Alcazar v. Alcazar, GR 174451, Oct.

13, 2009

Issues: Does physical incapacity to consummate the marriage constitute psychological incapacity?

Facts: Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Rey’s house in Occidental
Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo. Rey
then left for Riyadh where he was working. He never contacted his wife since he left. About a year and a
half, Veronica was informed that her husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go
directly to her in Tondo but to his house in Mindoro instead. Thus, Veronica concluded that respondent
was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has
been uncooperative to the investigation. Dr. Tayag testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. RTC denied. CA
also denied. Hence, this petition.

Ruling: No. Art 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to the lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. Veronica even admitted that she and
Rey had sex before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not exist in this case.

Veronica was seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Rey based on the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Court declared that “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Ninal v. Bayadog, GR 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

Issues: May parties be exempted from securing a marriage license if during their cohabitation of at least
5 years, one or both of them are legally incapacitated to enter into a marriage?

Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting them from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, Ninal et al filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack
of marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect Ninal et al’s successional rights.

Ruling: No. The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that
they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
De Castro v. De Castro, GR 160172, Feb. 13, 2008

Issues: Can the validity of the marriage be attacked collaterally?

Facts: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in
September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the wedding despite of absence of marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day. However, they did not live
together as husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and supported the child on her own.
Annabelle then filed a complaint for support against Reinel before the RTC Pasig. In her complaint,
Annabelle alleged that she is married to Reinel and that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to
financially support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied that they are married and claimed that
the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only
forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy without marriage may
bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, declared Reinel as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support.

Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which Reinel and Annabelle executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.

he Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. the Court may
pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
absolute nullity. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus