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 TIPS
FOR
LEADERS
AIRBORNE

D1024 )
31-20- 1
TC 31- 20 - 1

REFERAT

SEP2S 1977

THE ROLE
HO

OF
70167
US ARMY

SPECIAL FORCES

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA LIBRARY

This training circular was prepared by the US Army Institute for Military
improving our doctrine and welcome your comments. Address your comments PL
to :

Commandant
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
ATTN : ATSU - TD - TL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

The use of the words " he," " his," " himself," etc.,in this training
circular is intended to include both themasculine and feminine
gendere Any en to this will be noted.
 TC 31-20 - 1
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington , DC , 22 October 1976

THE ROLE OF
US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

THIS TRAINING CIRCULAR sets forth basic concepts and new doctrine for US
Army SpecialForces. This doctrine willbe included in FM 31-20 , Special Forces
Operations, currently under revision .

Commanders and trainers at all echelons should use this training circular in
conjunction with Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP ) 31-101,
Airborne Special Forces Group .

CONTENTS

PAGE

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . ...................................

ORGANIZATION .. .........................
3. MISSIONS.....
COMMAND AND CONTROL.....
...... ........
APPENDIX A . RELATED SPECIAL FORCES
PUBLICATIONS .. .. .. A - 1
 R
BE
OPE
D

LI
V
PESSO

MYTH
Special Forces can do everything!
REALITY
There are those who believe Special Forces is some complicated ,
mysterious, all-powerful system which should be able to answer
every need . This is not true. To do everything, wewould need all the
assets in the world.It is true that SpecialForceshas the capabilities to
conduct a wide variety of missions under circumstances and in
environments not normally envisioned for conventional forces.
However, there are somemissions forwhich SpecialForces is neither
organized nor equipped, e. g., conduct of offensive or defensive
operations as a conventional maneuver unit.
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This training circular explains the role of US Army Special Forces. Specifically , it
explains the basic concepts of doctrine for Special Forces support of the Army's
responsibility for unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal
defense .

The Army's primary objective is to win the land battle - to fightand win battles, large
or small, against any foe , in any location . US Army SpecialForces is ready to meet the
challenge ofmodern warfare ,not justwith new equipment,butwith new doctrine and
training thatwill insure responsiveness and accomplishmentof themission . Success
will depend on our ability to develop andmaintain a high state of combat effectiveness
through the integration of:
2 BETTER TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
BETTER TRAINING MANAGEMENT
BETTER INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT PROFICIENCY
BETTER ORGANIZATIONS
Military leaders at all levels must examine and understand the basic concepts of
Special Forces doctrine to effectively use this valuable source of combatpower. These
basic concepts of doctrine include:
I MISSION

I CAPABILITIES
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

| COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
CHAPTER 1

SpecialForces is a multipurpose force specifically developed, trained, equipped, and

tasked to provide the US Army the flexibility to tailor its response to various
contingencies. Special Forces provides a training, advisory, or operational capability
in the functional areas of:

1 Command and staff I Demolitions

1 Operations Medical
Intelligence I Logistics
Tactics Communications
Weapons Field engineering

We will begin our discussion by taking a brief look at the organization and general
concepts for employing SpecialForces. The discussion then centers on themission
to conduct unconventionalwarfare, specialoperations, and foreign internal defense.
Here, we will stress the unique ability of Special Forces to conduct a variety of
strategic missions under circumstances and in environments notnormally envisioned
for conventional forces. Finally , we will consider the various command and control
arrangements which confront Special Forces.

Before we begin our discussion we must establish a common frame ofreference and
insure that everyone understands what is meant by the term UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE (UW ).

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW ) in the context of this training circular is

defined as:

Operations, which include but are not limited to guerrilla warfare,

evasion and escape, subversion , and sabotage, conducted during
periods of peace and war in hostile or politically sensitive territory .

Responsibility for the various aspects of unconventionalwarfare has been delegated

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that service having primary concern . The US Army is
responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities. US Army Special
Forces are primarily concerned with guerrilla warfare, but must be prepared to
assume responsibility for the other aspects ofunconventionalwarfare to support US
national interests.
 CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATION

This chapter describes the organization , capabilities, limitations, and general

concepts of employment for the:

1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

2 GROUP HEADQUARTERS
3 OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS
4 SERVICE COMPANY
5 SIGNAL COMPANY
6 ASA DETACHMENT (SP OP)

CONTENTS

PAGE
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) ..
GROUP HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS
SERVICE COMPANY...
SIGNAL COMPANY .. . ..........
ASA DETACHMENT (SP OP ) .....
CHAPTER 2

1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

The Special Forces Group (Airborne) includes a headquarters and headquarters

company, three SpecialForces battalions, a service company, a signal company, and
an Army Security Agency Detachment (Special Operations). Each Special Forces
battalion consists of a battalion headquarters and three Special Forces companies;
each company with a company headquarters and six operational detachments . This
flexible organization is designed to enhance tailoring for specific missions. For
operational purposes, the battalion headquarters becomes a C Detachment, the
company headquarters a B Detachment, and the operational detachment an A
Detachment. Therefore, the normal basic operational elements of a Special Forces
Group (Airborne) are 3 C detachments , 9 B detachments, and 54 A detachments. For
the remainder of this training circular, only the terms C, B, and A detachment are
used .

SF GROUP
(ABN )

ASA DET
HHC SF BN SVC CO SIG CO (SP OP )

( DET SF CO

B DET A DET
 - CHAPTER 2

MISSION

To plan for and conduct operations in the related areas of unconventional warfare,
special operations, and foreign internal defense as directed by the NationalCommand
Authority.

ASSIGNMENT

To a unified command or as directed by the National Command Authority .

CAPABILITIES
The Special Forces Group (Airborne) can :

Function as the Army component, or as an element of a separate Army

component headquarters, of a joint unconventional warfare command
( JUWC) or joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF).

Command, control, and support organic and attached elements.

Establish , support, and operate a Special Forces operational base (SFOB)

and two or more forward operational bases (FOB), depending on the
mission .

Infiltrate or exfiltrate specified areas by air, land, or sea .

Operate in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods

with minimal external direction and support.
Develop , organize, equip , train , and direct indigenous forces to conduct
guerrilla warfare.

Train , advise, and assist US and allied forces or agencies.

LIMITATIONS
Requires additional combat and combat service support for sustained
operations.

Is not normally employed as a conventional maneuver unit.

Normally operates beyond the range of conventional fire support.

CHAPTER 2

GROUP HEADQUARTERS
The group headquarters, consisting of the command element, coordinating staff, and
special staff, can :

I Provide command, control, and staff planning.

I Provide command and staff personnel to establish and operate an
SFOB .
• Provide advice and coordinate the employment of Special Forces
elements with a JUWC, JUWTF , military assistance advisory group ,
or other headquarters.
I Provide operational direction for all communications.

Dep

RR /EO S5
SEC SEC SEC SEC SEC
CPT MAJ

Budget - Chaplain Surgeon MAJ

Off Stf Off2

Engr
LEGAL BUDGET CHAPLAIN SIGNAL SURGEON Stf Off
SECSEC SEC SECT SEC

* Exercises staff supervision ofSignal Company.

