BORJA-MANZANO VS.
SANCHEZ the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
FACTS: Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of
the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born
out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.
ISSUE: W/N contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code
HELD: No. Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties had a subsisting
marriage as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is
an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage.
QUIAZON V. BELEN
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate. Elise Quiazon, represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las
Piñas City and claimed that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to
Eliseo as her father.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage between Amelia and Eliseo is valid
HELD: No. The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of
marriage.
In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia,
may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
CASTILLO VS CASTILLO
Facts:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo married Benjamin Bautista.
On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo .
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting
when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also
said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared
void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of
nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage
with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of
the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages
were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at
the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore,
the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED. The Court held that the
subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent
marriage to Renato is valid.
Ratio:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance
with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at
the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the
parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and
1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph);
and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning -
while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent
court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable
marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural
children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no
express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings
in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3
August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly
required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance
of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
SUNTAY VS COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
FACTS: Petitioner, Federico, is opposing respondent’s Isabel, his granddaughter, for
her petition for Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina,
Federico’s wife, who died without leaving a will. Isabel’s father Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously
been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on the
fact, that his son, Emilio had his marraige judicially declared null and void alleging
that based on Art. 992 of the Civil Code, Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child.
ISSUE: (As to the Iron Clad Doctrine) Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD: Yes, Isabel is a legitimate child. Article 144 of the Civil Code provides that
children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction
have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children
under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are
in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered
valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a
marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being
totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable
marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and
children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.
In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of
Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of voidable
marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”
TERRE VS TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting
of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. No
judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the
nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Dorothy Terre was married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. With
this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced complainant that her marriage
with Bercenillo was void ab initio for being incestuous, for which they are free to
contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote
“single” as her status. After getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre
abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent
marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s
evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre.
In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A.
Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly
first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known
that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court
which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential.

IWASAWA VS CUSTODIO
FACTS: Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met Felisa in 2002 in one of his visits to
the Philippines. Felisa introduced herself as "single" and has never married before.
Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came
back to the Philippines and married Felisa on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City.
After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.
 
In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it
and to his shock, Felisa confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth and discovered that
she indeed was married to Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage
took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground
that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
 public prosecutor present evidence to the contrary.The Court has consistently held
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner offered the pieces of
documentary evidence issued by the NSO– (1) Certificate of Marriage between
petitioner and Felisa, as proof of the fact of marriage between the parties; (2)
Certificate of Marriage between Felisa and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo, proving
fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994; (3) Certificate of Death of
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14,
2009; and (4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to Felisa marked, to prove that Felisa in
fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28,2002.
 nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the OSG admitted the authenticity and due
execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial. However, the RTC
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior
existing valid marriage to another man. That while petitioner offered the certificate
of marriage of Felisa to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said
marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no
personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s
death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between
private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled
that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since
he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
ISSUE:
W/N Felisa contracted a bigamous marriage
RULING:
Yes. The documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof
of their due execution and genuineness. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts
stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the
that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void
from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out
by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the
nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that
private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,1994 in the City of Manila; (2)
that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on
said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have
been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to
petitioner is bigamous hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid
and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
FUJIKI VS MARINAY
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Marinay and Maekara got
married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki again. Then Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan declaring her marriage with Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial court dismissed the petition
maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality to file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the
said rule provides for who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal personality to file the
petition. PETITION GRANTED.
REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR
FACTS: Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
5years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadel's Pension House. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport. A document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged. The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda
L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required.
Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to
institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
HELD: Yes, the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage can be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. A Rule 108
petition is allowed to correct or cancel the entry in a registered marriage contract
on the ground that the marriage was fictitious. A fictitious marriage is one where
there is no marriage ceremony as required by the Family Code. Here, since the
marriage was fictitious, hence, the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which would nullify the marriage can be undertaken.
SANTOS VS CA
Facts:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the
marriage, the couple quarreled over a number of things including the interference
of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the
United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of
five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should
be appreciated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere
abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of
Julia.
REPUBLIC vs DE GRACIA
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in
Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint
for the declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their
courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad
left their conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she
lived with a certain Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a
second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding that both parties suffered
from “utter emotional immaturity”. The RTC ruled that Natividad is psychologically
incapacitated. CA sustained the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological
incapacity?
HELD: The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily
on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how
Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable
within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is,
therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.
CHI MING TSOI VS CA
FACTS: On May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi had their marriage at the Manila
Cathedral, Intramuros Manila. The first night of their married life was spent in the
house of Gina’s mother. Both of them slept in the same room and in one bed, but
there was no sexual intercourse that occurred between them. Similar events
happened until the fourth night. From the day of their marriage until the day of
their separation, no intercourse has taken place between them. For this, they
submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, who is a
urologist in the Chinese General Hospital. The results of Gina’s tests were
disclosed, but the petitioner’s results and medications were kept confidential.
Subsequently, Gina filed a motion to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to
nullify their marriage on the ground of Chi Ming Choi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse. The Trial Court granted the motion and declared their marriage void.
Chi Ming Tsoi, the petitioner, then filed a motion to the Supreme Court appealing
that it is Gina, respondent, who had a problem on sexual intimacy."
