
nd
Gibraltar
1
Australia includes: Montserrat
Christmas Island Pitcairn Islands
Cocos (Keeling) Islands Saint Helena
Norfolk Island South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands
Ashmore and Cartier Islands
Turks and Caicos Islands
Coral Sea Islands
British Antarctic Territory
Heard Island and McDonald Islands
2 Guernsey
New Zealand includes:
Isle of Man
Cook Islands
Jersey
Niue 7
United States of America include:
Tokelau
3 American Samoa
Denmark includes:
Guam
Faroe Islands
Northern Mariana Islands
Greenland
4 Puerto Rico
France includes:
United States Virgin Islands
French Polynesia 8
China includes:
New Caledonia
Hong Kong
Saint-Barthélemy
Macau
Saint Martin
Taiwan
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Wallis and Futuna
French Southern and Antarctic Lands
5
Netherlands include:
Aruba
Netherlands Antilles
6
United Kingdom includes:
England
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
Akrotiri and Dhekelia
Anguilla
Bermuda
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
nd
APPENDIX C — AIRCRAFT GENERATIONS
Where the report refers to aircraft generation the worldwide fleet was divided as follows:
Aircraft Aircraft
Generation Generation
Type Type
An-12 A300
An-24 A310
An-26 ATR-42
First B707 ATR-72
F-27 B737-300
HS 748 B737-400
SE-210 Caravelle 11R B737-500
YS-11 BAe-146
An-140 Third Beech 1900
An-28 DC-10
An-32 Do-328
B727 ERJ-135
B727-200 F-100
B737-200 MD-11
B747-200 MD-80
Bae 146 MD-90
CASA 212 Saab 340
Second
DC-9 A318
DHC-6 A319
DHC-8 A320
Emb-110 A321
F-27 A330
F-28 A340-200
F-50 A340-300
Hawker 125 Fourth A340-600
II-62 CRJ Regional Jet
Il-76 B737-600
Jetstream 31 B737-700
Let 410 B737-800
Metro B737-900
Metro II EMB-170
Metro III EMB-190
Shorts 360
Tu-154
nd
APPENDIX D — FACTORS INVOLVED IN RUNWAY EXCURSIONS
The factors listed below were cited in one or more of the runway excursion accidents in this report.
Runway excursions are usually the result of one or more of the following factors:
 Aircraft Malfunction
• Power-on touchdown (i.e., preventing the auto-extension of ground spoilers, as
applicable)
• Failure to detect non-deployment of ground spoilers (e.g., absence of related standard
call)
 Human Factors
• Flying pilot adherence to procedures
• Non-Flying Pilot (NFP) crosscheck
• Embedded piloting skills
• Pilot fatigue
• Aircraft handling
 Crew Technique/Decision Factors

• Rejected take off (RTO) initiated at speed greater than V1
• Un-stablized approaches
• No go-around decision when warranted
• Inadequate pilot directional control
• Approach - high
• Approach - fast
• Touchdown - fast
• Touchdown - hard
• Landing long
• Bouncing and incorrect bounce recovery
• Ineffective braking on runway contamination
• Pilot techniques in wind shear conditions
• Pilot technique on wet/contaminated runways
• Use of the nosewheel-steering tiller at an excessive airspeed
• Airspeed too fast on the runway to exit safely
• Extended flare (allowing the aircraft to float and to decelerate [bleed excess airspeed]
in the air uses typically three times more runway than decelerating on the ground)
• Late braking (or late takeover from autobrake system, if required)
• Increased landing distance resulting from the use of differential braking or the
discontinued use of reverse thrust to maintain directional control in crosswind
conditions
 Weather Factors
• Runway condition (wet or contaminated by standing water, snow, slush or ice)
• Wind shear
• Weather information availability and accuracy
• Reverse-thrust effect in wind and on a wet runway or a contaminated runway
nd
 Air Traffic Management
• Lack of awareness of stabilized approach criteria
• Failure to provide timely or accurate runway condition information to pilots
• Failure to provide timely and accurate weather condition to pilots
 Airports / Regulators
• Runways are not maintained to minimize effective friction and drainage
• Inaccurate runway condition reports
• Inadequate runway end safety areas (RESAs)
• Lack of timely NOTAM issuance of on Runway condition
nd
APPENDIX E — 2010 EXCURSION ACCIDENTS VS INCIDENTS
Note: this graph includes preliminary data as of December 31st, 2010. It is provided only as a means
of indicating the relative number and location of runway excursion accidents as compared to incidents.
Data in this graph was drawn from publicly available runway excursion incident and accident reports.
However, since many runway excursions do not result in damage, and are therefore not reported, this
data is not considered to be comprehensive.
Incidents Accidents
nd
nd
www.iata.org/safety
nd

Runway Excursion Analysis 2004-2009: (RERR 2nd Edition - Issued 2011)

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Runway Excursion Analysis 2004-2009: (RERR 2nd Edition - Issued 2011)

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RUNWAY

Senior Vice President

3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 11

4 CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS ............................................................................................... 13

5 AIRCRAFT GENERATION ................................................................................................... 19

6 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS .................................................................................................... 20

Appendix A — IATA Accident Criteria and Definitions ................................................................ 22

Appendix B — IATA REGIONS ....................................................................................................... 24

Appendix C — Aircraft Generations .............................................................................................. 28

Appendix D — Factors Involved in Runway Excursions.............................................................. 29

Appendix E — 2010 Excursion Accidents vs Incidents ............................................................... 31

1.1 RUNWAY EXCURSION DEFINITION

The data in this report specifically excludes the following:

2.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS RELATIVE TO ALL ACCIDENTS

Figure 1: Runway excursions by year

Figure 2: Runway excursions during daylight vs. darkness

2.2 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE

Figure 3: Breakdown of runway excursions

Figure 4: Runway excursion accidents for jets and turboprops

2.3 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT

Figure 5: Breakdown of runway excursion accidents by flight phase

Figure 6: Runway excursion accidents per year by flight phase

Figure 8: Runway excursions veer-off vs. overrun

Figure 9: Runway excursions turboprops & jets – overruns vs. veer-off

Figure 13: Fatal veer-off vs. overrun accidents

2.6 FATALITIES BY PHASE OF FLIGHT:

Fatalities by aircraft type:

Jet Fatalities Turboprop Fatalities

3.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY REGION

Figure 15: Runway excursion rates by IATA region

Figure 17: Runway excursion comparison:

Figure 18: Component of human factors

Figure 20: Component of human factors per fleet type

Figure 21: Distribution of human factors

Figure 22: Weather related factors in runway excursion accidents

Figure 23: Breakdown of the frequency of weather related factors

Figure 25: The distribution of the weather related factors

Note: no data in NASIA in the weather related category

Figure 27: Breakdown of the frequency of technical related factors

Figure 28: Component of technical related factors per fleet type

Figure 30: Unstable approach

Figure 32: Aircraft generation

TYPE OF OPERATION CRITERIA

Region Country Region Country

 Crew Technique/Decision Factors

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