TABLE OF CONTENT

S.NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

1. Introduction 4

2. Principles of Interpretation of Statutes 6

 Interpretation of Statutes
 Statute must be Read as a Whole in its Context
 Statutes to be Construed to make it Effective and Workable
 Appraisal of the Principle of Plain Meaning

3. Conclusion 12

4. References 13

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INTRODUCTION

“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being
the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it”

-Salmond

Enacted laws, specially the modern Acts and Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it may be
anticipated that the language utilized will leave small room for interpretation or construction.
But the experience of all those, who ought to bear and share the task of application of the law,
has been diverse. It is very often that we discover courts and lawyers active in unfurling the
meaning of vague words and expressions and settling irregularities. The age ancient process
of application of the enacted law has led to formulation of certain rules of interpretation or
construction. Interpretation of a legal provision and its application to a set of realities are two
diverse exercises requiring diverse approaches. Whereas interpretation of a legal provision is
continuously independent of the facts of any given case, the application of a statutory
provision would continuously depend on the precise facts of a given case.1

Interpretation implies the art of finding out the genuine sense of an enactment by giving the
words of the enactment their characteristic and standard meaning. It is the method of finding
out the genuine meaning of the words used in a statute. The Court isn't anticipated to decipher
arbitrarily and so there have been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous
exercise by the Courts.

The purpose of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature which
is conveyed either expressly or impliedly in the language used. Whereas interpretation of a
lawful provision is continuously subordinate of the fact of any given case, the application of a
statutory provision would continuously depend on the precise facts of a given case. As per
Salmond, ‘By interpretation or construction is meant, the method by which the courts seek to
discover the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which
it is expressed’.2 Interpretation varies from Construction, be that as it may. The previous is
the art of finding out the genuine sense of any form of words, which also means the sense that
the author intends to communicate. It may moreover be caught on as the process by which the
courts decide the meaning of a statutory provision for the reason of applying it to the
1
Sudevanand v. State, through CBI 2012 3 SCC 38.
2
Salmond, Jurisprudence 152 (11th edn.).

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circumstance before them. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions,
respects subjects that lie past the coordinate expression of the content from components
known from and given within the text.3

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

3
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 9.

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1. Interpretation of Statutes

A statute is a proclamation of the Legislature and the customary way of deciphering or

interpreting a statute is to look for the 'intention' of its producer. A statute is to be understood
concurring 'to the intent of those that make it' and 'the obligation of judicature is to act upon
the genuine intention of the Legislature--the mens or sententia legis'.4 The expression
'intention of the Legislature' could be a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words
utilized by the Council impartially decided with the direction furnished by the acknowledged
principles of interpretation.5 If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation
the court has got to select that interpretation which speaks to the genuine intention of the
Legislature, in other words the 'legal meaning' or 'true meaning' of the statutory provision.
The errand is frequently not a simple one and the difficulties emerge because of different
reasons. To specify a couple of them: Words in any dialect are not logical symbols having
any exact or positive meaning, and language is but a flawed medium to communicate one's
thought, much less of a huge gathering comprising of persons of different shades of
supposition. It is inconceivable indeed for the most creative Legislature to hinder exhaustive
circumstances and circumstances which will rise after sanctioning a statute where its
application may be called for. The work of the courts is only to clarify and not to legislate.
The various rules of interpretation or construction defined by courts are communicated in an
unexpected way by distinctive judges and support may be found in these details for
apparently conflicting suggestions.

“The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting
it”.6 The issue with interpretation, is a problem of meaning of words and their adequacy as a
medium of expression to communicate a specific thought. ‘Words and expressions are images
that invigorate references to referents’7. But words of any language are capable of referring to
distinctive referents completely different settings or times. However, there continuously lies
the trouble of borderline cases, inside or outside the essence of a word. Language, in this
manner, has greater chances of misconception.

4
Supra note 2.
5
R v. Secretary of State for the Environment exparte Spath Holme, 2001 1 All ER 195.
6
South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 346.
7
G. Williams, “Language and the Law” 61 Law Quarterly Review 73.

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The law is a down to earth instrument of social order and an interpretative exertion must be
permeated with the statutory reason. A construction that would advance the purpose or object
of an Act, even in case not communicated, is to be preferred. “There is no possibility of
mistaking midnight for twelve; but at what exact minute twilight becomes obscurity is
difficult to determine.”8 In this way, the courts, although conscious of such a partitioning line,
don't endeavour to draw it for reasons of viable impossibility; however, in some cases,
endeavours it after laying down a working line; howsoever pragmatic, it may or may not be.
There's a minimal region in which the courts form or imaginatively translate legislation and
hence wrap up or refine legislation which comes to them in a state requiring shifting degrees
of refinement. Since, interpretation continuously infers a degree of caution and choice,
imagination, a degree which is particularly high in certain regions such as constitutional
adjudication. Some judges proclaim that they perform imaginative capacities even in
interpretation, in any case, this may some of the time lead to conclusions which have a solid
legislative flavour. Interpretation ought to not be regarded as a rummage around for the
reason of the Legislature or even for the reason of the statute, but as one of ‘attribution of
purpose’, in order to do justice.

The intention of the Legislature hence acclimatizes two angles: In one viewpoint it carries the
concept of 'meaning', i.e., what the words mean and, in another viewpoint, it passes on the
concept of 'purpose and object' or the 'reason and spirit' invading through the statute. The
method of construction, in this manner, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In
other words, the legislative intention, i.e., the genuine or lawful meaning of an enactment is
determined by considering the meaning of the words used within the enactment within the
light of any recognizable reason or question which comprehends the evil and its cure to
which the enactment is coordinated.9 This definition afterward received the endorsement of
the Supreme Court and was called the 'cardinal principle of construction'. In both
Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court is assumed to work out caution in
deciding the correct relationship between the subjective and objective purposes of the law
and offer assistance the law accomplish its purpose.10

2. Statute must be Read as a Whole in its Context

8
Jane Straford Boyse v. John T. Rassborough, 1857 6 HLC.
9
  State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277.
10
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, 2014 1 SCC 18.

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When the question emerges as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it isn't only
authentic but legitimate to read that provision in its context. The context here implies, the
statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the common
scope of the statute and the insidiousness that it was planning to remedy. This explanation of
the rule was afterward completely embraced by the Supreme Court.11

It is a rule now immovably established that the intention of the Legislature must be found by
perusing the statute as a whole. The rule is alluded to as an 'elementary rule' by Viscount
Simonds;12 a ‘compelling rule’ by Lord Somervell of Harrow;13 and a ‘settled rule’ by B.K.
Mukherjee, J.14

The rule that the statute must be read as a whole is similarly applicable to distinctive parts of
the same section. The section must be interpreted as a whole whether or not one of the parts
may be a sparing clause or a proviso. 15 Subbarao, J. calls it "an elementary rule that
construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together," which "it isn't permissible to
exclude any portion of it; the whole segment ought to be read together". 16 The Supreme Court
held that the expression 'tranships' occurring under Section 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act,1985, must essentially be understood within the context of the
plot of the section, and the preceding expressions 'imports into India' and 'exports from India',
to mean as it were transhipment for the reason of either import into India or export out of
India.17

As already expressed, the rule that the statute should be read as a whole which words ought to
be studied in their context is of common application but since 'you must have a context
indeed more plain' to control plain words, the practical utility of the rule is more obvious in
construction of common words and in settling irregularities by response to harmonious
construction.

3. Statutes to be Construed to make it Effective and Workable

The courts emphatically incline against a construction which decreases the statute to a
pointlessness. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so understood as to make it
11
Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 2001 (1) JT SC 53.
12
AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus 1957 1 All ER 49.
13
Id. at 61.
14
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274.
15
Jennings v. Kelly 1939 4 All ER 46.
16
State of Bihar v. Hiralal Kejriwal AIR 1960 SC 47.
17
Union of India v. Sheo Shambhu Giri 2014 12 SCC 69.

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effective and operative on the rule communicated within the maxim: ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.18 It is an application of this rule that courts while articulating upon the
constitutionality of a statute begin with an assumption in support of constitutionality and lean
toward a construction which keeps the statute inside the competence of the Legislature. The
significance of the principle can be judged from the fact that there's barely any detailed
decision, where a statute may have been pronounced void for sheer dubiousness, in spite of
the fact that hypothetically it may be possible to reach such a conclusion in case of 'absolute
intractability of the language used,' or when 'it is inconceivable to resolve the ambiguity,' i.e.,
when the language is completely meaningless.19

An illustration of the working of the rule is furnished within the construction of section 18-A
(9) of the Indian Income-tax Act,1922, by the Supreme Court. 20 The dispute there, was that
when activity of imposing punishment was sought to be taken under section 28 for failure to
comply with section 18-A (3), the conditions as to take note under section 22(1) or 22(2)
must be fulfilled. The Supreme Court negatived this dispute and backed its conclusion by
indicating out that the construction recommended will make section 18-A(9)(b) wholly
worthless.

Applying the same rule, the Supreme Court has rejected constructions progressed in regard
of validation Acts which in the event that acknowledged would have led to the conclusion
that the Legislature fizzled to realize the object of approving earlier executive acts which it
avowedly had as expressed within the preamble conjointly clear from other provisions of the
Acts in question.21 An approving Act may indeed make ineffective judgments and orders of
competent courts given that it, by retrospective legislation, evacuates the cause of invalidity
or the premise which had led to those judgments. 22 Yet by careless drafting the Legislature
may now and then entirely or partially fail to realize the purpose of validation. Similarly, a
validation Act which impacts approval by pronouncing non-existent facts as existing may
also be ineffectual in case the affirmation violates the Constitution. A validating Act will
moreover be incapable to the degree it even otherwise violates the Constitution.

4. Appraisal of the Principle of Plain Meaning

18
CIT v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352.
19
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1990 SC 12.
20
Supra note 18.
21
Krishnachandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 138.
22
Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India JT 1994 (5) SC 8.

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It may look to some degree confusing that plain meaning rule isn't plain and requires some
clarification. The rule, that plain words require no construction, begins with the preface that
the words are plain, which is itself a conclusion come to after understanding the words. It
isn't conceivable to choose whether certain words are plain or vague unless they are examined
in their context and construed.23 The rule, therefore, in reality implies that after you have
understood the words and have come to the conclusion that they can bear only one meaning,
your obligation is to give impact to that meaning.

Use of syllepsis in a section does not make it vague. 'It isn't an uncertainty in case a term 'T'
means 'X' in connection to 'a' and 'Y' in connection to 'b'. It is as it were an uncertainty if 'T'
implies either 'X' or 'Y' in connection to 'a' or 'b'.’24

Caution has some of the time been given that uncertainty ought to not be assumed where
there's none.25 In a case V.O. Tractor Export v. Tarapore & Co., 26 relating to the construction
of the words 'a submission made in compatibility of an agreement' as they happen in section 3
of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, the Supreme Court by a
majority of two against one held that the word 'submission' implied genuine accommodation
or completed reference and not simply an agreement to allude or an arbitral clause. The
majority received this meaning on the view that the words were plain. They denied to donate
an amplified meaning to the word 'submission' in spite of the fact that the confined meaning
received by them fizzled to attain the object of the Act which was to deliver impact to the
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards which was set
forward in a Schedule to the Act. In so holding, they contrasted from an English case, T B &
S Batchelor & Co. Ltd. v. Owners of S.S. Merak 27 where a more extensive construction was
adopted of the word 'submission' in a comparable enactment. Grover, J., talking for the
majority said: "We are aware of no rule of interpretation by which rank uncertainty can be
first presented by giving certain expressions a specific meaning and after that an endeavour
can be made to emerge out of semantic perplexity and lack of clarity by having resort top
continued intention of the Legislature to donate impact to international obligations." 28
Ramaswamy, J. in his contradicting opinion, did not discover the language that plain and
understood the word 'submission' in a wide sense as including an agreement to submit to
23
D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India AIR 2003 SC 250.
24
Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd. 1975 3 All ER 881.
25
Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. 1899 AC 14.
26
AIR 1971 SC.
27
1964 3 All ER 638.
28
V.O. Tractor export v. Tarapore & Co. AIR 1971 SC 1.

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arbitration. The case outlines how sharp dissimilarity of conclusion may result on the
question whether certain words are plain or ambiguous.

Sometimes it is said that 'though a construction agreeing to plain language ought to ordinarily
be acknowledged, such a construction ought to not be embraced where it leads to
inconsistencies, injustices and absurdities'.29 This and similar statements are not precise
articulations of the rule and all that they truly mean is that prima facie plain language may not
be plain. As of now seen, plain meaning rule applies at the stage when the words have been
understood in their context and the conclusion is come to that they are susceptible to only one
meaning. In that occasion the meaning so derived is to be given impact to independent of
results for no alternative construction is truly open. This, of course, is subject to the capability
in India that the statute is constitutional and unreasonableness, which the injustice or
absurdity isn't of the nature and gravity which makes the statute offend the Constitution.

29
Girdharilal and Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur 1986 2 SCC 23.

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CONCLUSION

At last, I would like to conclude by saying that art of interpretation may be a surprising
apparatus to paint citizens' life with various advantageous colours of bliss, peace and joy.
Indian judiciary has magnificently embraced Indian Statutes with a way which is reasonable,
sensible and in congruity with the reason for which the law is framed. Here, it isn't to
recommend that legal interpretation has never been wrong or never resulted into absurdity but
is to essentially show that to form sense out of miserably worded statute, where the reason of
the statute was clear, judicial violence with the language has paid rich profits for the nation.
In light of which, I can essentially hope that statutory support by judiciary will continue since
a statute can never be thorough and legislatively inadequate to hypothesize all the
conceivable circumstances which will emerge in a future and in horde circumstances will
continuously leave a wide scope for interpretation. This gap will ensure that the interpretation
by judiciary within the future will abdicate fruit bearing results for all. The degree of
strictness and literal construction applied by the Courts swung just like the certifiable
pendulum to extremes. The above is an exceptionally essential diagram of the principles of
interpretation of statutes and is planning to grant knowledge into the different strategies
utilized by the Courts to discover the meaning of legal provisions. To conclude, one must
strive hard to read between the lines by using the interpretative methods, since one must bear
in intellect the words of LJ. Denning who expressed that, “It would be idle to expect every
statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity”.

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REFERENCES

BOOKS

1. Avtar Singh & Harpreet Kaur, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis India,
Gurgaon).
2. M.P. Tondon, Interpretation of Statutes & Legislation (Allahabad Law Agency, Allahabad,
11th edn., 2013).
3. Amita Dhanda, N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis India, Gurgaon).

CASES

1. Sudevanand v. State, through CBI 2012 3 SCC 38.

2. R v. Secretary of State for the Environment exparte Spath Holme, 2001 1 All ER 195.
3. South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 346.
4. Jane Straford Boyse v. John T. Rassborough, 1857 6 HLC.
5. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277.
6. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, 2014 1 SCC 18.
7. Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 2001 (1) JT SC 53.
8. AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus 1957 1 All ER 49.
9. Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274.
10. Jennings v. Kelly 1939 4 All ER 46.
11. State of Bihar v. Hiralal Kejriwal AIR 1960 SC 47.
12. Union of India v. Sheo Shambhu Giri 2014 12 SCC 69.
13. CIT v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352.
14. Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1990 SC 12.
15. Krishnachandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 138.
16. Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India JT 1994 (5) SC 8.
17. D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India AIR 2003 SC 250.
18. Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd. 1975 3 All ER
881.
19. Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. 1899 AC 14.
20. V.O. Tractor Export v. Tarapore & Co AIR 1971 SC.
21. T B & S Batchelor & Co. Ltd. v. Owners of S.S. Merak 1964 3 All ER 638.

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22. Girdharilal and Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur 1986 2 SCC 23.

WEBSITES

1. Indian Kanoon, http://www.indiankanoon.org.

2. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal.
3. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in.
4. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com.

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