JTRG-01738; No of Pages 12

Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Transport Geography

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jtrg

Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and
the impact on planning, operation and system performance
Ela Babalık-Sutcliffe
Department of City and Regional Planning, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Many cities around the world have seen efforts to restructure the provision of public transport. While transit au-
Received 19 January 2015 thorities as public agencies continue to deliver transit services in some cities, many others have privatised these
Received in revised form 18 August 2015 services, have opened up the market to private operators or have outsourced them to newly founded subsidiaries.
Accepted 18 August 2015
The situation is no different in Turkey, where new legislation was enacted in the 1980s enabling local authorities
Available online xxxx
to establish corporate companies under their own agency, and to shift to them the entire responsibility for run-
Keywords:
ning certain public transport operations. The motivation is often to increase efficiency, productivity and profit-
Urban rail systems ability in these operations, although there is a risk that planning and operation may become fragmented under
Transit operation such organisational reforms, making it difficult to maintain coordination in planning and to ensure the provision
Organisational reform of an integrated service. This paper analyses this organisational change in public transport in Turkey, focusing on
Integration the planning, operation and performance of urban rail systems in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
There has been a recent tendency in many cities in the world to
launch efforts towards the restructuring of public transport provision.
Historically, it is fully public agencies, i.e. transit authorities established
under local governments, that have been the main responsible body for
the planning and delivery of public transport services. Since the 1980s
however, the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public
transport has seen a marked increase. In a number of cases, public trans-
port services have been privatised or have been opened up to the mar-
ket through competitive tendering, government authorisation or
franchising, i.e. selling private companies licences to operate; while in
other cases, transit agencies have outsourced public transport services
to newly founded subsidiaries (for reviews on various forms of private
provision of public transport, see Cox, 1986; Berechman, 1993; Button
and Rietveld, 1993; Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1993; Costa, 1996; van
de Velde, 1999; Cox and Duthion, 2001; Richmond, 2001; Jain et al.,
2008; Hensher and Wong, 2011).
The underlying objective of such organisational reforms is generally
cost-savings, since the lure of profit is likely to be a strong enough incen-
tive for operators to be more efficient in service delivery. There are
many global examples of private operation and competitive regimes
in public transport resulting in improved cost efficiency and productiv-
ity in transit services (Berechman, 1993; Button and Costa, 1999; Cox
and Duthion, 2001; Gwilliam, 2008; Jain et al., 2008) as well as in the
elimination of subsidies for public transport (Buehler and Pucher,
E-mail addresses: ebaba@metu.edu.tr, ela.babalik.sutcliffe@gmail.com.
2011). It is also claimed that the involvement of the private sector in
the provision of public transport reinforces accountability, leading to in-
creased responsibility (Richmond, 2001), which in return can help in-
crease responsiveness to user needs, and as a result, service levels
(Sohail et al., 2006). Furthermore, autonomous independent companies
are not constrained by the same cumbersome procedures that govern-
ment agencies or local authorities are subjected to, and so may bring
flexibility and ease in financing to the playing field, along with rapid
infrastructure investments (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1993). More-
over, private operators may bring about technical and service innova-
tion through competence development (Ongkittikul and Geerlings,
2006) and this may also result in more efficient service and network
development.
On the other hand, it is often discussed that private provision of pub-
lic transport may result in increased fares, alongside reduced wages in a
bid to keep costs low and subsidies to a minimum (Banister et al., 1992;
Berechman, 1993; Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1993; Richmond, 2001;
Sohail et al., 2006; Buehler and Pucher, 2011; Hensher and Wong,
2011). A certain level of competition is desirable to take advantage of
the expected benefits of privatisation (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer,
1993); however, fierce competition along the same routes results in a
wasteful duplication of fixed costs (Tang and Lo, 2008; Hensher and
Wong, 2011) as well as actual competition between vehicles on the
road, resulting in problems of traffic safety. In addition, the privatisation
of services or the creation of new operating companies may result in a
fragmentation of service providers, with undesirable consequences on
service and ticket integration (Mees, 2005). If public transport is left
to the private sector, the result may be too many service providers, mak-
ing fare integration and reduced transfer fares a challenge, leading to a

