CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGESTS
(2015-2019)

Submitted to:
Judge Oscar Pimentel

De Castro, Fritz Angelain R.

2017-0520
 CASE TITLE PAGE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR

and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS 1

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

9

JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

CRISTINA YAO 16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y CRISTO

AND EMILIO MACAWILI, ACCUSED, CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y CRISTO 23

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO

29

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCIS URSUA y BERNAL

38

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. ELEUTERIO URMAZA Y TORRES

46

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. LEONARDO QUIAPO

54

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE FLORES, DANIEL

FLORES AND SAMMY FLORES 62

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. BRYAN GANABA y NAM-AY

71

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTHONY PALADA @ TON-TON,

AND JONALYN LOGROSA @ MISA, ET AL. 80

PRUDENCIO DE GUZMAN Y JUMAQUIO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES 88

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIOSCORO COMOSO TUREMUTSA

94

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO TERNIDA Y MUNAR 105

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ZZZ, 112

ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CASE # 1
FIRST DIVISION
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 225608
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS, Accused-
Appellants
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appealfiled by accused-appellants Alberto
Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively,
accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision3 dated August 20, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-SD(96), and 74-
SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide,
defined and penalized under Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively.
The Facts
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations were filed before the R
TC, each charging accused-appellants of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide, viz.:5
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
[AAA6 ]gainst her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one AAA
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles], together with two
(2) other persons whose identities are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe),
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on
the different

1
parts of her body with the use of a pointed instrument, thereby causing her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in
Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the
Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy
between accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The R TC allowed the
amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein
as a conspirator; however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim. Case No.
72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator on the ground that Alejandro had
already been arraigned in the latter case.8 The amended Information in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, at
Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with
lewd design, and in conspiracy with one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @
"JESUS'', by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA] against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.9
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-
SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned
in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a
vacation in the province of Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they
stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA
would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in
the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy.
Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and
stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and
restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and
started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places
with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back
by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while
Alejandro hit her left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke
up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries.11
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and showed her several mugshots in
order for her to identify her assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and
Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as the perpetrators of the
crime. Medical records also revealed that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while
BBB died due to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple blunt injury
and fracture of the mandibular and facio-maxillary bones."12
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He
averred that on the night before the incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as
early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7) o'clock in the
morning of the next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He
further averred that his relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son.13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around
nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified
by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help
him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to
Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house was
closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep.
Alejandro further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of
the charges against him.14

2
The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty
as charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-
SD(96), Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96),
accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and each ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) in
Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and ordered to pay BBB's heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the latter's death.16
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive identification of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no
ill motive to falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In this light, the RTC found untenable
accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi, considering too that they have failed to
show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when the
crimes against AAA and BBB were committed.17
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the following
modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple Rape, while Angeles was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and accordingly, were
separately sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim.
Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily pay BBB's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P525,000.00 as temperate damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise
ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.20
It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants'
complicity to the crimes charged, as they were positively identified by AAA who had an
unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes were being committed. It
likewise found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said crimes,
considering that accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling BBB,
resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal knowledge of AAA without her
consent, while the other restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting.21
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crimes
The Court's Ruling

3
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite
knowing the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still desires to have his
appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said motion, and
accordingly, deems the case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left before
the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants'
convictions, as will be explained hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the
next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion
temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover,
the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on
the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention
or attendance."24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision
as the rapes were committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in
1997) read:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force
or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states
that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more
persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty."26
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive
identification that accused-appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting
in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro
restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the
contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby, upholds
Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case

4
No. 74-SD(96), given that the elements of said crimes square with the established
incidents. In People v. Antonio:27
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon
this Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized
that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The
appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.28
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's
conviction in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the
CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in
Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro
in raping her."29
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states
that "[Angeles], with lewd designs, and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party."30 Plainly, the wording of the amended Information
reveals that it charged accused-appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it
was error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles must be
convicted with one (1) count of Rape in relation to Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to
be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were
convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said
case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC
states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was
committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his
appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide.
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to adjust the award
of damages as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is
ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully
paid.31
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw
Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to
him.

5
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles)
is DENIED. The Decision dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to him, as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

6
DIGEST # 1
FACTS: Three separate Informations were filed before the RTC, each charging
accused-appellants of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of Homicide.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in
Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the
Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy
between accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The RTC allowed the
amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein
as a conspirator; however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim. Case No.
72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator on the ground that Alejandro had
already been arraigned in the latter case.
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-
SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned
in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of
Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey
house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA would sleep at
the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning,
AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed
on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and
Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while
Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and started having carnal
knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles and the
latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back by scratching Angeles'
s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw
with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while
BBB succumbed to her injuries.
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He
averred that on the night before the incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as
early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7) o'clock in the
morning of the next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He
further averred that his relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son.13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around
nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified
by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help
him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to
Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house was
closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep.
Alejandro further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of
the charges against him.
RTC found accused-appellants guilty as charged. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held
that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants'
complicity to the crimes charged, as they were positively identified by AAA who had an
unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes were being committed. It
likewise found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said crimes,
considering that accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling BBB,
resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal knowledge of AAA without her
consent, while the other restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crimes
RULING: The elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or
intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if
the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2)

7
Since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to
include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such
charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from Simple
Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the
rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two
(2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide.

8
CASE # 2

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203466               February 25, 2015

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated August 31, 2011
and the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN which sustained the conviction of petitioner for the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The Facts

Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank
Inc., Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or
accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts
therefor,4 accomplish a cash transfer s lip at the end of each banking day detailing the
amounts of money that she has received, and remit such payments to Jenkin U. Tupag
(Tupag), her supervisor.5

Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions
for the period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and
certain irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of
some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued
by its account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said
provisional receipts.6 Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate
amount of ₱470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and, more
significantly, the corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection
reports on file.7

Thus, in a memorandum8 dated July 13, 2001, Siam Bank directed Benabaye to

explain, among others, the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she had
issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand
upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation 9 dated
July 18, 2001, Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be
clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer
slips together with the corresponding provisional receipts.

Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum 10 dated July 13, 2001 to Tupag
requiring him to explain, among others, the same discrepancies between the provisional
receipts and daily collection reports that were submitted to him; it further demanded the
return of the amount involved. In his written explanation 11 dated July 16, 2001, Tupag
admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were
privy to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.

Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank Terminated 12 the employment
of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case for Estafa before
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4 (RTC), docketed as Crim. Case No.
9344, against them. On March 5, 2002, they were charged in an Information 13 which
reads:

That sometime between the period from December 1, 2000 up to June 15, 2001, in the
City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring and confederating

9
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Siam Bank, Inc. in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
being then employed as Micro Finance Unit Supervisor and Loans Bookkeeper,
respectively of Siam Bank, Inc.-Iligan Branch and authorized to collect and receive
payments of loans, did collect and receive payments from the bank's borrowers or
clients in the total amount of ₱688,833.00, under the express obligation on the part of
said accused to remit the amount collected to the bank, but once in possession of said
amount and far from complying with their obligation, said accused converted,
misapplied said amount to their own use and benefit, and despite repeated demands,
they failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the said amount of
₱688,833.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said Siam Bank, Inc. in the aforesaid
amount of ₱688,833.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 14

In her defense, Benabaye reiterated15 the contents of her written explanation dated July
18, 2001 that she remitted the provisional receipts together with the corresponding
amounts collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag, at
the end of each banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1)
copy of the daily cash transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the
possession of Tupag.16 She asseverated, however, that when she was allowed to
inspect the files of the bank after the audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several
provisional receipts, for which she had previously issued provisional receipts, which
were unremitted to the bank.17 At the dorsal portion of the reissued provisional receipts,
Tupag had annotated the numbers of the unremitted ones that she had issued. 18 She
also claimed that other Siam Bank employees were authorized to issue provisional
receipts, e.g. their janitor, the bank manager, and even on-the-job trainees (OJTs),
asserting that it was the bank's standard operating procedure. 19

As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his
testimony.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated July 31, 2000, the RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b ), and sentenced
each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. They were likewise ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the total amount of
₱688,833.00 as actual damages.22

In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged have been
established, to wit: (a) that any goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property to the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.23 From the evidence presented, the RTC found that both Benabaye and Tupag
held.the loan payments of Siam Bank's clients in trust for the latter, with the obligation to
remit it to the Bank, in the total amount of ₱688,833.00 insofar as Benabaye is
concerned and ₱25,955.00 on the part of Tupag. 24 However, they misappropriated the
same to the damage and prejudice of Siam Bank, and despite demand, failed to
account for the money. As for Benabaye, while she claimed that she remitted the loan
payments to Tupag, she failed to offer evidence that Tupag had actually received the
said amount.25

Dissatisfied, Benabaye appealed26 her conviction to the CA, maintaining her innocence

on the grounds that: (a) her possession of the money comprising the loan payments of
Siam Bank's clients was merely material, not juridical, hence, she cannot be validly
indicted for Estafa; ( b) the R TC erred in holding that the acts described in the

10
Information constituted only one (1) single offense; and ( c) there was no conspiracy
between her and Tupag.27

On the other hand, Tupag likewise appealed 28 his conviction, but was however denied
by the RTC in an Order29 dated October 9, 2009. The RTC held that Tupag lost his
remedy to appeal under Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 120 30 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Records of this case were then elevated to the CA. 31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated August 31, 2011, the CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto,

similarly finding that all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation have been
established. It ruled that Benabaye, together with Tupag, held the money collected in
trust for Siam Bank.33 Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853 unremitted
provisional receipts involved in this case, Benabaye's "continuing intention to commit
Estafa constituted a single intention although committed on different dates." 34 Thus, her
crime was a "continuing offense" as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a
"single criminal design."35 Finally, the CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and
Tupag was sufficiently established, considering that both had access and facility to
determine if payments made by Siam Bank's clients were properly remitted. 36 As such, if
there were unremitted payments, both of them would likewise be aware thereof.
Moreover, while Benabaye claimed that she remitted the provisional receipts and
corresponding payments to Tupag, she however failed to show, through sufficient
evidence, that Tupag actually received the same. 37

Benabaye moved for reconsideration,38 which the CA denied m a Resolution39 dated

September 6, 2012, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was
charged and prosecuted, states:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of pr is ion correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to

11
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.]

The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or
denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial
is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received. 40

Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner.41

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an

employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. 42 The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a
recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. 43 Hence, conversion of
personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the
said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material
and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property
constitutes Estafa.44

In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected
loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted
of the said crime.45

The Court agrees.

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam
Bank's clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all
cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag.46 As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller,47 she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.

In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce

(Chua-Burce) of Estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was
absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession
over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA, 49 where a travelling sales
agent was convicted of the crime o f Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the
proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain
the distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability for Estafa, viz.:

There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds

received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds
of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case,
payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere
custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain
or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to

12
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered
without his fault.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent
who could have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only
acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot
be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa
charge against Benabaye should come as a matter of course, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against her as may be
warranted under the circumstances of this case.

Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye's supervisor and co-accused in this case,
Tupag, who likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and thus had no
juridical possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of the same Estafa
charge in view of Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully
perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties.51 Considering that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit
the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of
conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory,52 Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is likewise applicable to
Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be
warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2011 and the
Resolution dated September 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-
MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal charges against petitioner
Cherry Ann M. Benabaye and her co-accused, Jenkin U. Tupag, in Crim. Case No.
9344, are DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

13
DIGEST # 2
FACTS: Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan
transactions and thereby found out that fraud and certain irregularities attended the
same. Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of
₱470,768.00 were issued by Cherry Ann Benabaye, the Loans Bookkeeper, but were
unreported, and, more significantly, the corresponding payments were unremitted based
on the daily collection reports on file.
Benabaye was directed to explain the discrepancies between the provisional receipts
she had issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final
demand upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation
Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her
supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together
with the corresponding provisional receipts.
Tupag admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees
were privy to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their
identities.
Siam Bank terminated the employment of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently
filed a criminal case for Estafa
In her defense, Benabaye reiterated the contents of her written explanation dated July
18, 2001 that she remitted the provisional receipts together with the corresponding
amounts collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag, at
the end of each banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1)
copy of the daily cash transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the
possession of Tupag. She asseverated, however, that when she was allowed to inspect
the files of the bank after the audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several
provisional receipts, for which she had previously issued provisional receipts, which
were unremitted to the bank.17 At the dorsal portion of the reissued provisional receipts,
Tupag had annotated the numbers of the unremitted ones that she had issued. She also
claimed that other Siam Bank employees were authorized to issue provisional receipts,
e.g. their janitor, the bank manager, and even on-the-job trainees (OJTs), asserting that
it was the bank's standard operating procedure.
As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his
testimony.
The RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa
ISSUE: Whether or not Benabaye should be convicted for the crime of Estafa through
misappropriation.
RULING: The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return,
the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received.
A sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be
only in the material possession of the employee. So long as the juridical possession of
the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in
the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes
Estafa.
In this case, Benabaye is correct in maintaining that the first element of Estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected
loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted
of the said crime. Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash

14
payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.

15
CASE # 3
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017
JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
CRISTINA YAO, Respondents.
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Orders,1 dated 15 June 2010 and
28 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City (RTC), in SCA
No. 3338, which affirmed the Decision,2 dated 15 April 2009, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 58, San Juan City (MeTC), in Criminal Case No. 80165-68 finding
petitioner John Dennis G. Chua (petitioner) guilty of four (4) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
THE FACTS

Respondent Cristina Yao (Yao) alleged that she became acquainted with petitioner
through the latter's mother. Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned
that her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in Bacolod City and asked
whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner P1 million on
3 January 2001; P1 million on 7 January 2001; and P1.5 million on 16 February 2001.
She also lent petitioner an additional P2.5 million in June 2001. As payment, petitioner
issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally delivered
her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary.3

Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The cases
were raffled to Branch 58, then presided by Judge Elvira DC Castro (Judge Castro). On
16 September 2004, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." After mediation and pre-trial
conference, trial ensued before Pairing Judge Marianito C. Santos (Judge Santos) as
Judge Castro was promoted to the RTC of Quezon City.4 On 25 July 2007, Judge Philip
Labastida (Judge Labastida) was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 58 and took
over trial proceedings.5 Since petitioner failed to present evidence, the cases were
submitted for decision and promulgation of judgment was set on 30 September
2008.6 Sometime in December 2008, Judge Labastida died.7 On 20 February 2009,
Judge Mary George T. Cajandab-Caldona (Judge Caldona) was designated Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 588 and she assumed office on 1 April 2009.9

The MeTC Ruling

In a decision, dated 15 April 2009, signed by Judge Santos as the pairing judge, the
MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200,000.00 for each count.

The MeTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that the checks issued by
petitioner were payments for a loan; and that upon dishonor of the checks, demand was
made upon petitioner through his personal secretary. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. FINDING the accused JOHN DENNIS CHUA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of)
having violated the crime of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which he is hereby sentenced
to pay a FINE of TWOHUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) for each count,
with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed SIX (6) MONTHS for each count in case of
insolvency;

2. HOLDING the accused civilly liable to the extent of the value of the four (4) subject

16
checks or in the total amount of P6,082,000.00 with twelve (12%) interest per annum
reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which was made on April 2002 until the
whole obligation shall have been fully paid and satisfied;

3. ORDERING the accused to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing Judge Santos'
authority to render the decision.

The RTC Ruling

In an Order, dated 15 June 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It held
that the expanded authority of pairing courts under Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98,
dated 18 February 1998, clearly gave Judge Santos authority to resolve the criminal
cases which were submitted for decision when he was still the pairing judge. The RTC
added that Judge Santos was in a better position to resolve and decide the cases
because these were heard arid submitted for decision prior to the appointment of Judge
Caldona as acting presiding judge on 20 February 2009 and her assumption to office on
1 April 2009. It observed that the promulgation of judgment was delayed merely
because a motion for reconsideration was filed which was later denied. The RTC
disposed the case thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11
Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
RTC in an Order, dated 28 December 2010.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
I.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION PROMULGATED AND EXECUTED BY A PAIRING

JUDGE, DESPITE THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERMANENT JUDGE TO A COURT, IS
VALID;
II.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO

PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIME, BUT STILL CONVICTING AN ACCUSED
IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS AN ACT TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;
III.

WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE

REVISED RULES OF COURT IS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR ACTS DONE BY A
PRESIDING JUDGE SHOWING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.12
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Circular No. 19-98, decisions rendered by pairing
judges are valid only when the same are promulgated at the time when no presiding
judge has been appointed, thus, the authority of pairing judges automatically ceases
upon the appointment and assumption to duty of the new presiding judge; that Judge
Caldona assumed office on 1 April 2009; that on 15 April 2009, when the assailed
decision was promulgated, only Judge Caldona had the authority to promulgate a
decision on the case; and that the prosecution failed to prove that a notice of dishonor

17
was properly served upon petitioner.

In its comment,13 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the cases were submitted for decision as early as
30 September 2008 and that Judge Caldona had not presided in a single hearing; that
in view of these circumstances, Judge Caldona was not familiar enough with the facts of
the case to enable her to competently render a decision; that Judge Caldona did not
raise any opposition to the promulgation of the 15 April 2009 decision; that Circular No.
5-98 provides that "cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage,
i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such
Acting/Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the
designated Acting Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former", that from the time of
the untimely demise of Judge Labastida, Judge Santos was tasked to take over the
cases as the designated pairing judge of Branch 58; and that Judge Santos was clothed
with authority to promulgate the assailed 15 April 2009 decision.

In his reply,14 petitioner counters that Circular No. 5-98 is not applicable to the case as
Circular No. 19-98 provides that "the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of
all the cases thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and assumption to
duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge", that the
authority of Judge Santos was derived as a pairing judge, not as acting or assisting
judge, of Branch 58; and that his authority automatically ceased on 20 February 2009,
when Judge Caldona was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 58.
THE COURT'S RULING

Appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to question the MeTC decision.

At the outset, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought to assail the
MeTC decision. First, it has been consistently held that where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be entertained - remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. The proper
remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is
appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is
its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof,
or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order
or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to
certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of
appeal.15

Second, even if a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner failed to comply
with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion
for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.16 The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is
intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied
error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case.17

Third, petitioner was not able to establish his allegation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MeTC. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent
court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.18 In Yu v. Judge
Reyes-Carpio,19 the Court explained:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
"evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and

18
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having
been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross x x x.20
As will be discussed, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of
discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of
Judge Santos.21 He was clothed with authority to decide the criminal cases filed
against petitioner.

In addition, considering that petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which is
an original action, the proper remedy after denial thereof is to appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) by way of notice of appeal.22 Hence, when petitioner filed a petition for
review before this Court, not only did he disregard the time-honored principle of
hierarchy of courts, he also availed of the wrong remedy for the second time.

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapses committed by petitioner, in the interest

of prompt dispensation of justice and to prevent further prolonging the proceedings in
this case, the Court resolves to give due course to his petition and rule on the merits
thereof.

Judge Santos had authority to render the assailed decision even after the assumption to
office of the designated presiding judge of Branch 58.

Petitioner cites Circular No. 19-98 to support his contention that Judge Santos no longer
had the authority to render the assailed decision at the time of its promulgation on 15
April 2009. The circular reads:
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, the authority of the pairing judge
under Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 (Pairing System for Multiple Sala
Stations) to act on incidental or interlocutory matters apd those urgent matters requiring
immediate action on cases pertaining to the paired court shall henceforth be expanded
to include all other matters. Thus, whenever a vacancy occurs by reason of resignation,
dismissal, suspension, retirement, death, or prolonged absence of the presidingjudge in
a multi-sala station, the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all the cases
thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and assumption to duty of the
regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge or the return of the regular
incumbent judge, or until further orders from this Court. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the OSG avers that Judge Santos was in due exercise of his
authority as provided by Circular No. 5-98, viz:
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an Acting/Assisting Judge shall cease to
continue hearing cases in the court where he is detailed and shall return to his official
station upon the assumption of the appointed Presiding Judge or the newly designated
Acting Presiding Judge thereat. Cases left by the former shall be tried and decided by
the appointed Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge.
However, cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage, i.e. where
all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such Acting/Assisting
Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the designated Acting
Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former. This authority shall include resolutions
of motions for reconsideration and motions for new trial thereafter filed. But if a new trial
is granted, the Presiding Judge thereafter appointed or designated shall preside over
the new trial until it is terminated and shall decide the same.
If the Acting/Assisting Judge is appointed to another branch but in the same station,
cases heard by him shall be transferred to the branch where he is appointed and he
shall continue to try them. He shall be credited for these cases by exempting him from
receiving an equal number during the raffle of newly filed cases. x x x (emphasis
supplied)

19
Both circulars are applicable in the case at bar in that Circular No. 5-98 complements
Circular No. 19-98. Undoubtedly, the judge of the paired court serves as acting judge
only until the appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the
designation of an acting presiding judge. Clearly, the acting judge may no longer
promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position.
Circular No. 5-98, however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the
assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge,
shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter's
assumption or designation.

In this case, Judge Santos, as judge of the paired court, presided over the trial of the
cases which commenced with the presentation of the prosecution's first witness on 7
June 2006.23 On 25 July 2007, Judge Labastida was appointed Presiding Judge of
Branch 58 and he took over the trial of the cases.24 The promulgation of judgment was
tentatively set on 30 September 2008.25 Unfortunately, sometime in December 2008,
Judge Labastida died.26 Hence, it was incumbent upon Judge Santos to serve as
acting judge of Branch 58 as a result of Judge Labastida's untimely death. When Judge
Caldona assumed the position of Acting Presiding Judge on 1 April 2009,27 the cases
already passed the trial stage as they were in fact submitted for decision. Further, it is
worthy to note that Judge Santos presided over a significant portion of the proceedings
as compared to Judge Caldona who assumed office long after the cases were
submitted for decision. Finally, the use of the word "shall" in Circular No. 5-98 makes it
mandatory for Judge Santos to decide the criminal cases against petitioner. Clearly,
Judge Santos had the authority to render the assailed decision on 15 April 2009
notwithstanding Judge Caldona's assumption to office.

Failure to prove petitioner's receipt of notice of dishonor warrants his acquittal.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.28

Here, the existence of the second element is in dispute. In Yu Oh v. CA,29 the Court
explained that since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-
payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof
as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way
of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

xxxx

Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of dishonor] cannot be taken
lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full
payment of the amount appearing on the check, within fivbanking days from notice of
20
dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to
preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due rcrocess demands that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.30 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter,31 yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testifY whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in
mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.32

In this case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of
B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end since there is no showing when petitioner actually
received the demand letter. The MeTC, in its decision, merely said that such
requirement was fully complied with without any sufficient discussion. Indeed, it is not
impossible that petitioner's secretary had truly handed him the demand letter.
Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.33 The absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution.34 As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of
dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot
arise.35

Nonetheless, petitioner's acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the
dishonored checks. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.36

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 15 June 2010 and 28 December 2010
Orders of the Regional Trial Court in SCA No. 3338 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 on four (4) counts on the ground that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. He is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Cristina Yao
the face value of the subject checks in the aggregate amount of P6,082,000.00, plus
legal interest of 12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and
demandable until 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

21
DIGEST # 3
FACTS: Respondent Cristina Yao (Yao) alleged that she became acquainted with
petitioner through the latter's mother. Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother
mentioned that her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in Bacolod City and
asked whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner P1
million on 3 January 2001; P1 million on 7 January 2001; and P1.5 million on 16
February 2001. She also lent petitioner an additional P2.5 million in June 2001. As
payment, petitioner issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao
personally delivered her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received
by his secretary.
Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual receipt of the notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of B.P.22.
RULING:  Failure to prove petitioner's receipt of notice of dishonor warrants his
acquittal.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor
and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangement for its payment.
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter, yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in
mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.

22
CASE # 4

G.R. No. 225794, December 06, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y

CRISTO AND EMILIO MACAWILI, ACCUSED, CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y
CRISTO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

On appeal is the 16 July 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06800, which affirmed the 20 March 2014 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 5323-C finding herein accused-
appellant Cresencio Campit y Cristo (Cresencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information,3 dated 16 September 2008, Campit and accused Emilio

Macawili (Emilio) were charged for the murder of Leon Capanzana, Jr. (Leon)
committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of July 2008, at Barangay Silang, Municipality of Lopez,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who were both armed with deadly weapons, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their
weapons one Leon Capanzana, Jr., inflicting upon the latter fatal wound on his body,
causing his untimely death.

On 17 April 2011, Cresencio was arrested in Camarines Norte, 5 while Emilio remains at-
large.

On 11 May 2011, Cresencio, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.6 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: eyewitnesses Ma. Kristine
Capanzana Hernandez (Kristine) and Leonisa Capanzana Hernandez (Leonisa), the
granddaughter and daughter of the victim, respectively; Dr. Jose M. Mercado (Dr.
Mercado), the Municipal Health Officer of Lopez, Quezon, who conducted the post
mortem examination on Leon's cadaver; and Carlos Dacanay Capanzana (Carlos), the
son of the deceased. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On 27 July 2008, at about 2:30 p.m., at Barangay Silang, Lopez, Province of Quezon,
Leonisa and Kristine were tending to their store when Leon arrived and told them that
Cresencio was asking to borrow money. 7 Leon was engaged in the business of buying
copra and owned a bodega adjacent to Leonisa's store. 8 After a while, Cresencio and
Emilio, who were apparently drunk because they reeked of alcohol, passed by the store.
Emilio stayed on the other side of the road, while Cresencio approached Leon, who was
then in his bodega arranging documents and was about to leave. Cresencio pressed
Leon to lend him money but the latter did not heed his request. 9 Suddenly, Cresencio
pulled out a knife from his waist and repeatedly stabbed Leon five (5) times, more or
less. Leon tried to parry the thrusts with his hand but he was eventually stabbed on his
stomach.10 Leon turned away from Cresencio and attempted to escape, but he was met

23
by Emilio who grabbed his left shoulder and stabbed him on his chest. 11 Leon fell on his
back in front of the bodega,12 while Cresencio and Emilio ran away and fled. 13

Meanwhile, Leonisa and Kristine came out of their store and rushed towards the bodega
when they heard that Cresencio was pestering Leon for a loan. 14 They stood just about
three (3)-arms' length away from Leon and his assailants. They were shouting "Tama
na" when Leon was being stabbed by his assailants. 15 They were, however, unable to
help Leon for fear of being harmed as well. After Cresencio and Emilio fled, Leonisa
rushed her father to the Holy Rosary Hospital in Lopez, Quezon, where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.16

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Mercado revealed that Leon sustained
four (4) stab wounds on his body and an incised wound on his right hand small
finger.17 Dr. Mercado further testified that the proximate cause of Leon's death is the
multiple stab wounds he sustained.18

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Cresencio as its lone witness. In his testimony, Cresencio
interposed the defense of denial, as follows:

On 27 July 2008, at around 3:00 p.m., Cresencio was buying rice at the store of one
Myrna Argamosa (Argamosa) in Barangay Silang, Lopez, Quezon, when he saw Leon
handing P1,000.00 to Argamosa. Cresencio then uttered "daming pera po ah" and
asked P200.00 from Leon as part of the payment for the charcoal he delivered to the
latter.19 Leon, who apparently did not appreciate the remark, got mad at Cresencio,
grabbed his shirt, and punched him on the face. Cresencio did not fight back and simply
told Leon "huwag po, hindi ako lalaban." Leon then left and proceeded towards his
bodega located about 60 meters from Argamosa's store. 20 After about 15 minutes,
Cresencio left for home.21 On his way, he saw Leon in his bodega weighing copra. Leon
approached Cresencio after noticing the latter. However, Cresencio backed away after
sensing Leon's hostile behavior.22 At this moment, Emilio suddenly appeared and
stabbed Leon. Cresencio pleaded with Emilio to stop, but the latter merely told him
"wala kang pakialam."23 After the incident, Emilio fled while Cresencio went
home.24 After learning that he was implicated in Leon's killing, Cresencio left and stayed
with his brother-in-law in Camarines Norte to hide for fear of being arrested for a crime
he did not commit.25

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found Cresencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Leonisa and Kristine who vividly described how Cresencio and Emilio attacked and
killed the victim. It observed that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were clear and
categorical, and were given in a straightforward manner. It further opined that the
positive identification of Cresencio by the eyewitnesses prevails over the former's
defense of denial.

The trial court likewise appreciated the attendant qualifying circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength in the commission of the felony, finding that there was
notorious inequality of force between the victim who was old and unarmed and the two
aggressors who were both armed with knives. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment finding

CRESENCIO CAMPIT y Cristo @ Jun GUILTY of MURDER for the killing of Leon
Capanzana, Jr. upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. He is hereby sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole in line with the provisions of R.A. No.
9346. He is likewise ordered to pay the family of the deceased the following amounts:
P75,000.00 for death indemnity; P75,000.00 for and as moral damages; P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages; P48,000.00 to reimburse the cost of full memorial service; and
P25,000.00 for and as temperate damages.

24
SO ORDERED.26

Aggrieved, Cresencio appealed before the CA. 27

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellate court held that
the trial court correctly gave full credence to the testimonies of Leonisa and Kristine
noting that their respective narrations of the incident were candid and unwavering. It
agreed that the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
attended the killing of Leon. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated March 20, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Calauag,
Quezon is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.28

Hence, this appeal.

THE ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court finds no reason to reverse the conviction of the accused-appellant.

No reason to disturb factual findings by the trial court; Prosecution witnesses

are credible.

Cresencio insists that the trial and appellate courts erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of Kristine and Leonisa as they were tainted with inconsistencies and
contradictions. He averred that Kristine and Leonisa's testimonies that they witnessed
the stabbing of Leon but failed to help him are incredible and do not deserve any
consideration. He claimed that such actions or lack thereof belie common experience as
held in People v. Benjamin Reyes (Benjamin Reyes).29

The Court is not persuaded.

Findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
weight and credence on review. 30 Equally settled is the rule that the assessments made
by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect. 31

As explained in a plethora of cases, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question

best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings, particularly when no significant fact or circumstance is shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, would have affected the outcome
of the case.32

The Court finds no reason to depart from the factual findings by the trial court,
especially considering that the same were affirmed by the appellate court.

As aptly found by the trial court, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Kristine and
Leonisa were clear, candid, straightforward, and credible. They positively identified
Cresencio as among the two perpetrators of the crime. Their respective narrations of
the incident were consistent in all respects material to the case. Moreover, their

25
accounts relating to the number and location of the stab wounds were substantially
corroborated by the post mortem examination conducted on the deceased.

Time and again, the Court has held that the testimony of even a single eyewitness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of
murder.33 Moreover, considering that Cresencio assailed the credibility of the witnesses
against him, it is incumbent upon him to show that Kristine and Leonisa were impelled
by ill motives in falsely accusing him of the crime charged. 34 Unfortunately for
Cresencio, there was no showing of any ill motive on the part of any of the
eyewitnesses. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive on why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely
implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 35

Similarly, Cresencio's reliance in Benjamin Reyes is misplaced. In said case, the mother
of the victim testified that she saw her husband stab her daughter but, instead of helping
her, she went home. While sustaining the conviction of the accused, the Court agreed
with the defense's submission that the testimony of the victim's mother was not credible.

A reading of the said case, however, would reveal that the witness' account was
regarded by the Court to be against common experience not because of her failure to
help her daughter during the stabbing incident, but because of the peculiarity of her
behavior immediately after the incident which included, among others, the fact that she
did not shout and ask her neighbors for help; that when she arrived home, she casually
brushed her teeth and slept with her husband, who was also her daughter's killer; and
that she remained silent when the police came to their house despite the fact that her
husband was not present; and was, thus, not under threat at that time. More
importantly, the Court declared therein that her testimony regarding the stabbing
incident did not deserve any credit because she categorically stated that she did not
witness the killing of her daughter.

None of the circumstances in Benjamin Reyes which justified the finding of the witness's
lack of integrity is present in this case. To recall, Leonisa and Kristine did not remain
silent during the felonious deed. They were shouting and begging for Leon's assailants
to stop. Clearly, while they were crushed by the spectacle of Leon being stabbed to
death, fear prevailed upon them preventing them from doing anything to aid their loved
one. Likewise, after Cresencio and Emilio fled, Leonisa immediately rushed her father to
the hospital in the hope that he would survive. Leonisa's behavior is directly opposed to
that of the witness in Benjamin Reyes who did not even bother to check on her daughter
after allegedly witnessing her being stabbed.

Furthermore, and as held in People v. Romeo Fernandez,36 it would be unfair to gauge

the actions of the eyewitnesses as incredible for there is no prescribed behavior when
one is suddenly confronted with a startling or frightening event. Different people react
differently to a given stimulus or situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Thus,
Kristine and Leonisa's inability to help and defend Leon due to their fear of reprisal is
understandable and not at all contrary to common experience.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to disturb the trial court's full faith in Kristine and
Leonisa's testimonies given that they were clear, credible, categorical, and positive.
Needless to state, their testimonies prevail over Cresencio's defense of denial which
has been repeatedly considered as a weak defense. 37

The crime committed is only homicide; abuse of superior strength not

established

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality

of force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of
it in the commission of the crime.38

26
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily
amount to abuse of superior strength. 39 For the qualifying circumstance to be
appreciated, it must be shown that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength. Differently stated, it must be proven that the
accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 40 Furthermore, the evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.41 Thus, it had been held that when the victim was
attacked by the assailants alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior
strength could not be appreciated.42

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that only Cresencio
approached Leon while the latter was in his bodega. Thereafter, Cresencio, following an
argument, stabbed Leon multiple times. It was only when Leon escaped from Cresencio
that Emilio appeared and stabbed the victim on his chest. Considering that the
perpetrators attacked the victim alternatively and did not combine their superior strength
to overwhelm the victim, they could not be said to have taken advantage of their
superior strength.

Furthermore, the events leading to the stabbing negate the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. From the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, as well as, to some extent, from the accounts of Cresencio, it could be
gathered that the quarrel started when Cresencio felt offended after Leon repeatedly
rejected his request for a loan. Clearly, the incident was unplanned and unpremeditated.
When the quarrel between the victim and his assailants arose unexpectedly, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength could not be appreciated 43 as
the same requires some degree of prior deliberation or meditation. 44

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the
commission of the felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority
was purposely sought by the assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that
there was blatant disparity in strength between Leon and his assailants.

Penalties

In the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by

Cresencio is homicide and the penalty should be reclusion temporal as provided in
Article 249 of the RPC. Considering that there is neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article
64(1) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Cresencio should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the offense, that
is, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years); and the maximum of which should be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months). Accordingly, the Court imposes the indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Cresencio Campit y Cristo is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Leon Capanzana, Jr., the following amounts: (1) P75,000.00, as civil
indemnity; (2) P75,000.00, as moral damages; and (3) P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until its full payment. 45

SO ORDERED.

27
DIGEST # 4

FACTS: The combined witnesses for the prosecution established that on 27 July 2008,
at about 2:30 p.m., at Barangay Silang, Lopez, Province of Quezon, Leonisa and
Kristine were tending to their store when Leon arrived and told them that Cresencio was
asking to borrow money. After a while, Cresencio and Emilio, who were apparently
drunk, passed by the store. Cresencio approached Leon, who was then in his bodega
the former pressed the latter to lend him money but the latter did not heed his request.
Suddenly, Cresencio pulled out a knife from his waist and repeatedly stabbed Leon five
(5) times, more or less. Leon tried to parry the thrusts with his hand but he was
eventually stabbed on his stomach. 10 Leon turned away from Cresencio and attempted
to escape, but he was met by Emilio who grabbed his left shoulder and stabbed him on
his chest. Leon fell on his back in front of the bodega while his perpetrators fled.

Meanwhile, Leonisa and Kristine came out of their store and rushed towards the bodega
when they heard that Cresencio was pestering Leon for a loan. For the assailants to
stop but were unable to help Leon for fear of being harmed as well. After Cresencio and
Emilio fled, Leonisa rushed her father to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Meanwhile, in his testimony, Cresencio interposed the defense of denial as he stated

that it was Leon who punched the accused first because the former alleged that he was
only asking for payment for the coal that Leon bought from earlier. However, when he
noticed that that Leon was becoming hostile, Cresencio claims that he began to head
home. It was at this moment that Emilio allegedly appeared and stabbed Leon. After the
incident, Emilio fled while Cresencio went home. After learning that he was implicated in
Leon's killing, Cresencio left and stayed with his brother-in-law in Camarines Norte to
hide for fear of being arrested for a crime he did not commit.

ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting the accused of murder
due to the qualifying circumstance of superior strength

RULING: childIt must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily
amount to abuse of superior strength. For the qualifying circumstance to be
appreciated, it must be shown that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength. Furthermore, the evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate
intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. Thus, it had been held that when the victim was attacked by the
assailants alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior strength could
not be appreciated.

The events leading to the stabbing negate the attendance of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength. From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as
well as, to some extent, from the accounts of Cresencio, it could be gathered that the
quarrel started when Cresencio felt offended after Leon repeatedly rejected his request
for a loan. Clearly, the incident was unplanned and unpremeditated. When the quarrel
between the victim and his assailants arose unexpectedly, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength could not be appreciatedas the same
requires some degree of prior deliberation or meditation. 44

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the
commission of the felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority
was purposely sought by the assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that
there was blatant disparity in strength between Leon and his assailants.

28
CASE # 5

September 4, 2017
G.R. No. 224886
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO, Accused-Appellant
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal @

Rambo (Racal), assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01450, which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-77654, finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The antecedents are as follows:
In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal
was charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads, thus:
That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco
by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.4 Subsequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4 o'clock in the morning of
April 19, 2006, "trisikad" drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at
Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. Among the "trisikad" drivers was Jose Francisco (Francisco).
Also present at that place during that time was Racal, who was then standing near
Francisco. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke in a
loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor.
Francisco, who was then holding a plastic container in one hand and a bread in another,
and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without
warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife,
hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the
pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped backwards and upon reaching a dark
portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and sped away. Thereafter, one of
the "trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived, Francisco
was already dead.
Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the
defense of insanity. He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a
predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the
defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not
capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.

29
After Trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, dated September 14, 2011, read as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the following considerations, the court renders judgment finding
accused ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties. He is
likewise directed to pay the heirs of the late Jose "Joe" Francisco the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC ruled that the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court that
Racal was indeed deprived of his mind and reason at the time when he committed the
crime as to exempt him from criminal liability becaµse his depression and psychotic
features are not the kind of insanity contemplated by law. The trial court found the
circumstance of treachery to be present, but ruled out the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 contending that the trial court failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party and voluntary confession of guilt on the part of Racal. However, the RTC
denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in its Order7 dated December 15, 2011. Aggrieved by the ruling of the
RTC, Racal appealed to the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Racal reiterated his defense of
insanity contending that, at the time he stabbed the victim, he snapped into a fatal
episode of temporary loss of rational judgment and that such a predisposition to "snap"
was testified upon by his expert witnesses.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Racal but modified the
judgment of the RTC by imposing interest on the damages awarded. The CA disposed,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the September 14, 2011 Judgment in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654,
convicting accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo of Murder and sentencing him
with reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of Jose "Joe" Francisco, interest
on damages awarded, the amount of 6% from the date of finality of the judgment until
fully paid, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary to
convict Racal for the murder of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. It also affirmed the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and affirmed the trial court in ruling out the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's defense of insanity, the CA held
that he failed to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of his commission of
the crime. The CA, nonetheless, appreciated the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to an illness of the offender that would diminish the exercise of his will-
power.
Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 questioning the penalty imposed upon him,
but the CA denied it in its Resolution 10 of October 22, 2015.
Thus, on November 23, 2015, Racal, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal 11 manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
In its Resolution 12 dated March 16, 2016, the CA gave due course to Racal's Notice of
Appeal and directed its Archives Section to transmit the records of the case to this
Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In a Resolution13 dated July 20, 2016, this Court, among others, notified the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

30
In its Manifestation and Motion, 14 filed on September 23, 2016, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it will no longer file a supplemental brief
because it had already adequately addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the
issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.
On the other hand, Racal filed a Supplemental Brief15 dated October 21, 2016,
reiterating his defense of insanity by contending that at the time of the commission of
the crime, expert evidence demonstrates that he had, within him, predisposing factors
that cause insanity. He also argues that the lower courts failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and voluntary
confession of guilt on his part.
The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present appeal is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld the conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for murder.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in the review of a case, the Court is guided by the
long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, deserve great weight and respect.16 These factual findings should not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were
overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the
case.17
In the present case, after a careful rading of the records and pleadings, this Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the RTC’s factual findings. There is no indication that
the trial court, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC are affirmed by the
CA. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court in this respect, especially considering that
it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties.
In any case, the Court will proceed to resolve the present appeal on points of law.
The Information in the instant case charged appellant with the crime of murder, for
stabbing the victim, Francisco, which offense was alleged to have been attended by
treachery and evident premeditation.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua,
to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
xxx
2. With evident premeditation;
xxx
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.18
In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was
stabbed and killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the

31
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 19 In
order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was
caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness,
Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was eating. The
stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the
victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there
is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and
the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact
that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence.
Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder
under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In this regard, the Court's
pronouncement in the case of People v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based,
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our
law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity
which exempts the actor from criminal liability.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
frorri criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as
a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital
or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the
accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed
by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining
a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedor~/ of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence
on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution.

32
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to
receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and
after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement
essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A
person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to
determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.23
In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The
testimonies of Dr. Preciliana Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr.
Gerong), as the defense's qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant's claim
of insanity. As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of
appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after
the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. In People v. So,24 which is a case of recent
vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed.25 Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified
to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental
condition at the time of his commission of the crime.
In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up
to the time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian
of his sister's children.26 He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one
who sends them to and brings them home from school. Certainly, these acts are not
manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct
examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was
wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime."27 "Diminished capacity" is
not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality
of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 28 Thus, on the basis of these
examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted
without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of
intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to
ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his
commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a
completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was
not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the
commission of the crime.
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in criminal
courts in the United States of America. This rule postulated that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the result of a mental disease or defect at
the time of the incident.29 However, in subsequent rulings, US Federal Courts and
State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted it, rejected and abandoned this
rule for being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for criminal
responsibility. 30 As earlier discussed, in the Philippines, the courts have established a
clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is
a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the
will.31 Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is misplaced and, thus, may not
be given credit.
Having been shown beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty
all the elements of the crime charged, the Court will now proceed to determine the
correctness of the penalty and the civil liabilities imposed upon appellant.
As to the penalty, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article
248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to
death. As to the alleged aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this Court
has ruled that for it to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution
must prove (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient

33
lapse of time between the detennination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will.32 In the instant case, no proof has been adduced to establish that appellant had
previously planned the killing of Francisco. There is no evidence when and how he
planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had
lapsed between his determination and execution. In this respect, the Court quotes with
approval the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
The circumstances that transpired immediately before and after the stabbing negate
evident premeditation. The time when accused-appellant conceived the crime cannot be
determined. Even assuming that there was an altercation that arose between the
accused-appellant and the victim due to the remarks made by the former to the latter,
this is not the overt act indicative of his criminal intent. Simply put, the prosecution failed
to establish that there was a sufficient lapse of time for accused-appellant to reflect on
his decision to kill the victim and the actual execution thereof. 33
Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in not considering the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation.
The Court likewise agrees with the RTC and the CA in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary
plea of guilt on the part of appellant.
With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part
of Francisco, the rule is that, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to ~xcite a person to
commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity.34 In the present case,
appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed the victim, the latter teased
appellant to be "gay" and taunted him that the girl whom appellant courted rejected him.
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC on this
matter, to wit:
For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines to apply, three requisites must be present:
a) provocation must be sufficient;
b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and
c) it must originate from the offended party.
"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit
the crime and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025, September 2, 1992], the mitigating circumstance did not
apply since it is not enough that the provocating act be unreasonable or annoying.
Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the sufficient provocation
contemplated by law that would lessen the liability of the accused.
"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval of time between the
provocation and the commission of the crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67
O.G. 7451] the Supreme Court ruled that provocation occurring more than one hour
before the stabbing incident is not immediate and in People v. Benito [62 SCRA 351] 24
hours before the commission of the crime. Per admission of the defense witnesses, the
taunting done by the victim occurred days before the stabbing incident hence the
immediacy required by law was absent. The lapse of time would have given the
accused [chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to refrain from
pushing through with his evil plan. 35
Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant's part, it is settled that a plea of
guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to
have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.36 Again, the Court quotes
with approval the RTC's disquisition, thus:
The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt. claimed by the accused
could likewise not be considered.1âwphi1 The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the
accused is not spontaneous because it was made after his arraignment and only to
support his claim of the exempting circumstance of insanity. The voluntary plea of guilt

34
required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong
he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for the law. It
is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his
reform. It may be recalled that accused in the case at bar did not change his plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty". In a last ditch effort to elude liability, however, accused claimed
the defense of admitting the act of [stabbing].37
The Court, however, agrees with the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however,
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and
10 of the RPC, as he was found by his examining doctors to have "diminish[ ed]
capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime."38 Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, appellant was correctly meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63, paragraph 3 of the RPC.
With respect to appellant's civil liability, the prevailing rule is that when the
circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, as in this case, the proper amounts
should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.39 In conformity with the foregoing rule, the awards granted by
the lower courts must, therefore, be modified. Thus, the award of moral damages
should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Appellant should also pay the
victim's heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. The award of
₱75,000.00, as civil indemnity, is sustained.
As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00, the
same must, likewise, be modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven
by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as
temperate damages, 40 the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual
damages which is of a lesser amount.41 Conversely, ifthe amount of actual damages
proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages
based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.42 The rationale
for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and
succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to
receive an amount which is less than that given as temperate damages to those who
are not able to present any evidence at all.43 In the present case, Francisco's heirs
were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages in murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to
Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual damages.
The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the
time of finality of this decision until fully paid, as well as the payment of costs, is likewise
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, finding accused-appellant Roger
Racal @ Rambo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) The award of moral damages is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00);
(2) Accused-appellant is DIRECTED TO PAY the heirs of the victim Jose "Joe"
Francisco exemplary damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00); and (3) The award of actual damages is DELETED and, in lieu
thereof, temperate damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) is
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.

35
DIGEST # 5
FACTS:  In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Offic, Racal was charged
with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended.The accusatory portion of the Information reads that
the said accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco
by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.
The evidence for the prosecution established that while the “trisikad” drivers were
waiting for passengers, Racal told the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he
is a traitor. Francisco asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning,
Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in
the chest and other parts of his body.
Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the
defense of insanity. He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a
predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the
defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not
capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco
RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. CA affirmed the conviction of
Racal. The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary
to convict Racal for the murder of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. It also affirmed the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and affirmed the trial court in ruling out the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's defense of insanity,
the CA held that he failed to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of his
commission of the crime. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of herein appellant,
Racal, for murder
RULING: YES. To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements
must be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.18
In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was
stabbed and killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor infanticide.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was
caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness,
Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was eating. The
stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the
victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there
is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and
the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact
that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence.
Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case.
Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In the present case, the
defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr. Preciliana

36
Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr. Gerong), as the defense's
qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant's claim of insanity.
Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to
ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his
commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a
completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was
not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the
commission of the crime.

37
CASE # 6
SECOND DIVISION
October 4, 2017
G.R. No. 218575
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
FRANCIS URSUA y BERNAL, Accused-Appellant
PERALTA, J.:
AAA was born on January 16, 19923 and is accused-appellant Ursua's biological
daughter. Together with her father and elder brother, BBB, she lived in a small house
with one room, but without kitchen and living room (sala).
Around 12:00 midnight on January 17, 2006, Ursua, who was drunk, woke up AAA and
instructed her to buy a porridge (lugaw). After eating, he told her to turn off the light and
close the door. As they were sleeping in one bed, he undressed her, touched her
vagina, and held her breast. He then removed his short pants and brief, moved on top
of her, pulled his penis, and inserted it into her vagina. He told her not to make any
noise. Consequently, she merely cried and did not shout, resist, or ask her father to
stop. After the acts were done, they went to sleep.
Early dawn the next day, Ursua repeated the dastardly acts on AAA. He held her vagina
and breast and inserted his penis into her vagina.1âwphi1 Again, she did not ask for
any help. She did not shout because her father almost hit her ("muntik na po nya akong
sapakin '').He told her not to make any noise; hence, she just cried. Later in the
evening, around 10 p.m., Ursua once more held AAA's breasts and vagina and placed
himself on top of her ("pinatong po nya uli yang, pumatong po uli sya sa akin ").4
From January 17 to 18, 2006, BBB was in the street, selling in the market. On January
19, 2006, AAA left their house and went to her godfather (ninong), CCC. She told him
what happened between her and Ursua. She did not return to their house and stayed
with her ninong and cousins in a place under the Pasig City Hall.
On November 14, 2006, AAA, assisted by a liaison officer of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), executed a sworn statement before the Women
and Children Concern Unit of the Pasig City Police Station.5 Based on the Request for
Genital Examination by the police station, PSI Marianne Ebdane, a Medico-Legal
Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
conducted a medical examination of AAA on November 9, 2006. After finding that there
were deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock position and shallow healed lacerations at 2, 3
and 9 o'clock positions, she concluded that there is a clear evidence of remote history of
blunt force or penetrating trauma to AAA's hymen.6 She interviewed AAA, who
disclosed that it was caused by her father who inserted his organ into her vagina.
Charges for qualified rape7 were then filed against Ursua. The three Informations, all
dated February 20, 2007, alleged:
Criminal Case No. 134832-H
On or about January 17, 2006, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with one [AAA], 14 years old, a minor
and his daughter, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.8
Criminal Case No. 134833-H
On or about January 18, 2006, at about 5:00 a.m., in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did

38
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with one
[AAA], 14 years old, a minor and his daughter, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.9
Criminal Case No. 134834-H
On or about January 18, 2006, at about 10:00 p.m., in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with one
[AAA], 14 years old, a minor and his daughter, against her will and consent. Contrary to
law.10
In his arraignment, Ursua pleaded not guilty.1âwphi1 Trial ensued.
Ursua denied having any carnal knowledge of AAA. He recalled that around 9:00 p.m.
to 10:00 p.m. on January 17, 2006 he arrived at the house after working at their
neighbor's place. At that time, AAA and BBB were at the house. He was living only with
them because he was already separated from his wife for a long time. He requested his
children to buy lugaw. When they returned, he ate it and rested. He just heard that they
closed the door and slept beside him. With lights on, BBB slept at the middle between
him and AAA. While they were asleep, he did not notice anything.
When Ursua woke up at 5:00 a.m. on January 18, 2006, BBB was already awake, while
AAA was still asleep. He brought BBB to the market to work at his (Ursua) cousin's
vegetable store. By 7:00 a.m., he returned to their house to pick up AAA and bring her
to school. Afterwards, he went to work and arrived at their house around 12:00
midnight. By that time, his two children were already sleeping.
On January 19, 2006, AAA attended school and proceeded directly to CCC's store
located under the Pasig City Hall. She stayed there from 12:00 p.m. until Ursua fetched
her around 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Subsequently, however, AAA did not return home
anymore. Since September 2006, she had been staying in the DSWD.
Ursua claimed that AAA filed the cases against him because he prevented her from
going to CCC. The reason being that she became especially close to her godfather.
Whenever he fetched her, he oftentimes saw him embracing her and that sometimes
she was sitting on his lap. Due to the prohibition, AAA would leave the house whenever
they were asleep. They would wake up without AAA and just see her already at CCC's
place.
Testifying for his father, BBB declared that on January 17, 2006, he was at home with
AAA, while his father was working as a helper.1âwphi1 Around 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Ursua arrived and told them to buy food. After which, they all ate the lugaw and slept
around 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The house they were residing at was only small and
with one bed. Ursua and AAA slept on his either side. While sleeping, he did not feel or
notice anything unusual. They woke up at 5 a.m. Considering that the light was on, he
did not notice if his father or sister was already awake. He does not know the reason
why AAA would file a case against their father and why she would lie about it. Prior to
the alleged incident on January 17, 2006, he did not notice any special treatment or any
unusual behavior of his father against his sister. There was no misunderstanding
between them. He affirmed that she frequented the shop of CCC.
On November 22, 2012, Ursua was convicted of three (3) counts of qualified rape. The
fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that
accused FRANCIS URSUA y Bernal has committed the crime of Qualified Rape (3
counts) under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, par. 5(1) of the Revised Penal
Code and in further relation to Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 8369 as charged, the Court hereby
pronounces him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and, there being aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of 3 counts of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Accused is ordered to pay AAA the amount of Php 150,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php60,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

39
The trial court found AAA as a witness and her testimony credible. She positively
identified her father as the one who raped her and testified consistently and
convincingly on the material facts, including the dates and time, that transpired in the
alleged incidents. In addition, PSI Ebdane presented and explained her medico-legal
report to corroborate AAA's declaration that she was sexually molested. The court was
unconvinced by the defense of alibi and denial of Ursua. Even if corroborated by his
son, the defense was not given credence as it was unsubstantiated and there was no
doubt that he could be at the scene of the crime at the time the alleged incidents
happened.
On appeal, the CA ruled that Ursua's denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of
AAA. She was spontaneous and credible as she gave clear and categorical narration of
events and was firm and steadfast in her accusations. However, in view of the failure of
the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with regard to the alleged rape
that occurred in the evening of January 18, 2006, the appellate court downgraded the
offense to acts of lasciviousness.12 It disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The conviction of
the Accused-Appellant Francis Ursua y Bernal for the two (2) counts of rape (Criminal
Case No. 134832-H and Criminal Case No. 134833-H) is AFFIRMED. The third
(Criminal Case No. 134834-H) count of rape is MODIFIED to
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua as maximum period and ordered to pay AAA moral damages of
₱15,000.00; civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱15,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 
Before Us, the People, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested
that it would not file a Supplemental Brief as the Appellee's Brief filed before the CA
adequately addressed the issues and arguments raised in this case. Per the Court's
Resolution dated March 16, 2016, Ursua was deemed to have waived the filing of the
required brief. It appeared that he did not file a supplemental brief pursuant to the
Resolutiondated July 27, 2015, within the period fixed therein which expired on October
17, 2015.
There is no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction, but a modification of the
penalties imposed, the damages awarded, and the nomenclature of the offense
committed, is in order.
We accord high respect and conclusiveness on the trial court's calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and the conclusions derived therefrom when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. Indeed, trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial, and the rule finds
an even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the
CA.
However, the assailed CA decision is modified as to the penalty imposed and the
damages awarded in Criminal Cases No. 134832-H and 134833-H. With respect to the
two (2) counts of qualified rape by sexual intercourse, Ursua is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole,and is
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, in line with
current Jurisprudence.
As to the penalty for qualified rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, Article
266-B (1) of the RPC provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the parent. Applying R.A. No.
9346,the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it should be
specified that it is without eligibility for parole. This is pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC
which states that " [w]hen circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the
death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the
qualification 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in
order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death

40
penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346." Meanwhile, the damages awarded by the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, should be modified in view of People v. Juguetawhere it
was held that in cases of qualified rape where the imposable penalty is death but the
same is reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No. 9346, the amounts of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages shall be in the amount of
₱l00,000.00 each.
As regards Criminal Case No. 134834-H, the CA decision is likewise modified as to the
nomenclature of the offense, the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.
Since AAA merely testified that her father touched her breasts and vagina, and
thereafter placed himself on top of her ("pumatong siya"), and there was no specific
mention of a penetration of Ursua's penis or fingers into AAA' vagina, the CA correctly
ruled that Ursua cannot be held liable for rape by sexual intercourse as charged in the
Information in Criminal Case No. 134834-H. Be that as it may, Ursua can still be
convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 pursuant to
the variance doctrine under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, because
the same offense was proved during trial and is necessarily included in acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is
necessarily included in the crime of rape.
Contrary to the CA's ruling that Ursua is, at the most, liable for one (1) count of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 due to the prosecution's failure to prove the fact of carnal knowledge, We rule
that the proper nomenclature of the offense is sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610. This is consistent with the CA's discussion on the prosecution's
failure to prove the fact of carnal knowledge in Criminal Case No. 134834-H:
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
are as follows:
1. The accused commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
First, accused-appellant's touching of AAA's breasts and vagina with lewd designs
constitute lascivious conduct defined in Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:
xxxx
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced
AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse.
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on
her testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during trial. x x
x26
Accordingly, Ursua should be convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, and not just acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in
relation to the same provision of R.A. No. 7610.
Concededly, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not
vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the
offense, but the actual facts recited in the information.27 It bears emphasis, however,
that the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.28 Thus, the Court finds it necessary to stress its ruling in Caoili:29(1) that
the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section
5(b ), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, can only be committed against a victim who is less
than 12 years old; and (2) that when the victim is aged 12 years old but under 18, or is
above 18 years old under special circumstances, the proper designation of the offense
is sexual abuse or lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:
41
Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, however, the offense
designated as Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section
4 of R.A. No. 7610 should be used when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age at
the time the offense was committed. This finds support in the first proviso in Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 which requires that "when the vicitim is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be. " Thus, pursuant to this proviso, it has been
held that before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct
on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section
5 of R.A. No. 7610.
Conversely, when the victim, at the time the offense was committed is aged twelve (12)
years or over but under eighteen (18), or is eighteen (18) or older but unable to fully
take care of herself/himself or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the
nomenclature of the offense should be Lascivious Conduct under Section S(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, since the law no longer refers to Article 336 of the RPC, and the perpetrator
is prosecuted solely under R.A. No. 7610.
xxxx
Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court takes this
opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper
offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in
determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should
be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take
care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the
crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. 
Considering that the victim was 14 years old at the time of the commission of sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and there being no mitigating circumstance
to offset the alternative aggravating circumstance of (paternal) relationship, as alleged
in the inforn1ation and proved during the trial of Criminal Case No. 134834-H, Ursua is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay ₱15,000. 00
as fine, pursuant to Section 3l(a) and (f) of R.A. No. 7610, as well as to pay AAA the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, in line with current Jurisprudence.
Finally, a legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all the
monetary awards for damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 1 7, 2014 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06105 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Francis Ursua y Bernal is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
following:
1. Two (2) counts of Qualified Rape in Criminal Cases No. 134832-H and 134833-H. He
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count; and

42
2. One (1) count of Sexual Abuse in Criminal Case No. 134834-H. He is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of ₱l5,000.00, and to pay AAA the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn an interest rate of six percent (6%) per
annum to be computed from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

43
DIGEST # 6
FACTS: Around 12:00 midnight on January 17, 2006, Ursua, who was drunk,
undressed AAA, touched her vagina, and held her breast. He then removed his short
pants and brief, moved on top of her, pulled his penis, and inserted it into her vagina.
He told her not to make any noise. Consequently, she merely cried and did not shout,
resist, or ask her father to stop.
Early dawn the next day, Ursua repeated the dastardly acts on AAA. Again, she did not
ask for any help. Later in the evening, around 10 p.m., Ursua once more held AAA's
breasts and vagina and placed himself on top of her.
On November 14, 2006, AAA, assisted by a liaison officer of DSW, executed a sworn
statement before the Women and Children Concern Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station.5 Based on the Request for Genital Examination by the police station, PSI
Marianne Ebdane conducted a medical examination of AAA on November 9, 2006. After
finding that there were deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock position and shallow healed
lacerations at 2, 3 and 9 o'clock positions, she concluded that there is a clear evidence
of remote history of blunt force or penetrating trauma to AAA's hymen.6She interviewed
AAA, who disclosed that it was caused by her father who inserted his organ into her
vagina.
Charges for qualified rape were then filed against Ursua.
Ursua was convicted of three (3) counts of qualified rape. The trial court found AAA as a
witness and her testimony credible. She positively identified her father as the one who
raped her and testified consistently and convincingly on the material facts, including the
dates and time that transpired in the alleged incidents. In addition, PSI Ebdane
presented and explained her medico-legal report to corroborate AAA's declaration that
she was sexually molested. \ 
On appeal, the CA ruled that Ursua's denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of
AAA. She was spontaneous and credible as she gave clear and categorical narration of
events and was firm and steadfast in her accusations. However, in view of the failure of
the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with regard to the alleged rape
that occurred in the evening of January 18, 2006, the appellate court downgraded the
offense to acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that Ursua is, at the most, liable for one (1)
count of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610
RULING: The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610 are as follows:1. The accused commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
First, accused-appellant's touching of AAA's breasts and vagina with lewd designs
constitute lascivious conduct defined in Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced
AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse.
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on
her testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during trial.

44
Accordingly, Ursua should be convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, and not just acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in
relation to the same provision of R.A. No. 7610.
Concededly, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not
vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the
offense, but the actual facts recited in the information.27 It bears emphasis, however,
that the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.28 Thus, the Court finds it necessary to stress its ruling in Caoili:29(1) that
the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section
5(b ), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, can only be committed against a victim who is less
than 12 years old; and (2) that when the victim is aged 12 years old but under 18, or is
above 18 years old under special circumstances, the proper designation of the offense
is sexual abuse or lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
Considering that the victim was 14 years old at the time of the commission of sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and there being no mitigating circumstance
to offset the alternative aggravating circumstance of (paternal) relationship, as alleged
in the information and proved during the trial of Criminal Case No. 134834-H, Ursua is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

45
CASE # 7
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEUTERIO URMAZA Y
TORRES, Accused-Appellants.
MARTIRES, J.:
On appeal is the 27 February 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 06343, which affirmed the 19 July 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-0462-D finding
accused-appellant Eleuterio Urmaza y Torres (Urmaza) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape.
FACTS
On the basis of a Sinumpaang Salaysay subscribed by the private complainant AAA, a
deaf-mute, Urmaza was charged with qualified rape before the RTC of Dagupan City, in
an Amended Information which reads:
That on or about the 7th day of September 2011, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ELEUTERIO URMAZA y TORRES, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, have carnal knowledge upon complainant
[AAA], who is a demented person (deaf-mute), against her will and consent to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to Article 266-A par. 1-a of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
8353.3
When arraigned, Urmaza entered a plea of "not guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, namely: AAA, AAA's mother BBB,
Joshua Illumin (Joshua), Dr. Mary Gwendolyn Luna (Dr. Luna), Dr. Rosalina Caoile (Dr.
Caoile), Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jocelyn Tappa, and PO1 Jobert Sarzadilla. Their
combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

With the assistance of a sign language interpreter, AAA recounted that on 7 September
2011, at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, she was inside her house in Dagupan City
taking care of her newborn baby when someone arrived.4 She put down her baby and
saw that it was Urmaza who entered the house. She prepared coffee for him. After he
had drunk the coffee, AAA asked him to leave as she was about to sleep. Urmaza,
however, did not leave; instead he closed the door and windows. He embraced AAA,
touched her breasts, and removed her shirt.5 He then removed his pants and held AAA
with both hands. AAA struggled and pushed him away to free herself, but Urmaza was
strong and he was able to insert his penis into her vagina four (4) times; after which
AAA felt something wet and sticky.6

Joshua, AAA's neighbor, attested that on 7 September 2011, at about 11:30 in the
morning, he was in front of AAA's house7 making a cage for doves when he saw
Urmaza enter AAA's house.8 He peeped through a hole and he saw Urmaza insert his

46
penis into AAA's vagina9 while touching AAA's breasts. He was frightened so he called
his cousin John Mark and they both watched Urmaza and AAA.10 Joshua got hold of a
cellular phone, handed it to John Mark, while they looked for a good place where they
could take a video of what was happening between Urmaza and AAA. John Mark,
however, accidentally touched a galvanized iron that made a sound. The noise caught
Urmaza's attention prompting him to leave AAA's house.11

BBB testified that Urmaza was the brother-in-law of her late husband.12 After her
husband's death, Urmaza stood as father to her children. BBB's children were close to
Urmaza and he would usually visit them.13 On 7 September 2011, BBB learned from
Joshua that Urmaza had raped AAA. BBB was shocked and confronted Urmaza, but the
latter denied any wrongdoing. Upon reaching home, AAA, through sign language,
admitted to BBB that she was raped by Urmaza. Thereafter, BBB went to the police
station and reported the incident. She then accompanied the police to Urmaza's house
where he was arrested.

Dr. Caoile testified on the psychiatric examination she conducted on AAA, as well as on
the findings in the medical certificate dated 10 October 2011,14 and the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report dated 23 October 2011.15 She attested that AAA suffered from
mental retardation and did not know the idea of safety.16 Meanwhile, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated on the findings made by Dr. Luna which was detailed in the
Medico Legal Report.17

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented the lone testimony of Urmaza.

He deposed that on 7 September 2011, at 11:30 in the morning, he went to see AAA at
her house to inform the latter that her grandmother had died.18 Upon arriving at AAA's
house, her sister-in-law served him coffee. After he had drunk the coffee, AAA
approached him and asked for money; then he and AAA had sexual intercourse, which
many of their neighbors allegedly witnessed. After the tryst, AAA bid him goodbye. In
the afternoon of the said date, he was arrested.

Urmaza asserted that he and AAA had a relationship, and they had engaged in sexual
intercourse for quite a long time even before 7 September 2011.19

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found Urmaza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In so ruling, the RTC noted Urmaza's admission that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA on 7 September 2011. It did not believe Urmaza's claim that AAA consented to the
sexual congress because they were in a relationship. Rather, the trial court found that
AAA was suffering from mental retardation and was thereby deprived of reason. Hence,
it concluded that the deed was tantamount to rape, qualified by Urmaza's knowledge of
AAA's mental retardation. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Eleuterio Urmaza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, sub-par, b in relation to Article 266-B, par. 6
sub-par. 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and is
hereby sentenced the (sic) suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The accused is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amounts of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

The period during which the accused was detained at the District Jail, Dagupan City,
shall be credited to him in full.

SO ORDERED.

47
Aggrieved, Urmaza filed an appeal before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling. It held that
AAA's testimony was credible and her narration of the rape was convincing and
straightforward, with detailed specifics as only one telling the truth could give.

The appellate court took into account Dr. Caoile's psychiatric evaluation and found that
AAA was indeed a mental retardate. Citing jurisprudence, it ruled that carnal knowledge
of a woman who is a mental retardate is considered rape, and proof of force or
intimidation is unnecessary because a mental retardate is incapable of giving consent to
the sexual act.

Finally, the CA adjusted the RTC's monetary awards in keeping with recent
jurisprudence. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated July 19, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
41 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that is, accused-appellant Eleuterio
Urmaza y Torres is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, sub-par. b in relation to Article 266-B,
par. 6, sub-par. 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility
for parole, in lieu of death. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the victim AAA the
following sums: a) Php 75,000.00 as and for civil indemnity; b) Php 75,000.00 as and for
moral damages; c) Php 30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages as provided by the
Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence plus legal interest on all damages awarded
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WHETHER IT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT URMAZA IS
GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE.
In a Resolution,20 dated 9 November 2015, the Court required the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desired. In his
Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief,21 Urmaza manifested that he was adopting
the Appellant's Brief filed before the CA as his supplemental brief, for the same had
adequately discussed all the matters pertinent to his defense. In its Manifestation and
Motion,22 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that it was likewise adopting its Brief
filed before the CA and would already dispense with the filing of a supplemental brief.
THE COURT'S RULING

Foremost, this Court would like to address its observation as to the use of the word
"demented" in the Amended Information under which Urmaza was charged.

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended, provides for two circumstances
when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape:

1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x;

2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.23

It was alleged in the Amended Information that AAA is a demented person (deaf-mute).
The tapestry of this case, however, depicts a victim who is suffering from mental
retardation, not dementia. For clarity's sake, the Court must restate that mental
retardation and dementia are not synonymous and thus should not be loosely
interchanged.

48
On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," not one who is "demented."27

At any rate, the erroneous designation of AAA as a demented person will not invalidate
the Amended Information. In the first place, Urmaza did not raise any objection at all on
the matter. More importantly, none of his rights was violated, particularly that of being
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.28 The material facts
necessary to establish the essential elements of rape were succinctly alleged, and the
Amended Information by itself is sufficient to enable Urmaza to suitably prepare for his
defense.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force
or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.29 In the case at bar,
Urmaza never denied having carnal knowledge of AAA. Thus, the only matter to be
resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her
will using threats, force or intimidation; or that AAA was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.30

In his appellant's brief, Urmaza impugns the finding that AAA was a mental retardate.
He argues that retardation is belied by no less than AAA herself, considering that she
was even able to prepare coffee for him; and that she was able to narrate her alleged
ordeal with clarity of thought and precision.

Urmaza's suggestions fail to persuade.

The RTC and the CA both found that AAA was a mental retardate. Well-settled is the
rule that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are
binding upon this Court.31 Besides, there is no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions
reached by the tribunals a quo with respect to AAA's mental condition.

Both clinical and testimonial evidence were presented by the prosecution to prove that
AAA was a mental retardate. The prosecution presented the Psychiatric Evaluation
Report made by Dr. Caoile whose qualification as an expert witness was admitted by
the defense.32 Based on the psychological tests performed on AAA, she was found to
be suffering from MENTAL RETARDATION, SEVERITY UNSPECIFIED. Such
diagnosis was grounded on AAA's significant sub-average intellectual functioning and
concurrent deficits or impairment in adaptive functioning, i.e., difficulty expressing what
she likes, constant need to be supervised with regard to hygiene and basic household
chores, and difficulty understanding or following simple instructions.

Dr. Caoile testified that:33

PROSECUTOR OLIVA B. NUDO (PROS. NUDO) on direct examination:

Q: What were your findings?

A: On examination, interview and observation, the patient is suffering from mental

retardation and as specified (sic),34 madam.

Q: What do you mean by on examination, interview and observation, the patient is

suffering from mental retardation and as specified (sic)?

A: Actually, there are three bases of mental retardation.

1.) Sub-average intellectual functioning meaning IQ below 70.

2.) There is an impairment in the patient adoptive functioning such as communication,

safety health care, home living direction and the onset should be for age 18, so this
49
case of [AAA] is considered suffering from mental retardation because of the
impairment of the adoptive function, as we can see she could not do simple chores at
home, she was supervised in sweeping the floor, washing the dishes or cooking which a
person could already do at age 35;

3.) She does not know the importance of safety; she was abused for several times, this
is a fourth incident, when asked what the accused did to her, she just smile and never
answer; with regard to the communication she has difficulty (sic) communicating; she
has difficulty of understanding simple instructions. So those are the impairment of
simple communication. However, an IQ test was not done in this patient because she
has a difficulty understanding simple question; however, even though there was no IQ
test done still as we can say the patient still suffering from a mental retardation because
of the impairment in adoptive functioning, madam.
In addition to the Psychiatric Report and Dr. Caoile's testimony, AAA's mental
retardation was further substantiated by the testimony of Urmaza himself,35viz:
PROS. NUDO on cross-examination:

Q: You are related to the complainant?

A: Yes, madam, her father and my wife are siblings.

Q: And the father of the complainant is already dead?

A: Yes, madam.

Q: And even with the death of the complainant's father, you frequent the house of the
complainant?

A: Yes, madam.

Q: So you know the complainant since her birth?

A: Yes, madam.

Q: You know that she is mentally challenged?

A: Yes, madam. (emphasis ours)

Q: Such that even at this age, she even thinks like a child?

A: Yes, madam.

Q: And you claimed that you have a relationship with AAA for quite sometime now?

A: Yes, madam.

Q: This, despite the fact that she is your niece and she is a mentally challenged? (sic)

A: Yes, madam.
From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to prove AAA's
mental retardation. In our jurisdiction, carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from
mental retardation is rape since she is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.
Under these circumstances, all that needs to be proved for a successful prosecution are
the facts of sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental
retardation.36

Urmaza does not deny having sexual congress with AAA in the morning of 7 September
2011. He, however, claims that the act was consensual as he has been in a relationship
with AAA for quitesometime now.

50
Urmaza must be reminded that the sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an oft-
abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests its
patience. To even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence. Mere testimonial evidence will not suffice. Independent proof is
required — such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. None of such were presented
here by the defense.37

That the sexual congress was against AAA's will is further shown by her testimony on
cross-examination by Urmaza's counsel.38
Atty. Ferrer:

Q: You said a while ago that Eleuterio Urmaza entered your house, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do when he entered your house?

A: I asked him to leave because I will sleep but he refused and I waited for him to leave
but he did not leave, sir.

Q: When he refused to leave, can you tell us what did you do next?

A: I was already angry and asked him to leave, sir.

Q: You said that Eleuterio Urmaza closed the door and the window of your house is that
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you when he closed the window of your house?

A: He closed the door and the window, sir.

Q: You said a while ago that he embraced you and touched your breast?

A: He embraced me, and I tried to push him away but he embraced me and he inserted
his penis, sir.

Q: You said a while ago that when he was allegedly inserting his penis you were holding
on to something, that your hand is holding something?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us what was that thing you were holding in your house? (sic)

A: (Witness demonstrating a post and shaking post made of wood)

Q: With your both hands on that position, you were able to hit or push Eleuterio Urmaza
on that point?

A: I kept on pushing him but he kept on touching me, sir.

It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims
as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it was shown that they could
communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity
of the complainant's accusations, it lends even greater credence to her testimony, as
someone feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the
details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the
accused.39

Moreover, it has been repeatedly held that the RTC's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect in the absence of any attendant grave abuse of

51
discretion, since it has the advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial
evidence, including the conduct of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on
the matter. This rule finds greater application when the RTC's findings are sustained by
the CA, as in this case.40 Accordingly, the Court finds nary a reason to depart from the
RTC's assessment of the testimony of AAA.

In sum, the prosecution has sufficiently established Urmaza's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. His conviction therefore stands.

While the Court affirms the RTC and the CA's ruling of conviction, it cannot, however,
subscribe to the penalty imposed upon Urmaza lest it runs afoul with the tenets of due
process. Indeed, knowledge of the offender of the victim's mental disability at the time of
the commission of rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under
Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353.41 Nevertheless, it appears that the tribunals a quo lost sight of the precondition
that an allegation in the Information of such knowledge of the offender is necessary, as
a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. A contrary
ruling would result in denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and hence, a denial of due process.42

Here, the offender's knowledge of the mental disability of the victim was not properly
alleged. There was no averment in the Amended Information stating that Urmaza knew
of AAA's mental retardation during the commission of the rape. While the erroneous
designation of AAA as a demented person did not cause material and substantial harm
to Urmaza, the same cannot be said of the prosecution's failure to recite the aforesaid
qualifying circumstance. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court require that
the qualifying circumstances be specifically alleged in the Information to be appreciated
as such. As elucidated in People v. Tagud,43 the purpose is to alert the accused that
his life hangs in the balance because a special circumstance would raise the crime to a
higher category.44

Lamentably, even if the prosecution was able to prove that Urmaza had knowledge of
AAA's mental retardation, the Court is constrained to find him guilty of rape only in its
simple form.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed 27 February 2015 Decision of the CA

with the MODIFICATION that appellant ELEUTERIO URMAZA y TORRES is
pronounced GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; all
such amounts to earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

52
DIGEST # 7
FACTS: Urmaza was charged with qualified rape before the RTC. Evidence for the
prosecution established that Urmaza had raped AAA and that AAA suffered from mental
retardation.
The defense presented the lone testimony of Urmaza. Urmaza asserted that he and
AAA had a relationship, and they had engaged in sexual intercourse for quite a long
time even before 7 September 2011. 
RTC found Urmaza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. RTC ruled that Urmaza's
admission that he had sexual intercourse with AAA on 7 September 2011. It did not
believe Urmaza's claim that AAA consented to the sexual congress because they were
in a relationship. Rather, the trial court found that AAA was suffering from mental
retardation and was thereby deprived of reason. Hence, it concluded that the deed was
tantamount to rape, qualified by Urmaza's knowledge of AAA's mental retardation.
CA affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling. The appellate court took into account Dr.
Caoile's psychiatric evaluation and found that AAA was indeed a mental retardate.
Citing jurisprudence, it ruled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental
retardate is considered rape, and proof of force or intimidation is unnecessary because
a mental retardate is incapable of giving consent to the sexual act.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that Urmaza is guilty of
Qualified Rape
RULING: No. The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
In the case at bar, Urmaza never denied having carnal knowledge of AAA. Thus, the
only matter to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge of
AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation; or that AAA was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.
The RTC and the CA both found that AAA was a mental retardate. In our jurisdiction,
carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is
incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all that needs
to be proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual congress between the
rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental retardation.
Urmaza did not deny having sexual congress with AAA in the morning of 7 September
2011. He, however, claims that the act was consensual as he has been in a relationship
with AAA for quite sometime now.
While the Court affirms the RTC and the CA's ruling of conviction, it cannot, however,
subscribe to the penalty imposed upon Urmaza lest it runs afoul with the tenets of due
process. Indeed, knowledge of the offender of the victim's mental disability at the time of
the commission of rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under
Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353.41 Nevertheless, it appears that the tribunals a quo lost sight of the precondition
that an allegation in the Information of such knowledge of the offender is necessary, as
a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment.
Here, the offender's knowledge of the mental disability of the victim was not properly
alleged. There was no averment in the Amended Information stating that Urmaza knew
of AAA's mental retardation during the commission of the rape. While the erroneous

53
designation of AAA as a demented person did not cause material and substantial harm
to Urmaza, the same cannot be said of the prosecution's failure to recite the aforesaid
qualifying circumstance
Lamentably, even if the prosecution was able to prove that Urmaza had knowledge of
AAA's mental retardation, the Court is constrained to find him guilty of rape only in its
simple form.

CASE # 8
G.R. No. 218804, August 06, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO QUIAPO
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the April 24, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CR
HC No. 00669-MIN affirming with modification the September 5, 2008 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 28 in Criminal Case
Nos. L-0098 to L-00103 convicting Leonardo Quiapo @ "Lando" (appellant) of one
count of attempted rape and five counts of consummated rape.

Antecedent Facts

Appellant was charged before the RTC of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 28 in six
separate Informations with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 to L-00103, inclusive.

The accusatory portions of the Informations read, as follows:

Criminal Case No. L-0098

That, in the afternoon, on or about the 20th day of September, 1996, in x x x

Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
moved by lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with one MMM,3 an 11 year old child, against her will and without her
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).4

Criminal Case No. L-0099

That, in the evening, on or about the 21st day of September, 1996, in x x x Zamboanga

del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by
lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with
one MMM, an 11 year old child, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).5

Criminal Case No. L-00100

That, in the morning, on or about the 18th day of April, 1996, in x x x Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one
AAA, a 12 year old child, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).6

Criminal Case No. L-00101

54
That, at noon, on or about the 18th day of April, 1996, in x x x Zamboanga del Norte,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, move by lewd and
unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one AAA, a
12 year old child, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).7

Criminal Case No. L-00102

That, in the evening, on or about the 18th day of April, 1996, in x x x Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one
AAA, a 12 year old child, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).8

Criminal Case No. L-00103

That, in the evening, on or about the 13th day of May, 1996, in x x x Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one
AAA, a 12 year old child, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).9

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The CA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the prosecution's
version of the incidents in the following manner:
Criminal Case Nos. L-0100, L-0101, L-0102 and L-0103:
Rapes committed on AAA:

In the summer of 1996, AAA stayed with x x x appellant Leonardo Quiapo, and Aunt
[BBB] Quiapo at their residence x x x, per request of AAA's Aunt [BBB]. While living with
the spouses, AAA helped out in the daily household chores x x x. Everytime that [BBB]
leaves the house, Leonardo would ask her to come to him.

In the afternoon of 18 April 1996, while AAA was fetching water, Leonardo followed and
beckoned her to come to him x x x. At first, AAA did not respond to Leonardo's call. x x
x Eventually, [AAA] succumbed to [appellant's] unrelenting request and came near him.
Immediately thereafter, Leonardo x x x [undressed AAA and threatened her] not to
shout.

Terrified by the bolo [hanging] at the side of Leonardo and the threat of killing her x x x,
AAA yielded to [her] uncle's desire. Leonardo laid her on the grass and took out his
penis x x x and positioned himself on top of AAA. However, Leonardo was not able to
fully insert his penis into AAA's vagina.

Days after, Leonardo's second sexual attack on AAA took place at the Quiapos['J house
x x x. While AAA was sleeping together with her aunt and cousins in the same room -
which was dark because the light[s] were off - Leonardo advanced towards AAA.
Despite AAA's three (3) shouts for help, her aunt [and cousins] did not wake up[.]x x x
Leonardo succeeded in penetrating her [causing her severe] pain and x x x vaginal
bleeding. She was sure that it was Leonardo because she recognized x x x his voice.

The third rape incident was committed in the grassy portion surrounding the house of
the Quiapos['] x x x while AAA was fetching water. Similarly, AAA felt severe pain and
vaginal bleeding resulting from Leonardo's penetration of her.

55
For the fourth time, Leonardo raped AAA while she was sleeping together with all the
members of the Quiapo family in the same room. Her shouting twice [at] the top of her
voice did not wake her aunt or anybody in the room x x x. Leonardo covered her mouth
to prevent her from shouting further. He succeeded in undressing and laying on top of
AAA by threatening her that [he] would kill her. Again, Leonardo successfully penetrated
AAA resulting in another episode of pain and vaginal bleeding on the part of AAA.

The fifth episode happened one morning while AAA was carrying palay from the rice
mill. Moments after reaching the house, AAA was commanded by Leonardo to come
close to him. When AAA did not accede, x x x Leonardo grabbed her hand. At this point,
[BBB] saw what her husband was doing to her niece. [BBB] hurriedly went inside the
house and a fight ensued thereafter. [BBB] inquired from AAA what her husband did to
her and AAA confessed the sexual molestations made by appellant against her x x x.
On the same day, AAA was brought to her house x x x. She was also brought to the
doctor for medical examination and to the police for investigation.

xxxx

Dr. Joshua G. Brillantes, Rural Health Physician of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte
conducted the physical examination on AAA on May 29, 1997. During the examination,
Dr. Brillantes observed that there was a complete laceration of hymenal membrane
which [had] already healed[, which laceration was] possibly caused by a penis inserted
through the hymen causing it to break.

On internal examination or manual examination, it was discovered that AAA's vaginal

womb readily admit[ted] the tip of the little finger without any resistance[. This was] a
result of the insertion of any object x x x to the vagina which [had] caused the elasticity
of the vaginal muscles. He testified that the above mentioned findings indicated that a
previous penetration occurred prior to the examination.

xxxx

Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099:

Rapes committed on MMM

Sometime in September 1996, MMM was invited by her Aunt [BBB] to stay in the latter's
house x x x to be a playmate to the latter's two children. MMM would [be] sleeping [in] a
small room beside her Aunt [BBB] who was, in turn, lying beside Leonardo.

[In the evening] of 20 September 1996 [MMM] was sleeping inside her Aunt [BBB] and
Leonardo's bedroom. At that time, her aunt was not around. While she was sleeping,
appellant came to lie beside her, x x x. While MMM tried to move away[,] Leonardo
pulled her towards him x x x. Leonardo held her hand, then shoulders, covered her
mouth and undressed her. MMM attempted to shout but Leonardo managed to cover
her mouth.

Eventually, after successfully pulling down MMM's panty, Leonardo removed his own
clothes and [laid] on top of her. MMM suddenly felt much pain when Leonardo inserted
his penis into her vagina Maintaining such position, Leonardo continued with a series of
'push and pull' movements until MMM felt something x x x flowed inside her vagina.

After Leonardo was through, hex x x warned her that[,] if she [would] report x x x what
[had] happened, he [would] kill her and her mother. Leonardo also promised to give
MMM money. Driven by an overwhelming fear, MMM did as she was told. Leonardo
was armed with an air gun beside him while he was committing these acts.

The following day, 21 September 1996 at around 4:00 PM, while MMM was [on a trail]
through the nearby grassy portion, Leonardo shouted at [her] and instructed her to
come near him because he had something to tell her. Thereat, Leonardo raped MMM
for the second time [and] blood oozed out of MMM's vagina after another painful sexual
attack made by appellant.

56
MMM reported the sexual molestations caused to her by her uncle to the police x x x [in]
May 1997 or approximately eight (8) months when her cousin AAA, who was also raped
by her uncle, appellant Leonardo, reported the matter to MMM's mother.

Dr. Brillantes was also the one who conducted the physical examination on MMM on
May 29, 1997. Dr. Brillantes observed that there was a complete laceration of hymenal
membrane which [had] already healed. He testified that the above mentioned findings
[indicated] that MMM was 'no longer a virgin' at the time of the examination [and] the
same result as that of his examination with AAA.10
On the other hand, appellant relied on denial and alibi. He denied ever having carnal
knowledge of AAA and MMM as he was no longer a resident of the place where the
occurrences transpired. He alleged that the accusations against him were fabricated
and instigated by the complainants' grandmother who was driven by a grudge against
him.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC gave more credence to the testimonies of AAA and MMM. It rejected
appellant's defenses of denial and alibi applying the principle that these defenses
cannot prevail over the positive testimony and identification of the accused. The RTC
was not persuaded that the charges were just fabricated as it was not clearly
established that the grandmother of the complainants really had a grudge on him.
However, in Criminal Case No. L-0100, the RTC found appellant liable only for
attempted rape since the prosecution failed to prove that appellant's penis was able to
penetrate, however slight, AAA's vagina. Thus, on September 5, 2008, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused LEONARDO QUIAPO
alias Lando, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the following:

1. For the crime of Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. L-0100 and sentences [him] to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum and to pay Victim - AAA x x x the sum of Php30,000.00
as civil indemnity; Php25,000.00 as moral damages and Php10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and

2. For two (2) counts of Consummated Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. L-0098, L-0099,

and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in two (2) counts, and to
pay the Victim - MMM x x x the sum of Php75,000.00; Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and Php75,000.00 as moral damages, for each case.

3. For three (3) counts of Consummated Rape in Criminal Case Nos. L-0101, L-0102,
and L-0103 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in three (3)
counts, and to pay the Victim - AAA x x x the sum of Php75,000.00[,] Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and Php75,000.00 as moral damages, for each case.

SO ORDERED.
Insisting on his innocence, appellant appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found the testimonies of AAA and MMM clear, candid and straightforward and
was convinced that appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. It rejected
his defenses of denial and alibi holding that affirmative testimony was far stronger than
negative testimony especially when it comes from a reliable witness. The CA ruled that
appellant failed to prove his physical impossibility to be at the situs criminis at the time
and date the crimes were committed. The precise time and date when the rapes took
place had no substantial bearing on its commission. Moreover, the CA held that the
delay in reporting the incidents did not militate against the credibility of AAA and MMM

57
as they were threatened with death by appellant. Thus, on April 24, 2015, the CA
disposed of appellant's appeal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, in Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte in Criminal Case Nos. L-0098, L-0099, L-0100, L-0101, L-0102
and L-0103, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Leonardo Quiapo is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of:

(a) statutory rape under paragraph 1 (d), article 266A of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility of parole, and to further pay the victim, MMM, for each count
of rape the amounts of [a] P50,000.00 as civil indenmity, [b] P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and [c] P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

(b) simple rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case Nos. L-0101, L-0102 and L-0103 and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, and to further pay the victim, AAA, for
each count of rape the amounts of [a] P50,000.00 as civil indenmity, [b] P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and [c] P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

(c) attempted rape in Criminal Case No. [L-]0100 for which he is sentenced to prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the victim, MMM, the amounts of [a] P30,000.00 as civil
indenmity, [b] P25,000.00 as moral damages, and [c] P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Upon finality of this decision, appellant is further directed to pay interest, at the rate of
6% per annum, on all monetary awards for damages from the date of finality until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.

In our Resolution13 dated August 5, 2015, we required the parties to submit their

respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice, if they so desired. The
parties filed their separate manifestations that they were no longer filing supplemental
briefs; instead, they were adopting their briefs filed before the CA.14
Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In assailing his conviction, appellant harps on the credibility of AAA and MMM
contending that their respective recollection of the events were conflicting and
contradictory regarding the details of the place, date and time of the incidents; and, their
delayed disclosure of the incidents to their parents.

Appellant explains that the Information in Criminal Case No. L-0100 stated that the
crime was committed in the morning on or about the 18th day of April, 1996; in Criminal
Case No. L-0101 stated that the crime was committed at noon or about the 18th day of
April, 1996; in Criminal Case No. L-0102 stated that the crime was committed in the
evening on or about the 18th day of April, 1996; and; in Criminal Case No. L-0103
stated that the crime was committed on or about the 13th day of May, 1996. However,
AAA testified during the trial that she was sexually abused in the year 1996 but could
not remember the dates and gave inconsistent testimonies on the details. Appellant also
avers that MMM could not state with consistency the place where the incidents of rape
happened on September 20 and 21, 1996. Moreover, appellant posits that the delay in
reporting the incidents hardly conforms to human experience.

58
Appellant's submissions are not tenable.

"[T]he date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal."15 Thus, any discrepancy regarding the dates, place and time of
the incidents deserves scant consideration. In People v. Sarcia,16 the Court "ruled, time
and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated."

Neither the delay of AAA and MMM in reporting the incidents undermines their
credibility. We have already ruled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of
threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim because delay in
reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not
necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant."17

The courts below correctly rejected appellant's defenses of denial and alibi. Well
established is the rule that "a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement
of appellant in the crimes attributed to him."18 The same is true with his claim of alibi.
As observed by the courts below, appellant failed to prove his physical impossibility to
be at the crime scene during their alleged commissions.

Anent appellant's ascription of ill-motive in filing the charges against him, the Court
already ruled that "motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed
this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim."19

Incidentally, appellant's contentions basically relate to the trial court's appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its factual findings based thereon particularly
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The time-honored rule is that 'the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best
addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on
the stand While testifying, x x x and absent any substantial reason which would justify
the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is
bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, which when considered would have
affected the outcome of the case. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA.20
This Court is convinced that the courts below were correct in giving full credence to the
complainants.

The Court agrees with the CA that appellant should be held liable for statutory rape in
Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099. The elements of the crime of statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) that such a woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.21 Essentially, the
foregoing elements are the same as those provided under paragraph 3 of Article 335,
the law in force when the rapes on MMM transpired. Thus based on records, the
prosecution had established the element of carnal knowledge through the testimony of
MMM with her age of being under 12 years old supported by her Certificate of Live
Birth.

With respect to the rapes committed on AAA, the CA made a clear conclusion which we
quote:

59
However, with respect to AAA, the Court upholds the trial court in finding appellant only
liable for simple rape in Criminal Case Nos. L-0101, L-0102 and L-0103. While it may
appear that AAA was under twelve (12) years old at the time appellant raped her, the
same was not properly alleged in the Information. Consequently, due to the defect in the
information charging appellant of rape, he can only be made liable for simple rape even
if it was proven during trial that AAA was under twelve (12) years old at the time of the
commission of the crimes charged.22
In addition, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CA
affirming that of the trial court that appellant can only be made liable for attempted rape
in Criminal Case No. L-0100 in view of the absence of any showing of the slightest
penetration of appellant's penis inside AAA's vagina.

Consequently, the CA properly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion

perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. L-0098, L-0099, L-0101, L-0102 and L-0103.

Recent jurisprudence23 however, constrains us to modify the amount of damages

awarded by the CA. The awards of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages have
to be modified and increased to P75,000.00 each in the aforenumbered cases, which
amounts shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

While we sustain the prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, imposed by the CA in Criminal Case No. L-0100 for attempted rape, we
find a need also for some modifications in the award of damages in line with recent
jurisprudence. The award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity must be reduced to
P25,000.00 while the amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages is increased to
P25,000.00. The award of P25,000.00 as moral damages is retained. All the amounts
awarded shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed April 24, 2015 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00669-MIN
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099, the appellant is found GUILTY of statutory
rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is
ordered to pay MMM P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, all with interest at 6% per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case Nos. L-0101, L-0102 and L-0103, the appellant is found GUILTY of
simple rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
He is ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, all with interest at 6% per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. L-0100, the appellant is found GUILTY of attempted rape and
sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is ordered to pay AAA P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest of 6% per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

60
DIGEST # 8
FACTS: Appellant was charged before the RTC of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte in six
separate Informations with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
AAA stayed with appellant Leonardo Quiapo, and Aunt BBB Quiapo at their residence
BBB. While living with the spouses, AAA helped out in the daily household chores .
While AAA was fetching water, Leonardo followed and beckoned her to come to him. At
first, AAA did not respond to Leonardo's call. Eventually, AAA succumbed to appellant's
unrelenting request and came near him. Immediately thereafter, Leonardo undressed
AAA and threatened her not to shout. Terrified by the bolo hanging at the side of
Leonardo and the threat of killing her, AAA yielded to her uncle's desire. Leonardo laid
her on the grass and took out his penis and positioned himself on top of AAA. However,
Leonardo was not able to fully insert his penis into AAA's vagina.
The attempted rape, however, was consummated days after. While AAA was sleeping
together with her aunt and cousins in the same room - which was dark because the
lights were off - Leonardo advanced towards AAA. Despite AAA's shouts for help, her
aunt and cousins did not wake up. Leonardo succeeded in penetrating her causing her
severe pain and vaginal bleeding. She was sure that it was Leonardo because she
recognized his voice.
On the part of MMM, she was invited by her Aunt BBB to stay in the latter's house to be
a playmate to the latter's two children. MMM would be sleeping in a small room beside
her Aunt BBB who was, in turn, lying beside Leonardo.MMM was sleeping inside her
Aunt BBB and Leonardo's bedroom. At that time, her aunt was not around. While she
was sleeping, appellant came to lie beside her. While MMM tried to move away,
Leonardo pulled her towards him. Leonardo held her hand, then shoulders, covered her
mouth and undressed her. MMM attempted to shout but Leonardo managed to cover
her mouth.
Eventually, after successfully pulling down MMM's panty, Leonardo removed his own
clothes and laid on top of her. MMM suddenly felt much pain when Leonardo inserted
his penis into her vagina maintaining such position, Leonardo continued with a series of
'push and pull' movements until MMM felt something flowed inside her vagina.

The RTC convicted the accused of his charges and the CA affirmed the conviction
modified the crime to statutory rape for the two cases.
ISSUE: Whether the accused should be held guilty for the crime of rape
RULING: .The elements of the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) are: (1)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under
12 years of age or is demented.21 Essentially, the foregoing elements are the same as
those provided under paragraph 3 of Article 335, the law in force when the rapes on
MMM transpired. Thus based on records, the prosecution had established the element
of carnal knowledge through the testimony of MMM with her age of being under 12
years old supported by her Certificate of Live Birth.
While it may appear that AAA was under twelve years old at the time appellant raped
her, the same was not properly alleged in the Information. Consequently, due to the
defect in the information charging appellant of rape, he can only be made liable for
simple rape even if it was proven during trial that AAA was under 12 years old at the
time of the commission of the crimes charged.

61
CASE # 9
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 228886, August 08, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE FLORES, DANIEL
FLORES AND SAMMY FLORES, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Facts

Accused-appellants Charlie Flores alias "Alit4 Flores" (Charlie), Daniel Flores alias

"Jover Violata" (Daniel), and Sammy Flores alias "Ricky Violata" (Sammy),5 along with
their co-accused, Gary Badeviso (Gary) and Rodel Torestre (Rodel), who remain at
large, were charged with murder in an Information6 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2002, at Barangay Tignoan, in the
Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with bladed weapons, with intent to
kill and qualified by abuse of superior strength, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and simultaneously gang up upon a certain Larry Parcon and stab him
several times with the use of said bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon him multiple
fatal stabbed wounds on the different vital parts of his body which directly caused his
death.

Contrary to law.7
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.8 After the conduct and
termination of the pre-trial,9 trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution revealed that, at around 8:45 p.m. on December 25,
2002, the victim, Larry Parcon (Larry) and Eduardo Mabini (Eduardo) were on their way
home aboard a motorcycle when it ran out of fuel right in front of a videoke bar
in Barangay Tignoan, Real, Quezon.10 After telling Eduardo to buy fuel and giving him
money, Larry went inside the videoke bar.11 When he was about to go in, Eduardo,
who was an arm's length away from the door of the videoke bar, heard a commotion
coming from inside the bar.12 He decided to go inside and climb the stairs, located in
front of the bar,13 to check.14 There he saw Larry pacifying Sammy and Daniel who
were fighting and Larry telling them, "bakit kayo nag aaway, paskong pasko."15 Then
suddenly, Rodel ran towards Lany and stabbed him.16 Eduardo shouted, "Why did you
hit my boss?"17 Sammy, Daniel, and Rodel then turned to Eduardo and took turns
punching him.18 Sammy tried to stab Eduardo but the latter failed because Eduardo
had fallen down the stairs.19 Sammy and Daniel went back to Larry and, using seven-
inch double-blade knives, alternately stabbed him on the lower right and left sides of his
body while Charlie held him by the armpits.20 Gary also stabbed Larry on the head
while another one, identified as Belgar, likewise stabbed him on his right side.21 When
the assailants had fled through the back door, Eduardo sought help at

62
the barangay hall.22 Larry was boarded on one of the barangay tanod's vehicle and
rushed to the hospital.23 Unfortunately, he was pronounced dead on arrival after
suffering five fatal stab wounds.24 Beverly, the wife of Larry, testified regarding the
burial expenses as well as to the moral damages caused by the death of her
husband.25 She likewise stated that Larry was a Philippine Army corporal earning
P8,000.00 a month.26

The Version of the Defense

Accused-appellants denied the allegations.27 Sammy and Daniel - who are cousins28 -

claimed that they were at the house of the manager of their logging business, Sheryl
Orozco (Sheryl), in Barangay Pagsanghan, General Nakar, Quezon at 9:00 p.m. and
Sammy went home around midnight to sleep.29 Sheryl testified to corroborate their
claim that, on that night, Sammy and Daniel were at her house.30 Meanwhile, Charlie,
brother of Sammy,31 claimed being with his wife, Lonelyn Bantigue (Lonelyn), and
brother-in-law, Jesus Bantigue (Jesus), in Sitio Pagitna, Rizal, Burdeos,
Quezon.32 Lonelyn corroborated the testimony of her husband that, at the time of the
incident, Charlie was with her and her brother, Jesus.33

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC of Infanta, Quezon, Branch 65, rendered a Decision finding accused-
appellants guilty of the charge. It found that there was abuse of superior strength which
qualified the crime to murder.34 The trial court also gave credence to the testimony of
the lone prosecution witness who was able to see the incident since the bar was well-
lit35 and who was not shown to have any ill motive in testifying against accused-
appellants.36 Finding that only P15,000.00 of the actual expenses was duly proven by
receipts and with no evidence presented on the earning capacity of the victim other than
the testimony of the widow, the RTC instead awarded temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.37 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered against accused

SAMMY FLORES alias "Ricky Violata," CHARLIE FLORES alias "Alit Flores," and
DANIEL FLORES alias "Jover Violata" finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder, and the provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law being not
applicable, the fact that the penalty [imposable] upon them is x x x indivisible, and
accordingly, the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant [to] Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby imposed upon all said accused, for them to suffer all the
accessory penalties, and to pay jointly and solidarily the heirs of victim Larry Parcon the
following, to wit:

a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity by reason of victim's death;

b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages[;] and[,]

to pay the costs of suit.

This case insofar as accused Gary Badeviso and Rodel Torestre are concerned, who
are still at large, is ordered archived to be revived as soon as the said accused are
apprehended.

SO ORDERED.38
Accused-appellants filed their appeal39 assailing their conviction. They specifically
assailed their identification by the lone witness for the prosecution.40 They also imputed
error on the trial court for having qualified the crime as murder after it had ruled that
they abused their superior strength.41

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other
hand, posited that accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.42 Specifically, plaintiff-appellee argued that the defense of denial could not

63
outweigh the positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime and the trial court committed no error in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness.43

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants subject only to minor
modifications in the penalty as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 October 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Infanta, Quezon, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 1738-I is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATION:

(1) Accused-appellants are not eligible for parole;

(2) That an interest, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this judgment until they are
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.44
Hence, the present appeal.45 After being asked to file supplemental briefs if they so
desired,46 the parties instead submitted Manifestations47 in which they stated that they
were adopting their Briefs48 submitted earlier before the appellate court and were
dispensing with the filing of Supplemental Briefs.49

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the appeal.

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder under Article 24850 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the following elements must be established: "(1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is
not parricide or infanticide."51

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements. The lone
witness for the prosecution, Eduardo, was able to categorically identify accused-
appellants. His testimony was clear, as follows:

Q:
After your boss said "bakit kayo nag-aaway, paskong-pasko," what transpired next if
there was any?
A:
After he said that, [a man suddenly came] running from outside, ma'am.
Q:
From your location, was it right side or left side?
A:
Right side, ma'am.
Q:
Where did this person go coming from the right side?
A:
Going to my boss, ma'am.

64
Q:
Was he able to reach your boss?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
What [did] this person do to your boss if there was any?
A:
"Parang sinuntok po nya ang boss ko sa kaliwang dibdib." (Witness is pointing to his left
chest).
Q:
Was he hit?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
Were you able to [identify] this person who hit your boss on his left chest?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
Who was this person?
A:
Rodel Flores, ma'am.52
xxxx
Q:
After you fell [down] the stairs, what transpired next if there was any?
A:
They went back to my boss, ma'am.
Q:
Who [were] you x x x referring to?
A:
Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores, ma'am.
Q:
Were they able to get back to your boss?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
What did they do to your boss if there was any?
A:
They stabbed him, both of them stabbed him, ma'am.
COURT
Q:

65
Who stabbed first your boss?
A:
Sammy Flores, ma'am.
Q:
How many times [did] Sammy [stab] your boss?
A:
Only [once], Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed, Fiscal.
FISCAL AVELLANO
Q:
Was [your] boss hit by Sammy Flores?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
[W]hich part of his body x x x was hit?
A:
Right side of his body, ma'am.
Q:
Was it the upper part of his body or lower part of his body?
A:
Lower right side, ma'am.
COURT:
Q:
How about Daniel Flores, how many times [did] he [stab] your boss Larry Parcon?
A:
Only [once], Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed, Fiscal.
FISCAL AVELLANO:
Q:
Was your boss hit by Daniel Flores?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
Which part of the body of Larry Parcon was hit by Daniel Flores?
A:
Left side, ma'am.
Q:
Was it upper or lower part of his body?
A:
Lower left side, ma'am. (Witness is pointing to his left side of his body.)
66
xxxx
Q:
After Larry Parcon was stabbed by Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores, what happened to
him if there was any?
A:
He was just lying, ma'am.
xxxx
Q:
While Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores were stabbing Larry Parcon, where was Charlie
Flores then?
A:
Charlie Flores [was holding] my boss Larry Parcon, ma'am.
Q:
Where did this Charlie Flores hold your boss?
A:
"Sa dalawang kili-kili po," ma'am. (In [sic] his two armpits.)
Q:
When did Charlie Flores hold the armpit of your boss, was it before x x x or after
Sammy Flores and Danny Flores stabbed him.
A:
Before they stabbed him, ma'am.
Q:
While Charlie Flores was holding your boss, what did Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores
do to your boss?
A:
They stabbed him, ma'am.
Q:
[Were] Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores the only [persons who] stabbed your boss
during that time?
A:
No, ma'am.
Q:
Who else stabbed your boss?
A:
Gary Badeviso and one Belgar, ma'am.53
Q:
Now, Mr. Witness, when these Sammy Flores and Daniel Flores ran away to the
direction of the back of the x x x bar, what transpired next, if there was any?
A:
Gary ran towards my boss, ma'am.
Q:
And when Gary Badeviso ran towards your boss, what transpired next?

67
A:
He stabbed my boss on his head, ma'am.
COURT:
Q:
Was his head hit by the stabbing of Gary Badeviso?
A:
Yes, Your Honor.
And what part of his head was hit by the stabbing of Gary Badeviso?
A:
Here, Your Honor.  (Witness is pointing to the top of his head.)
FISCAL AVELLANO:
xxxx
Q:
After Gary stabbed your boss on his head, what transpired next, if there was any?
A:
His head bled, ma'am.
xxxx
Q:
And after this Gary Badeviso ran away, what transpired next, if there was any?
A:
It was Belgar who approached my boss, ma'am.
xxxx
Q:
After Belgar went to your boss, what transpired next?
A:
Belgar also stabbed him on his side, ma'am.
Q:
And was your boss hit by the stabbing of Belgar?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
Q:
To which side of his body?
A:
On his ride side, ma'am. (Witness pointed to his right side just below the armpit.)54
At the time of the incident, the videoke bar was well lighted by three fluorescent lamps
while a fourth lamp illuminated the counter.55 No ill motive was also shown for the lone
prosecution eyewitness to testify against accused-appellants. This Court thus finds no
error in the affirmance by the appellate court of the trial court's finding of guilt of the
accused-appellants based on the sole testimony of the prosecution witness who
positively identified the perpetrators.

68
Meanwhile, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was proven by the
prosecution. People v. Beduya56 is instructive on the notion of abuse of superior
strength.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the
victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.
The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.57 (Citations
omitted)
In the instant case, the prosecution clearly established that the accused-appellants,
taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Larry by the armpit so
that all the knife-wielders would be free to stab him, albeit successively. In People v.
Garchitorena,58 the Court en banc appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength after finding that therein "accused-appellants, armed with a deadly
weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly
weapon." Moreover, in terms of numbers, Larry was with his lone companion, Eduardo,
while the assailants, totaling five, participated in the attack. A disparity in strength and
size was thus apparent.

Anent the penalty, there being no other circumstance other than the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the trial court had imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which the CA properly affirmed.

As to the award of damages to Larry's heirs, prevailing jurisprudence59 directs the

payment to the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages;
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages as well as the payment of 6% interest per annum on all amounts
from finality of this Decision until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The June 16, 2016 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07219 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellants Charlie Flores alias "Alit Flores", Daniel Flores alias "Jover Violata",
and Sammy Flores alias "Ricky Violata" are hereby found guilty of murder. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Larry Parcon the following: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d)
P50,000.00 as temperate damages; and (e) interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all
amounts from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

69
DIGEST # 9
FACTS: Accused-appellants Charlie Flores alias "Alit Flores" (Charlie), Daniel Flores
alias "Jover Violata" (Daniel), and Sammy Flores alias "Ricky Violata" (Sammy), 5 along
with their co-accused, Gary Badeviso (Gary) and Rodel Torestre (Rodel), who remain at
large, were charged with murder in an Information.
The prosecution narrated that Larry and Eduardo were on their way home aboard a
motorcycle when it ran out of gas. They stopped in front of a videoke bar. When they
were about to enter the bar, they heard a commotion inside. Eduardo and Larry then
climbed the stairs inside the videoke bar and tried to pacify the accused-appellants who
were fighting. However, Rodel stabbed Larry which caused Eduardo to be outraged.
The accused-appellants then tuned to Eduardo and took turns in punching him and
Sammy tried to stab Eduardo but failed because he fell down the stairs.
Accusedappellants went back to assaulting Larry by using double-bladed knives to stab
him. When the assailants left the scene, Eduardo then sought the help of barangay
tanods and brought Larry to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival
after suffering five fatal stab wounds, For the defense, they averred that they were at
the house of their manager in a logging business. Sammy and Daniel, according to
Sheryl, were at his house. Meanwhile, Charlie was said to be with his brother Jesus
during the incident, which was corroborated by Charlie’s wife.
The RTC rendered a Decisionfinding accused-appellants guilty of the charge. It found
that there was abuse of superior strength which qualified the crime to murder.
The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appelants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
RULING: To successfully prosecute the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established: "(1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide." In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly
establish all the elements. The lone witness for the prosecution, Eduardo, was able to
categorically identify accused-appellants. At the time of the incident, the videoke bar
was well lighted by three fluorescent lamps while a fourth lamp illuminated the
counter.No ill motive was also shown for the lone prosecution eyewitness to testify
against accused-appellants. This Court thus finds no error in the affirmance by the
appellate court of the trial court's finding of guilt of the accused-appellants based on the
sole testimony of the prosecution witness who positively identified the perpetrators.

Meanwhile, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was proven by the
prosecution. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two
persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To
take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation
of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

In the instant case, the prosecution clearly established that the accused-appellants,
taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Larry by the armpit so

70
that all the knife-wielders would be free to stab him, albeit successively.

CASE # 10

THIRD DIVISION

APRIL 4, 2018

G.R. No. 219240

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
BRYAN GANABA y NAM-AY, Accused-Appellant

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay (accused-

appellant) assailing the 27 August 2014 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06030 affirming, with
modification as to the award of damages, the 9 January 2013 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City, finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape under Article (Art.) 266-A3 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information docketed as Criminal Case

No. 429-V-09, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about July 1, 2009 in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by
means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of AAA, 16 years old (DOB:
June 16, 1993), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the complainant, against her will and without her consent, thereby
subjecting the said minor to sexual abuse which debased, degraded, and demeaned
[her] intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him;5 hence, trial proper ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the victim, AAA, 6 and P/Supt. Bonnie Y.
Chua (Dr. Chua), a medico-legal officer of the Northern Police District Crime
Laboratory (crime laboratory).

PO1 Archie P. Castillano (PO1 Castillano) was no longer put on the witness stand after
the parties stipulated that he would be testifying on his affidavit 7 relative to the arrest of
the accused-appellant. To prove his defense, the accused-appellant testified.

To prove his defense, the accused-appellant testified.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA had been working at the house of the accused-appellant since 1 June 2009, as
nanny to his four-month-old child. On 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., while AAA was
inside the room feeding the child, the accused-appellant sneaked in and closed the door
and window. AAA did not notice that the accused-appellant, who was supposed to enter

71
the room only when the child's mother was around, was behind her wearing only his
shorts. 8

When AAA turned, the accused-appellant held both her arms and mounted her. AAA
kicked the accused-appellant who in turn pinched her left shoulder. When AAA kicked
again, the accused-appellant stood up and got a knife. AAA stood up also and tried to
open the door but was unable to do so as it was locked. The accused-appellant poked
the knife at AAA, threatened he would kill her, dragged her to the bed, mounted her,
parted her legs, and inserted his penis into her vagina. 9

When his friend arrived at the house, the accused-appellant went out of the room and
proceeded right away to the restroom. AAA immediately left for her brother's house and
there confided what had happened to her. 10

That same afternoon, AAA proceeded to the barangay where she was advised to report
the incident to the police station. After AAA narrated 11 what had happened to her at the
Valenzuela City police station, PO1 Castillano and two other police officers arrested the
accused-appellant at his residence. 12

At around 5:45 p.m. on the same day, AAA was physically examined by Dr. Chua.

Version of the Defense

On 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., the accused-appellant was at home with his wife
Jane, their son Edison, and a boarder named Erickson. He was watching television. 13

The accused-appellant claimed that the accusation against him was not true and that he
was implicated by AAA to ask for money.1âwphi1 He was told by Jane that AAA asked
for ₱200,000.00 in exchange for dropping the case against him. Although the accused-
appellant and Jane were only factory workers, that amount of money could be raised by
his relatives; but the accused-appellant did not give in to AAA's demand because
nothing happened between him and AAA. 14

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC held that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by using force
and intimidation. According to the R TC, AAA gave details of her ordeal that took place
on 1 July 2009, and that she positively identified the accused-appellant as the person
who raped her. Moreover, AAA's testimony, coupled with the medical findings,
confirmed the truth of her charges.15

The RTC found the accused-appellant's denial without merit. It ruled that his denial was
negative and self-serving which pales in comparison with AAA's clear and convincing
narration and positive identification of the accused-appellant. 16

The fallo of the RTC decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused BRYAN GANABA y NAM-AY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape and in the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 17

Not satisfied with the RTC's ruling, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that the prosecution had indubitably established that the accused-
appellant raped AAA. It held that the accused-appellant's act was consummated
through force, threat, and intimidation. Moreover, AAA's unrelenting narration of what

72
transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of the accused-appellant as
the malefactor, established the case for the prosecution. On the one hand, it held that
the defense of denial and alibi offered by the accused-appellant was weak since he
failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the
time of its commission. 18

While the CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the R TC upon the accused-appellant, it
found the need to modify the award of damages; hence, it ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 9 January 2013 of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Accused appellant Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the victim AAA ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages
shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.19

ISSUES

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING ILL MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS THE REASON FOR THE FILING OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.20

OUR RULING

The appeal has no merit.

The testimony of AAA deserves weight and credence.

Jurisprudence has emphatically maintained that the trial court's evaluation and
conclusion on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great
weight and respect, and at times even finality, especially after the CA, as the
intermediate reviewing tribunal, has affirmed the findings; unless there is a clear
showing that the findings were reached arbitrarily, or that certain facts or circumstances
of weight, substance or value were overlooked, misapprehended or misappreciated
that, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. 21

The Court has amply elucidated on the reason for according weight to the findings of
the trial court, viz:

It is well-settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the
witness' credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of
these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the· appellate
court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies
with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the
process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent
impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a

73
witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to
the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally,
under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing
on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of
the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things
cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the
appellate court. "22

Consequently, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to present clear and

persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse the lower courts' unanimous
determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve the appeal his way. 23 The
onus is upon the accused-appellant to prove those facts and circumstances which the
lower courts allegedly failed to consider and appreciate, and that would fortify his
position that they seriously erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged. The
accused-appellant, however, miserably failed to discharge his burden.

By the distinctive nature of rape cases, conviction usually rests solely on the basis of
the testimony of the victim; provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Thus, the victim's
credibility becomes the primordial consideration in the resolution of rape
cases.24 Noteworthily, both the RTC and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible
and persuasive.

In conjunction thereto, jurisprudence has firmly upheld the guidelines in evaluating the
testimony of a rape victim, viz: first, while an accusation for rape can be made with
facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove; second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
of the defense.25 The Court has meticulously applied these guidelines in its review of the
records of this case, but found no reason to depart from the well-considered findings
and observations of the lower courts.

The Court notes that the testimony of AAA was full of convincing details which, in her
young age, could not have been known to her unless these were the truth. "When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." 26

A catena of cases sustains the ruling that the conduct of the victim immediately
following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in tending to establish the
truth or falsity of the charge of rape.27 In this case, after the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her, AAA immediately left his house and proceeded to her brother's
house where she narrated what had happened to her. On that same day, AAA went to
the barangay to report the incident, then to the police station to give her statements, and
subsequently to the crime laboratory to submit herself to physical examination. The act
of AAA in wasting no time in reporting her ordeal to the authorities validates the truth of
her charge against the accused-appellant.

AAA's positive and categorical statement that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her was reinforced by the testimony and medicolegal report of Dr. Chua.
The pertinent findings of Dr. Chua were as follows:

LABIA MINORA: Hyperemic with abrasion at 6 o'clock position.

HYMEN: Deep healed laceration at 5 and 6 o'clock positions.

POSTERIOR FOURCHETTE: Congested.

74
CONCLUSION: Clear evidence of penetrating trauma/force to the hymen with recent
penetration trauma to the Labia Majora and Minora. 28

Dr. Chua testified that, based on her findings, her conclusion was that AAA was
sexually abused.29 Of significance in this case is the legal teaching that while it is settled
that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape
case, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the
case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are
veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster the victim's
testimony. 30 Together, these pieces of evidence produce a moral certainty that the
accused-appellant indeed raped the victim. 31

To prove that the RTC erred in according credence to AAA's testimony, the accused-
appellant offered the absurd contention that AAA's testimony can only prove that she
had shared an intimate moment with someone else and not with him. Accused-appellant
anchored his contention in his testimony on the witness stand, viz: that on 1 July 2009,
he was at home watching television with his wife; that AAA was not in his house that
day; that he was told by his wife that AAA had asked ₱200,000.00 in exchange for her
dropping the case against him; and that he did not give in to the demand of AAA
because nothing happened between him and AAA. In contrast, according to the
accused-appellant, was the testimony of AAA where she admitted that nothing
happened between them.32

Accused-appellant's contentions have no basis. When AAA affirmed her sworn

statement33 before the RTC, she clarified and firmly maintained that the accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Her testimony was as follows:

Q. What happened next after he pinched you on your left shoulder?

A. I kicked him again and he stood up. He took a knife, threatened to kill me. And after
that his friend arrived.

Q. And he went out?

A. I went out of the room, got my slippers, told the matter to my brother and we went to
the barangay but the barangay referred us to the police.

Q. Let us go back to the holding of the knife and his friend has not yet arrived. What
happened when Bryan got that knife?

A. He threatened to kill me if I would tell it to anybody (Papatayin kita pag nagsumbong

ka).

Q. What happened next?

A. His friend arrived. When his friend arrived he proceeded to the c.r. Bryan followed
him. I immediately went out of the room and got my pair of slippers and proceeded to
our house and reported the matter to my brother.

Q. So nothing happened, there was no sex?

A. None, sir.

You gave your sworn statement to the police marked as Exh "A." I will read your sworn
statement to the police given on July 2, 2009 wherein you stated: "Una po, nagpadede
po ako ng bata, four months old na anak ng amo ko, tapos isinarado niya po iyong
pintuan at tsaka iyong bintana. Dapat kami lang ng bata sa higaan, tsaka lang siya
pupunta sa higaan pag dumating iyong asawa niya, tapos tumabi siya sa akin. Ako po
ang umalis, tapos sinampal niya aka, bakit daw ako umaalis e umiiyak yung bata.
Pinabalik niya aka sa higaan, bumalik aka noong umalis siya, pumunta siya sa higaan
sa kabila. Bumalik aka, pinadede ko iyong bata, wala akong kamalay-malay na nandyan
na pala siya sa tabi ko. Paglingon ko nakahubad na siya, hinawakan niya ang kamay ko

75
binanda aka sa pader malapit sa higaan, sinabi kong huwag mong gawin sa akin kasi
hindi ako ang asawa mo, katulong lang aka. Pero ginawa niya pa rin. Hinubaran niya
aka, hinawakan niya ang dalawang kamay ko tapos sinampal pa niya ako. Tapos
pinatungan niya po ako, tapos dun, tinadyakan ko siya, pag pangalawang tadyak
kinurot niya aka dito sa may balikat ko. Lumaban aka, tapos pagtayo niya tumayo na rin
aka, bubuksan ko iyong pinto pero hindi mabuksan iyong pinto pag walang susi. Tapos
kumuha siya ng kutsilyo, tinutukan niya ako ng kutsilyo, tinutok niya dito sa noo ko,
sinabi niya sa akin 'sige, sige anong gusto mo papatayin kita ngayon,' hinila niya ako sa
higaan. Lumaban po aka pero hindi ko siya kaya. Tapos pinabuka niya iyong paa ko,
pinasok na niya iyong oten niya sa pekpek ko. Sinampal pa niya ako, napasok niya
iyong oten niya, nilabas pasok niya ... "Is that not true?

A. That is true.

Q. So before the friend arrived, was Bryan able to have sex with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you not say before when I asked you? You went once to the friend?

A. When he was already naked, he was able to pin my both hands on the wall, and
he parted my legs and inserted his penis in my vagina and after that he kicked me
and he pinched me on my shoulder. 34 (emphasis supplied)

The Court emphasizes that it has been its consistent declaration that inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony are generally expected, 35 viz:

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an
offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds
and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious
and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone. 36

Moreover, since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the
credibility of a witness.37 To the Court, what is essential is that AAA's testimony meets
the test of credibility notwithstanding the gruelling cross-examination by the defense,
and that it persuasively conformed to the evidence on record.

In the same vein, the assertion of the accused-appellant that AAA had ill motive in filing
the present charge, i.e., demanding ₱200,000.00 in exchange for dropping the case
against him, fails to convince. Notably, it would be the accused-appellant's wife, Jane,
who would be in the best position to testify on this matter considering that AAA allegedly
had demanded the ₱200,000.00 from her. Jane, however, never took the witness stand
to corroborate the claim of the accused-appellant. Likewise, the record is bereft of any
showing as to any documentary evidence that would substantiate AAA's demand for
₱200,000.00.

The legal teaching continuously invigorated by our jurisprudence is that motives have
never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape
victim. 38 A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary
submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she
could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so
easily dismissed as mere concoction. 39

The defense proferred

by the accused-appellant
was inherently weak.

76
The defense proffered by the accused-appellant that he was home with his wife during
the time material to the charge against him, cannot suffice to reverse his conviction.

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and· denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of
non-culpability to merit credibility.40 Alibi, on the one hand, is viewed with suspicion
because it can easily be fabricated. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he
was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 41 Unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of a victim who, in a natural and straightforward manner, convincingly
identifies the accused-appellant.42

Accused-appellant's alibi and denial easily came to nothing in view of his admission that
he was actually at the place of the crime at the time of its commission. Even granting for
the sake of argument that there was truth to the accused-appellant's contention that he
was with his wife on that day, this, however, cannot justify a conclusion that he did not
have carnal knowledge of AAA. The consistent ruling of the Court is that "Rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within
school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the
same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or
incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be
awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and
place x x x."43 More importantly, AAA's unfailing positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the one who had carnal knowledge of her, fastened to the fact that there
was no showing that she had ill motive in filing this charge, prevails over his defense of
alibi and denial.

The dearth of evidence that would corroborate the implausibility that the accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA weakens his defense of denial and alibi. To
stress, not even Jane or Erickson testified to reinforce his position that he could not
have raped AAA on 1 July 2009.

The crime of rape was

proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution.

For a successful prosecution of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) that said act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force and intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim
is under 12 years of age or is demented. 44

The evidence of the prosecution unmistakably validates the conclusion that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA on 1 July 2009, through the use of
force and intimidation. AAA persuasively narrated that, despite her effort to escape from
the room after the accused-appellant pinned her arms, mounted her, and pinched her
shoulder, the accused-appellant was able to get hold of a knife that he used to threaten
her while he dragged her to the bed and, thereafter, successfully have carnal
knowledge of her.

Jurisprudence imparts that the act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of
force or at least intimidation; and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring
a woman to submission, although the victim does not even need to prove resistance.45
Force, threat or intimidation, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible, but just
enough to bring about the desired result.46

The penalty to be
imposed upon the
accused-appellant

77
The Court finds that the RTC and the CA were correct in imposing upon the accused-
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Art. 266-B of the RPC.

As to the award of damages, the Court finds the need to modify the same to conform
with the jurisprudence laid down in People v. Jugueta,47 viz: civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages at ₱75,000.00 each. The civil indemnity and the
moral and exemplary damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 27 August 2014 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06030, finding the accused-appellant Bryan
Ganaba y Nam-ay GUILTY of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages
as follows: civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00, and exemplary
damages of ₱75,000.00. The civil indemnity and the moral and exemplary damages
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

78
DIGEST # 10
FACTS:Accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 429-V-09
AAA had been working at the house of the accused-appellant since 1 June 2009, as
nanny to his four-month-old child. On 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., as AAA was
feeding accused-appellant’s four-month-old child inside the room, accused-appellant
sneaked in then closed the door and window. However, AAA suddenly noticed that
behind her was accused-appellant who was only wearing his shorts. As AAA turned,
accused-appellant held both her arms and mounted her. AAA retaliated by kicking him,
but he pinched her left shoulder then stood up and got a knife. AAA tried to escape, but
the door was locked. Then, accused-appellant poked the knife at her, threatened to kill
her, dragged her to the bed, mounted her, parted her legs, and proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of her. Accused-appellant’s friend arrived, hence, he went out and
proceeded to the restroom; while AAA immediately left for her brother’s house and there
confided what happened to her. That very same day, AAA reported the incident to the
police and was then physically examined by Dr. Chua. Accused-appellant denied every
allegation of AAA, and argued that he could not have raped her because on that day, he
was just at home with his wife watching TV and that AAA was not in his house at the
time.
RTC held accused-appellant guilty of having carnal knowledge of AAA by using force,
threat, and intimidation.
CA affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction of having raped AAA.The CA ruled that
the prosecution had indubitably established that the accused-appellant raped AAA. It
held that the accused-appellant's act was consummated through force, threat, and
intimidation. Moreover, AAA's unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by
her categorical identification of the accused-appellant as the malefactor, established the
case for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.

RULING: Yes.For a successful prosecution of rape, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force and
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. 44

The evidence of the prosecution unmistakably validates the conclusion that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA on 1 July 2009, through the use of
force and intimidation. AAA persuasively narrated that, despite her effort to escape from
the room after the accused-appellant pinned her arms, mounted her, and pinched her
shoulder, the accused-appellant was able to get hold of a knife that he used to threaten
her while he dragged her to the bed and, thereafter, successfully have carnal
knowledge of her.

Jurisprudence imparts that the act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of
force or at least intimidation; and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring
a woman to submission, although the victim does not even need to prove resistance.
Force, threat or intimidation, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible, but just
enough to bring about the desired result.

79
CASE # 11

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 225640, July 30, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ANTHONY PALADA @

TON-TON, AND JONALYN LOGROSA @ MISA, ET AL., ACCUSED.

JOEL ACQUIATAN @ "KAIN", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

BERSAMIN, C.J.:

Although it is not an element of the crime charged, conspiracy, whenever alleged, must
be proved with the same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the
offense, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the existence of
the conspiracy renders each accused only liable for his own specific acts.

The Case

The accused-appellant hereby seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on March 28, 2016,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
judgment rendered on July 1, 2014 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in
Dolores, Eastern Samar finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the
killing of the late Franco Anacio.2

Antecedents

The accused-appellant was indicted for the murder along with Anthony Palada and
Jonalyn Logrosa under the following information that alleged thusly:
That at past 12 midnight of February 1, 2009, in Brgy. 04, Can-avid, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this [H]onorable [C]ourt, the said accused,
conspiring, helping one another and with treachery, malice afterthought, [evident]
premeditation and deliberate intent to take the life of FRANCO ANACIO did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, attack by shooting with the use of unlicensed
firearm known as shotgun fatally hitting and inflicting mortal wounds to the different
parts of the body of the victim causing his immediate death.

[CONTRARY TO LAW.]3
All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the information. In the course of the
proceedings, however, Palada died, and the case against him was dismissed.

The CA summarized the evidence adduced by the parties, to wit:

Evidence for the prosecution

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Marly Anacio, the
wife of the victim; (2) Eva Anacio, the mother of the victim; and (3) SPO4 Feleo Grata,
the investigating officer.

Culled from the records, the prosecution's version is as follows: Marly Anacio (Marly)
testified that, on 1 February 2009, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, she, her
husband Franco Anacio (Franco), and their baby, were sleeping inside their house in
Brgy. 04, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, when they were suddenly awakened by the barking
of their dogs. Alarmed, Franco asked her to switch on the light at the front and back of
their house. Franco peeped through a hole in the wall, saw four (4) persons outside
their fence, and told his wife about it. Curious, she also peeked and saw these persons.

80
Thereafter, they decided to go back to sleep.

A few minutes later, she heard a gunshot and immediately opened one of the windows
of their house. She saw accused-appellant, Palada, and Logrosa who was then carrying
a long firearm, and an unidentified person, walking out of their fence and heading
towards the street illuminated by sodium light. She went outside their house where she
saw her mother-in-law Eva already thereat. Both Marly and Eva followed the four men.
According to Marly, accused-appellant proceeded to his parents' house while his
companions went inside the house of a certain Pacita Irasga. Marly and Eva then went
back to Franco's house where Marly saw her husband lying down with blood oozing
from the side of his body. Upon seeing this, she shouted for help from her neighbors.

Franco succumbed to death[,] Dr. Felix G. Nicart conducted the postmortem

examination on Franco's body and concluded that the cause of his death was the
multiple gunshot wounds he sustained.

Marly also testified that, previously, Franco had told her that, on 22 December 2008,
Palada warned him to watch out as they will "destroy" him. Also, Marly mentioned that,
on 8 January 2009, accused-appellant, while with Palada and two other companions,
pointed a gun at Franco and his friend Ruel Cebreros, and then fired it upwards. This
incident occurred near the Iglesia [n]i Cristo (INC) Church.

Witness Eva Anacio (Eva) essentially affirmed the testimony of Marly as to what
transpired in the early hours of 1 February 2009. Additionally, she testified that she rose
from her bed to find out why their dogs were barking. She peeped through the jalousie
window and saw accused-appellant, Palada, Logrosa and an unidentified person
conversing under a guava tree just outside their fence. Eva's house is located a few
meters from her son's house which are both enclosed by a common fence. According to
Eva, the place where these men were standing was illuminated by a fluorescent light
coming from the barangay captain's house which is about 15 meters away. She then
returned to sleep, but stood up again when she heard a gunshot. When she opened her
jalousie window, she saw accused-appellant, Palada, an unidentified person, and
Logrosa who then appeared to be carrying a long firearm, going out of their fence. Eva
went out through the back door to go to her son's house, but, when she was already
outside the house, she saw Marly coming after those men. Marly told her that those
men were quarrelling. Eva observed that the four men were heading towards different
directions; some to the INC Church, while the others went to Pacita Irasga's house.
When Eva and Marly came back to the house, they found Franco lying down on the
floor and wounded. At that point, Eva lost consciousness. Upon regaining
consciousness, she joined Marly in asking for help from their neighbors. She further
declared that she incurred expenses for her son's wake and burial.

SPO4 Feleo Grata testified that, on 1 February 2009, he was called to investigate the
killing of Franco. He went to the victim's house where he saw the dead body of Franco
and observed that there was a hole in the wall which was probably caused by a
gunshot. He invited Eva and Marly to the police station for investigation where they told
him the names of the suspects and gave one (1) empty shell of a homemade shotgun.
He declared that the incident was entered in the police blotter wherein the nicknames of
accused-appellant and Palada were indicated as the persons responsible for the killing
of the victim.

Evidence for the Defense

Accused-appellant raised the defense of alibi. He testified that he was sleeping in his
house at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of 1 February 2009. According to him, his
parents, sister and family friend, Wenefrida Cantos, were in his house at that time. He
went to sleep early at around 7:00 o'clock that evening of 31 January 2009 so that he
can attend a morning mass at the. INC Church. He woke up at 6:00 in the morning of
the following day and prepared himself for church service. It was from Eustaquio Legion
that he learned that Franco Anacio was shot and killed.

Accused-appellant admitted that he knew the victim because they were childhood

81
friends and neighbors. He also mentioned that Franco was known to be a trouble maker
whenever he was drunk as evidenced by a statement appearing on Page No. 0912,
Entry No. 1058, dated 6 January 2009, of the Police Blotter of the Can-avid Municipal
Police Station, Can-avid, Eastern Samar (Exhibit "I").

Witness Wenefrida Cantos corroborated the testimony of accused appellant and

testified that she was in accused-appellant's house at the time of the incident. She
recalled that, in that evening of 31 January 2009, accused-appellant arrived home at
6:00 p.m., ate his supper, and went to sleep. She woke up at 4:00 a.m. the following
day and saw accused-appellant still asleep. She asked him if he will attend the church
service, to which the latter replied that he will just follow later.

SPO1 Allan Cebrero, the property custodian of the PNP, Can-avid, Eastern Samar,
brought the original police blotter Entry No. 1058 and certified that it is a true copy of the
original. However, on cross examination, he admitted that the original police blotter
does not contain the signature of Rodrigo Baliquia and, thus, admitted that the
photocopy of the police blotter was not a faithful reproduction of the original copy.

Accused Logrosa and Palada, for their part, denied any participation in the commission
of the crime and interposed the defense of alibi. Palada declared that he was asleep in
his cousin's house at the time of the incident, while Logrosa claimed that he was then in
Balanga City, Bataan. In support of their defense of alibi, they presented their respective
witnesses.4
Judgment of the RTC

On July 1, 2014, the RTC rendered judgment after trial convicting the accused-appellant
of murder, but acquitting Logrosa for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused JOEL ACQUIATAN is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused is hereby order to indemnify the heirs of Franco Anacio the amount of
SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00); the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and the amount of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as temperate damages.

On the other hand, accused JONALYN LOGROSA is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Unit-in-charge of the Bureau of Jail Management and Phenology (sic), Dolores,
Eastern Samar is hereby ordered to release immediately the body of Jonalyn Logrosa,
unless he is detained for some other easels.

Furnish copy of this decision to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and the
National Bureau of Investigation for them to delete the name of Jonalyn Logrosa from
the roster of persons with cases pending before the Regional Trial Courts.

SO ORDERED.5
The RTC deemed as credible the testimonies of witnesses Marly Anacio and Eva
Anacio regarding the presence of the accused-appellant and two unidentified persons at
the crime scene prior to the shooting. It relied on Marly's testimony that after hearing the
shots she had then seen the accused appellant and his companions leave the area, and
she had thereafter found her husband dead. It ruled that treachery had attended the
killing of Franco because it was committed while the victim was asleep.

Decision of the CA

On March 28, 2016, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the RTC with
modification of the damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 1 July
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Dolores, Eastern Samar, 8 th Judicial Region, Branch
82
4, in Criminal Case No. 266-09-04 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
damages. In addition to the civil indemnity, moral and temperate damages awarded by
the court a quo, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Franco Anacio
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

The aforementioned awards shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6
The CA noted that the accused-appellant had conspired with his co-accused to kill
Franco; that all the accused had arrived at the crime scene together, had conversed
and had immediately walked away together after the shots had been fired; and that
although no eyewitness had seen the shooting, sufficient circumstantial evidence to pin
the crime on all of the accused, including the accused-appellant, existed considering
that they had conspired in committing the murder.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

The accused-appellant insists that the CA erred in its finding of the conspiracy among
the accused; and that the circumstantial evidence presented by the Prosecution was
insufficient to establish his participation in the murder of Franco.

Was the conviction of the accused-appellant supported by proof beyond reasonable

doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert
at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had
the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is
sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts
with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to
commit a felony.7 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge or
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, absent any showing of his active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 8 In this regard,
we stress that conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.9 In other words, conspiracy requires the same degree of proof
required to establish the elements of the crime itself-the proof beyond reasonable
doubt.10

In finding that conspiracy among the accused was amply established, the CA observed
that:
In the case at bar, although no one witnessed the actual shooting of the victim, the
prosecution had sufficiently established that accused appellant and his companions
acted together to achieve one common design, i.e., to kill Franco. As already discussed
above, the series of events and the actuations of the accused-appellant and his
companions reveal that there was a common design, understanding, and agreement
amongst themselves to commit the crime charged. They arrived together at the crime
scene and positioned themselves outside the victim's fence. A few minutes later, a
gunshot was heard. Immediately after the gunshot, they were seen fleeing from
the situs criminis. With the foregoing, unbroken chain of events, duly established by the
evidence for the prosecution, the conclusion of conspiracy is inevitable Thus, each one
of the accused-appellant and his companions is guilty as principal perpetrator of the
crime as the act of one is the act of all. When conspiracy is established, it matters not
who[m] among the assailants actually shot and killed the victim. 11

83
The observation of the CA lacked factual and legal bases.

Although the CA found that witnesses had seen the accused-appellant and his
companions near the house of Franco prior to the fatal shooting, with one of them being
armed, and that they had left the yard after the shot had been heard, such
circumstances would not suffice to establish the conspiracy without showing that each
of the accused had committed at least an overt act in furtherance of the attack on
Franco. Without the clear showing of their respective overt acts, conspiracy could not be
shown to exist, and each of them could only be held responsible for the results of his
own acts.

In this connection, the character of the overt act is well explained in People v. Lizada:12
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention· to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the
law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or ah overt
act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so
for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it
was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of
the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
The lack of direct evidence on the commission of the murder as far as the accused-
appellant was concerned would not have hampered the effort to incriminate him had
sufficient circumstantial evidence presented herein been sufficient. The Rules of
Court specifies that in order for circumstantial evidence to suffice to produce a
conviction, some requisites must concur, namely: (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven,
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. 13

The CA listed the following eight circumstances m supporting its finding of guilt against
the accused-appellant, to wit:
1.) As testified to by witnesses Marly and Eva, minutes before Franco was shot,
accused-appellant together with Palada and two (2) other men were seen outside the
fence of their house;

2.) Eva also testified that, minutes before the shooting, accused-appellant and his
companions were conversing under a guava tree;

3.) When Marly heard a gunshot, she immediately opened her jalousie window and saw
accused-appellant and his companions fleeing from the crime scene;  

4.) Eva also testified that she saw accused-appellant together with his companions
going out of their fence after she heard a gunshot;

5.) One of the men was carrying a long firearm;

6.) A spent shell of a 12 gauge homemade shotgun was recovered at the crime scene;

7.) The Certificate of Death states that "multiple gunshot wounds" were the underlying
cause of Franco's death; and

84
8.) The prosecution witnesses had no ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. 14
The foregoing requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to establish guilt did
not concur.

The mere presence of the accused-appellant at the scene of the crime could not justly
incriminate him considering that the identity of the shooter himself remained not reliably
established. In fact, Eva Anacio precisely recalled that it was Logrosa whom she had
seen carrying the long firearm right after the shooting. Despite that testimony, however,
the trial court acquitted Logrosa on the ground that the Prosecution did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.15 This should reveal that the combination of all the
circumstances did not result in a moral certainty that the accused-appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, had committed the crime.

Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides in its Section 2 that:

. . . . [i]n a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (Bold underscoring supplied)
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal
procedure for very good reasons. The accused has at stake an interest of immense
importance to protect, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by a conviction.
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and personal freedom of every
individual should not easily condemn a man for the commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the fact finder of his
guilt. To this end, the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on
the trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue. 16 The Court must
now acquit the accused-appellant in order to breathe life to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the

decision promulgated on March 28, 2016; ACQUITS the accused-appellant JOEL
ACQUIATAN @ KAIN for failure to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and ORDERS his immediate RELEASE from detention unless he is otherwise legally
confined for another cause.

No pronouncement is made on the civil liability in view of the record not showing the
factual basis to render the accused-appellant responsible for the killing of the victim.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Superintendent, Bureau of Corrections, Leyte
Regional Prison, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Bureau of
Corrections, Leyte Regional Prison is directed to report the action taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

85
DIGEST # 11

FACTS:The accused-appellant was indicted for the murder along with Anthony Palada
and Jonalyn Logrosa.
During the trial, the prosecution narrated that on 1 February 2009, at about 1:00 o'clock
in the morning, she, her husband Franco Anacio (Franco), and their baby, were
sleeping inside their house in Brgy. 04, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, when they were
suddenly awakened by the barking of their dogs. Alarmed, Franco asked her to switch
on the light at the front and back of their house. Franco peeped through a hole in the
wall, saw four (4) persons outside their fence, and told his wife about it. 

A few minutes later, she heard a gunshot and immediately opened one of the windows
of their house. She saw accused-appellant, Palada, and Logrosa who was then carrying
a long firearm, and an unidentified person, walking out of their fence and heading
towards the street illuminated by sodium light. She went outside their house where she
saw her mother-in-law Eva already thereat. Both Marly and Eva followed the four men.
According to Marly, accused-appellant proceeded to his parents' house while his
companions went inside the house of a certain Pacita Irasga. Marly and Eva then went
back to Franco's house where Marly saw her husband lying down with blood oozing
from the side of his body. Franco succumbed to death.

RTC rendered judgment after trial convicting the accused-appellant of murder, but
acquitting Logrosa for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the RTC. The CA noted that the
accused-appellant had conspired with his co-accused to kill Franco; that all the accused
had arrived at the crime scene together, had conversed and had immediately walked
away together after the shots had been fired; and that although no eyewitness had seen
the shooting, sufficient circumstantial evidence to pin the crime on all of the accused,
including the accused-appellant, existed considering that they had conspired in
committing the murder.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused conspired to commit the crimes charged; Whether
or not the conviction of the accused-appellant supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt

RULING: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused
acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such
acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its
execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit a felony.7 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even
knowledge or acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy, absent any showing of his active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.8 In this regard, we stress that conspiracy must be established, not by
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence. 9 In other words, conspiracy
requires the same degree of proof required to establish the elements of the crime itself-
the proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Although the CA found that witnesses had seen the accused-appellant and his
companions near the house of Franco prior to the fatal shooting, with one of them being
armed, and that they had left the yard after the shot had been heard, such
circumstances would not suffice to establish the conspiracy without showing that each

86
of the accused had committed at least an overt act in furtherance of the attack on
Franco. Without the clear showing of their respective overt acts, conspiracy could not be
shown to exist, and each of them could only be held responsible for the results of his
own acts.

The mere presence of the accused-appellant at the scene of the crime could not justly
incriminate him considering that the identity of the shooter himself remained not reliably
established. In fact, Eva Anacio precisely recalled that it was Logrosa whom she had
seen carrying the long firearm right after the shooting.

Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has
borne the burden of convincing the fact finder of his guilt. To this end, the reasonable
doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of
reaching certitude of the facts in issue. The Court must now acquit the accused-
appellant in order to breathe life to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

87
CASE # 12

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 224742, August 07, 2019

PRUDENCIO DE GUZMAN Y JUMAQUIO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. The law provides that a judicial
declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. 1

This resolves a Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 assailing the Court of Appeals'
June 30, 2015 Decision3 and April 21, 2016 Resolution4 in CA-G.R.CR No. 35209.

On April 8, 1994, Prudencio De Guzman (Prudencio) and Arlene De Guzman (Arlene)

were married before Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Their
marriage was solemnized by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, 5 with Marriage License No.
1031606 issued on April 6, 1994.6

In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife and children. 7

In December 2009, a friend informed Arlene that Prudencio contracted a second

marriage with a certain Jean Basan (Basan) on December 17, 2009 at the Immaculate
Church in Las Pinas City.8

On January 8, 2010, Arlene went to the Immaculate Church and confirmed that
Prudencio had indeed married Basan. Arlene secured a copy of Prudencio and Basan's
marriage contract at the City Civil Registrar's Office. 9

Arlene then filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint against Prudencio
for bigamy under Article 34910 of the Revised Penal Code.11 The Information read:

That sometime in the month of December, 2009 in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then legally married to one Arlene de Guzman y de Jesus which marriage is still existing
and has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Jean Basan y Hubilla, which second
marriage has all the essential and formal requisites for validity.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12
On arraignment, Prudencio pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 13 Trial on the merits
then ensued.

In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the
copy of their Marriage Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics
Office,14 did not bear the solemnizing officer's signature. 15

In its March 13, 2012 Decision, the trial court did not give weight to Prudencio's
defense. It explained that such discrepancy was inadvertent, as it found that a copy of
the same Marriage Contract in the Local Civil Registrar bore the solemnizing officer's
signature. Moreover, marriage photos, along with Prudencio's own admission in his

88
Counter-Affidavit, were enough evidence for the trial court to find that Prudencio and
Arlene were married.16

The trial court concluded that Prudencio could not unilaterally declare that his marriage
with Arlene was void as only courts have the power to do so. 17

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to show that all the elements of
bigamy were present:
(1) the marriage between the appellant and the private complainant is still existing; (2)
the same has not been legally declared to be dissolved; (3) appellant contracted a
subsequent marriage with a certain Jean Basan while his first marriage with the private
complainant is still subsisting; and (4) the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for its validity.18
The trial court convicted Prudencio of bigamy. The dispositive portion of its Decision
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused PRUDENCIO DE GUZMAN y JUMAQUIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.19
Prudencio appealed before the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of his appeal,
Arlene executed an Affidavit of Desistance praying that the case be dismissed after she
had reconciled with Prudencio.20

In his Appeal, Prudencio reiterated his previous arguments and added that the case
should be dismissed in view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Arlene. 21

In its June 30, 2015 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals denied Prudencio's appeal. It
affirmed his conviction and modified the penalty:
WHEREFORE, the 13 March 2012 Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed. Appellant Prudencio De Guzman is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.23 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution had sufficiently
proved that all the elements of bigamy were present. It ruled that the prosecution's
failure to offer Prudencio and Arlene's marriage license as evidence of their marriage
does not strengthen Prudencio's claim that his marriage with Arlene was void. 24

The Court of Appeals held that the presentation of the marriage license was not
essential to establish the existence of marriage. The certified true copy of the Marriage
Certificate, it ruled, was enough.25

Similarly, the Court of Appeals found that the solemnizing officer's signature in the
Marriage Certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage. Hence, its absence in
the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office does not invalidate the
marriage.26

The Court of Appeals declared that Prudencio could not unilaterally declare his
marriage with Arlene void. Citing Article 40 27 of the Family Code, it explained that before
he can remarry, a competent court must first issue a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.28

Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance would not free
Prudencio from liability since it did not cancel out the established elements of

89
bigamy.29 It noted that the Affidavit of Desistance, which was executed 13 months after
the trial court's judgment, should be considered an afterthought and given no probative
value by the courts.30

The Court of Appeals applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law and modified the penalty
imposed by the trial court to four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor, as
maximum, absent any attendant circumstances. 31

Prudencio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 32 claiming that the issuance of a

Certificate of No Marriage Record by the National Statistics Office made him believe
that there was no legal impediment for him to remarry. 33

In its April 21, 2016 Resolution,34 the Court of Appeals denied his Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, Prudencio filed this Petition.

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio's guilt for the crime of bigamy.

The Petition is denied.

The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of
remarriage.35 In Teves v. People.36
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 37 (Citation omitted)
Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal
impediment for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance
of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage
Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April
8, 1994.38 Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for Prudencio to
assume that his previous marriage with Arlene has been voided.

Moreover, Prudencio claims that the prosecution's failure to offer a copy of the marriage
license is fatal to its case. This contention lacks merit. As the Court of Appeals noted,
"[t]he presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish
the existence of a marriage as the certified true copy of the [M]arriage [Certificate is
sufficient for such purpose."39

Prudencio also claims that the absence of the solemnizing officer's signature in the
Marriage Certificate renders the marriage void. It is worth noting that based on the trial
court's findings, the discrepancy was merely inadvertent since a copy of the Marriage
Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed. 40 The trial court explained:
The marriage contract between the accused and the complainant that was presented by
the prosecution bears the signature of the solemnizing officer (Exhibit "C"). Upon the
other hand, the NSO copy of the marriage contract secured by the accused does not
have the signature of the solemnizing officer but after a careful scrutiny, it is shown that
the two (2) marriage contracts contain the same details of the civil wedding ceremony
between the accused and the complainant. Even the signatures of the parties and their
witnesses have a striking resemblance to the naked eye. The only logical explanation
for this is that the duplicate original that must have been forwarded by the local civil
registry to the NSO was not signed by the solemnizing officer but the other duplicate
original on file with the local civil registry is duly signed. 41

90
Lastly, Prudencio's argument that the case should be dismissed due to Arlene's Affidavit
of Desistance is unavailing. Affidavits of desistance that were executed after judgments
of conviction had been promulgated by trial courts are generally received with extensive
caution.42 Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance provides that she filed the Complaint due to a
misunderstanding, which both she and Prudencio had agreed to reconcile. 43 This
Affidavit of Desistance cannot prove the nonexistence of all the elements of bigamy.

Moreover, the Affidavit of Desistance was executed 13 months after the accused's
conviction in the trial court. As the Court of Appeals held, an afterthought merits no
probative value.44 In People v. Dela Cerna:45
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal
or administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed
upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our
jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought. 46
Petitioner has not raised any substantial ground for this Court to grant the relief he
seeks.

WHEREFORE, the Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' June 30, 2015 Decision and April 21, 2016 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
35209 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

91
DIGEST # 12

FACTS: On April 8, 1994, Prudencio De Guzman and Arlene De Guzman were married
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, with Marriage
License No. 1031606 issued on April 6, 1994, solemnized their marriage.

In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife and children. In December 2009, a friend
informed Arlene that Prudencio contracted a second marriage with a certain Jean
Basan on December 17, 2009 at the Immaculate Church in Las Pinas City.

On January 8, 2010, Arlene went to the Immaculate Church and confirmed that
Prudencio had indeed married Basan. Arlene secured a copy of Prudencio and Basan's
marriage contract at the City Civil Registrar's Office. Arlene then filed before the Office
of the City Prosecutor a Complaint against Prudencio for bigamy under Article 349of the
Revised Penal Code.

In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the
copy of their Marriage Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics
Office, did not bear the solemnizing officer's signature.

CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy

RTC: Convicted Prudencio of bigamy
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio is guilty of the crime of

bigamy

RULING: Yes, Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio is guilty of the crime of bigamy.

The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of
remarriage. In Teves v. People.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal
impediment for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance
of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage
Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April
8, 1994. Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for Prudencio to
assume that his previous marriage with Arlene has been voided.

Moreover, Prudencio claims that the prosecution's failure to offer a copy of the marriage
license is fatal to its case. This contention lacks merit. As the Court of Appeals noted,
"[t]he presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish
the existence of a marriage as the certified true copy of the Marriage Certificate is
sufficient for such purpose."

Prudencio also claims that the absence of the solemnizing officer's signature in the
Marriage Certificate renders the marriage void. It is worth noting that based on the trial
court's findings, the discrepancy was merely inadvertent since a copy of the Marriage
Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed. The trial court explained:

92
The marriage contract between the accused and the complainant that was presented by
the prosecution bears the signature of the solemnizing officer. Upon the other hand, the
NSO copy of the marriage contract secured by the accused does not have the signature
of the solemnizing officer but after a careful scrutiny, it is shown that the two (2)
marriage contracts contain the same details of the civil wedding ceremony between the
accused and the complainant. Even the signatures of the parties and their witnesses
have a striking resemblance to the naked eye. The only logical explanation for this is
that the duplicate original that must have been forwarded by the local civil registry to the
NSO was not signed by the solemnizing officer but the other duplicate original on file
with the local civil registry is duly signed.
Lastly, Prudencio's argument that the case should be dismissed due to Arlene's Affidavit
of Desistance is unavailing. Affidavits of desistance that were executed after judgments
of conviction had been promulgated by trial courts are generally received with extensive
caution. Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance provides that she filed the Complaint due to a
misunderstanding, which both she and Prudencio had agreed to reconcile. This Affidavit
of Desistance cannot prove the nonexistence of all the elements of bigamy.

Moreover, the Affidavit of Desistance was executed 13 months after the accused's
conviction in the trial court. As the Court of Appeals held, an afterthought merits no
probative value. In People v. Dela Cerna:
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal
or administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed
upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our
jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought.
Petitioner has not raised any substantial ground for this Court to grant the relief he
seeks.

93
CASE # 13

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DIOSCORO COMOSO

TUREMUTSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an
accused's acquittal.

This resolves an appeal of the October 9, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05992, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court January 22, 2013
Decision.2 The trial court convicted accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa
(Comoso) for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In a March 27, 20053 Information, Comoso was charged with violation of the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, particularly for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. The Information read:

That on or about the 26th day of March 2005, more or less 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, (sic) at Quim[s]on, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, convey, distribute and deliver one (1) piece
transparent plastic sachet containing dried Marijuana leaves/flowering tops, a
dangerous drug weighing more or less 1.1 grams to one poseur-buyer for a
consideration of Four Hundred (P400) Pesos, (sic) without being authorized by law to
convey, distribute and deliver the same, which act is penalized under Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, Comoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits
then ensued.5

Prosecution witnesses testified that on March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation
Task Force and Drug Enforcement Action Division planned a buy-bust operation after
receiving information from their civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling illegal
drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. The team prepared
four (4) P100.00 bills, with Serial Nos. KU494857, MB020653, QQ011743, and
DD744924.6

At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer
3 Jose Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They
parked their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset
told them to wait since their target, later identified as Comoso, was still playing tong-

94
its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's
house.7

Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing
marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his
hat—the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated. 8

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the
scene and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet
from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust
money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the
plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA." 9

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items. 10

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police
Superintendent Julita T. De Villa (Superintendent De Villa), a forensic chemist at the
Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the
samples of seized items and a letter-request for laboratory examination. In Chemistry
Report No. D-017-05, she found that the specimens tested positive for marijuana. 11

Comoso, a fisher residing on Liberty Road, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa
City, solely testified in his defense. He alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005,
on his way home from delivering his catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2)
armed men, whom he figured were police officers. They first brought Comoso to the
airport, then to the police station, where he would be detained.

The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from
selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs. 12

In its January 22, 2013 Decision,13 the Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having satisfactorily proven the
guilt of the accused DIOSCORO COMOSO y TUREMUTSA, the Court hereby found
him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs and to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

The confiscated marijuana used in prosecuting this case is hereby ordered to be turned
over to the local office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.14

Comoso appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the poseur-buyer, the
sole witness to the transaction, was never presented as a witness; and (2) the identity
and integrity of the corpus delicti was not properly established.15

In its October 9, 2015 Decision,16 the Court of Appeals dismissed Comoso's appeal and
affirmed his conviction.

According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution's failure to present the informant in
court was not fatal to the case since the informant's testimony would merely be
corroborative. It held that the testimony of the arresting officer, who witnessed the
transaction, was sufficient to prove the prosecution's version of events. 17

95
Maintaining that the chain of custody was established, the Court of Appeals excused the
absence of photographs of the seized items since there were justifiable reasons for
noncompliance. It found that the prosecution had duly established that PO2 Aquino had
custody of the seized items from their seizure until their turnover to the crime
laboratory.18 Since Comoso failed to present any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses had ill motives against him, the Court of Appeals held that the regularity in the
performance of official duty should be presumed. 19

Comoso filed a Notice of Appeal.20 His appeal having been given due course the Court
of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court. 21

In its December 5, 2016 Resolution,22 this Court noted the records and directed the
parties to file their supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing
plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that it would no longer submit a
supplemental brief and moved that this Court instead consider the arguments in its Brief
submitted before the Court of Appeals.23 Accused-appellant, on the other hand,
submitted a Supplemental Brief.24

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the prosecution has sufficiently
established accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt since PO2 Aquino
witnessed the entire exchange and was able to testify to the sequence of events. It
claims that in drugs cases, the police officers' narration of facts should be given
credence as they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 25

The Office of the Solicitor General further asserts that despite changes in the seized
item's custody and possession, their identity had been proven by the totality of the
prosecution's evidence. Maintaining that the chain of custody remained unbroken, it
argues that the "integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that evidence has been tampered with[.]" 26

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, counters that PO2 Aquino did not testify that the
seized items were marked or inventoried in front of him. He points out that there were
no photographs of the seized items taken, and that he did not sign the inventory of
seized items. Moreover, he claims that the prosecution failed to prove that there was no
"possibility of switching, planting, or contamination." 27

Accused-appellant contends that the chain of custody was not established, pointing out
that there was no transfer of the seized items from the arresting officer to the
investigating officer. He further notes that it was not explained how the seized items
were handled from the crime laboratory to the forensic chemist, the transfer of which
took 11 days from March 28 to April 8, 2005. This, he argues, puts a "cloud of doubt and
suspicion as to the supposed preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value" 28 of
the corpus delicti.29

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved
accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not
strictly complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti.

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. 30 To secure conviction,
the prosecution must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Rule 133, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof

96
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the
weakness of the defense:31

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not
demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from
benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises
from a constitutional imperative[.]32

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants
an accused's acquittal.

II

The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act:

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."33

Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." 34 In
buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

In People v. Andaya35 the prosecution failed to present their informant, who was also
their poseur-buyer, to testify on the sale of illegal drugs. Despite the police officers
occupying "different positions where they could see and observe the asset[,]" 36 this
Court noted that none of them had witnessed the transaction and only acted upon the
informant/poseur-buyer's pre-arranged signal. This proved fatal to the prosecution's
case:

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested
Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-
arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had
been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not
present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly
the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no
issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their
being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the
supposed transaction.37

97
Andaya recognized that not presenting the informant was different from not presenting
the poseur-buyer. As held in prior cases,38 there was no need to present the confidential
informant since the testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who
actually witnessed the transaction. The case is different, however, if the confidential
informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the same person:

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in

those instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly
incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur
buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur
buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya. 39

As with Andaya, the confidential informant here, despite also acting as the poseur-

buyer, was never presented to testify to the transaction. Nonetheless, PO2 Aquino
testifying that he had witnessed the entire transaction 40 suffices to prove the offense's
first element—that the transaction took place absent any irregularity in the performance
of law enforcers' duties.

This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of innocence. To do so,
the prosecution must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of
the corpus delicti.

In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish
compliance with the chain of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items[;]

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the

98
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall
be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall
be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification[.]
(Emphasis in the original)

Chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs is defined as:

... the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made
in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. 41

Moreover, every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v. Nandi,42 must

be established:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.43

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic
sachet from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that
he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items
to the crime laboratory.44

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the
inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant;
and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over to an investigating officer. He testified:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you got the plastic sachet containing this illegal
drug from your civilian asset, could you tell us what did you do to this plastic
sachet containing illegal drug (sic) or marijuana leaves?
A I marked it with my initials and brought it in (sic) the crime lab.
Q What mark did you place, Mr. Witness?
A My initials.45 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic
chemist, only received the seized items on April 8, 2005, 46 or 10 working days after the
buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period
required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to explain. This
creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic chemist
was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant:

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may
not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant.
The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-
appellant.47

99
Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign
the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned
entrapment operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement
officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated that "the integrity of
the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with." 48

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search
and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds." 49 However, the absence
of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's
performance of their official duties:

To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution

must identify and prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show that, despite non-
compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the prosecution must establish that
positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The prosecution cannot rely
on broad justifications and sweeping guarantees that the integrity and evidentiary value
of seized items were preserved.50

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption
only applies when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from
the standard procedures required by law. In People v. Kamad:51

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu
and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing mle of law or
statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that
the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law;
where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the
flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. 52

The law's stringent requirements are not designed to hamper police operations with
needless procedural minutiae. They merely ensure that courts can, with reasonable
moral certainty, guarantee that the illegal drug presented by the prosecution is the same
illegal drug that was seized from the accused:

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.

Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics

may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through
methods that exceed human sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units
and screening devices) are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs.
The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration
and substitution. It also makes conducive the planting of evidence. In Mallillin v. People:

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as
in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature.
The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility,

100
that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been
tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by accident or
otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must
be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

People v. Holgado, et al., recognized that:

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement. . . ensures the integrity of

confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g.,
weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items
seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the
substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or
peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting,
contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21,
the second element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It
follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People v.
Lorenzo:

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.53 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the often minuscule amounts of dangerous drugs seized by law enforcement
officers compel courts to be more circumspect in the examination of the evidence.
Reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of
custody cannot be properly established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had
not been tampered with, substituted, or altered. In People v. Holgado:54

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving
violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly
uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must
employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can
be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an
accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of
evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in
this case, a speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez
whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. 55

This Court has already recognized the numerous "orchestrated or poorly built up drug-
related cases"56 that have been languishing in the clogged dockets of our lower courts.
Thus, in People v. Lim,57 this Court mandated the policy that must be followed in
prosecuting drugs cases:

[T]o weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or
poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a
mandatory policy:

101
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and
its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must

state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements

or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court.
Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule
112, Rules of Court.58 (Citation omitted)

Lim serves as a clarion call to law enforcement officers and those involved in the
prosecution of drugs cases to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must,
thus, be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals October 9, 2015

Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED unless
he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City for immediate implementation. The Superintendent
is ORDERED to REPORT the action he or she has taken to this Court within five (5)
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

102
DIGEST # 13

FACTS: At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and
Police Officer 3 Jose Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the
operation. They parked their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area,
where the asset told them to wait since their target, later identified as Comoso, was still
playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of
Comoso's house.

Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing
marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his
hat—the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the
scene and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet
from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust
money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the
plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA."

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police
Superintendent Julita T. De Villa, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police
Regional Crime Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the samples of seized items
and a letter-request for laboratory examination. In Chemistry Report No. D-017-05, she
found that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.

Comoso alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005, on his way home from
delivering his catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2) armed men, whom he
figured were police officers. They first brought Comoso to the airport, then to the police
station, where he would be detained.

The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from
selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs.

CRIME CHARGED: Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, particularly

for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y

Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not strictly complying with the requisites
for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti

RULING: No, the prosecution did not prove accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso
y Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."

Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." In buy-
bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

103
In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish
compliance with the chain of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640:

Moreover, every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v. Nandi, must

be established:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic
sachet from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that
he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items
to the crime laboratory.

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the
inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant;
and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over to an investigating officer.
The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic
chemist, only received the seized items on April 8, 2005, or 10 working days after the
buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period
required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to explain. This
creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic chemist
was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant:

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may
not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant.
The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-
appellant.

Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign
the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned
entrapment operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement
officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated that "the integrity of
the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with."

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search
and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds." However, the absence
of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's
performance of their official duties:

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu
and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case.

104
CASE # 14

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 212626, June 03, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLANDO TERNIDA Y

MUNAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The failure of law enforcers in buy-bust operations to photograph seized drugs in

accordance with Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, combined with the
prosecution's failure to address this omission, raises doubt on the identity of the drugs
seized, especially when the amount of dangerous drugs allegedly taken from the
accused is minuscule.

This Court resolves an appeal1 of the October 30, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05208, which affirmed the conviction of Rolando
Ternida y Munar (Ternida) for violating Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

An Information was filed charging Ternida with selling 0.0402 gram of shabu, in violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. It read in part:

That on or about the 17th day of November 2009, in the City of San Fernando, Province
of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law and without first securing the necessary permit,
license or prescription from the proper government agency, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, dispense and deliver one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "Shabu"
a dangerous drug, weighing ZERO POINT ZERO FOUR HUNDRED TWO (0.0402)
gram to PO2 RICARDO ANNAGUE, who posed as a poseur buyer thereof using
marked money one (1) piece of One Thousand peso bill bearing serial number 526998.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Ternida pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial was
conducted, and trial on the merits then ensued. 4

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On November 12, 2009, a confidential informant told the San Fernando City Police that
an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in five (5) days at Quezon
Avenue, San Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San Fernando City Police
formed a buy-bust team composed of Police Officer 2 Ricardo Annague (PO2
Annague), who was designated as the poseur-buyer, Police Inspector Quesada
(Inspector Quesada), PO3 Raul Dapula, and PO3 Paul Batnag (PO3 Batnag), who was
designated as back-up.5

On November 17, 2009, the team carried out the operation. At around 10:40 p.m., the
officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague approached him, while
PO3 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe the transaction. 6

Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said
P1,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave PO2 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of

105
crystalline substance in exchange for PO2 Annague's P1,000.00 bill, which had been
designated as the buy-bust money. After securing the sachet, PO2 Annague gave the
pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who immediately approached and arrested Ternida.
A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. The seized plastic sachet was
then sent to the crime laboratory for forensic examination, where it tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.7

In his defense, Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed
that on November 17, 2009, he was about to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to
Golden Society Restaurant when three (3) men, whom he later identified as Inspector
Quesada, PO3 Batnag, and PO2 Annague, arrested him. Inspector Quesada held his
neck, while PO3 Batnag and PO2 Annague handcuffed him. 8

After frisking him, the officers took his cell phone and coin purse containing P150.00.
They then brought him under a tree, where they took photos of him beside the plastic
sachet. Afterwards, they brought him to the police station, where he was detained. 9

In its July 6, 2011 Decision,10 the Regional Trial Court found Ternida guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROLANDO TERNIDA y Munar is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

On appeal,12 Ternida argued that the prosecution failed to preserve the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti. He pointed out that the seized item was not marked with
the date of seizure, which meant that it could not be distinguished from other evidence
that may have been in the police officer's possession. Moreover, he claimed that the
drugs allegedly seized were not photographed. He asserted that the prosecution did not
give justifiable grounds for the apprehending officers' failure to comply with the chain of
custody requirements under the law.13

Ternida also pointed out that the witnesses who had signed the Certificate of Inventory
were not presented in court. l1oreover, he claimed that the arresting officers
contradicted each other as to the witnesses' presence during the buy-bust. PO2
Annague testified that the barangay officials and media representatives witnessed the
buy-bust operation itself, while PO3 Batnag testified that they were called only after the
arrest.14

Moreover, Ternida asserted that no Certificate of Coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency was presented, and that the police officers themselves admitted
that they did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency during the
surveillance and monitoring operations before Ternida's arrest. He also claimed that
PO2 Annague's and PO3 Batnag's testimonies on their coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency were not only inconsistent with each other, but also
inconsistent with the Pre-Operation Report and Coordination Sheet presented by the
prosecution.15

Ternida also claimed that the prosecution did not present the official Physical Sciences
Report regarding the shabu, and offered only the initial laboratory report, which was
"issued exclusively for the inquest ... pending the release of the official chemistry
report[.]"16

Ternida also insisted that the prosecution did not establish the chain of custody of the
seized item.17

Finally, Ternida maintained that PO2 Annague had motive to plant evidence to arrest
him. He claimed that it was improbable for Ternida to sell drugs to PO2 Annague,
considering that PO2 Annague had previously arrested Ternida in a commotion
incident.18

106
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, countered in its Brief19 that PO2 Annague's testimony was sufficient to
establish the chain of custody.20 As to PO2 Annague having previously arrested
Ternida, it inscrutably asserted that "it [was] impossible for appellant to sell shabu to
someone whom he [had] previously known as a policeman." 21 In any case, the Office of
the Solicitor General insisted that the presumption that police officers have performed
their duties with regularity applies in this case. 22

In its October 30, 2013 Decision,23 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
Court's findings in toto. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
ordered DISMISSED, and the appealed decision rendered by Branch 66 of the RTC of
San Fernando City, La Union in Criminal Case No. 8514 on 06 July 2011
is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, Ternida filed a Notice of Appeal. In its December 5, 2013 Resolution, 25 the Court
of Appeals gave due course to Ternida's appeal and elevated the case records to this
Court.26 Accused-appellant and plaintiff-appellee, in compliance with this Court's July
23, 2014 Resolution,27 filed their respective Manifestations on September 9, 2014 28 and
September 26, 2014.29

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not accused-appellant Rolando
Ternida y Munar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Accused-appellant should be acquitted.

To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not
only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In
doing this, the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized items 30 to
prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drug seized. 31

Article II, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides the
procedures that the apprehending team must observe to comply with the chain of
custody requirements in handling seized drugs. The first step upon seizure mandates:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
That the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs must be done
immediately where seizure had taken place minimizes the possibility that evidence may
be planted. Noncompliance with this legally mandated procedure, upon seizure, raises
doubt that what was submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in court was
seized from an accused.32

Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs
were photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. That no photograph
of the seized drugs was offered in evidence raises questions as to whether the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was seized from accused-appellant in
the buy-bust operation.

Worse, the prosecution did not even address the apprehending team's failure to
photograph the seized items. In plaintiff-appellee's brief, the Office of the Solicitor
General argued that even if there was a failure to observe the mandated process, this
Court has held that it is irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case:
Even assuming arguendo that there is a deviation from the cited provision, the same
does not affect the prosecution of the case. It does not render the evidence gathered
inadmissible and certainly could not reasonably lead to the acquittal of appellant. As
held by the Supreme Court, the failure of arresting officers to comply with a Dangerous

107
Drugs Board (DDB) regulation is a matter strictly between the DDB and arresting
officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case. There is no
provision or statement in any law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility
of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. Indeed, the commission of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drug is considered consummated once the sale is established and the prosecution
thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
regulations of the DDB. In the case at bar, the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs was clearly proven by the prosecution.33 (Citations omitted)
In support of this argument, the Office of the Solicitor General cited People v. De los
Reyes,34 a 1994 case where this Court rejected the accused's argument that the
arresting officers failed to comply with a 1979 Dangerous Drugs Board regulation. Such
reliance-despite the passage of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act in 2002,
which expressly requires the apprehending team to seize the drugs in a specific way-is
misplaced, outdated, and rejected.

