QUASI-JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

I. Definition of Adjudication Power

 The quasi-judicial power is the power of the administrative

agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself.

 The administrative body exercises the quasi-judicial power

when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for, the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it.

 There is no invalid delegation of judicial power to the

administrative body where the legislature authorizes it to
resolve factual questions in certain controversies in order to
give effect to the mandate and policy of the law it is supposed
to enforce.

 The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires

compliance with 2 conditions, to wit:

1.Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the

administrative body;
2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.

A. Distinguish from JUDICIAL POWER (1987 Constitution, Article

VII, Section 1)
Judicial Power, in the strict sense, is the power to hear, try and
determine all sorts of cases at law and equity which are brought before the
courts. It is the power and authority to make a final, rather than an initial
 determination, of what the law is and adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties.

1. Where function primarily administrative –For the purpose of deciding

questions as to the powers with which an administrative agency may
be vested, the true rule is that where the function of the agency is
primarily administrative and the power to hear and determine
controversies is granted as an incident to the administrative duty, the
power is administrative, or at least it is properly exercisable by
administrative agencies. Such a power is variously held to be judicial
but validly conferred, or to be quasi-judicial.
2. Where function primarily to decide question of legal rights –Where the
duty is primarily to decide questions of legal rights between private
parties, such decision being the primary object and not merely
incidental to regulation or some other administrative function, the
function is judicial. An element if judicial action which is sometimes
stressed by the courts is freedom of action or independence and the
absence of control or coercive influence.

B. E0 292, Book VII, Chapter 3

The Administrative Code of 1987 defines the power of

adjudication simply as “an agency process for the formulation
of final order.

Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative

proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive
litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable
settlement, comprise and arbitration.

Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -

(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and
hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of
the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.

(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and

argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may
be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default.

(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.

Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:

(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence
commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs.

(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies

or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the
parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If
the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy
thereof may be accepted.

(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses

presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence.

(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and
of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized
knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to
contest the facts so noticed.

Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the
power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books,
papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party
before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless
otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience,
invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the
contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or
refusal as contempt.

Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a

contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case
within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be
notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their
counsel of record, if any, or to them.

Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by
the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative
appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for
reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said
period.

Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. -

 (1) Every agency shall publish and make available for
public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of
contested cases.

(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency

or his equivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of
those decisions or final orders for use by the public.

Section 17. Licensing Procedure. -

(1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is

required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning
contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.

(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and

regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no
license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice
and hearing.

Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made

timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with
reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall
not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the
agency.

II. Source

Source of Quasi-Judicial Power:

The quasi-legislative power is incidental to the power of regulation vested in the

administrative body but is often expressly conferred by the legislature through
specific provisions in the charter of the agency. The justification for the grant, as
against the contention that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, is that the
power is needed to enable the administrative officers to perform their executive
duties.

It has been observed that the use of the term “quasi-judicial” is merely a
convenient way of approving the exercise of judicial power by an administrative
officer. It is often referred to as the power of adjudication.

III. Determinative Powers

 To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi-judicial authority, it
is also vested with what are known as determinative powers and functions.

These powers are classified into:

1. Enabling powers –those that permit the doing of an act which law undertakes to
regulate and which the law undertakes to regulate and which would be unlawful
without government approval. The most common example is the issuance of
licenses to engage in a particular business or occupation.
2. Directing powers –order the doing or performance of particular acts to ensure
compliance with the law and are often exercised for corrective purposes. An
example would NLRC compelling an employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed
employee and him damages. It include:

a. Dispensing power –allows the administrative officer to relax the general

operation of a law or exempt from the performance of a general duty, as
when a student is excused from physical education requirements for health
reasons, or when residential buildings are permitted by the zoning board to
remain in an area designated as commercial or industry.
b. Summary power –are those involving the use by administrative authorities
of force upon persons or things without necessity or previous judicial
warning. An example is the padlocking by the mayor’s office of filthy
restaurants or movie house exhibiting obscene movies.
c. Examining power –enables the administrative body to inspect the records
and premises and investigate the activities of persons or entities coming
under its jurisdiction. This will include, among others, the following
powers:
i. Issuance of subpoenas
ii. Swearing of witnesses
iii. Interrogation of witnesses
iv. Calling for production books, papers, records
v. Requiring that books, papers and records be available for
inspection
vi. Inspection of premises
vii. Requiring written answers to questionnaires
viii. Requiring periodic or special reports
ix. Requiring the filing of statements

CASES
 1. Sanado vs CA

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or

revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is
administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative
agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined

The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear.
Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of
the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the
fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license.
Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have
elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of
judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.

