Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself
to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004,
a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two
assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On
23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA
04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR
161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so
as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such
election." The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did
not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary
basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree
of certainty from the documents would be that (1)
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August
1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
(5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COM
 Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856
March 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and

Reno Lim both filed certificates of
candidacy for the position of Representative
of the 3rd district of Albay in the May 10,
2010 election. Lim was the incumbent
Congressman while Gonzales was the
former Governor of Albay. On March 30,
2010 a petiton for disqualification and
cancellation of certificate of candidacy was
filed by Stephen Bichara on the ground that
Gonzales is a Spanish national, being the
legitimate child of a spanish father and a
filipino mother, and that failed to elect
Philippines citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act no. 625.
And that his certificate of candidacy
contains misleading information. The
Comelec second division division
disqualified Gonzales in the forthcoming
National and Local elections. Gonzales thru
counsel, received a copy of the aforesaid
resolution on May 11, 2010. Lim petitioned
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
consider the votes cast for Gonzales as stray
or not counted and/or suspend his
proclamation, citing the second division’s
May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying
Gonzales as a candidate. PBOC dismissed
the petition stating that the period for filing
the of a motion for reconsideration of the
comelec resolution has not yet elapsed, and
hence, the same is not yet final and
executory. Based on the results of the
counting, Gonzales emerged as the winner
having garnered a total vote of 96000 while
Lim ranked second with a vote of 68701
votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC officially
proclaimed Gonzales as the duly elected
Representative of the 3rd district of Albay.

Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction

over a Representative which was officially
proclaimed as a winner.

Held: We have constantly held that once a

winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the house of rep. the comelec’s
jurisdiction over election, returns, and
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. We declared that the
court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon
the eligibility of the private respondent who
was already a member of the house at the
time of the filing of the petition for
cerctiorari.
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC (2016)
Perez, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner was found as an abandoned newborn
infant in Jaro, Iloilo by one Edgardo Militar on
September 03, 1968.
 Care and custody for the petitioner was passed
on to a relative, EmilianoMilitar, who then
registered her as a foundling with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
 A petition for her adoption was filed by sps. Poe
before the MTC of San Juan. The petition was
granted on May 13, 1974.
 Petitioner initially enrolled in UP, but opted to
finish her studies in the US. She graduated from
Boston College in 1991.
 In the same year, she married
TeodoroLlamanzares, a dual citizen of the US
and the Philippines. Two days after the wedding,
or on July 29, 1991, she and her husband
returned to the US.
 On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. She obtained her
US Passport on December 19, 2001.
 After her father died, she and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
o They prepared for their resettlement,
including pulling her children out of their
schools and moving their property for
relocation.
o As early as 2004, petitioner already quit
her job in the US.
 Petitioner came home to the Philippines on May
24, 2005. Her husband and children stayed
behind to facilitate the sale of their family home.
 Petitioner then purchased a condominium unit in
San Juan City and a CCT was issued by the
San Juan RD on February 20, 2006. Her
children were then enrolled in local private
schools.
 On February 14, 2006,the petitioner made a
quick trip to the US and travelled back to the
Philippines on March 11, 2006.
 Their US family home was sold on April 2006.
Around the same time, they bought their present
family home.
 On July 07, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA 9225.
o Under the same Act, she filed a sworn
petition with the BU to reacquire her PH
citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship for her minor
children on July 10, 2006.
o The BI acted favorably on the petition on
July 18, 2006.
 She registered as a voter on August 31, 2006.
She also secured from the DFA a new passport.
 On October 06, 2010, Pres. Aquino appointed
her as chairperson of the MTRCB.
o Before assuming her post, she executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship on October 20, 2010.
o From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
 On July 12, 2011, petitioner executed before the
Vice Consul of the US Embassy an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
of the United States.
o On December 09, 2001, she was issued
a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States.
 She filed a COC with the COMELEC on October
02, 2012, wherein she stated “6 years and 6
months” as to the question of period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013.
 On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed a COC for
Presidency. She declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and a resident for 10 years and 11
months counted before May 09, 2016, counted
from May 24, 2005. This triggered the filing of
the present cases against her.
 Elamparo Petition (G.R. No. 221697):
o On residence: petitioner committed
material misrepresentation; she was
bound by her declaration in the 2012
COC that she was a resident for 6 years
and 6 months.
o On citizenship: she cannot be
considered natural-born as international
law does not confer natural-born status
on foundlings. Therefore, she is not
qualified to apply for reacquisition under
RA 9225. Assuming arguendo that she
was natural-born, she acquired this
status when she became a US citizen.
Natural-born citizenship must be
continuous since birth.
 On December 01, 2015, the COMELEC Second
Division granted Elamparo’s Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy,
 Contreras/Tatad/Valdez petitions (G.R. Nos.
221698-700):
o Tatad alleged that the Philippines
adheres to jus sanguinis, and hence,
parents of unknown origin such as
foundlings cannot be considered
natural-born. Moreover, there is not
standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.
o On residency, Tatad claims that
petitioner only acquired her domicile in
QC when she renounced her US
citizenship, which was in 2010 or 2011.
There was lack of intention to abandon
domicile as petitioner’s husband stayed
in the US and had frequent trips thereto.
o For Valdez, natural-born citizens who
are repatriated under RA 9225 will not
revert to their original status as natural-
born citizens. He also took note of the
representation in the 2012 COC.
o Contreras, meanwhile, only attacked the
residency issue. The statement that
petitioner was a resident for 10 years
and 12 months was a false entry. The
reckoning date should be July 18, 2006
when the BI approved her petition.
 On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born
citizen and that she failed to comply with the ten-
year residency requirement.
 Petitioner then filed petitions for certiorari with
urgent prayer for TRO/status quo ante order
and/or WPI.
ISSUES + RULING:
citizens. YES.
WON the COMELEC committed GAD in denying due
course or cancelling the COC of petitioner. YES.
 The COMELEC, cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or
lack thereof of the candidate.
 None of the powers enumerated in Art. IX-C,
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution have the same
exactitude of the provisions of Art. VI, Sec. 17,
which provides for the HRET and SET, or that of
Art. VII, Sec. 4, which provides that the SC en
banc shall be the sole judge of all contests
regarding the Presidency and Vice-Presidency.
 These tribunals have jurisdiction over the
question of qualifications of the President, VP,
Senators, and the HoR. There is no such
provision for candidates for these provisions.
 In Fermin v COMELEC, the SC ruled that mere
rules could not be sufficient to provide the
COMELEC with power to decide on the
ineligibility of candidates.
 The COMELEC rules were drastically revised,
and the present situation is that in order to
disqualify a candidate, there must be a
declaration by final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified
“is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution.”
 The fact of qualification must be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly
vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination
may be by statute, EO, or judgment of a
competent court or tribunal.
[Sub-issue] WoN the fact of petitioner’s blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen was demonstrable.
YES.
 The burden of proof was on the private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen.
