CASE DIGESTS by Adrian Players

WEEK 1
Edited by ResTigas

NAVARRO VS PINEDA
FACTS:
- On Dec 14, 1959, Rufino Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales borrowed P2,250 from
Plaintiff Navarro.
- On June 14, 1959, to secure indebtedness, Gonzales, by way of real estate mortgage,
pledged a parcel of land belonging to her in Tarlac.
- Piineda also, by way of Chattel Mortgage, mortgaged his two-story residential house
erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Castro located at Bo. San Roque, Tarlac.
- Defendants were unable to pay debt even after numerous extensions given to them.
- Aug 10, 1960, plaintiff Navarro filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgages and for
the damages P500 and interest of 12% per annum.
- Defendants claim that the chattel mortgage is not valid because the house of Pineda was
made a subject thereof.
ISSUE:
- W/N the house in question may be considered personal property
HELD:
- Yes, a house erected on a rented land may be treated as personal property, insofar as
contracting parties are concerned, when such is stipulated and agreed upon in a contract.
- In this case, the parties of the contract treated the house as a personal property in their
contract, and the defendants have even grouped the house with a truck, a movable property.
Alongside this, the materials of the house in question were only made of cheap materials
compared to the cases cited by the appellants.
- The cases cited by appellants are not applicable to the present case. The Iya cases refer to
a building or a house of strong materials, permanently adhered to the land, belonging to
the owner of the house himself. In the case of Lopez vs. Orosa the subject building was a
theater, built of materials worth more than P62,000.00 attached permanently to the soil.

Board of Assessment Appeals vs Manila Electric Company

FACTS:
- Meralco’s electric power is generated by its hydroelectric plant located in Laguna
- Transmits electricity from Laguna to urban areas by means of electrical transmission
fastened to insulations attached to steel towers.
 - On Nov 15, 1955, petitioner City Assessor of QC declared aforementioned towers for real
property tax which requires respondents to pay P11,651.86. This was approved by lower
courts.
- Meralco petitioned for certiorari and claimed that the steel towers fall under the term
“poles” which are declared to be exempt from being taxed
- Meralco claims that the towers are to be considered personal property.
ISSUE:
- W/N the steel towers fall within the term “poles”
- W/N the steel towers are considered real property
HELD:
- Yes. The steel towers fall within the term poles. The term pole refers to “upright standards
to the top of which something is affixed or something is supported”. These tower's purpose
is to support wires for electrical transmission.
- No. The steel towers are not real properties according to Art. 415, paragraph 1 as the
mentioned steel towers, are not adhered to the soil.
- This is also according to Art. 415, paragraph 3, because the towers are not attached to an
immovable object in a fixed manner. It can easily be disassembled by means of unscrewing
the components and moved to another place without the breakage and deterioration of the
aforementioned towers.

Mindanao Bus Company v City Assessor and Treasurer and Board of Tax Appeals CDC
FACTS:
- Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks.
- Respondent City Assessor assessed at P4,400 certain equipment owned by petitioner,
classifying them as real properties.
- The machines are sitting on wooden or cement platforms.
- Petitioner claims that these equipment are personal property.
- After the CTA sustains City Assessor’s ruling, petitioner raised the case to Supreme Court.
- Claimed that the CTA erred in the interpretation of Art 415 (5)
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the City Assessor erred in the interpretation of Art 415 (5)
HELD:
- Yes. For the equipment to be immobilized and classified as real properties, they must first
be essential and principal elements for industry or works (meaning that the said industry
or works will not function without such equipment). The equipment in question merely
facilitates and improves service, and shall be classified as incidentals rather than principal
elements of an industry.
Meralco Securities vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals
FACTS:
- Meralco installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system
- Pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and solidly welded together so as to preclude
breakage and prevent leaking
- In order to remove, repair, replace segments of the pipeline, the pipes must be digged out
of the land
- The pipes are therefore permanently attached to the ground
*Some segments may be moved from one place to another
- Provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued for
declarations
- Meralco brought the case to the CBAA but was given an unfavorable ruling
- Meralco filed a petition for certiorari, but then the CBAA argued that the pipes fall under
Art 415 in the list of immovable properties
ISSUE:
- W/N the pipeline is considered real property
HELD:
- The pipeline system is real property. Article 415 (1) and (3) provides that real property
may consist of constructions adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, wherein the separation thereof of the pipeline components would cause
breakage and deterioration of the object.