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
0966-6923/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
2 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
requirement for government regulation to ensure integrated ticketing
and affordability of fares (Hensher and Wong, 2011).
While the debate continues over private versus public provision of
urban transport, there has also been an increase in hybrid organisations
that combine the characteristics of both public- and private-sector orga-
nisations. In general terms, these quasi-governmental corporations are
set up by central and local governments to deliver a public service,
and while they may be publicly funded, they operate at arm's length
of the government (van Thiel, 2001), being exempt from many of the
laws and regulations that apply to government (Koppell, 2003). Existing
at the interface between the public and private sectors (Lan and Rainey,
1992), the appeal of quasi-governmental agencies “lies in the belief that
they combine the best of both worlds: public accountability and private
efficiency” (Koppell, 2003:1).
Similar to the expectations from the private sector provision of pub-
lic services, in the case of quasi-governmental agencies too, politicians
expect an increase in service efficiency and effectiveness (Keeling,
1976; van Thiel, 2001; Koppell, 2003; Heinrich et al., 2010; Kosar,
2011). Furthermore, the absence of bureaucratic red tape, which pre-
vents governments from responding quickly to public need, is expected
to allow quasi-governmental agencies to be more agile and flexible
(Keeling, 1976; Bertelli, 2005) as well as innovative (Heinrich et al.,
2010). It is also argued that since these agencies are likely to have a sin-
gle or a limited range of objectives, they can establish the appropriate
form of organisation for the task in hand, developing “strong manageri-
al, administrative, diplomatic or research characteristics, in a way im-
possible in a multi-role government department” (Keeling, 1976:168).
Previous researches have supported some of the expected benefits of
quasi-governmental agencies in public transport provision: Jain et al.
(2008) showed that urban rail transit systems operated by corporations
that were local government enterprises were more efficient in service
provision when compared to systems under public sector ownership.
Xu et al. (2010) argued that after the decentralization of transit service
delivery responsibilities to the new corporations set up by the city gov-
ernment in Beijing, mass transit system ridership increased. Costa
(1996) reported that the city-owned enterprise in Gothenburg reduced
the financial burden on the public transit authority of the city, based, it
would seem, on a significant reduction in workforce.
That said, a number of criticisms have been levelled against quasi-
governmental agencies, among which accountability is prominent.
These agencies are not necessarily run by elected officials, raising ques-
tions of political accountability and legitimacy (Koppell, 2003; Bertelli,
2005; Heinrich et al., 2010; Kosar, 2011); nor are they subject to the
same strict government auditing, and so they lack financial accountabil-
ity (Keeling, 1976; Koppell, 2003; Bertelli, 2005). In addition, similar to
the case of private operators, the emergence of these single-purpose or-
ganisations has been criticized as leading to fragmentation in govern-
ment (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011), with various organisations
pursuing often incompatible and even contradictory goals, requiring
strong action by governments to ensure that they perform their tasks
in a more integrated manner (Peters, 2004). As Heinrich et al. (2010)
argue, government managers cannot expect the competitive market
and its quasi-governmental entities “to just work their ‘magic’ in im-
proving service outcomes without government input” (i.17).
It is clear, therefore, that shifting the provision of public transport to
a private company, license holder, or government-owned corporation
does not mean the local authority is released from its responsibilities
in the implementation of city- or region-wide policies to promote tran-
sit and introduce incentives to use public transport. There must be col-
laboration and cooperation between the operator(s) of public transport
and local and regional governments (Buehler and Pucher, 2011), and
local government intervention may be required to introduce and main-
tain an integrated transport policy, which the market is not likely to de-
liver on its own (Glaister, 2004).
In Turkey too, many cities have carried out organisational changes to
the governance and delivery of their public transport operations. New
Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
legislation in the 1980s allowed local authorities to set up companies
under their own agency and to shift to these quasi-governmental agen-
cies the entire responsibility of delivering certain public services. These
companies are separate legal entities that can be defined as corporations
since they act as independent private entrepreneurs and in most cases
enjoy an autonomous budget.
The main motivation for local governments in setting up these
quasi-governmental organisations in Turkey is to increase efficiency in
service provision (Keleş, 1993; Berk, 2003; Özdemir, 2008; Tekeli,
2009), while flexibility in employment policy and salaries is seen as a
further motive, since this can help local governments develop local
know-how with modern management structures by employing quali-
fied staff with salaries that are often higher than what the government
offices can pay (Berk, 2003; Özdemir, 2008; Meşe, 2011). Employment
policies and local government spending are beset by red tape, while
these organisations can bring flexibility to both aspects due to their
autonomous budgets and their authority to spend and invest (Berk,
2003; Özdemir, 2008). The absence of such cumbersome procedures
in investment, expenditures and employment is considered to be
a key advantage of these subsidiary companies, while the main criti-
cisms made against them stem from the inadequacy of procedures to
control spending. The lack of oversight of central government financial
auditing that applies to local governments raises issues of financial ac-
countability (Demirkaya, 2010; Meşe, 2011; Kendirli et al., 2014); al-
though it should be noted that they are accountable to the local
government, and produce annual performance programmes, reports
and strategic plans, all of which contribute to their transparency, to a
certain extent (Barun, 2007). In addition, while they had flexibility in
the initial years in tenders, they are now subject to the Public Procure-
ment Law, and so no longer enjoy exclusive rights in investments
(Demirkaya, 2010). That said, there are concerns that tenders an-
nounced by municipalities are being increasingly awarded to their sub-
sidiary companies, jeopardising the competitiveness of the market
(İlhan, 2013; Savaşkan, 2013).
The majority of studies of these quasi-governmental agencies at the
local government level in Turkey raise the issue of financial accountabil-
ity and the implications for public policy and management. However,
the presence of these subsidiary companies has implications also for
government fragmentation, policy coordination, and the integrated
planning and operation of transit services. It is the intention in this
paper to analyse this organisational change in transit delivery in
Turkey, focusing on the planning, operation and performance of urban
rail systems in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the three most populous cit-
ies in Turkey.
2. Methods and data
The analysis aims to reveal how the existence of quasi-governmental
subsidiary companies affects the planning and operation of local trans-
port in Turkey, with particular emphasis on coordination in planning
and integration in transit operations. It also tries to find out whether
the different approaches to the reorganisation of transit service provi-
sion in the three cities, Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, have resulted in dif-
ferences in coordinated planning, transit integration, service levels, cost
of travel, and finally, the performance of the systems in terms of efficien-
cy and productivity.
To this end, the following four aspects of each urban rail system are
analysed and assessed:
■ Planning coordination: urban development planning and the plan-
ning of the rail systems (particularly route location decisions) are
analysed to understand whether the presence of separate subsidiary
companies affects integrated planning.
■ Integration with other modes: integration with different modes of
transport is analysed to explore how the presence of subsidiary com-
panies affects system integration.
 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
■ Fare integration, cost of travel and service levels: cost and quality of
service are compared to assess how the subsidiary organisations af-
fect transit service delivery from a users' perspective.
■ System performance: ridership trends since the opening of the sys-
tems are analysed and factors behind increases and decreases in pas-
senger numbers are explored with a view to assessing whether the
policies of subsidiary companies affected ridership levels. Efficiency
and productivity in service provision are major motivations for
the introduction of private or quasi-governmental corporations.
Defining efficiency and productivity as “the ability to use resources
(inputs) to produce an urban rail service (output)” (Graham,
2008:84), the analysis also compares such figures as ridership,
round trips, number of staff, energy consumption, operating cost
and system route lengths. A comparison of costs and revenues is
also helpful for assessing the profitability of systems, and this is
done to a certain extent, despite the data limitations described
below.
Data was collected through field studies in the three cities in 2013
and 2014. Semi-structured interviews, which were designed to obtain
information on the four aspects noted above, were made with urban
planning and transport planning departments as well as with subsidiary
company managers and representatives. In addition, current and previ-
ous urban and transport plan reports were analysed together with other
documents obtained from the cities, and previous researches were used
where available. It should be noted that while information on the issues
of planning coordination and transit and fare integration was more
straightforward to obtain through in-depth interviews and site surveys,
some of the data needed for the performance analysis could not be ob-
tained. Maintenance costs, for example, were not available, and hence
the cost analysis had to rely on operating cost data. Fare revenue data
could not be obtained either; and therefore, a precise farebox recovery
ratio comparison was not possible, although the operators provided in-
dications, as described in Section 4.4, as to whether the fare revenues
covered operating costs and whether subsidies were required from
local governments. Finally, capital cost data could be obtained only for
the initial phases of the systems; and therefore, the capital cost compar-
ison is based on these first phases.
3. Background information on the case study systems and their
transit agencies
Urban transport in Turkey is governed, planned, and managed by
local authorities, i.e. municipalities, who are also responsible for the
planning and provision of public transport services. In the 1930s and
1940s, the three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, created transit
authorities (named IETT, EGO, and ESHOT respectively) with a special
status to plan and operate public transport systems. These fully public
agencies stand as general directorates under the municipality, but are
separate public entities with their own autonomous budgets. In addi-
tion to these agencies, municipalities often have a separate department
for urban transport, and in some cases separate departments of urban
rail system planning. In greater city municipalities, there are also Trans-
port Coordination Centres, created by law, for the coordination of dis-
trict municipalities and the various departments and operators that
exist in urban transport.
In addition to the public transport services provided by the munici-
palities, there are also privately operated services run by individual ve-
hicle owners. Minibuses, a paratransit mode that emerged in the 1940s
when publicly provided transit services were failing to meet the de-
mand, operate on many lines in cities, with the municipalities regulating
their routes, schedules, fares, vehicles used and vehicle quotas per route.
The difficulty in meeting mobility demand also resulted in the introduc-
tion of privately-operated buses in the 1980s by such cities as Ankara
Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
3
and Istanbul, with the routes, schedules, fares and vehicles also subject
to municipality regulation.
The 1980s also saw the enactment of legislation allowing local au-
thorities to establish subsidiary companies, to which they were able to
shift the entire responsibility for the delivery of certain services. Urban
rail systems in particular have become a key area for such companies,
and in all three cities analysed here, subsidiary companies were set up
to manage urban rail operations, although the models vary from city
to city.
Background information on the three cities (Table 1) shows the rel-
atively low car ownership levels compared to most Western European
and North American cities, and the relatively high public transport
usage, accounting for around 75% of motorised journeys (all trips
excluding those made with non-motorised modes, i.e. walking and
cycling) in 2007 (when latest comparable data is available), although
recent data shows that this has declined to 62% in Ankara (EGO,
2015). Istanbul has the most extensive urban rail network, followed
by Izmir, although it should be noted that the 80 km regional rail system
in Izmir is not an entirely new investment, but a modernisation of the
old commuter rail line.
In Ankara, the subsidiary company was set up by the transit author-
ity EGO. Falling under the control of this authority, the subsidiary com-
pany has no autonomous budget, and so cannot enter bids or tenders, or
carry out investments. Its mission is to operate urban rail systems that
are planned and developed by EGO, to which it is accountable, and
which also acts as its financial guarantor for the operation of these sys-
tems. The Transport Planning Department, Rail Systems Department
and Bus Systems Department are also under EGO, which retains the re-
sponsibility of planning all public transport systems as well as operating
the majority of bus routes. The Ankara case, therefore, stands as an ex-
ample in which the transit authority remained as a powerful actor in
public transport planning and operation.
In Istanbul, the company that was set up to operate urban rail sys-
tems is a subsidiary to the Istanbul Greater Municipality, having its
own separate autonomous budget. The task of the company is defined
in its contract as not only operating the urban rail systems, but also tran-
sit planning, construction and investment. Furthermore, the company is
also engaged in project preparation and consultancy works, and so pro-
vides input for the planning and development of urban rail lines. It also
invests heavily in research and development with a view to producing
trains and equipment in-country, and so can be seen as an active
entrepreneur.
While the subsidiary company is asked for inputs during the
planning of urban rail lines, transit planning, and hence the planning
of the rail systems remains the responsibility of the Istanbul Greater
Municipality. The transit authority, IETT, is still active, though its re-
sponsibilities are limited to the planning and operation of bus systems,
including the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The Department of Transport, De-
partment of Road Maintenance and Infrastructure, and Department of
Rail Systems are not under IETT, but exist as separate departments
under the greater municipality. The Department of Transport is the
main body in charge of urban transport planning, and has four director-
ates: Transport Planning, Transport Coordination, Traffic, and Public
Transport Services. In addition to the rail operating company, the mu-
nicipality has established other subsidiary companies to operate ferries
and some of the bus lines in the city. None of the subsidiary companies
are under direct control of the transit authority, as is the case in Ankara
EGO, but they are under the Department of Resource Development.
For the case of Istanbul, the central government involvement in de-
cision making should also be noted. Several mega projects, such as the
third Bosphorus bridge and road tunnel crossings, were proposed by
the central government, despite not featuring in local urban develop-
ment and transport plans.
All of the above factors lead to fragmentation in transit planning and
operation in Istanbul, exasperated further by the presence of private in-
dividual bus and minibus operators. Despite the presence of a Transport
4 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Table 1
Background information on the three cities and their urban rail systems.