As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of
and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest
officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which
courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its
principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties (Francisco,
Evidence [Rules 128-134], 1996 ed., p. 24, citing Canal Zone vs. Mena, 2 Canal Zone 170).

The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is premised on the essential
function of the executive department — which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is
being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and
decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind such
laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the fishery industry and
to keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition through proper
conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).

Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject
fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the
administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter — the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of
the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the
approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745
[1971]). Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the
fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception
is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse
of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.
2. Carino vs CHR

The CHR was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The
most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factualconclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to

investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of
any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in
the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or

probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course,
is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
 The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means
"to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award
or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means:
"To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies
a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

3. Lastimosa vs Vasquez

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power
to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted
rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute.

In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.
§31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
 Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control. (Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez

and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already
conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court.
Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged
would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that
he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse
or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own
and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

4. De Syquia vs Board of Power and Water Works

The Court sets aside respondent board's orders ruling upon the complaints of the three
private respondents-tenants of petitioner's apartment building that petitioner may not
charge them pro rata the extra cost of electricity consumed for the building's common
areas and facilities such as the elevator and servants' quarters. The question of the
proportionate amount that each tenant should bear for the additional electricity cost for
common facilities of the apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil
in character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be
adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general
jurisdiction and is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board.

The Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and to grant the petition. Under
the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service related
to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act 1 were
transferred to respondent board.
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with

respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in
the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common
facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters)
give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory
board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the
additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at
a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its
jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

5. Globe Wireless vs PSC

Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the
Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision
and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.
However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which
petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner
only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,

Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only
with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international
commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously,
such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very
limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public
service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions
or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so
there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to
petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
 Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

6. RCPI vs NTC

E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the
shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public
Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of the
Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers
to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to
impose administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service to customers,
ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of legislation. It
is true that the decision in RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to have modified
the Santiago ruling in that the later case held that the Board of Communications can
impose fines if the public service entity violates or fails to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission. But
can private respondent's complaint be similarly treated when the complaint seeks redress
of a grievance against the company? 8 NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546
invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive
Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service
utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to
consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power
of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission,
are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in
the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . . (Globe Wireless case, supra).

7. Boiser vs CA
PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board
of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the
Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to
award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the
bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day
prior notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is
one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract.

Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve
"a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary
affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.

We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471):

We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service
Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and
powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute'.
Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.) The functions of the Public
Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only
jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna, Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 111.) As
successor in of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications
exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the
Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. ...

The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission.

The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary
implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board
of Communications, "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica
Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the
proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against
petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications."
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101 SCRA
769). It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon, 62 SCRA 388). The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67
SCRA 425.)

8. National Federation of Labor vs Eisma

Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a
labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of
first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope
of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages,
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express
terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant
ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision.
The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus,
"The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them." It is so even after the lapse of sixty years.

Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is
given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved
on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree
1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article
217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of
workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising
from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code."

The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again
be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit,
history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine
American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association
of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny
question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the
power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to
refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that
unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an
administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to
the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in
the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining
what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either
labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-
employee relations.
9. Angara vs The Electoral Commission
. Sec. 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides: “There shall be an Electoral Commission
(EC)… shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” From the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention, it is evident that the purpose of creating the EC was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The EC is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the

performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to
all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. The grant of power to the EC to judge all contests relation to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging in
the EC is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.

The creation of the EC carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character
to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred.

In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be

followed in filing protests before the EC, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commisison. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
does not and cannot deprive the EC of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be
filed.

10. Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs Agrava

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of
law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office,
then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated,
such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
 exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as
regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before
them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice
before the Patent Office.