People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs Dahican Lumber

FACTS:
- West Virginia company referred to as ATLANTIC sold and assigned all its rights in the
Dahican Lumber concession to DALCO for $500,000 of which only $50,000 was paid
- DALCO also obtained various loans from BANK amounting to P200,000
- DALCO, also obtained a loan of $250,000 from Export-Import Bank of Washington
through BANK.
- DALCO mortgaged 5 parcels of land situated in Cam Norte as security to pay BANK.
- A second mortgage was executed on the same properties in order to pay ATLANTIC the
unpaid balance of $450,000.
- Both deeds extended the mortgage lien to properties subsequently acquired “after acquired
properties”
- DALCO and DAMCO also pledged 7,296 shares of stock (DAMCO) and 9,286 shares
(DALCO) to secure the same obligations
- DALCO and DAMCO failed to pay the fifth promissory note
- On July 13, 1950, DALCO purchased some equipment to replace some of those already
owned.
 - The BANK requested DALCO to submit a complete list of these items as they are part of
the “after acquired items” but DALCO failed to do so.
- DALCO turns out to also have a sum due to CONNELL the amount of P452,860.55 and to
DAMCO P2,151,578.34.
- On Dec 16, 1952, DALCO rescinded the sale of equipment by DAMCO and CONNELL
to it
- On Jan 13, 1953, the BANK demanded that such agreements be cancelled but CONNELL
AND DAMCO refused to do so
- ATLANTIC and BANK commenced foreclosure proceedings
- CONNELL claimed that they own some of the equipment purchased therefore it is not part
of those “after acquired properties”
- On Aug 30, 1958, the machineries and equipment of DALCO were sold for P175,000.One-
half for the “undebated properties”, and the other for “after acquired properties”
- Defendants-appellants contend that the “after acquired properties” stipulation is null and
void.
ISSUE:
- Are the so called “after acquired properties” valid despite the fact that they have not been
registered in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage law?
- W/N DAMCO and CONNELL have rights to the “after acquired properties”
HELD:
- Yes. Such equipment has been immobilized by the agreement to include them in the real
estate mortgage because they were not characterized as Chattels. Machinery placed on
property by a tenant does not become immobilized, yet when the tenant places it there
pursuant to the contract that it shall belong to the owner, it then becomes immobilized as
to that tenant.
- No. Neither DAMCO and CONNELL supplied any goods. All items were supplied by
other parties, and CONNELL only acted as the general agent for DALCO.

HPS software vs PLDT

FACTS;
- On Oct. 20, 2000, two applications were filed for a search warrant for violation of Article
308 of the RPC for Theft of Telephone Services. (and PD 401, for unauthorized installation
of telephone services)
- PLDT claimed that they were able to monitor the use of respondent’s equipment in
receiving and transmitting calls from US to PH without these calls passing through PLDT
--- Testified that respondents are engaged in the business of Intl. Simple Resale (ISR) or
unauthorized sale of long-distance calls
- This business deprived PLDT of revenue, and caused damaged and prejudice to the same
- Test calls showed international calls to reflect the no. of Philip Yap
- Items relating to the alleged crime were seized upon a court issue
- Philip and Hyman Yap then filed a Motion to Suppress Illegally retrieved evidence in
response to the seizure of items
 - These seized items were then released before PLDT was able to file a memorandum.
- Respondents claim that ISR does not fall under ART. 308 because international long
distance calls and business of providing telephone services are not personal properties
ISSUE:
- W/N the business of telecommunication or telephone service fall under personal property
HELD:
- Yes. Article 414 of the NCC states that all things which are or maybe the object of
appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Although business
(and the intent to do business) is not enumerated as personal property, it may still be
appropriated. Since it is also not included in the list of immovables (in accordance with
Art. 415), it is therefore personal property.