© Also platoon leader, Medical Platoon , Service Company.
 - CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

The group headquarters organizes organic and attached elements to establish and
operate an SFOB . The SFOB is organized into three functional activities:

O OPERATIONS CENTER (provides operational control and planning).

SUPPORT CENTER (provides administrative and logistical support).
O SIGNAL CENTER (provides communications with deployed
elements , higher and supporting units).

The group headquarters may also be directed to function as the Army component
headquarters of a JUWC/ JUWTF , or as the command, control, and support
organization for Army operations when a JUWC / JUWTF is not organized.
Employment of the group headquarters in these roles normally requires additional
administrative, logistical, and communications support from theater assets.

3 OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS

There are three types of operational detachments in the Special Forces Group
(Airborne): the C , B , and A Detachments .Although primarily organized for command
and control purposes , C and B detachments can perform a variety of operational
missions. The A detachment is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to provide
the basic operational element for the group . Let's now look at the organization and
concept of employment for each of these detachments .
CHAPTER 24

C DETACHMENT

O
U

CPT CPT MAJ CPT

CAR
Med
NCO
Sup Sgt 1 CSLR C /Radio
Supv
Alho
Fld C
Radio C /Radio Unit Equip
Mech

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
The operational C Detachmentprovides a ready command, control, and staff element
that can be employed in an unconventionalwarfare, special operations, and foreign
internal defense role to:
Expand the command and control capabilities of the SFOB .

• Conduct independent operations.

warfare operational areas (UWOA).

I Advise, assist, and train counterpart indigenous forces.
I Prepare operational elements for deployment.

I Serve as a liaison party to conventional forces.

1 Augment the staff sections of the group.

 FOLDOUT
SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS
- CHAPTER 2 -

41 SERVICE COMPANY
The Special Forces service company consists of a company
headquarters, medical platoon , group logistics platoon , administrative services
platoon , and an aviation platoon .

Svcco

.
SVC CO
IT

GP ADMIN SVC
1

Со но MED PLT LOG PLT PLT AVN PLT

PLT HO PLT HQ PLT HO PERS SECH PLT HO

MED L PVNT MED FLT

TM TM SEC

MED OP MAINT
GSBESOJI
SEC

FOOD SVC MAINT RIG AIR TRANS GP SUP

SEC SEC DLVY SEC SEC SEC

SEC HQ SEC HQ SEC HQ

BASE FOOD FOOD SVC RIG AIR RIGTMSPT GP SUP
TM
FWDTM SUP
SVC TM SPT TM DLVY TM
!
SUBS TM ! -- Augmentation
Augmentation

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
The service company is organized to provide administrative, logistical, medical,
rigger /aerial delivery, maintenance , mess, limited aviation , and transportation
support for the group. For extensive operations, augmentation may be required. The
service companyprovides supportto thegroupheadquarters elements from theSFOB
support center.Forward support elements are deployed to FOB's as required.
 CHAPTER 2 —

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
The company headquarters consists of the company commander, executive officer,
first sergeant, and enlisted personnel to provide command, control, administrative,
and logistical support for the service company. The service company commander is
directly responsible for the logistical support operations of the group .

MEDICAL PLATOON
The medical platoon consists of the personnel and equipment required to provide
dispensary, preventive medicine, and veterinary support for the group. The medical
capability of the group may be augmented by up to three medical operations teams.
These teamsmay be deployed with operational elements to provide limited treatment
and training facilities. The group surgeon is also the platoon leader of the medical
platoon .

GROUP LOGISTICS PLATOON

This platoon provides food service, maintenance, rigger/ aerial delivery , transpor
tation , and supply support to the group.

The food service section provides consolidated mess support to the group
headquarters elements, service company, and signal company. This section
also has three food service support teams, one provided through augmen
tation , to provide messing support to deployed Special Forces battalions.
The maintenance section provides organizational maintenance support for
wheeled vehicles, power generators, engineer equipment, and marine items
organic to the group . It does not provide organizationalmaintenance support
for organic equipment of the signal company.
The rigger/ aerial delivery section provides support to the SFOB and has three
rigger support teams, one filled through augmentation , that provide support to
the Special Forces battalions.
I The transportation section has a limited capability to transport the group 's
supplies and personnel.

temporary storage, issue, and distribution of supplies and equipment for the
group. This section has three forward supply teams to perform the normal
supply services for the battalions.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES PLATOON

The administrative services platoon , under the staff supervision of the group Si,
provides personnel services and administrative support to the group.Normally, this
support is provided to the group from the SFOB support center.
AVIATION PLATOON
The aviation platoon provides limited fixed and rotary wing US Armyaviation support
for the group. Its organization and equipment limit this support to command and
control, liaison , and reconnaissance activities. A maintenance section performs
aviation unit maintenance on all organic aircraft and organizationalmaintenance of
all avionics equipment.
— CHAPTER 2 -

5 SIGNAL COMPANY
The Special Forces signal company consists of a company headquarters, two base
operations platoons, an electronic maintenance section, a communications support
platoon , and a photo section .

SIG CO

CO HQ | BASE OP ELCT MAINT PHOTO SEC

PLT SEC

PLT HQ PLT HQ

BASE RADIO COMMC CEN WIRE REAR COMM . FWD RADIO

STA SE SEC SEC

CON FWD WIRE

SEC
TM
RCVR FWDTMMAINT
SEC
XMTR
SEC

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
The signal company is organized to provide internal communications, terminal
communications facilities, signalequipmentmaintenance, and photographic support
for the group from the SFOB signal center.Forward support elements aredeployed to
FOB 's as required .
 - CHAPTER 2 —

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
The signal company headquarters consists of the company commander, operations
officer, first sergeant,and personnelto provide command,control,administrative, and
logistical support for the company.

BASE OPERATIONS PLATOONS

There are two base operations platoons assigned to the signal company. These
platoons maintain continuous internal communications for an SFOB and FOB by
providing a message center, crypto services, limited groundmessenger service, and
telephone, teletypewriter and radio communications.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE SECTION

This section performs direct supportmaintenance of the group signal equipment,less
crypto, and limited general support maintenance of signal equipment peculiar to
Special Forces.

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT PLATOON

This platoon can provide two FOB 's with AM radio , radio teletypewriter and telephone
communications, and limited direct support maintenance; or it can provide three
FOB 's the same services which are time shared between the SFOB circuits and
contacts with the deployed operational detachments.

PHOTO SECTION
The photo section provides still photographic support for the group to include the
development of black and white prints.

13
CHAPTER 2

6 ASA DETACHMENT (SP OP)

The Army Security Agency Detachment (Special Operations) (ASA Det (Sp Op))
consists of a detachment headquarters , two special operations B teams of five
persons each , and four special operations A teams of six persons each .

ASA DET
(SP OP)
TL
1

SP OP SP OP
DET HQ ТЕАМ В TEAM B

SP OP SP OP I SP OP SP OP
TEAM A | TEAM AL TEAM A | TEAM AT

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
The ASA Det (Sp Op) is organized to provide signal security (SIGSEC ) advice and
assistance , communications intelligence (COMINT) support, and limited electronic
warfare (EW ) support to the group. The personnel of this detachment are qualified to
perform ASA functions and Special Forces assignments. These dual qualified
personnel are deployed to FOB's and committed Special Forces operational
detachments as required.

The major focus of our discussion in this chapter has been on the
organization and capabilities of SpecialForces.Next,wewill consider
the missions and operational employment of Special Forces which
make optimum use of their unique capabilities.
 CHAPTER 3

MISSIONS

This chapter provides a broad overview of the Special Forces mission — to train ,
organize , supply , direct, and control indigenous forces in the conduct of:

1 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Ż SPECIAL OPERATIONS
3 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The United Stateshas never fought a war at any time, anyplace, without
arming, training, and directing local people in support of our military
objectives.

CONTENTS

PAGE

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ......... ... .....

Guerrilla Warfare .............

Evasion and Escape...... . .. ...
Subversion . . ... ...... ......

SPECIAL OPERATIONS. .. ......

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE.. ..........

CHAPTER 3 —

1 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Unconventional warfare (UW ) is the primary mission of US Army Special Forces. It
may be conducted in remote , urban , or rural environments during peace or war to

operations, as directed by the National Command Authority , may be :

OVERT No attempt is made to conceal either the operation or

identity of the sponsor.
COVER Operations which are so planned and executed as to
conceal the identity of the sponsor. They differ from
clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on
concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on
concealment of the operation .
CLANDESTIN Operations which are so planned and executed in such a
way as to assure secrecy or concealment. They differ
from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on
concealment of the operation rather than on con
cealment of identity of sponsor.

US Army Special Forces normally does not create a resistance movement; the
potential should exist prior to Special Forces commitment. When directed, Special
Forces provides support and advice to indigenous resistance forces by working with
leaders and in -place assets .

A RESISTANCE FORCE MAY INCLUDE THREE ELEMENTS :

THE GUERRILLA FORCE takes overt action against enemy forces and
facilities. It is organized into units and subunits along military lines. Although
it may rely on temporary assistance from part- time personnelwho live within
the area of operations, its membership is made up of individuals exclusively
occupied as full- time guerrillas.

THE AUXILIARY organizes both active and passive civilian support of the
resistance movement to be responsive to the needs of the resistance area
command. The organization and operations are clandestine in nature and
members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the
resistance movement. Auxiliaries are normally assigned direct support
missions for a specific guerrilla unit in their area and general support
missions for the resistance area command. Support activities for the guerrilla
unit include security and warning, logistics, medical support, recruiting, and
providing reserve or part -time guerrillas for diversionary operations or
temporary reinforcement of the supported guerrilla unit.

16
 CHAPTER 3 —

THE UNDERGROUND extends resistance operations in areas normally

denied to guerrilla forces and/ or conducts operations not suitable for
guerrillas. The underground is a covert, compartmented organization whose
members make every effort to conceal their participation . It is largely self
contained and performs most of its own support functions; however,
requirements beyond its capabilitymaybe procured through other resistance
channels or from a sponsoring power. The success of an underground
depends on its careful selection of members and a superior security system .

When committed to accomplish the unconventionalwarfare objectives of the National

Command Authority , US Army Special Forces is primarily concerned with :

A GUERRILLA WARFARE
B EVASION AND ESCAPE
C SUBVERSION
O SABOTAGE

A GUERRILLA WARFARE
Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. It is:

Conducted to complement, support, or extend conventionalmilitary

operations.

Characterized by swift, brief, violent offensive actions carried out

with elusiveness, mobility , and surprise.

Influenced by military, political, and legal considerations; local

population support; and external sponsorship .
CHAPTER 3

Guerrilla operations wear down and inflict casualties upon the enemy, damage
supplies and facilities, and hinder and delay enemy operations. The success of
guerrilla operations— even the fact that the guerrillas continue to exist - lowers
enemymorale and prestige; disrupts the economy, politics, and industry of the enemy
or enemy-occupied areas; and maintains the morale and will to resist of the native
population . In addition , the enemy is compelled to divertmanpower and equipment to
combat guerrilla activities.

Guerrilla warfare missionswhich contribute to the land battle may be described in

four main categories:

S ie
| MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND
-
2 MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES
3 LINKUP OPERATIONS
4 POST LINKUP OPERATIONS

1 MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND

These missions are strategic in nature and have both long-range and immediate
effects on the enemy. Special Forces influences guerrilla force unconventional
operations to accomplish these strategic missions. Operational command of UW
forces is retained by the unified commander. He assigns missions and orders their
execution in the area of operations through the JUWC/ JUWTF. Type missions
include:

INTERDICTION
Operations conducted to hinder or interrupt the enemy's lines of communica
tion , deny him use of certain key areas, and destroy industrial facilities, military
installations, equipment, and resources. Of all guerrilla operations, interdiction
usually has the widest impact on the enemy's ability to wage war and
consequently is considered the basic guerrilla warfare operational mission .
 - CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP )

Guerrilla operations are conducted in a manner that creates a favorable impact

on the indigenous population since adverse psychological effects of guerrilla
operations may outweigh the tactical results . The ability of guerrilla forces to
influence the population and elicit civilian support is dependentlargely upon the
psychological impact of the resistancemovement upon the populace.Guerrilla
forces operating in enemy territory psychologically demoralize the enemy. This
benefits the resistance movement and should be fully exploited by Special
Forces.Normally, psychological operations conducted by guerrilla forces support
the needs of the operational area and are governed by the overall objectives of
the unified command .

INTELLIGENCE
Special Forces, although not primarily an intelligence collection agency,may be
required to support information gathering tasks of a special nature . Special
Forces located deep behind enemylines are ideally situated to contribute to the
overall intelligence plan of the unified command. However, security restricts
radio traffic , thus limiting the amount ofintelligence information which can be
relayed . Special tasks may require information pertaining to:

• Order of battle data .

• Support of psychological operations.
• Targets of opportunity.
• Post-strike assessments .
Political, sociological, and economic matters.
• Support of specific air, ground , and naval operations.
• Technical intelligence.
• Identification , location , and affiliation of all known or
suspected enemy collaborators .

19
CHAPTER 3

2 MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES

Unconventional warfare operations are normally ongoing before the commitmentof
conventional combat forces. When a corps is committed and its area of intelligence
interest nears the UWOA , guerrilla operations are expanded to assist the tactical
commander. A Special Forces liaison party is provided by the SFOB to the corps
headquarters. This liaison party must:

I Be capable of providing liaison and expertise on UW operations.

I Have sufficient secure communications to insure a continuous and

timely intelligence flow between the conventional force head
quarters and the SFOB .

Be integrated into the all source intelligence system to insure

operational and communications security.

I Advise the tactical commander in selecting only those critical

essential elements of information (EEI) requirements for collection
by Special Forces elements. This will enhance security and
survivability within the UWOA .

PRIOR TO LINKUP , Special Forces-advised guerrilla forces can complement, support,

or extend conventional force offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations.

OFFENSE

Guerrilla forces can assist the tactical commander to :

SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

Guerrilla forces extend the depth to which a commander can see the
battlefield by conducting reconnaissance andmaintaining surveillance of
critical routes, areas, and installations to provide highly accurate and
timely intelligence information .

CONCENTRATE OVERWHELMING COMBAT POWER

Guerrilla forces can conduct cover and deception operations to allow the

divert enemy units from an objective area by accelerating activity in other

areas.

20
 - CHAPTER 3 —

SUPPRESS THE ENEMY' S DEFENSIVE FIRES

Guerrilla forces can attack enemy weapon systems to support the
commander's fire suppression plan .

SHOCK , OVERWHELM , AND DESTROY THE ENEMY

Guerrilla forces can support the main attack by:
• Interdicting or blocking approaches to an objective area.
Occupying and holding key terrain features for a limited time.
• Seizing key installations, e.g ., bridges, tunnels, dams, and power
facilities, to prevent destruction by the enemy.
• Conducting supporting attacks against enemy forcesand facilities.
• Providing guides.
• Assisting in containing bypassed enemy units.
• Assisting in recovery of prisoners and stragglers .
• Assisting in control of civilians.

ATTACK THE ENEMY REAR

Asconventional forces close on UW elements and conductoperationsnear
the UWOA, guerrilla forces can support airborne, airmobile , or amphibious
assaults on objectives deep in the enemy's rear. Timing for employmentof
guerrilla forces is extremely important. Premature commitmentmay alert
the enemy and lead to the destruction of the guerrilla force. Conversely ,
late employment may not have the desired effect upon the enemy.

DEFENSE

Guerrilla forces can assist conventional defensive operations by providing

accurate and timely strategic intelligence from deep within enemy territory.
These forces operating within enemy rear areas may divert enemy units from
tactical employment by conducting interdiction , blocking approaches to an
objective area, or attacking enemy forces and facilities.

RETROGRADE
In retrograde operations, guerrilla forcesmay be used in the samemanner as
they were in support of offensive and defensive operations. The ability of the
tactical commander to accurately see the battlefield is of critical importance in
the retrograde. As movement is rearward, guerrilla forces positioned behind
enemy lines are uniquely suited to provide realtime intelligence.
- CHAPTER 3 —

( 3 ) LINKUP OPERATIONS

involve a linkup between elements of the two forces. This linkup may occur in ground,
airborne, airmobile, or amphibious operations. As linkup becomes imminent,
coordination and control are intensified and positive restrictions are placed on the
forces involved .

Regardless of the conditions under which linkup is effected, the following

considerations govern linkup planning;

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
When linkup becomes imminent, operational control ofUW forces is passed to
the conventional force commander (normally a corps). Initial passage of such
controlwill be coordinated and directed by the headquarters exercising control
over both forces. The tactical commander exercises operational control of UW
forces through a Special Forces liaison party which is provided to him by the
SFOB. For a detailed discussion of command relationships in various situations,
see chapter 4 .
LIAISON
A transfer of operational controlof UW forces from the unified command level to
tactical commands requires the exchange of liaison personnel. The SFOB
attaches a SpecialForces liaison party to the corps headquarters being assigned
operational control of UW forces. If operationalcontrol is passed to division level,
the Special Forces liaison party provides the necessary liaison to the division
headquarters.

The SFOB may direct that a liaison party consisting of Special Forces and
resistance representatives be exfiltrated from the UWOA to assist in linkup
planning. This party can provide timely information concerning the latest
resistance and enemy situations, and recommend linkup coordinationmeasures
and missions for guerrilla forces .

The tacticalcommandermay infiltrate a liaison party into the UWOA. This liaison
party may include representatives from the G3 section , Special Forces liaison
personnel, tactical air control parties, forward observer teams, and communica
tions personnel and equipment. This liaison party must be knowledgeable of the
scope and purpose of the linkup plan and appropriate missions for the guerrilla
force .

CONTACT POINTS
Specific locations must be established for the two forces to effect contact.
Usually these points are well-defined terrain features.
 CHAPTER 3 -

COORDINATION OF SCHEMES OF MANEUVER

Tactical controlmeasures must be established to assist linkup.Guerrilla forces

are usually dispersed over a large area; consequently , linkup may take place at
several widely separated points and at different times. Not all guerrilla forces
may be involved in linkup with tactical units. For example, during a raid or area
interdiction operation by airborne forces orwhen conducting operationsas part
of a cover and deception plan for an amphibious force, it is often undesirable to
linkup all guerrilla forces with the attacking force.

FIRE COORDINATION MEASURES

Fire coordination measures, such asno- fire and no-bomb lines, and fire support
coordination lines (FSCL ) must be established to protect both the linkup and
guerrilla force . Because of the wide dispersion of guerrilla forces and the fact
that civilian support organizations are a part of the UW force, thorough
coordination of targets selected for nuclear and conventionalweapon attack is
required. Provisions mustbe made to warn friendly elements of the population
who may be endangered by these fires.

COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION
Radio communication equipment with the guerrilla forces is normally limited .
The tactical commander must provide the guerrilla force equipmentwith a voice
capability which can link them to his headquarters. Visual recognition signals
are selected to assist in linkup. Pyrotechnics and other required items not
available to the guerrilla force should be provided by the conventional force.

EMPLOYMENT FOLLOWING LINKUP

The unified commander, in coordination with US and allied officials,determines
the disposition or further utilization of UW forces following linkup. Within this
guidance, the tactical commander may employ recovered guerrilla forces.

Next, we will discuss some of the appropriate missionswhich

may be assigned after linkup.
- CHAPTER 3 -

4 . POST LINKUP OPERATIONS

When the United States retains control of guerrilla forces, these forcesmay be further
employed on missions in support of and under control of conventional combat forces.
For this role , a period of retraining and reequipping is usually required prior to
commitment to combat.

In addition , US Army Special Forces-advised indigenous forces may be employed to

augment conventional forces conducting combat operations or to conduct operations
behind friendly lines.
Until command relationships can be established with the appropriate command,
Special Forces should remain with indigenous forces to help them adapt to becoming
a combat unit operating in a strange environment under unknown higher
commanders. Indigenous forces employed in supportofconventional forces should be
commanded by their own officers .

Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla , paramilitary, or irregular

forces supporting conventional US units include:

CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS

Indigenous forces maybe employed to augment,relieve,or replace conventional
units in themain battle area , e .g ., to contain or destroy bypassed enemy units.

When assigning operational missions to indigenous forces, the tactical

commander must carefully consider their capabilities. The sustained combat
capability of indigenous forces is affected by their strength , organization ,
leadership , training, equipment, background ofpersonnel, and extent of civilian
support. Consequently, indigenous units may not be able to accomplish
comparable missions of like -size conventional units. Assignment of missions
should take advantage of their lightinfantry characteristics and area knowledge.

The most severe limitation to employing indigenous forces on conventional

combat operations is their shortage of adequate voice communications
equipment and transportation . The tactical commander must overcome this
disadvantage by providing them the necessary equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE
Familiarity with the terrain and people makes indigenous forces unique for
reconnaissance missions. They can patrol difficult terrain and gaps between
tactical units , establish roadblocks and observation posts , screen flanks, and
provide guides.
 CHAPTER 3 — .

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
Indigenous forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counterguer
rilla operations. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the language, terrain ,
and population can be exploited by tactical commanders . They may provide the
principal sources of intelligence on dissident elements opposing friendly forces
and can move in difficult terrain to locate guerrilla bands. They can detect enemy
sympathizers in villages and towns and implement control measures in
unfriendly areas. When properly supported, indigenous forces may be given
complete responsibility for counterguerrilla operations in selected areas.

REAR AREA SECURITY

Indigenous forcesmay be used as security forces within the theater army area
command (TAACOM ). In assigning these forces a rear area security role, their
area knowledge should be the governing factor and, whenever possible, they
should be employed on an area basis . They may guard lines of communications,
logistical and administrative installations, supply depots, airfields, pipelines,rail
yards, or port facilities; patrol terrain which contains bypassed enemy units or
stragglers; and police towns and cities. When provided with appropriate
transportation , indigenous forces may be used as a mobile security force
reserve .

CIVIL SUPPORT
Because of their area knowledge and experience, indigenous forcesmay assist
to restore the area to its normal state . They can perform refugee collection and
control duties, civil police duties, assist psychological operation campaigns in
rear areas, apprehend collaborators and spies, recruit labor, and guard key
installations and public buildings.

A significant mission which may be assigned to Special Forces after

completion of their involvement with resistance forces is to :

RETRAIN HOST COUNTRY CONVENTIONAL MILITARY UNITS

SpecialForcesmaybe used to retrain and reconstitutehost country conventional

military units which have suffered reversals in combat actions. The emphasis is
to rapidly train unit cadres in leadership , operations, and combat tactics and
techniques.

Wehave been discussing the employment of SpecialForces in guerrilla warfare.Our

main focus has been on the operations of the overt element of a resistance force - the
guerrillas. Next, we will consider how Special Forces supports evasion and escape,
subversion , and sabotage. These operations usually involve the clandestine and
covert elements of a resistance force — the auxiliary and the underground. Our
discussion will be limited since most of thematerial concerning these operations is
classified.

25
 CHAPTER 3

B EVASION AND ESCAPE

Evasion and escape (E & E ) is defined as the procedures and operations whereby
military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an
enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

Evasion and escape nets provide a means for the recovery and exfiltration of
personnel from hostile areas . They are composed of members of the auxiliary or
underground and are compartmented to reduce the possibility of penetration or
compromise.All E & E nets operating in the theater are directed by the JUWC/ JUWTF .
The E & E activities in a UWOA are coordinated by the SFOB to support overall theater
E & E plans. Special Forces personnel are trained to plan and conduct E & E activities
and may advise, assist, supervise, or train resistance forces to organize and operate
E & E mechanisms in the UWOA . In addition to this capability , Special Forces can :

Implement identity verification procedures.

1 Establish contacts and contact procedures .

Coordinate exfiltration .
Provide additional communication support.

C SUBVERSION
Subversion is defined as action designed to undermine the military, economic ,
psychological, or political strength and morale of a regime.

Resistance forces use force and violence or penetration by a seriesofplanned political

actions to undermine, overthrow , or affect the decisions or actions of an incumbent
government or occupying power. Special Forces supports indigenous subversion
operations to further UW objectives of the unified command.

D SABOTAGE
Sabotage is defined as an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with , or obstruct
thenational defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to
injure or destroy, anynationaldefense orwarmaterial, premises or utilities, to include
human and natural resources.

Sabotage may be the most effective or the only means of attacking a specific target.
Special Forcesmay be required to advise and assistresistance forces in the conduct of
some act or acts of sabotage which contribute to both resistance and US national

26
 - CHAPTER 3

objectives.Planning guidance, intelligence, and logistical support are provided by the

SFOB for the integration of local activities into a theaterwide sabotage campaign .
Sabotage may be classified as:

ACTIVE SABOTAGE
Active sabotage uses violent techniques to destroy orinterrupt the operation of
facilities, installations, or lines of communications. This type of sabotage is
selective in that it aims at incapacitating activities which cannot easily be
replaced or repaired in time to meet the enemy's crucial needs. Unlike passive
sabotage, it usually requires extensive training in the use of various sabotage
devices and techniques. It includes actions such as:

• Abduction .
• Arson .
• Bombings.
• Raids and ambushes.
• Sniping

PASSIVE SABOTAGE

Passive sabotage usesnonviolenttechniques to disrupt an activity or installation

using the population according to a well-organized propaganda campaign. It
includes actions such as:

Absenteeism .
Boycotts.
• Demonstrations, protests, riots , and strikes.
• Production delays.
• Delay of repairs and neglect ofmachinery.
• Organized production of poor quality and useless products.

Up to this point,wehave been discussing the employmentofSpecial Forces within the

framework of an indigenous resistance movement. Such employment is most
appropriate in an established theater where UW operations continue long enough to
permit the further development and exploitation of a resistance potential. Not all UW
tasks can be accomplished in this way and SpecialForcesmaybe required to conduct
SPECIAL OPERATIONS .
- CHAPTER 3

2 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations can be conducted during periods of peace or hostility. They are
actions of a specified nature initiated in the face of emergency or strategic
contingency. Special operations are normally limited in scope and duration ,and may
be conducted in urban , rural, or remote areas .

The maturity, experience, flexibility, and multiplicity of skills inherent in Special

Forces provide a valuable option in response to highly sensitive and criticalsituations
of national import.

Special operations may be executed:

1 Unilaterally by Special Forces.

Jointly by Special Forces and indigenous assets .

Unilaterally by indigenous assetsſtrained and directed by Special Forces.

Because of their sensitivity, special operations are only directed by the National
Command Authority (NCA) or by a unified commander if so delegated. Command and
control of special operations are exercised through a JUWTF. The JUWTF may be
established directly under the JCS ormay already existunder a unified command. The
following illustrations depict various command and control arrangements for the
conduct of special operations.

NCA NCA

JCS JCS

UNIFIED
JUWTF COMMAND

SF

SF

28
 -CHAPTER 3 -

Special Forces may be tasked to perform the following special operations:

INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS
Conduct strategic reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition .
I Call for, and adjust, air, naval, or artillery fire on observed targets.

STRATEGIC TARGET MISSIONS

Conduct electronic target acquisition / designation .
Plan and execute attacks on critical strategic targets using conventional
or specialmunitions.
Abduct selected personnel.

RECOVERY MISSIONS
· Liberate PW 's and political prisoners.
1 Locate, identify, and extract personnel not detained , e .g ., downed
aircrews, political or military leaders who have expressed a desire to be
placed under US control, and other selected personnel.
Locate , identify, and recover sensitive items, e . g ., nuclear weapons,
satellites, classified documents , etc .

ANTI-TERROR MISSIONS
When directed , advise and assist in hostage rescue operations.
1 Assess vulnerability of installations to terrorist attacks.
I Advise and assist on measures to prevent terrorist acts.
Provide advice on security for critical installations and systems.
Attack terrorist installations and personnel to preclude their continued
threat.
Locate , identify, and recover sensitive items stolen by terrorist groups.

29
- CHAPTER 3

3 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internaldefense embraces all measures taken by a governmentor its allies to free and
protect its society from subversion , lawlessness, and insurgency. It is intended to
create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace .

A Special Forces group, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological

operations,military intelligence,medical,military police, engineer, and ArmySecurity
Agency elements, possesses the highly specialized skills needed to assist a host
country to develop internal defense. A Special Forces group so augmented is called a
security assistance force (SAF).

When directed, Special Forces may be employed in a limited internal defense role to
provide advisory assistance to host country:
I REGULAR FORCES
I PARAMILITARY OR IRREGULAR FORCES

I GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Special Forces missions to support internal defense are broad in scope. These
missions are broken down into detailed requirements dictated by the local situation
and the host country internal defense plan . US Army SpecialForces, in conjunction
with host country forces, can conduct:

OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENT BASE AREAS

These operations are designed to separate the insurgent force from its support
and destroy facilities and forces to interrupt training, rest, and reequipping.
Operations against insurgent base areas are frequently conducted in conjunc
tion with combat operations by regular forces.

OPERATIONS AGAINST INTERIOR INFILTRATION ROUTES

Operations are conducted to deny or limit insurgent movement. Detection of
enemy movement or the location of infiltration routes, crossing sites, and
support facilities is followed by attack, ambush , or destruction , as appropriate.

REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS

Operations may be undertaken in contested areas, or areas under insurgent
control, populated by ethnic , religious, or other isolated minority groups. The
 CHAPTER 3 -

purpose ofoperations in these areas is to establish islands ofpopular support for

the government.When government strength and authority arepresent, security
and governmental services can be provided for the population . These areas are
expanded into larger areas where the people can defend themselves and deny
support to the insurgents.

Operations may also be conducted in areas devoid of population in which

insurgent forces have established training bases, mission support sites, rest
areas, arms factories, sources of food, ormajor infiltration routes. The purpose of
operations in these areas is to interdict the insurgent movement and destroy
insurgent support facilities.

URBAN OPERATIONS

One oftheprimary functionsof SpecialForces in urban areas is to assist the local

government in neutralizing the insurgentpoliticalleadership and infrastructure.
Intelligence and rapid response are keys in identifying, locating, and then
apprehending the hardcore insurgent leaders. This is the first step in
neutralizing the insurgentinfrastructure and eliminates its centralized direction
and control, creates disunity, and eventually destroys the insurgent under
ground apparatus.

BORDER OPERATIONS
Border surveillance or controlis usually a function of civilian - controlled police or
paramilitary forces. When requirements exceed the capabilities of established
border forces, paramilitary or irregular units supervised by SpecialForcesmay
which are inadequate for themission . Border operations serve to :

• Separate insurgents from external support.

• Separate insurgents from an external sanctuary .

• Separate insurgents from support of the local population .

• Destroy insurgent forces and facilities existing in areas
adjacent to the border.

Locate and establish surveillance on insurgent infiltration

routes.
- CHAPTER 3 -

In this chapter, we looked at a variety ofmissions which may be assigned Special

Forces during the conduct of UW , special operations, and foreign internal defense.
Our discussion ofUW centered on SpecialForces employment in guerrilla warfare
that area of responsibility for UW delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army.
We also saw that Special Forces must be prepared to assume responsibility for the
otheraspects ofUW ,as well as for operationsbehind friendly lines in a forcemultiplier
role .In the review of special operations,we considered those missionswhich employ
Special Forces maturity , flexibility, skills , and expertise. The discussion of internal
defense was primarily concerned with Special Forces advisory and operational
assistance to friendly governments confronted with subversion , lawlessness, and
insurgency.

Thus far, unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense
have been discussed as separate areas for the employment of Special Forces. The
following illustration shows that these areas are related and in some situations
require that two or all three be conducted at the same time. For example , Special
Forces may be tasked to conduct special operations (strategic intelligence missions,
strategic targetmissions, etc.) as an adjunct to their primary mission of unconven
tional warfare. Foreign internal defense operations may require Special Forces to
employ unconventionalwarfare techniques, e.g., guerrilla warfare, to deny supportto
the insurgents by establishing islands of popular support for the government. At the
same time, various special operations may be conducted.

UW
SPECIAL FOREIGN
INTERNAL
OPERATIONS
DEFENSE

Next, let's look at the command and control arrangements which are
peculiar to Special Forces operations.
 CHAPTER 4
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Special Forces functions undermanyvaried command and control arrangements. The
exact structure is determined by the assignedmission , tasks , and therequirements of
the commander. In this chapter, we will discuss command and control of Special
Forces from the unified command level down to the organization within the UW
operational area .

1 UNIFIED COMMAN
ENSE
D
NP

VILIWTS
1

UJUNI

INS
3 SFOB
-
BERSEN
4 FOBSREDORES
5 UWOA RAMOS
6 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

CONTENTS
PAGE
UNIFIED COMMAND .
JOINT UW COMMAND / JOINT UW TASK FORCE ............
SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE ............ ............
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASE .
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA ..
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS .........
CHAPTER 4 -

1 UNIFIED COMMAND
Unconventional warfare plans are prepared and updated by the unified commands.
When it becomes necessary to implement UW in a theater of operations, a separate
joint subordinate command and control headquarters, either a joint UW command
(JUWC) or a jointUW task force (JUWTF), is established by the unified command. Its
structure and title may vary according to the commander,duration andmagnitude of
operations, and the involvement of US UW forces and/ or nonmilitary agencies.

2 JUWC / JUWTF
The JUWC is a jointheadquarters with staff representations from all US UW forces
and non military agencies and includes its own combat service support elements. A
or act as, the JUWC. The JUWTF is organized similar to a JUWC but is a
semipermanent command arrangement. This command relationship is graphically
shown below .

UNIFIED COMMAND

ARMY AIR FORCE

COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT

JOINT JUWC/
TASK FORCE JUWTE
ED
US UW FORCES

In somesituations, the unified commandmay organize and dispatch a joint task force
to an operational area for contingency operations. Its relationship to the JUWC/
JUWTF is determined by the scope of operations of each element. If the areas of
interest coincide, operational control of the JUWC/ JUWTF may be passed from the
unified command to the commander of the joint task force, after the joint task force
deploys to the operational area. This command relationship is graphically portrayed
below .

UNIFIED COMMAND
SERVICE JOINT
COMPONENTS TASK FORCE

SERVICE JUWC /
COMPONENTS JUWTF

US UW FORCES

34
 - CHAPTER 4 —

The commander of the JUWC / JUWTF exercises operational control of assigned UW

forces through the appropriate component commander, e .g ., operational control of
Special Forces is through the commander of the JUWC/ JUWTF Army component. A
separate JUWC/ JUWTF Army componentheadquarters is required when more than
one Special Forces group is represented or if significant numbers of other Army
elements are allocated to the JUWC/ JUWTF. When one Special Forces group is
represented , the group will normally function as the Army componentheadquarters.
In some situations, the commander of the JUWC/ JUWTF may exercise direct
operational control of deployed UW forces.

3 SFOB
The SFOB is a command post type arrangement formed and operated by the Special
Forces group from organic and attached resources. It is the focal pointforoperational,
administrative , logistical, and communication support functions. Ideally , the SFOB is
activated and established before the start of operations, butif prior activation is not
authorized, itmay be established on a standbybasis for long-range or intratheater/ in
trabase communications and contingency stocks. The SFOB is normally organized
into three functional centers :
The operations center.
The support center.
The signal center.
Although the Special Forces group can establish and operate an SFOB , and provide
limited logistical support, it does require augmentation for sustained support
operations. Theater support is provided as required.The JUWC or JUWTF commander
will attach appropriate units to support physical security, counterintelligence, and
base defense requirements. In designing the SFOB, the following factors mustbe
considered:
I Mission .

Duration and scope of operations.