o Petitioner’s admission that she was a
foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were
Filipinos. There is a high probability that
they are.
 Citing Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the RoC, evidence on
collateral matters may be allowed when it tends
to establish the probability or improbability of the
fact in issue.
 The OSG offered statistics to the effect that any
child born from 1965-1975 was 99.83% natural-
born.
 In 1960, 99.62% of the population in Iloilo was
99.62%. The OSG also presented other such
data (all above 99%) to show the percentage of
Filipinos in the population. The COMELEC did
not dispute these figures.
 Other circumstantial evidence: the fact of being
abandoned in a Catholic Church and her
physical features. There is disputable
presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.
[Sub-issue] WoN foundlings, as a class, are natural-born
 While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude them
either.
 Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is
a need to examine the intent of the framers.
 During the 1934 convention, Rafols wanted to
introduce an amendment that children of
“unknown parentage” be included in the
enumeration; however, Roxas cited that since
these cases are few and far in between, the
Constitution need not refer to them.
o Echoed by the OSG in the oral
arguments: the Montinola and Roxas
were of the view tat there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.
 All there Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1987)
guarantee the basic right of equal protection of
the laws. There are also special provisions that
exhort the State to render social justice.
o According to the Court, these provisions
contradict intent to discriminate against
foundlings.
 Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted.
 The Court likewise promulgated Rules on
Adoption include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
 Under Art. VI, Sec. 2, “having to perform an act”
means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In the case of foundlings,
determination of their status is done by the
authorities. The object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents,
not the citizenship of the child. This process is
also not analogous to naturalization.
 Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law. Generally accepted principles
of international law form part of the laws of the
land, via the incorporation doctrine.
o International customary rules are
accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements:
 Established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part
of States
 Psychological element or the
opinion jurissive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity)
o There are general principles against
discrimination, which are the same core
principles that underlie the PH
Constitution itself.
o The UDHR states that everyone has a
right to a nationality, and that no one
shall be deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his
nationality.
o Meanwhile, the UNCRC imposes as a
state obligation that a child has the right
to acquire a nationality and state parties
must ensure the implementation of
 rights in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.
o The ICCPR also provides for the right of
every child to acquire a nationality.
o The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws states that a foundling
is presumed to have the nationality of
the country of birth. It also carries the
principle that a foundling is presumed
born of citizens of the country where he
is found.
 Although not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, the above principles
are still binding.
o The Court, in Razon v Tagtiisand
Mijares v Rañada, approached the
matter of unratified Conventions in this
manner: generally accepted principles of
international law are based not only on
international custom, but also on
general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.
 All of the international law conventions and
instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight
of their class, which is not of their own making.
WoN the petitioner’s repatriation in July 2006
resulted in the acquisition of natural-born citizenship.
YES.
 The COMELEC ruled that since the
applicant for repatriation under RA 9225
must perform an act, what is reacquired is
not natural-born citizenship but only plain
“Philippine citizenship”
 The COMELEC disregarded consistent
jurisprudence on RA 9225. The law is a
repatriation statute that provides for an
abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one’s Filipino citizenship.
 In Parreño v COA, the Court categorically
stated that “if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under RA 9225), he will
recover his natural-born citizenship.”
 COMELEC’s position that natural-born
status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson v HRET, where the
phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean at
the time of birth. Thus, a person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
o In the same decision, the Court
stated that there were only two
types of citizens under the present
Constitution: natural-born and
naturalized.
 The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent.
WoN petitioner committed false material
misrepresentations in her 2015 COC as to the period of
residence. NO.
 Petitioner’s claim that she will have been a
resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day
before the 2016 elections is true.
o Petitioner’s entry in the COC
corresponds to a beginning date of May
25, 2005, when she returned for good
from the US.
 To successfully effect a change in domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond to that purpose.
 Petitioner presented evidence showing that she
and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good, such as:
o Passport entry showing arrival on May
24, 2005 and her return to the PH every
time she travelled abroad
o Correspondences regarding the
shipment of their properties to the PH
o School records of her children in PH
schools starting June 2005
o Tax Declarations and titles to properties
in the PH
o Sale of their US home
o Questionnaire from the SU Embassy
showing that petitioner stated that she
was a PH resident since May 2005
 COMELEC: there was no animus non-
revertendi. Argued that the stay of an alien
former Filipino cannot be counted unless he
acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires citizenship.
o SC: The cases that the COMELEC rely
on have only sparse evidence on
residence. In contrast, the evidence in
the case at bar is overwhelming and
shows no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her US
residence.
 COMELEC also took it against petitioner that
she entered visa-free as a balikbayan. However,
RA 6768 or the balikbayan program does not
treat balikbayans as ordinary transients.
 As to the 2012 COC entry, petitioner explained
that she misunderstood the date requirement as
the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012.