WEEK 2
Case Digests by Adrian Players

MIAA vs City of Pasay

FACTS:
- MIAA operates and administers the NAIA under EO 903 which was issued by then
President Marcos.
- Under EO 903, approximately 600 hectares of land, including runways, the airport tower,
and other airport buildings were transferred to MIAA.
- On Aug 28 2001, MIAA received notices from the City of Pasay to pay real property taxes
for the taxable years of 1992-2001.
- MIAA petitioned to the CA praying for a temporary restraining order on the taxes imposed
to them.
- The CA held that MIAA is not exempt from real property tax since their exemption has
been removed by RA 7160 or the Local Govt. Code.
- The Court ruled that petitioners fall under “government-owned or controlled corporations”
which are included in the list of withdrawn tax exemptions.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not MIAA is a government-owned or controlled corporation making them
included in the list of those whose tax exemptions have been withdrawn.
HELD:
- MIAA does not fall under such classification. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers, performing essential public service. It is not organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties
devoted to public use and are thus properties of the government. Under Art 420 of the NCC,
 those properties intended for public use, including ports (airports), constructed by the State
are those of public dominion therefore exempting them from real property tax.

Laurel vs Garcia
FACTS:
- On May 9 1956, four properties in Japan were acquired by the Philippine government
through a Reparations Agreement.
- Part of the four properties, the Roppongi property was acquired by the PH govt with the
intention of it being the land and building “for the Chancery of the PH Embassy”.
- Such property became the site of the Embassy until it was transferred to the Nampeidai
(also part of the four properties) in 1976.
- The transfer was made due to the lack of funds by the PH to tend to the major repairs which
the Roppongi property needed.
- Former PH ambassador to Japan, Carlos Valdez, proposed to then President Aquino to
subject the Roppongi property to a lease as a solution to repairing the property.
- The Executive department denied such proposal and decided to sell the properties
(including the Roppongi property) to non-Filipino citizens.
- Petitioner Laurel claimed that such cannot be done since the property in question is
property of public dominion intended for public service.
- Respondents countered in saying that such properties have been converted to Patrimonial
property since the Roppongi property has been long abandoned and the Embassy was
transferred to Nampeidai.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the Roppongi and others of its kind can be alienated by the PH govt.
HELD:
- The Roppongi property cannot be alienated by the PH govt. The property is classified as
public property for public service under Art. 420 (2), since its acquisition is intended for
such. The fact that the property in question has not been used for a long time for Embassy
service does not automatically convert it into patrimonial property. A formal declaration is
required from the government to convert such property into patrimonial property.

DENR vs Yap/Sacay vs DENR

FACTS:
- On November 10,1978, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves, and peninsulas in the PH as tourist zones and
marine reserves.
- Yap and company raised doubts as to their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
- They claimed that through their predecessors, they have occupied such lands since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
 - They also claim that since Boracay has been declared as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership.
- OSG countered in saying that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
- On May 22 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land (for protection purposes) and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
- Sacay and company alleged that such Proclamation diminished their “prior vested rights”
over portions of Boracay.
ISSUE:
- Whether private respondents have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions of
Boracay.
HELD:
- They do not have such right. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation. 1064 (Arroyo’s Proc).
Such lands are considered as a public forest under PD No. 705 which defines public forests
as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification”.
- Proclamation 1801 (Marcos’ Proc) did not classify the island as to its alienability. It aimed
to administer such islands for tourism and ecological purposes.
- Since the land has not been converted to agricultural lands during the time of Marcos, the
land in question fell into the ownership of the State since the claimants could not present
clear evidence that they have been occupying the island since time immemorial. The tax
declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove that they have been
long occupying the island because the earliest tax declarations issued by them were in 1993.

Halili vs CA
FACTS:
- Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties
in the Philippines.
- His widow, Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son David Rey Guzman, both of whom are
also American citizens, inherited the lands left behind by Simeon.
- On Aug 9 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim which transferred all her rights, titles
and interests of said properties to her son David.
- On Feb 5 1991, David Guzman sold one of the parcels of land inherited and transferred to
him to Emiliano Cataniag. Such land is situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
- Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the RTC assailing
the validity of the conveyance of rights by Helen to her son David, and the sale of land
between David and Emiliano.
ISSUE:
- Are the two conveyances by Helen to her and son, and by David to Emiliano valid?

HELD:
- The first conveyance is not valid. Under section 7 Article 12 of the Constitution, aliens
may only acquire private lands through hereditary succession. The inheritance of the land
by Helen and David is valid since such was acquired through succession. When Helen
transferred her rights and ownership of the said land to David, such was not made through
succession and is therefore invalid.
- The second conveyance is valid. Even though the manner of which David acquired
ownership of the land in question is not in accordance with the law, such flaw in the first
transaction is considered cured by selling such land to a person qualified to own private
land in the PH

*Rationale behind this principle* (Just so you can understand this concept more)
Vasquez vs Li Seng Group:
“If the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands is to preserve
the nation’s lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.”

