VILLUGA VS.

KELLY HARDWARE, 18 JULY 2012

DOCTRINE: Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2)

requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

FACTS:

Respondents field a complaint for collection of sum of money against the

petitioner the principal sum of P259,809.50. In the answer of the latter he
admitted having indebtedness and alleged having paid in the amounts of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00.

Respondent twice amended his complaint with leave of court, in the two
amendments the respondent admitted the payments but alleged that they
were applied to other obligations of the petitioners. The petitioner in his
answers to the amended complaint merely denied the allegations and
reiterated those he alleged in the answer to the complaint. Hence, the
respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether summary judgment is proper?

RULING:

When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to
be tried, the Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way
of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim.

When respondent subsequently filed its Second Amended Complaint

admitting therein that petitioners, indeed, made partial payments of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00. Nonetheless, respondent accounted for such
payments by alleging that these were applied to petitioners' obligations
which are separate and distinct from the sum of P259,809.50 being sought
in the complaint. This allegation was not refuted by petitioners in their
Answer to Second Amended Complaint. Rather, they simply insisted on
their defense of partial payment while claiming lack of knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth of respondent's allegation that
they still owe the amount of P259,809.50 despite their payments of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00.
MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI VS. BETITO, 09 JULY 2010

DOCTRINE: A judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer

admits all the material averments of the complaint. But where several
issues are properly tendered by the answer, a trial on the merits must be
resorted to in order to afford each party his day in court.

FACTS:

In a case concerning the unpaid real estate taxes of the properties

belonging to National Power Corporation situated in Municipaliy of Tiwi, the
legal services of the respondent hired by the former mayor of the
Municipality through the resolution of Sanguniang Bayan. In the contract
the respondent would receive a contingent fee of 10% of amount the Tiwi
would recover.

Despite the recovery by Tiwi of the unpaid taxes, the respondent was not
aid of the contingent fee, hence, he filed a collection suit. In their answer,
although the current mayor of Tiwi admitted the resolution, it rather denied
the authority of the former mayor to enter in the contract. Petitioners further
claim that they are not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly
handled on behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the
previous administration, and some of the cases were handle by some other
persons.

Respondent filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, which the
court granted, noting petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the
actionable documents.

ISSUE:

Whether the partial judgment on the pleading was proper?

RULING:

No, It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise

admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. [15]  However,
when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were
admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed,
and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven,
would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment
on the pleadings cannot be rendered.

In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as
plaintiff) and petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and
defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while others
requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution.
SOLID HOMES VS. LASEMA, 08 APRIL 2008

DOCTRINE: The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be

rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based," 22 does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions," which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, feeling aggrieved of the decision of HLURB and Office of

the President, appealed the decision before the CA. On the ground of lack
of merit, the appeal was dismissed and the CA affirmed in toto the decision
of OP.

Petitioner further appealed the case arguing the Office of the President
merely adopted by reference the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts and law on which it was
based, runs afoul of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which provides that: "No decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which it is based." The Office of the President, being a government
agency, should have adhered to this principle.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the OP runs counter of the provision of Sec. 14 Art
VII of the 1987constitution?

RULING:

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need
not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions
have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of
government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions
of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the
requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
SHIMIZU PHILS VS. MAGSALIN, 20 JUNE 2012

DOCTRINE: As adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the

dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on
the writing of valid judgments and final orders.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the respondents. Due to

procedural backdrop however, the RTC dismissed the case merely stating
in the complaint as follows; “For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case
is hereby DISMISSED.”

Petitioner appealed the case on the ground that the decision is a denial of
due process.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the RTC is a denial of due process against the
petitioner?

RULING:

Yes, The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states
its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a
legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is
based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized

under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order
and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of
actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are
with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]" 19 As a prejudicial
dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a
judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No.
02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata.
Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and
the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication
on the merits.20
GO V. EAST OCEANIC LEASING AND FINANCING CORPORATION,
JANUARY 19, 2018

FACTS

Respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against

petitioner for the latter’s failure to pay his loan. The RTC ruled in favor of
the respondent.

However, in the decision there is no discussion on how it arrived at its

conclusion finding Go liable to pay East Oceanic "the sum of
P2,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from the time of the filing of
the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision is invalid?

RULING:

Yes, In Yao v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court emphasized that "[t]he parties

to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court

In this case, a review of the records shows that the RTC had failed
to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it based its
ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East Oceanic is concerned.
DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS,
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

DOCTRINE: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so

exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies
are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought
to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud.

FACTS:

Petitioner acquired the parcel of land collectively from the Goc-Ongs.

Petitioner subsequently discovered that the Goc-Ongs executed a joint
affidavit declaring themselves as the owner of the land and mortgaged the
same to the Ngs.

Due to the failure to pay the obligation the Ngs filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money or I the alternative the foreclosure of the
mortgage. Due to the default of the respondent the court declared the
plaintiff owner of the land.

The petitioner filed an action before the CA for the annulment of the
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the remedy availed by the plaintiff is proper?

RULING:

No, A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so

exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies
are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought
to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud.8Ï‚rνll Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not
allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions.9Ï‚rνll The Court has thus instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 10Ï‚rνll of Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 11Ï‚rνll A
petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.
HEIRS OF YUSINGCO V. BUSILAK, JANUARY 24, 2018

FACTS:

Herein petitioner filed five separate complaints for accion publiciana and/or
recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo
Peralta. MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner.

In an earlier case for accion reivindicatoria (Civil Case No. 1645) decided

by the Court of First Instance of Surigao Del Norte on June 8, 1979 and
affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated August 30, 1982 (CA-G.R. No.
66508-R), which became final and executory on December 18, 1986,
herein petitioners were declared the true and lawful co-owners of the
subject properties

On appeal the CA held that, being an action in personam, the judgments in

the said case binds only the parties properly impleaded therein. Since
respondents were not parties to the said action, the CA concluded that they
could not be bound by the judgments declaring petitioners as owners of the
disputed properties.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision in the previous case binds the respondent?

RULING:

Yes, A perusal of the complaints filed by petitioners shows that the actions
were captioned as "Accion Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession."
However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the lower courts that the
complaints filed were actually accion reivindicatoria.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action

whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.11 It is a suit to recover possession of a
parcel of land as an element of ownership. 12 The judgment in such a case
determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the
property to the lawful owner.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND V. SAGUN, JULY 31, 2018

FACTS:

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee initiated the complaint for specific
performance and damages against HDMF on November 15, 2010.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 10-1120, the case was assigned to Branch 58
of the Makati RTC. Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee thereby sought to
compel HDMF to accept the proposed replacements of the
buyers/borrowers who had become delinquent in their amortizations,
asserting that HDMF's inaction to accept the replacements had forced
Globe Asiatique to default on its obligations under the MOA and FCAs.

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, which the Makati RTC, after due proceedings, resolved on
January 30, 2012.

Instead of filing an appeal HDMF file a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether a petition for certiorari is proper to assail the Summary Judgment?

RULING:

 Under the circumstances, the summary judgment was, properly speaking,

but an interlocutory judgment of the Makati RTC. A partial summary
judgment like that rendered on January 30, 2012 by the Makati RTC was in
the category of a separate judgment. Such judgment did not adjudicate
damages, and still directed that further proceedings be had in order to
determine the damages to which Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee could be
entitled.

Considering that the January 30, 2012 partial summary judgment was
interlocutory, the remedy could not be an appeal, for only a final judgment
or order could be appealed. Consequently, the interlocutory January 30,
2012 summary judgment could be assailed only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. V. WESLEYAN
UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, JANUARY 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the

pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the
pleadings.

FACTS:

Respondent delivered and installed medical equipment and supplies to the

respondent hospital. According to the petitioner, respondent failed to pay its
full obligation.

In a letter sent, the respondent under new administration informed the

petitioner that the contract was invalid due to lesion. And due to the
respondents default petitioner filed a case for collection of money.

In its answer the respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the

complaint "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were
undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant
Wesleyan University-Philippines.

Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent's total obligation as of

February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00, but its balance thereafter
became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid
P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the petitioner
had agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the
balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36
months through 36 postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the
respondent then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after
four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent
stopped payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation due and
demandable pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement.

In view of the foregoing the petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
ISSUE:

Whether the motion is proper?