Ankara Istanbul Izmir

City population 5 million 14 million 4 million

Cars per 1000 people (2014) 223 158 149
Modal share of private cars in 22.5% 26.3% 20.1%
motorised trips (2007)
Urban rail system(s) and route Metro (M1): 14.7 km Light Metro (M1): 26.1 km Light Metro: 20 km
lengths as of 2014 Metro (M2): 16.6 km Metro (M2): 23.5 km Regional Rail: 80 km
Metro (M3): 15.4 km Metro (M3): 15.9 km
Light Metro: 8.7 km Metro (M4): 21.7 km
Tram (T1): 18.2 km
Tram (T4): 15.3 km
Total urban rail network length 55.4 km 120.7 km 100 km
Opening year of urban rail systems Metro (M1): 1997 Light Metro (M1): 1989 Light Metro: 2000
Metro (M2): 2014 Metro (M2): 2000 Regional Rail: 2010
Metro (M3): 2014 Metro (M3): 2013
Light Metro: 1996 Metro (M4): 2012
Tram (T1): 1992
Tram (T4): 2008
Subsidiary company opening year 1995 1988 1997
Other public transport service Majority of bus services by the transit Majority of bus services and BRT by All bus services by the transit authority
operators authority the transit authority Another subsidiary company for some
Privately operated buses and minibuses: Another subsidiary company for other bus routes
individual owners some other bus routes Privately operated minibuses: individual
Privately operated buses and owners
minibuses: individual owners Separate subsidiary companies for regional
Separate subsidiary company for ferries rail and ferries

Notes: Although all operating urban rail systems are shown here, those that opened after 2008 are not included in the performance analysis given in Section 4.4, since these systems were
considered very new at the start of the research, and so data was not collected. However, the impacts of the opening of new lines on the ridership performance of the studied systems are
included in the analysis. In Istanbul, T1 and T2 tram lines were combined, with both analysed under T1. T3 is a 2.6 km long nostalgic tram, and hence not included.
Sources: Gerçek and Demir (2008), EGO (2007), Greater Izmir Municipality (2007), TURKSTAT (2015), systems' Internet pages.

Coordination Centre, as described above, the multitude of actors in-
volved in urban transport is recognised as a serious challenge in Istanbul
(Gerçek, 2013), and a need for administrative reform in the shape of a
single transport authority has been stressed in previous studies (Ocak
and Manisalı, 2006; Gerçek and Demir, 2008; Hennig, 2011; Gerçek,
2013).
A similar organisational structure exists in Izmir, although not as
fragmented as the Istanbul case. A subsidiary company with an autono-
mous budget was set up to operate the light metro, while the transit au-
thority (ESHOT), under the greater municipality, operates the majority
of bus transit systems. Aside from ESHOT, the Transport Department
and Rail System Investment Department also exist under the greater
municipality, and the planning of transport in general and public trans-
port in particular in Izmir falls under the responsibility of these three
bodies. In addition to the buses operated by ESHOT, some other bus
lines are operated by a different subsidiary company; another operates
the regional rail system; and a further company has control of the
ferries. As in Istanbul and Ankara, private individual operators provide
minibus services in the city.
Urban rail operator companies in both Istanbul and Izmir can enter
tenders and bids, although they are subject to the Public Procurement
Law under the same terms as local governments. The planning of the
urban rail lines and major investments, such as the construction of
new lines, are still made by the municipalities, while the companies in
these two cities can make procurements and certain investments for
system maintenance and improvement, although they are expected to
cover the operating and maintenance costs through their own budgets.
The subsidiary company in Ankara, on the other hand, cannot make any
maintenance investments or expenditures on its own, and must request
these from the transit authority, EGO. Furthermore, it is not required to
cover the operating costs: all fare revenues are paid to EGO, which
makes a fixed payment to the company for its services.
The following section presents an analysis of the three cases to pro-
vide an understanding of how the different organisational structures
have affected the planning, operation and performance of the urban
rail systems.
4. Analysis of the three cases from Turkey
4.1. Coordination between urban development planning and the planning
of the rail systems
The planning of the urban rail systems predates the introduction of
the subsidiary companies that were set up to operate the systems, and
the analysis, therefore, provides the planning conditions and the level
of coordination both before and after these companies.
The Ankara case represents a good practice in terms of its integrated
planning of urban development and public transport. In the 1970s, the
metropolitan development plan of the city introduced a corridor-
development scheme, with two metro lines identified along the corri-
dors that extended the city towards west. The detailed transport plan
carried out by EGO was postponed until the early-1990s; however, it
was based strongly on the corridor plan and included the two metro
lines along the two corridors as the priority lines, with an additional
light metro line serving the inner city (Fig. 1). In implementation, only
the light metro and one of the priority metro lines were built initially
and opened to service in 1996 and 1997 respectively. The metro line
along the second development corridor was constantly postponed,
and remained “under construction” for over 10 years, opening in 2014
only after the Ministry of Transport, Maritime and Communication
took over the responsibility for its construction. Notwithstanding this
problem in implementation, the existing metro lines in Ankara were
well integrated into the urban development plans and were planned
to serve the new growth corridors that were proposed and have been
developed since the 1970s (Babalık-Sutcliffe, 2013). Another point wor-
thy of note related to the implementation of plans is that over the last
decades the city experienced growth also in other directions, expanding
towards both the north and south, while the dominant western growth
continued, albeit characterised more and more by urban sprawl rather
than controlled growth (Batuman, 2013). These expansions have been
due to the lack of compliance of the urban plans and projects with the
upper scale corridor development plan, and undoubtedly affected the
integration of urban rail infrastructure development and urban land-

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 5

Fig. 1. Ankara urban rail lines. Note: Prepared by the author using www.openstreet.com.