WEEK 3
Case Digests by Adrian Slayers

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v Lozada

FACTS:
- Lot No. 88 (1017 sqm), situated in the City of Cebu, is owned by respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada and his wife Rosario (formerly owned by Anastacio Delparine).
- Such lot was expropriated among several other properties in Lahug in favor of the Republic
of the Philippines for the purpose of the expansion and the improvement of the Lahug
Airport.
- On December 29,1961, the trial court ordered the Republic to pay Lozada the fair market
value of Lot 88adjudged at P 3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way
of legal interest computed from Nov. 1947 (the time since the lot was occupied by the US
army which then handed over said lots to CAA).
- Lozada received the amount of P 3018.00 by way of payment.
- The affected landowners then appealed. The ATO, formerly the CAA, proposed a
compromise settlement wherein the owners of the lots would withdraw their appeal in
 consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold to the owners at
a price they were expropriated for in the event that the ATO would abandon such properties
for their intended use.
- Because of this agreement, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
- On Nov 29 1989, then President Aquino issued a Memorandum directing the transfer of
operations of the Lahug Airport to the MCIAA and before the end of such transfer, the
closure of the Lahug Airport.
- Because of such Memorandum, the expropriated lands were not used for their public
purpose.
- Respondents then filed a complaint so that they may retrieve their property pursuant to the
agreement made by them and petitioner.
- Petitioner then claimed that the Decision made in the expropriation proceedings did not lay
a condition that should the intended use of Lot 88 be for the expansion and improvements
of Lahug airport be abandoned, the property would revert to the owners.
ISSUE:
- Whether Lot 88 may be reverted to the owners.
HELD:
- Lot 88 may be reverted to the owners. The Decision by the court to have such properties
expropriated for their intended purpose was made under the impression that Lahug Airport
would continue to be in operation. The Government’s exercise of its power of eminent
domain is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to a specific public
purpose for which it was taken. If this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, then the former owners may seek the reversion of the property.
- Respondents must return to petitioners their just compensation plus legal interest, along
with the necessary expenses the latter may have incurred in maintaining Lot 88.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sarabia

FACTS:
- Sometime in 1956, the ATO (Air Transp. Office) took possession and control of some
4,901 sqm of Lot 6068
- Such Lot is a 10, 468 sqm lot located at Pook Kalibo, Aklan.
- Initially, the ATO utilized the subject occupied portion of Lot 6068 as an airport parking
area. In time, several structures were erected thereon, including the control tower, the
Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the
PNP Aviation Security Group.
- Since petitioner and private respondents did not agree on the amount of compensation for
the property, an action for expropriation of the entire Lot 6068 was filed.
- The trial court fixed the just compensation for the for the 4,901 sqm portion (the portion
already occupied) at P800 per square-meter based on the current market value (1999) and
not at the time of the taking which was in 1956.
 - Petitioners then claim, through appeal, that the just compensation should be fixed on the
time of the taking of the property which was in 1956 and not during the time the writ of
possession was issued in 1999.
- Respondents admitted that ATO has been in control of such property since 1956. (relevant
in establishing that the taking commenced since then)
ISSUE:
- When is the precise time at which just compensation should be fixed?
HELD:
- In this case, just compensation must be fixed based on the time of the taking of the property.
For where the property is taken ahead of the filing of the expropriation proceedings, the
value thereof may be altered by the public purpose for which it is taken. Where the
institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property subject thereof,
the compensation is fixed as of the filing of the complaint.
- However, the remaining 5,567 sqm portion cannot be part of such assessment of value
since there was no proof that the remaining portions are necessary for public use.

WEEK 4
Case digest by Adrian Meyers
(Salamat sa tulong josh I love you with homo)

Spouses Maximo Espinoza and Winifreda De Vera vs Spouses Antonio Mayandoc and
Erlinda Cayabyab Mayandoc
FACTS:
- A parcel of land located in Dagupan City was originally owned by Eusebio Espinoza, after
his death, the parcel of land was divided among his heirs, namely: Pastora Espinoza,
Domingo Espinoza and Pablo Espinoza.
- Maximo (petitioner) is the son of Domingo Espinoza who died in 1965, and Agapita
Cayabyab who died in 1963
- On May 25, 1972, Pastora Espinoza (one of the three heirs) executed a Deed of Sale
conveying her share of the same property to respondents and Leopoldo Espinoza.
- On that same date, a fictitious deed of sale was executed by Domingo Espinoza, conveying
the three-fourth (3/4) share in the estate in favor of respondent Erlinda Cayabyab
Mayandoc’s parents.
(Respondents and Leopoldo got 1/3 or the share of Pastora. Erlinda’s parents got ¾ths of
the land.)
- In 1977, a fictitious deed of sale was executed by Nemesio Cayabyab, Candida Cruz,
petitioners-spouses Maximo Espinoza and Winifreda De Vera and Leopoldo Espinoza in
 favor of respondents Antonio and Erlinda Mayandoc. The whole land was issued under the
names of the latter.
(Leopoldo (1/3) and Nemesio (3/4) gave their land to Antonio and Erlinda Mayandoc.)
- In 1995-1996, a house was built by respondents on the disputed land.
- On Aug 1999, petitioners then filed an action for annulment of document with prayer for
the nullification of Antonio’s and Erlinda’s title. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.
- Respondents then filed a complaint for reimbursement for useful expenses, pursuant to Art.
448 and 546. They alleged that the house in question was built in good faith.
- Petitioners argued that respondents are builders in bad faith because the latter were aware
that the deeds of sale were fictitious.
- RTC rendered a decision requiring defendants (Maximo petitioner) to sell the land, where
the plaintiff’s house stands, to the latter at a reasonable price based on the zonal value
determined by the BIR.
*Simplified facts as to the conveyances made (nakakalito eh!!!)
- Eusebio died, giving the lands to Pastora, Domingo, and Pablo
- Pastora gave her share to Respondents and Leopoldo Espinoza
- On the same day, Domingo gave 3/4ths of the land through a fictitious sale to Erlinda’s
parents (Nemesio)
- Maximo and Nemesio both gave the land to Antonio and Erlinda (respondents)
- Respondents built a house on the land.
ISSUE:
- Are the respondents builders in good faith?
HELD:
- Yes. The house was built in 1995, two years before the filing of the complaint for nullity
of documents and reconveyance. During this time, respondents believed that they were the
owners of the land with no defect in their title.
- Good faith is also presumed from the builders. Bad faith should be established by clear and
convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith. Petitioners were not able
to prove this so the presumption of good faith prevails.
WEEK 5
Case digests by 4drian M3yer$

Celestial vs Cachopero
FACTS:
- Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA with the Bureau of Lands covering a 415
sq meter parcel of land located at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the
Salunayan Creek.
- Respondent alleged that he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built a
residential house and introduced other improvements.
- Petitioner then filed a protest against respondent’s MSA, claiming preferential right over
the land subject thereof since it is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential
house.
- The Bureau of Lands then dismissed and denied both the petitioner’s protest and
respondent’s MSA. It was found that the land in question was formerly a part of the
Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an Irrigation canal by
the National Irrigation Administration.
- Such land is therefore outside the commerce of man because it is property of public
dominion.
- In 1991, respondent then filed another MSA with the DENR Regional Office involving a
portion of the same lot.
- The DENR held that the land in question is suited for residential purposes and no longer
needed by the municipal government.
- DENR then ruled that the land in dispute shall be sold at public auction due to the
conflicting interest of the parties. (did not include this issue anymore but this is about the
grave abuse of discretion issue)
- Petitioner then claims right of ownership over the disputed land by applying article 461 of
the NCC. She also claimed ownership because of her alleged long-term adverse possession
and that of her predecessor in interest, Marcelina Basadre.
ISSUE:
- Can Petitioner claim ownership?
HELD:
- No. Saluyanan Creek is a property of public dominion and is therefore outside the
commerce of man. The government only declared such land as alienable when the DENR
held as so pursuant to the MSA filed by respondent. Petitioner therefore cannot assert her
title by long-term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest because the
land in question was not declared as alienable during that time.
- Article 461 cannot apply in this case because (a) the Saluyanan Creek dried up without a
natural change of course in the waters. Meaning that there has to be a change in the course
of a river, not where the river simply dries up; and (b) Such abandonment is required to be
 natural. The subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal
by the National Irrigation Administration.

WEEK 6
Case digests by 4drian M3yer$

Mananquil vs Moico
FACTS:
- Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated
by the NHA and placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Dev. Project.
- In Oct 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a
Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19 was sold to Prescilla in Feb 1980 by its occupant
- In 1991, both Iluminardo and Prescilla died without isse, but it turned out that Prescilla had
a child by a previous marriage named Eulogio Maypa.
- After the spouses’ death, an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by
petitioners to attain ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita (one of the
petitioners).
- Both lots were then leased out to third parties by them.
- The Mananquil heirs then discovered that in 1997, Eulogio, on the claim that they are
surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed and Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Salte in favor of Moico.
- In 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquil’s tenants and demolishing the structures they
built on Lots 18 and 19.
- The Mananquils then instituted a Civil Case for quieting of title and injunctive relief.
- The RTC ruled in favor of the Mananquils but the decision was reversed by the CA, ruling
that petitioners failed to show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have perfected their title of the
lots.
- Petitioners argue that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo Mananquil, they possess
the requisite legal or equitable title or interest in Lots 18 and 19.
ISSUE:
- Do the petitioners possess the requisite legal or equitable title needed to pursue the case for
quieting of title?
HELD:
- No. Since the lots in question have been acquired by Iluminardo and Prescilla through the
NHA project, it is necessary that the petitioners present any title, award, grant, document
or certification from the NHA or any other proper government agency that would show
that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/awardees of
Lots 18 and 19. This is because the spouses who died acquired the lot under a Conditional
Deed of Sale so it must be shown that the former have complied with the conditions and
 thus, attaining ownership of the Lots. Petitioners cannot have a legal or an equitable title
without this.

De Aviles vs CA and Aviles

FACTS:
- Petitioners are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. The landed is bounded on the North by Camilo Aviles; on the East by Malawa
River; on the South by Anastacio Aviles and on the West by Juana and Apoliono Joaquin,
with and area of 18.900 sqms.
- The property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles.
- In 1957, Eduardo Aviles presented to the boundary owners the earthen dikes that would
act as boundary limits to the property.
- In 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the
property with an area of approx. 1200 sqm. by constructing a bamboo fence thereon and
moving the earthen dikes.
- As part of the portion of land partitioned to him, it turns out that Camilo is only in
possession of 12,686 sqm. out of the 14,470 sqm. entitled to him.
- Because of this, an action for quieting of title was filed by petitioners. The court dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit while ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land
Surveyor to relocate and determine the extent and the boundary limit of the land.
- Petitioners brought the case to the CA wherein the court affirmed the decision of the lower
court and mentioned that the special action availed by petitioners was not the proper
remedy for settling a boundary dispute.
ISSUE:
- Is a special action for quieting of title the proper remedy to settle a boundary dispute?
HELD:
- No. Art 476 authorizes the said remedy if there is a cloud on a title to real property or any
interest therein. A plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title. The question raised in this case does not concern a cloud, but a
concern of proper measurement of the boundaries. There is no adverse claim by the
defendant “which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable” and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Tan v Rodriguez
FACTS:
- Respondents are children of Reynaldo Rodriguez and Ester Rodriguez, who died on Aug
17 2008 and Set 11 2004 respectively.
 - Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. On Feb 13 2009,
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo and
Ester.
- Anita (petitioner) is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita Ong Tan and
Reynaldo in the BPI.
- On Aug 31 2009, BPI sent a letter to Anita and informed her that her joint account with
Reynaldo would become dormant if no transaction will be made.
- With Anita deciding to withdraw her funds amounting to P1,021,868.30, BPI required her
to submit additional requirements, one of which is the extrajudicial settlement of the heirs
of Reynaldo.
- Anita approached respondents and asked them to sign a waiver of rights to the said joint
account but the respondents refused to do so, believing that the funds in the said joint
account belonged to their father.
- Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account were her exclusive funds,
which came from her East West Bank account. She presented as evidence a Debit Memo
from East West, which was used for the issuance of a Manager’s Check in the amount
(mentioned above) which is the exact same amount that was deposited to the BPI joint
account.
- A testimony coming from the East West branch manager was also presented saying that
the subject amount came from her East West account.
- Respondents continue to argue that the funds deposited in the BPI joint account belonged
exclusively to Reynaldo.
- RTC ruled in favor of Anita but was reversed by the CA claiming that she failed to prove
that she is indeed the sole owner of the funds therein.
ISSUE:
- Did Anita sufficiently prove that she is the exclusive owner of said funds?
HELD:
- Yes. Under Art. 485, it is presumed that the portions belonging to co-owners are equal
however the same may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. It has been clearly
presented that the money in the BPI joint account came from Anita’s personal account with
East West. The exact amount which was first withdrawn was the exact amount used to
open the BPI joint account. Both transactions occurred within the same day on Nov 14
2007. No further transaction in said joint account was made after the same was opened
until the death of Reynaldo. Respondents also failed to refute the evidence presented by
Anita.

Cuizon v Remoto
FACTS:
- Petitioners possess a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3121 pursuant to a
notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale dated Aug 3 1983. The property is situated
in Agusan del Norte.
 - Such document was executed by the heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo, wherein they
adjudicated unto themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same time, sold
said portion to petitioner (their co-heir).
- TCT RT-3121 is a transfer from TCT RT-183 which originally covers 16 hectares in the
name of Placida, Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patecia Tabada. Each of them
is a one-fourth share owner. (Placida owns 4000 sqm)
- Respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed of Sale of Real Property dated September
19, 1968, involving the same property, measuring 4,300 sqm. executed by Placida in favor
of Angel Remoto (husband of respondent).
- In an action to reconvey the property, the RTC ruled in favor of the Remotos in saying that
the plaintiffs (Remotos) can legally claim possession and ownership because of the duly
notarized but unregistered Deed of Sale of Real Property which was signed by Placida and
Angel Remoto. The defendants (Cuizon) also failed to prove any defect in the title of
plaintiff.
- Petitioners insist that they are the rightful owners of the property based on TCT RT-3121,
and that the 1968 Deed of Sale has no legal effect.
ISSUE:
- Who has the better right to the property?
HELD:
- The Remotos have the better right. This is pursuant to the principle that “He who is first in
time is preferred in right”. The Deed of Sale executed in favor of respondents was done in
1968 while the document possessed by petitioners was issued in 1983. In addition, the land
acquired by Cuizon was through the Placida heirs. This cannot be valid because during this
time, the heirs of Placida did not acquire any right to adjudicate the property unto them and
sell it Encarnacion because the property was already sold to Angel Remoto (no one can
give what one does not have or “nemo dat quod non habet”).
- In connection with Art 493: the portion sold by Placida and bought by Angel should only
pertain to one-fourth of Placida’s share in the 16-hectare property or 4,000 sqm (instead of
4,300 sqm). This is because the conveyance of the 4300 sqm would prejudice the rights of
the co-owners. The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership (Art 493).

Vda. De Espina v Abaya

FACTS:
- Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa Vda.
de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa, Necifora, Sora
and Jose, all surnamed Espina.
- Decedent's estate comprises of four (4) parcels of land located at the Municipality of
Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur.
 - On Aug 1973, an action for partition was filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children
Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and Necifora (all her children except for respondents
Sofia and Jose).
- The complaint alleges that parcel 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence the
same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in 8 equal parts, while
the other three parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned in common, one-
half belonging to Simprosa and the other half is owned by her and her children in eight
equal parts.
- Petitioners demanded the partition of the land but private respondents refused to agree.
- Respondents agrued that in 1951, Marcos Espina and his widow, together with their
children made a temporary verbal division and assignment of shares among their children.
After the death of Marcos, the temporary division was finalized and the heirs took
immediate possession of their respective shares.
Note: The division of land in the temporary division was not divided in the same manner
as to that of the action for partition filed by petitioners (see page 2 of the case for the
assignment of shares).
- Petitioners argue that the oral partition is invalid and strictly under the coverage of the
statute of Frauds (unenforceable).
- Petitioners also argue that an action for partition is imprescriptible (meaning ownership
cannot be claimed through uninterrupted possession).
ISSUE:
- Is an oral partition valid?
- Additional issue: Is prescription valid in this case?
HELD:
- Yes. An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. It is enforceable upon the
parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreement because a partition
is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the
property which belong to the co-owners.
- Yes. An action for partition is generally imprescriptible but it ceases to be such, and
becomes one for title where the defendants allege exclusive ownership. The
imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked because two of the co-heirs
(respondents) possess the property as exclusive owners and their possession for a period of
21 yrs is sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
WEEK 7
Case digest by Adrian Meyers

Sabio v. Interbank
FACTS:
- In 1973, Spouses Gerardo and Emma Ledonio assigned to the spouses Camilo and Ma.
Marlene Sabio (petitioners) all their rights, interests, title and participation over a
contiguous portion of the subject property, which is located in Almanza, Las Pinas City,
measuring 119,429 sqm.
- Similarly, while the property was still the object of several pending cases, Interbank
acquired from the Trans-Resource Management and Development Corporation all of the
latter’s rights to the subject property.
- In 1985, the Sabios and Interbank settled their opposing claims by entering into a MOA
whereby the Sabios assigned, conveyed and transferred all their rights over the land
involved to Interbank, with the express exception of a 58,000 square meter contiguous
portion of said lot.
- The Sabios were paid P750,000 for such conveyance.
- Interbank then transferred all its rights and interests to the Las Pinas Ventures, Incorporated
(LPVI).
- LPVI then transferred the same to the Ayala Group of Companies through a merger
between LPVI and Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI). The entire land, excluding the 58,000
sqm subject to be conveyed to petitioners, became the site of what was known then as
“Ayala Las Pinas Subdivision” which was later renamed as “Ayala Southvale”.
- Pursuant to the MOA, defendants aver that they could not fulfill its obligation because
petitioners refused to sign the Deed of Conveyance prepared by the former.
- Petitioners claim that the defendants should first clear the subject property of all squatters
and other illegal occupants. Petitioners demand this pursuant to the provision stipulated in
the MOA providing that the subject land will be transferred to them “free from all liens
and encumbrances”.
- Petitioners also claimed that they were never in actual possession of the property, therefore
defendants must first give such possession to them because possession is an essential
attribute to ownership.
- Respondents claim that they are under no obligation to do so since there is no express or
implied stipulation in the MOA that demands them to do so.
- The trial court ruled in favor of defendants, finding that the MOA did not impose, whether
expressly or impliedly, the obligation to clear the subject 58,000 sqm portion of squatters
and other illegal occupants. The CA affirmed such ruling from the trial court.
ISSUE:
- Are defendants obliged to clear the subject land of squatters or other illegal occupants?
- Is the possession of the land a main attribute of ownership?
HELD:
- No. If one of the main purposes of the petitioners in entering into a MOA with respondent
is to clear the area of illegal squatters then they should have expressly stipulated the same
in the contract. Having squatters or illegal occupants occupying the land cannot be seen as
a lien or encumbrance, pursuant to the interpretation of the petitioners of what is stipulated
in the contract. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, subject to a few exceptions, that of
which petitioners failed prove exist.
- No. Ownership and Possession are two entirely different legal concepts. Just as possession
is not definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership.
Petitioners may still be able to perfect their title without having possession as a
requirement. What is more important than possession is the control over the subject
property. Petitioners may avail the appropriate action/s to secure the eviction of the illegal
occupants of the subject portion of land. This signifies their control and their intention as
owners to obtain for themselves and to terminate said occupants’ actual possession thereof.

Carlos v Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
- On Dec 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos
Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land
with an area of 3,975 square meters located at Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
- Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since 1945 or earlier under a
bona fide claim of ownership. There is also no encumbrance affecting such property.
- Such property was bought from Maria Carlos by Ususan Development Corporation and
has been in possession of such since 1996.
- The application of for confirmation of title was made because Maria Carlos made a
commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title to Ususan Development
Corp so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
- The trial court granted the application but the CA reversed such decision stating that the
applicant (petitioners) was no longer in possession and occupation of the land in question
since on Oct 16, 1996, the land was sold to Ususan Development Corp.
ISSUE:
- Are petitioners qualified for confirmation of title?
HELD:
- No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945. Petitioners did not meet the second requirement because during the
 filing of the application, Ususan Devt Corp was the one who is already in possession and
occupation of the land.
- Even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the land at that time,
such possession was no longer in the concept of an owner but only that of a holder. This is
because Petitioner acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan Development Corp. in
1996. It cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of
ownership. Only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is
entitled to confirmation of title.