RULING:

Yes,

The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is

whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the
pleadings.28 Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on how
the defending party's answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint. The defending party's answer either admits or denies the
allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The
allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not
require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of
ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed, will require
evidence.

In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly admitted

paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint. The admission related
to the petitioner's allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery
and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the
respondent; (c) the payments made by the respondents; (d) the balance
still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the February 11, 2009
agreement. The admission of the various agreements, especially the
February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner's
complaint. To recall, the petitioner's cause of action was based on the
February 1 1, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in the
case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11,
2009 agreement, and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the
express admission of the genuineness and due execution of the February
11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings became proper.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION V. HUANG, AUGUST 9, 2017

DOCTRINE: A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and

unalterable. It can neither be modified nor disturbed by courts in any
manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived
errors of fact or law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing
the execution of the judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly.

FACTS:

In a complaint for damages based on quasi delict, the court ruled in favor of
the respondent. Upon attainment of finality of the decision, the resondents
moved for the execution of the judgment.

Petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution arguing clerical errors in

the computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the judgment may be assailed despite attainment of finality?

RULING:

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality

becomes immutable and unalterable. The doctrine of immutability of
judgment, however, is not an ironclad rule.73 It is subject to several
exceptions, namely: (1) [T]he correction of clerical errors; (2) [T]he so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3)
[V]oid judgments; and (4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, there are no clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the

computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity awarded to
respondent Stephen. The amounts indicated in the dispositive portion of
the judgment faithfully correspond to the findings of fact and conclusions of
the trial court.
HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, DECEMBER 5, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged and found guilty of crime of malversation of public

funds. After the case became final and executory, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay
the Execution.

Tthe Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following requisites for
the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before finality of a
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5)
the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the order.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion to reopen the case may be granted?

RULING:

No,

Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following
requirements for the reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
(5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be
terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already
cripples the motion. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August
3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was
already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
PAGDANGANAN V. COURT OF APPEALS, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

DOCTRINE: A case becomes moot when there is no more actual

controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with

Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals. The
petition seeks to assail the decision of the trial court in allowing the holding
of stockholders meeting despite the pendency of the interpleader case.

On August 2, 2012 they filed Petition for Mandamus 1 seeking to compel the
Court of Appeals to resolve the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. The
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on February 8, 2013. It issued a
Resolution dated March 10, 2014 on petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the case may still continue?

RULING:

No, In this Petition, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of

mandamus to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No.
104291.62 However, the Court of Appeals already rendered a Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104291 on February 8, 2013. It also resolved petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration on March 10, 2014. Despite the occurrence of
these subsequent events, petitioners, in their Memorandum, reiterated their
prayer for this Court to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP
No. 104291.63
Any issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case, however, becomes an
exercise in futility. The Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to resolve a
case it has already fully resolved. This Petition must be dismissed for being
moot.
FACTS

In the labor case between FASAP and PAL, the court decided in favor of
FASAP. A motion for reconsideration was filed by PAL which was
dismissed by the court, hence, a second motion for reconsideration was
filed, which the second division of the court denied through a resolution.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court En Banc recalled the resolution of the
Second Division and acquired jurisdiction of the case and subsequently
granted the second motion for reconsideration.

FASAP argued that the resolution of the SC void for failure to comply with
the Sec. 14 Art VII of the 1987 constitution and the second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading further FASAP invoked the
harmless error rule.

ISSUE:

Whether the harmless error rule has an application in the instant case?

RULING:

No, The harmless error rule obtains during review of the things done by

either the trial court or by any of the parties themselves in the course of
trial, and any error thereby found does not affect the substantial rights or
even the merits of the case. The Court has had occasions to apply the rule
in the correction of a misspelled name due to clerical error; 49 the signing of
the decedents' names in the notice of appeal by the heirs; 50 the trial court's
treatment of the testimony of the party as an adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel; 51 and the failure of the trial court to give
the plaintiffs the opportunity to orally argue against a motion. 52 All of the
errors extant in the mentioned situations did not have the effect of altering
the dispositions rendered by the respective trial courts. Evidently, therefore,
the rule had no appropriate application herein.
BERNARDO V. SORIANO, JUNE 19, 2019

DOCTRINE: An appealable judgment or final order refers to one that

adjudicates the parties' contention and determines their rights and liabilities
as regards each other, disposing the whole subject matter of the case.