11. Agusmin Promotional vs CA

While there may be some merit in the arguments of the petitioner since the rule is that "in
deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced
and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable", 20 little, if any,
useful purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of
Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancellation of the timber license issued to
AGUSMIN, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decisions of the Executive Secretary
before the same became final and enforceable. the said decisions "did not acquire any
finality".

The background details recited therefore disclose that no finality was ever achieved by the
letter decision of the Executive Secretary in favor of respondent AGUS- MIN dated May 7,
1962 in view of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners herein in said DANR
3093-A. Under such situation the aforesaid Surety Bond, earlier posted by petitioners
herein under DANR Case Nos. 3093 and 3093-A duly approved by Director of Forestry,
subsists as a restraining factor that would enjoin respondent AGUS-MIN from
immediately conducting logging operations in the area conceded to the petitioners herein,
P.B. de Jesus, by the DANR. As now stands, the letter decision of the Office of the
Executive Secretary dated May 7, 1962 never gained finality and has in fact now been
overturned in the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 87209 of the Court below, dated
November 27, 1975. Not only this, the timber license rights of respondent AGUS-MIN, was
even then earlier cancelled on February 28, 1974 by the Office of the President under
Letter of Instruction No. 172., 21

12. Office of the Ombudsman vs Samaniego

Section 27, Article II of the Constitution reads:

The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.
 To implement this, the Constitution established the Office of the Ombudsman, composed
of the Ombudsman, one overall deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao. It was the intention of the Constitution to make the Ombudsman
independent.

The Office of the Ombudsman is vested with full administrative disciplinary authority
including the power to determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers
or employees as warranted by the evidence, and necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus,
the provisions in [RA] 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to
bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These
provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority
to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its
rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence and necessarily, impose the said penalty.xxx (emphasis supplied)

 
Full disciplinary authority is one of the broad powers granted to it by the Constitution and
RA 6770. These broad powers, functions and duties are generally categorized into:
investigatory power, prosecutory power, public assistance functions, authority to inquire
and obtain information, and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive
measures.
 
Actions of the Ombudsman that do not fall squarely under any of these general headings
are not to be construed outright as illegal. The avowed purpose of preserving public trust
and accountability must be considered. So long as the Ombudsmans actions are
reasonably in line with its official functions and are not contrary to law and the
Constitution, they should be upheld. Defending its decisions in the CA is one such power.

The Ombudsman is expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive onlooker.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution ― such as RA 6770
― should be liberally construed to advance the objectives for which it was created.

13. In Re Contempt Proceedings against Armando Ramos, Carmelo vs Ramos

NO. The SC ruled that the committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it
and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. Petitioner’s contention that the Mayor
of Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials and employees appointed by
him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such
officials of employees may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition
but we do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation
implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
 appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. In the case of Francia
v. Pecson, in denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of
Manila, we held that "Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the
powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."

14. Pascual vs BME

YES. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand."
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we
had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence
cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the
right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged

malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.

15. Masangcay vs COMELEC

There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose
the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. The
resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for
contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be
followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the
different municipalities. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its ministerial functions,
such as the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among different
municipalities, has no power to punish for contempt, because such power is
inherently judicial in nature. The Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in
punishing Masangcay for contempt, and so its decision is null and void. Having reached
the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass on the question of constitutionality
raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
which confers upon the Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for
acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

16. Tolentino vs Inciong

 The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is express
and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act.
There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of
a valid grant, they are devoid of power. The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong
that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for
exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to have known that the
competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly cannot
extend to a judge of the court of first instance. It must ever be borne in mind by an
administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with
the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. It is true that courts, like any other
governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case,
it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on the
propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution
in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. The proper step for an
administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on
the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it.
Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. That was
an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. It would be a reproach to
any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances.
The resort of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical
jurisprudence, seeking shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied
admission of his actuation being devoid of support in law. As well stated by Chief Justice
Hughes: "It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by [a] statute."

17. Ang Tibay vs CA

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable."
(Section 20) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of
this legislative policy, appeals to Supreme Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the Supreme Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion