Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex (check page 230-231)

- when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases

The principle that when the grounds that gave rise to a law cease to exist, the law
itself ceases to exist. 

Many if not all laws are brought in to respond to situations that exists at the time of the
law. Society evolves and the time comes when a law, still on the law books, has no
relevance to modern society.

For example, martial law declared in a time of crisis quickly loses relevance as the
society calms down or the crisis goes away and martial law is no longer required
- Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex - the reason for a law ceasing, the law itself
ceases.
The omission to remove irrelevant laws often creates a situation colloquially known as
crazy laws, of which we have an entire collection.

CASES:
Comendador v. de Villa (check page 231)
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991

FACTS:

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place
on December 1 to 9, 1989.

January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.

January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually
addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of
the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical
certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the
petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal.
 February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14
by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:

Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to
peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408 (Articles of War).

November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing

the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to
military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.

January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying
these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule
embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now
again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

Farinas v. Barba (check page 235)

 GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA, 
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996

FACTS:

Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas,

Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the
United States.

To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the

appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution,
containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the

Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the
authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the
Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the
Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the
Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On
the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox
to the same position.

June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a
petition for quo warranto and prohibition.

July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of
respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

ISSUE:

Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?

HELD:

The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the
Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.

The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor
respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the
preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For
while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it
was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.