Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe

44 SCRA 22 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity from Arrest under the
1935 Constitution
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification
of a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest.
They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the
charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases
of treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which
Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of
the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision
of the Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome

Cabangbang
17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate 
Bartolome Cabangbang was  a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the
publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have
been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions
with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup
d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among
others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are
being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect
a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session
or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session
when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

United States vs Juan Pons

34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopezarrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On
the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since
this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court  and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought
into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February
28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez

Vito
78 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory 
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended
by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their
seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker.  They argued that
some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of
each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) –
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then.  At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was
passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because
the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue
by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,
for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs
of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects
of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have
been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed
by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed
by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals

Casco Philippine Chemical Co.,

Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill               
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic
resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a
Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde
are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund.
The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied
the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and
distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision
of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported
by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision
should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that  the bill approved
in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and,
“formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this
view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill
before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as
a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled
bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.

Enrique Morales vs Abelardo

Subido
26 SCRA 150 – Political Law –  The Legislative Department – Journals vs Enrolled Bill 
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau
of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales  was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of
Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police
department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when
the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city orwho has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by
Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made
in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in
the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being
deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon
the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD:  No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in
slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands
that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to
as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in
the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at
bar hence the SC does not now decide.  All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.

Herminio Astorga vs Antonio

Villegas
56 SCRA 714 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;When to be
Consulted 
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the
city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with
the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of
RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this
said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to
the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the
bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate.
The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter.
The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found
out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the
version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino
and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the
President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on
the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and
is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific
facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law.  To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Carmelo Lazatin vs Commission

on Elections
57 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s
Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests 
Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to
annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged
the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all
election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that
Lazatin’s petition had become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC
Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October
6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due
course because the proclamation was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing
the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board,
to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the
proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns
contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates
Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course
to the petition.   The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed
winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of
office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival
candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate

Electoral Tribunal
166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals –
Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested
the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE:  Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17.  The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative”
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.  It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.

Augusto Sanchez vs Commission

on Elections
153 SCRA 67 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals –
Jurisdiction – Pre-proclamation Controversy 
These are three consolidated cases.
After the first senatorial elections under the 1987 Constitution, Augusto Sanchez, a
candidate therein, petitioned the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
recount of the votes. Allegedly, votes intended for him, which were merely written as
“Sanchez”, were considered as stray votes because of the sameness of his last name to
that of Gil Sanchez – another candidate who was later disqualified. Sanchez was then
running as the 25th in ranking among the candidates. He filed an urgent petition to re-count
or re-appreciate those votes in favor of him.
Meanwhile, Santanina Rasul and Juan Ponce Enrile, ranked 23 rd and 24th respectively
intervened and filed before the COMELEC requesting the latter to proclaim them as the duly
elected senators elect completing the 24 senators-elect. They moved to dismiss Sanchez’
petition. Rasul’s lead over Enrile was just about 1,910 and there were just 3 municipalities
left to be counted (amounting to 31,000 votes). Enrile’s lead over Sanchez was 73,034
votes. COMELEC then denied Sanchez’ petition. Subsequently, COMELEC declared Rasul
as the 23rd senator-elect but there was still a mathematical possibility that Enrile can
overtake Rasul. Enrile opposed Rasul’s proclamation as the 23 rd senator-elect and he
averred that COMELEC should complete the canvassing first before declaring who placed
23rd and 24th respectively.
COMELEC justified Rasul’s proclamation on the ground that since the remaining 3
municipalities were in Muslim Mindanao, and that Rasul is a Muslim, there is a logical
presumption that majority of the votes therefrom would be for Rasul. While this was
foregoing, COMELEC, by a vote of 5 to 2 reversed its earlier decision in denying Sanchez’
petition and it granted Sanchez’ request for recount and re-appreciation. Enrile then filed a
petition against COMELEC and Sanchez. Enrile alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and abused its discretion in refusing to
proclaim him (Enrile) on the ground that Sanchez’ petition for recount is not a pre-
proclamation controversy which involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic
validity, of the said election returns and that Rasul’s lead over him was only 1,916 votes
while his lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes remaining to be
canvassed in 3 towns, could not offset his lead over Sanchez.
ISSUE: Whether Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the
Comelec may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy falling within the
Comelec’s exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) or properly pertains to
the realm of election protest falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of
the [Senate’s] members.” (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution).
HELD: Sanchez’ petition must fail. There is no clear showing that the said stray votes
constitute “omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his
corresponding votes” (incomplete election returns). The election returns are in fact complete
as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the
boards of inspectors. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues
enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the
issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In
the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are
incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with,
falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes
credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec.
236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to,
granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez’ petition
must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima
facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among
the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of
invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and
authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has
granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election
returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie
case backed up by a specific offer of evidence and indication of its nature and importance
has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of
witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of
canvassing and proclamation proceedings leading to a vacuum in so important and
sensitive an office as that of Senator of the Republic could easily be brought about —- this
time involving the eight place and next time involving perhaps all the eight places, when it is
considered that the position of senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66
provinces and 57 cities comprising the Philippines.

Raul Daza vs Luis Singson

Tribunal and its Composition
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the
new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political
parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to
it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT
the court.

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali

Gonzales
HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed
to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that  the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the said compromise.  He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the
CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party    either the LAKAS    NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.

Jean Arnault vs Nazareno

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution
was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in
a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who
refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.

Senate of the Philippines vs

Executive Secretary Ermita
495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour –
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the
senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing
the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval,
Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made
to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power
is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.  In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is
not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry.  The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.  While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.  One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.  Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance
of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. 
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.  They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads.  Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.   It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.   The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face.  For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section
1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation.  Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of
legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

Romulo Neri vs Senate

Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers
549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in
aid of legislation – Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
 
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later
refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under
executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),  Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of  E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to
ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal.  The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that  “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation,  is a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information
to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation.

Juan Bengzon vs Secretary of

Justice
68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) – Political law – Bill – Veto – Veto a Bill
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law.
He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 “An Act to provide for the payment of
retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the
service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the
justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.”
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like
Bengzon but that provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the
veto is beyond the power of the governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement
Gratuity Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his
power; for this is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a
law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it
provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the
Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative
purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.
Bolinao Electronics Corporation
vs Brigido Valencia
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate
and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned
by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit
has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and
their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been
violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does
not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by
Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

olitical Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred
the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the
President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of
the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices  filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which
were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due
to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill
(GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment
for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not
at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the
president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

Enrique Garcia vs Executive

Secretary (1992)
211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%.
In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.  Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific
limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and
Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the

Philippines, Inc. vs City of Butuan
ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
 

24 SCRA 789 – Political Law – Uniformity in Taxation

In 1960, Ordinance No. 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance 122.
This Ordinance imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24
bottles of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi operates within Butuan and it paid under protest the amount of
P4.926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from
January 1 to July 30, 1961 pursuant to said ordinance. Pepsi filed a complaint for the
recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may later on
pay until the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of
the City of Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional.
Pepsi averred it is unconstitutional because of the following reasons:
1. it partakes of the nature of an import tax because   the tax “shall be based and computed
from the cargo manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases” — not sold;
2. it is highly unjust and discriminatory because some dealers engaged in selling of
carbonated drinks are exempt while others are covered and such exemption is not justified
in the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.
HELD: No, it is invalid. The tax prescribed in said Ordinance, as originally approved, was
imposed upon dealers “engaged in selling” soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would
seem that the intent was then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended
by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon “any agent and/or consignee of any
person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in selling . . . soft drinks
or carbonated drinks.” As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drinks or
carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents and/or consignees of
another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business outside
the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less
than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month.
When we consider, also, that the tax “shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest
or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases” — not sold — but “received” by the
taxpayer, the intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated
drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle,
the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendant’s authority to
impose by express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid
exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all
circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation.
The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be
reasonable  and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose
of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions,
but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the
classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions
are not fully met by the ordinance in question.
Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or
carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents or
consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be
exempt from the tax.

Province of Abra vs Harold

Hernando
107 SCRA 104 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxes – The Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of
Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side.
Hernando ruled that  there “is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the
Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.”
Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly
and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or
charitable purposes.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that “charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of
“lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also
“actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer. However, in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are
actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.

Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province

vs Treasurer of Baguio
71 phil. 547 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxation – Assessment
In 1937, an ordinance (Ordinance No. 137: Special Assessment List, City of Baguio) was
passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess properties of property
owners within the defined city limits. The Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the
other hand, is a religious corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the
ordinance, it paid a total amount of P1,019.37  in protest. APMP later averred that it should
be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious institution, it has a
constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No. In the first place, the ordinance was in the nature of an assessment and not a
taxation.
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley’s words:
While the word ‘tax’ in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and special
assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax,
yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local
impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its
immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed.
The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment
can be levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in most states) be
made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is based wholly
on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The
imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a tax and
not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or
highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment
rather than a tax notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax.
In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the assessment is not
taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.
Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of
Public Works and
Communications
110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He
claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned
by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved
the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he
owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of
the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then  prayed that the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose.
Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the
City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does
not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property
was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.”
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence,
was null and void.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of

prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the
latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The
petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act
4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is

constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps
by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect
or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event
considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the
Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

Manuel Alba vs Francisco Perez

154 SCRA 225 – Political Law – Appropriation
Dr. Francisco Perez, the City Health Officer of San Pablo City, was named “Outstanding
Health Worker” in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase pursuant
to Letter Of Instruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for Perez’ salary. The SP
however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials
of the national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered.
Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national
government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Manuel Alba – the
Minister of Budget – refused to recognize Perez’ right to such increase because he averred
that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Perez then filed a mandamus case against
Alba. The trial court judge granted the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per the said LOI.
HELD: Yes. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government
officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health
is a national service. Besides, Perez is an employee of the Ministry of Health and not of the
city of San Pablo. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government.
Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half
from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the national government.
There is no basis in Alba’s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the
appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the
Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government
official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the
Health Ministry wherein Perez is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus
becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment.
Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
 

Teresita Fabian vs Aniano

Desierto
95 SCRA 470 – Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with
a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so
to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman
but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to
the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional
provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction
of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower
courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted
to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs

COMELEC
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action
for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional
provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735
indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided
for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the
Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for
the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-
executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action.”  Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people
cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever
reason does not provide for its implementation.
 
***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the
SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a
mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions
already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See
discussion here