I Administrative and logistical support requirements .
I Security requirements for dispersal/ compartmentation of activities.
Communication restrictions imposed by distance, terrain , or security .
I Desirable span of control.
The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational elements for deploymentand , after
deployment, to direct, administer, and support these elements .

35
 CHAPTER 4

Functions which may be performed at the SFOB include:

Planning and direction of operations.

Administrative support.
I Logistical support.
Communications support.
Intelligence support.
Air support.
Mission preparation , training, briefing, and staging.
Coordination of infiltration and exfiltration operations.
Liaison and coordination with higher, adjacent, or subordinate head
quarters.

The JUWC or JUWTF commander in coordination with the Special Forces group
commander determines the location of the SFOB. The SFOB may be tactically
arranged in one location or dispersed among several small sites. It should not be
collocated with airfields, port facilities, or other major headquarters, but locating it
within a reasonable distance of employed delivery agencies simplifies tactical
deploymentand resupply operations. Variousmodificationsmaybenecessary tomeet
the tactical situation . The site selected must be integrated in the rear area defense
system ; maximum security must be provided to prevent or minimize compromise and
to protectagainst ground or air attacks. Effective camouflage concepts and techniques
must be used and strictly adhered to. Plans must also include site selection for an
alternate operations center.

4 FOB
An FOB is a command, control, and support arrangement established by the SFOB :
Forspecificmissionsrequiring a separate command and control headquarters
reporting directly to a JUWC or JUWTF. The SFOB provides theresources to
form the FOB ,buthasno command andcontrol function . The FOB coordinates
with the SFOB for operational, administrative, and logistical support as
required . The organization ,missions, and functions of the FOB are similar to
those of the SFOB , but on a reduced scale.

To extend the span of control of the SFOB when distances involved preclude
effective command or support of deployed operational elements . The
organization and functions ofthe FOB will varywith the mission ;duration and
scope of operations; and security , communications, administrative, and
logistical support requirements. For example, it may function as an
intermediate command and controlbase , a forward launch / recovery site , or a
radio relay site.

36
 CHAPTER 4 –

6 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Command relationships are based on the mission , duration and scope of operations,
administrative and logistical supportrequirements, security requirements ,communi
cations capability , and desirable span of control.

Seven of themost common command relationships for Special Forces are illustrated
on the following pages:

The first five situations show the relationships when SpecialForces

conducts operations which support the theater or unified command ,
but do not impact directly on conventional combat forces.

Next, we discuss the Special Forces liaison party .

The sixth situation depicts the relationship when a corps area of

intelligence interest encompasses the UWOA and the corps is
provided a Special Forces liaison party.

closing on UW elements and conducting operations close to the

UWOA ; Special Forces elements being placed under operational
control of the tactical commander; and linkup operations.

WHEN WE DISCUSS PASSAGE OF OPERATIONAL

CONTROL FROM THE UNIFIED COMMAND TO A
SUBORDINATE COMMAND , WE ARE REFERRING
TO A CORPS . SPECIFIC MISSIONS MAY REQUIRE
THAT OPERATIONAL CONTROL BE PASSED AS
LOW AS DIVISION LEVEL.

38
 CHAPTER 4 -

SITUATION 1

JUWC •• UWOA
••
UMIINI
OR INII
IIII
••
• IM ITTL SF DETS
IN
JUWTF |< IIII SFOD } < IMM
I

The most common relationship is for the SFOB to direct all operations in theUWOA.It
provides command, control, administrative and logistical support for all of its
detachments deployed in the UWOA, as well as those awaiting deployment at the
SFOB.

SITUATION 2

JUWC COMMUNITIMINIMICILIULITINIMITTIMMMMILLAL
OR UWOA
SE DETS

JUWTF

SFOB

In this situation , the JUWC/ JUWTF exercises direct operational control over Special
Forces detachments in the UWOA . This may be for sensitive missionswhere positive
control andmaximum security measures are required. Those detachments awaiting
deployment remain under the command and control of the SFOB. Deployed
detachments may communicate directly with the SFOB for administrative and
logistical support.
- - CHAPTER 4

SITUATION 3
. (SFOB
UWOA
SF DETS
JUWC
OR
JUWTF

UWOA
SF DETS
FOB

Theater UW missions may require the establishmentofan FOB as a separate control

headquarters reporting to a command other than themain SFOB . In this situation , the
FOB provides direct command , control, administrative , and logistical support for all of
its detachments. The FOB coordinates with the SFOB for operational, administrative,
and logistical support as required.
DES

SITUATION 4 FOB
UWOA
JUWC SF DETS
OR
JUWTF

UWOA
SF DETS

FOB
SFOB

n FOB may be established as an intermediate control headquarters to extend the

span of control, support, or communications of the SFOB. The SpecialForces group
has the organic assets to establish two FOB's.
 CHAPTER 4

SITUATION 5 SFOB ) <

1111111LLL
LLLLILIITT
ON
JuwOAC
JUWC SF DETS
OR
T
I

UWOA
SF DETS
( FOR
( INTIMITET
FOB

In this situation the FOB may be employed using a subordinate FOB to further extend
its span of control, support, or communications.

THE SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON PARTY

PURPOSE
A Special Forces liaison party or intermediate command and control elementmay be
provided by the SFOB and attached to a corps headquarters to coordinate intelligence
flow and advise the tactical commander in Special Forces employment when his:
Area of intelligence interest encompasses theUWOA .

Area of influence closes on the UWOA .

COMPOSITION
The Special Forces liaison party is a non -TOE element, organized by the SFOB from

FUNCTIONS
The liaison party assists the tactical commander in gaining timely and continuous
intelligence of interest from the UWOA and helps him to exercise his operational
CHAPTER 4

control of UW forces by coordinating operational, administrative, logistical, and

communications requirements . The liaison party must be capable of:

I Providing expertise and staff assistance on employment of Special

Forces, the guerrilla force, and all aspects of UW operations.
Providing secure communications with UW _ forces in the UWQA .

I Insuring timely and continuous intelligence coverage from UW

assets in the UWOA.

Advising the tactical commander in selecting only those critical EEI

requirements for collection by Special Forces elements. This
insures communications and operational security within the
UWOA .

I Advising the tactical commander on the psychological implications

of operations in the UWOA .
I Providing liaison to division level when directed .

COMMUNICATIONS
The SpecialForces communications system is used to pass traffic between the SFOB
and deployed Special Forces elements in the UWOA.When the area of intelligence
interest of a committed conventional force encompasses the UWOA , requests by the
tactical commander for intelligence information will be passed by the Special Forces
liaison party to the SFOB using the area communications system or a SpecialForces
radio teletypewriter link. The radio teletypewriter link is established when the area
communications system cannot meet operational requirements. The SFOB will then
task appropriate elements in theUWOA and receive information from those elements
using the Special Forces 300wpm burst communications system . The requested
intelligence information is passed back to the corps through the SpecialForces liaison
party over the teletype system discussed above.

When UW forces are placed under operational control of a corps, the Special Forces
liaison party will beaugmented by a communications element from theSpecialForces
Signal Company. This elementis capable ofreceiving burstmessages from deployed
Special Forces detachments in the UWOA and gives the liaison party the capability to
directly task operational detachments in the UWOA . .

In both situations above, Special Forces operational detachments would not or

normally should not enter directly into conventional unit communications nets as
these nets cannot accommodate burst transmissions. If Special Forces elements
switch to the manual CW or voicemode, they become extremely vulnerable to enemy
radio direction finding techniques. The physical capability for direct Special Forces
communicationswith the conventional unitmust be viewed in the light of security and
survivability . The continuous communications capability which exists between the
 CHAPTER 4 —

Special Forces liaison party and UW forces in the UWOA, prior to and during inkup
operations,must be restricted to essentialtraffic to enhance security and survivability
within the UWOA . Tactical commanders should insure that only critical EEI
requirements are levied on Special Forces operational detachments.

SITUATION 6
XXX

CORPS
HQ

JUWC SF LN
OR PARTY
JUWTF
- xxx

UWOA
SF DETS
- XXX

2011

SFOBB ) < THUTUOTTEETTITITI

((SFO SI

In this situation , a corps area of intelligence interest encompasses the UWOA

although UW operations are beyond the corps area of influence.US UW forces are
intended primarily to support the theater or unified command, and the majority of
intelligence information gathered byUW forces is of interest to and for use by these
commands. The sensitive nature ofUW operationsrequires adhering to principles of
compartmentation and strict security. Intelligence flow would follow existing linesof
command and control with appropriate information being passed to the corps
commander by the theater or unified commander. However, a Special Forces liaison
party may be provided by the SFOB and attached to the corps headquarters at this
time. The liaison party's mission is to insure that intelligence ofinterest to the tactical
commander is provided by UW assets in the UWOA through the SFOB to the liaison
party at the corps headquarters. Communications and operational security are
essential to the survivability ofUW forcesin theUWOA and,therefore, only criticalEEI
requirements should be selected for collection by Special Forces elements . The SFOB
retains command and control and provides administrative and logistical support to the
operational detachments in the UWOA.
CHAPTER 4 -

SITUATION 7 XXX

| CORPS
HQ

JUWC SF LN
OR PARTY HT

JUWTF XXX

UWOA
SF DETS
XXX - 2

SFOL

During this situation, a corps area ofinfluence closeson the UWOA,and operationsof
either conventional ground forces or UW forces impact directly on the other. This may
dictate passage of operational control of appropriate UW forces to the tactical
commander. Close coordination and a rapid , timely flow of intelligence information
must be maintained between UW and conventional forces. At this time, a Special
Forces liaison party is normally provided by the SFOB and attached to the corps
headquarters. The liaison party can provide the tacticalcommander with intelligence
of interest, assistance in linkup planning and passage of operational control of UW
forces, and advice on Special Forces employment during and after linkup.

The command relationship between unconventional and conventional forces is

extremely important during passage of operational control and linkup operations.

LINKUP WITH GROUND FORCES

The initialpassage of operational control ofUW forces in the UWOA from the SFOB to
controls both forces. Normally , operational control of Special Forces and guerrilla
forces is not passed below division level. The tactical commander exercises
operational control through the Special Forces liaison party; Special Forces
detachments in the UWOA report directly to the Special Forces liaison party .
Communications must be restricted to essential traffic to enhance detachment
security and survivability .
 CHAPTER 4 -

The SFOB continues to monitor operationsand provides administrative and logistical

support to the UWOA until physical linkup is made between UW and conventional
forces. At this time, the conventional force normally assumes this support
responsibility. The control link retained by the SFOB with the Special Forces liaison
party insures immediate response to UW missions directed by the JUWC/ JUWTF .

LINKUP WITH AIRBORNE FORCES

When planning and executing airborne assault operations, the command relation
ships discussed above must be modified. As soon as possible after approval of the
ground tactical plan , the joint airborne task force commander assumes operational
control of SpecialForces and guerrilla forces which directly and indirectly affect the
operation . Thus, UW forces have sufficient time to respond to assigned tasks in
support of the joint airborne task force's mission . The time frame is not precisely
defined, but depends on the mission , communications, responsiveness, and the
capability of the UW forces. Correct timing of Special Forces and guerrilla operations
with the airborne assault is essential. If committed prematurely , they may nullify the
surprise effect of the airborne assault and , in turn , be destroyed by the enemy.
Conversely, if committed too late , the desired effects oftheir employmentmay never
be realized .

Operational control of UW forces which can directly influence the mission of the
airborne force is passed by the jointairborne task force commander to the commander
of the unit conducting the airborne operation . This passage of operational control
normally occurs when the airborne assault begins.

Operational control ofUW forceswhich indirectly affect themission is retained by the

joint airborne task force commander.

LINKUP WITH AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

When an amphibious task force commander becomes responsible for an amphibious

assault objective area, SpecialForces and guerrilla forces within that area are placed
under his operational control. Operational control ofUW forces is transferred to the
landing force commander when he assumes responsibility for operations ashore.
Normally, operational control ofUW forces supporting amphibious operationswillnot
be passed below major landing force component level.

When a planning directive for the conduct of an amphibious operation is issued, the
SFOB provides a Special Forces liaison party to both the amphibious task force and
landing force commanders. Early deployment of the Special Forces liaison party
insures complete integration of UW activities to support the amphibious operation .
46
 APPENDIX A

RELATED SPECIAL FORCES

PUBLICATIONS
TRAINING CIRCULARS (TC ' S ) PLANNED FOR PUBLICATION

TC 21-76 -1 Prisoner of War Resistance Training

TC 31-20- 2 The Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB )

TC 31-20- 3 Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations

TC 31- 20 -4 Special Forces Surface Swimming

TC 31-20-5 Special Forces Small Boat Operations

TC 31- 20 -6 Special Forces Underwater Operations

TC 31-20-7 Special Forces Fingerprint Identification System (FIS )

TC 31- 20 -8 Special Forces Dental Identification System (DIS )

TC 31-20-9 Special Forces Signal Communications

PUBLISHED ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS

(ARTEP )

ARTEP 31 - 101 Airborne Special Forces Group (Test Edition )

FIELD MANUALS (FM 'S ) PLANNED FOR PUBLICATION

FM 21-76 Survival, Evasion , Resistance and Escape (SERE)

FM 31- 19 Special Forces Military Free Fall Parachuting

FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations

A-1
- APPENDIX A

PUBLISHED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

(TOE'S )

TOE 31-101H Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 31-102H Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne
Special Forces Group

TOE 31-105H Special Forces Battalion (Airborne), Airborne Special

Forces Group
TOE 31 - 106H Headquarters, Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) (C
Detachment), Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 31-107H Special Forces Company, Special Forces Battalion (Air

borne), Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 31- 127H Service Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 11- 257H Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 32 -104H Army Security Agency Special Operations Detachment

(Airborne)

A .2
NOTES

A -3
 NOTES

A -4
 We would like to know what you think of this training circular. Does it give you a clear
understanding of how US Army Special Forces is organized, what it can do, andhow it is used?
Please send us your comments .
COMMENTS:

Rank Name Duty Position

Duty Station AUTOVON Number

TC 31-20 - 1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TC 31- 20 - 1
We would like to know what you think of this training circular. Does it give you a clear
understanding ofhow US Army Special Forces is organized, what it can do, andhow it is used ?
Please send us your comments.

COMMENTS:

Rank Duty Position

Duty Sta AUTOVON Number