o SC: her explanation is bolstered by the
changed introduced by the COMELEC
in the 2015 COC which now asks
“period of residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 09, 2016.”
There was thus an acknowledgement
that the previous form of the COC was
vague.
 It was GAD for the COMELC to treat the 2012
COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner.
o In Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC, the
Court ruled that it is the fact of
residence, not a statement in the COC
that is decisive in determining fulfillment
of the residency requirement.
o Petitioner was in good faith.
 Petitioner also did not appear to have hidden
anything. In her Answer in the SET proceedings
on September 01, 2015, she admitted that she
misunderstood the residency requirement in the
2012 COC. She filed her 2015 COC on October
15. The SET case was a matter of public record.
 There must be evidence that there was a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate
eligible.
DISPOSITION: Granted.
TALAGA V COMELEC
FACTS
In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who
was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election
and the ascertainment of who should assume the
office following the substitute’s disqualification.
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their
certificates of candidacy (COC) for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010 elections.
Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to
cancel the COC of Talaga on the ground that he
has already served as mayor of Lucena for three
consecutive terms (2001, 2004, 2007) without
interruption.
Talaga countered by saying that the
Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him
from office during his second and third terms, which
he claims to have amounted to an interruption.
Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May
4, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed her own COC to
substitute Talaga. Talaga’s name remained printed
on the ballots and votes in his favor were counted
for Barbara Ruby, who won against Castillo.
But it was only on May 13, 2010 when the Comelec
gave due course to Ruby’s COC to include her in
the official list of candidates. Ruby was proclaimed
newly elected mayor.
ISSUES
The core issue involves the validity of the
substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon,
her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of
who among the contending parties should assume
the contested elective position.
RULING
1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give
rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too,
that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted, because a person without
a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a
CoC is not at all a candidate.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be
substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy
in the first place because, if the disqualified
candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a
candidate at all.
2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of
Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy
should be filled pursuant to the law on succession
defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor
or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. xxx
Bautista vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On June 10, 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of
candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the
July 15, 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer
Jareño refused to accept Bautista's certificate of
candidacy because he was not a registered voter in
Lumbangan. On June 11, 2002, Bautista filed an action
for mandamus against Election Officer Jareño with the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas. The trial court ordered
Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista's certificate of
candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of
candidates for Punong Barangay. In compliance with the
trial court's order, Election Officer Jareño included
Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong
Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño
referred the matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified
list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department
on 5 July 2002. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law
Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's
certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a
voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to
act on the COMELEC Law Department's
recommendation before the barangay elections on 15
July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista
and private respondent Alcoreza, ere candidates for the
position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista
obtained the highest number of votes (719) while
Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of
197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay.
Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on
23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August
2002 ("COMELEC Resolutions"). In Resolution No.
5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel
Bautista's certificate of candidacy. On the other hand,
Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELEC's policy
regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible
for not being registered voters in the place of their
election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;
2. Whether or not the COMELEC deprived
Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584
3. Whether Bautista was a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan when he filed his
certificate of candidacy; and
4. Whether or not it was proper to proclaim
Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the
alleged disqualification of the winning candidate
Bautista.
HELD:
1. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the ineligible candidate.
decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it
ordered the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of
candidacy without first referring the case to a division for Following Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code
summary hearing.
provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative Office of the Punong Barangay, the highest ranking
functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his
involve the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions. permanent disability, the second highest ranking
2. The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the sangguniang member, shall become the Punong
right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal Barangay. Thus, the proclamation of the second placer
hearing. There is due process when a party is able to Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void.
present evidence in the form of pleadings. However, the
COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to
explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and
hearing.

A summary proceeding does not mean that the

COMELEC could do away with the requirements of
notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at least
given notice to Bautista to give him the chance to
adduce evidence to explain his side in the cancellation
proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista
of procedural due process of law when it approved the
report and recommendation of the Law Department
without notice and hearing.

3. Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he
lacked one of the qualifications - that of being a
registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office.
He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact
when he made a false statement in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay
Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of
the electoral process by falsely representing himself.
The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests
at the very core of the electoral process.Under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of
a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground
for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated
by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A
candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1)
prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or
(3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

4. It is a well-settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot

proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes in case the winning
candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception to
this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections which held that the exception
is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of
votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as

Lanot v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Henry Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta,
Reynaldo dela Paz, Edilberto Yamat and Ram Alan
Cruz, filed a petition for disqualification against
Vicente Eusebio before the COMELEC. Petitioners
alleged that Eusebio engaged in various forms on
various occasions premature campaigning.
Regional Director Ladra recommended to the
COMELEC the disqualification of Eusebio. The
COMELEC Fist Division adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Regional Director and
ordered the disqualification of Eusebio. The
resolution is immediately executory unless
restrained by the Commission en banc.
On May 9, 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for
reconsideration. On election day itself, Chairman
Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing
the resolution of the COMELEC First Division due
to the motion for reconsideration filed by Eusebio.
On May 11, 2004, the day after the elections,
petitioners filed before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of
votes. The COMELEC en banc partially denied the
motion. It ordered the suspension, until further
orders of the Commission, the proclamation of
Eusebio in the event he receives the winning
number of votes.
On May 21, 2004, the Commission en banc lifted
and set aside the suspension of proclamation.
Eusebio was proclaimed City Mayor of Pasig. The
Commission also annulled the order of the
COMELEC First Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Lanot can be proclaimed
and allowed to sit as mayor-elect in case of
disqualification of Eusebio.
RULING:
No. The disqualification of the elected candidate
does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to occupy the
office vacated. Votes cast in favor of the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is
qualified.
However, there is an exception which rests on two
assumptions: that the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified and that the voters
nonetheless voted for him despite knowing that he
is disqualified. The petitioners failed to prove the
applicability of the exception to this case. The rule
on succession shall apply. The Vice Mayor shall be
the Mayor.
Federico vs COMELEC
FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent
Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was
the Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna
and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of
Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
mayor. She then filed a new COC and the
corresponding Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as
substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico)
filed his COC and CONA as official candidate of the
Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for
mayor, in lieu of Edna.
Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner
ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed after the
deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution
No. 8678.
However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due
course to the candidacy of Edna and Petitioner.
However, by the time of the elections, because the
ballots had already been printed, the name of Edna
was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto.
Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna
garnered the most votes for that election, beating
Private Respodent for the position of mayor. Eventually
the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to
Petitioner (who was the replacement of Edna).
Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the
proclamation of Petitioner Federico.
The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the
proclamation of Petitioner and proclaimed Private
Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya). The
COMELEC declared that Petitioner's substitution of
Edna was void because if was filed after the period for
filing of COCs had lapsed.
Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme
Court. He claimed that Comelec Resolution No. 8678,
which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs
cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election code,
specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's
replacement candidate of one who withdraws, dies or
is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day of the
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it annulled Federico’s proclamation as
the winning candidate on the ground that his
substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.
HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion. The Comelec is empowered by law to
prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and
successful the conduct of the first national automated
election. RA 9369 which governs the conduct of
automated elections specifically allows COMELEC to set
deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.
Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must
be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to
Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse
its discretion.
Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of
time and was thus void.
Barot vs COMELEC
Petitioner Felix Barot and private respondent
Rolando Tabaloc were candidates for councilor of
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental in the May 14, 2001
elections. The Board of Canvassers (BOC)
proclaimed the winning candidates for mayor, vice-
mayor, and ten councilors including Barot who was
proclaimed the 10th. Then, BOC Chair Nochefranca
requested the COMELEC En Banc for authority to
correct the erroneous entries in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates, and to proclaim Tabaloc in place of
Barot. The COMELEC En Banc granted the request
and annulled the proclamation of Barot. Hence, this
petition. Barot contends that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the petition for the same has been
filed beyond the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has
jurisdiction acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
HELD:
As to the claim that the petition was not filed within
the reglementary period, it should be noted that the
5-day period to file a petition for correction may be
done after proclamation as provided under
paragraph (b), Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules. The petition may also be made before
proclamation as provided in Section 34 of
Resolution No. 3848 which furnishes instructions
for the Municipal, City, District and Provincial
Boards of Canvassers in connection with the May
14, 2001 national and local elections. At all events,
Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules provides
that in the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all the matters pending before
the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof
may be suspended by the Commission. The
COMELEC thus has the discretion to suspend its
rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice
such that even if the petition was filed 12 days after
the proclamation, the COMELEC may, in the
interest of justice, disregard the reglementary
periods provided by the rules and resolve the matter
filed before it.
TAN vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay,
Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto
proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC
scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with
the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental,
other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros
del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states
that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there
is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries
of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political
units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would
be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as
a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting
view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units
affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of
the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an
area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by
the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being
a patent nullity