ISSUE: Is refusal for sexual intercourse a connotation of psychological incapacity?
RULING: Yes, because the prolonged refusal to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is an indicator of psychological incapacity. Chi Ming Tsoi admitted that
he is unwilling to perform sexual intercourse with his wife, whom he love and who
has not resisted to his supposed approaches. This is an indicator of a personality
disorder which is related to psychological disorder. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial court
nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains
that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who
refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
MALILIN VS REPUBLIC
FACTS
Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972 and
begot three children. The petitioner filed a complaint for nullity of marriage on the
grounds that the respondent allegedly suffered from psychological and mental
incapacity at the time of the marriage celebration, unpreparedness to enter into
such marital life, and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an
American. While they were still together though, Robert disclosed that respondent
did not perform responsibilities of being a housewife like keeping the house in
order, preparing meals, washing clothes and taking care of the children. He also
stated that she dated several men and contracted loans without his knowledge. In
turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity.
On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision declaring
the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations but the Court of
Appeals, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING
DENIED. The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other
witness corroborated his allegations on her behavior. As the Court has repeatedly
stressed, psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been
interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination.
On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
yes, they are given great respect by our courts, but they are neither controlling nor
decisive.
Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented
clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly
entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness
existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
MARCOS VS MARCOS
FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he
as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They got married twice,
first was on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and blessed with five children.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to his
failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children. In 1992, they were already living separately. On October 16, 1994,
when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him.
Wilson then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. On October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted
herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus,
petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the
Family Code. The court ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality
of the evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to
prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this
case show psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the
social worker were not enough to sustain a finding that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated. Personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity. Although Supreme Court is convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
VIÑAS VS.PAREL-VIÑAS
FACTS:
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological
evaluation by Clinical Psychologist. The doctor found him as “amply aware of his
marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personality was assessed through
the data gathered from Glenn and his cousin and diagnosed her to be suffering
from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. The doctor then
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual
love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist
or psychiatrist is fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING:
No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. In the case of Mary Grace, however, the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity,
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition and that it existed at the inception of
marriage.
Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been
used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
REPUBLIC VS HAMANO
FACTS:
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, left respondent Lolita Hamano and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan
with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for 2 months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters the respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
but did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts
to contact him, but to no avail.
Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, in which the trial court rendered it so. CA
affirmed trial court’s decision contesting before the SC that the requirements in
Molina and Santos were not applicable for the case at bar involves a “mixed
marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.
ISSUES:
1) WON Toshio is psychologically incapacitated.
2) WON requirements in Molina and Santos applicable in mixed marriages.
RULING:
1) NO. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness.
As the Court ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
2) YES. In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between
an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
DEDEL VS DEDEL
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20,
1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David
instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s
psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that
Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a
lieutenant in the Preisdential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite
the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children.
When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing
along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and
even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned
David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special occasions.
Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts
his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon
was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display
of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with
David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the
said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgement and ordered the
dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.
RULING:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. As held in
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than
a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by
David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for
declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment,
and the like.
SIAYNGCO VS SIAYNGCO
Facts:
On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life together, respondent
Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his
wife exhibited an over... domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was
exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with
her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife
and mother; that it was... respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors
despite his philandering.
In the pre-trial order, the parties only stipulated on the following:
That they were married on 27 June 1973; That they have one son who is already 20
years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness
stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel's Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel's office. But when she was there, she
would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the...
office.
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.
From her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco
contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which
affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and
understanding.
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel's allegations. She
insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that
they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital
affairs which... he had admitted to her. Even when he already filed the present
case, she would still attend to his needs. She remembered that after the pre-trial,
while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to... give him a
chance to have a new family.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically... capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.
The Trial court denied respondent Manuel's petition. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON
MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL
AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a
clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar.
In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological
incapacity to comply... with the essential marital obligations
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of
whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation
of fidelity.[49]Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with...
the basic and essential obligations of marriage.[54]
Dr. Garcia's report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally
during the marriage, who pursued their... individual dreams to the hilt, becoming
busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This
was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
VILLALON VS VILLALON
FACTS: In order to annul his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
the petitioner presented a clinical psychologist to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with
“Casanova Complex”. The Doctor described the said disorder as “a pervasive
maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main
symptoms of "grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is
unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality." A person
afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and
sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
"Casanova Complex" exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one
relationship to another.
ISSUE: W/N sexual infidelity can be considered as psychological incapacity and a
ground for annulment of marriage
HELD: In denying the petition the Suprme Court held that sexual infidelity, by itself,
is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to convince us that
petitioner's marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that
petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for
respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by
his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondent's life
and that the latter did not need or want him. Respondent's uncommunicative and
withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioner's discontentment with the marital
relationship.
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, refusal to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the
meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
FERRARIS VS FERRARIS
FACTS:
The RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from
epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil
Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial
court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio on the
ground of respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house”
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend
more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.
ANTONIO VS REYES
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in
1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall
and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was
born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated
in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner,
aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of
Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological
liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
PAZ VS PAZ
The Facts
Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband
Jordan. She alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the
essential obligations of marriage such as he has uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. That he had a
tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and
spending a great deal of time with his friends. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan
was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother and even demanded from
his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son. And worse he
threatened to hurt Jeanice and did not provide financial support to his son when
Jeanice left their conjugal home.
Jeanice’s claim was substantiated by Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) who
testified, based on the testimonies given by Jeanice to Gates, that Jordan was
afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive
behavior, delinquency and instability." Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological
maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates
added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder
appears to be grave and incorrigible.
Despite the denial of Jordan that he is not psychologically incapacitated; and that
Jeanice was merely motivated by her inability to cope with the struggles of
marriage, the trial court declared the marriage null and void based on the findings
of Gates.
Issue
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling
Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity. Jeanice’s petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: (a) Gravity – It must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability – It must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist,
there is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through
independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. In
this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s
psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and
the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court.
Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor
of her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate
Jordan. Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since
she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’
testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.
The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that Jordan suffered from grave
psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which
showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates
also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband nor Jordan’s condition was
incurable.
SUAZO VS SUAZO
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support them, they lived with Angelito’s parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and were most of the time
drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels.
A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another
woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn
testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B
was not personally examined by the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with
his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of
the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer
group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives
for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-
social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the
respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Court fined the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error
of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity.
The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect
manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of
Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist
was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that
there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s
testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal
to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
DOMINGO VS CA
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know
that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against
her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had
been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such
voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in
order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired
during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.
RULING:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of
remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with
bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are
the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation
be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them.

SANTIAGO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor
Santiago were served an information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that
Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into the 2nd marriage; he
was able to escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that
when she married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred that their
marriage was void due to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be
charged with bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the
first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner and
introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated that
she met Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.
Issue: W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.
W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first
marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor
was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly
showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible
witness, compared to petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions
that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of
the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an
accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.
ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES
Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for
Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has
two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in
Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in
his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge
had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the
respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated
the affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is
married to Zenaida Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was
celebrated twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California was because he believed in good faith and for
all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case
because his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd
relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es
his act to cohabit with De Castro
Held: Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies
with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can
get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first
marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage,
Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was
Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and is now living with Milagros, his
paramour. Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the pendency of the
petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to
the criminal case.
The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed
by Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower
court from trying his case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?
RULING:
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose
a prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower
court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
BOBIS VS BOBIS
Facts:
On October 21, 1985 the respondent and Maria Dulce Javier got married. This was
the first marriage of the respondent which was not judicially declared as nullified
before the second marriage contracted by the respondent with the petitioner
which was celebrated on January 25, 1996. It was also alleged that there is a third
marriage contracted by the respondent with some Julia Hernandez.
On February 25, 1998, the petitioner filed bigamy, a criminal case, against his
husband respondent. Thereafter, the respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the grounds that this
was celebrated without a marriage license which is a formal requisite for a valid
marriage. The respondent also contends of his ignorance of the requirement of
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting in a new marriage.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) suspended the proceedings of the criminal
case pending the decision of the civil case. The petitioner then files this case for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can invoke his ignorance of the requirement under
Article 40 of the Family Code.
Held:
No, the respondent cannot invoke his ignorance of the requirement for the judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting a new marriage.
Article 3 of the Civil Code states that, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. Thus, the respondent is presumed to have a conclusive
knowledge of the requisites of a valid marriage since the Family Code is already in
effect and force during the celebration of his second marriage with the petitioner.
Hence, the decision of the RTC in suspending the criminal case pending the civil
case was reversed because it is wrong to invoke ignorance of a law which is already
in effect and force like the Family Code.
SSC vs AZOTE
FACTS: On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS,
were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the
SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries.
Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three
younger children as additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed
away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the
wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that
Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a different set of
beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer
Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children
were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her
minor children. Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump
sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife
of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information
in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper
of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the
publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in
default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that
the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo
to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it
opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing
that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.
ISSUE: W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled
to the benefits
RULING: No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of the
deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In
this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage
with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at
the time when the Family Code was already in force. For the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without
doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment
was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo.
Settled is the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by
law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna
was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that
she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the
law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
MERCADO VS TAN
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not
know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993
declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of
nullity of the former marriage.
HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of
the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge.
MORIGO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
CARINO VS CARINO
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the
first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and
Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost
ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the
latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized
without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee,
ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack
of marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void
ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those
exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such
being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has
been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is
void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and
Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article
148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court
and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta being bigamous and thereby null and void. On January 17 1996, the lower
court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia. On appeal the Court
of Appeal rendered decision in favor of Marietta declaring her marriage to
Teodorico valid and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.
Issue:
Whether the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in
turn would determine her right as surviving spouse.
Held:
The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code
should be thus deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of judicial declaration of
marriage of presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of
Teodorico and Marietta, upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should be rightly divided one portion to the surviving s pouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse

CALISTERIO VS CALISTERIO
Facts:
On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land with an estimated
value of P 604,750 Teodorico was survived by his wife respondent Marietta
Calisterio. Teodorico was second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. Teodorico
and Marietta were married eleven years later without court declaration that James
presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In matter of Intestate Estate