use growth. It can be concluded, therefore, that the coordinated plan-
ning of urban development and rail transit systems has not been main-
tained, although neither the coordination nor the lack of it can be traced
to the presence of the metro operating company: although a subsidiary
of EGO, it has little involvement in transit planning, and so has exerted
little influence in this regard.
In Istanbul, the metropolitan development plans have been aiming
at controlling the growth of the city in a linear form from east to west
along the southern coast, with the underlying objective of preserving
the forest in the north as the green belt of the city. The Light Metro
(M1) line, the T1 tram, the commuter rail tunnel crossing (Marmaray)
and the M4 metro line on the eastern side comply with this scheme,
serving the south of the city in a linear form (Fig. 2). The northern sec-
tions of the M2 Metro line, on the other hand, can be considered contra-
dictory to metropolitan development vision, extending to areas in the
north that border the forests. In addition, the tram line T4 and metro
line M3 also provide access to the north towards the green belt areas
(Fig. 3). Despite being very close to zones of controlled growth, these
areas feature popular housing and commercial development areas that
have developed due to the construction of the Bosphorus bridges and
associated road infrastructure (Gerçek and Demir, 2008; Alpkökin
et al., 2011). Particularly the second bridge to the north, which is part
of the Trans-European Motorway, had a profound impact on city
growth, attracting development towards the north (see Dökmeci and
Berköz, 1994; Tezer, 2004; Alpkökin et al., 2005; Gerçek and Demir,
2008; Geymen and Baz, 2008; Gerçek, 2014). Currently, a third bridge
is under construction at the most northern point of the Bosphorus that
will undoubtedly have a strong influence on urban development at
the expense of the green belt. The central government, as the instigator
of these bridge projects, announced the third bridge project just as the
latest metropolitan development plan of the city had been prepared
and approved. This latest plan maintained the linear growth and green-
belt vision, and consequently featured no bridge to the north. It is clear
that such projects change the urban development trends in the city, and
some of the urban rail lines are shaped to respond to the mobility de-
mands created by such new trends. The Istanbul experience, therefore,
points to a partial coordination between urban development planning
and rail system planning. It may be argued that the involvement of
the subsidiary company in transit planning allows it to exert influence
in the siting of new lines and extensions towards new high-demand
areas to the north, although proving this would require deeper analysis
of the decision-making process. The fragmented government structure
in transport planning in general in Istanbul, and the involvement of cen-
tral government in particular, may help explain the loss of coordination
in planning.
The initial planning of the urban rail system in Izmir was integrated
into the urban development plans, which foresaw a linear form for the
growth of the city in a north–south direction with a secondary corridor
for residential development in the east–west direction (Arkon and
Gülerman, 1995; Datta and Young, 2007). An urban rail system would
be the spine of the north–south axis, with future lines to support
other corridors in later phases. However, the alignment changed in
later stages of metro planning and the first line to be constructed turned
out to be a light metro system running in the east–west direction
(Özgür, 2009). It was only in 2010, with the opening of a new regional
rail system, that the north–south axis started to be served in line with

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
6 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Fig. 2. Istanbul urban rail and BRT network.

Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa) (Creative Commons Attribution).

Fig. 3. Istanbul urban rail lines. Note: Prepared by the author using www.openstreet.com.

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 7

the development plans and the earliest transport studies of the city
(Fig. 4). This experience indicates an initial coordination in urban and
rail system planning that was partially lost during the phasing and sys-
tem design. The subsidiary companies came into the picture only with
the opening of the metro however, and so this loss of planning coordi-
nation cannot be attributed to the presence of such companies.
4.2. Integration with other modes
The Ankara metro was planned to be strongly supported with a feed-
er bus network, and when the system opened, buses were reorganised
by EGO, with free feeder services provided at the terminal station.
Since the opening, however, these feeder services have been reduced.
Privately operated individual bus and minibus services do not feed
into the urban rail systems either, but openly compete with them
(Özgür, 2010). There is also a lack of well-developed park and ride
schemes, and no coherent parking policy in the city that restricts car
parking or charges high prices in the city centre car parks in a bid to pro-
mote public transport use. The city has actually witnessed a very car-
oriented road programme since the mid-1990s that saw the construc-
tion of more than 100 grade-separated junctions aimed at easing traffic
flow into the city centre (see Öncü, 2009; Babalık-Sutcliffe, 2013;
Batuman, 2013). Finally, there are no bike lanes or any other cycling
programmes in the city. In short, although EGO has retained all depart-
ments related to urban transport planning under its control, this has not
resulted in an integrated transport network.
Public transport route integration is also a problem for Istanbul due
to the scattered lines and the lack of planning for transfer stations (see
Gerçek, 2007; Özgür, 2010). Many of the urban rail system lines run ad-
jacent to each other and to the BRT system, with no proper passenger
transfer facilities envisaged during planning. While some transfer sta-
tions were built in 2013 to alleviate the problem, in a number of stations
passengers are still required to walk long and inconvenient distances,
such as across busy roads, when transferring between modes. Although
these stations are referred to as “transfer stations”, no direct transfer is
provided, as the operators made use of the proximity of stations. Al-
though the routes of privately operated bus and minibus services
were reorganised in 2002 to feed into the urban rail systems, today
there are still many lines that compete with them. However, the park
and ride system is well developed, with a subsidiary company of the
greater municipality to provide parking services with reduced prices
at the peripheral stations of the metro, BRT and ferry piers, and higher
prices for parking in inner city areas. Some bike lanes have been built
in the city, but they are not well-maintained, and while a bike-sharing
project has been introduced, it is only a small-scale recreational project
with no integration into the urban rail systems. Finally, Istanbul too has

Fig. 4. Izmir urban rail lines. Note: Prepared by the author using www.openstreet.com.

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
8 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Table 2 minibus services are not included, although there are ongoing negotia-
Fares and transfer conditions (2014). tions to address this. One drawback in the system is that BRT journeys
Ankara Istanbul Izmir do not offer reduced transfer prices when transferring from other
Fare with smartcard 2.00 2.15 2.25
modes.
Fare without smartcard 3.00 4.00 2.25 In Izmir, the smartcard is also an outcome of the Transformation in
Reduced fare 1.50 1.10 1.25 Transportation project, which launched the integration of modes in
Duration allowed for transfers 75 min 120 min 90 min both routes and fares. The card is valid on ferries, metro, regional rail
Max. no. of transfers allowed 2 5 Unlimited
and all buses, but not on paratransit minibus services although there
in this time
Transfer fare 0.67 each First transfer 1.45; free are ongoing studies, as in the case of Istanbul, to include them in the
second 1.15; rest 0.85 fare integration scheme. Offering unlimited numbers of free transfers
Transfer fare for reduced free First transfer 0.45; free within 90 min of first boarding is a major incentive for transit usage,
fare users rest 0.40 the impact of which is shown in Fig. 7 in Section 4.4.
Fare on buses 2.00 2.15 (1.75–3.25 on BRT) 2.25
Fare on private buses 2.25 2.15 No private
Although the cost of travel in Istanbul appears relatively high in
buses terms of transfer fare conditions for both regular and reduced fare
Fare on minibuses 2.40–2.75 1.65 + 2.00–2.25 users, this may be due to the high distances associated with local trans-
Note: All fares in Turkish Liras. port in Istanbul, and the total rail system length, which is much higher
than in other cities, as shown in Table 1. Fares in Ankara are cheaper;
however, transfer conditions are the poorest of the three cities.
witnessed a recent programme of tunnels and underpasses with a view Service levels are presented in Table 3. Service frequency in the full
to easing traffic flow into the city centre, which inevitably encourages metro systems is comparable. While the Izmir Light Metro also provides
more car usage. quite frequent services, the light metro systems in Ankara and particu-
Izmir represents a good example of route integration due to the larly Istanbul (M1) provide relatively lower frequency of service.
major reorganisation of public transport systems by the greater munic-
ipality one year prior to the opening of the light metro line. The project 4.4. System performance
was named “Transformation in Transportation” and included the
reorganisation of bus routes to feed the metro stations and ferry piers; Figs. 5 to 7 present the passenger statistics of the urban rail systems
an improvement in service capacity and quality of the ferries; and the since their opening in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. Interviews with oper-
introduction of park and ride facilities (see Öncü, 2007; Özgür, 2010; ators and planners revealed that the leading factors in ridership trends
Martinet and Allaire, 2012). Izmir has no privately operated bus ser- and fluctuations were route and fare integration schemes. The introduc-
vices. While there are private minibus operators, their operating routes tion of systems that did not feed the rail lines but rather competed with
have been changed in the past and relocated to the peripheral areas of them had strong negative effects on ridership, as was the case with the
the city, serving to eliminate the competition of such private operators first phase of the BRT in Istanbul in 2007, which ran alongside M1, and
with the metro system. In addition, plans are in place to increase the with the introduction of a new type of privately operated midibuses
currently limited bike lanes in the city, and to ensure all metro stations that were authorised to follow routes parallel to the metro line in
have bike parking facilities. Furthermore, in a recent implementation, Ankara in 2008. In contrast, when systems were better integrated
bike users are now permitted to carry their bikes on the metro at off- (tram and metro integration via the funicular in Istanbul in 2007, BRT
peak times, and a bike-sharing project has been recently introduced. extension feeding Istanbul M2 Metro in 2009, extension and integration
of M1 and M2 with each other in 2014 in Istanbul, and metro and re-
4.3. Fare integration, cost of travel, and service levels gional rail integration in Izmir), ridership levels experienced sharp in-
creases. The introduction of transfer opportunities through new fare
Information on fares and integrated tickets is provided in Table 2. systems had a positive effect on ridership in all urban rail operations,
While the fare levels are slightly lower in Ankara, the system offers lim- while extensions to the systems, as observed in both Istanbul and
ited transfer opportunities. Only two transfers are allowed within Izmir, boosted ridership by serving new areas.
75 min with a reduced price, compared to five transfers in Istanbul The figures also show the differences in investment in the three cit-
and unlimited numbers of free transfers in Izmir. The smartcard in ies. The case of Istanbul, where the subsidiary company is engaged not
Ankara is valid on urban rail systems and municipal buses, but not on only in system operation but also in transit planning, procurement, in-
privately operated bus services. This may be interpreted as a policy to vestment, consultancy, and research and development, supports the ar-
attract passengers to municipal buses from private buses, although the gument that such companies can bring agility to system development
municipality continues to authorise additional lines to private bus oper- and investment, given their mission to operate an effective urban rail
ators. With privately operated lines on the increase, the lack of an inte- system. In Ankara, where the subsidiary company has neither an auton-
grated transfer system results in poor service levels for users who opt to omous budget nor the authority to enter tenders, no new lines or line
wait for municipal buses to make use of their cards. extensions were opened from 1997 to 2014, which stands in stark con-
The smartcard in Istanbul is valid on the metros, trams, ferries and trast to Istanbul, where the infrastructure is being expanded constantly.
sea buses, BRT, municipal buses, the municipality's subsidiary company The three cities and their urban rail systems are also analysed and
buses, and privately operated individual bus services. The inclusion of compared in terms of a number of performance indicators (Table 4).
the latter was a major challenge, and clearly an achievement since it Istanbul Tram carries the highest number of passengers when its route
gives more options to smartcard holders. Privately-run paratransit length is taken into consideration (i.e. passengers carried per route

Table 3
Service levels.

Ankara Metro Ankara Light Metro Istanbul Metro M2 Istanbul L. Metro M1 Istanbul Tram Izmir Light Metro

Operating hours 06:00–00:20 06:00–24:00 06:15–24:00 06:00–24:00 06:00–24:00 06:00–00:20

Peak headway 3 min 30 s 4 min 20 s 3 min 5 min 2 to 5 min 3 min 30 s
Off peak headway 6 to 10 min 8 to 9 min 5 to 10 min 6 to 10 min 7 to 12 min 4 to 10 min

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 9

Fig. 5. Ridership in Ankara Metro and Light Metro since the opening of the systems.

kilometre). The system serves very high density and already developed
areas, and this may explain its relative high performance in this indica-
tor. Istanbul Metro (M2) also carries relatively higher numbers of pas-
sengers, followed by Izmir Light Metro and Istanbul Light Metro (M1).
The systems in Ankara carry lower numbers per line kilometre, while
the relatively higher ridership (per kilometre) on Ankara Light Metro
may also be attributed to its location along already developed, high den-
sity, inner-city areas.
As a measure of efficiency and productivity, a comparison is also
made between ridership and round trips, number of staff, and energy
consumption. In terms of passengers carried per round trip, Ankara
Metro stands out while Izmir Light Metro performs relatively poorly.
In a comparison of the ratios of passengers to staff, Istanbul Tram and
Light Metro appear to be the most efficient, while the Ankara systems
are the least efficient. The Istanbul systems also appear to be the most
productive in terms of round trips per staff, followed closely by Izmir
Light Metro, while the performances of the Ankara systems are ex-
tremely poor. Energy consumption levels per passenger and per round
trip are highest in Ankara Metro, whereas Ankara Light Metro and the
systems in Istanbul and Izmir are more energy efficient. The tram in Is-
tanbul is the most energy efficient, as is to be expected, given that tram
technologies are less energy intensive than metro systems.

Fig. 6. Ridership in Istanbul Metro, Light Metro and Tram since the opening of the systems.

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
10 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Fig. 7. Ridership in Izmir Light Metro since the opening of the system.

The capital cost comparison also reflects the differences in system
technologies: Istanbul Tram was the least expensive system to build,
and Istanbul Light Metro was also relatively less expensive when com-
pared to other light metro systems, namely those in Ankara and Izmir.
The capital cost of Ankara Metro is comparable to the light metro sys-
tems, while Istanbul Metro (M2) was the most expensive system to
build. It should be noted that there are a number of factors, such as
route location and grade separation (for example being fully or partially
underground), with the potential to impact on capital costs. In addition,
the construction of the systems was carried out by the local govern-
ments, and consequently the differences in capital costs cannot be at-
tributed to differences in the organisational structure of subsidiary
companies.
The analysis of operating costs, on the other hand, seems to reflect
the differences in the financial responsibilities of subsidiary companies.
It is worth noting that operating costs per route length and per passen-
gers carried are significantly higher for the systems in Ankara. It should
be remembered that the subsidiary company in Ankara is not expected
to cover operating costs, as it does not have an autonomous budget,
while in both Istanbul and Izmir it is the responsibility of the subsidiary
company to cover operating and maintenance costs through their own
budgets (as mentioned in Section 2, maintenance costs could not be ob-
tained, and hence are not included in the analysis).
The final comparison of the systems is related to cost recovery ratios.
Full information on fare revenues could not be obtained, although it was
stated that for Ankara, fare revenues do not fully cover operating costs,
and although they come close (actual percentage not given), the short-
fall has to be picked up by EGO, the transit authority. In Izmir too, fare
revenues do not cover all operating costs; however, the subsidiary com-
pany covers the cost of operation through a combination of revenues
from fares, advertising, etc., with no subsidy from the municipality. In
the case of Istanbul, it was stated by the subsidiary company that fare
revenues from urban rail systems fully cover the operating costs.
5. Results and discussion
As discussed earlier in the paper, organisational reforms that allow
subsidiaries to provide public transport services may have two out-
comes. The first of these is that public transport operation may become
more cost-efficient, productive and profitable, removing a cost burden
from local authorities, and it is this expectation that is the underlying
objective behind such organisational reforms. The second possible out-
come is a rather undesirable side-effect — that the entry of private oper-
ators or the introduction of quasi-governmental agencies may result in
fragmentation in the planning and operation of transport. This compar-
ison of three examples in Turkey has been carried out with a view to ob-
serving whether these possible outcomes have been experienced.
The three cases in Turkey represent three different models in the use
of subsidiary companies as urban rail operators. In the Ankara model the
strong transit authority retained its power in public transport planning

Table 4
Ridership, efficiency and productivity.

Ankara Ankara Light Istanbul Metro M2 Istanbul Light Istanbul Tram Izmir Light Metro
Metro Metro Metro M1

Annual Ridership (Passengers) 53,282,612 35,078,547 112,636,936 112,046,120 121,490,005 86,493,421

Passengers per route kilometre 3,624,667 4,032,017 4,793,061 4,292,955 6,675,275 4,324,671
Passengers per round trip 958 615 616 559 651 392
Passengers per member of staff 79,428 72,952 386,899 434,762 476,387 210,522
Round trips per member of staff 83 119 629 778 732 537
Energy consumption per passenger (kWh) 0.71 0.45 0.65 0.53 0.20 0.49
Energy consumption per round trip (kWh) 676.27 274.39 397.66 294.10 129.75 193.17
Capital cost per route km (USD) 62,950,000 59,950,000 105,190,000 35,370,000 12,180,000 65,860,000
Operating cost per route km (USD) 2,127,995 2,231,851 1,433,505 827,668 474,120 1,293,903
Operating cost per passenger (USD) 0.58 0.54 0.34 0.20 0.10 0.31
Cost recovery–subsidies Subsidised Subsidised Fare revenues Fare revenues Fare revenues Fare revenues do not
cover costs cover costs cover costs cover costs

Notes: Ridership data in the first two rows is for 2014. Capital costs were available for the initial phases of the systems; and therefore, cost per route kilometre data was calculated using
route lengths in the first phases. All capital cost data was discounted to 2015. Operating cost data is for 2013 (calculated using 2013 route length and ridership). The rest are calculated
using 2012 figures.

Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
 E. Babalık-Sutcliffe / Journal of Transport Geography xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
and operation, and retained strict control over the responsibilities
appointed to the subsidiary company. In contrast, Istanbul has an ex-
tremely fragmented local government structure, and the subsidiary
company has become a powerful entrepreneur with an autonomous
budget and many responsibilities in public transport planning, invest-
ment, procurement, research and development, and international con-
sultancy. The Izmir model in part mirrors that of Istanbul in terms of
the autonomous budget of the subsidiary companies and the similar re-
sponsibilities they hold. While the local government also appears
fragmented in Izmir, the municipality has nevertheless provided a
clear transport policy framework under the Transformation in Trans-
portation project, to which the majority of actors in the transit market
seem to have complied. The differences in these models deserve atten-
tion with regard to their impact on the planning, operation and perfor-
mance of urban rail systems.
The results of the analysis support expectations regarding efficiency:
notwithstanding the lack of data on maintenance costs and fare reve-
nues, it is seen that in Istanbul and Izmir, where the urban rail systems
are operated by subsidiary companies with autonomous budgets, oper-
ating costs are lower and local governments are relieved of the subsidy
burden. In Istanbul, fare revenues cover operating costs, pointing to
profitability, while in Izmir, the fare revenues do not fully cover operat-
ing costs, although a combination of revenues helps the subsidiary com-
pany to meet costs without local government subsidy. In addition,
urban rail systems in these two cities are significantly more productive
when staff numbers and operating costs are considered. Furthermore,
the Istanbul model supports the argument that the focus of these agen-
cies on a single objective can help develop strong management and re-
search capabilities, which would not be possible in a multi-role
government (Keeling, 1976), as well as the argument that such agencies
can be agile in system development and investment (see Gómez-Ibáñez
and Meyer, 1993; Ongkittikul and Geerlings, 2006).
In terms of the impact on coordinated planning and integrated ser-
vice provision, the results are less straightforward. In the first model,
i.e. the case of the strong transit authority in Ankara, metro lines were
indeed based on the urban development plan and the transport plan, al-
though severe delays in the construction of some lines had a negative ef-
fect on coordinated planning. In Istanbul, some of the metro systems
have been extended towards the northern green belt areas, contraven-
ing the urban development plans, and in Izmir the route location has not
been in compliance with the priority development axis. In the Istanbul
case, this may be explained by, among other factors, the current
fragmented structure of the local government, exacerbated by the pres-
ence of subsidiary companies; however, in the case of Izmir the subsid-
iary companies were introduced after the planning of the route. It can be
concluded that the coordination between urban and transport planning
is not easily maintained regardless of the presence of subsidiary
companies.
With regard to integrated transport policy, the Ankara case shows
that having a strong transit authority that gathers all transport planning
agencies under the same roof does not necessarily result in an integrat-
ed policy. Rather than complementary transport policies to encourage
public transport usage, the city has seen numerous underpasses and
fly-over junction investments, some of which are along the metro corri-
dor, aimed at providing non-stop traffic flow into the city centre.
Similar to the above point, having the majority of public transport
operators under the same roof does not necessarily ensure a well-
integrated transit service either, as clearly seen in the Ankara case
where the metro feeder buses have disappeared over time, and new
private bus operators have been authorised to provide services along
the metro route. The presence of subsidiary operators as quasi-
governmental agencies within an already fragmented government
structure can also have a negative impact on network integration.
The parallel BRT and light metro lines, as well as the lack of proper
transfer and interchange facilities in Istanbul are examples of the prob-
lems resulting from fragmentation in public transport planning.
Please cite this article as: Babalık-Sutcliffe, E., Urban rail operators in Turkey: Organisational reform in transit service provision and the impact on
planning, operation and system performance, Journal of Transport Geography (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.08.008
11
Notwithstanding, Istanbul has one of the most progressive smartcard
systems, including private bus operators in the integrated fare scheme.
Izmir also has a well-integrated smartcard, offering free transfers across
modes. These cases show that the local authorities and operators are
aware of the possible negativities associated with high numbers of dif-
ferent operators in the city, and use the integrated smartcard to over-
come these and attract passengers.
In both fare and route integration, the Izmir model stands out due to
the Transformation in Transportation Project of the greater city munic-
ipality that reorganised all buses and ferries to feed into each other and
into the light metro. The fare integration scheme was also an outcome of
this project. Interviews revealed that the project was strongly embraced
by the subsidiary companies too. The finding highlights the importance
of a clearly defined planning framework that can integrate all transit
services into a shared vision for public transport planning and opera-
tion, contributing to the argument by Buehler and Pucher (2011) that
for organisational reform to be successful, there must be strong collabo-
ration between transit companies and the local government. Similarly,
the case of Izmir supports Peters (2004), who argues that to ensure
strong policy coordination across a number of organisations, clear strat-
egies must be developed by the government, resulting in a common
goal among the different organisations.
To conclude, this analysis of urban rail operators in Turkey reveals
that subsidiary companies, which are quasi-governmental agencies
with autonomous budgets, can help enhance efficiency, while also re-
ducing financial burdens on local authorities, although they may also re-
sult in a fragmented government structure, and consequently, a
fragmented transit network. As stated by Heinrich et al. (2010), how
the government contracts or arranges for these agencies to perform
their roles has critical implications for the outcomes. The experience
in the three Turkish cities shows that the physical integration of routes
is a major challenge, requiring a strong intervention by the local govern-
ment. Similarly, a pro-active role by the local authority is required in
order to introduce and maintain an integrated transport policy that sup-
ports public transport while discouraging car usage. This is important in
any case of transit provision, but particularly for cities with subsidiary or
private operators, in that the creation of these companies does not en-
sure improved service outcomes without government input (Heinrich
et al., 2010); and as emphasised by Glaister (2004), the market is un-
likely to deliver an integrated transport policy on its own.
Acknowledgement
The paper is part of a research conducted with financing from the
Second Prize Award granted to the author by the Global Development
Network (GDN) in its 2004 Competition for Outstanding Research on
Development under the theme “Understanding Reform”. The author
would like to thank the experts in the municipalities and companies
analysed here for providing the data on which this study is based, al-
though the views and conclusions expressed here belong solely to the
author.
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