FACTS:
In a custody case between Bernardo and Soriano over their granddaughter
the court upheld Soriano's right to parental custody and parental
authority but ruled that, in the meantime, it will be for the best interest of the
minor to stay with Bernardo for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at
Notre Dame of Greater Manila. Thus, the RTC granted temporary custody
of the minor to Bernardo.

After denial of motion for reconsideration, Bernardo filed a notice of appeal

which the court denied in due course rationated that Motion for
Reconsideration have not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the
subject of an appeal. 

ISSUE:

Whether the notice of appeal was proper?

RULING:

According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be

taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it is not disputed that the RTC
rendered its Decision dated August 5, 2010, which resolved the merits of
the Custody case, upholding Soriano's right to parental custody and
parental authority, albeit ruling that it will be for the best interest of the child
to stay with Bernardo first for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at
Notre Dame of Greater Manila.
An appealable judgment or final order refers to one that adjudicates the
parties' contention and determines their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, disposing the whole subject matter of the case.
BUOT V. DUJALI, OCTOBER 2, 2017

FACTS

In the instant case Buot filed her petition for administration over a property
of Gregoro Dujali, Dujali filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. When
the RTC denied his motion to dismiss, Dujali filed a motion for
reconsideration. This led to the RTC's issuance of the Order of September
19, 2011 granting Dujali's motion for reconsideration and holding that
Buot's petition for administration should be dismissed. It was only at this
point that Buot filed, for the first time, a motion seeking for reconsideration
of the Order which declared the dismissal of her petition for administration.
The court dismissed it being a second motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion is a second motion for reconsideration?

RULING:

No, Clearly, this is not the motion for reconsideration contemplated in

Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it
prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party
involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot's
motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the Order
dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC
clearly erred in denying her motion on the ground that it is a second motion
for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules.
CRISTOBAL V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., OCTOBER 4, 2017

DOCTRINE: Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing

itself on a matter, a motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of
this reversal, for the first time, is not a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.

FACTS:

On appeal of the case between petitioner and respondent, the NLRC on

motion for reconsideration of both parties modified its ruling causing the
filing of the petitioner of motion for reconsideration.

The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration being a second motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion for reconsideration is a second motion for

reconsideration?

RULING:

No, Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a

matter, a motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this
reversal, for the first time, is not a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.
NEYPES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 14 SEPTEMBER 2005

DOCTRINE: the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the "final order,"

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court. The court dismissed the case due to prescription.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.  The court a quo denied the
notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. 5 This was received
by petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the notice of appeal was filed late?

RULING:

this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43
on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies 31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt
of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is
not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. 33 Hence, the use of "or"
in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of
the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
YU VS. SAMSON-TATAD, 09 FEBRUARY 2011

DOCTRINE: "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for
appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

FACTS:

The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later he filed a
motion for new trial which the RTC denied. After the denial the petitioner
filed a notice of appeal invoking the fresh period rule in Neypes.

ISSUE: Whether the fresh period rule equally applies to criminal cases?

RULING:

Yes, While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's

pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of

Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a
civil case and in a criminal case.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also
apply to appeals in criminal cases,
FORTUNE LIFE VS. COA, 27 JANUARY 2015

DOCTRINE: Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition

for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Petitioner’s petition for money claims was denied by the Commission on

Audit. After receiving the notice he filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied. Hence, the petitioner resorted to file a petition for
certiorari. The petition for certiorari was also denied due to its late filing.
The petitioner in its motion for reconsideration invoked the Neypes Rule.

ISSUE: Whether the fresh period rule applies to petition for certiorari?

RULING:

No, There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. The reglementary periods under
Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period;
hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days
in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS VS. BAYANG, 20 APRIL 2015

DOCTRINE: "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals

and not to administrative appeals.

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages

against respondent before the HLURB. After the arbiter ruled against the
petitioner it appealed before HLURB Board of Commissioners it was
however denied. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
filed an appeal before the Office of the President which was also denied
due to late filing.

The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule"
enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.9 should be applied to their case.

ISSUE:

Whether the fresh period rule applies in the instant case?

RULING:

It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial

appeals and not to administrative appeals.

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in
nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.