Still, conviction may be sustained despite noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirements if there were justifiable grounds provided. This was only expressly codified
into the law with the passage of Republic Act No. 10640 in 2014, five (5) years after the
buy-bust operation had been conducted. Nonetheless, at the time of the buy-bust, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is
already in effect. It states:
(a) ... Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 35
This Court has expounded on this provision in People v. Miranda:36
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the , integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.
Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non
compliance must be proven as , a fact, because that Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.

To be sure, this Court is not impervious to the sentiments of the State when it is left to
deal with the seemingly unfair situation of having a drug conviction overturned upon
grounds that it was not able to meet in the proceedings a quo. However, there is no
gainsaying that these sentiments must yield to the higher imperative of protecting the
fundamental liberties of the accused. Besides, the law itself apprises our law
enforcement authorities about the requirements of compliance with the chain of custody
rule. Case law exhorts that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. Therefore,
as the requirements are clearly set forth in the law, then the State retains the
positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items

108
seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the
same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a
conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and
evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal, or even
not raised, become apparent upon further review. 37 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
Thus, before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance
with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The
prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved.38 It has the positive duty to establish its
reasons for the procedural lapses.

In this case, the prosecution has failed to perform such duty.

Assuming that the other requirements of the law had been complied with, the
prosecution could have strengthened its case by taking positive action and by providing
evidence on why the seized drugs were not photographed. It could have also presented
evidence to establish that what was submitted for laboratory examination was, indeed,
seized from accused-appellant.

Instead, the prosecution claimed that noncompliance with the law is irrelevant. This is
not only insufficient to convince this Court of the evidentiary value of the allegedly
seized drugs; it also raises serious doubts as to their identity, especially given the
minuscule amount involved.39

Accused-appellant's other arguments regarding his arrest are unconvincing. There is no

evidence supporting his claim that the prosecution had an ulterior motive to arrest him,
and that it was implausible for him to engage in illegal transactions with the police officer
due to their prior interaction. When accused-appellant took the stand, he did not
mention having previously interacted with PO2 Annague or knowing his
face.40 Moreover, the wording of PO2 Annague's testimony on Ternida's previous
incident is unclear and insufficient to establish that PO2 Annague had any interaction
with accused-appellant prior to the buy-bust operation. 41

Finally, worth noting is the minuscule amount of shabu subject of this case. This Court
reiterates its pronouncement in People v. Holgado:42
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of
prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving
small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a
bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast
network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the
more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true
leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial
resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under
doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in
fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the
causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts
of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.43
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals October 30, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05208 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Rolando Ternida y
Munar is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
some other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision. For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of
the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency.

109
Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST # 14

FACTS: On November 12, 2009, a confidential informant told the San Fernando City
Police that an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in five (5) days
at Quezon Avenue, San Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San Fernando
City Police formed a buy-bust team composed of Police Officer 2 Ricardo Annague
(PO2 Annague), who was designated as the poseur-buyer, Police Inspector Quesada
(Inspector Quesada), PO3 Raul Dapula, and PO3 Paul Batnag (PO3 Batnag), who was
designated as back-up.

On November 17, 2009, the team carried out the operation. At around 10:40 p.m., the
officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague approached him, while
PO3 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe the transaction.

Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said
P1,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave PO2 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
crystalline substance in exchange for PO2 Annague's P1,000.00 bill, which had been
designated as the buy-bust money. After securing the sachet, PO2 Annague gave the
pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who immediately approached and arrested Ternida.
A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. The seized plastic sachet was
then sent to the crime laboratory for forensic examination, where it tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed that on November
17, 2009, he was about to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to Golden Society
Restaurant when three (3) men, whom he later identified as Inspector Quesada, PO3
Batnag, and PO2 Annague, arrested him. Inspector Quesada held his neck, while PO3
Batnag and PO2 Annague handcuffed him.

After frisking him, the officers took his cell phone and coin purse containing P150.00.
They then brought him under a tree, where they took photos of him beside the plastic
sachet. Afterwards, they brought him to the police station, where he was detained.

CRIME CHARGED: Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. It read in

part:
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165
CA: affirmed the Regional Trial Court's findings

ISSUE:Whether or not accused-appellant Rolando Ternida y Munar is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs

RULING: To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must not only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in
evidence. In doing this, the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the
seized items to prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drug seized.

Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs
were photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. That no photograph
of the seized drugs was offered in evidence raises questions as to whether the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was seized from accused-appellant in
the buy-bust operation.

Worse, the prosecution did not even address the apprehending team's failure to
photograph the seized items. In the case at bar, the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs was clearly proven by the prosecution.

110
This Court has expounded on this provision in People v. Miranda:
The Court, however, clarified that IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

The law itself apprises our law enforcement authorities about the requirements of
compliance with the chain of custody rule. Case law exhorts that the procedure in
Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects. Therefore, as the requirements are clearly set forth in the law,
then the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of
custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not
the defense raises the same in the proceedings  a quo; otherwise, it risks the
possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first
time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review.
Thus, before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance
with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The
prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved.It has the positive duty to establish its reasons
for the procedural lapses.

In this case, the prosecution has failed to perform such duty. Nonetheless, the arresting
officers' failure to photograph the seized drugs, to explain this failure, and to establish
that the integrity of the seized drugs was preserved despite the failure, are sufficient to
reverse accused appellant's conviction based on reasonable doubt.

111
CASE # 15

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 229862, June 19, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ZZZ, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Recantations are viewed unfavorably especially in rape cases. Circumstances in which

the recantation was made are thoroughly examined before the evidence of retraction
can be given any weight.

Before this Court is a criminal case for rape committed by the common-law spouse of
the victim's mother. Accused-appellant ZZZ assails the September 30, 2016
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01769, which affirmed his
conviction in the June 25, 2013 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court.

On May 23, 2006, an Information3 was filed against ZZZ charging him with the crime of
rape:

That on or about 11:00 o'clock (sic) on the morning of the 12th day of April 2006, in the
City of xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, the live-in partner of the mother of the victim, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the victim [AAA], a minor fourteen (14) years old, against her will.
Contrary to Article 266-A, in relation to 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. 4
ZZZ pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during his arraignment on July 19, 2006.
Pre-trial was held on October 25, 2006. Trial on the merits then ensued. 5

The prosecution presented AAA6 and Dr. Edalin Dacula (Dr. Dacula) as its witnesses.7

AAA narrated that in the afternoon of April 12, 2006, she had fallen asleep after doing
laundry, while her stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works. Suddenly, she woke up
and found ZZZ on top of her, his lower body naked. He then sat on the floor with his
penis showing and removed her short pants and underwear, after which he went back
on top of her and masturbated. He took AAA's hands and put them on his penis, 8 telling
her that if she became pregnant, "he [would] be happy." 9 ZZZ then inserted his penis
into her vagina "and sat, kissed her face, touched her vagina[,] and kissed her breast." 10

AAA later reiterated on cross-examination that ZZZ put his penis into her vagina. She
failed to see the act, but felt it. She also felt pain on her vagina's side, caused by the
penis' insertion.11

Dr. Dacula, who conducted the medical examination on AAA, testified that she had
found redness and abrasion on the right side of the victim's labia minora, "caused by a
smooth, soft object"12 as indicated in the Medico-Legal Report. 13

Meanwhile, the defense presented as witnesses: (1) AAA's mother BBB; (2) ZZZ; and
(3) AAA, on her affidavit of recantation.14

BBB testified that ZZZ had been her common-law spouse for four (4) years. At 10:00
a.m. on April 12, 2006, she and her stepdaughter, CCC, went for a 30-minute walk to
the barangay hall to request a toilet bowl, as instructed by ZZZ. They went back home

112
after being told that the toilet bowl was not yet available. 15

When she arrived at their house, BBB was surprised to see that the door and window
were shut. Upon opening the door, she saw AAA sitting and ZZZ standing, both silent.
BBB got mad and whipped ZZZ with a plastic hose, but he remained silent. 16

Thinking that her daughter was raped, BBB brought AAA to the barangay hall. Then,
with the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the
police, they went to xxxxxxxxxxx City for AAA's physical examination.17

On cross-examination, BBB stated that she brought AAA to the barangay hall "because
her vision at that time was blurred as if she cannot notice a person[.]" 18 Maintaining that
their house was closed when she first arrived from the barangay hall, she reiterated
seeing ZZZ and AAA inside when she opened the door and thinking that her daughter
was raped.19

ZZZ testified that he was BBB's common-law spouse. He took AAA as his stepdaughter,
supporting her since childhood. He narrated that at 6:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, he was
working on the kitchen in their house while AAA and DDD did the laundry. Meanwhile,
BBB proceeded to the barangay hall to check if the toilet bowl they requested was
already available.

ZZZ further narrated that at around 10:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, DDD and AAA were
eating breakfast after they had finished washing clothes. AAA then went up the second
floor of their house and slept, while he was then Installing an electric bulb in the kitchen.
When BBB arrived, she opened the door at once.20 AAA "was surprised because [BBB]
was shouting as if she was dreaming."21 BBB asked ZZZ if he raped AAA, which he
denied. He was around 12 meters away from AAA, holding a hammer on the window.
BBB then went to AAA and pinched her "bulog[.]" 22 Afterwards, BBB grabbed a hose
and whipped ZZZ, who was able to parry the strike. BBB then went out with AAA only to
return the following morning.23

ZZZ claimed that BBB was influenced by her cousins to accuse him. 24 The cousins were
allegedly mad at him and wanted BBB and him to separate since he was "not a useful
person."25

On cross-examination, ZZZ stated that the house's window and door were always shut
because the house was still unfinished. He restated that when BBB arrived, she saw
him standing by the window and AAA sitting at a corner of their house. He reiterated
that BBB whipped him with a hose.26 He added that when he saw AAA crying, he
thought that she would not pinpoint him as her rapist "because her conscience [was]
bothered."27

On August 8, 2008, AAA executed her Affidavit of Recantation and

Desistance,28 praying that the rape case be dismissed. She claimed that her
declarations during the direct and cross-examinations "were done under duress and that
she was afraid of the authorities at that time[.]" 29 Maintaining that ZZZ did not rape her,
she claimed that she was forced by a certain EEE to file the rape case.

On cross-examination, AAA testified that she was not compelled by the prosecutor to
testify. Contrary to her Affidavit, she also admitted that she was not under duress when
she was presented as a witness. She recalled crying during the direct examination and
pointing to ZZZ as her rapist when she was asked. EEE, she added, was their
neighbor.30

In its June 25, 2013 Judgment,31 the Regional Trial Court found ZZZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple statutory rape.32

The trial court found that the prosecution failed to establish AAA's minority. It did not
present documentary evidence, such as her birth certificate, or even testimonial
evidence to prove that AAA was a minor when the crime was committed. 33

113
The trial court further gave weight to AAA's declaration that she was raped. It noted her
sincerity during trial and her candid and straightforward manner in giving her testimony.
It held that her allegations were corroborated by Dr. Dacula's findings and BBB's
subsequent acts in bringing AAA to the barangay officials, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, and the police.34

The trial court did not give merit to ZZZ's denial for being unsubstantiated. It further held
that instead of discrediting the prosecution's evidence, AAA's Affidavit of Recantation
and Desistance bolstered her earlier statements by reaffirming that: (1) ZZZ sexually
molested her; (2) the prosecutor did not force her to testify; and (3) she was not put
under duress.35

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Judgment read:

WHEREFORE, based on the prevailing facts, evidences, law and jurisprudence
applicable, the court finds accused [ZZZ] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of simple statutory rape and hereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby ordered to pay to the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 without proof of its basis.

SO ORDERED.36
ZZZ appealed37 before the Court of Appeals. In turn, the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief. 38

In its September 30, 2016 Decision, 39 the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and
affirmed the trial court Judgment with modification. 40 It declared that the trial court
erroneously used the word "statutory" since it was not established that AAA was below
12 years old when the crime was committed. Nonetheless, the error was harmless
because the penalty meted and the monetary awards granted were for the crime of
simple rape.41 It sustained ZZZ's conviction based on AAA's "vivid recollection" 42 of how
rape was committed against her.43

The Court of Appeals did not give merit to ZZZ's argument that the prosecution failed to
prove the presence of force, intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of
authority.44 Citing People v. Arpon,45 it held that the moral influence or ascendancy of
the common-law spouse of the victim's mother replaced the elements of violence and
intimidation.46

Likewise, the Court of Appeals gave no merit to either AAA's recantation or the
argument that her lack of hymenal laceration negated the crime of rape. 47

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated June 25, 201.3, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Bayawan City, in Criminal Case No. 529 is hereby
AFFIRMED, but with modification only in that the word "statutory" in the dispositive
portion thereof is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.48
Hence, ZZZ appealed his case before this Court. 49

On April 5, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution 50 requiring the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. The parties filed their respective Manifestations, 51 stating that they
would no longer file their supplemental briefs as they had sufficiently exhausted their
arguments in their Briefs before the Court of Appeals. 52

Accused-appellant argues that the crime of statutory rape was not proven because the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish AAA's minority, which the trial court also
noted.53

Assuming that the prosecution established her age, accused-appellant contends that he
was still wrongly convicted of statutory rape. Pointing out that AAA's alleged age in the

114
Information was 14 years old, he argues that under the law and jurisprudence, the
victim must be below 12 years old for the crime to be statutory rape. 54

Accused-appellant avers that since the case does not involve statutory rape, the
presence of force, intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of authority must be
established in the alleged crime's commission. He contends that the prosecution failed
to show these circumstances.55

Moreover, accused-appellant alleges that AAA's "[inconsistent and improbable

statements[,]"56 particularly on direct examination and on her Affidavit of Recantation
and Desistance, raised doubts on the credibility of her allegations. 57

Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Dacula only found redness and abrasion, and
not hymenal laceration, which should have been present had there been sexual
intercourse.58 These manifestations "could have been easily caused by pinching,
scratching, or wearing very tight underwear." 59

Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the prosecution should not draw its strength on
the alleged weakness of the defense.60 He maintains that he should be acquitted
considering that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 61

Plaintiff-appellee counters that accused-appellant was actually convicted not of statutory

rape, but of simple rape, and was meted with the penalty of simple rape. Hence, even if
the trial court erroneously included the word "statutory" in describing the crime, there
was no effect in the imposed penalty.62

Plaintiff-appellee insists that accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable

doubt.63 It was able to establish the following elements:
First. [AAA] was then 14-year old when appellant had sexual intercourse with her.

Second. Appellant who is the common-law husband of [AAA's] mother exercises moral
ascendancy and authority over her.

Third. [AAA] testified that appellant had carnal knowledge of her on April 12, 2006 at
about 11:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning while her mother went to the Barangay Hall to
do an errand for appellant.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that AAA's narration of the incident proves that accused-
appellant raped her.65 It adds that recantations are usually viewed unfavorably since it
can be secured by intimidating the witness or in exchange of monetary
consideration.66 It alleges that AAA's recantation was doubtful because BBB and
accused-appellant continued their common-law relationship and AAA's new claim "was
a mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less
truth."67

Finally, plaintiff-appellee contends that AAA's intact hymen is not fatal to its cause. In
the crime of rape to be consummated, it is sufficient that the penis touched the
pudendum or the labia.68

In arguing for his innocence, accused-appellant maintains that the element of force,
intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of authority in the crime of rape was not
established, and that the element of the victim's minority in the crime of statutory rape
was not proven. Moreover, AAA's recantation and her intact hymen both negate the
allegation of rape.

Accused-appellant's contentions have no merit.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines rape as:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

115
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a Through force, threat, or intimidation;

)
b When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
)
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
) though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
After a careful examination of the case records, this Court holds that the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of raping
AAA. The trial court also found AAA's testimony credible and supported by evidence:
The candid, straightforward and unrehearsed testimony of victim [AAA] who declared
against the bestial acts of the accused on her person and maintained that she was
required to hold his penis and thereafter, again, rode on top of her placing his penis on
her vagina is corroborated by the unrefuted findings of Dr. Edalin L. Dacula who found
that the abrasion and redness in color on the right side of the labia minora is caused by
a smooth, soft object. A smooth, soft object is a penis and that the abrasion and
redness in color on the right side of the labia minora is caused probably by the friction of
the hardened and erected penis of the accused. That was why the victim complained
that she felt pain on her vagina.69
The Court of Appeals, likewise, found that AAA's testimony during the direct
examination showed that she clearly remembered how accused-appellant committed
the crime:
PROS. BALBUENA
ON DIRECT
EXAMINATION:
(COURT
INTERRUPTED)
COURT . . . Which come (sic) first, the raping or the masturbating?
WITNESS The raping.
Q How did he rape --- How did the accused rape you?
....
A First, he positioned himself on top of me and then he
undressed me, and then he sat on the floor and masturbated.
He let me hold his penis, kissed me. On top of me, he kissed
me, and he undressed me, sat on the floor and masturbated,
and then he let me hold his penis, and then he again
positioned himself on top of me.
Q Court. Tell in straight words; answer 'yes' or 'no'. Did he place his
penis inside your vagina?
A Yes.
....
[ON CROSS
EXAMINATION]
(COURT
INTERRUPTED)

116
Q Did you feel?
A Yes.
Q And what was your feeling?
A Pain
Q What was painful?
A At the side
Q Of what?
A The side of my vagina.
Q Why?
A Because his penis [was] in my vagina. 70 (Emphasis in the
original)
This Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. In People v. Quintos:71
The observance of the witnesses' demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-
examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is
indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction
that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial provides
judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues
and microexpressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole,
suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These important aspects can never be
reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.

Hence, "[t]he evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is a matter best left to the trial court
because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the
trial. Thus, the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings," more so when
the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.72 (Citations omitted)
There is also no merit in accused-appellant's argument that force, intimidation, threat,
fraud, or grave abuse of authority was not present. In People v. Gacusan,73 this Court
reiterated that "[t]he abuse of moral influence is the intimidation required in rape
committed by the common-law father of a minor." 74

As to the inclusion of the word "statutory" in the dispositive portion of the trial court
Judgment, this Court holds that it was erroneously added by the trial court judge.

In People v. Dalan:75
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the
accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.76 (Citation omitted)
Here, the Information against accused-appellant did not allege AAA to be below 12
years old, but 14 years old, when the crime was committed upon her. The trial court
even held that without documentary or testimonial evidence, the prosecution failed to
substantiate the qualifying circumstance of minority. Despite this, it still found him guilty
of simple statutory rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is correct
as it is the penalty for offenders who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape under Article 266-B77 of the Revised Penal Code.78

II

As a rule, affidavits of desistance are viewed with skepticism and reservation because
they can be "easily obtained for monetary consideration or through intimidation." 79

117
If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have made the Affidavit at the earliest
instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it more than two (2) years after the
crime had been committed. If the crime did not really happen, she would not have
submitted herself to physical examination or hours of questioning—but she did.

Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime was detailed;
her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured by
the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination:
PROS. BALBUENA ON CROSS
EXAMINATION:
Q: Now, Mrs. (sic) Witness, can you recall
having testified in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, it was I who presented you as our
witness, Mrs. (sic) Witness?
A: Yes.
Q: And when you testified Mrs. (sic) Witness,
of course, this Fiscal did not force you to
testify, is that not right?
A: I was not forced.
Q: So, in your testimony when you were
presented by the prose[cu]tion as our
witness[,] you were not under duress
then, Mrs. (sic) Witness?
ATTY. CABUSAO: Objection Your honor.
What has be[e]n testified by the witness,
Your Honor, it is not the Prosecutor who
forced her, Your Honor.
PROS. BALBUENA: I am on cross
examination, Your Honor and the
credibility of this witness is questioned,
Your Honor.
COURT: Okay, let her answer.
....
WITNESS:
A: I was not forced by the
Fiscal.80 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
Likewise, the absence of hymenal laceration fails to exonerate accused-appellant. As
explained in People v. Osing:81
[M]ere touching, no matter how slight of the labia or lips of the female organ by the male
genital, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is sufficient to consummate
rape. The absence of fresh hymenal laceration does not disprove sexual abuse,
especially when the victim is a young girl[.] 82 (Citation omitted)
This Court has consistently held that an intact hymen does not negate the commission
of rape.83 The element of rape does not even include hymenal laceration:
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a
compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal
officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution

118
for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. 84 (Citations
omitted)
The guilt of accused-appellant having been proven beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. However, in line
with prevailing jurisprudence,85 this Court increases the amount of civil indemnity to
P75,000.00 and moral damages to P75,000.00. Exemplary damages of P75,000.00
shall also be awarded to AAA.86

Finally, a six percent (6%) per annum legal interest shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded to AAA from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. 87

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' September 30, 2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01769 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant ZZZ is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, as punished under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused-appellant is further DIRECTED to pay AAA: (1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos

(P75,000.00) as moral damages; (2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
civil indemnity; and (3) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST # 15

FACTS:AAA narrated that in the afternoon of April 12, 2006, she had fallen asleep after
doing laundry, while her stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works. Suddenly, she
woke up and found ZZZ on top of her, his lower body naked. He then sat on the floor
with his penis showing and removed her short pants and underwear, after which he
went back on top of her and masturbated. He took AAA's hands and put them on his
penis, telling her that if she became pregnant, "he [would] be happy." ZZZ then inserted
his penis into her vagina "and sat, kissed her face, touched her vagina[,] and kissed her
breast."

AAA later reiterated on cross-examination that ZZZ put his penis into her vagina. She
failed to see the act, but felt it. She also felt pain on her vagina's side, caused by the
penis' insertion.

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Dr. Dacula, who conducted the medical examination on AAA, testified that she had
found redness and abrasion on the right side of the victim's labia minora, "caused by a
smooth, soft object" as indicated in the Medico-Legal Report.

ZZZ testified that he was BBB's common-law spouse. He took AAA as his stepdaughter,
supporting her since childhood. He narrated that at 6:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, he was
working on the kitchen in their house while AAA and DDD did the laundry. Meanwhile,
BBB proceeded to the barangay hall to check if the toilet bowl they requested was
already available.

ZZZ further narrated that at around 10:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, DDD and AAA were
eating breakfast after they had finished washing clothes. AAA then went up the second
floor of their house and slept, while he was then Installing an electric bulb in the kitchen.
When BBB arrived, she opened the door at once. AAA "was surprised because [BBB]
was shouting as if she was dreaming." BBB asked ZZZ if he raped AAA, which he
denied. He was around 12 meters away from AAA, holding a hammer on the window.
BBB then went to AAA and pinched her "bulog[.]" Afterwards, BBB grabbed a hose and
whipped ZZZ, who was able to parry the strike. BBB then went out with AAA only to
return the following morning.

CRIME CHARGED: Rape

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple statutory rape
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ's guilt for the crime of rape has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING: After a careful examination of the case records, this Court holds that the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is
guilty of raping AAA. In People v. Dalan: The gravamen of the offense of statutory
rape, as provided for in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an
accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the
complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal
knowledge between the accused and the complainant.

Here, the Information against accused-appellant did not allege AAA to be below 12
years old, but 14 years old, when the crime was committed upon her. The trial court
even held that without documentary or testimonial evidence, the prosecution failed to
substantiate the qualifying circumstance of minority. Despite this, it still found him guilty
of simple statutory rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is correct
as it is the penalty for offenders who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

Based on the circumstances here, this Court cannot give any weight to AAA's Affidavit
of Recantation and Desistance. If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have
made the Affidavit at the earliest instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it
more than two (2) years after the crime had been committed. If the crime did not really
happen, she would not have submitted herself to physical examination or hours of
questioning—but she did.

Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime was detailed;
her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured by
the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination:

Likewise, the absence of hymenal laceration fails to exonerate accused-appellant. As

explained in People v. Osing:Mere touching, no matter how slight of the labia or lips of
the female organ by the male genital, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is

120
sufficient to consummate rape. The absence of fresh hymenal laceration does not
disprove sexual abuse, especially when the victim is a young girl.
This Court has consistently held that an intact hymen does not negate the commission
of rape. The element of rape does not even include hymenal laceration:

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a
compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal
officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution
for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.

121